







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ACCOUNTS AND PAPERS:

THIRTY-SIX VOLUMES.

— (32.) —

STATE PAPERS.

AUSTRIA, PRUSSIA, AND DENMARK; CHINA;
CHINCHA ISLANDS; CIRCASSIAN TRIBES.

Session

4 February — 29 July 1864.

VOL. LXIII.

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ACCOUNTS AND PAPERS:

1864.

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CORRESPONDENCE

BETWEEN

AUSTRIA, PRUSSIA, AND DENMARK.

1851—52.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.
1864.

LONDON:
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No. 1.

The Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Danish Ministers at Vienna and Berlin.

(Translation.)

Copenhagen, August 26, 1851.

I HAVE already had the honour of making your Excellency acquainted preliminarily with the contents of two communications relative to the affairs of Holstein, which were almost simultaneously transmitted at the beginning of this month to the accredited Representatives of the two great German Powers.

These communications, as you will easily understand, have been the more gratifying to the King our most gracious Master, inasmuch as His Majesty has recognized, with real satisfaction, an unequivocal proof of the wise and benevolent intentions of his august allies, in the wish urgently expressed on the part of both Powers that they may very shortly be placed in a situation to restore the entire Government of the Duchy of Holstein to his most august hands.

As to the opinion at the same time expressed on their part that a continuance of the present transitional state is attended with manifold disadvantages, and is by no means compatible with the interests of all parties concerned, we do most fully concur therein, since we, ready as we are to do all justice to the goodwill of both of the Federal Commissioners in Holstein, have from repeated experience come to the conviction, that by the continued participation of the Confederation, or of the Powers which *ad hoc* represent the same, in the government of the Duchy of Holstein, it will be impossible to carry through the measures which still remain to be adopted, on which the quiet transition to the settlement of the affairs of the Duchy depends, in a satisfactory manner: it also is perfectly manifest that the present unsettled state prevents the general pacification of the different Provinces.

This unsatisfactory state of things lies entirely in the nature of the case, and such a situation will, as time advances, become continually more hazardous, since the continuance of the Federal Commissioners in their functions, and the prolonged occupation by the Confederation after tranquillity actually has been everywhere restored, may indirectly be made use of to develop afresh the lurking spirit of opposition which still exists, inasmuch as under such circumstances it is obviously very easy to place the intervention of the Confederation in the background, and to propagate amongst the population the erroneous notion that the Commissioners and troops of the Confederation are not here for the purpose of restoring the authority of the Sovereign, but rather to protect the supposed rights of the country against him.

These considerations have necessarily made it the more gratifying to us to observe from the aforementioned communications that the necessity for a speedy and complete restoration of legitimate government in Holstein by the recall of the Commissioners and troops of the German Confederation is recognized on the other side also.

But inasmuch as the Courts of Vienna and Berlin (Berlin and Vienna) still appear, for this purpose, to await the further determinations of our Government with regard to the organization plan of the Danish Monarchy, which was communicated to them at the time, and was subsequently discussed by the Assembly of Notables, we must limit ourselves to the observation that His Majesty the King and his Government still consider, now as before, that the intentions displayed in the afore-mentioned proposal as to the future relative position of the Provinces united under His Majesty's sceptre may be taken as the basis and starting-point for the ordering of affairs, but that the ultimate determinations—which, however, can only interest the Confederation so far as they concern the Federal relations of the Duchies of Holstein and Lauenburg—cannot be taken without the most mature deliberation, and not until His Majesty has re-obtained in Holstein also the complete enjoyment of his rights as a Sovereign.

But as the two Governments which have received full powers from the Confederation are anxious, in laying down their commission from the Federal Diet, to be enabled to present a sufficient guarantee for the preservation of the rights of the Confederation, I have not hesitated to request the more specific commands of His Majesty in this respect, and he has most graciously been pleased to direct me to empower you to make this formal declaration, "that His Majesty, so soon as the restoration of the complete rights of Sovereign into His Majesty's hands shall have taken place, intends and has irrevocably resolved to govern the Duchy of Holstein according to legally subsisting laws, to introduce changes in the Constitution of that Duchy only in a constitutional way, and that His Majesty of course never will leave out of sight the relation of Holstein to the German Confederation, or the rights and competencies arising from that relation."

For the rest, the example of Lauenburg is well suited to serve as a type in this respect, inasmuch as the manner after which the old Constitution has there been restored without resorting to any kind of violent measures for preparing the changes which appeared necessary under conservative forms, at once affords the most satisfactory proof of the manner in which His Majesty wishes to proceed in Holstein, when he shall again have obtained there that independence which of right belongs to every member of the German Confederation in the arrangement of the internal affairs of a Federal country.

I request your Excellency as soon as possible to express yourself to his Serene Highness the Prince von Schwarzenberg (to his Excellency Baron von Manteuffel) conformably to the tenour of the foregoing observations; and you are at the same time empowered, at the request of the Minister President, to furnish him with a copy of this communication.

Count Plessen.
Count Bille-Brahe.

Accept, &c.
(Signed) REEDTZ.

No. 2.

The Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Austrian Minister at Copenhagen.

(Translation.)

M. le Baron,

Vienna, September 9, 1851.

THE re-establishment of the Provincial Estates of Holstein, ordered by His Majesty the King of Denmark, is looked upon by the Imperial Cabinet, as well in its general aspect as in the point of view of German Federal right, as an important and favourable change of the Danish question. But the Danish Ministers will hardly be able, at the moment when the future of their country must be founded anew, to cast their eyes on the position of Denmark and of Europe without being obliged to confess to themselves that that salutary resolution is but a first step made towards the re-establishment of the vital conditions of the Danish Monarchy. The idea of separating Holstein still more from the other Provinces of the Monarchy, in order more closely to unite Schleswig with the Kingdom of Denmark, is repugnant to the principle of the integrity of the Monarchy, for which we are ready to give new guarantees. That idea does not take its rise from the urgent requisitions of the Powers; it arises from a tendency which manifests itself more or less in every country, and which aspires to the formation of a new map of Europe according to nationalities. The steps taken in order to realise that

idea,—steps which have also found their expression in the plan of organization of Count Sponneck, and the evident or hidden object of which is the incorporation of Schleswig with Denmark,—are the results of the innovations of the year 1848, which it would be quite time definitively to restrict also, according to solid principles, to that important part of the North. The Duchy of Schleswig has always been an intermediate link between Denmark and Holstein. Contrary to the policy followed by the Kings of Denmark up to the most recent times, attempts have been made to alienate the institutions of that Duchy from those of Holstein, in order to unite them with the institutions of a democratic Denmark, which trenches upon the permanent interests of the Monarchy no less than upon existing rights.

Lastly, in the part which we are desirous of taking in the re-organisation of the Danish Monarchy, we cannot and will not abandon the rights of the Germanic Confederation, and the position which it holds in the system of European States. These are the conditions for our concurrence in a European guarantee: community for every part of the Monarchy, of the order of Succession, and of the political institutions necessary for the unity of the Monarchy; no incorporation whatever, either expressed or in fact, of Schleswig with Denmark, of Provincial Estates in the Duchy of Schleswig as well as in the Duchy of Holstein; and the settlement of the position of the Duchy of Holstein in the German Confederation in such a manner as shall render it possible to establish amicable relations between that Duchy and Germany. Such are the bases upon which alone it is possible, according to our firmest conviction, to build up the new edifice of the Danish Monarchy, which has been grievously impaired.

You will make such use of this despatch as shall appear to you most convenient in the interest of the question, and you will at the same time invite M. de Reedt to lay it before his Royal Master.

Baron von Vrintz:

Receive, &c.
(Signed) SCHWARTZENBERG.

No. 3.

The Minister-President of Prussia to the Prussian Minister at Copenhagen.

(Translation.)

Sir,

Berlin, September 14, 1851.

YOU will find herewith a copy of a despatch which M. de Reedt addressed on the 26th of last month to Count Bille-Brahe, and to Count Plessen at Vienna,* and which contains the answer to the overtures made at Copenhagen by the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin relative to the settlement of the affairs of Holstein, and that made by our Cabinet in my despatches of the 4th and 15th of that month. We have seen with satisfaction in the despatch of the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs, a copy of which was forwarded to us by Count Bille-Brahe, that His Majesty the King of Denmark does justice to the benevolent dispositions which have determined the Courts of Berlin and Vienna to make the said overtures. In fact, the Government of the King pronounced itself too clearly on the points of view which guided it in its participation for the pacification of Holstein, and the attitude of the Federal Commissioners who, actually, still exercise their functions, bears too perceptibly the stamp of the greatest impartiality, seriously to fear any misunderstandings in the object of the intervention of those Federal organs in the affairs of the Duchy: but precisely because the Government of the King is not unmindful of the inconveniences which the prolongation of the provisional situation of affairs, and the presence in the Duchy of other troops than those of the country, must involve, as they shackle and retard the normal development of the authority of the Sovereign; precisely because we are anxious for the moment which shall place the Cabinets actually charged to represent the Germanic Confederation in a position to notify to the Germanic Diet, in resigning their mandate, the term of the direct intervention of the Confederation in the Duchy of Holstein, and at the same time to present to it the necessary guarantees to protect legal order, which is incontestably within its constitutional jurisdiction; it is precisely for these reasons that the Government of the King wishes to obtain, in conjunction with the Austrian Government, from the Danish Cabinet, the declarations containing the possibility of establishing legal order in the new phase which we have just pointed out.

The declaration that Count Bille-Brahe has been authorized to make, and

which states "that His Majesty the King of Denmark has the intention, so soon as the complete sovereign authority shall have been placed in his hands, to govern the Duchy of Holstein according to the laws legally established, that at the same time he is firmly decided not to introduce changes in the constitution of the Duchy except in the due constitutional course, and that His Majesty will always bear in mind the relations of Holstein towards the Germanic Confederation, as well as of the rights and attributions arising out of those relations towards the Confederation,"—that declaration, we say, we accept with joy, because it is a sure warrant that His Danish Majesty wishes to regulate the relations between the Germanic Confederation and Denmark in a satisfactory manner, and in completely protecting all the rights of the former. We particularly attach very great importance to the declaration stating that no changes shall be introduced in the Constitution of Holstein except in due constitutional course; that is to say, by means of deliberations with the Provincial Estates of the Duchy which still legally exist, and that until then the existing laws shall continue to be in force. However, if we judge the above declaration according to the impression which it will probably produce in the Germanic Diet, we cannot conceal—and we think that the Danish Cabinet will consider our fears as founded—that in consequence of the uncertainty of the legal situation of the Duchy of Holstein, which is the result of the events of late years, the Germanic Diet will consider the assurance given by His Danish Majesty to govern, in the meantime, the Duchy of Holstein according to the existing laws, less as a solution of the question than as the maintenance of the difficulties which formerly existed.

In fact, it would be impossible to deny that the Diet would be borne out in considering the said assurance in a similar point of view. The Treaty of Peace of the 2nd July of last year has been restricted to the reservation of reciprocal rights and to the return of the *status quo ante*, precisely because it was not possible to agree upon the essential points in litigation. For the Germanic Diet, the re-establishment of the *status quo ante* is principally connected with its Resolution of the 17th September, 1846. It is generally recognized, it is true, that the events which have occurred in the interval, and which are independent of the action of the Germanic Confederation, make a return to the ancient order of things impossible; but there is still actually wanting a positive basis for the object to which it is necessary to aim, and which must be attained. It would be impossible to consider as such the project of organization communicated at the beginning of the year by Count Sponneck to the Cabinets of Berlin and Vienna. I have already in several instances informed you of the decided opinion of the Government on that project; I shall nevertheless again explain the circumstance that, far from approving the said project, the Cabinets of Prussia and Austria have not even examined its special dispositions; that they confined themselves, whilst expressly reserving all the rights of third parties,—viz., those of the Confederation,—to consent that the project should be presented to the Notables who were to assemble at Flensburg. That is what has taken place. But on the one side all the Holstein Deputies pronounced against the project, and on the other it has been essentially modified by the Resolution of the majority. We learn that, in consequence of this diversity of opinion, scruples have arisen even in the midst of the Council of His Majesty the King of Denmark against that project, which was to serve as a basis for the new organization. It would therefore not be possible to contest, as it appears, that doubts do not exist precisely upon the essential elements of public right in Holstein, and there are many questions connected therewith. I will recall, for example, the General Law upon the establishment of the Provincial Estates of the 28th May, 1831, in virtue of which no changes were to take place in the relations which then existed between Holstein and Schleswig; I will recall the ancient *nexus socialis*, recognized at all times, between the Equestrian Orders of the two Duchies; I will recall the Customs regulations of 1838, which were adopted for the two Duchies, after having consulted the Provincial Estates of the latter, but which, in spite of the formal protestations of the Government of the King, have been essentially altered in latter times by the establishment of a line of Customs on the Eider; lastly, I will recall different Ordinances, in virtue of which common institutions for the two Duchies have been successfully created.

So many doubts are raised with reference to all those relations which bear so intimately upon the legal order of Holstein that the Germanic Diet will justly desire to obtain on that subject more ample information than is to be found in the declaration of His Danish Majesty. If under such circumstances the Cabinet of

the King must hesitate, jointly with that of Vienna, to submit the said Declaration to the Germanic Diet, it hopes that it has only acted in this respect in the true interest of the Danish Government.

You will be pleased to leave a copy of this despatch with M. de Reedtz.

Receive, &c.
(Signed) MANTEUFFEL.

No. 4.

The Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Danish Ministers at Vienna and Berlin.

(Translation.)

Copenhagen, December 6, 1851.

FROM my former communications, by which you have been made fully acquainted with the contents of the despatches of the Imperial Royal Minister President of the 9th September of the present year (with the contents of the despatches of the Royal Prussian Minister President of the 14th September of the present year), you will have learnt more particularly that, and for what reasons, the Governments of Austria and Prussia (Prussia and Austria) have hesitated to submit to the Diet of the Confederation the declaration which was issued on our part on 26th of August of the present year, and to move, on the ground of that declaration, for the cessation of its temporary mandate in Holstein, and for the restitution of the full sovereign power into the hands of His Majesty the King.

The Royal Government regrets this so much the more as, according to the opinion more fully explained by us in the subjoined statement, the assurances which have already been given contained such an ample guarantee for the preservation of all the rights constitutionally appertaining to the Confederation, and to the Confederate States interested, that nothing further, on the part of the Confederation, could well be demanded from the King, our gracious Master, without at the same time trenching on his sovereign rights.

These rights are amongst those which have never been contested; and a further suspension of their exercise in the Duchy of Holstein would, under the present circumstances, when tranquillity and order have actually been re-established there, appear the less allowable, as a prolongation of this exceptional state of things, contrary to the desire and the will of His Majesty, would not only militate against the spirit and wording of the provisions of the Confederate laws by which the intervention of the Confederation is regulated, but would also infringe, unjustifiably in our opinion, upon the equal and synonymous reservation of reciprocal rights in Article III of the Treaty of Peace. A peaceful settlement of opposite views, however—and this must incontestably be the object of that reciprocal reservation—of necessity pre-supposes liberty of will and action, as well on one part as on the other; and it would therefore be desirable that this view, as it is the only one of practical value, should be forthwith carried out in its consequences, and made practically useful.

These remarks, as well as the explanations contained in Annex 1, have and can have only for their object the removal, where possible, of the doubts which have been raised on the other side respecting our declaration of the 26th of August, as presumably insufficient. We continue to adhere to the opinion that neither the Confederation nor its Commissioners, as such, can demand more extensive promises without encroaching upon a province wherein their competency fails, and the conflicts, appeased with so much difficulty, would commence anew.

Legal guarantees for more cannot therefore be demanded on their part, and must not be given by us.

It may, however, be possible for us, at a future time, not, it is to be hoped far distant, to strengthen the moral guarantees which serve as the basis of internal and external peace, if by the restitution into the hands of the King, of the full sovereign power in Holstein, the just demands of His Majesty be complied with. Such guarantees, however, according to their essence and nature, can only be given spontaneously.

The Royal Government has a right to expect confidence; and, even if it be withheld, feels urgently called upon to take pains to secure it. Without such confidence on the part of the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin (Berlin and Vienna), it will be well-nigh impossible for the Government to perform its difficult task, and to keep in the path which, concurrently with the Great Powers, it entered upon a long

time ago in order to maintain unimpaired, and, if possible, to consolidate by new guarantees, the integrity of the Monarchy. The continuance in this path is so closely connected with the imminent, definitive solution of the question relative to the Succession, that even for this reason it must be of the greatest importance to the King our most gracious Sovereign to proceed forward without impediment; so that the promises made in our declaration of the 26th of August shall, as soon as circumstances permit, be upheld by Government Acts, which, though not altering in any way the text of that declaration, may still be calculated to exclude any doubt whatever about the policy to be pursued on our part. It is only in such acts that the guarantees desired by the Imperial Royal Cabinet (the Royal Prussian Cabinet) can be sought for and found; wherefore it will be of prime importance to obtain beforehand the assurance that the resolutions which His Majesty feels disposed to come to under the circumstances, shall not only meet with the approval of the allied Powers, and more especially of the Courts of Vienna and Berlin (Berlin and Vienna), but that these resolutions shall not, at their proximate accomplishment, meet with obstacles anywhere.

For this purpose you are authorised, in accordance with what is set forth more fully in Annex 2, to make the Imperial Royal Minister President (the Royal Prussian Minister President), confidentially acquainted with the intentions of His Majesty; adding at the same time that the King our gracious Master will not delay their eventual accomplishment.

As, however, it is self-evident that His Majesty proceeds herein upon the supposition that the evacuation of Rendsburg, the withdrawal of all Federal troops from the Duchy of Holstein, and the restitution of the full sovereign power into his hands, will simultaneously take place, and without further delay; so His Majesty's final resolutions cannot be decided upon until the most unequivocal assurances have made it certain that no obstacle from abroad will be thrown in the way of their accomplishment, in general as well as in particular, and that the Great Powers will consider the proposed provisional arrangement of things sufficient in order to take forthwith such further steps as are necessary for the definitive regulation of the Succession, and for giving effect to the guarantee held out in the Protocol of London.

On occasion of these confidential communications, you should not, moreover, leave unmentioned the scruples which, as you will easily conceive, have, during the deliberations on this matter, prevailed against any revival—however temporary and transitory—of Provincial Estates in Schleswig. These scruples are the natural result of the proceedings of these Estates during the last ten years, in one Duchy as well as in the other; for as even previous to the year 1848, they were eagerly striving for the development of Schleswig and Holstein into one united State, detached from the Kingdom, and for the admission of Schleswig into the Germanic Confederation, so did they in the year 1848, and afterwards,—at first by the illegal coalition of both Assemblies, and subsequently by their abolition and the formation of a so-called National Assembly, and ultimately by the contrivance of elections in Schleswig for the so-called National Assembly at Frankfort,—act against duty and loyalty to such a degree that the personal disinclination of the King to avail himself any further of these institutions cannot well be wondered at, especially as an attempt to arrive, by the medium of such an organ, at an advantageous common Constitution for the whole Monarchy does not, at least hitherto, seem to promise any successful result.

If, nevertheless, under the presuppositions and conditions above mentioned, the King shall not object to comply eventually with the wishes and advice of his high Allies, by temporarily summoning the Assembly of the Estates of Schleswig, this will be done, as indicated at the beginning of Annex 2, exclusively by his own supreme authority, and mainly for the attainment of a well-defined object.

I need hardly add that as a ground for the eventual decision of the King, there exists the never-extinguished hope that his subjects, who were misled under the pressure of violent commotion, have in preponderating numbers returned to their duty, not only in outward show, but with a revived feeling of their former loyalty, and that the dearly bought experience of the past years has made room for an unprejudiced and deliberate comprehension of the circumstances. Trusting in this, His Majesty will also concede that the Provincial Estates for the Duchy of Schleswig shall eventually be called together, in accordance with the Regulations of 1831 and 1834, but there must be new elections, even if the convocation should be ordered before the expiration of the period of six years for which the last elections were made. It must also be taken for granted that the manhood

vote for the Ducal Augustenburg entailed possessions ceases, and that in the Assembly of the Schleswig Estates the facultative use of the Danish and German languages shall be sanctioned with perfect equality; and, finally, it is the pleasure of His Majesty that none of the Ordinances issued since the conclusion of the peace, either by His Majesty directly or through the organ of the Extraordinary Commissioner of the Government, shall be submitted to any deliberation whatever of the Provincial Estates, unless His Majesty should be pleased especially and explicitly to order otherwise with regard to any of these Ordinances.

I request you to make the Imperial Royal Minister President (the Royal Prussian Minister President) fully acquainted with the contents of this communication, and also to place a copy, if demanded, at the disposal of his Serene Highness (his Excellency).

Accept, &c.

Count Plessen.
Count Bille-Brahe.

(Signed) BLUHME.

Annex 1 to the preceding Despatch to Vienna.

In answer to several expressions and observations occurring in the Imperial Royal Austrian note of the 9th September, 1851.

When in the note, marked No. 1, of the Imperial Royal Minister President, it is first of all asserted that, with regard to the authority for the armed intervention of the Confederation at present exercised in Holstein, no difference of opinion prevails among the parties concerned, this pre-supposition certainly seems so founded on the nature of the circumstances, that any such difference of opinion could not well be conceived. Thus, for example in Article IV of the Treaty of Peace, special reference is made to the Federal laws, in order to show the right of His Majesty the King to appeal to the Germanic Confederation for intervention, the interposition of the Confederation was asked for, in pursuance of those laws, and with express reference to the provisions in point of the Final Act of Vienna, after the stipulation of the Treaty of Peace, in reference to the previous notification of our intentions in regard to pacification, had been complied with by the communication of the Royal Manifest of the 14th of July last year; this application was made both in Vienna, by means of a note of the Baron von Pechlin of the 12th September, 1850, and in Frankfort by the Representative of the King at the Diet; moreover, the Decree of the Diet, by which the settlement of this matter was entrusted to the Imperial Government of Austria, contains likewise an express reference to the Federal laws. By the Resolution of the Diet of the 11th of June of the present year, the further management of this affair, respectively by renewal and by co-transfer of full powers, was entrusted provisionally, for six weeks, to the Governments of Austria and Prussia, which Commission still continues, under the tacit consent of the Diet.

The legal authority for the armed intervention is, therefore, simply derived from Article IV of the Treaty of Peace, from the laws of the Confederation on the subject, and from the Resolutions passed by the Diet in conformity with those laws. That the Imperial Royal Cabinet is of the same opinion could not, however, we regret to say, be inferred, had it not been expressly stated, from the further tenor of the despatch, in which obstacles well nigh insurmountable are put in the way of the termination of the armed intervention, and of the restoration of Holstein to the sole exclusive dominion of His Majesty the King.

According to Articles XXVI and XXXII of the Final Act of Vienna of 1820, and according to Article VI of the Federal Execution Regulations of the 3rd August, 1820, the measures to be taken by the Diet in analogous cases must never be of longer duration than the Government to which such assistance is rendered deems necessary, and the proceedings must always be in conformity with its requisitions. It is, therefore, clear that the decision of the question relative to the prolongation of the present intervention as carried out by the Diet, and of the measures in connection therewith, does by no means, according to the unequivocal wording of the above regulations, rest with the Diet or with the Governments empowered by the said Diet, but solely with the Government of His Majesty the King. As soon as the latter declares to the Diet that it thinks a continuance of the said measures no longer necessary, and requires the recall of the Federal Commis-

sioners and the evacuation of Holstein by the Federal troops, these requisitions must, according to the Federal laws, be complied with.

The Royal Government, moreover, in communicating immediately after the commencement of the intervention the plan of organization which was submitted to the estimable men who subsequently assembled at Flensburg, as well as by the declaration of its willingness to convoke the Provincial Estates in Holstein, has done more than it was bound to do; for, as these notifications, on the one hand, exceed by far the tenor and extent of the general promise given in Article IV of the Treaty of Peace, it is, on the other hand, self-evident that the information could not yet be demanded in the present case, which, in Article XXVII of the Final Act of Vienna, it is made incumbent upon the Government to which the assistance of the Confederation has been rendered to supply regarding the measures taken for the consolidation of re-established legal order.

When, in the further course of the said note, a decided protest is made against the supposition that in the operations of the Commissioners of the Confederation might be found the real obstacle to a transition to a regular state of things, it may be sufficient to point out that, in our despatch of the 26th of August, the good intentions of the two Commissioners have in no way been called in question, but rather that mention was made of a matter of fact, the existence of which has been likewise acknowledged on the other side. As a matter of course the Commissioners are responsible only to their high Governments in regard to the view which they take of their task, and to these latter our Government would have to apply, if in concrete cases the operations of the Representatives of Austria and Prussia in Holstein should appear but little conducive or even obstructive to the ends to be attained in that Duchy.

Further, the declaration on our side, that changes in the Constitution of Holstein shall be introduced only in the way of deliberation with the Provincial Estates of that Duchy, and that the country shall be governed according to the laws legally existing, is stated to be a very decisive change for the better; as if the Royal Government had ever expressed or intimated an intention to proceed in Holstein in any other spirit. To this eulogistic testimonial, however, is immediately linked the somewhat damaging question, "What are the existing laws in Holstein?"—a question which could only be answered by communicating the voluminous collections of laws concerning that Duchy.

Moreover, the question on their side is not limited to this general point, but special questions are added in reference to particular laws. But when it is stated directly after that, according to the General Law of the 28th May, 1831, no alteration is to be made in the relations which at that time united the Duchy of Holstein with the Duchy of Schleswig, this erroneous conception could only have been caused by an incorrect representation of the portion of that Law in question to the Imperial Royal Minister President. Section 1 of the General Law of the 28th May, 1831, is to the effect that no alteration shall be made in the said relations by the separate Assembly of the Provincial Estates. That provision, however, so little excludes alterations in the said relations by other means, so long as this is effected constitutionally, that even the change of the very institution of the deliberative Provincial Estates has been foreseen, and the mode of proceeding in the event of such a change prescribed in § 3 of the above quoted Law, and at the conclusion of the Decrees of the 15th May, 1834. It is further certain that the several Ordinances adverted to on their side, in general, without special indication, by which regulations common to both Duchies have been established, cannot, in reference to Holstein, according to the declaration made on our part, be altered without the previous knowledge of the Provincial Estates of that Duchy, in so far as the respective Ordinances and regulations belong to the sphere of operation of those Estates, which is confined to a participation in the legislation relative to taxes and rates, the rights of persons and property, and to communal matters; and it is equally certain that the participation of the Provincial Estates in reference to the two first-named branches of the legislation is merely deliberative. With respect to the separately mentioned Customs regulation of the year 1838, and the common Customs system founded by it, not for the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein alone, but for the whole Monarchy, with the exception of Lauenburg, this system, in reference to the Duchy of Holstein, has, by the laws issued and the regulations made by the insurrectional Governments and the chief civil authorities at present ruling in the Duchy, become for the present impracticable to the Government on our side; whilst, on the other hand, the intention of this Government to re-establish the former common Customs system has been repeatedly declared; and according to its most

recent declaration, no doubt can well be entertained that this will be carried out in Holstein only in the constitutional way. The Customs regulation of the year 1838 is therefore definitively set aside only in so far as it has undergone alterations in the way of constitutional legislation, more especially the periodical revision of the Tariff, as prescribed in the regulation itself, up to the outbreak of the insurrection.

Inasmuch as in the further course of the note mention is made of a legal state of things acknowledged on both sides previously to the war, and as these expressions, not very intelligible in and by themselves, are subsequently more fully explained by a reference to the Federal Decree of the 17th September, 1846, a closer elucidation of that Decree and of its origin may not be superfluous.

After the Provincial Assembly of the Estates of the Duchy of Holstein had, in a memorial, not accompanied with a motion, submitted to the Diet the Royal Ordinances which had preceded their own arbitrary dissolution in August 1846, and after this Memorial had been referred to the Commission of Claims, our Representative delivered a declaration, wherein he briefly explained the designation used in the Royal Letters-Patent of the 8th July, 1846, of the Danish Monarchy as one collective State ("Gesammt Staat"), and the connection existing at that time between the Duchies of Holstein and Schleswig, adding that no intention of any alteration of that connection had ever entered the King's mind; with the express exclusion of any competency whatever of the Diet in reference to the Duchy of Schleswig, and without giving the slightest assurance whereby the abolition or limitation of the relations then existing between the said Duchies might have been made dependent on the consent of the Diet.

The Reporter of the Commission of Claims in his Report first of all characterized the Memorial of the Provincial Assembly of Holstein as a complaint of an imaginary infringement of the Constitution; he pointed out the groundlessness of the complaint, remarking subsequently that the Memorialists, when delivering their Memorial, had intended at the same time to place the maintenance of the union of the said Duchies, and the pretended community of succession under the protection of the Confederation; he likewise declared the explanation of the Royal Representative sufficient on this point; and finally, without entering in any way whatever into further explanation as to the extent of the present or the eventual competency of the Confederation in reference to the question at issue, he arrived at his motion,—subsequently adopted as a Decree of the Diet,—in which the existence of an infringement of the Constitution was considered as not established; at the same time, however, in the present case, the conformity of the Royal interdict as to the acceptance of petitions relative to the Succession, with the verbal tenor of the Law of the 28th May, 1831, to that extent in which the interdict had been framed, was called in question, and the competency of the Confederation for future events reserved, without, however, in this motion, which passed into a Resolution, or in any of the subsequent remarks thereupon by individual members of the Diet, one single word having been said of the Duchy of Schleswig, or of the union of Holstein with that Duchy. It is therefore clear that the foundation, or the mutual recognition of a legal state of things by means of the said Resolution of the German Diet, and by means of the explanation of our Representative which preceded that Resolution, is as much out of the question as any competency of the Germanic Confederation, in reference to the Duchy of Schleswig, reserved by the said Resolution, or acknowledged by that explanation.

To act upon such a competency would, besides, be diametrically opposed to the Resolution of the Diet passed in the year 1823, upon the reclamation of the Prelates and Knighthood of Holstein, and more especially to the vote of Prussia which preceded that Resolution, excluding every imaginable interference of the Diet with the Duchy of Schleswig. The question about the said competency of the Diet cannot, therefore, be answered according to the Resolution of the 17th September, 1846, which is not an insidious one in this or in any other respect; but it must be answered according to the principles of the law of nations, and according to the laws of the Confederation. According to principles of international law, any competency whatever of the Confederation in regard to Schleswig can no more be founded upon the relation which, previous to the war, existed between Holstein and Schleswig, than the union of Austria with Hungary could be the ground of any competency of the Confederation with reference to Hungary. But the competency of the Confederation would, according to Article LVI of the Final Act of Vienna, have a foundation, if His Majesty the King desired to alter the Constitution of

the Duchy of Holstein otherwise than in a Constitutional way; that it is not His Majesty's intention to do this has been distinctly declared on our part, and the Diet is not-entitled to demand more.

Mention is further made in the said note of the so-called "Assembly of Notables," which took place at Flensburg, as well as of the general and special reservations made on the part of Austria at the communication of the project submitted to that Assembly.

Irrespective of the question in regard to the legal effect and significance of such reservations in an internal matter of the Danish Monarchy, in no way belonging or submitted to any foreign decision, the Government on our side might, if Austria dissented from the project in question, have expected a definite expression of opinion thereon, the more so as the provisions of the project, in reference to Holstein and to its future union with Schleswig, are in perfect harmony with a project submitted on our part at the negotiations of peace in Berlin on the 17th March, 1850, and which project at that time met with the decided and expressed approbation of the Imperial Royal Minister-President.

In so far as the election of the Notables for Schleswig is mentioned again, coupled with the remark that the conditions which Austria had included in its reservations could not be considered as complied with, there is the less occasion to enter into further explanations upon this point so often adverted to,—more particularly in our despatch of the 6th of May of the present year,—since the election of the Notables of Schleswig, as well as of those of Holstein, must, in consequence of the approval of His Majesty, have ceased to be an object of criticism.

Independently of this, every one who, from impartial description, has a knowledge of the persons concerned, will confess that the very same principles have been observed in the election of the Notables of Schleswig and of those of Holstein. Men who, on one side or the other, had been engaged in the events of late years, have not been excluded in that election; at the same time, however, estimable men have been chosen who enjoy the confidence of their fellow-citizens, so that at all the elections the tenor of the Royal Manifesto of the 14th July, 1850, has been dutifully observed as a rule.

Finally, upon occasion of the question put in the said note, "whether the Holstein Estates are not united with the Schleswig Estates by the *nexus socialis* of the Knighthoods?" we cannot on our part relieve ourselves from the necessity of explaining more fully the true meaning of the said *nexus socialis* by means of the following literal extract from the Memorial of the 29th of March, 1847, drawn up by the former Deputy of the Chancery, M. von Moltke (one of the Notables of Holstein lately assembled at Flensburg).

It is said therein:—

"The petitions addressed, in the years 1722 and 1723, to King Frederick IV, for a declaration respecting the recognition of their privileges, remained without a reply. King Christian IV, upon special application to this effect from the nobility of Schleswig and of Holstein, and after a request, *communi nomine*, by the Prelates and Knighthood of the Duchies had been rejected, first confirmed anew those privileges under date of the 12th March, 1731, but then, however, in separate charters, wherein, to the confirmation of the Schleswig Prelates and Knighthood, this clause was added:—

"So far as these (privileges) be not opposed to our sovereign and sole government of the oft-named Duchy."

"It was but natural that those occurrences should occasion the apprehension of an intended dissolution of the ancient intimate union of the knighthood of the two Duchies. The Prelates and the Knighthood of the Duchy of Schleswig, therefore, on the 7th July, 1731, came forward with a most humble representation, wherein, besides various requests in reference to the holding of Provincial Courts of Law, to their rights of patronage, to the convents, and to other points altogether special, they made literally the following proposition:—

"We take the liberty of briefly calling to your Royal Majesty's mind how, from times almost immemorial, we have, as well *quoad emolumenta* as *onera*, been placed in a most intimate union with the Knighthood of the Duchy of Holstein, and have by every Sovereignty of the country been constantly left undisturbed in the *corpore* and *nexus sociali* proceeding therefrom; for which reason our most humble petition to your Majesty is that your Majesty's declaration may be graciously granted to us that the *nexus socialis* existing between us and the Knighthood of Holstein shall always remain in full force and permanence."

"After the Chancery in its report thereon had certified that the same, chiefly in respect of the convents for the nobility, of which only one, and that the worst, was situated in the Duchy of Schleswig, and besides on account of the system of credit and exchange could not be abolished without great prejudice to the Knighthood of Schleswig, the following Royal Resolution resulted under date of the 27th June, 1732 :—

"(We) graciously consent that the said *nexus socialis* may be henceforward maintained, in so far as it may not be prejudicial to us, as their supreme and sole Sovereign, in our high *juribus* and prerogatives."

"In so far as in recent times, and likewise in the General Law of the 28th of May, 1831, a high political importance is attributed to this Resolution, and to the maintenance in general of the so-called *nexus socialis*, and as the same has in many instances been used for the purpose of deducing from it an indirect recognition of the former Provincial Constitution by the Sovereign of the country, the groundlessness of such assertions will follow of itself from the above proceedings; as it is unequivocally obvious that therein the question in reality was as to the continuance of the theretofore community in the purely private privileges of the Knighthood."

That the Provincial Estates of Holstein (and there are no other Estates in Holstein) cannot, however, be united with those of Schleswig by a *nexus socialis* existing in such a manner between the Knighthoods does not appear to require any further proof.

Annex I to the Despatch to Berlin.

In answer to several expressions and assertions occurring in the Royal Prussian notes of the 14th September, 1851.

The more pleasure it has afforded the Royal Government to learn from the note marked No. 1 of the Royal Prussian Minister President, that they are, on that side, satisfied with the contents of our declaration of the 26th of August, the greater astonishment has it caused us that any apprehension of an unfavourable reception of that declaration in the German Diet should be entertained on their part. If to that approved declaration be applied the measure of influence which, by her position in the Germanic Confederation, Prussia is enabled to exercise upon its resolutions, we cannot well share that apprehension; when at the same time, however, to the scruples prevailing on that side the further remark is added that the events which have occurred since the 17th of September, 1846, and which would render the complete return to the former state of things hardly possible, were independent of any influence of the Germanic Confederation, we feel compelled, on our part, to advert to the circumstance that it was just by a Resolution of the Germanic Confederation that the armed irruption, in the spring of 1848, was sanctioned, and the unhappy war between Denmark and Germany occasioned, the so-called Provisional Government acknowledged, and the insurrection, which had been completely subdued in the action at Bau, re-invigorated.

For obvious reasons, however, it cannot be wished further to follow out here the recollection of those events; but rather to adduce the proof that the scruples raised against our declaration, from the point of view of the German Confederation, cannot be well founded.

Thus, for example, in Article IV of the Treaty of Peace special reference is made to the Federal laws, in order to show the right of His Majesty the King to appeal to the German Confederation for intervention, the interposition of the Confederation has been asked for in pursuance of those laws, and with express reference to the provisions in point, of the Final Act of Vienna; after the stipulations of the Treaty of Peace in reference to the previous notification of the intention on our part in regard to pacification had been complied with by the communication of the Royal Manifesto of the 14th of July of last year, this application was made both in Vienna, by means of a note of the Baron von Pechlin of the 12th September, 1850, and in Frankfort by the Representative of the King at the Diet; moreover, the Decree of the Diet, by which the settlement of this matter was entrusted to the Imperial Government of Austria, contains likewise an express reference to the Federal laws. By the Resolution of the Diet of the 11th of June of the present year the further management of this affair respectively, by renewal and by co-transfer of full powers

has been entrusted provisionally, for six weeks, to the Governments of Austria and Prussia, which Commission still continues, under the tacit consent of the Diet.

The legal authority for the armed intervention is therefore derived merely from Article IV of the Treaty of Peace, from the laws of the Confederation on the subject, and from the Resolutions passed by the Diet in accordance with those laws.

According to Articles XXVI and XXXII of the Final Act of Vienna of 1820, and according to Article VI of the Federal Execution Regulations of the 3rd of August, 1820, the measures to be taken by the Diet in analogous cases must never be of longer duration than the Government to which such assistance is rendered deems necessary, and the proceedings must always be in conformity with its requisitions. It is therefore clear that the decision of the question relative to the prolongation of the present intervention, as carried out by the Diet, and of the measures in connection therewith, does by no means, according to the unequivocal wording of the above regulations, rest with the Diet, or the Governments empowered by the said Diet, but solely with the Government of His Majesty the King. As soon as the latter declares to the Diet that it thinks a continuance of the said measures no longer necessary, and requires the recall of the Federal Commissioners, and the evacuation of Holstein by the Federal troops, these requisitions must, according to the Federal laws, be complied with.

The Royal Government, moreover, in communicating, immediately after the commencement of the intervention, the plan of organization which was submitted to the estimable men who subsequently assembled at Flensburg, as well as by the declaration of its intention to convoke the Provincial Estates in Holstein, has done more than it was bound to do; for, as those notifications on the one hand exceed by far the tenor and extent of the general promise given in Article IV of the Treaty of Peace, it is on the other hand self-evident that the information could not yet be demanded in the present case, which in Article XXVII of the Final Act of Vienna it is made incumbent upon the Government to which the assistance of the Confederation has been rendered to supply regarding the measures taken for the consolidation of the re-established legal order.

Inasmuch as it is intimated that it appears to the Diet that the re-establishment of the *status quo ante*, so far as a return to it may still be possible, is still most closely linked with its Resolution of the 17th September, 1846, that Resolution and its origin may here require a closer elucidation.

After the Provincial Assembly of the Estates of the Duchy of Holstein had in a Memorial, not accompanied with a motion, submitted to the Diet the Royal Ordinances which had preceded their own arbitrary dissolution in August 1846, and after this Memorial had been referred to the Commission of Claims, our Representative delivered a declaration, wherein he briefly explained the designation used in the Royal Letters-Patent of the 8th July, 1846, of the Danish Monarchy as one collective State ("Gesammt Staat"), and the connection at that time existing between the Duchies of Holstein and Schleswig; adding, that no intention of any alteration of that connection had ever entered the King's mind; with the express exclusion of any competency whatever of the Diet in reference to the Duchy of Schleswig, and without giving the slightest assurance whereby the abolition or limitation of the relations then existing between the said Duchies might have been made dependent on the consent of the Diet.

The Reporter of the Commission of Claims in his Report first of all characterized that Memorial of the Provincial Assembly of Holstein as a complaint of an imaginary infringement of the Constitution; he pointed out the groundlessness of the complaint, remarking, subsequently, that the memorialists, when delivering their Memorial, had intended at the same time to place the maintenance of the union of the said Duchies and the pretended community of succession under the protection of the Confederation; he likewise declared the explanation of the Royal Representative sufficient on this point; and finally, without in any way whatever entering into further explanations as to the extent of the present or the eventual competency of the Confederation in reference to the question at issue, he arrived at his motion, subsequently adopted as a Decree of the Diet, in which the existence of an infringement of the Constitution was considered as not established; at the same time, however, in the present case, the conformity of the Royal Interdict, as to the acceptance of petitions relative to the Succession, with the verbal tenor of the Law of the 28th May, 1831, to that extent in which the inhibition had been framed, was called in question, and the competency of the Confederation for future events

reserved; without, however, in this motion, which passed into a Resolution, or in any of the subsequent remarks thereon by individual members of the Diet, one single word having been said of the Duchy of Schleswig, or of the union of Holstein with that Duchy. It is therefore clear that the foundation or the mutual recognition of a legal state of things by means of the said Resolution of the German Diet, and by means of the explanation of our Representative which preceded that Resolution, is as much out of the question as any competency of the German Diet in reference to the Duchy of Schleswig, reserved by the said Resolution or acknowledged by that explanation.

To act upon such a competency would, besides, be diametrically opposed to the Resolution of the Diet passed in the year 1823, upon the reclamation of the Prelates and Knighthood of Holstein, and more especially to the vote of Prussia, which preceded that Resolution, excluding every imaginable interference of the Diet with the Duchy of Schleswig. The question about this competency of the Diet cannot therefore be answered according to the Decree of the 17th September, 1846, which is not an insidious one in this or any other respect; but it must be answered according to the principles of the law of nations, and according to the laws of the Confederation. According to the principles of international law any competency whatever of the Diet in Schleswig can no more be founded upon the relation which previous to the war existed between Holstein and Schleswig, than the union of Austria with Hungary could be the ground of any competency of the Confederation with reference to Hungary. But the competency of the Confederation would, according to Article LVI of the Final Act of Vienna, have a foundation if His Majesty the King desired to alter the Constitution of the Duchy of Holstein otherwise than in a Constitutional way: that it is not His Majesty's intention to do this has been distinctly declared on our part, and the Diet is not entitled to demand more.

Mention is further made, in the said note, of the Assembly of Notables which took place at Flensburg, as well as of the reservation of all the rights belonging to third parties, more especially to the Confederation and others, made on the part of the Royal Prussian Government at the time of the communication of the project submitted to the said Assembly. When on this occasion the observation is made, that the said project cannot in any way be designated as a positive basis for the attainment of the object in view, we are really unable to bring this assertion into harmony with the former declarations of the Cabinet of Berlin in reference thereto; but we may for the present moment refrain from further explanations, the more so as it cannot be our intention to enter here into a closer investigation of the question in reference to the legal significance of the objections and reservations of Prussia, in a matter which in no way belongs or has been submitted to foreign decision.

The Royal Prussian Minister President is further of opinion that it is precisely about the essential elements of the public law in Holstein that doubts prevail, and he raises several special questions thereupon. But when his Excellency asserts that, according to the General Law of the 28th May, 1831, no alterations are to be made in the relations which at that period connected the Duchy of Holstein with the Duchy of Schleswig, that erroneous conception can only have been occasioned by an incorrect statement to his Excellency of the respective passages of that law. Section I of the General Law of the 28th May, 1831, is to the effect that no alteration shall be made in the said relations by the separate Assembly of the Provincial Estates. By that provision, however, an alteration in the said relations by some other means is not excluded, so long as this is effected in a constitutional way; so little, indeed, is such the case that even the change of the very institution of the deliberative Provincial Estates has been foreseen, and the mode of proceeding in the event of such a change has been prescribed in § 3 of the above-quoted Law, and at the conclusion of the Decrees of the 15th May, 1834. It is further certain that the several Ordinances adverted to in general, and without special indication, by which regulations in common to both Duchies have been established, cannot, in reference to Holstein, according to the declaration made on our part, be altered without the previous knowledge of the Provincial Estates of Holstein, in so far as the respective Ordinances and regulations belong to the sphere of operation of those Estates, which is confined to a participation in the legislation relative to taxes and rates, the rights of persons and property, and to communal matters; and it is equally certain that the participation of the Provincial Estates in reference to the two first-named branches of the legislation is merely deliberative.

In regard to the Customs Regulations of the year 1838, specially brought

forward, and the Customs system founded by it, not for the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein alone, but for the whole Monarchy, with the exception of Lauenburg, this system, in reference to the Duchy of Holstein, has by the laws issued and the regulations made by the insurrectional Governments and the chief civil authorities at present ruling in the Duchy, become for the present impracticable for our Government; whilst, on the other hand, the intention of this Government to re-establish the former common Customs system has been repeatedly declared, and, according to its most recent declaration, no doubt can well be entertained that this will be carried out in Holstein only in the constitutional way. The Customs regulation of the year 1838 is therefore definitively set aside only in so far as it has undergone alterations in the way of constitutional legislation, more especially the periodical revision of the Tariff, as prescribed in the regulation itself, up to the outbreak of the insurrection.

With reference, finally, to the remarks respecting the *nexus socialis* between the Knighthoods of Schleswig and Holstein, we cannot refrain from more fully explaining the true meaning of the said *nexus socialis*, by means of the following literal extract from the Memorial of the 29th March, 1847, drawn up by the former Deputy of the Chancery, M. von Moltke (one of the Notables of Holstein lately assembled at Flensburg).

It is said therein :—

“The petitions addressed, in the years 1722 and 1723, to King Frederick IV for a declaration respecting the recognition of their privileges, remained without a reply. King Christian VI, upon a special application to this effect from the nobility of Schleswig and of Holstein, and after a request, *communi nomine*, by the Prelates and Knighthood of the Duchies, had been rejected, first confirmed anew those privileges, under date of 12th March, 1731, but then, however, in separate charters, wherein to the confirmation of the Schleswig Prelates and Knighthood, this clause was added :—

“So far as these (privileges) be not opposed to our sovereign and sole government of the oft-named Duchy.”

“It was but natural that those occurrences should occasion the apprehension of an intended dissolution of the ancient intimate union of the Knighthood of the two Duchies. The Prelates and the Knighthood of the Duchy of Schleswig, therefore, on the 7th July, 1731, came forward with a most humble representation, wherein, besides various requests in reference to the holding of provincial courts of law, to their rights of patronage, to the convents, and to other points altogether special, they made literally the following proposition :—

“We take the liberty of briefly calling to your Royal Majesty’s mind, how, from times almost immemorial, we have, as well *quoad emolumenta* as *onera*, been placed in a most intimate union with the Knighthood of the Duchy of Holstein, and have by every Sovereignty of the country been constantly left undisturbed in the *corpore* and *nexu sociali* proceeding therefrom, for which reason our most humble petition to your Majesty is, that your Majesty’s declaration may be graciously granted to us, that the *nexus socialis* existing between us and the Knighthood of Holstein shall at all events remain in full force and preservation.”

“After the Chancery in its report thereon had certified that the same, chiefly in respect of the convents for the nobility, of which only one, and that the worst, was situate in the Duchy of Schleswig, and besides on account of the system of credit and exchange, could not be abolished without great prejudice to the Knighthood of Schleswig, the following Royal Resolution resulted under date of 27th June, 1732 :—

“(We) graciously consent that the said *nexus socialis* may be henceforward maintained, in so far as it may not be prejudicial to us, as their supreme and sole Sovereign, in our high *juribus* and prerogatives.”

“In so far as in recent times, and likewise in the General Law of the 28th of May, 1831, a high political importance is attributed to this Resolution, and to the maintenance in general of the so-called *nexus socialis*, and as the same has, in many instances, been used for the purpose of deducing from it an indirect recognition of the former Provincial Constitution by the Sovereign of the country, the groundlessness of such assertions will follow of itself from the above proceedings, as it is unequivocally obvious that therein the question in reality was solely and alone as to the continuance of the theretofore community in the purely private privileges of the Knighthood.”

That the Provincial Estates of Holstein (and there are no other Estates

in Holstein) cannot, however, be united with those of Schleswig by a *nexus socialis* existing in such a manner between the Knighthoods does not appear to require any further proof.

In the note marked No. II, the prospect of the revival of the Provincial Estates of Holstein is hailed with a satisfaction which can only be so far agreeable to the Royal Government as the hope that in them may be found not only a legal, but at the same time a practically adapted organ for the new foundation of a lawful state of things in Holstein, has, as a matter of course, been uppermost in our minds.

When, however, on this occasion the eulogistic testimony is bestowed by the other side on the Provincial Estates of the Duchies, as having distinguished themselves for centuries by faithful attachment to their Sovereign, and as having proved themselves well-disposed representatives of the interests of the country, we cannot forbear, on our part, to call to remembrance that those Provincial Estates were first created by the Law of the 28th May, 1831, and were called into existence three years afterwards; but, even independent of this, we must call in question their claim to such a glorifying acknowledgment of their proceedings, which have not, at least, proved conducive to the maintenance of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy.

We are just as little able to assent to the opinion that Schleswig was formerly the mediator between Holstein and the other parts of the kingdom (*sic*). Schleswig has, unfortunately, from the moment it was brought into a kind of union with Holstein, and up to the time of its reconstitution as an inseparable appurtenance of the Danish Crown, been constantly an apple of discord between Denmark and Holstein; and herein precisely lies the germ of the differences still unsettled.

For the rest, it could not be otherwise than satisfactory to the Royal Government to find in the last paragraph of the said note a confirmation of its conviction that the wish on the other side to see the full sovereign power in the Duchy of Holstein restored to His Majesty the King is felt as sincerely as earnestly. When, however, the looked-for convocation of the Provincial Estates is pointed out as the suitable moment for the beginning of this new period, we cannot on our part agree with this. It is, of course, obvious that the Deputies elected in 1847, all of whom have taken part more or less in the insurrection, cannot be convoked, but that new elections must be ordered; and the Provincial Estates can only be assembled after the conclusion of the said elections. In order, however, to proceed with the elections, the previous appointment of Directors of the elections will be necessary, and this, as well as the arrangement of other preparations for the elections, presupposes the confirmation or the appointment by the Sovereign of the respective local officials, which again can only take place after the full governmental power has been restored into the hands of the King.

Annex 2 to both Despatches.

1. If His Majesty, out of regard to the advice and the wishes of his high Allies, resolves for the present to govern not only the Duchy of Holstein, but also the Duchy of Schleswig as an absolute King, with the co-operation of deliberative Provincial Estates, it is, so far as regards the Duchy of Schleswig, simply from free plenitude of power, and in no way with the intention of re-establishing the institution of Provincial Estates in the Kingdom of Denmark, by the abolition of the Fundamental Law, adopted and at present in full vigour in that kingdom; but with the object in view of bringing about an organic and homogeneous constitutional union of all the parts of the Monarchy in a legal and constitutional manner; that is, by means of the deliberative Provincial Estates of each of the said Duchies separately, and so far as regards the Kingdom, by means of Resolutions of the Diet; as well as, in reference to Lauenburg, with the co-operation of the Knighthood and Representatives of the country.

2. As, on the one hand, the King has promised and again declares that neither any incorporation of the Duchy of Schleswig into the Kingdom shall take place, nor any steps whatever leading thereto be taken, so His Majesty cannot, on the other hand, approve of anything at all whereby an amalgamation of Holstein and Schleswig, or any other kind of union of those Duchies between themselves, of a more intimate nature than that existing between either of them and the Kingdom should either be effected at once, or be brought about in future. The

community, therefore, more especially in reference to the management of public affairs and to the administration of justice in the superior tribunals, existing since 1834 between the two Duchies, and which, by the events of later years not chargeable to His Majesty the King, has already actually been repealed, shall also be abolished henceforth and for ever.

3. This principle, by which the so-called Schleswig-Holsteinism is definitively rejected by the King, in no way offers an impediment to the maintenance of those ties which, simply from the nature of things, grow up in the relations between countries bordering on each other, by reason of a similar state of the territory and from analogous relations of subsistence among the inhabitants, because they involve in themselves the conditions of social and commercial intercourse. These, of course, His Majesty will endeavour, as much as possible, to promote and to animate by a legislation for the said Duchies similar to that for the other parts of the Monarchy. Nor can that principle prevent the maintenance of such ties as are founded either on the community to both parts of the Empire of institutions of a non-political character (the Eider Canal, the Institution for Deaf and Dumb, the Lunatic Asylum in Schleswig, the Houses of Correction in Glückstadt, the use and support of the University of Kiel), or which depend upon common relations of the nature of private rights of certain classes (a non-political *nexus socialis* of the Knighthood of Schleswig and of Holstein).

4. Even as the King, on the one hand, must acknowledge that for the present, and so long as he has not taken exclusively into his hands the power of government over all the constituent parts of the Monarchy, and so long as the passionate emotion occasioned by the lamentable events of late years has not been appeased, no endeavours can, with any hope of a salutary result, be made to bring about a common Constitution for all parts of the Monarchy; so likewise His Majesty cannot conceal from himself that the possibility of such a common Constitution and of the administration generally of his States as an integral Monarchy, will depend entirely on the non-extension of the obligations which the King, as a member of the Germanic Confederation, has taken upon himself; and on his sovereignty over his two German Duchies being no more limited or restricted than is required by the existing legislation of the Confederation adopted by the King of Denmark; and that, finally, the German Diet should renounce all claims of competency in, or in regard to, the Danish Province of Schleswig, consequently that nothing should be deduced from the Resolution of the Diet of the 17th September, 1846, that would go beyond its literal meaning.

5. Respecting the practical management of the affairs of the State during the above-mentioned period of transition, the next thing of importance is to bring the relations back, provisionally, as far as possible, to the *status quo ante*.

Under Nos. 1 and 2 it has already been more fully developed in what respects this will be impossible, and opposed to the will of the King. It is in like manner impossible to call the former collegiate institutions again into existence, whilst, on the other hand, it will be possible to manage the affairs at present common to the whole Monarchy henceforward as such, that is to say, in Ministerial form.

Whilst, consequently, the matters which formerly belonged to the jurisdiction of the Schleswig-Holstein-Lauenburgian Chancery, and likewise a part of the business belonging to the province of the Treasury and of the General Board of Customs and Commerce, would, as regards Schleswig and Holstein, have in future to be transferred to a special Minister, respectively for Schleswig and for Holstein, which Ministers therefore, each by himself, would have to be considered as a Minister of the Interior in the respective Duchy; all business, on the other hand, formerly transacted by the Department of Foreign Affairs, by the Adjutant-General of the Accounts of the Land Force, and the Board of General Commissariat, the Board of Finance, and the Board of Public Debt and of the Sinking Fund, of the Customs sections of the General Board of Customs and Commerce, of the General Direction of the Post Office, &c., would, in regard to Schleswig and to Holstein, have to be administered in future by the Royal Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of War, of Marine, and of Finance; with this difference, however, that those Ministers, according as their orders, arrangements, and counsels have reference to the Kingdom or to the Duchies, should be responsible in the first instance to the King and to the Diet, and in the latter instance, for the present, to the King alone.

In the mean time the power is therewith reserved to transfer the said common affairs provisionally, and according to circumstances, to the special Minister for

each Duchy separately, inasmuch as the immediate management by the respective Minister in common might meet with practical difficulties.

The King's Council of State would consist of all the Ministers collectively, each with an equal vote in matters which concern the Monarchy as a whole. The manner and way in which other affairs, special to single parts of the Monarchy, would have to be attended to and settled in the Council of State, so that adequate influence be secured to the Minister (or Ministers) of the respective part of the Monarchy, would have to be left to the particular decision of the King.

Although it may be easily anticipated that, for various reasons, the management of the common matters will, during the period of transition, be difficult, and that in many respects practical difficulties will arise, yet these difficulties do not appear insuperable. For instance, as regards the common armed force. In reference to this, precisely the same rule in point of principle applies as in other common matters. The obligation of the King to supply a military contingent to the Germanic Confederation is not of such a kind as to exclude or to militate against the unity of the army, which is, moreover, sufficiently proved by experience in reference to all those States whose territories lie partly without the Confederation; but even supposing (a supposition indeed which can hardly be defended) that the Federal obligations in reference to the army require a particular division of troops, formed exclusively from natives of the Duchies of Holstein and of Lauenburg, yet it cannot be conceived why the management of those matters which concern the said division of the army should not be entrusted by the King, as Commander-in-chief, to the common Minister of War, subject to the observance of legal regulations, issued for the purpose.

On the other hand, it is obvious that the incongruities which are inevitably connected with the transitory state of things, most urgently require that nothing should be left untried to set a limit to them by the attainment of the object, an organic and constitutional union of all the parts of the State as soon as ever it is possible.

No. 5.

The Minister President of Austria to the Austrian Minister at Copenhagen.

(Translation.)

Honourable Baron,

Vienna, December 26, 1851.

COUNT PLESSEN has communicated to me a copy of the despatch of his Government of the 6th instant, with which, as well as its two annexes, you have already become directly acquainted by the favour of the Royal Minister for Foreign Affairs.

In this communication the Danish Government expresses its regret that the explanations which, under date of the 26th of August of the present year, it addressed to the Courts of Vienna and of Berlin, should not have been considered satisfactory by them. The said Government expresses its continued conviction that more than is already contained in those declarations could not on the part of the Germanic Confederation be required of His Majesty the King, without trenching on his sovereign rights; and that, consequently, the King could demand the full restitution of those never-disputed sovereign rights, and that legal guarantees for more ought not to be demanded by the Powers which act in the name of the Confederation, or given by the King. The Danish Government considers it to be the only legal and practical view of the state of things, that the King must previously be in full possession of his legal power before he can proceed with that peaceful reconciliation of contending views which must incontestably be considered the real object of the reciprocal reservation of rights in the Treaty of Peace.

Annex 1 to the despatch is intended to exhibit more fully these views, in reference to the contents of the note, marked No. 1, of the Imperial Cabinet, of the 9th September of the present year.

After this preliminary, the Royal Government goes on to tell us that when, by the restitution of the sovereign rights in Holstein into the hands of His Majesty the King, its just demand shall be complied with, it hopes to be very soon enabled to strengthen the moral guarantees which serve as the basis of the internal and external peace of the

Monarchy, and which, from their very nature, can only be granted spontaneously. The Royal Government claims the confidence of the Governments of Austria and Prussia, and adds that it has the most pressing occasion to excuse that confidence, since without it the Government will scarcely succeed in pursuing the course entered upon in concert with the great Powers for the maintenance and the consolidation of the integrity of the Monarchy; a course with the keeping of which the imminent definitive settlement of the question of Succession is so closely connected. That even for this reason alone it must be all-important to the King to uphold, as soon as circumstances permit, the promises contained in the Declaration of the 26th August, by Governmental measures, which, though making no alteration whatever in the text of that Declaration, may yet be calculated to exclude all doubts as to the policy to be observed by His Majesty.

In order, therefore, to make sure beforehand that the Resolutions which under certain circumstances the King may feel disposed to adopt, shall not only meet with the approbation of the Governments of Austria and Prussia, but that, moreover, the said Resolutions shall from neither party experience any obstacles whatever in their subsequent execution, the Cabinet of Copenhagen, in Annex 2 to its note, apprizes us confidentially of the intentions of the King, with the remark that His Majesty will not hesitate eventually to carry them out.

At the same time, however, it is taken for granted that the evacuation of Rendsburg, the withdrawal of all the Federal troops from Holstein, and the restitution of the full sovereign power into the hands of the King, will without further objection be simultaneously proceeded with, and further that the final Resolutions of His Majesty will not be taken until the most unequivocal assurances have been given that their execution in general and in particular will not be opposed by any impediment from abroad; and also that the great Powers shall consider the intended regulations sufficient in order to proceed immediately thereafter with the definitive recognition of the Succession, and with the fulfilment of the guarantees held out in the Protocol of London.

From our former communications you have become fully acquainted with the point of view from which we regard in general these overtures of the Danish Court. You will, therefore, be aware that in order to accelerate the conclusion of this matter, we shall readily state our opinion upon the intentions of His Majesty the King of Denmark as now revealed to us, but that this can only be done on our part under the supposition of having to deal with a declaration which is looked upon by its originator as binding, and the carrying out of which is therefore assured.

Convinced that the solution of the still-existing difficulties could no longer fail when a material understanding on the appropriate measures of the Danish Government should be come to between it and the German Powers, we could hardly apprehend that, even under such favourable circumstances, the Danish Government should delay to secure, by a positive promise, the actual accomplishment of these measures.

What consideration of any importance could possibly dissuade the Royal Government from such a resolution? According to its own expressions, the motives for its hesitation are, that it thinks it ought not to give the Governments of Austria and Prussia any further promises than those already contained in the Declaration of the 26th of August, because this would infringe the sovereign rights of the King. But can its conviction of this be really unshaken?

If such be the case, we can only express our sincere regret for it, inasmuch as after the exertions which, since the Declaration of the 26th of August, have been made to draw the point of view of the Danish Cabinet closer to that of the friendly Powers, and of which so large a share fell to the Minister M. Bluhme, we should have to consider it as a decidedly retrograde step in the negotiations, if they were made to turn anew upon the question whether the said Declaration of the 26th of August of the present year may justly be objected to by the Powers which act in the name of the Confederation. We would the rather set this question aside, as one no longer of any practical interest, since we have no desire to enter unnecessarily into the discussion of it contained in the Annex 1 of the note of the 6th of the present month, in which, as we cannot conceal, certain expressions have called forth our utmost surprise.

The sovereign rights of His Majesty the King, we restrict ourselves to merely repeating this, are sacred to us; but they are, according to our innermost conviction, not in the least infringed because His Majesty finds himself in a situation to owe explanations to his co-members of the Germanic Confederation, which cannot possibly, under existing circumstances, be set aside by a simple appeal to his sovereign rights, to the laws of the Confederation, and to the confidence which his Government deserves.

The declaration of the Danish Government of the 7th September, 1846, was a

spontaneous act; it was given with a view to allay apprehensions which had arisen from the Patent of King Christian VIII, and it was accepted in the same spirit in the Resolution of the Diet founded thereon. Neither the Courts of Austria and Prussia, nor the Diet, have claimed for this transaction the character of a Convention of reciprocally binding effect, which character it did not in fact possess: nor have they declined to give every requisite consideration to the intervening change of circumstances. On the part of Denmark it will certainly not be asserted that immediately after that declaration, the King, by virtue of his sovereignty, might have acted in the contrary sense, without giving the Confederation any other explanation than that his sovereign rights can be no further restricted than the constitutional competency of the Diet reaches. Now, if such was not admissible at that period without violation of the Confederation, it is certain that the same consideration is still in full force under the present circumstances, when not only have both parties reserved in the Treaty of Peace all those rights which they possessed previous to the war, but, moreover, the Diet, in consequence of its intervention, invoked by Denmark, is entitled to expect a satisfactory notification of the measures which have been taken for the consolidation of re-established legal order.

This indispensable explanation once given, any further misunderstanding which might possibly arise between Denmark and the Confederation will certainly turn again exclusively upon the question of the competency of the Confederation. We confess that it is just this view of the reciprocal relations which we recognize as being of chief practical value. Our judgment of the resolutions now contemplated by the King, so far as our proceedings as a Confederate Government are concerned, must therefore be formed accordingly.

We rejoice, after having thus pointed out anew our position relative to the whole question, to be able to say that we really consider the contents of these resolutions to be an adjustment of the opposing views, appropriate to the altered state of things.

The subjoined remarks, which follow point by point Annex II of the Danish despatch, explain the motives of our acquiescence, as well as the expectations which we entertain of a corresponding accomplishment.

We would especially wish the Danish Cabinet to be convinced thereby that we are far from insisting upon the unchanged maintenance in all future times of the Constitution with Provincial Estates for the Duchies; on the contrary, we recognize the full value of the endeavour to suit the existing political institutions of all the parts of the Danish State to the future organisation of the entire Monarchy, which is to be established upon Conservative principles. But as we have before this had occasion to pronounce more than once against the former intention of the Danish Government, as declared from the commencement, to convoke again the Provincial Estates only for the purpose of definitively abolishing them, and to adapt the Constitution of the Monarchy exclusively to the Fundamental Law in force in the Kingdom of Denmark, so it is now incumbent on us to guard decidedly against any possible interpretation, as if this very intention were involved again in the spirit of the programme now communicated to us.

The maintenance of independent, constitutional, and administrative institutions in the various parts of the country, without prejudice to the concentrated direction of their common affairs, we consider to be an indispensable condition for the consolidation of the internal tranquillity of the Monarchy.

When the Danish Government adverts to the objections which, from the experiences of the last ten years, suggest themselves against any revival, even if transitory only, of the Provincial Assemblies of Schleswig; and when that Government expresses a doubt as to whether a salutary result could be expected from the endeavour to arrive at a common Constitution for the Monarchy, through the medium of such an organ, we will by no means contest the weight of those observations; but, at the same time, we cannot refrain from mentioning that it was principally the uncertainty in regard to the Succession that occasioned and continued such a bias in the proceedings of the Estates as was incompatible with the integrity of the Monarchy. Under the present circumstances, now that the principle of a common Succession appears to be already sufficiently secured against any attempt at opposition, the hope might not be ill-founded that henceforth a beneficial co-operation of the Government with the Provincial Estates would not be attempted in vain, if the given principles—that is to say, on the one hand, the permanent union of the Monarchy; and, on the other, the equal rights of all the constituent parts of the same—be on both sides sincerely adopted, and acknowledged in their necessary consequences.

At least, we think that the embarrassments by which the Government of the Danish collective Monarchy would inevitably be beset by a project of organization

abounding with Representative Estates and with Ministerial responsibility, multifariously divided, like the one which on a former occasion Count Spornéek submitted to us, would not be of a lesser kind, nay, would perhaps be even more difficult to overcome than those which might be apprehended from the re-establishment of the institutions of the Provincial Estates of the Duchies.

That the convocation of the Provincial Assemblies, even if it takes place within the current elective period of six years, shall be proceeded with only under an order for new elections, pursuant to the Regulations of 1831 and 1834; that the manhood vote for the Ducal Augustenburg entailed estates shall be abolished; and that the use of the German and of the Danish language shall be equally admitted in the Provincial Assembly of Schleswig will not be objected to by the Imperial Government; neither do we mean to anticipate the intentions of His Majesty the King, which undoubtedly are simultaneously directed towards the maintenance of the Royal authority and to the pacification of excited minds, in reference to the question whether and how far the ordinances which have been issued since the conclusion of the peace should still be submitted in some way to the deliberation of the Provincial Estates.

If the Danish Government would now be induced to adopt as its own the view of its programme which we have embodied in the present note and in the Annex to it; if at the same time it would give us security, in the binding form of a Declaration, made by order of His Majesty the King, for the actual accomplishment of those intentions which hitherto the said Government has officially communicated to us only as a possible eventuality; and if it would act accordingly, so far as there is occasion for the present to do so, we might confidently look forward to a speedy and conciliatory issue of the present misunderstanding between the various parts of the Danish Monarchy, and between that Monarchy and the Germanic Confederation. We should lay aside the mandate by virtue of which we, in common with Prussia, are representing the German Confederation in this matter, with the simultaneous evacuation of Holstein and the re-establishment of the full sovereign power in that Duchy; we should vouch in the German Diet for the agreement entered into, and should consider the new internal foundation of the bond between the countries united under one Sovereign sufficiently advanced to join in the guarantee, in accordance with the law of nations, of the integrity of the Monarchy, by means of the recognition of the common Succession.

The programme itself points out the first and necessary step for the fulfilment of the promises which it contains, inasmuch as, in its 5th Article, it provides for the temporary management of public affairs until the time of the definitive settlement of the question of the Constitution. The guarantee offered by the Danish Government for the provisional protection of the interests, and for the equality of all the parts of the country as to their legal position, lies solely in the formation of the Council of State for the entire Monarchy of members belonging to the various constituent parts of it. The appointment of this collective Ministry therefore appears to us to admit of no delay, and we likewise hope that it will not escape the enlightened judgment of the King and of his Cabinet, how much, in the eyes of foreign Powers, as well as of the different parts of the country, the value of this guarantee depends on the choice of persons perfectly suitable for their position.

We communicate the present note to the Court of Berlin, in case their views be, as we have already reason to believe, in accordance with ours. You are hereby instructed to declare to the Cabinet of Copenhagen that His Majesty the Emperor, convinced of having answered all just demands in regard to his intervention in the Holstein affair, is only waiting for the actual confirmation of the concurrence of the Government of His Majesty the King in the present overtures to give the necessary orders respecting the restitution of the full sovereign power in Holstein into the hands of the King, and also respecting the withdrawal of the Imperial-Royal troops from Holstein, including the fortress of Rendsburg.

His Majesty, at the same time, considers it a matter of course that the part of Rendsburg which has latterly been occupied by Austrian and Prussian troops shall be occupied by troops of the new-formed Confederate contingent of Holstein-Lauenburg, and that the decision of the disputed question of the boundaries is reserved

(L.S.) SCHWARZENBERG.

Le Baron Von Vrints.

Annex.

1. THE Imperial Court of Austria learns with satisfaction the resolution of His Majesty the King of Denmark to reinstate, not only in the Duchy of Holstein but

also in the Duchy of Schleswig, the legally existing institutions of the Provincial Estates; and when His Majesty at the same time manifests the intention to bring about in the legal and constitutional manner, therefore after consultation with the Provincial Estates of the said Duchies, and as regards the Kingdom of Denmark in conjunction with the Diet and in regard to Lauenburg with the co-operation of the Knighthood and the Estates of the province—an organic and homogeneous constitutional union of all the parts of the country into one collective Monarchy, it is only for the Imperial Court to recognize these intentions of the King as directed towards the fulfilment of an inevitable task.

The present Provincial Constitution of Holstein, to which Article LVI of the Final Act of Vienna applies, cannot offer any obstacle to the realization of the Royal intentions; the less so that in the laws by which the institutions of the Provincial Estates in Holstein are founded, the alteration thereof, after consultation with the Estates, has been foreseen.

Sincerely as His Majesty the Emperor wishes to see the tranquillity and well-being of the Danish Empire consolidated as soon as possible by an organization suitable to its requirements, so does His Majesty confidently cherish the hope that in its efforts towards this important measure, the Danish Government will not bestow any exclusive preference upon the institutions which during late years have been conferred on the Kingdom of Denmark Proper; but that the said Government will bear in mind as the only safe rule, the permanent relations of the entire Monarchy, and the object of intrinsically strengthening its union into one whole. Once satisfied on this point, His Majesty will not delay to co-operate with other friendly Powers in securing that union by guaranteeing, according to the laws of nations, a common Succession to all parts of the Monarchy.

2. In the declaration of His Majesty the King of Denmark that no incorporation of the Duchy of Schleswig into the Kingdom shall take place, nor any steps tending towards that end be taken, the Imperial Court recognizes with satisfaction a fresh confirmation of the promise already made to his subjects by the late King Christian VIII, and subsequently renewed by His Majesty the present King soon after the Treaty of Peace of the 2nd of July, 1850, in the Manifest of the 14th of the same month, and which likewise, conformably to Article IV of the said Treaty of Peace, has been notified to the German Confederation as a resolution taken by the King for the pacification of the country. When, on the other hand, those other declarations made by the Government of His Majesty's predecessor on the Throne, at the sitting of the Diet on the 7th of September, 1846, and recognized by the Diet as satisfactory, according to its Resolution of the 17th of the same month, and according to which it was not the intention of King Christian VIII to bring about any alteration whatever in the relations which at that time connected the Duchy of Holstein with the Duchy of Schleswig,—are considered by the King of Denmark to be no longer suitable in all respects to the present state of things; and if His Majesty feels particularly convinced that especially the community of both Duchies in reference to the administration of public affairs and of justice in the Superior Courts, which has subsisted since the year 1834, but which, in consequence of the late events has, in fact, already become abrogated, must also remain abrogated for the future, it is acknowledged on the part of the Imperial Court that the said Declarations of the 7th September, 1846, were based on the circumstances of the Danish Monarchy at that time, and were not attended with the legal effect of making the consent of the Diet necessary to resolutions which under changed circumstances the King, by virtue of his rights of sovereignty, might take in reference to that union, but not affecting the legal competency of the Confederation.

The Imperial Government will not, therefore, on its part, object to the abolition of the said community, but will use its influence to prevent any objections being made to this measure by the Diet.

3. The Imperial Government declares that its views are in accordance with point 3 of the Danish Annex.

4. As His Majesty the Emperor will never allow that within the Germanic Confederation the rights of sovereignty of one of its members shall be subjected to other restrictions, or that more extensive demands shall be made upon one member of the Confederation than is the case with regard to all the members of the Confederation, by virtue of the fundamental legal equality of their reciprocal stipulated rights and stipulated obligations; and as it is further beyond doubt to the Imperial Government that the force of the Federal laws, together with the competency of the Diet, emanating alone from those laws, can never be extended to a country not belonging to the Confederation; and as, moreover, the Imperial Government has already declared on a

former occasion, and again declares by these explanations, that it (the said Imperial Government) does not deduce from the Decree of the Diet of the 17th of September, 1846, any rights for the Confederation which would go beyond the literal tenor of that Decree,—His Imperial Majesty, so far as he is called upon to co-operate, considers that the conditions are fully laid down under which the wisdom and the sense of justice of the King will undoubtedly succeed in uniting the Confederative relations of his German Duchies, Holstein and Lauenburg, with the requirements of a common Constitution and administration of his States as a collective Monarchy, and in keeping them in unison.

5. It is well known that the Imperial Government has repeatedly pointed out that, by the Treaty of Peace of the 2nd of July, 1850, while all rights which belonged to both parties before the war were reserved, reference was made, in the next place, to the restoration of the *status quo ante* in the disputable relations. The approbation of the Imperial Government is therefore secured to the Royal Danish Government, if the latter on its part declares that until the organization of the Monarchy shall be definitively effected, it intends to return, in regard to the practical management of public affairs, as much as possible to the *status quo ante*, with the restrictions pointed out by that Government, and to which the above explanations have reference, under 1 and 2. His Majesty the Emperor expresses, especially in this regard, his confident expectation that the King, like as in the question of the future organization of the Monarchy, so also in the temporary management of public affairs, will know how to preserve by suitable arrangements the position which is due to the various parts of the country, as members of one integral whole, wherein no part is subordinate to the other. If, on the one hand, this purpose, in consideration of the impracticability of calling the earlier collegial form of the chief management of State matters into life again, be perfectly answered, in so far as the special affairs of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein—which formerly belonged to the jurisdiction of the Schleswig-Holstein-Lauenburg Chancery, and partly also to that of the Treasury, and of the General Board of the Chambers of Customs and Commerce—will now be entrusted to a separate Minister for each of the said Duchies; it has not, on the other hand, escaped the just consideration of the Imperial Government that this equally ordered position of all parts of the State would suffer a material infringement, to the prejudice of the Duchies, if those affairs which extend to the entire Monarchy should be conducted exclusively by Ministers who, in regard to the Duchies, would be responsible only to the King, but in regard to the Kingdom of Denmark would at the same time be responsible to the Danish Diet. The Royal Government, therefore, has at the same time, in regard hereto, already declared that it would reserve to itself the right of entrusting to the special Ministers of the Duchies, separately, a share in the common affairs, according to circumstances; and it only remains for the Imperial Court to recognize, on its part, an impartial realization of that reservation as the appropriate means of abating the said inequality, and of bringing about the transition to the new foundation of the organic union of the Empire under circumstances in which all the subjects of the King may perceive a reassuring guarantee for the present and future preservation of their interests within the collective State.

No. 6.

The Minister President of Prussia to the Prussian Minister at Copenhagen.

(Translation.)

Berlin, December 30, 1851.

THE communications of the Royal Danish Ministry which you announced to us have now reached us in the form of a despatch of the 6th of this month, with two annexes, addressed by the Minister Bluhme to Count Bille-Brahe. I inclose complete copies of these papers. They have, as I need hardly assure you, been submitted to a full consideration and examination, conducted with the most sincere wish to arrive at an understanding.

They have given occasion to define and collect the points upon which a general understanding may be considered as already existing. You will likewise find this Memorandum inclosed. The points set down in it naturally form, together with the contents of this instruction, a connected whole, the several parts of which form the conditions. Whilst I request you to bring this inclosure to the knowledge of the Minister Bluhme, it only remains for me to mention, in a few words, those points with regard to which an agreement has not hitherto formally taken place, which, however, are partly less important, partly more of a transitory nature, and which relate not so much to organic institutions as to the manner and time of their being carried into effect.

To this, in the first place, belongs the intentions of the Royal Danish Government not to re-establish the community introduced by the predecessors of His Majesty the King of Denmark, of the Administrative authority, and of the Supreme Court of Appeal for the Duchies of Holstein and of Schleswig. It cannot be doubted but that the more deeply the subjects of His Danish Majesty in Schleswig and Holstein had felt the advantages of these common institutions granted to them by their Sovereign, the more painfully will they be affected by their withdrawal. We therefore hope that as the abolition of these common superior authorities has taken place, the Royal Danish Government will, with a benevolent regard for the tranquillization of the public mind, grant a judicial and administrative organisation corresponding as much as possible to the general wish.

With full confidence we think we may assume that it is the intention of the Royal Danish Government to put an end to the exceptional state of things still continuing in Schleswig, before the elections for the Provincial States there. If these elections take place under the management of a Minister who enjoys the confidence of the country, the people will freely and confidently take part in them, and will hail their chosen Representatives as the really authorized organs of the interests of the country. It is of great importance, and it is a very satisfactory omen, that distinguished persons are not wanting who would in every respect furnish the desired guarantees, and who, according to information to be relied upon, are besides ready to obey the call of His Majesty the King of Denmark to fill this difficult post, which, however, promises a most beneficent sphere of action. If the management of the affairs of Schleswig is entrusted to such hands, and if a statesman of equally distinguished qualities is at the head of the Administration of Holstein, there will be in the position of these Ministers, as members of the Ministry for the whole State which, according to the announced intentions of His Danish Majesty, is to be established, a high guarantee for the speedy execution of the paternal intentions towards his country of His Majesty the King-Duke, the importance of which must also be fully appreciated by the German Powers.

The issuing of the writs for the elections for the Provincial States and their Assembly at as early a period as possible, would then cause the Governments who represent the Germanic Confederation to submit to the Diet, for its sanction, those measures which must be considered as requisite for the re-establishment of the full authority of the Sovereign in the Duchy of Holstein.

We regret sincerely that the labours of the Boundary Demarcation Commission, which met at Rendsburg, have not produced a result that seems calculated to bring about a speedy settlement of the territorial frontier between the two Duchies.

Under the circumstances of the divergent statements put forth by the respective Commissioners, and of the generally-felt necessity of concluding this affair, the expedient of an arbitration by a third impartial Government seems to present itself. Supposing the Germanic Confederation as well as Denmark to accept it, there would indeed only be a prospect of a decision after the lapse of a period which could not previously be specified. In order, however, not to defer so long the evacuation of Holstein by the Federal troops, that could likewise take place if, as the Germanic Powers may assume positively and as a matter self-understood, in the place of the Federal troops which are now in Rendsburg, only component parts of the Holstein Federal contingent shall be employed there, and if, as the Danish Government will acknowledge to be not less suited to the circumstances, no changes shall be made in the present state of the fortifications of Rendsburg until the definitive settlement of the question of the frontier.

You will express yourself in the sense of the above remarks to the Minister Bluhme, and give him, if he should wish it, a copy of this despatch.

(Signed)

MANTEUFFEL.

Baron Werther.

Annex.

Memorandum.

(Translation.)

WHEN it is said in the instruction of the Royal Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 6th of this month to Count Bille-Brahe, that the Danish Government feels the strongest inducement to endeavour to obtain the confidence of the Cabinets of Berlin and Vienna, and when, accordingly, in Annex II, those Government measures are specified which are contemplated by His Majesty the King of Denmark, and by which the Danish Declaration, already given on the 26th of August, that the Duchy of Holstein should be governed according to the existing laws, and no changes made in these excepting in a

constitutional manner, is further explained, this more detailed communication can only be welcomed with pleasure on the part of Prussia as a further step towards an early definitive understanding.

In reviewing the sphere of the individual questions the general solution of which forms the object of the negotiations between the Germanic Powers and Denmark, one cannot shut out the persuasion that with regard to the great part, and by far the most important points, an understanding may be considered as having been already attained.

1. Foremost appears the general acknowledgment of the principle that in the interests of Europe the whole Danish Monarchy, as at present constituted, should remain together as a whole under one sceptre.

2. In virtue of this acknowledged principle, consent has been expressed generally, and specially by Prussia, to the arrangements which have been made respecting the succession to the Throne of the whole Danish Monarchy, in favour of Prince Christian of Glücksburg and his male descendants from his marriage with his wife, born a Princess of Hesse.

A general understanding exists respecting the manner and the form in which these settlements may be more formally established, in so far as they relate to Holstein, by setting aside a claim (of the Duke of Augustenburg), doubtful, it is true, in itself, but not, under existing circumstances, to be passed over.

The Prussian Cabinet may indulge the hope that certainly in this respect its efforts are appreciated and acknowledged on the part of the King of Denmark.

3. In regard to Holstein, it is decided that the Provincial Estates of the Duchy shall be assembled as the legally existing organ of the country, and that to these Estates belongs the representation of the peculiar rights of the country.

4. The armed force of the Duchy of Holstein, as a German Federal country, has been organized by agreement between the Powers representing the Confederation and the Crown of Denmark, and whilst its destination as a Federal contingent has been reserved, the command-in-chief of it has been left to the King of Denmark as the Military Sovereign of the whole Monarchy.

5. The circumstances of the Duchy of Schleswig as a non-German country do not of themselves form the object of deliberation and negotiation on the part of the Germanic Confederation. Only in as much as the German Duchy of Holstein, in consequence of the common legal relations of both Duchies, has claims to the maintenance of such relations, do the same form the subject of an understanding between the Powers representing the Germanic Confederation and the Crown of Denmark.

Whilst it is acknowledged, on the part of Prussia and Austria, that a more extended claim of the Duchy of Holstein to community and unity of relations in both Duchies is not admissible, the Royal Danish Government acknowledges, on its part, that the Holstein States remain, in the attributions belonging to them according to the Ordinances of 1831 and 1834, as an authorized organ of the Duchy of Holstein in regard to the community of relations of both Duchies based upon particular legal titles.

In particular, it is generally acknowledged that the *nexus socialis* between the Knighthood of Schleswig and Holstein is to be maintained to the same extent and with the same legal consequences for the future as it has existed since the year 1731.

6. The Royal Danish Government is agreed with the German Powers that the Duchy of Schleswig shall subsist as a separate part of the whole Danish Monarchy, not to be incorporated, either with regard to its constitution or administration, with Denmark.

It is in like manner acknowledged, on the part of Denmark, that the Schleswig knighthood is furthermore maintained as a corporation, with the attributes derived from the *nexus socialis*, with the Holstein knighthood. His Majesty the King of Denmark has declared his intention likewise to convoke the Schleswig Provincial Estates by new elections, as they were established by the Ordinances of 1831 and 1834.

Prussia expresses her expectation, founded upon the above recognized points, that a State representation will take place in Schleswig corresponding to the wants of the country and to the Constitution which existed before 1848. The form and the composition of this Representation will have to be discussed with the Provincial Estates, which are now to be assembled again.

7. The German Powers acknowledge that in consequence of the recognized principle of the integrity of the whole Danish Monarchy, a representation of all parts of this Monarchy in a Legislative Assembly for the discussion and decision of the common interests of all, is not incompatible with the separate rights of the German Duchies of Holstein and Lauenburg. On the other hand, the Royal Danish Government does not intend to introduce into the Duchies of Holstein and Lauenburg belonging to the Germanic

Confederation, or into the Duchy of Schleswig, the Constitution at present existing in the Kingdom of Denmark, nor the Electoral Law in force there; but, on the contrary, to have regard, in the Constitution to be framed for the whole Monarchy, to the relations of the Estates in the German Duchies, and to the particular relations of the Duchy of Schleswig. Especially, the Electoral Law now in force in Denmark will not be introduced into Schleswig and the German Duchies.

8. The community of the University of Kiel hitherto existing for Holstein and for Schleswig, as well as the community of the other institutions settled for both Duchies, continues to subsist to the same extent as was the case until the end of the year 1847.

No. 7.

Proclamation of the King of Denmark, dated January 28, 1852.

WE Frederick VII, by the grace of God, King of Denmark, of the Wends and Goths, Duke of Schleswig, Holstein, Stormarn, of the Dithmarses, of Lauenburg, and Oldenburg, send our royal favour and grace to all our beloved and faithful subjects.

We have been informed that the deliberations of the notables convened last year in Flensburg, in accordance with our Manifest of the 14th July, 1850, have not led to the result which we had in view, that is to say, an agreement on the most important questions of our monarchy, and more especially in regard to the position which our Duchy of Schleswig is to occupy.

Having therefore deemed it expedient not to give further effect to the results of the said deliberations, we have resolved, in so far as the regulation of the affairs of our monarchy is concerned, to proceed in a conservative spirit of improvement of legally existing relations, maintaining and further developing those institutions which either comprise all parts of the said monarchy, or which have been specially established for certain distinct parts of the same.

In like manner as the complete maintenance of our monarchy within the whole extent of its territory will, in future, be secured with the assistance of the great European Powers, so also the union which binds the various parts of that monarchy to one well-regulated whole shall be maintained and consolidated, in the first instance by means of the administration of the common affairs and by collective authorities, and in the next place, by a common constitution for the discussion of the common affairs, for the introduction of which we will make preparations with as little delay as possible.

Pursuant thereto, those matters from all the parts of the monarchy which were formerly either decided or submitted to us by the Department for Foreign Affairs, by the Quartermaster-General, by the Adjutant-General for the Army and Navy Accounts, by the General of the Commissariat, by the Board of Admiralty and Commissariat, by the Board of Finance, by the Direction of the Public Debt and the Sinking Fund, as well as by the General Direction of the Post Office; further those matters which formerly belonged to the 1st and 2nd section of the Treasury, so far as those matters concern the rates and taxes, and the collection of taxes and the public accounts, as well as the customs and colonial matters which formerly belonged to the General Chamber of Customs and Commerce (all of which matters, so far as they have reference to the Kingdom of Denmark, have been already assigned to the respective Ministries), shall be treated in future by Ministers for Foreign Affairs, of War, of Marine, and of Finance, according to the existing rules, and in such manner that the sphere of action of those Ministries shall, in the same manner as the above-mentioned immediate authorities formerly held their appointments from us, extend over all parts of our monarchy.

No modification is introduced in the functions of the Ministries for the Kingdom properly so called, namely, the Ministries of Justice, of the Interior, of Religion, and of Public Instruction.

Those matters which formerly belonged to the Chancery of Schleswig-Holstein-Lauenburg, the affairs of Schleswig, of Holstein, and of Lauenburg, which formerly belonged to the Treasury or to the 3rd section of the General Collegiate of the Boards of Customs and Commerce, with the exception of the affairs relating to lighthouses, which have been assigned to the Ministry of Marine, and of Consular affairs, which have been assigned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in the same manner as the affairs formerly belonging to the Government of Schleswig-Holstein, shall henceforth be managed, in conformity with the existing regulations, by the Ministry for the Duchy of Schleswig, in so far as they relate to that Duchy, and by the Ministry of the Duchies of Holstein and

Lauenburg, in so far as they relate to the Duchies of Holstein and of Lauenburg, those matters, however, which concern the non-political institutions common to the Duchies of Schleswig and of Holstein, more especially the University of Kiel, the Equestrian Body, the Schleswig-Holstein Canal, the fire insurance, the houses of correction, the institution for the deaf and dumb, and the lunatic asylum, shall be collectively administered ("collegialt") by the Minister for the Duchy of Schleswig and the Minister for the Duchies of Holstein and Lauenburg.

All our Ministers shall have their permanent residence in our royal capital and residence of Copenhagen.

Our Privy Council of State shall be composed of all our Ministers, over which Council we shall also in future continue to preside, and in the sittings of which our most beloved uncle, His Royal Highness the Hereditary Prince, shall in future take part as heretofore. With reference to the extent and the regulation of our Privy Council of State, they shall, until further orders, be subject to the same regulations as heretofore. The Secretary of State is to keep the minutes of the proceedings.

The Minister for the Duchy of Schleswig and the Minister for the Duchies of Holstein and of Lauenburg are responsible to us only for the management of their functions. The responsibility of the other Ministers towards the Danish Diet is limited to that part of their official acts which refers to the Kingdom of Denmark in accordance with § 18 of the Fundamental Law.

In accordance with § 21 of the said Fundamental Law, we have temporarily appointed our Minister for Foreign Affairs President of the Council for the Kingdom of Denmark.

In like manner, as no doubt can be entertained in regard to our firm resolution to observe inviolate the provisions of the Danish Fundamental Law, we have resolved to grant in a constitutional manner to the Provincial Estates of our Duchy of Schleswig, as well as to the Provincial Estates of our Duchy of Holstein, such a development that each of the said Duchies shall, in regard to those of its affairs which hitherto have been within the sphere of the deliberative Provincial Estates, obtain a representation of Provincial Estates invested with Legislative power.

In order to attain this object we have resolved to order projects of laws for each of the two said Duchies to be drawn up and to be submitted to the Provincial Estates for deliberation, in accordance with § 8 of the General Law of the 28th May, 1831, and to the final provisions of the Ordinances of the 15th May, 1834.

The project of law which shall be drawn up for the said purpose for the Duchy of Schleswig shall more particularly contain the necessary provisions to give and to secure to the Danish and to the German nationalities in the said Duchy perfect equality of rights and powerful protection.

The suspension of the functions of the Schleswig-Holstein-Lauenburg High Court of Appeal with reference to the Duchy of Schleswig shall be continued. Projects of law for the purpose of definitively limiting the competency of that superior Court to the Duchies of Holstein and of Lauenburg shall be submitted to the next Assembly of the Provincial Estates for their deliberation.

The Provincial Assemblies of the Duchy of Schleswig and of the Duchy of Holstein shall be convened as soon as practicable after the expiration of the present electoral period, which period terminates with the present year, and so soon as the new elections of deputies shall be completed. In those districts of the Duchy of Schleswig where a state of siege prevails, the said elections shall take place only after the said state of siege shall have been raised. The hereditary viril vote in the Provincial Assembly of Schleswig granted to His Serene Highness the Duke of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Augustenburg is repealed. The free use of the Danish as well as of the German language in the Assembly of the Provincial Estates of the Duchy of Schleswig, shall, without any restriction, be permitted in the next Assembly of the said Estates; and we will issue the necessary orders to that effect.

As soon as our sovereign power shall have been fully re-established in our Duchy of Holstein, that Duchy shall be governed according to the existing laws, which laws shall not be altered in any other than in the constitutional manner. In order to establish a uniform Customs system for the whole Monarchy, the necessary preparations shall forthwith be made for the abolition of the Customs boundary on the Eyder; the state of siege existing in some districts of the Duchy of Schleswig shall be raised, and the Patent respecting the amnesty issued for the latter Duchy, under the date of the 10th May, 1851, shall be submitted to an extensive revision. Those who, subsequently to that revision, shall remain excluded from that amnesty shall be permitted to sojourn in any other part of our Monarchy, but those who are not excluded from the amnesty shall have unrestricted liberty to return to the Duchy of Schleswig.

Respecting the Constitution for our Duchy of Lauenburg, we shall publish our Royal resolutions, after preliminary constitutional deliberations with our dear and faithful Estates of the Equestrian and Land orders of that Duchy ("Ritter- und Land-schaft").

Our position as a member of the German Confederation for the Duchies of Holstein and Lauenburg shall undergo no alteration.

We confidently hope that our beloved and faithful subjects in all parts of our Monarchy will recognize in the above a new proof of our paternal sovereign solicitude, extended with equal affection to all of them; and we hope that with the assistance of the Almighty we shall succeed in securing a prosperous future to the countries which are united under our sceptre.

Given at our Castle of Christiansborg, the 28th January, 1852.

Witness our Royal signature and seal prefixed.

(L.S.)

FREDERICK R.

(L.S.)

REVENTLOW-CRIMINIL.

C. F. HANSEN.

W. C. E. SPONNECK.

P. G. BANG.

C. MOLTKE.

C. A. BLUHME.

STEEN-BILLE.

A. W. SCHEEL.

No. 8.

The Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Danish Ministers at Vienna and Berlin..

(Translation.)

Copenhagen, January 29, 1852.

IN reply to the communications which, in conformity with my notes of equal tenour of the 6th December last, you, as well as Count Bille-Brahe (Count von Plessen), have made respectively to the Imperial Royal and to the Royal Prussian Minister President (the Royal Prussian and the Imperial Royal Austrian Minister President), the Baron von Vrints first, and soon afterwards the Baron von Werther, have handed to me copies of the subjoined despatches respectively, of the 26th December last year.

Though these despatches are differently drawn up, yet from the reason alone that the two Courts, as representatives of the German Confederation, form, and must of necessity form, one unity in their joint quality in regard to us, we could not entertain the slightest doubt that a reply on our part, by which we accede to the construction which on the part of Austria is put upon our programme, will not only meet the approbation of the Royal Prussian Government, but will also be considered perfectly sufficient for it to issue forthwith, in company with the Imperial Royal Austrian Cabinet, the necessary orders for the evacuation of the fortress of Rendsburg, and the recall of the Federal Commissioners and troops which at present occupy Holstein, so that the King may without further delay re-enter upon the full and undivided enjoyment of his sovereign power over the country. In like manner as this supposition, which is based on the very nature of the circumstances, has already been confirmed by the confident hope expressed by the Imperial Royal Minister President at the conclusion of his note of the 26th of December, so also has Baron von Werther subsequently given us the express assurance that the Royal Prussian Government, as regards the communications which are to be made to the German Diet, is in perfect harmony with the Austrian views.

Under these circumstances it cannot but afford me the highest satisfaction, pursuant to authorization of His Majesty, hereby to deliver the following Declaration:—

"That the interpretation which in the note of the Imperial Royal Cabinet of the 26th December last year, and in the annex to that note, has been given to the intentions of His Majesty, as intimated to the Courts of Vienna and Berlin (Berlin and Vienna) as well in general as more particularly in regard to the non-incorporation of Schleswig with the Kingdom, is acknowledged by the King our most gracious Master to be in accordance with his own views."

At the same time His Majesty, feeling, after a short indisposition, again enabled to take part in Government business, has not hesitated to prepare for the actual carrying out of those intentions by such proceedings as there is at present occasion for.

For this purpose His Majesty has, in the first place, considered it important, immediately after the dissolution of the heretofore Ministry, to form a Council of State for

the whole Monarchy, and, moreover, to effect this in such manner that His Majesty might confidently look upon the composition of that Ministry as a reassuring guarantee for the maintenance of the interests and of the equal legal position of all parts of the country conformably with his sovereign paternal views. After a careful examination of all the considerations which have to be taken into account on this occasion, and which the head of the State solely and alone can fully appreciate in their totality, His Majesty has been pleased now to call the Privy Council of State into activity again, under his own presidency.

The Proclamation here subjoined, which was issued on the 28th instant, is the first act performed by His Majesty since the new formation of the Privy Council of State.

The contents of this Proclamation of His Majesty will, as the Royal Government may confidently hope, answer to the fullest degree all just expectations; nor can it be doubtful that, after the accordance on our part with the views taken by the Royal Prussian Government, as sharing those of the Imperial Royal Austrian Cabinet, has been decidedly realized by the above Declarations, the form which has been chosen to pronounce the Royal intentions will appear quite sufficient to both Courts, so as to make them no longer hesitate to carry out the measures which have been held up to view on their part.

I therefore request you, in communicating a copy of this note to the Imperial Royal (Royal Prussian) Minister President, to express our confident hope that the Imperial Royal (Royal Prussian) Government will, in accordance with the promise made to us, feel induced to consider as void the mandate by virtue of which the said Government jointly with Prussia (with Austria) represents the German Confederation in the Holstein affair, the evacuation of Rendsburg and of the Duchy of Holstein, and the restitution of the full sovereign power of that Duchy taking place at the same time, and to vouch in the German Diet for the agreement thus made; and that at the same time the said Government will consider the new consolidation of the union of the countries united under the sceptre of the King sufficiently advanced to participate in guaranteeing, according to the law of nations, the integrity of the Danish Monarchy by means of the acknowledgment of the common Succession.

With the remark that a note of the same purport with the present has been forwarded this day to the Royal Ambassador at Berlin (at Vienna), I beg to add only that it is the intention of the King to replace the troops of the Confederation, which hitherto have occupied a part of the fortress of Rendsburg, by troops of the newly-formed Contingent of Holstein-Lauenburg as soon as they go away; that His Majesty finally takes it for granted that the decision relative to the regulation of the boundary question, as yet unsettled, is reserved and at the same time unprejudiced.

(L.S.) BLUHME.

No. 9.

Resolution of the Diet of the Germanic Confederation.

(Translation.)

Frankfort, July 29, 1852.

1. TO recognize the provisions of the Proclamation issued by His Majesty the King of Denmark, Duke of Holstein and Lauenburg, under date of 28th January of the present year, as being in accordance with the laws and the rights of the Confederation, so far as those provisions have reference to the affairs of the Duchies of Holstein and Lauenburg, and are, according to existing circumstances, subject to constitutional examination and resolution thereon by the Confederation; as well as to give the reserved definitive assent to the adjustment of the dispute hitherto existing between Denmark and the German Confederation, which has been thus effected by His Majesty the King, in accordance with the Governments of Austria and Prussia, acting in the name of the Confederation.

2. To request the Royal Danish, Ducal Holstein-Lauenburg Legation to acquaint the Royal Government with the present proceedings, adding at the same time, that the Diet feels persuaded that His Majesty will also in future, and in the same just and conciliatory spirit of which the Royal Proclamation of the 28th of January of the present year bears testimony, watch over the maintenance and fructifying development of the institutions legally existing in those portions of his dominions belonging to the German Confederation, as well as over the position assigned to those countries in their union with the other parts of the Monarchy.

3. To consider the full powers in the Holstein affair entrusted to the Governments of Austria and of Prussia, and which, after the expiration of the term fixed for them, have been tacitly prolonged since the declaration of both Courts, made at the sitting of the 6th September of last year, as being cancelled by the above Resolutions.

Frankfort, July 29, 1852.

Correspondence between Austria, Prussia,
and Denmark. 1851—52.

*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Com-
mand of Her Majesty. 1864.*

LONDON:
PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.

CHINA.

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

STATEMENTS

IN

MR. LAY'S MEMORANDUM

DATED JANUARY 11, 1862.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.
1864.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.

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Correspondence respecting Statements in Mr. Lay's Memorandum
dated January 11, 1862.

No. 1.

Messrs. Matheson and Co. to Mr. Layard.—(Received April 1.)

Sir, 3, Lombard Street, E. C., March 31, 1863.
WE have been requested by Mr. Robert Jardine, of the firm of Messrs. Jardine, Matheson, and Co., of China, to forward you the accompanying official letter; and we trust that as a matter of justice to our China friends it may be included in the next series of papers relating to China which may be presented to Parliament.

Requesting the favour of an acknowledgment, we have, &c.

(Signed) MATHESON & Co.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Mr. R. Jardine to Mr. Layard.

Sir, 3, Lombard Street, March 28, 1863.

MY attention has been called to a Memorandum by Mr. Lay, Inspector of Customs, in the service of the Chinese Government, included in the papers recently presented to Parliament,* in which very grave charges are made against the leading merchants in China, and my firm, Jardine, Matheson and Co., is named as having been engaged in "smuggling."

The Memorandum is dated the 11th January, 1862, and I think I may reasonably complain that it should have now been published without any opportunity being afforded to the parties so wantonly aspersed of meeting the statements made in it.

I have no official documents in this country with which to refute the charges I refer to. But in one of the two cases specified by Mr. Lay (that of the "Rose"), a copy of the decision given by the Consular Court at Shanghai appears in the public papers entirely exonerating the master and owners of the "Rose" from the charge brought against them. On receipt of the Parliamentary papers in China, my firm will take the earliest possible opportunity to furnish you with a complete and satisfactory vindication of their conduct throughout.

There is nothing which we desire more than an efficient Custom-house system established on the coast of China, and we have from the commencement cordially approved the principle of a foreign Inspectorate. I beg, therefore, to protest against the terms used by Mr. Lay in speaking of the leading houses, and mine among them, particularly in paragraph 11 of his Memorandum, page 175, as being most uncalled for and insulting, and giving a colour to our conduct directly the reverse of the truth, as will be readily testified by every high officer of the British Government who has served in China since the opening of the trade in 1834.

I have, &c.

(Signed) R. JARDINE.

* See page 171 of "Further Papers relating to the Rebellion in China," presented to Parliament March 1863.

No. 2.

Mr. Hammond to Messrs. Matheson & Co.

Gentlemen,

Foreign Office, April 6, 1863.

I AM directed by Earl Russell to acknowledge the receipt of your letter to Mr. Layard of the 31st ultimo, forwarding a letter from Mr. Robert Jardine relative to the Memorandum drawn up by Mr. Lay with regard to smuggling in China, which was included in the correspondence recently laid before Parliament.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 3.

Mr. Hammond to Mr. R. Jardine.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 6, 1863.

I AM directed by Earl Russell to acknowledge the receipt of your letter to Mr. Layard of the 28th ultimo, in which you complain of the terms used by Mr. Lay in speaking of the leading mercantile houses in China in his Memorandum of the 11th of January, 1862, which, together with other correspondence, has recently been laid before Parliament.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 4.

Messrs. Jardine, Matheson & Co., to Mr. Layard.—(Received August 8.)

Sir,

Hong Kong, June 10, 1863.

WE have perused with equal surprise and indignation the remarks which Mr. H. N. Lay, Inspector-General of Chinese Customs, has permitted himself to make in the "Memorandum" published in the Appendix (page 171) of "Further Papers relating to the Rebellion in China," which were presented to Parliament by the Foreign Office in March last. Without pausing to dwell on its passages of more general application to China merchants and the China trade, or on its personal accusations of our neighbours, all of which will doubtless receive their appropriate answers elsewhere, we proceed at once to notice the paragraphs in which our firm and various members of it are held up to public condemnation as engaged in illicit and disgraceful practices.

To expose effectually the falsehood of these charges we must, however reluctantly, occupy more of your time than we could wish. As Her Majesty's Government has thought fit to become the medium of publishing such personal attacks to the world, we can only rely on their sense of justice to give the same publicity to the contradiction that they have done to the accusation, and in the same form.

We would first draw your attention to paragraph 11 in the "Memorandum" (page 175), headed "Disfavour of Merchants explained," and ending as follows:—"Disappointment at the result may account for the 'strong language' employed by the Hong Kong Chamber, the Chairman of which is the Head of Jardine, Matheson and Co., which firm has been once fined, and whose vessel has been recently seized while smuggling between Shanghai and Chin-kiang." The whole animus of this paragraph is most discreditable to the writer, and is altogether so unusual in public documents that we can only express our wonder at its being suffered to appear with the sanction of Government. It insinuates by implication what it hardly dares to affirm openly, that merchants in the position of our firm have made fortunes by paying "little or no duties;" that we have practised upon Chinese officials "by bribery or by bullying;" that we are capable of bearing part in his supposititious case, to "smuggle a consignment of cotton goods into port, fill the cases with tea in place of the cotton goods, ship these as cotton goods re-exported, and obtain a drawback for the import duty on the cotton goods that had never been paid." It exults in the "merchant prince" being debarred from "such doings;" it describes him as "naturally chafed at having to conform to any rules or regulations whatever;" it depicts his resentment at "having to forego large profits, and the luxury of doing whatever seemed good in his eyes;" it states with the effrontery of untruth that

"when honest, he declined to conform to the regulations; when dishonest, he essayed attempts, successful in former times, to defraud, relying upon his influence at home and abroad to deter the British officers of Customs from making him an open enemy." Such is the habitual conduct of the British merchant in China as portrayed by Mr. Lay; and of this portrait the only representatives instanced are our firm and its managing partner.

We protest, Sir, in the strongest terms against such monstrous language. Nothing but literal truth could justify such a libel; and here, as we will show, there is not even the semblance of truth. It is no mean outrage that merchants hitherto esteemed to be of reputation and honour should be dragged from the privacy of their station and business to figure unwarrantably in an aspect so odious. It is unfair to them that such accusations should be kept dormant by Her Majesty's Government for fourteen months without any attempt being made (so far as it appears) to ascertain their credibility, and then laid before Parliament and the country with all the weight which such a mode of publication implies. We can hardly condescend to notice the vulgar passage which speaks of the discomfiture of the merchant "who had had Admirals and Ambassadors as guests in his house;" but it may be assumed that Her Majesty's Representatives in China of these respective professions are, at least, as capable of estimating the character of their acquaintances as is Mr. Lay, and that there is little probability of their exchanging social courtesies with any man who could habitually or at any time act as that gentleman alleges, while it is even less likely that they would demean their high offices by "asking the opinion, and sometimes acting upon it," of a host so utterly unworthy of confidence.

In China, where we are well known, our refutation of charges so preposterous would be superfluous; and even in England we are not so wholly unknown as that our solemn denial of them may not carry some weight. We affirm, then, that we have not acted as above described, and should blush to be esteemed capable of doing so. With respect to our attitude towards the Custom-house in China, as managed by foreigners, we can assert with truth that we were the steady advocates and upholders of the system at a time when it could count very few friends. We believed that it was calculated to remedy evils which were beginning to prove of serious injury to legitimate trade, and so long as the foreigners employed preserved their position of subordinate revenue officers we saw nothing to object to in their introduction. We were, therefore, most anxious that it should have a fair trial, and it is only through a lengthened experience of the arbitrary injustice and needless annoyances which in too many instances its present mode of working has given rise to that we have been compelled to modify our views. Even now we are far from desiring the abolition of the foreign Custom-house, but we do most earnestly desire its thorough reform; and until this is accomplished we feel persuaded that the institution will be the fruitful source of future complications between the Governments of Great Britain and China, and of constant dissensions between merchants and officials, which can be beneficial to none concerned. Meanwhile, notwithstanding many causes of complaint which we have against Customs management at several of the ports, our instructions to our Agents all along the coast of China have uniformly been not merely to pay every lawful duty to the last cent, but also to pay (under protest) every surcharge or exaction levied, whatever its nature or circumstance might be, taking no further steps in the matter until they had referred the case to ourselves. We have enjoined them above all things not to quarrel with the Custom-house officials, and to afford them no cause of preferring complaints of irregularities against our firm. These instructions we believe to have been very fairly carried out; and it is something that in four years of the varied and constant transactions which we have had with the Custom-house under its present system of management, Mr. Lay is only able to adduce against us the two instances of alleged misconduct noticed in the passage from which we have extracted above, and which are more particularly referred to at page 176 of the "Memorandum" as "Case of the Hellespont" and "Case of the Rose."

We shall proceed to give a faithful account of these two cases, which will show what an unjustifiable use Mr. Lay has made of them. For that of the "Hellespont" we have to go back as far as March 1859, when, with the sanction of the Chinese authorities and their foreign Commissioners of Customs, all the opium receiving-ships lay near Woo-sung, about twelve miles from Shanghai. That this was a recognized "anchorage for loading and discharging" is sufficiently shown by the fact that all vessels importing opium remained there until their drug was discharged; among others the contract steamers of the Peninsular and Oriental Company carrying Her Majesty's mails invariably did so. There was, therefore, nothing irregular in the circumstance of the "Hellespont" (the chief portion of her cargo being opium) lying at Woo-sung. She had, however, likewise on board eighty-two packages of merchandize intended for Shanghai. The "Hellespont" was urgently required for another voyage, and as a second vessel of ours, the "Laurick," happened at the same moment to

be at Woo-sung inward bound, to save time we transhipped these packages from the "Hellespont" to the "Laurick." As soon as the latter vessel arrived at Shanghai, the whole of the goods in question were entered for duty in the usual manner. Not the slightest attempt at concealment was made; the original manifest and bills of lading per "Hellespont" were even exhibited at the Custom-house to show that everything was accounted for, and the duties were paid. The Custom-house after receiving these duties actually claimed the confiscation of the goods transhipped, and announced a fine of 500 dollars on the "Hellespont." These claims were preferred through Her Majesty's Consul (for in those days the jurisdiction of the Consul in revenue cases was not ignored), who after inquiring into the circumstances promptly disallowed the confiscation, and urged, though ineffectually, that a fine of 100 dollars was ample. He declined to make any official levy of the larger fine, which the Custom-house accordingly enforced by refusing to clear the "Laurick" until the 500 dollars had been paid in. In support of this statement we would refer you to Mr. Consul Robertson's letters to Woo, Taoutae, dated 19th, 24th, and 29th March, 1859, in the course of which he expressly says: "Were I not convinced that there was no intention on the part of Messrs. Jardine, Matheson and Co. to break the regulations or commit an act of smuggling, I would not have supported them for one moment; but it was clearly an oversight." So far then from admitting that any boon was accorded by commuting the confiscation into a fine, we were of opinion then, and are so still, that we were treated with unmerited harshness in being fined at all.

The case of the "Rose" formed the subject of an investigation which was held in the Shanghai Consular Court on the 8th August, 1861, upon a plaint brought by the Chinese Superintendent of Customs against the boat "Rose," not for smuggling, but for "having in defiance of the above regulations (Treaty of Tien-tsin, and Regulations for Trade on the Yang-tze) traded at certain places between this port and Chin-kiang." The fact of this plaint being brought officially shows that even at so recent a period comparatively the right of the British Consul to adjudicate on breaches of the revenue laws alleged against British subjects was fully admitted by the Chinese authorities. The proceedings at the Court are very voluminous (filling four columns of close print); but were verbally reproduced from the Consulate records in the "North China Herald" newspaper of 17th August, a copy of which can be exhibited to you by our London correspondents, Messrs. Matheson and Co., if desired. The following is a summary of the circumstances:—

The "Rose" had for some two years traded between Shanghai and Sin-yu-miou for the purpose of taking up opium and bringing back specie. Our partner, Mr. Whittall, distinctly denies that either he or the Captain "had been previously warned by the Commissioners of Customs of the illegal nature of the 'Rose's' proceedings." The Commissioner was informed of her destination; but would not clear her for Sin-yu-miou, saying that he could only clear for places specified in the Treaty. She was accordingly cleared for Chin-kiang, from which Sin-yu-miou is distant some twenty miles. She invariably entered and cleared at the foreign Custom-house, while her trading was conducted with the knowledge and sanction of the local mandarins, who several times sent letters by her, and on one occasion supplied her with a gun as a defence against pirates. The duties were always paid in full upon whatever cargo she took. Upon the occasion complained of she went up the river in ballast to obtain treasure, with which in due time she returned; and her only other cargo consisted of eight boxes tea, and two boxes silk goods, which were at once reported for duty in the customary manner as soon as she arrived at Shanghai. These ten packages did not even belong to us, having been placed on board without our knowledge or consent by the Chinese shroff as a small speculation on his own account. After a minute investigation of all the circumstances the Court declined to convict for a breach of the Yang-tze Regulations, as it held that penalties could not be recovered under them without more formal authorization by Her Majesty's Minister; and further decided "that the defendants are not punishable under Article XLVII of the Tien-tsin Treaty, as the visit of the 'Rose' to Sin-yu-miou for trading purposes was warranted by the encouragement given by the Chinese authorities, and by precedents established by themselves on other parts of the coast." The case was subsequently appealed by the Superintendent of Customs to Peking, where Sir Frederick Bruce (who very rarely decides in favour of a British subject against the Custom-house) reversed the Consular decision without assigning a single reason, and fined the "Rose" 500 dollars.

It will thus be seen that two different Consuls (Mr. Robertson and Mr. Medhurst) fully exonerated us in the only two cases which Mr. Lay is able to adduce. Moreover, even had their decision been otherwise, nothing could be more false than to term these charges "Instances of Smuggling" (as is done in the heading of paragraph 12 of the "Memorandum" in which they appear), or to state that our "vessel has been recently seized while engaged in smuggling on the Yang-tze between Chin-kiang and Shanghai."

We apprehend that to constitute an act of smuggling some fraud upon the revenue, or at least some intention to defraud, must be shown; while here not only is everything above board, and freely communicated to the Customs officials without attempt at concealment, but every fraction of duty involved had been paid even before complaint was made. It can hardly be supposed that Mr. Lay was ignorant of the true state of the cases when he penned these charges. Yet knowing what they were, he deliberately sat down to put a construction upon them which is palpably untruthful; or else he must have received the details from his subordinate, the Shanghai Commissioner, as condemnatory of us, while the latter carefully suppressed all the circumstances bearing in our favour. In either alternative the administration of the China Custom-house is not exhibited in a very honourable light.

While writing this letter we are advised from Shanghai of another fine, which we take this opportunity of explaining, lest it should figure in some future Blue Book as case of the "Carthage," and likewise because it is a fair example of the arbitrary manner in which the Customs authorities now habitually act. Our steamer "Carthage" sailed on the 30th April last, on a coasting voyage to Amoy, Foo-chow, Ningpo, and Shanghai with a general cargo. She had on board fifty chests of opium, of which our agent at Foo-chow was directed to take delivery, if he considered it advisable. He did not do so, but allowed the drug to be carried on to Shanghai, advising this in his letter to the firm there. The moment that the steamer arrived at Shanghai, the shipping clerk made out a manifest as usual for the Customs, and, knowing nothing of these fifty chests, did not include them. When the letters were read the omission was rectified, and permits taken out the same day for the entire quantity of opium on board, including the fifty chests.

It will hardly be credited in England that the Custom-house authorities, in the plenitude of their power (Sir Frederick Bruce having recently decreed that the Consuls are not to adjudicate or interfere in any case of Customs seizures, penalties, or confiscations), levied a fine of 500 taels for presenting a false manifest, which, to get the steamer cleared, we were compelled to pay. The only result of our explanation of the obvious and temporary mistake was that, as an act of grace, the fine was reduced to 200 taels, and the balance of 300 taels refunded to us. Persisting, however, that we had done nothing wrong, we have placed the matter in the hands of Mr. Consul Harvey. It is probable that his instructions preclude him from acting at all, in which case we intend appealing to Sir Frederick Bruce, though we must confess with very faint hopes of being righted. It can scarcely be wondered at that merchants lose their patience when subjected to such treatment at the hands of those whom Great Britain has helped into places of power under the Chinese Government, especially when they are at the same time calumniated as smugglers and resisters of the law.

We have thus, Sir, endeavoured to give a complete and satisfactory reply to Mr. Lay's distorted accusations; and we hope to find that our vindication of our conduct has been established in the eyes of Her Majesty's Government, though we must be prepared to expect, as the result of our plain speaking, increased severity of treatment at the hands of those who are under the Inspector-General's control, in the exercise of the large powers over British trade with which, as it appears to us, both he and they have been so unwisely invested.

We have, &c.

(Signed) JARDINE, MATHESON & Co.

No. 5.

Mr. Layard to Messrs. Jardine, Matheson & Co.

Gentlemen,

Foreign Office, August 18, 1863.

I AM directed by Earl Russell to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th of June last, in reply to certain statements contained in the Memorandum by Mr. Lay, which was published in the Appendix to the "Further Papers relating to the Rebellion in China," laid before Parliament in March last.

I am, &c.

(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

Messrs. Dent & Co. to Earl Russell.—(Received August 28.)

Your Lordship,

Shanghai, June 30, 1863.

IN a Blue Book dated 1863, containing "Further Papers relating to the Rebellion in China," published for the information of the members of Parliament, and which has just been received in China, we have noticed a Memorandum by Mr. Lay, Chinese Inspector of Customs, on the complaints of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Chambers of Commerce.

Without entering into the general questions involved in that controversy, we cannot allow Mr. Lay, among his "instances of smuggling," to bring forward the name of our firm, Dent, Beale, and Co., without refutation.

It was at the time in Shanghai a matter of notoriety—and no one knew it better than Mr. Lay himself—that the two instances quoted against us as acts of smuggling were not at all so, in the ordinary acceptation of the term.

In the case of the "Paou-Shun," in June 1855, the vessel had left Hong Kong for this port in ballast, and calling at Amoy *en route*, a trifling quantity of merchandize was put on board by a Chinese, of which we knew nothing, and when the vessel was entered by us in ballast, she was fined by Mr. Lay, as he states. Without troubling your Lordship with all the details of the case, we may mention that the goods not belonging to ourselves, we could have no possible interest in evading the duty; and even if they had been our property, the quantity of them and the amount of duty leviable was ridiculously small. The case was brought before Her Britannic Majesty's Consul here, and decided in our favour; but Mr. Lay, although willing to come into Court to obtain a decision against us, refused to abide by the judgment when given against himself, and declined to clear the vessel until the two fines were paid. This was done under protest, and the case was referred to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who ordered that the fines should be repaid to us, which, however, was never done. In support of our statement, we refer your Lordship to the original correspondence and documents forwarded to the Foreign Office at the time. Mr. Lay thus accuses us of smuggling upon a case which was decided by an impartial tribunal not to be so.

In the second instance, that of the "Wynaud," which vessel was seized for loading rice, in April 1855, it is also well known that until that time vessels had taken in rice (an article on which no duty, either import or export, was leviable under the old Treaty), whenever it was desired, without any opposition from the Customs; and this seizure was only made under the plea of an old disused Chinese law against it, of which there was no mention either in the Treaty or Regulations then in force.

From Mr. Lay's own account of the matter, your Lordship will observe that permits to export rice had been constantly refused. This refusal of the Customs was regarded as an unauthorized stretch of power, and the rice was shipped without such permission. It will also be noticed, in Mr. Lay's account of the case of the "Spec," that the prohibition to export rice, emanating from the Chinese authorities, was not made public till May 1855, a month after the affair of the "Wynaud" had happened, and that the French Consul, so far from regarding the Chinese authorities as exercising a right in prohibiting it, sanctioned the shipment, in defiance of the new Regulations of the Customs.

Upon such grounds as these Mr. Lay does not hesitate to brand us as smugglers when it suits his purpose, in order to extol the system of the Foreign Inspectorate of Customs.

We feel that we may leave this matter in your Lordship's hands without further comment, only requesting that in any future Blue Book on the affairs of China this letter may have the same publicity as Mr. Lay's charge against us.

We have, &c.
(Signed) DENT & Co.

No. 7.

Mr. Layard to Messrs. Dent & Co.

Gentlemen,

Foreign Office, September 4, 1863.

I AM directed by Earl Russell to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th of June, relative to the statements made by Mr. Lay in the paper relating to the Chinese Custom-house which was laid before Parliament last session.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 8.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received October 28.)

My Lord,

Peking, July 31, 1863.

I BEG to forward herewith a letter from Messrs. Dent and Co., of Shanghai, to your Lordship, remarking on certain statements contained in Mr. Lay's Memorandum recently published among the papers on Chinese affairs laid before Parliament.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure in No. 8.

Messrs. Dent & Co. to Earl Russell, June 30, 1863.

[See No. 6.]

No. 9.

Mr. Hammond to Messrs. Dent & Co.

Gentlemen,

Foreign Office, November 4, 1863.

I AM directed by Earl Russell to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th of June, which was forwarded to his Lordship by Her Majesty's Minister at Peking, and which contains observations on certain statements contained in Mr. Lay's Memorandum recently laid before Parliament among the papers on Chinese affairs; and I am to inform you that your letter will be published with the next series of papers on the same subject.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 10.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received November 16.)

My Lord.

Peking, September 7, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a letter from the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce to your Lordship, with reference to a Memorandum by Mr. H. N. Lay, contained in the papers on China lately published for Parliament.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure in No. 10.

The Chairman of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce to Earl Russell.

Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce, Shanghai,

My Lord,

August 10, 1863.

ON behalf of the members of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, I beg most respectfully to address you under the following circumstances:—

In a Blue Book, entitled "Further Papers relating to the Rebellion in China," recently received in this country, there is printed a Memorandum by Mr. Lay, Chinese Inspector of Customs, in reference to the complaints of this and the Hong Kong Chambers of Commerce. Your Lordship has already replied to our memorials, and I should not again venture to trouble you on the same subjects had not Mr. Lay, in order to support his own views, made statements regarding the merchants in China which cannot be allowed to pass uncontradicted. The acrimony with which this Memorandum is written, and the furious way in which individuals and the statements made by them are assailed, might of themselves raise suspicions of the weakness of the cause he defends, and certainly prove the impossibility of his giving fair and calm opinions on the matters treated of. I do not propose to re-argue any of the points in dispute between this Chamber and the Customs, but only to show the incorrectness of some of Mr. Lay's statements, and the want of foundation for the charges so wantonly made against the merchants.

Mr. Lay states that the merchants complain "of outrages and injustice, but in no case that he is aware of have they brought forward a single fact in support of their allegations." Considering the despotic administration of the Customs under his own inspection, it is hard to say what he would admit to be an outrage or injustice; but if fining vessels very large sums for the most trifling and evident mistakes of a master or a merchant's clerk, seizing goods and confiscating them without trial or explanation, and frequently in opposition to the opinion of the Consuls, who can have no possible interest in protecting a smuggler, be regarded as such, there are numberless cases, some few of which are in the list he himself cites to prove that the China merchants are smugglers, viz., cases of "Salacia," "Paou-shun," "Hellespont."

In order to show that the merchants are only restrained from smuggling by the Customs, Mr. Lay mentions some instances of it, bringing forward the names of some of the largest firms in China, and applying to them the opprobrious name of smugglers, when perfectly well aware that in nearly every case it was a simple dispute, or the mere infringement of technical regulations, and had nothing to do with defrauding the revenue.

1. *Case of the "Spec."*—From Mr. Lay's own account of the matter it will be observed that there was no notification against the export of rice by foreigners till the Superintendent of Customs issued one on the 24th May, 1855, and up to a month before that time when the dispute took place about the "Wynaud" loading rice, it always was so exported whenever it was desired to do so. Messrs. Russell and Co. applied to ship the rice, and when the Customs refused to permit it, they shipped it under the direct authority of the French Consul, who like themselves did not recognize the power of a small local official to make such a change in the existing practice. No duty ever was at that time paid on the exportation of rice, that being arranged in the new Tariff in the Treaty of Tien-tsin.

2. *Case of the "Salacia."*—This was a simple mistake in the entry by a clerk of Messrs. Gilman and Co., who did not know the difference in the classification of cottons by the Customs. It is against reason to suppose that any one should knowingly risk property worth 6,000*l.* to save 250*l.* in duty; the error was one that might readily be committed.

3. *Case of the "Paou-Shun."*—This vessel left Hong Kong in ballast calling at Amoy, when some cases of vermilion were put on board by a Chinese unknown to the consignees. She was entered "in ballast," and fined as Mr. Lay states for giving a false manifest, although, as the goods belonged to a Chinese, the owners could have no possible interest in smuggling them.

She was fined also for discharging without a permit, the goods so discharged being one addressed parcel of ribbons, which was received and forwarded among other miscellaneous packages without any charge for freight, as was and is still customary with addressed parcels.

These two ridiculous cases were brought on in the British Consular Court, and decided in favour of Messrs. Dent, Blake, and Co.; on Mr. Lay refusing to abide by the decision, the matter was referred to the Home Government, who also decided against Mr. Lay's view.

4. *Case of the "Wynaud."*—This vessel was seized for loading rice in April 1855, one month before any notice against it was given, as mentioned in the case of the "Spec." "Permits to ship" were applied for, and being refused it was done without them, as the refusal was regarded as an unauthorized stretch of power. No duty whatever was chargeable on rice at that time.

5. *Case of the "Unicorn."*—This Chamber has no knowledge of the case in question.

6. *Cases of the "Emily Annina."*—These two were the only true cases of smuggling, in the usual acceptation of the term (unless No. 5 be one), in Mr. Lay's whole list; and as it would have been little to his purpose to bring them forward against unknown individuals, he points out Messrs. Lindsay and Co. as the parties in one case, and Messrs. Blenkin, Rawson, and Co., in the other. The real individuals, two clerks in Messrs. Lindsay and Co.'s employ, who smuggled in the first case, went themselves to Mr. Lay, and acknowledging that they had done so, exonerated Messrs. Lindsay and Co. The culpable individual in the second case was a Chinese in the employ of Messrs. Blenkin, Rawson, and Co.

7. *Case of the "Hellespont."*—This vessel did what had hitherto been permitted, and was a frequent practice to save time, viz., discharged her cargo at Woo-sung into another vessel, which latter vessel brought it to Shanghai, the "Hellespont" proceeding to Japan. The cargo was reported at Shanghai by Messrs. Jardine, Matheson, and Co. themselves, as "Hellespont" and the duties tendered, thus showing that no concealment or fraud was thought of; but this did not save the cargo from seizure and threats of confiscation, and eventually from a fine.

8. *Case of the "Rose."*—The owners of this vessel having made several trading voyages to Sin-yu-miou, a port between Shanghai and Chin-kiang, with the knowledge and sanction of the Chinese authorities, and having carried their despatches, had been notified by the Foreign Customs that the trade must be discontinued, as being to a port in contravention of the Treaty. She then proceeded in ballast to bring back treasure, the returns for cargo previously sold, and lay for three days at the entrance of the creek to Sin-yu-miou, without proceeding to that town.

A Chinese servant of Messrs. Jardine, Matheson, and Co. did put on board eight packages of tea and two packages of silk goods. This gave a handle to the Foreign Customs to accuse her of trading; but the case was considered by the British Consular Court, on the 8th August, 1861, as undeserving anything but the most mitigated penalty, and it was decided "that, under the XLVIIIth Article of the Treaty, the defendants (Messrs. Jardine, Matheson, and Co.) were not punishable, as the visit of the "Rose" to Sin-yu-miou for trading purposes was warranted by the encouragement given by the Chinese authorities, and by precedents established by themselves on other parts of the coast."

By these explanations your Lordship will perceive that Mr. Lay's accusations are utterly untrue. He does not state that the merchants, at the commencement of the system of foreign inspection, resisted what they considered illegal assumptions on his part, nor that in several of the very cases he cites the Consular Courts decided against the Customs; but calls them by the opprobrious term of smugglers to damage their characters, and thereby lessen the weight of their testimony against the Customs.

Mr. Lay points to the Trade Returns of Shanghai, which show a great increase on the past seven years, as a proof that the system of Foreign Customs did not injure trade. A more specious and transparent argument could hardly be brought forward. Seven years ago no port in Japan, or on the Yang-tze-Kiang, or on the coast of China to the north of Shanghai, was open, whereas all these nine new ports do more or less business with this place; and further, the opium trade was not then included in the Returns, only being admitted since the conclusion of the Treaty of Tien-tsin.

I do not speak of those charges brought more directly against the Hong Kong Chamber, and it is needless to refer to the tirade of abuse which Mr. Lay indulges in when giving his own explanations of the disfavour of the merchants. I merely rebut those statements he makes affecting their honesty and truth, and have to request that in any future "Blue Book" published on the affairs of China this letter may be inserted in their justification.

Regretting that I should be obliged in defending the members of this Chamber from gratuitous calumny to trouble your Lordship, I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWARD WEBB, *Chairman.*

No. 11.

Mr. Hammond to the Chairman of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 18, 1863.

I AM directed by Earl Russell to acknowledge the receipt of the letter dated August 10, signed by you on behalf of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, and which has been forwarded to his Lordship through Her Majesty's Minister in China, respecting the statements made by Mr. Lay in the Memorandum by that gentleman which was published in the Papers relating to the affairs of China recently laid before Parliament.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 12.

Mr. Hammond to Mr. Lay.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 27, 1863.

I AM directed by Earl Russell to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a Memorial* addressed to his Lordship respecting the statements contained in the

* Inclosure in No. 10.

Memorandum drawn up by you, dated January 11, 1862, which was published in the Papers relative to the affairs of China presented to Parliament during last Session.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 13.

Sir F. Bruce to Mr. Layard.—(Received December 14.)

Sir,

Peking, October 10, 1863.

I BEG to forward the inclosed documents from Messrs Lindsay and Co. of Shanghai respecting certain passages in Mr. Lay's Memorandum to Earl Russell affecting their firm. They are desirous of having Mr. Lindsay's letter to you of the 30th of March last inserted in the next volume of Papers on China published for Parliament.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 13.

Messrs. Lindsay & Co., to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Shanghai, September 14, 1863.

WE take the liberty of inclosing to you copies of the whole of a correspondence between our Mr. H. H. Lindsay, ourselves, and Mr. Lay, accompanied by an affidavit by Mr. H. R. Innes, on the subject of the course taken by Mr. Lay in reference to our firm in the Memorandum commencing page 171 of the Parliamentary Blue Book presented to Parliament in March last, in continuation of former Papers on the Rebellion in China.

We venture to request your Excellency's kind perusal of the correspondence, and we hope that your Excellency will see fit to accede to our wish that the letter of our Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Layard of 30th March last should appear in the next ensuing Blue Book by soliciting for us at the hands of the Foreign Office its insertion.

We had intended asking that the whole correspondence might be so inserted, but it has become so extended that we refrain from doing so; and, moreover, it is of the less consequence to us because, whilst it seems to us essential that some refutation of Mr. Lay's unfair notice of the copper cash case and the "Emily Annina" should appear in the same publication which contained his remarks, Mr. Layard, Her Majesty's Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has from his seat in Parliament most fully relieved our firm from those unjust imputations which Mr. Lay, in the full knowledge that in reality two of our clerks and not the firm were the guilty parties, had cast upon it.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LINDSAY & Co.

Inclosure 2 in No. 13.

Mr. H. Lindsay to Mr. Layard.

Sir,

The Hermitage, Ripley, Surrey, March 30, 1863.

I HAVE recently perused with much interest the Blue Book relating to the Rebellion in China, but to my great surprise, at page 176, in a Memorandum by Mr. Lay, Chinese Inspector of Customs, under date London, 11th January, 1862, I have seen the following paragraph:—

"Case of the 'Emily Amina.'—Application was made by Lindsay and Co. to ship 60 hogsheads of coal (on which no duty was due). Suspected and seized. The barrels were found to contain 1,000l. worth of copper cash, dexterously concealed by the coal above and below. The export of cash is altogether prohibited, and a notice to this effect had been published by Mr. Alcock in 1848, by direction of Her Majesty's Plenipotentiary, Sir George Bonham. The whole was confiscated."

The facts of this case are as follows, and are well known to Mr. Lay as well as to the community of Shanghai.

Two clerks in the employ of Lindsay and Co., in direct violation of their agreements,

and without the knowledge of the partners, committed this act of smuggling. A third, senior to the others, was cognizant of the act, though not a sharer in the transaction. On discovery they were justly punished by a confiscation of property worth 1,000*l*. The elder clerk left our service in consequence; the younger one, having fully and frankly acknowledged his error, was forgiven. In corroboration of this I annex an extract from a letter written by myself, under date 7th April, 1858, to the senior, who knew what was done but did not participate:—

“I cannot adequately describe to you how grieved and disappointed I have felt on hearing from Mr. James Hogg that all the annoyance arising from the clandestine trading of our clerks, which had created so much trouble some years ago, had again occurred, and in a more aggravated form. It appears that Mr. — and Mr. —, not content with clandestinely trading in violation of their bond, actually used the name of the firm to cover an attempt at smuggling, which was discovered, and thus led to a complete exposure. Mr. — has throughout shown so much duplicity that I sincerely hope a prosecution may have been instituted, and the full penalty enforced. Mr. — having fully and frankly confessed his fault and requested Mr. Hogg’s forgiveness, I am glad to find that he has treated him with leniency.”

The firm bearing my name have throughout been consistent supporters of the new system, the object of which was that the legal duties should be fairly levied on all. Such an act of smuggling—discreditable under any circumstances—would, in my opinion, have been absolutely disgraceful and dishonourable had it been committed by a firm avowedly supporting the introduction of a new and better system of collecting duties. Under these circumstances I think I may in justice request that Lord Russell will allow this refutation of an unjust and injurious charge to appear in the next batch of Chinese correspondence laid before Parliament.

Mr. Lay justly merits and has gained much credit for the combination of firmness, conciliation, and tact by which he has obtained the full confidence of the Chinese Government; it is therefore with much regret that I see the tone of sarcasm he adopts towards his own countrymen in page 175. Surely such remarks cannot tend to promote that spirit of friendly co-operation from the leading merchants in China which is so essential for the general interests of both Chinese and foreigners. I shall inclose a copy of this letter to Mr. Lay by the next mail, and shall request him to confirm the accuracy of the statement I have now made.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. H. LINDSAY.

Inclosure 3 in No. 13.

Mr. H. Lindsay to Mr. Lay.

My dear Sir,

The Hermitage, Ripley, Surrey, April 9, 1863.

I HERE inclose a copy of an official letter I felt called upon to write to Mr. Layard on reading your remarks on the case of the “Emily Annina” contained in your Memorandum dated the 11th of January, 1862. You may recollect that the last time I had the pleasure of seeing you at your office this very case was a topic of conversation between us, and I certainly imagined that you were well aware of the real facts which were matter of public notoriety in Shanghai at the time. I was therefore not a little surprised on seeing our firm held up to public odium as guilty of an act of very discreditable smuggling, which would have been doubly disgraceful if committed by a firm which was avowedly giving its hearty support to the introduction of a fair and honest collection of the revenue. Under these circumstances I think I am justly entitled to request that you will favour me with a reply, stating whether or not the statement I have officially made to Mr. Layard is in accordance with your knowledge of the facts of the case. Both Antrobus and myself most heartily desire to give every support in our power to make the new system work pleasantly, but we both feel it unjust that such unmerited reflections should be cast upon Lindsay and Co. in papers laid before Parliament.

Believe me, &c.
(Signed) H. H. LINDSAY.

Inclosure 4 in No. 13.

Messrs. Lindsay & Co. to Mr. Lay.

Dear Sir,

Shanghai, May 28, 1863.

WE have the pleasure of handing to you herein a cover from our Mr. H. H. Lindsay, containing a letter to your address of the 9th of April, and copy of a letter from him to Mr. Layard, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, dated the 30th of March, of each of which Mr. Lindsay has sent us a copy.

We thoroughly confirm Mr. Lindsay's letter, and with him consider that we are entitled to receive at your hands an admission that our firm was morally free from blame in the case of smuggling of copper cash per "Emily Annina," as well as that this was known to you when you addressed to Earl Russell the Memorandum inserted at page 171 of the Blue Book on China just published.

That so it was is to our personal knowledge the case; for, besides the fact that such was a matter of public notoriety in Shanghai at the time, we have the evidence of Mr. James Hogg, the then resident partner of our firm here, and of the junior clerk involved in the smuggling transaction, both of which gentlemen are still here. The former informs us that he personally assured you of his entire ignorance of the whole transaction until informed of the seizure; and the latter assures us that he personally confessed to you his own culpability in the matter, and entirely freed our firm from all knowledge of or participation in the transaction.

Whilst, therefore, we must lay to the charge of those who committed the act the unpleasantness of having our name brought forward as involved, though without our knowledge or sanction, in so discreditable a proceeding, we cannot help feeling ourselves deeply aggrieved at your hands for having, in order to support a statement (into the merits of which we will not now enter), that the merchants as a class, and the leading firms in China in particular, objected to and opposed the Foreign Inspectorate of Customs, and deliberately infringed its rules and regulations, represented us in a paper laid before Parliament as an example of such behaviour in the committal of an act which would involve us in well-merited reprobation, but from all connivance in or knowledge of which you knew us, when you addressed Earl Russell, to be perfectly free.

As an act of simple justice therefore to us, we have to ask you, in so far as still lies in your power, to rectify those wrong impressions, injurious to our credit and our good name, to which your remarks must, amongst those not personally acquainted with us, inevitably have given rise.

We remain, &c.
(Signed) LINDSAY & Co.

Inclosure 5 in No. 13.

Mr. Lay to Messrs. Lindsay & Co.

Gentlemen,

Peking, June 16, 1863.

I AM in receipt of your letter of the 28th ultimo, and its inclosures, relating to the case of copper cash smuggling per "Emily Annina," and requesting me, so far as lies in my power, to rectify those impressions injurious to the credit of your firm to which the remarks on this case contained in my published Memorandum of the 11th January, 1862, must in your opinion have inevitably given rise.

For the sake of accuracy I will first state the facts of the case as they were known to me when I wrote my Memorandum:—

1. Application was made in the usual way by Messrs. Lindsay and Co. for a permit to ship sixty hogsheads of coal.
2. Subsequent to shipment, the hogsheads were discovered to contain, besides coal, copper cash, and were thereon seized.
3. After the seizure, Mr. James Hogg came forward and disclaimed, on the part of his firm, all cognizance of the transaction.
4. One of the clerks in the house presented himself at the Custom-house, and declared the cash to be his property. A few days later, a junior clerk appeared, declaring that he too had a share in the shipment.
5. The sixty hogsheads with their contents were confiscated.

Your letter under acknowledgment informs me that the junior clerk "personally confessed his own culpability and entirely freed your firm from all knowledge or participation in the transaction."

No such confession was communicated to me. Another clerk assumed ownership of the cash seized, and, as I have stated, Mr. James Hogg came forward and disclaimed on the part of the firm all cognizance of the transaction; but it was only in February of this year (1863), more than twelve months after the date of my Memorandum, since published in the Blue Book, that I learned in the course of conversation with Mr. H. H. Lindsay, that a clerk had been dismissed for his participation in the affair. Until then I was unaware that Messrs. Lindsay and Co. had taken any further steps to separate themselves from the act of their clerks, or otherwise to mark their disapproval of their clerks' proceedings.

I have gone thus much into detail because your letter alleges, that in order to support my statement of the grounds on which the mercantile community in general was opposed to the Customs establishment, of which I am the head, I had represented your firm as engaged in an act from all knowledge of which I knew you, when I drew up my statement, to be perfectly free. I have thought it due to myself to show that there are no grounds whatever for such an allegation.

Your letter presses for an admission at my hands that your firm was "morally free from blame" in the case of the "Emily Annina." I take the liberty of recommending you to publish this correspondence, and I make no doubt that the perusal of it will remove any misconception that may have previously existed as to the real merits of the case.

I cannot, on principle, say more than this. It is with the infraction of the Revenue laws alone that, in any particular case, the Customs have to deal; they are not competent to condemn or acquit on the ground that they assume the intention to have been fraudulent, or the reverse. The exoneration, should any be deemed necessary, of those whose names may be unfortunately connected with such infraction of the Revenue laws, must depend not on a Customs certificate of belief in the purity of their motives, but on the decision at which, as in your case, the action taken by themselves may enable the public to arrive.

I have only to add that in the defence forced upon me of a system that had been furiously assailed, it was impossible for me not to state what I conceived generally to have the grounds on which the law, as administered by the Customs Establishment, had been defied or evaded, and, in answer to the specific charge of over-stringency, to bring forward the most prominent instances of infraction of these laws. It was equally unavoidable that, in the enumeration of these instances, the names of the parties directly or indirectly concerned should be given; but they were given with no personal animus, either in the case of the "Emily Annina" or in any other case to which I had occasion to refer.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. N. LAY.

Inclosure 6 in No. 13.

Messrs. Lindsay & Co. to Mr. Lay.

Sir,

Shanghai, July 27, 1863.

WE have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 16th June, in reply to our communication to your address of the 28th May.

You say, "For the sake of accuracy I will first state the facts of the case as they were known to me when I wrote my Memorandum."

We thank you for doing this, for you confirm our assertions and those of Mr. Lindsay in every single particular, save one, where you deny that the junior clerk involved in the transaction confessed to you his own culpability, and entirely freed our firm from all knowledge of, or participation in, the matter.

We were hardly likely to make so distinct a statement save on the safest grounds, and now to aid in recalling the circumstance to your memory, which appears to be defective, we inclose to you an affidavit by Mr. H. R. Innes, the gentleman in question, entirely corroborating, under oath, the correctness of our statement to you of the 28th May.

With your own admissions, therefore, before us, and with the production of the inclosed affidavit, it is established beyond a shadow of doubt that our allegation that "you had represented our firm as engaged in an act, from all knowledge of which you knew us, when you drew up your statement, to be perfectly free," is true to the very letter, and substantiated in every single particular.

It may, perhaps, not be within the province of the Customs to give any opinion as to intentions, but merely to notice acts and positive infractions of its regulations; but it is equally certain that it is not the province of the Customs, still less that of its Chief

Superintendent, to convey to the public wrong and unjust impressions in regard to the conduct of any house of business; and if that has been done, though without intention, there does lie, in our opinion, an honourable obligation upon the Customs and its Superintendent, if he personally has committed the act, just as there would be upon any individual gentleman in private life, to rectify, as far as may be possible, the wrong impressions created.

You "take the liberty of recommending us to publish the correspondence, to remove misconceptions that may have previously existed as to the real merits of the case." No such course is necessary to us here, where the facts were and are as well known to every one else as to yourself; but, in justice to ourselves, we shall request that the correspondence may be inserted in the next Blue Book, to remove those impressions, injurious to our good name, which must have arisen in England amongst those who have seen a serious charge brought against our firm, and those in responsible management of it, by an officer in the high position which you hold, without their being aware that, as you knew at the time of writing, our firm had merely become involved in the matter by the unauthorised action of two of its assistants.

We remark that you disclaim any personal animus in any allusions made to houses or to individuals in your Memorandum. This we are glad to learn. At the same time it is much to be regretted that the tone of sarcasm adopted, and general tenor of many of your remarks, are such as can only lead those who peruse them, unaided by any disclaimer on your part, to an entirely opposite conclusion.

We are, &c.
(Signed) LINDSAY & CO.

Inclosure 7 in No. 13.

Declaration of Hugh Rose Innes.

I, HUGH ROSE INNES, a British subject, residing within the district set apart for the location of foreign renters at the port of Shanghai, in the Empire of China, do solemnly and sincerely declare as follows:—

1. That in the year 1858 I was in the service of Messrs. Lindsay and Co., of Shanghai, merchants, in the capacity of shipping-clerk, and that whilst in such service and occupation I prepared in customary form an application to the Commissioner of Customs at Shanghai aforesaid, for shipment of fifty-five casks of coals on board the ship "Emily Annina," which said application bore the name, and purported to be made by, the said firm of Messrs. Lindsay and Co.

2. That the intended shipment of the said fifty-five casks, and the said application to the Customs at Shanghai in respect thereof, were respectively without the authority and without the knowledge, directly or indirectly, of the said firm of Messrs. Lindsay and Co., or of any of the partners constituting the said firm.

3. That the said fifty-five casks contained copper cash and coals, and were confiscated by the Customs at Shanghai, and that upon the seizure of the same, I called at the Custom-house at Shanghai respecting it, and saw Mr. Horatio Nelson Lay thereon, and personally explained to him unreservedly the facts of the transaction, and then informed him that none of the firm of Messrs. Lindsay and Co. had any knowledge of the intended shipment, or were in any way concerned with it, and I then stated to him my own personal responsibility concerning it, and the said Horatio Nelson Lay then stated to me that he was satisfied with my admissions as far as concerned the firm of Messrs. Lindsay and Co., personally.

4. And I make this solemn declaration conscientiously believing the same to be true, and by virtue of the provisions of an Act made and passed in the sixth year of the reign of His late Majesty King William IV, intituled "An Act to repeal an Act of the present session of Parliament, intituled 'An Act for the more effectual abolition of Oaths and Affirmations taken and made in various Departments of the State, and to substitute declarations in lieu thereof, and for the more entire suppression of voluntary and extra-judicial Oaths and Affidavits, and to make other provisions for the abolition of unnecessary Oaths.'"

(Signed) HUGH ROSE INNES.

Declared at Her Britannic Majesty's Consulate at Shanghai, in the Empire of China, this 1st day of August, 1863.

Before me,
(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM, *Her Majesty's Acting Consul.*

To all to whom these presents shall come, I, John Markham, Her Britannic Majesty's Acting Consul at the port of Shanghai, in the Empire of China, certify that on the day of the date of the declaration hereunto annexed, personally came and appeared before me, Hugh Rose Innes, named and described in such declaration, and by solemn declaration which the said Hugh Rose Innes then made before me, did solemnly and sincerely declare to be true the several matters and things mentioned and contained in the said annexed declaration.

In faith and testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and seal of office, dated at Shanghai aforesaid this 1st day of August, 1863.

(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM, *Her Majesty's Acting Consul.*

Inclosure 8 in No. 13.

Mr. Lay to Messrs. Lindsay & Co.

Gentlemen,

Peking, August 18, 1863.

YOUR second letter on the subject of the copper cash case calls for some observations to which I might, if I had pleased, have confined my first letter.

In my Memorandum which has been published in the Blue Book, I stated with reference to your firm facts which you cannot gainsay. For any impressions conveyed by the mention of those facts I am certainly not responsible.

Your anxiety to exculpate your firm from all share in the transaction has induced you to make an allegation which is wholly groundless. You must allow me to point out to you that there is every distinction between those circumstances of the case that occurred within my own knowledge, and those circumstances that did not occur within my knowledge, but which were communicated to me as facts. In the sentence "the facts of the case as far as they were known to me," in my first letter, I was not sufficiently guarded, and I perceive that you have been swift to take advantage of my words.

The facts within my own knowledge were briefly these:—

1. That your firm did apply for a permit to ship casks of coal which contained copper cash.

2. That the casks were seized and, with their contents, confiscated.

The circumstances that did not arise within my own knowledge, but which were communicated to me as facts, were:—

1. That your firm had no cognizance of the transaction.

2. That the copper cash was the property of your clerks.

Respecting the first two facts I can say that I know them, because they arose within my own knowledge. Of the last two I cannot assert any knowledge, for the plain reason that these did not arise within my own knowledge. You are not at liberty to affirm that because Mr. Hogg told me that the firm had no share in the smuggling, therefore I "knew" such to be the fact. All that you are entitled to say is that Mr. Hogg did, subsequent to the seizure of the cash, make a verbal communication to me to that effect, and to this I have borne testimony.

Whether the firm was or was not cognizant of the transaction, this, it is manifest, can be known only to the members of Messrs. Lindsay and Co.'s firm. I can have no knowledge of what transpired within the walls of your establishment.

Your grievance, if any exists, is not against the Customs, but, as you rightly indicated in the fifth paragraph of your first letter, you "must lay to the charge of those who committed the act, the unpleasantness of involving your firm in so discreditable a proceeding."

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. N. LAY.

Inclosure 9 in No. 13.

Messrs. Lindsay & Co. to Mr. Lay.

Sir,

Shanghai, September 14, 1863.

WE have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th August, in reply to ours of the 27th July, on the subject of copper cash case per "Emily Annina," and the course you have adopted in the matter in reference to our firm; and in now closing the correspondence on the question, we will only remark that it is plainly useless to continue it, because, on our part, we should never be able, any more than we would wish to do so, to attain to that refinement of argument which, in order to remove the only conclusion deducible from an inconvenient admission, endeavours to draw an important distinction,

as affecting your moral responsibility towards us, between facts which occurred within your own knowledge, and those communicated to you by others as facts, but to which you equally gave at the time, as is established by the sworn testimony of Mr. Innes, entire credence.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LINDSAY & Co.

No. 14.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received January 18, 1864.)

My Lord,

Peking, November 10, 1863.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 143 of the 7th of September last, I have the honour to forward a letter from the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce to your Lordship on the subject of Mr. Lay's Memorandum.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure in No. 14.

The Chairman of the Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce to Earl Russell.

*Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce,
Victoria, October 22, 1863.*

My Lord,

NO reply has yet been received to the letter of the 26th August, 1861, addressed to your Lordship on behalf of this Chamber by its then Chairman, Mr. Perceval; but the importance to the commercial community in this country of the action of Her Majesty's Government in their relations with that of China, and the publication of the "Further Papers relating to the Rebellion in China," presented to both Houses of Parliament early in the present year, induce the Committee of this Chamber once more to address your Lordship; and while they will trespass as shortly as possible on your time, they indulge in the hope that other and more important avocations may not prevent your Lordship from giving some attention to the statements now submitted to your consideration.

2. In the Blue Book above referred to, among much matter of deep interest to the foreign commercial community in China, appears a "Memorandum by Mr. Lay, Chinese Inspector of Customs, on the complaints of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Chambers of Commerce," submitted by him to your Lordship, and dated January 11, 1862.

3. The personal rancour against the commercial body generally displayed in this document is so remarkable as to lead irresistibly to the conviction that it was never meant by its author for the public eye; and it seems to have escaped Mr. Lay that his evidence (in addition to its many other weak points) is that of a partisan witness deeply interested in the permanence of the service with which he has identified himself; and no less so, it would seem, in the endeavour to prove that all the members of it, from the gentlemen whose names he somewhat unnecessarily parades, and on whose official or private integrity no attack has been made, down to the numerous and motley subordinates of all ranks, who with equal care are kept in the background, are superior to all the temptations of self-interest to which, in their anomalous position, they might not unnaturally be thought to be exposed.

4. The Committee would not, however, have troubled your Lordship with any remarks on the exaggerated charges of systematic evasion of duties at the Treaty ports, so persistently brought by Mr. Lay against the foreign merchants of China, as a class, but for their adoption by one of Her Majesty's Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs. The Committee believe that the improbable assertion, that the men by whom the enormous foreign trade of China is conducted are, as a body, incurable smugglers, might safely be left to the corrective influence of time, and to the common sense of the European public; and that the several firms implicated in Mr. Lay's list of special cases would, generally, have no difficulty in showing how large a superstructure his zeal has raised on (in most cases) very slender foundations. The report, however, in the "Times" of the 7th July of the speech delivered by Mr. Layard on the previous evening, during the debate in the House of Commons, on our relations with China, makes it incumbent on them, the Committee think, to give, on behalf of the commercial body, an emphatic denial of the correctness of the statement that, "up to the present time, foreign merchants had always been attempting to evade the payment of any duty; they had recourse to all manner of

fraud and deception ;"—and earnestly to deprecate the assumption that, more or less, runs through the whole of that honourable gentleman's address, that there is a spirit of resistance to the Foreign Customs, and of opposition to Sir Frederick Bruce, on the part of the great bulk of Her Majesty's subjects, that greatly increase the difficulties of the British Minister's position.

5. As a body, merchants are not averse to moderate duties when their assessment and collection press equally on all. And could an effective chain of Custom-houses, under one system of management, be established all along the coast of China, their introduction would meet with general approval, as tending greatly to the security and development of trade. To put the question of smuggling on its lowest ground it does not, in the long run, pay. And Lord Elgin has well stated the case, in his letter to Mr. Layard, of February 8, 1862, when he says, "The more I examined into the matter the more satisfied I became that, where duties are as moderate as they are in China, smuggling is a great moral evil, qualified by very little of commercial advantage, and that the general interests of trade do not suffer by their being regularly levied, although a looser system may sometimes swell the gains of individuals."

6. The Committee have no wish to weary your Lordship by a refutation in detail of the various inaccuracies of statement in the Memorandum under review; but a slight reference to one or two of them will sufficiently show the disingenuous spirit in which that Memorandum was framed. In section 10, on the "Personnel of Customs Establishment," Mr. Lay gives a list of the foreign gentlemen respectively at the head of the Department in each port, as a sufficient reply to the assertion of this Chamber, that "lawless foreigners" were taken into the service; while the context of the paragraph clearly shows that the reference was to the foreigners forming the crews of the revenue cruisers employed in Canton waters. Passing by Section 2, the "disfavour of merchants explained," in which the animus that pervades the whole Memorandum is more peculiarly displayed, the Committee find, in section 15, the preventive force of Canton described as consisting "of a small American river-steamer, not adapted for fighting purposes, carrying one gun (a 12-pounder), and some Chinese boats manned by Chinese," while very shortly before, if not at the very time of the date of the Memorandum, that force included an armed lorcha manned by foreigners.

7. It would be easy to extract from the Memorandum numerous instances of insidious attack, such as the vague and unsupported assertion in section 16, that "the foreign merchant at Canton does not usually smuggle himself—he employs the agency of the Cantonese, who are much more daring than the Northern Chinese," and of strange inaccuracy on points with which Mr. Lay might be supposed to be familiar, as for instance in his argument (section 18), that it would be hardly fair to expect the Chinese Government to submit its right to fines, &c., "to the judicial discussion and decision of any foreign Court, still less that it would allow merchants, who are themselves daily endeavouring to evade the Chinese revenue laws, to have any voice in such decision, as the assessors of their Consul;" the fact being that under the Order in Council of June 13, 1853, "any charge against a British subject for a breach of Treaties, or for a breach of the rules and regulations for the observance of such Treaties, shall be heard and determined by the Chief Superintendent or Consul without assessors."

8. The Committee will not, however, dwell longer on this ill-judged Memorandum, but proceed to state the real grievances complained of by merchants.

9. These are :—

(1.) The independent and irresponsible right of confiscation of ships and cargoes, for breaches of Treaty Regulations, claimed and exercised by the Foreign Customs Department; and the almost invariable exaction of the highest penalty, without reference to the existence of mitigating circumstances in the offence.

(2.) The direct countenance given to the assumption of irresponsible authority, by the refusal of British Consuls to take cognizance of such acts, when brought to their notice, or to do more (when pressed) than record the protest of the complaining parties.

(3.) The finality of the decision of the Superintendent of Trade in all cases between British subjects and other foreigners or Chinese, both in original suits before himself, or on appeal from the decision of the Consular Courts.

(4.) The consequent practical impossibility of applying a check to any high-handed proceedings of the Foreign Customs.

10. With respect to the first named ground of complaint, Mr. Lay stands up stoutly for the moderation of the Foreign Customs in its treatment of revenue offences. Such is not the popular impression, and further the foreign community are impressed with a belief, amounting to conviction, that the proceeds of confiscation are largely, if not wholly,

distributed among the various grades of subordinates. Should this belief be groundless, an inquiry conducted by the Consuls would be an easy means of rebutting the charge.

11. Notwithstanding the dictum (section 18 of the Memorandum), "that the Chinese Superintendent of Customs, with or without the advice of the Foreign Commissioners, can in no case overstep the limits assigned to his actions by the Treaties, without being forthwith called to account by the Consuls, upon the complaint of the merchant aggrieved," that liability is very small, when, as at present, British Consuls are reluctant to entertain such complaints; and as the influence of the foreigners in the service is avowedly not limited to that gained by sagacious advice, the "weak and corrupt officials" (described in section 11) are as likely to succumb to the misdirected energy of Foreign Customs officials, as to the (there asserted) "bribery" or "bullying" of foreign traders.

12. But the Committee will not discuss the "procedure in cases of fine and confiscation," as now practised, because they deny the right of the Chinese authorities to make such seizures in Treaty ports, or levy such fines independently of the British Consul.

13. In all Treaties with China foreign Governments have acquired and obtained various extraterritorial rights, and the reason of such demands on the part of Her Majesty's Government is thus stated by Lord Clarendon, in his despatch to Sir George Bonham of June 24, 1853, inclosing the Order in Council of the 13th of the same month:—

"In ordinary cases of British subjects resorting to a foreign country, their persons and property are entrusted to the laws and institutions of the country to which they may resort, in the full assurance that those will be duly administered, and that the institutions of such country, although they may differ from those of England, are substantially in harmony with the general principles of jurisprudence recognised among Christian communities. But the case is different as regards China; and there the British Crown has found it necessary to require that British subjects shall be entirely exempted from the jurisdiction of the local tribunals, and has engaged in return, either expressly or by implication, to take effectual measures for the maintenance among British subjects of peace, order, and good government."

14. In the IInd Article of the Treaty of Nanking, a Treaty renewed and confirmed by the IInd Article of the later Treaty of Tien-tsin, Her Majesty agrees to appoint "Superintendents or Consular officers to reside at each of the above-named (Treaty) cities or towns, to be the medium of communication between the Chinese authorities and the said merchants, and to see that the just duties and other dues of the Chinese Government, as hereafter provided for, are duly discharged by Her Majesty's subjects."

15. In the Order in Council of June 1853, there is no waiver of any of the rights so secured; but, on the contrary, it embodies a series of regulations for the guidance of Consular officers in dealing with them.

16. The authoritative opinion given in 1860 by the three Crown lawyers, Sir J. D. Harding, Sir Richard Bethell, and Sir W. Atherton, in reference to vessels and cargoes seized for the breach of the blockade of the Canton River, affirms still more strongly the exclusion of China from the comity of civilized nations; and, from its having been communicated to the British authorities in this country, shows that up to that period Her Majesty's Government had seen no reason to depart from the principles laid down by Lord Clarendon. That opinion broadly states that, "as between Her Majesty's Government and the Government and subjects of China (a country which neither acknowledges nor follows the *jus gentium* of European States, under which the necessity for Prize Court condemnation arises), no condemnation as prize is either necessary or expedient."

17. The ex-territorial provisions of the Treaty are the natural consequences of the recognized exclusion of China from the comity of civilized nations, and the judicial powers of Consuls follow as a matter of course where some restrictive jurisdiction must exist, but is denied under Treaty to the native authorities. To argue, therefore, that "the Chinese Government is no more obliged to resort to a British Court to enforce fines or confiscations for a breach of its revenue laws where a British subject is concerned, than it is to an American or French Court where an American or French subject is concerned," is beside the question; for the Chinese Government is bound to British subjects by the express stipulations of its Treaties with Great Britain, while British subjects are not bound by the Treaties of other nations, though entitled to the benefit of all privileges accorded to them greater than those secured by the British Treaties. The VIIth clause of the French Treaty, quoted by the Inspector-General of Customs, declares, it may be remarked, the obligation of a formal notice to a French Consul of any intention to seize or confiscate.

18. But a serious fallacy underlies all arguments in favour of Chinese, as opposed to Consular jurisdiction, in cases of smuggling in the open ports by subjects of Treaty

Powers. They assume that such smuggling is an offence against the Chinese revenue laws, when in fact it is an offence against the Treaty only, a knowledge of Chinese revenue laws not being obligatory, nor their observance compulsory, except in so far as they are recognized by Treaty. If this view be correct, of which the Committee entertain no doubt, the pretensions of the Chinese Customs to independent action in cases of violations of Treaty stipulations fall to the ground.

19. Assuming the correctness of the statements now submitted to your Lordship, it seems clear that British subjects have a right to the judicial action of their Consuls in all cases of fine or confiscation; and that the limitation of their functions to *ex post facto* political action, as urged by the advocates of the Chinese Customs, is as untenable in theory as it was contrary to fact in practice till recently: for it would be extremely difficult for the Inspector-General of Chinese Customs to prove that the special cases of seizure enumerated in his Memorandum were made without a previous application from the Department to the British Consul. And even were it otherwise, the Committee of this Chamber are prepared to show, that within the last twelve months some of the Chinese Superintendents of Customs have pleaded the direct or implied sanction of Her Majesty's Superintendent of Trade as their authority for carrying out confiscation. And further, that a rule framed by that officer for the regulation, *inter alia*, of cases of confiscation at Canton run thus:—"If the goods are on board British vessels, or in the possession of a British subject, the particulars shall be communicated to the Consul, who shall grant a warrant for their seizure; and if on examination they are undoubtedly smuggled, it shall be permitted to the Hoppo to declare their confiscation."

20. Before proceeding to the other questions enumerated above, it is the pleasing duty of the Committee to state that the Baron de Meritens, Commissioner of Customs at Foo-chow, has appreciated the fact that the best mode of discouraging illicit trade is to deprive it of motive, and as a commencement in opening the ports of China more widely to legitimate commerce, has induced the superior authorities to sanction the resort of ships to the ports of Keelung and Takao, in Formosa. Should the experiment succeed, as it no doubt will, it will probably lead to its extension to other important ports on the mainland.

21. The second cause of dissatisfaction to the foreign commercial body, viz., the direct countenance given to the pretensions of the Chinese Customs authorities, by the present reluctance of British Consuls to entertain any complaints arising from the acts of those officials, will be more shortly discussed.

22. It is generally understood and believed that the Consular Officers act in this matter under special instruction from the Superintendent of Trade; but apart from the violation of right which the foreign residents believe to be involved in the surrender to the Chinese Customs establishment of irresponsible power in dealing with Treaty offences, they unreservedly condemn such surrender as impolitic. Should the foreign element in the Chinese Maritime Customs be a permanent one, it might at any time be composed of men of a very different stamp and very inferior grade to the gentlemen now holding the higher offices of the foreign Inspectorate, and who might be the reverse of scrupulous in their administration of the Department, but keenly alive to the value to themselves of mingling political power with their fiscal functions, particularly if through the direct agency of the Maritime Customs establishment, the cost of foreign armed and manned gun-boats, and of disciplined Chinese troops, is to be defrayed.

23. But, indeed, the perilous union of powers appears to have been already initiated. In the supplement to the "North China Herald" of September 26 of this year, the case is reported of "The United States of America v. Pinder and others," tried in the United States' Consular Court, in which Commander Solway (one of the witnesses for the prosecution), describing himself as a British naval officer in the service of the Emperor of China, is stated to have deposed that his commission in that service is held from Mr. Lay and Captain Sherard Osborn, and that it professes to be given on behalf of the Emperor. Certainly among the many anomalous arrangements now in existence in this country this is one of the strangest.

24. Again commercial men in this country have no faith in the theory of Chinese, of any rank, being led up to European international civilization, by being dealt with as though they were guided by its maxims, in anticipation of their honest adoption of them. They accept as an axiom that relaxation of ex-territorial rights obtained under Treaty should follow, but never precede, practical advance in such civilization on the part of the Chinese. They are satisfied that Asiatics of every race attach no meaning to the phrase of political magnanimity, and cannot believe in the existence of such a virtue. Asiatics respect those who respect their own rights, and attribute to fear or ignorance any concession that is not palpably balanced by some corresponding advantage. Justice they understand and appre-

ciate; and the Committee would respectfully urge on your Lordship that a strict adhesion to the principles now submitted to your consideration would be the course most consonant to the dignity of Her Majesty's Government, and to the real reciprocal interests of both her subjects and the Chinese people.

25. The third ground of complaint stated above, is the finality of the decision of Her Majesty's Superintendent of Trade in all cases between British subjects and other foreigners or Chinese, both on appeal from the Lower Consular Courts, and in original suits before himself.

26. The Order in Council of June 1853 expressly limits the Supreme Court of Hong Kong to a concurrent jurisdiction only with the Superintendent of Trade, in all cases between or against British subjects, and declares the decision of that officer to be final in all cases arising from the violation of Treaty stipulations, or from disregard or infringement of rules and regulations for the observance of the stipulations of such Treaties; the Supreme Court being interdicted from taking any cognizance of this class of offences.

27. The vast interests involved in the foreign trade with China entitle Her Majesty's subjects resident in the country, in the opinion of the members of this Chamber and of the commercial community generally, to be placed, in regard of appeals from the local tribunals, on as favourable a footing as British residents in any part of the world. In Her Britannic Majesty's Colonies and Empire of India, appeals to the Privy Council, in cases of a certain magnitude, lie from the decisions of Her Courts, though presided over by professional Judges, and there seems to be no valid reason why the privilege should be denied to Her subjects in China in the class of cases now excepted. On the contrary, many strong and self-evident reasons naturally suggest themselves why in this country the right of appeal should be allowed. Among them (though by no means one of the greatest force) is the present union of diplomatic and judicial functions in the British Representative. It is an union that, notwithstanding the acknowledged great ability of Sir Frederick Bruce, tends to weaken public confidence in his decisions; and it may also be remarked that his residence at Peking, although politically necessary and of the highest importance, is obstructive to the speedy discharge of his judicial duties. The Committee, therefore, as representing the feelings and desires of this commercial community, earnestly crave your Lordship's special attention to this subject, and your favourable consideration of the general desire to have the restrictions of the Order in Council of June 1853 modified in respect of appeals home.

28. It is unnecessary to dwell on the fourth-named in the list of grievances—the practical impossibility of applying a check to any high-handed proceedings of the foreign Customs; for it follows as a natural consequence of the existence of the grounds for the other three. So long as Consuls can, under the protection of orders from a superior officer, whose acts cannot be resisted, refuse to discharge any duties imposed on them by Treaty—so long, with the present official leaning to the Chinese Customs, will it be impossible to check the proceedings of that establishment; for no machinery exists by which the execution of the Treaty functions of the Consuls can be otherwise enforced.

29. Mixed Courts for the adjudication of cases arising out of infractions of Custom-house regulations under Treaty have been suggested. But the Committee abstain from any discussion of them, because they concur in the general conviction that the right of investigating such cases, prior to seizure or confiscation, is inherent in the Consuls by the terms of those Treaties. They would, however, submit to your Lordship's favourable consideration that a Court, similarly constituted to those actually in existence in Turkey and Egypt, in connection with the Consular establishments, would be quite as beneficial and is as urgently required in China as in those other countries.

30. It now only remains for the Committee to refer briefly to the present policy of intervention by Her Majesty's Government in the internal affairs of the Chinese Empire. This, in their opinion, becomes necessary from the confident but erroneous statements made by imperfectly informed parties at home, that the foreign merchants as a body are well satisfied with, and approve of, that policy. An additional and powerful reason for adverting to it is afforded by the remarkable difference in the policy itself, as explained in Parliament, and as interpreted by the acts of the military authorities on the spot.

31. The great majority of the respectable commercial classes (foreign) in this country strongly disapprove of the present action of our authorities; and many persons even, who at an earlier period gave all their influence in opposition to the maintenance of neutrality, have seen reason materially to modify their opinion. The commercial body, for the most part, have no faith whatever in the regeneration of China by such foreign aid as is now afforded; nor do they believe that hearty co-operation in introducing the foreign element into the various branches of the Chinese public service, can be expected from any native officials, beyond, perhaps, the few men at Peking within the personal influence of foreign

Ministers. The foreign merchants, with few (if any) exceptions, are impressed by the belief that there is a deep and wide-spread feeling of animosity to foreigners in the governing classes; and that these very naturally view with great jealousy the pretensions of foreigners to almost independent power in three such important branches of the Government as the Maritime Customs, the newly-formed Marine, and the military organization of their troops; and that the events of the last three years have made a bitter sense of humiliation the prevailing feeling of the Chinese in regard to foreigners.

32. It may not be too late to withdraw from Shanghai with either safety or honour, but there can be no difficulty in restraining the energy of our military Chiefs within the defined thirty-mile radius round that city and settlement; and the extension of the system of protected areas round the other Treaty ports would, in the general opinion of foreign residents in China, be a most serious mistake, and one much to be deprecated. The latest intelligence from the north reports the occupation by British troops of Taitan and Quinsan, the latter post being sixty miles distant from Shanghai; and this is far from being a solitary instance of the manner in which the professed limitation of military action to the defence of the above-named area is apparently understood.

33. The relaxations of the provisions of the Foreign Enlistment Act in favour of British subjects taking service in the Imperial army and navy have attracted to this country crowds of foreigners of all nations, and for the most part of very lawless habits, who are equally ready to take service with Imperialists and Taepings, or to engage in any deeds of violence. The evil has become a most serious one; and the question of under what law foreigners when serving in China are to be dealt with must seriously complicate the already anomalous relations of foreign Powers with the Empire. There can be little doubt that all men so circumstanced would equally claim their country's protection as against the Chinese, and the immunity of the latter from foreign jurisdiction as against foreigners.

34. The deep importance to foreigners in this country of the several matters now submitted to your Lordship will, the Committee believe, plead their apology for the great length of this communication, and for their again earnestly requesting a reply to it.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JAS. J. MACKENZIE.

No. 15.

Mr. Hammond to the Chairman of the Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 21, 1864.

I AM directed by Earl Russell to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22nd October, containing observations on the Memorandum by Mr. Lay on the complaints of the Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce, dated the 11th of January, 1862, and setting forth certain grievances complained of by merchants in China.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

Correspondence respecting Statements in Mr. Lay's
Memorandum dated January 11, 1862.

*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by
Command of Her Majesty. 1864.*

LONDON:
PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS,

CHINA. No. 2. (1864.)

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

FITTING OUT, DISPATCHING TO CHINA, AND
ULTIMATE WITHDRAWAL,

OF THE

ANGLO-CHINESE FLEET

UNDER THE COMMAND OF

CAPTAIN SHERARD OSBORN;

AND THE

DISMISSAL OF MR. LAY

FROM THE

CHIEF INSPECTORATE OF CUSTOMS.

*Presented to the House of Commons by Command of Her Majesty, in pursuance of their
Address of February 9, 1864.*

LONDON:

PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.

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for—

“Copies or Extracts of any Despatches that have been received from Sir F. Bruce, relative to the proceedings of the Chinese Force under the command of Major Gordon, R.E., to the fitting out, dispatching to China, and ultimate withdrawal of the Anglo-Chinese Fleet under the command of Captain Sherard Osborn, R.N., to the proceedings of Mr. Lay in reference to that Expedition :

“Of any Despatches on the subject of the position of the Foreign Inspectorate of Customs in China ; the dismissal of Mr. Lay from his office of Chief Inspector, and the appointment of Mr. Hart :

“Of any Communications that may have been received by Sir F. Bruce or the Government from British Merchants on the subject of the Inspectorate of Customs :

“And, of any Despatches which may have been received from the British Naval and Military Authorities in China, relative to the same subjects ; together with the replies made and instructions issued by Her Majesty’s Government.”

[The Correspondence respecting the Inspectorate System has already been presented to Parliament. The Correspondence respecting the Rebellion in China will be included in a separate collection of Papers relating to China.]

No. 1.

Mr. Lay and Captain Osborn to Earl Russell.—(Received August 14.)

Chinese Government Agency, 6, Little George Street,
Westminster, S.W., August 13, 1862.

My Lord,

WE, the undersigned, on the part of the Emperor of China, have the honour to apprise your Lordship that a green flag, bearing a yellow diagonal cross, has been adopted as the national ensign of the European Chinese force, and to beg that your Lordship will be pleased to cause this fact to be notified in the “Gazette,” for general information.

We have, &c.
(Signed) H. N. LAY.
SHERARD OSBORN.

No. 2.

Mr. Lay to Earl Russell.—(Received August 29.)

6, Little George Street, Westminster,
August 28, 1862.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my letter of the 13th instant, respecting an ensign for the European Chinese force, I beg to be allowed to press upon your Lordship the necessity of this step.

1. By the law of nations, vessels without a recognized flag are subject to capture or detention.

2. The British ensign cannot be hoisted in vessels the property of the Emperor of China.

3. The ensigns on board Chinese vessels are in hue and colour dependent upon the taste of the commanders. China has no national flag.

4. The flag I propose appears to be one least likely to be mistaken for that of any other
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nation ; and your Lordship will appreciate the great importance, in view of cases of the "Arrow" class, of binding the Chinese Government to the use of one ensign in their naval force. I see no reason to apprehend any difficulty in obtaining the formal consent of the Emperor to the flag proposed.

Lastly, I have already purchased five vessels. As public property, it is desirable that they should be exempted from the payment of port charges and harbour dues. And it is essential, in order to guard against detention by the customs, as the vessels can have no register, that they should have an officially recognized flag. I trust, therefore, that your Lordship will not deem me importunate in again requesting you to cause the notification of the adoption of the flag in question to be published in the "Gazette."

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. N. LAY.

No. 3.

Mr. Layard to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 28, 1862.

I AM directed by Earl Russell to transmit to you copies of two letters from Mr. H. N. Lay,* notifying the adoption of a green flag with a yellow cross to designate the vessels of war which he and Captain Osborn are fitting out for the service of the Chinese Government, and requesting that this notification may be published in the "Gazette."

I am to request that you will state to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that before taking any steps in this matter, Lord Russell would be glad to be informed whether their Lordships are aware that the Chinese Government has no national distinctive flag, as stated by Mr. Lay, and whether they see any objection to a compliance with Mr. Lay's wishes.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 4.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Layard.—(Received August 30.)

Sir,

Admiralty, August 29, 1862.

IN reply to your letter of yesterday's date, transmitting copies of two letters from Mr. Lay, notifying the adoption of a green flag with a yellow cross, to designate the vessels of war which he and Captain Osborn are fitting out for the service of the Chinese Government, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to request you will state to Earl Russell that they will give the necessary orders that the flag chosen by Mr. Lay be respected by their officers ; but their Lordships cannot recommend that an official notification of a national flag for Chinese vessels should appear in the "Gazette" until the adoption of the flag has been approved by the Chinese authorities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. G. ROMAINE.

No. 5.

Mr. Layard to Mr. Lay.

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 2, 1862.

IN reply to your letters of the 13th and 28th ultimo, I am directed by Earl Russell to inform you that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty will give directions to Her Majesty's naval officers to respect the flag chosen by you and Captain Osborn to designate the vessels of war which you are fitting out for the service of the Chinese Government, but that no notification respecting this flag can be published in the "Gazette" until it has been approved by the Government at Pekin.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 6.

Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 2, 1862.

I INCLOSE copies of a correspondence with Mr. H. N. Lay and with the Admiralty,* relative to the adoption by Mr. Lay and Captain Osborn of a green flag with a yellow cross, to designate the vessels of war which they are fitting out for the service of the Chinese Government, and I have to instruct you to inquire of Prince Kung whether the Chinese Government sanctions the adoption of the flag in question.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 7.

Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 2, 1862.

I INCLOSE, for your information, copies of the "London Gazette" of this day, containing an order of the Queen in Council, authorising Mr. Lay and Captain Osborn to enlist men and to equip vessels for the service of the Emperor of China.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 8.

Mr. Hammond to Mr. Lay.

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 10, 1862.

I AM directed by Earl Russell to state to you, that it appears to Her Majesty's Government that unless you are already provided with a written authority from the Chinese Government for the steps which you are taking to provide that Government with naval assistance, you should procure such authority; and I am accordingly to request that you will take steps for obtaining such authority as soon as possible, although in the meanwhile Her Majesty's Government are prepared to act on the assurances of Mr. Bruce, and not interpose any delay in your proceedings.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 9.

Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 10, 1862.

I INCLOSE, for your information, copy of a letter which I have caused to be addressed to Mr. Lay,‡ suggesting that he should procure some written authority from the Chinese Government for the steps which he is taking to provide that Government with naval assistance.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 10.

*Mr. Lay to Mr. Hammond.—(Received October 8.)**Chinese Government Agency, 6, Little George Street,**Westminster, October 9, 1862.*

Sir,

MY absence from England has prevented my receiving before yesterday your letter of the 10th September.

With reference to Earl Russell's desire that I should obtain a written authority from the Chinese Government for the steps I am taking to provide it with naval assistance, I have the

* Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.

† See Paper presented to Parliament in Return to an Address of the House of Commons, dated June 4, 1863 (No. 341.)

‡ No. 8.

honour to state that I hold such written authority, dated the 14th March, 1862, from my *locum tenens*, Mr. Hart, to purchase and equip a steam fleet, in accordance with instructions from the Imperial Government.

I have since received regular remittances from the Foreign Customs for that purpose, by direction of Prince Kung.

I may add, for his Lordship's information, that on the 28th June last, I received through Mr. Hart a despatch from the Chinese Foreign Office relative to the proposed fleet. This despatch prays the Inspector-General of Customs in earnest terms to use the utmost despatch in procuring the vessels. It repeats the instructions issued to the Governors of various provinces as to the amounts to be contributed by them towards the cost of the fleet; refers to the Emperor's anxiety that no time should be lost; and closes with a second earnest appeal to the Inspector-General for these reasons "not to lose a day."

With respect to the flag for the fleet, I have written for precise authority. As soon as I receive it, I will not fail to apprise Earl Russell of the fact.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. N. LAY.

No. 11.

Mr. Lay to Earl Russell.—(Received January 29.)

Chinese Government Agency,

6, Little George Street, January 28, 1863.

My Lord,

REFERRING to my letter to your Lordship of the 28th of August last, I have now the honour to transmit to your Lordship a drawing of the flags. Ensign:—Green ground, intersected by two yellow diagonal bands, bearing the Imperial Jack in the centre. Jack:—Yellow, triangular, with Imperial blue dragon. Which, under the authority of the Emperor of China, conveyed to me through Prince Kung, have been chosen for the use of the European-Chinese naval forces. The Jack bearing the Imperial crest was transmitted to me from Pekin by a recent mail.

In order to enable me to dispatch the vessels purchased in this country to China, I beg that your Lordship will cause the necessary notification to be inserted in the "Gazette" for the information of foreign Powers as well as of our own authorities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. N. LAY.

No. 12.

Mr. Hammond to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Foreign Office, February 7, 1863.

Sir,

WITH reference to your letter of the 29th of August last, I am directed by Earl Russell to transmit to you, herewith, a copy of a letter from Mr. Lay,* stating that he has received authority from the Chinese Government to use the flags of which drawings are contained in the accompanying inclosure, and asking that the necessary notification may be inserted in the "Gazette," for the information of foreign Powers, as well as of the British authorities.

I am to request that, in laying the same before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, you will move them to take the proper steps in compliance with Mr. Lay's request, if they should see no objection thereto.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 13.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received April 13.)

Pekin, January 4, 1863.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward translation of a despatch from the Prince of Kung, by which your Lordship will see that the Chinese Government have adopted a national flag, for which they claim the same privilege as that accorded to other nations.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure in No. 13.

*The Prince of Kung to Mr. Bruce.**Pekin, October 22, 1862.*

(Translation.)

THE Prince of Kung makes a communication.

It is the usage of foreign vessels to fly a national ensign so easily recognised that a glance suffices to show, at any distance, that such or such a vessel is a Government vessel, and the removal of this ensign is prohibited.

The war vessels of China have flags which enable them to be distinguished, and to those already in use there is now to be added a dragon ensign. The flag will be three-cornered. That carried by large vessels will measure ten Chinese feet in the perpendicular; that of small vessels seven or eight Chinese feet. Its length along its other sides may be varied at discretion. The ground will be yellow, and on this will be designed a dragon with his head toward the upper part of the flag. This will, to a certain extent, make the flag recognisable the moment it is seen.

The proposal having been submitted to the Throne, His Imperial Majesty has issued a Decree instructing the naval forces of all the provinces to adopt it; and the Prince trusts that the British Minister will forthwith signify to the officers of the British Navy in different parts of the empire, and to all British vessels, that, whenever they meet the above described dragon ensign they are to regard it as the Government flag of China; that, as with foreign flags, the removal of it is an unauthorized proceeding; that if it be removed (the offender) will be punished for violation of the rule (*lit.* steps will be taken as in the case of violation of prohibitions); and that, no matter what the cause of quarrel, or what the rights of the question, the violation of the prohibition must be severely punished before any further discussion,

The Prince hopes the British Minister will issue most positive instructions on this subject.

A necessary communication addressed to the Hon. Mr. Bruce, &c. &c. &c.

Tung-Chih, 1st year, intercalary 8th moon, 29th day (22nd October, 1862).

No. 14.

Mr. Hammond to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 22, 1863.

I AM directed by Earl Russell to transmit to you, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty,* copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Minister in China, inclosing a copy of communication from Prince Kung, relative to the national flag adopted by the Chinese Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 15.

Captain Osborn to Earl Russell.—(Received January 8, 1864)

My Lord,

Shanghai, November 23, 1863.

AS I fear that Mr. Lay, by some accident, has failed to send you the correspondence which has taken place between us and the Prince Regent of China, as well as Sir Frederick Bruce, I take the liberty of enclosing a copy; for I feel that, in justice to Mr. Lay, myself, and the officers and men of the force under my command, it is only proper that your Lordship should be put in possession of all the circumstances connected with the dissolution of a force organised under Her Majesty's Order in Council of August, 1862.

I have reported all the circumstances to the Admiralty, and send home Commander Chas. S. Forbes, R.N., to give all further information.

I am proud to say, that every officer and man in the force has supported me in the line of conduct I considered it necessary to carry out, and that is my best consolation under as sore a disappointment as could well befall a naval officer.

I have, &c.

(Signed) SHERARD OSBORN.

Inclosure 1 in No. 15.

The Prince of Kung's Letter of Instructions to Mr. Lay.

(Translation.)

Pekin, October 24, 1862.

THE Prince of Kung, charged by Imperial authority with the superintendence of Foreign Affairs, addresses a communication to the Inspector-General, Mr. H. N. Lay.

The official records show that, at the interview which the Acting Inspector-General had with me in the autumn of 1861, he represented that, in order to render our navy efficient, it was absolutely necessary that foreign vessels and foreign guns should be procured. He subsequently addressed me in writing, begging that orders might be issued to the custom-houses to contribute towards the purchase of foreign vessels and guns. The Foreign Office thereupon memorialised the Emperor on the subject, and His Majesty's assent having been obtained, orders were issued to the custom-houses to pay into the hands of the Acting Inspector-General the amount sanctioned for the above purpose; and the Acting Inspector-General was desired to act without delay.

The Acting Inspector-General has now come to the capital, and apprised us that all the arrangements connected with the purchase of vessels and guns he has officially handed over to the Inspector-General, Mr. Lay, to carry out on his behalf in England, and that he has remitted the monies paid by the custom-houses to the Inspector-General Lay, who is proceeding in the matter with the utmost despatch.

Mr. Hart has stated, further, that the ability of the Inspector-General Lay is great, and that he possesses a mind which embraces the minutest details,—that he is therefore fully competent to make the necessary arrangements with more than a satisfactory result; and he has accordingly requested us to address a despatch to the Inspector-General Lay, to serve as his authority.

In any arrangements which the Acting Inspector-General might have made with respect to the purchase of vessels and guns, there is no doubt that he would have taken the greatest pains, and would have left no point unconsidered; but as he has now requested that the management of the whole affair should be entrusted to the Inspector-General, this will be, of course, still more satisfactory. I therefore address this despatch to the Inspector-General, and transfer the management of the affair into his hands.

There are three important points:—

1. The purchase of the vessels, guns, gunpowder, coal, and the miscellaneous articles for the use of the vessels.
2. The engagement of officers, gunners, and seamen, and others, for service in the vessels; and the arranging the terms and conditions of every description of agreement.
3. The retention, as proposed, of a sum of money to meet the salaries and wages that may be settled by the agreements, and also to provide for the payment of compensations and other items in time to come.

The above three points we leave the Inspector-General to dispose of, as in his discretion he may see fit.

The money already collected from the custom-houses has been transmitted, through Mr. Hart, to Mr. Lay; and that still due should be, as collected, handed through Mr. Hart to Mr. Lay, who is alone charged with the responsibility of its disbursement.

And we leave it to Mr. Lay to appoint, if he think fit, a person to help him, and also to make whatever arrangements may, in his judgment, seem desirable, with a view to the successful carrying out (of the objects in view).

China is in urgent need of vessels and guns. Effort should therefore be made to effect, with the least possible delay, their completion and dispatch to Shanghai, there to await orders. The work (put into the vessels) should be strong, the materials genuine—both of super-excellent quality—that so the high trust we have confided to Mr. Lay may be fulfilled.

In the event of the Inspector-General's returning to his post before these ships and guns are ready and dispatched to China, and if any other circumstances which we cannot here foresee should arise, let the Inspector-General report thereupon to us himself, and recommend a person trustworthy in all respects to act in his room; so that, in respect of the arrangements subsequently made, the responsibility may be definitely fixed.

Inclosure 2 in No. 15.

Agreement entered into between Mr. Lay and Captain Osborn.

London, January 16, 1863.

THE following conditions embody our mutual understanding :—

1. Osborn agrees to take the command of the European-Chinese navy for a period of four years, and stipulates that there shall be no other European naval Commander-in-Chief.
2. Osborn, as Commander-in-Chief, is to have entire control over all vessels of European construction, as well as native vessels manned with Europeans, that may be in the employ of the Emperor of China, or, under his authority, of the native guilds.
3. Lay will procure from the Emperor such an authority as may be necessary to cover Osborn's acts as the Commander-in-Chief of the European-Chinese navy.
4. Osborn undertakes to act upon all orders of the Emperor which may be conveyed direct to Lay ; and Osborn engages not to attend to any orders conveyed through any other channel.
5. Lay, upon his part, engages to refuse to be the medium of any orders of the reasonableness of which he is not satisfied.
6. Osborn will appoint all officers and men on board the vessels of the force, subject, however, to the approval of Lay, as the representative of the Emperor.
7. Osborn's subordinates will not be at liberty to act without his permission ; and Lay will not authorise his subordinates to call upon them to act without having first consulted Osborn, and obtained the necessary order.
8. Lay and Osborn agree to carefully inquire into any complaints that may be preferred against the officers and men employed in the force by Chinese officials.
9. The force being European, it is indispensable that the flag under which it acts should have an European character, first, to secure its own efficiency ; secondly, to ensure for it due respect in the eyes of the foreign communities.
- Lay, therefore, agrees that the flag shall be green, with two yellow diagonal bands, bearing in the centre a blue imperial dragon. Green is chosen because it is rarely used by European Powers, and therefore not likely to be confounded with any other national colours.
10. Lay undertakes to procure from the Emperor, as soon as possible, a sum of money as a guarantee fund, to cover the pay and maintenance of the force for four years, and in the meantime it is understood that the vessels, with their equipment, will constitute the security for the just claims of the force.
11. In the event of the death of either Lay or Osborn, these conditions, which are entered into with the authority of the Emperor of China, are not, it is understood, in either case to be departed from.
12. The conditions of this understanding, the terms of the formal agreement, and the printed instructions, shall be formally ratified by the Emperor at Peking, before Osborn shall be called upon to act with the force under his command.
13. In the event of Osborn's death from disease while in command of the force, Lay will recommend the Emperor of China to make some grant to his widow and children,

(Signed)

H. N. LAY.

SHERARD OSBORN.

Our motive for drawing up the above memorandum is, that there may be hereafter no deviation from a plan of action long deliberated and decided upon by mutual consent.

We have to deal with Asiatics, prone to deceit and falsehood, ready to evade any engagement directly it interferes with their views or momentary interests. We are about to afford them material military aid, and it behoves us to guard against its being misapplied, and thereby bring scandal upon ourselves, and those who in Great Britain have promoted our views ; above all, we are to take care that the great power, and proportionate responsibilities, conferred upon us by Her Majesty's Order in Council, be not abused by us, by our successors, or by the Chinese authorities.

Clause 1. This condition needs no explanation. It is made a *sine qua non* by Captain Osborn.

Clause 2. This we agree, too, is most necessary. We are aware that for some time local mandarins have been, without imperial authority, purchasing vessels of European construction, arming them, placing crews of all nations in them, and giving over the command to British or American subjects selected by themselves. Lorchas or junks, commanded by Europeans, half pirates, half privateers, are swarming in the Yang-tsze. They claim, in many cases, to be men-of-war belonging to particular mandarins, guilds, or hong. It is the object of this force to

extinguish all these dangerous freebooters. They should come under Imperial authority, without which no European has a shadow of right to levy war in China.

Clause 3. This is inserted to meet any objection that might be raised, on the ground that Europeans are serving without commissions, or direct authority from the Emperor.

Clauses 4 and 5. These are to meet the following difficult questions :—Is this squadron to carry on war in China upon a Chinese method? Through what channel is Captain Osborn, unacquainted as he is with the language, to communicate with the Emperor or Regent? How shall he be protected against the charge of disobedience of orders? How are cruel or unjust orders from Peking to be prevented? How shall European officers and seamen levy war for a barbarous sovereign, without being made to participate in acts which our country would repudiate? How shall the officers be protected from orders, the execution of which would involve breaches of international law or treaty rights?

There is in our opinion no other way of meeting these difficulties than by arranging that, as Mr. Lay is to live in Peking, and as the revenue which he collects is to be the guarantee for the maintenance of the force, he—as one well competent, from a knowledge of the language and people—should be the channel of inter-communication between the ruler of China and Captain Osborn, and that in the event of any order being at variance with law or justice, he should submit it to the European representatives, and supported by them, decline to communicate it to Captain Osborn.

The remaining clauses do not seem to us to need explanation.

Inclosure 3 in No. 15.

Mr. Lay to Captain Osborn.

Sir,

Peking, September 25, 1863.

I BEG to inclose for your information the translation of a letter to your address from the Prince of Kung, which was sent to me in July last, and to invite your attention to the marginal notes I have appended to it. From my remarks you will see that the Prince has not been quite accurate in making it appear that I had requested the appointment of a Chinese officer to command the steam fleet, or that I had consented that the fleet should be placed under the irresponsible authority of the local officials, as my letters to his Highness, which are upon record, show. I never gave more than a qualified assent to the rules with which he has furnished you. I accepted the money clauses, but those having reference to yourself and the fleet generally, I told the Ministers plainly, would have to be considered upon your arrival. The Prince doubtless thought that by declaring positively that these rules had been agreed to by me, the chances of your offering any opposition to them would be diminished.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. N. LAY.

Inclosure 4 in No. 15.

The Prince of Kung's Letter of Instructions to Captain Osborn. *

(Translation.)

Peking, July 8, 1863.

HIS Imperial Highness the Prince of Kung issues these instructions to Osborn, the Assistant Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese steam navy.

Whereas China, in view of the then unfinished military operations, did last year direct the Inspector-General of Customs—Lay, to purchase foreign steamers and guns for use in the fight, and for the subjugation of the foe, and whereas the said Inspector-General has arrived at Peking, and reports that the seven steamers, and the store-ship purchased, will shortly arrive at Shanghai, and requesting the appointment of an officer to take the command, highly recommends the said Osborn, as having hitherto in England been zealous in the performance of his duties, of high military capacity, and, being thoroughly versed in naval affairs, able to assist a high Chinese officer* in the management of such vessels, so that there may therefrom be expected a speedy sweeping away of the appearance of rebellion, and whereas I, the Prince,

Remarks by Mr. Lay.

* This is not correct. So far from requesting that a Chinese should be appointed, I told the Ministers, when they brought forward the proposition, that it was altogether out of the question.

memorialized the throne, requesting that the officer already nominated by the Governor-General of the Two Keang, and the Governor of Keangsoo, might be appointed Chinese Commander-in-Chief of the fleet, and that the said Osborn might be appointed Assistant Commander-in-Chief, and that the expenditure of the fleet should be controlled, for a period of four years, by the Inspector-General Lay, and whereas on the 23rd of the 5th Moon (8th July) the Imperial edict was received. "Let it be as proposed. Respect this."

Now, therefore, in addition to hurrying despatches to the Governor-General of the Two Keang, and the Governor of Keangsoo, that they may at once order the Chinese Commander-in-Chief to repair to Shanghai with his officers and men, and take up his commission on board ship, it is further extremely proper to furnish the said Osborn with a copy of the agreement, in five articles,* entered into between the Inspector-General Lay and the Foreign Office, and to appoint the said Osborn to be Assistant Commander-in-Chief, and to direct him, in accordance with the articles of the agreement, to co-operate with the Chinese Commander-in-Chief in the command of the fleet now commissioned.

It is to be expected that the fleet will act with vigour against the enemy. The crews are to be kept under strict discipline, and not suffered to annoy the people. If trading vessels, whether Chinese or foreign, illegally engage in the carriage of munitions of war, they are to be seized and detained until receipt of orders from the Foreign Office. If there are pirates on the Chinese seas or rivers, from time to time, no matter where the place may be, they are to be captured and destroyed, in order to the complete restoration of tranquillity.

As regards smuggling, and smuggling guilds, at the ports on the coast, and up the rivers, the fleet is authorized to take measures for the due repression of the same.

The said Assistant Commander-in-Chief will, moreover, consider himself under the orders of the Governor-General of the Two Keang and the Governors of Keangsoo, and will take their instructions as to the disposal, from time to time, of his force.

Inclosure.

Five rules agreed upon respecting the steam fleet :—†

1. It has been settled that the post of Chinese Commander-in-Chief of the steam fleet now purchased shall be filled by the High Officer selected by the Chinese Government, and that Captain Osborn, C.B., a British subject, shall be Assistant Commander-in-Chief, for a period of four years. The affairs of the fleet are to be managed by the said Commanders-in-Chief in a friendly spirit of co-operation. Whilst Captain Osborn assists the Chinese Government in the command of the fleet, he will take the instructions of the Governors-General and Governors as to the employment or distribution of the force.‡ In all operations, he is always to confer personally with those officers before either undertaking or staying these, and is to accept the Chinese decision as final.

2. Captain Osborn, in the capacity of Assistant Commander-in-Chief to the Chinese Government, will receive a commission from the Foreign Office giving him the requisite powers. The foreign crews will be duly controlled by him ; and in the event of any individual injuring the people, or acting in a lawless manner, Captain Osborn will exercise due severity in the punishment of the same, in order to the sustaining of proper discipline.

3. In order to the insuring of beneficial results from the fleet now purchased by the Chinese Government, Chinese sailors, as time and circumstances will permit, ought to be chosen for service on board the steamers, in order that they may become experienced, and that long-

** Remarks by Mr. Lay.*

* The Prince chooses to assume that the rules were agreed to by me, while the fact is that I declared over and over again that assent to them was impossible; my most decided opinion being that to accept the terms proposed would be to court certain failure and discredit.

† I forwarded a translation of our agreement officially to the Prince, and in my covering letter called his special attention to one point embodied in that agreement, viz., that you would be under the orders of the Imperial Government at Peking, and the Imperial Government alone. His Highness "burked" my letter, and up to this time has not acknowledged its receipt. Neither has he, I may add, approved the general agreement and Book of Instructions, which shows, were other proof wanting, that he could not have been under the impression that the questions relative to the steam fleet were disposed of.

‡ These conditions would practically place you under the orders of the lowest officer on the staff of either of the officials named. Prince Kung has seen that our military officers will act under Taoutais and Foutais; and hence it has occurred to him that if you could be persuaded to occupy a similar position, the Imperial Government would be relieved of all trouble and responsibility. I have told the Ministers that I would rather see the force disbanded and the ships sold than consent to such a proposition. There can be but one naval Commander-in-Chief, yourself; and but one master, the Imperial Government.

continued practice may prevent them from forgetting their duties, and thereby rendering the fleet useless. The working of the ships and the management of the guns and other arms, Captain Osborn and the other Commanders will exert themselves to teach to such sailors, in order that they may attain a real acquaintance with the same.

4. It is agreed that for the support of the fleet, consisting of seven steamers and one store-ship, there shall be appropriated the monthly sum of 75,000 taels. This amount is to cover the expense of salaries, wages, rations, ammunition, coals, rewards, compensations, as well as every other possible, and, at the present time, impossible-to-be-indicated expenditure. The control of the expenditure is confided to the Inspector-General Lay. The Office of Customs at Shanghai will provide 10,000 taels monthly; the Kiukiang Customs will provide 10,000 taels monthly; the Foochow Customs will provide 34,000 taels monthly; the Amoy Customs will provide 6,000 taels monthly; the Canton Customs will provide 10,000 taels monthly; and the Swatow Customs will provide 5,000 taels monthly. In all will be provided, monthly, the sum of 75,000 taels, which, in the proportions above-mentioned, will be received from each Office of Customs by Mr. Lay monthly. Every three months Mr. Lay will send in an account of the expenditure to the Foreign Office, which, in turn, will communicate the same to the Board of Revenue. Should there be any surplus money, Mr. Lay will retain it for future use.

5. From the 17th day of the 6th moon—that is, from the 1st day of August—it will be the duty of each of the said Offices of Customs to hand over in full, before making any other appropriations, from the duties received, the monthly sum fixed on to the person appointed by the Inspector-General Lay to attend at the bank to receive the same. In the event of the money not being forthcoming, the Inspector-General Lay will at once proceed to deduct the same from the duties. For a period of four years, and for each month during that period, this rule is to be in force.

Inclosure 5 in No. 15.

Captain Osborn's Remarks upon Prince Kung's Letter of Instructions.

Pekin, September 28, 1863.

IN the first place these instructions are in direct contravention of my formal agreement with Mr. Lay, which runs to the following effect: That I was to be Commander-in-Chief of the European-Chinese Navy, with entire control over all vessels of European construction, as well as native craft manned with Europeans in the employ of the Emperor of China, or under his authority, in the employ of natives; and I was to have an authority from the Emperor to cover my acts as Commander-in-Chief of the European-Chinese Navy. On the other hand, I bound myself to act upon all orders from the Emperor conveyed through Mr. Lay, and not to attend to those delivered through any other source.

A copy of this agreement was furnished to the Prince; yet in spite of it, and indeed ignoring it entirely (for I am told he has not even acknowledged the document), the Prince sends me orders to place myself and my people under the authority of the Foutai Le, as well as that of no less than three other provincial authorities.

Prince Kung acknowledges that the appointment of Commander-in-Chief of my force was filled up by the Governor-General of Keangsoo, and merely confirmed by the Emperor; and further, he (Prince Kung) directs the said Chinese Commander-in-Chief to repair on board a ship at Shanghai. This would virtually suspend me from the post I at present hold by virtue of a temporary commission, granted me by the Inspector-General, Mr. Lay, upon the authority of Prince Kung's instructions and promises of last year.

Apart from the conclusions which Mr. Lay has arrived at, as to the want of good faith displayed in the document before me, my own suspicions are aroused by the crafty wording of its contents. In one paragraph I am superseded, and have, apart from the Emperor, Prince Kung; and the Board called the Chinese Foreign Office, all provincial high officers placed over me; in another, I am enjoined to act in a friendly spirit of co-operation with my superiors; and this is immediately followed by a carefully-worded sentence, in which I am distinctly warned that the distribution of the Force will be dependent upon the whim of the Governors and the Governors-General of the Provinces; that I am to follow their instructions in all things, and, as the original document runs, I am "not to act, advance, retire, or remain stationary, without conferring with those dignitaries, and to consider their decision as final!"

Mr. Lay says very justly, in his marginal notes, that these conditions would practically place me under the orders of the lowest officer on the staff of either of the officials named.

I have no intention of submitting to such terms, and for the following reasons:—

1. Naval operations for the suppression of all the disorders enumerated in the Prince's

orders could not be successful, fettered as I should be under such a system. It may be the Chinese system; if so, it explains their unfitness for war or naval operations.

2. I came here to serve the Emperor, and under him the Regent; not to be the servant of mere provincial authorities. On that point I stand distinctly upon the terms of my agreement.

3. The officers and men of the force were entered under a specific agreement to serve me as Commander-in-Chief. Directly a Chinese officer steps in as my superior in that force, the agreement is null and void; and, without it, all law and order would cease, and my power be at an end.

4. By submitting to such instructions and violation of my original agreement, I should at once deprive myself of the power to assist in carrying out in China the policy of Western civilisation. My force, powerful as it will be for good or evil, might be directed against the interests of commerce or of common humanity. Brutal butchery might be perpetrated, and I should be powerless to prevent it. My men and officers, the pick of many from the Royal Navy of England, would be associated upon equal terms with the rowdies and pirates the Foutai might be pleased to employ. My power to restrain my own men within the bounds of ordinary discipline would be *nil*, and the European-Chinese Force, instead of being a blessing, would become a curse to the Chinese people, and to the best interests of Europe in this empire.

5. If I was weak enough to forget what is due to my own position, and attempted to act upon such instructions, I am certain that I should come to a dead-lock with the provincial authorities within a month, exactly as it is at present the case with Major Gordon, R.E. He is insulted by his Chinese superior, the pay of his men suddenly stopped at the will of the Foutai; he is called upon to attempt impossibilities, and deprived of adequate forces; and he has again, for the second time, virtually resigned office as the military coadjutor of the Foutai. Yet they wish me to be "the naval assistant" of such a Mandarin.

6. To the argument advanced by the Chinese Foreign Office, "that the course proposed by Prince Kung is a usual one in China," I reply, I did not come here, or my followers either, to accustom ourselves to the treatment usual with Chinese sailors or soldiers, or to assist them in a retrogressive policy in the treatment of European employes or Europeans in general.

The employment of ships of war and war steamers of European construction is an innovation, that of European officers and gentlemen still more so. I and my force are part and parcel of a new order of things, indicating "progress in China." I will be no party to her lapsing back into her ancient system, and treating Europeans as if they were Chinamen.

European commerce in China, and consequent intercourse, is a departure from all foregone customs.

The presence of Europeans at the open ports is the same.

The residence of European Legations in Peking strikes at the root of China's most ancient prejudices.

The entire responsibility of the conduct of the provincial authorities towards our merchants and missionaries being forced upon the Ministers at Peking, is another departure from the most cherished institutions of these people.

I merely claim for the European force under my command another stride in the same wise direction, and I will not, on all the foregone grounds, depart from a line of policy decided upon by Mr. Lay and myself after long and careful discussion—a line of conduct approved of, I am sure, by my countrymen and profession, and which I see more and more reason not to swerve from, since I have noted the present bearing of the Pekinese authorities towards foreigners.

I may add in general terms that if I required any confirmation of my opinion of the utter impossibility of serving the Chinese Government upon the terms the Prince suggests, I should find ample grounds in my own experiences whilst at Shanghai, as well as in the information General Brown gives me of Major Gordon's present position.

I found on my arrival at Shanghai that the Foutai's agents had tampered with the crews of the vessels under my orders. They were told that the Foutai would give them higher wages than those I engaged them at; that they would all be made officers; and that the discipline existing amongst the Europeans in his steamers was far pleasanter than the order I enforced. Puzzled to find such a different system existing in what was called the Imperial service, the men became naturally disaffected, and anxious to leave me to join the Europeans employed by the Foutai; and to enable them to do so without prejudice to their pockets, I found they were actually offered 12% a-head bounty, the money to be lodged in the names of the deserters in an English bank. I had to discharge fourteen men, and was detained several days at Shanghai in consequence. It was no fault of the Foutai's that I was not detained there altogether.

Foutai Le is an able Chinaman, and as unprincipled as all Chinese officials. His plan

would be to render me powerless, and then to use or toss me aside, just as he does all European leaders in his force. He is a civilian by education, ruling over military and naval affairs without the slightest knowledge of either. He is squandering the revenue of the province as well as that derived from European trade, and is in league with unprincipled traders at Shanghai. Although he can procure from the British stores all such military supplies as he can require, he is encouraging the import of munitions of war by private firms, and granting permits to land the same, in spite of all our proclamations against the importation by foreigners of goods contraband of war. Having secured the services of an excellent officer in Major Gordon, who appears to have entered his service, not that of the Emperor of China (for he holds no authority from the latter), Foutai Le proceeds to render him powerless and to hamper his action in two ways:—First, by depriving him of the means to carry out any decisive measures; and next, by placing in exactly similar positions a number of other Europeans, and playing one off against the other. Major Gordon wishes to attack Soo-chow foo, and asks for one hundred Europeans. The Foutai agrees, but says the hundred men must only be entered for one month. Gordon declines to enter into any such agreement, seeing its injustice and folly. The Foutai insults him by questioning his desire to fight the rebels, and proposes that the assaulting column shall be formed of all the European officers in his employ, and that over their bodies the Chinese would advance to victory.

Again, what faith can I have in any Mandarin's listening to my advice as a subordinate, when I am told by General Brown, Commander-in-Chief of our Military Forces in China, and the superior of the Foutai, that he will listen to no advice or suggestion the General offers; that he purposely avoids all conference with him; and when an interview is sought by General Brown, insolently replies that he is too busy to see him; and be it remembered that Foutai Le is not a bit more unreasonable than other Mandarins, and that he is an average specimen of his class.

(Signed) SHERARD OSBORN.

Inclosure 6 in No. 15.

Mr. Lay to Captain Osborn.

Sir,

Pekin, October 13, 1863.

I REGRET to say that at an interview which I had to-day by appointment with the President of the Foreign Office, Wensiang, he requested me to intimate to you that the Prince of Kung would decline to ratify the agreements entered into by us under his letter of instructions of October, 1862.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. N. LAY.

Inclosure 7 in No. 15.

Captain Osborn to the Prince of Kung.

Your Royal Highness,

Pekin, October 15, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to request that you will be pleased to furnish me officially and in writing with your decision relative to the agreements entered into between your agent, Mr. Horatio N. Lay, C.B., Inspector-General, and myself.

The Inspector-General informs me that after a delay of four months and a half, during which time Your Royal Highness has neither acknowledged a single letter nor referred to the agreements, Wensiang informed him formally that you intended to adhere to your manifest intention of ignoring all such agreements, as evinced in your instructions already addressed to me.

I may remind you that I have now been three weeks in Pekin fruitlessly endeavouring to point out to the members of your Foreign Office, through Mr. Lay, that your instructions to me are entirely contrary to the understanding under which Her British Majesty's Government permitted myself and others to agree to serve the Emperor of China, and that I declined to act except upon the terms explicitly laid down in your agreements.

To all these representations no attention has been paid.

I therefore avail myself of this opportunity to remind you of the circumstances under which the force I command has been placed at your disposal. Last year (1862) you applied in an unofficial form to the British Minister of Legation in Pekin for assistance to procure

men-of-war of an European construction. You were recommended to employ your own official, the Inspector-General, as the best agent. You set aside a large sum of money. You ordered the vessels, and you gave instructions to both Mr. Hart and Mr. Lay to procure not only ships but proper officers and men to fight and manage them; and lastly, you furnished your Inspector-General with a formal authority to enter into all such agreements as he might think necessary to carry out the object you had in view. Upon the strength of that authority to your agent, and supported as your wishes were by the official representations of his Excellency Sir F. Bruce, Her Majesty's Government were pleased to suspend, in favour of China, the Neutrality Act, and the Admiralty of Great Britain granted me and other officers permission to serve the Emperor of China for a stated period, and every assistance was given by all departments to aid the Emperor to carry out the wishes expressed in your instructions to Mr. Lay.

The Inspector-General having satisfied me that the powers you had given him were ample, I entered into certain agreements with him, subject to your ratification as Regent of China. It only remains for me to say, that my power to maintain order and discipline in the force is now at an end, and that if I do not receive a favourable reply within forty-eight hours it will be necessary to immediately disband the force.

I have, &c.
(Signed) SHERARD OSBORN.

Inclosure 8 in No. 15.

Captain Osborn to Sir F. Bruce.

Your Excellency,

Pekin, October 19, 1863.

PRINCE KUNG having failed to ratify the agreements entered into between Inspector-General H. N. Lay, C.B., and myself, it becomes necessary for me to disband the European-Chinese Naval Force.

I have the honour to inclose you copies of the agreements in question, as well as all correspondence, and to request you will inform me whether you see any objection to my surrendering to Prince Kung the eight ships which I have brought out to this country. They are Imperial property, and I have no right to detain them; but I would submit that there might be some danger if vessels of so formidable a character were trusted to the rowdies and pirates now so numerous in Shanghai, and who I dare say are quite ready to serve the provincial authorities without agreements or guarantees.

Directly I receive your Excellency's official instructions upon that point, I shall, in conjunction with Mr. Lay, proceed to dissolve the force, sending the officers and men to England in detachments, and reporting all the circumstances to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, and sending them an exact description of the ships if you decide upon not surrendering them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) SHERARD OSBORN.

Inclosure 9 in No. 15.

Sir F. Bruce to Captain Osborn.

Sir,

Pekin, October 20, 1863.

I HAVE received your letter with its inclosures, informing me of the refusal of the Prince of Kung to ratify the agreements entered into by his agent, Mr. Lay, with yourself, and of your consequent resolution to disband the force.

I have informed His Imperial Highness of my conviction that Her Majesty's Government would not have consented to the organisation of this powerful squadron had it not been on the understanding that it was to be placed under the orders of an officer in whose prudence and high character they had full confidence, and that I will not consent to the ships and stores being handed over to the Chinese Government without instructions to that effect from Her Majesty's Government.

I, therefore, request you to take measures for keeping them in deposit until the pleasure of Her Majesty's Government be known.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 10 in No. 15.

Captain Osborn to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Pekin, October 27, 1863.

CONSEQUENT upon the receipt of your Excellency's letter of the 20th instant, in which you acquaint me that you will not consent to the surrender of the ships and stores to the Emperor of China, and desire me to take measures for keeping them in deposit until the pleasure of Her Majesty's Government shall be known, the following questions have arisen in my mind, upon which I solicit your early instructions:—

1. If the Emperor of China should repudiate the arrangements recently sanctioned for the regular payment of this force, what steps am I to take to avoid selling the ships according to the 10th Article of my agreement? As Prince Kung has already repudiated his formal instructions to Mr. Lay, I am compelled to anticipate the probability of his treating all his engagements in the same fashion.

2. Where shall I procure funds for the maintenance of the force, pending the orders of Her Majesty's Government?

I have, &c.
(Signed) SHERARD OSBORN.

Inclosure 11 in No. 15.

Sir F. Bruce to Captain Osborn.

Sir,

Pekin, November 6, 1863.

AS you are aware, the scheme of keeping the ships of the flotilla in deposit, awaiting instructions from Her Majesty's Government, has been abandoned, and the Chinese Government has requested me to send the vessels to England to be disposed of. His Imperial Highness expresses his thanks to yourself for the trouble to which you have been put in procuring the fleet, and in bringing it out to China, and requests you to accept 10,000 taels, in addition to your pay, for the labour entailed upon you by it. He further requests that the ships may be put under another flag. That, however, is a point which must be left to your own discretion. I have, therefore, to request that you will take charge of the vessels and men, with a view to the disposal of the former in England, or in India, as you may think best. The officers and men to be sent home and paid up to their arrival in England. But, as the contract may be construed to give them a claim for pay for three months after their arrival, or up to the 30th of August, it will be advisable to obtain the opinion of counsel, as to the liability of the Chinese Government, they having declined to accept the flotilla, on the ground of their agent having exceeded his authority in the conditions attached to the scheme. You will feel with me, that our honour is involved in winding up this affair upon terms as little onerous as possible to the Chinese Government.

I will give instructions to the Consuls to contribute what may be required, out of the monies received by them on the indemnity account, to meet such part of the expenses of sending the vessels home as the Chinese Government is unable to provide for. The sum so advanced will form a lien on the ships, and to be deducted from the expenses of sale, or set off against the value of the ships and stores, should Her Majesty's Government decide on taking any of them back.

I think it but just to express my entire approbation of the honourable and dignified course you have pursued during the discussion of the question at Peking. An officer more alive to pecuniary advantages, less scrupulous as to the interests of Great Britain, and less careful of his own honour, might have admitted some unsatisfactory compromise as to his position, and might have trusted to an arbitrary exercise of the power wielded by him to have extricated himself from future embarrassments. By your firmness you have saved Great

Britain from complications, and you have vindicated the honour of the British uniform in the eyes of the Chinese by refusing to accept an unbecoming position.

However disappointing the result of your honourable wish to advance the cause of progress in China, you have the consolation of knowing that you have gained the respect and approval of persons of every nation who are acquainted with the course you have pursued.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

No. 16.

*Mr. Hammond to the Secretary to the Admiralty.**

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 11, 1864.

I AM directed by Earl Russell to request that you will acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that it appears, from the accounts received from China, that, in consequence of some disagreement between Captain Sherard Osborn and the Chinese Government, the vessels which that officer purchased and equipped as vessels of war in this country, for the service of the Emperor of China, were about to be sent, some to India and some to England, to be disposed of by sale.

These vessels are understood to be fully equipped for belligerent purposes, and Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that it is incumbent upon them to take any precaution that may legally be within their power to prevent them from passing in their present state into the hands of any Power or State engaged in hostility with another Power or State in amity with Her Majesty.

Her Majesty's Government would therefore desire that the attention of the Naval, Colonial, and Indian authorities, both at home and on any station abroad within Her Majesty's dominions where the vessels may be expected to be met with, should be called to the necessity of taking such measures as may be legally within their power in furtherance of the views of Her Majesty's Government in this matter; and specifically as regards Captain Osborn, who is an officer in Her Majesty's Naval Service, that he should be pointedly cautioned against disposing of any of the vessels to be used in the naval service of a belligerent Power.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 17.

Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 11, 1864.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith, for your information and guidance, a copy of a letter which I have directed to be written to the Admiralty, Colonial, and India Offices† respecting the vessels which were bought and equipped by Captain Sherard Osborn for the service of the Emperor of China, and which are now to be disposed of in consequence of the disagreement which has occurred between that officer and the Chinese Government.

If that officer should be still in China when this despatch reaches you, you will make to him a communication to the effect stated in my letter to the Admiralty.

I have furnished Sir H. Parkes with copies of this despatch and its inclosure, in order that he may at once communicate with Captain Osborn, if that officer should be at Shanghai when Sir H. Parkes arrives at that port.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

* A similar letter was sent to the Colonial and India Offices.

† No. 16.

No. 18.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(Received January 13.)

Sir,

Admiralty, January 12, 1864.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of Earl Russell, a copy of a letter from Captain Sherard Osborn, stating that, acting upon the instructions of Her Majesty's Representative in China, he was about to send the major portion of the Anglo-Chinese naval force organized in England by him to England, and take the rest to Bombay, and reporting the causes which have induced him to take those steps.

I am, &c.
(Signed) C. PAGET.

Inclosure 1 in No. 18.

Captain Osborn to Secretary to the Admiralty.

My Lord,

Shanghai, November 20, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to request that you will lay before my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty the inclosed papers and correspondence connected with the force organized in Great Britain by me under Her Majesty's Order in Council, and I have to inform their Lordships that acting upon the instructions of Sir Frederick Bruce, Her Majesty's Representative in China, I am about to send the major portion of the squadron to England, and take the rest to Bombay.

The latter vessels I shall lay up, and return overland to England to make the necessary arrangements for their disposal.

The circumstances which have led to this unexpected change in the disposal of the European-Chinese naval force are as follows:—

In September I reached Shanghai with nearly all my force, and instead of receiving, as I expected, full powers as Commander-in-Chief, I found a note from Mr. Lay urging me to hasten to Pekin; at the same time the local Mandarins commenced to intrigue by trying to persuade my crews that the scale of pay I had established was far below what they could give. They inveigled nearly all the stokers from one ship, and tried hard, in combination with the European rowdies in Shanghai, who appeared to know of some difficulty connected with my powers, to get up a general desertion, so that the ships would fall into the hands of the Mandarins.

My men behaved, however, very well, and I was able to collect the squadron at Chefoo, in Shantung, and leave the ships in excellent order, under the charge of Captain Burgoyne, my second in command.

On my arrival at Pekin I received the letter of instructions marked No. 4. It was perfectly inadmissible, and the remarks I have annexed represent all the arguments against it which I used with the Mandarins forming the Foreign Board. I found their tone personally polite; but Wensiang, the Prince's Minister, was at little pains to disguise the fact, that within a very recent period the opinions of Prince Kung and his colleagues had changed as to the policy of employing Europeans under the direct authority of the Emperor, and that instead of centralizing the responsibility at Pekin, as European policy dictated, the Mandarins had evidently decided upon again reverting to their ancient system of thrusting the responsibility upon the provincial authorities.

It was, in short, simply the object of Prince Kung to make me the servant of the local provincial Mandarins, instead of that of the Emperor.

I told him that Her Majesty's Order in Council gave me no power to pass either my own services or those of others to the irresponsible action of local Mandarins, and that we all came to China to serve the Emperor or his Regent, not Chinese prefects or intendents.

All the European Ministers at Pekin cordially supported these views of my duty and position, but to all my representations urging the Regent to ratify the terms of the agreement I had entered into with his agent upon the faith of his instructions, I received

nothing but idle excuses; and at last, after four months endeavour on the part of Mr. Lay, and five weeks' additional labour by myself, I felt it was weakness to temporize any longer. To a point-blank question I received at last a blunt verbal refusal, and having then addressed a letter to Prince Kung, to which no reply was given, I handed the whole affair over to the British Minister.

Sir F. Bruce then requested me to retain the ships until the decision of Her Majesty's Government was known. I believe his Excellency informed Prince Kung that neither he nor his colleagues, the other Ministers of Legation, would consent to let him have a squadron of so formidable a character, whilst the Prince evinced such a determination to evade all responsibility as to its control or disposition.

The Prince, either from ill will, or want of power, persisted in refusing to assume the responsibility of employing my force under the direct authority of the Emperor, and concluded the affair by making some idle excuses for non-ratification of his agent's agreements; and after thanking me for my services in fitting out the squadron, requested Sir F. Bruce to cause the ships, stores, and men to be again got rid of.

Sir F. Bruce then addressed me the inclosed final letter, and although I did not feel called upon to relieve Prince Kung from the difficulties arising from his own want of good faith, still I hope their Lordships will think I have done right in undertaking the disagreeable task of disposing of the ships and stores at the request of Her Majesty's Minister, and to prevent so formidable an armament falling into the hands of the villains now swarming in Central China.

I think the perusal of the inclosed documents will lead their Lordships to the same opinion as the one I hold, in common with every one at Peking, that the change in Prince Kung's views since 1862, when he led our Minister to believe that he was in earnest in desiring to reform the naval and military forces of this empire, is solely owing to his subordinates in the provinces having discovered that they can hire Europeans to defeat the Taepings, and yet be able to perpetuate the old misrule of every department of the State.

To the gross abuse of the Orders in Council of last year by Europeans in Shanghai, I trace the failure of my effort to serve these people in a way which would really serve their own as well as European interests.

I am now dispatching all the force to England, except two paddle dispatch vessels, and one gunboat, which I intend to place in Bombay harbour, and then proceed overland to London.

Commander Charles J. Forbes, R.N., whom I am dispatching to England on business connected with the legal opinion required as to the terms of the agreement, will be able to furnish their Lordships with all particulars connected with the vessels of the force.

I have, &c.

(Signed) SHERARD OSBORN.

No. 19.

Mr. Lay to Earl Russell.—(Received January 13, 1864.)

Peking, November 10. 1863.

My Lord,

THE present mail conveys to your Lordship the papers having reference to the dissolution of the naval force which Captain Osborn and myself were empowered by Her Majesty's Order in Council to organise for the Emperor of China. And I gladly avail myself of the privilege your Lordship kindly accorded me, to submit to you some account of my proceedings in this country in regard thereto.

On my arrival in Peking, on the 1st of June last, I placed the agreements which I had entered into, under his letter of instructions of the 20th October, 1862, in the hands of the Prince of Kung.

These consisted of:—

1. The agreement between myself, as agent for the Emperor of China and the officers and crews of the vessels, to which were appended certain regulations for the discipline of the force organized.

2. The agreement between Captain Osborn and myself, which embodied the principles we had laid down for the government of our conduct in this country.

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This was framed so as to insure Captain Osborn a proper position ; and to provide against his being placed upon a footing with the filibusters in the employ of the Chinese local authorities.

We were careful to guard against the possible mis-employment of the force by the Emperor, by my engaging to be the medium of all instructions to Captain Osborn ; and to prevent orders being at any time issued to him at variance with Treaties or international obligations, I promised (as is the case in my own department) to refuse to convey instructions, of the reasonableness of which I was not satisfied.

Pains were taken to make this agreement stringent in its terms, for my experience made me mindful of the defect in the Chinese character, falsity and bad faith ; and I felt that unless the Emperor were securely bound by conditions of the above nature, which he would have to ratify before the flotilla could be called upon to act, any obligations that might be entered into on his behalf would share the fate of all Chinese engagements, whenever it becomes convenient or safe to repudiate them.

The serious responsibilities which I incurred in entering upon the undertaking at all made it incumbent on me, in the exercise of common prudence, to adopt every precaution against the possible misbehaviour in time to come of the Chinese Government. And upon no other conditions than those laid down would I have consented for one moment to become instrumental in procuring force of a formidable character for an Asiatic Power, knowing well that, unrestricted by any conditions, it would sooner or later be tempted to direct that force against our own interests or the interests of other European Powers, leading to complications in which Captain Osborn and I would certainly be sacrificed.

When I presented the agreements for formal ratification, the "Foreign Board" (Prince Kung, it seems, has ceased for a year past to occupy himself with the details of foreign affairs) suggested modification of the terms of my agreement with Captain Osborn. I referred to the Prince's letter of authority to me, which, I observed, had been written upon a draft sent out from England by me for his signature ; in that letter he had given me explicit authority to arrange on his behalf the terms of all agreements ; under it I had arranged the only terms upon which I could obtain the sanction, in the first place, of my own Government, and in the second, the services of officers of proper standing ; and by it the Prince must be held bound.

I may mention to your Lordship, that before I acted upon that letter, I took the precaution to fortify myself with a legal opinion, which pronounced it sufficient to warrant my entering into all terms and conditions.

The Board said the Prince would ratify the agreements if I would consent to Captain Osborn's being placed under the orders of the local authorities. I answered that this could not be entertained. Captain Osborn had permission to serve the Emperor of China only, and could receive orders only from Peking.

Thus the matter stood until Captain Osborn's arrival in September. Satisfactory financial arrangements for the maintenance of the force were made in the meantime, the Board taking it for granted that the money question would be the only one which would be considered of real importance by us.

When Captain Osborn arrived, we lost no time in explaining jointly that the proposal to place him under the orders of the local Mandarins was inadmissible. The Board tried hard to persuade us to yield the point, but finding us firm, declared at length that the Prince would in that case decline to ratify the agreements.

I asked repeatedly that this decision might be communicated in writing, but in vain. The Prince had skilfully ignored his letter of instructions throughout, and had left the letter, in which I had drawn his attention to the important clauses of the agreement, unacknowledged.

We informed the Foreign Board that if the Prince refused to ratify, the force must be disbanded.

The matter was then placed, with all the correspondence connected with it, in the hands of Sir F. Bruce, from whom, as your Lordship will receive a report of the subsequent proceedings, I forbear trespassing upon your time by referring to them here.

I think that the motives which have influenced Prince Kung to repudiate the agreements entered into under his written authority may be easily explained. When he ordered the steam flotilla, the Government had not yet recovered the effects of our last expedition. A vague feeling of alarm as to the future prevailed ; the recent progress of the rebels had been rapid ; no less than four of the open ports, Canton, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai, were in danger of capture ; the Government was beset with appeals from the foreign Ministers for action, and was, in short, told that if it did not make an effort we should have to treat with the rebels.*

* " See Further Papers relating to the Rebellion in China," presented to Parliament in 1863, page 13.

The Prince was therefore ready to do anything, and while in this mood signed the letter of instructions to me.

In the meantime, however, under the auspices of Admiral Hope and General Stavley, the Government obtained, through the local authorities, all the aid that it needed. Officers were lent; guns and ammunition supplied; and before my return Ningpo was recovered, the other ports secured against attack, and the rebels driven back within the walls of Soochow.

The Chinese Government found itself relieved of its embarrassments in a manner most acceptable to it; the local Mandarins obtained the services of as many officers and men as were necessary, upon the simple terms of so many dollars a-month, without guarantees or agreements of any kind; the Government was not required to give a single pledge or to incur any responsibilities.

When, therefore, the terms upon which the naval force had been organized were submitted for ratification, it was not strange that they should be pronounced unacceptable. The Chinese Government naturally prefers unconditional aid, to aid fettered by restrictions. My aim has been to make reform and progress the condition of aid. It is only thus, I believe, that aid can lead to any good in China, or that we are justified in affording it.

The military assistance, as at present rendered at Shanghai, is under the irresponsible control of the local Mandarins, and will, I apprehend, be found attended with troublesome, if not serious, consequences. My observation, after five month's residence in Pekin, leads me to doubt altogether the sincerity of Prince Kung's friendly professions, and my belief is that the anti-foreign party is gaining strength daily.

In Sir F. Bruce's despatches, advocating the formation of this naval force, he coupled the reformed administration of the Customs with the promised re-organization of the executive forces of the empire. To have passed the naval force into the hands of the local authorities would have been to destroy all hope of improvement in any direction. As soon as it had served its purpose of slaughter, it would have been thrown aside.

With Sir F. Bruce, I had hoped that Her Majesty's Government would have been relieved, by means of this flotilla, of the expense of maintaining order at the open ports; and that the Chinese Customs' establishment would have been furnished with the necessary support to enable it to contend against the hostility of European evil-doers, and to render it independent of the local authorities, whose interest it is to restore the former corrupt state of things.

Disappointing as the dissolution of the force must be to all concerned, I feel that no one has greater cause than I of complaint against Prince Kung. Obligated to return to England by ill health, induced by wounds and years of toil in the Chinese service, I sacrificed my leisure while in England to his service. My proposals on his behalf were well received in England, and met with the kindest support of Her Majesty's Government. On my arrival here, the Prince treated the whole matter with assumed indifference, and fancying that we had gone too far to withdraw, and that from the number of Europeans in Chinese employ ready to serve upon his terms, he was independent of Captain Osborn, he attempted to impose his own conditions.

Although our hopes have not been realized, I have at any rate the consolation of feeling that we have not broken a single pledge made in England, and that the refusal of the force placed at the disposal of the Chinese Government, through the generosity of Her Majesty's Government, is an act for which Prince Kung and his colleagues are alone responsible.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. N. LAY.

No. 20.

Mr. Hammond to Mr. Lay.

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 18, 1864.

I AM directed by Earl Russell to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th of November last, respecting the dissolution of the Anglo-Chinese squadron lately under the command of Captain Osborn.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 21.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received January 18, 1864.)

My Lord,

Pekin, November 19, 1863.

THE Chinese Government having, after four months discussion, resolved definitively not to ratify the conditions to which Mr. Lay had engaged to procure the Emperor's assent, and which Captain Osborn considered indispensable to enable him to direct the flotilla without compromising his country or his own honour, that officer placed the affair in my hands. It is finally arranged that the ships, with the officers and men, are to return to England, the Chinese Government having agreed to pay all expenses and fulfil the contracts entered into with the men, and having requested me to assist them in the sale of the ships for their benefit, Captain Osborn has undertaken this duty, and intends to dispose of two of the smaller vessels in India, if possible, not wishing to risk them a second time round the Cape.

I interfered to prevent the ships being handed over to the Chinese, because they could not make use of them, and because of the danger of their being bought by the Japanese, or falling into the hands of adventurers who might have used them against the interests of commerce.

I will write at length by next opportunity, by which time the necessary documents connected with this affair will be ready for transmission. I will only add here, that Captain Osborn has merited the highest approval by the superiority he has shown to pecuniary considerations, and by his resolution not to undertake this delicate service, unless upon such conditions as would have enabled him to preserve the British name from being sullied by the perpetration of excesses in his presence, and from being dragged into proceedings which would have created embarrassment with other foreign Powers. At the same time, I do not think the Chinese Government open to the charge of bad faith, as the conditions they were called upon to ratify are not such as the authority given to Mr. Lay entitled him to assent to in their name.

Mr. Lay mistook his position, and over-rated his influence when he resolved on starting this flotilla without having previously ascertained that the terms agreed upon with Captain Osborn would be accepted.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

 Inclosure 1 in No. 21.
The Prince of Kung's Letter of Instructions to Mr. Lay.

[See Inclosure 1 in No. 15.]

 Inclosure 2 in No. 21.
Agreement between Mr. Lay and Captain Osborn, signed in London, January 16, 1863.

[See Inclosure 2 in No. 15.]

 No. 22.
Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 20, 1864.

HER Majesty's Government approve your proceedings, as reported in your despatch of the 9th of November, with reference to the refusal of the Chinese Government to ratify the agreement between Mr. Lay and Captain Osborn.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 23.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received January 27, 1864.)

(Extract.)

Pekin, November 19, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copies of various documents, forwarded to me by Captain Osborn, on the refusal of the Chinese Government to agree to the conditions on which, alone, he had consented to organize a steam flotilla for the service of the Emperor of China.

Also, of my correspondence with the Chinese Government and with Captain Osborn, on the disposal of these war-vessels, and on the arrangement, ultimately agreed on, for sending them and the officers and men to England.

In order to understand clearly what has taken place, it must be borne in mind that though the flotilla sailed in winter from England for China, it was not until Mr. Lay arrived here in the spring that the Chinese Government had any intimation of the composition of the force, of the cost of its maintenance, or of the contents and scope of the undertaking entered into by Mr. Lay with Captain Osborn; I must call your Lordship's attention to the latter document, as the refusal of the Chinese to ratify it has proved fatal to the success of the scheme.

Mr. Lay proceeded at once to urge on this Government the necessity of conferring upon himself and Captain Osborn the authority he had engaged in his undertaking to procure. His recent arrival from Europe, the honours conferred on him by Her Majesty, and his acquaintance with men of influence and standing, enabled him to assume, in dealing with the Chinese Government, rather the dictatorial tone of an independent authority than the language of persuasion appropriate to the agent of the Government he was addressing. His hopes of success were strengthened by the reserved attitude of the Ministers of the Treaty Powers, all of whom, on different grounds, had reason to be dissatisfied with the dilatory proceedings of this Government in granting redress for illegal acts committed by the local authorities. The Prince and his advisers were thus led to infer that a scheme which promised to strengthen the hands of the central Government, as against provincial influences, could not fail to be acceptable to foreign Ministers, as being a step towards that policy of centralization which they had always advocated, and that a feeling existed in their minds that the difficulties encountered by Mr. Lay were attributable to retrograde views.

So far, therefore, as foreign influences were concerned, Mr. Lay was more favoured by events than he could have reasonably expected, considering the exclusive composition of the force and the jealousies which, in this respect, it was fitted to awaken. I can state positively that nothing fell from the foreign Ministers calculated to thwart him in his attempts to obtain the ratification of these agreements, and that his failure is due to the spontaneous resolution of the Chinese themselves; their motives being the opposition of the provincial authorities; the reluctance of the Chinese Government to assume the responsibility of directing the force instead of leaving it to be directed by local Governors; and, above all, the alarm and suspicion engendered in their minds by the proposals contained in the understanding entered into by Mr. Lay and Captain Osborn, by which they considered that the exclusive control of the operations would be vested in Mr. Lay, who would thus be enabled, indirectly, to compel them to act in all matters in subservience to his will.

Mr. Lay injudiciously, in my opinion, held language and advanced pretensions which tended to increase their apprehensions in this respect. He proposed that they should give him a "Foo" to reside in, that is to say, one of the palaces conferred by the Emperor on princes of the blood, such as those inhabited by the Ministers of England and France; a class of building which the highest officers of the Chinese Government are not permitted to inhabit. He acted as if he held the independent position of head of a great revenue department, which put him on an equality with Wensiang and the superior Members of the Foreign Board, and as, therefore, only accountable to the Prince of Kung, the Vice-Regent of the empire. The members of the Foreign Board could obtain from him no specific statement, or account, of the sums expended by him, or anything beyond vague assurances that the money had been rightly spent, and would be accounted for in due time, and he insisted on the dismissal of the two Chinese superintendents, placed by this Government at the head of the Customs Department, and the appointment of himself as sole director and recipient of the foreign Customs revenue, amounting already to about £3,000,000 sterling, with a fair prospect of increase. In fact, it is impossible to doubt that Mr. Lay, full of large schemes of progress and commercial development in China, desirous of arriving at immediate results, and conscious that the course of

improvement will be both uncertain and slow, if depending solely on the influence which events and persuasion combined may gradually exercise in the Chinese mind, aimed at solving the difficulty by obtaining the sole command of the most certain source of the Imperial revenue, and of the most efficient branch of its executive. Armed with this power he hoped by threats of suspending the action of the flotilla, and of withholding the funds, that the Chinese Government would be compelled to adopt such measures as he should propose. He was to dictate the policy to be pursued; it was to be promulgated to the empire by Imperial Decree; and to be executed by the flotilla and such land forces as might be required, the expenses of which were to be provided for out of the Customs' revenues.

I believe I am correct in assuming that an article in Blackwood's Magazine of January 1863, entitled "Progress in China," contains a statement of the results anticipated by those who promote this course of policy, and I concur with Mr. Lay in thinking that nothing short of a dictatorship lodged in European hands, and so supported by foreign influence as to render the Chinese powerless to defeat or thwart it by intrigue or opposition, would enable its supporters to realise the promises it holds out. Even thus, looking to the reluctance of the Chinese Government, and the determined hostility of provincial authorities, this scheme could not have been successfully carried out.

The Chinese Government, however, comprehended at once the scope and bearing of this scheme, and look upon it as an insidious attempt to take the administration out of their hands. They were unacquainted with Mr. Lay, and employed him as their agent for the purchase of ships and hiring of men at Mr. Hart's suggestion, who recommended him as a person on whom they might rely, and who, being in England, could carry out their wishes in a satisfactory and economical manner. They had no such special confidence in him as would have induced them to put themselves in his hands. They do not look upon the Inspector-General as anything more than a subordinate officer in their employ, to whom a general superintendence is given over the foreigners engaged to aid in the collection of the Customs revenue on foreign trade, but on whom no control is bestowed over the application of the receipts. They do not consider him as a political officer at all, nor do they consult him as of right even in questions affecting foreign trade. It was only at my invitation, and contrary to the intentions of the Chinese Government, that Mr. Hart was able, two years ago, to come up to Peking, and it was only by his tact, good sense, and modesty, that he obtained access to the Prince of Kung, and turned to useful account the favourable impression he made upon his Imperial Highness and his advisers. It is a significant mark of the light in which they view Mr. Lay's pretensions, that he never was admitted to the Prince's presence during these months of discussion. Indeed, he would not have seen him at all had I not requested an interview with the Prince, which he anticipated would be of a disagreeable character. To forestall any remark I might make on his not having seen Mr. Lay, he sent for him in the morning, and had a few minutes' conversation with him on indifferent matters.

If the hope, therefore, was entertained in any quarter that Mr. Lay enjoyed, either on account of his personal merits, or in virtue of his office, any such influence over the Chinese Government as would enable him to carry out the views he entertained with their concurrence and assent, it was founded on an entire misapprehension of his position, and of their feelings towards their foreign employés. They looked upon him as an agent for a special purpose, whose authority was limited to the purchase of ships and to the engaging of men to bring them out. They certainly did not contemplate conferring upon him any authority to tie up their hands for years as to the manning of these vessels, still less that he should take upon himself to determine, at his will, how the operations of the ships were to be directed, and under whose immediate orders they were to be placed; and they were totally indisposed to alter the character of the office he bears, to give to him, or to any foreigner, a leading part in the administration of the Government, or to invest him with any control over the Customs' revenues, except in so far as was required to meet the expenditure of the foreign part of the establishment. They are profoundly irritated, not only because of the embarrassments in which they are involved by his having exceeded his authority, but on account of the position he thus sought to create for himself. They attribute his conduct to personal motives, and their confidence in the good faith of foreign agents has been most seriously shaken.

After much discussion the enclosed paper was drawn up by the Chinese Government, and in order to mark that they could go no further, it was invested with the form of an Imperial Decree, the form they adopt when discussion is closed. Whether, as they assert, they understood Mr. Lay to acquiesce in this arrangement or not I am unable to determine, and it is of little consequence, as it remained with Captain Osborn to decide how far he would consent to the modification of his understanding with Mr. Lay.

That officer shortly afterwards reached Peking. During his voyage up the coast incidents were not wanting to show him that his position would be one of more difficulty than he had

been led to expect. He found that he would have to encounter the bitter opposition of a large section of the foreign communities, and the active hostility of the provincial authorities. Agents were employed at Shanghai to go on board his ships and to seduce his men, by offers of higher pay, if they would enter the service of the Governor of Keangsoo. He was obliged, in consequence, to discharge some of his men who became dissatisfied with the rates of pay assigned to them, and to remove his vessels up to Chefoo to prevent the disorganization of his force. He felt that the efficiency of his squadron required not only that he should be freed from the control and interference of the provincial officers, but, further, that effectual steps should be taken to prevent them from offering employment to his men, otherwise his ships might be disabled at any moment. In addition to these difficulties in the provinces, he found on his arrival at Pekin that the Chinese Government looked upon the flotilla as part of a scheme to place them in a position inconsistent with their dignity and independence of action, and therefore doubly indisposed to antagonise the provincial authorities in its behalf. He accordingly decided, after mature reflection, to abide by the terms of his understanding with Mr. Lay, and to call on the Chinese Government to declare whether they would ratify the agreement or not. On receiving a verbal refusal through Mr. Lay (no written communication having been addressed to him during the period of delay granted in his letter), Captain Osborn enclosed to me the documents with the accompanying letter. It was essential that a decision should be come to at once, as he held no commission, and his authority to enforce discipline among his men was liable to be called in question.

Thus far I had taken no part in the discussions between Mr. Lay and the Chinese Government. Indeed, I studiously avoided expressing any opinion on the proposals made to them, for I felt much embarrassment as to the answer I should be compelled to give if the Chinese Government put the question to me: Are we bound to ratify this agreement against our convictions? I foresaw, also, that if I were to attempt to extort their assent against their will, the question would become a political one, for the Chinese would certainly have consulted the other foreign Ministers, and in spite of their wish to act with me in a friendly and large spirit, I could not expect their support in any attempt to impose this scheme upon them by menace. I therefore resolved to leave the matter to be arranged, if possible, by the Chinese themselves with their Agent and Captain Osborn, and to protract, in the interest of the scheme, the suspense in which they were held as to my opinion and intentions.

During this period I had two interviews with the Foreign Board. In neither did they allude to the flotilla, and I imitated their reserve. Our conversation turned on the dangers arising from the employment of foreign adventurers by the local Governors, and on the impossibility of foreign officers of character being induced to serve the Chinese by land or sea, unless they held formal commissions from the central Government, and unless they were secured against the caprice and jealousy of the provincial authorities. In fact, this was the line of observation most likely to induce the Government to accede to Captain Osborn's terms; for if they and the provincial Governors had felt convinced that they would be deprived of the foreign element which has gained for them all their late successes near Shanghai, and would have to rely on purely Chinese resources, they would have had a strong inducement to agree for the moment to the conditions proposed.

So long as Governors can obtain on their own terms foreign officers and steamers officered by foreigners sufficient to repel the insurgents, it is idle to expect that the Government at Pekin will undertake the organization of an Imperial force either on land or on the sea, and thereby relieve local Governors from the responsibility of maintaining tranquillity in their provinces, which is the established principle of Chinese administration. Of their reluctance to make this change in their system, we have abundant proof in the abandonment of foreign drill at Tientsin, in their refusal to engage, under contract, French drill instructors, or to accept the gratuitous services of officers whom the Russian Government offered to lend them for that purpose.

It was now, however, incumbent on me to interfere directly, and the first step I took was to inform the Chinese Government that I could not consent to hand over the ships to them without instructions from Her Majesty's Government. My reasons for taking the step were, that the ships were held as security by Captain Osborn for fulfilment of the terms agreed on by the men; that the latter were entitled to be sent home, and that it was not quite clear whether they were to be paid up to the time of their arrival in England or up to the 30th of August next. Moreover, these ships are not of a kind that the Chinese could manage, or that it would be safe to put in the hands of the class of foreigners who are on board the small steamers bought by the Governor of Kiangsoo (about ten in number), and which have proved so efficient in the operations near Soo-chow. On the other hand, it would not be safe to sell them on the coast, as they might fall into the hands of hostile Daimios in Japan, or be

bought for employment as Confederate cruisers in these seas. The inclosed copy of a despatch from the Minister of the United States will show that he was alive to this danger; and I may add that M. Berthemy was equally of opinion that the flotilla should not be given up, as there was no means of guaranteeing to what purposes the ships might be turned. It struck me, also, that if the Chinese found that they could not have the ships without ratifying the agreements, they might, perhaps, be induced to reconsider their decision; and in order to throw away no chance of inducing them to accept the flotilla, and to put myself in as good a position as possible to deal with the pecuniary difficulties that would ensue from its rejection, I took advantage of the Prince's reluctance to face an unpleasant discussion, and declined the interview proposed by Wensiung unless the Prince were present.

Having sent me the inclosed despatch, they sought an interview with the Minister of the United States, Mr. Burlingame, upon whose friendly desire to arrange matters satisfactorily I could thoroughly rely. Before entering into the subject, he required them to state, distinctly, whether they had definitively resolved not to ratify the agreements entered into with Captain Osborn. They replied in the affirmative, adding that it was impossible for them, in the face of opinion in China, to take the direction of the flotilla out of the hands of the local authorities, or to ratify conditions which, to use their own phrase, would deliver them over, bound hand and foot, to Mr. Lay.

Mr. Burlingame, in three protracted interviews, argued the question at great length, in order to ascertain whether any feasible scheme could be hit upon which would meet their objections and enable the flotilla to act; but finding that the points on which they differed with Captain Osborn were such as to render a compromise impracticable, Mr. Burlingame advised them to state their reasons fully for not ratifying the agreement, to thank Her Majesty's Government and Captain Osborn for what had been done in their behalf, and to request me to have the vessels returned to England under Captain Osborn, to be there sold, the proceeds, after discharging all liabilities, to be remitted to the Chinese Government. This advice was followed to the letter; as your Lordship will see by the inclosed despatch; and the Chinese, of their own accord, and without a suggestion from any one, added that they wished Captain Osborn to accept 10,000 taels (3,300*l.*) in consideration of the labour entailed upon him by this flotilla. To this letter I returned the reply of which copy is inclosed.

I think the arrangement proposed, in consequence of which the vessels are to leave China at once, is more advantageous to all parties than the one I originally suggested, for expense is thereby avoided, and the danger obviated of keeping a large number of men on the coast in a state of idleness, and subject to no sufficient authority, during the period that must have elapsed before instructions from England could have been received. Captain Osborn takes two vessels to India in the hopes of disposing of them there, and the rest will sail for England as soon as the necessary arrangements are made.

I cannot express too strongly my sense of the friendly and valuable assistance rendered by Mr. Burlingame in bringing about an arrangement which provided satisfactorily for all the interests concerned, and in such a manner as not to compromise those friendly relations which I am so anxious to maintain with this Government; and I think this incident illustrates the importance of adhering, in China, strictly to a just and fair line of policy. The belief that I, as British Minister, would respect the rights of the Chinese, and that I would not force the flotilla upon them from selfish political considerations, induced my colleagues to abstain from interfering while the question was under discussion, and thereby secured for the flotilla a deliberate and unfettered consideration on the part of the Chinese Government; and I am certain that this course was more favourable to the success of the scheme, had success been possible, than any other that could have been adopted. It appeared to me also, that I should not have been justified in taking a more* active part, for I had reason to believe that your Lordship had no cognizance of the undertaking of so novel a character entered into by Mr. Lay with Captain Osborn; and the absence of instructions was to me a significant proof that Her Majesty's Government had no intention of being a party to, or responsible for, the arrangements under which the operations of the flotilla were to be conducted. Had the Chinese voluntarily accepted the squadron, the onus of the difficulties it would have encountered would have rested on the Chinese Government; but the burden would have been thrown on Her Majesty's Government by the Chinese, and with justice, had it appeared that this flotilla, exclusively British in its character, directed by British officers and agents, and imposed by British pressure, was acting under a Chinese flag, which the Chinese Government, contrary to its wishes, had been compelled to hoist on board the ships.

Moreover, the Chinese Government has latterly shown its inability or indisposition to carry out the various suggestions I made for strengthening the central power, of which the flotilla is only one, and it was evident that there was no disposition on the part of the Chinese to

incorporate it into their system, so as to subserve the general purposes of police and revenue ; but that, if forced to accept it, they would have directed it against Nanking, and would then have left it to be disorganized by the ill-will and intrigues of the provincial authorities. Putting aside the consideration that Her Majesty's Government would not have assisted in the formation of the force had this been the only object contemplated, I must observe that such a course would have been full of danger to our trade.

In fact, this flotilla ought to have been designed to carry out the revenue laws, and to assist in suppressing piracy. Less formidable and expensive vessels would have been sufficient for these purposes, and they would have been at the same time, though in a subordinate degree, of much use in assisting military operations. Whereas, a purely war squadron was provided, with officers who looked to *actions d'éclat*, and not to the disagreeable and prosaic task of stopping smugglers and robber-junks. And further, if it was considered necessary that the flotilla should be taken out of the hands of the Government who paid for it, and the exclusive control over its operations vested in its foreign commander and the foreign agent employed in procuring it, these conditions, of so singular a nature, ought to have been submitted and agreed to before the vessels were allowed to sail for China.

I owe it to Captain Osborn to state that he has shown great sagacity in appreciating the situation, and the most honourable spirit in the course he has pursued. In spite of the great pecuniary advantages secured to him he would not consent to any compromise which might hereafter place him in a false position, or involve his country in embarrassment.

I have only to request your Lordship's indulgent consideration amid so many difficulties, and to beg that Her Majesty's Government will enable me to redeem my pledge to the Chinese Government, and that every assistance may be given in the disposal of the ships and their armament, in order that the loss entailed upon them may be as light as possible.

Inclosure 1 in No. 23.

Mr. Lay to Captain Osborn, September 25, 1863.

[See Inclosure 3 in No. 15.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 23.

Understanding between Mr. Lay and Captain Osborn, January 16, 1863.

[See Inclosure 2 in No. 15.]

Inclosure 3 in No. 23.

The Prince of Kung's Instructions to Captain Osborn.

[See Inclosure 4 in No. 15.]

Inclosure 4 in No. 23.

Captain Osborn to Sir F. Bruce, October 19, 1863.

[See Inclosure 8 in No. 15.]

Inclosure 5 in No. 23.

The Prince of Kung's Instructions to Mr. Lay, October 24, 1862.

[See Inclosure 1 in No. 15.]

Inclosure 6 in No. 23.

Remarks by Captain Osborn on the Prince of Kung's Instructions to him, September 28, 1863.

[See Inclosure 5 in No. 15.]

Inclosure 7 in No. 23.

Mr. Lay to Captain Osborn, October 13, 1863.

[See Inclosure 6 in No. 15.]

Inclosure 8 in No. 23.

Captain Osborn to the Prince of Kung, October 15, 1863.

[See Inclosure 7 in No. 15.]

Inclosure 9 in No. 23.

Sir F. Bruce to Captain Osborn, October 20, 1863.

[See Inclosure 9 in No. 15.]

Inclosure 10 in No. 23.

Captain Osborn to Sir F. Bruce, October 27, 1863.

[See Inclosure 10 in No. 15.]

Inclosure 11 in No. 23.

Sir F. Bruce to Prince of Kung.

Sir,

Pekin, October 20, 1863.

I AM informed by Captain Osborn that, in consequence of the refusal of your Imperial Highness to ratify the agreements entered into by your agent, Mr. Lay, with that officer, he is about to disband the force engaged, in England, for the service of the Emperor of China.

As Her Majesty's Government took an active part in promoting the equipment of the vessels composing it, and certainly would not have consented to the organization of the squadron had it not felt satisfied as to the prudence and high character of the officer under whose command it was to be placed, it is my duty to report what has taken place to Her Majesty's Government, and to request instructions as to the disposal of the ships and stores. I have informed Captain Osborn, therefore, that they are to be detained until those instructions are received.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 12 in No. 23.

The Prince of Kung to Sir F. Bruce.

(Translation.)

Pekin, October 25, 1863.

THE Prince of Kung makes a communication in reply.

The Prince has to acknowledge the receipt of the British Minister's despatch of the 20th instant, on the subject of the purchase of a steam flotilla and armament by the Chinese Government.

Inasmuch as the Chinese Government of its own motion authorized the Acting Inspector-General Hart to purchase (vessels), the Prince therefore did not trouble the British Minister with any particulars in regard to the matter; but as the Prince is now in receipt of a letter from the British Minister on the subject, it becomes His Highness's duty to put his Excellency in possession of the full particulars of the matter.

In the memorandum which Mr. Hart submitted in person to the Members of the Foreign Board, last year, as to the officers, gunners, and crews of the steamers (it was proposed to purchase), he mentioned that it would be necessary to appoint a Chinese high officer to act with Captain Osborn in all matters connected with the control and management (of the fleet); he also mentioned that there should be selected 200 Chinese (Hoonan men), to serve as gunners; 200 Shantung men, as sailors; 100 Manchoos, as marines, and 50 Manchoos, to act as powder-monkeys. It appeared to the Members of the Foreign Board, upon examination of his proposition, that it would be of advantage, and not injurious to China. It was not proposed that the people to be engaged for the steamers should consist wholly of foreigners, nor was there any intention of depriving the Chinese Government of the military authority. The Foreign Board therefore memorialized the throne, and received His Majesty's sanction and permission to carry out the proposal, and the Prince issued official instructions to Mr. Hart to proceed with the purchases, &c., in accordance with that sanction, stating clearly, moreover, in his letter, that it must rest with the Governors-General and Governors to appoint officers to the fleet.

Mr. Hart subsequently informed (the Members of the Foreign Board) that, with reference to the purchase of vessels and guns, he had officially addressed the Inspector-General Lay, who was at that time in England, and had placed the whole matter in his hands, and that therefore it would be necessary for the Prince to issue to Mr. Lay a letter of authority to enable him to act.

The Foreign Board considering that it had Mr. Hart's memorandum before it, expected that, no matter who might be entrusted with the management of the affair by Mr. Hart, under the authority of the Chinese Government, he would still act in accordance with that Memorandum. Mr. Hart afterwards informed the Board that his Memorandum was only a general idea of the probable arrangement, and had reference only to the number of Chinese soldiers (to be employed); but that foreign officers, gunners, and crews, &c., would have to be engaged for service on board the vessels by Mr. Lay, to whom it would have likewise to be left to arrange the various agreements for the amounts of salaries, wages, &c., at the time of their engagement by him. The Foreign Board, considering that as the matter to be arranged remained the same, Mr. Hart having first been entrusted to proceed in the matter, and Mr. Lay afterwards having succeeded to the management, the mode of proceeding would, as a matter of course, not differ from Mr. Hart's original memorandum, accordingly prepared the letter of instructions to Mr. Lay as Mr. Hart had suggested. Comparing that document with the letter which Mr. Lay, on his arrival in Peking, addressed to the Prince, inclosing an agreement in thirteen articles, it was found to differ very materially from Mr. Hart's memorandum. For instance, he proposed that all orders (to Captain Osborn) from His Majesty must pass through him (Mr. Lay), and that if conveyed through any other channel they could not be obeyed. As China would thus have spent several millions of revenue without obtaining an atom of power, his arguments (in support of the agreement) were rebutted, and in the place of it five other articles were drawn

up, every sentence of which was discussed and settled in personal interviews with Mr. Lay and Mr. Hart, and without the slightest word to the contrary on their part. The money clauses for monthly expenditure were also one by one discussed and settled; and that being done the arrangements determined by the five articles and the money clauses were embodied in a Memorial, and respectfully submitted to and approved of by His Majesty. Since that time all the monies for monthly expenditure, and for purchase and equipment, have been regularly paid over according to agreement.

The regulations have been ratified, and large monthly payments made, it was expected that as soon as the vessels arrived they would accomplish their work, and that there would be no further discussion.

But now the Inspector-General, all at once turning his back on the Imperial Decree, disobeys the five Articles which had been discussed and settled in personal interviews, and had received the sanction of His Majesty, and brings up afresh the thirteen clauses which it was settled face to face should not be put in force, and insists upon their adoption. This agreement in thirteen articles is not only at variance with Mr. Hart's memorandum appended, but is different from the Prince's letters addressed to Mr. Lay and Mr. Hart, and is not in accordance with the intentions of His Highness when he gave his authority to Mr. Lay to enter into the various agreements, and hence the Foreign Board did not accede to the agreement in question.

Moreover, when it had been distinctly settled at the time in a personal interview that the five Articles should be the rules of action, and when the Inspector-General had received a despatch announcing that these articles had been ratified by His Majesty, and when in accordance with these five Articles he has already been paid over the money to cover expenses for several months, how is it that he presumes to disobey an Imperial Decree, looking upon it as mere child's play?

The British Minister and Mr. Wade have on former occasions urged that Chinese military authority ought not to be delegated to foreigners. The principle for China and foreign countries is in this matter identical. And the Prince is still rejoiced to think of the surpassing discernment of the British Minister and Mr. Wade, of the justice and fairness of their remarks, and that they do not share the wish of the Inspector-General, who would insist upon imposing restrictions on the Chinese Government.

As the British Minister has addressed a despatch to the Prince on this subject, his Highness has not been able to avoid entering thus fully into particulars in his reply. If the British Minister will but weigh the matter impartially he will, without doubt, perceive plainly (the real state of the case, or, that the Chinese Government is in the right.)

Inclosed are copies of Mr. Hart's memorandum of the letter of instructions to Mr. Hart, of the two letters to Mr. Lay; of Mr. Lay's letter to the Prince, inclosing the agreement,* and a copy of the five Articles discussed and agreed to in personal interviews with Mr. Lay; all which the Prince requests the British Minister carefully to peruse.

A necessary communication addressed to his Excellency Sir F. Bruce, K.C.B., &c.

Tung-Chih, 2nd year, 9th month, 13th day (October 25th, 1863).

Inclosure 13 in No. 23.

Regulations proposed by Mr. Hart in regard to the (Chinese) Officers, Gunners, Sailors, &c., to be appointed to the seven Steam-Vessels.

1. AN officer of high rank must be appointed to act with Sherard Osborn in all matters connected with the control and management of the fleet.

Seven additional officers (should) be appointed, the number to be added to hereafter as occasion may require.

These officers should not exceed thirty years of age.

2. Two hundred Hoonan men should be selected to serve as gunners. To be had at Hankow, as soon as the vessels arrive.

3. Two hundred Shantung men, to serve as sailors. To be had at Tung Chow as soon as the vessels arrive.

4. One hundred Manchooks as marines, and fifty Manchoo boys, to serve as powder-monkeys. To be had at Tientsin as soon as the vessels arrive.

* The second letter to Mr. Lay is identical with the one addressed to Captain Osborn inclosing the "Five Articles," which together form Inclosure No. 5.

The gunners, sailors, and marines must be selected between the ages of eighteen and thirty; the boys between the ages of fourteen and eighteen.

Several cooks will also be required on board each ship.

Of the seven vessels, it is probable that four will be large, and three small. Each large ship ought to have on board about forty gunners, forty sailors, twenty Marines, and ten boys. Each small ship ought to have about ten gunners, ten sailors, ten marines, and three or four boys.

It is absolutely necessary that all the men appointed to serve on board the vessels should be strong and healthy.

The above is only a general idea of the probable arrangement. What the actual arrangement will be can only be known when the vessels arrive.

Inclosure 14 in No. 23.

Instructions from Chinese Foreign Board to Mr. Hart.

(Translation.)

Pekin, February 1, 1862.

THE Foreign Board gives urgent instructions to Acting Inspector-General Hart.

Mr. Hart stated in a despatch received some time ago by this Board, that, after his arrival at Shanghai, he had had an interview with his Excellency Sieh (then Governor of Kiangsoo) on the subject of the purchase of foreign ships and guns, who had said that, if no more than 800,000 taels were wanted, the getting of the money would be a matter of no difficulty; and that if the Foreign Board in Peking would give an order on the subject, the Shanghai Customs could, within a period of four months, easily provide at least 200,000 taels.

Mr. Hart himself suggested that it would be sufficient if the Shanghai and the Canton Customs were each required to provide 200,000 taels, Foochow; 100,000 taels, and Amoy and Ningpo each 50,000 taels.

The Foreign Board thereupon wrote to his Excellency Sieh, to arrange the matter as proposed. This is all on record. But as there is at present a most urgent need for the guns and arms, on account of the recent loss in succession of Ningpo and Hangchow, in the Province of Che-Kiang, this Board has obtained from His Majesty a decree, commanding the Governor of Kiang-Soo, in conjunction with the Superintendents of Customs at Canton and Foochow, to provide funds immediately for the line of foreign steamers, and to commission officers to proceed with these, when procured, to the port of Ningpo, to cut off the escape of the rebels; and also commanding the Governors-General and Governors of Kwan-tung and Fu-kien in like manner to hire steamers for the same purpose. This Board has now to instruct Mr. Hart to lose no time in consulting with his Excellency Sieh on the immediate carrying out of these projects. Let there be no further delay when the steamers have been procured and equipped with arms, either of their Excellencies Sieh or Tseng (Governor-General of the Two Keang) will appoint officers to proceed in the vessels, first to Ningpo to oppose and exterminate the rebels, and after that place has been recovered to clear the river and go right at Nanking. With such steamers as these will be, we may hope in a given time to see that little plague extinguished. As it is feared that the land-route is not at present quite free and open, a duplicate copy of this despatch is being sent by steamer.

Tung Chih, 1st year, 1st month, 2nd day (February 1st 1862.)

Inclosure 15 in No. 23.

Mr. Lay to the Prince of Kung.

(Translation.)

Sir,

June 29, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt, on the 15th of January, 1863, of the letter of instructions furnished to me by Your Imperial Highness, and to report that, in conformity therewith, I engaged in England Captain Sherard Osborn to act as Commander-in-Chief of the naval force there organised; and that in accordance with your instructions, in which you drew my attention to the three important matters,

namely, the purchase of vessels, guns, powder, coal, &c., the engagement of officers and crews, together with the drawing up of every description of agreement, and the setting apart a guarantee fund in order to meet the claims for salaries, wages, &c., I entered into an agreement, in thirteen articles, with Captain Osborn. The important provisions of this agreement are:—

First. That Captain Osborn is an officer under the orders of the Foreign Board, from which he must receive all orders and instructions so that he may act in concert with the Governors-General and Governors.

Second. That he must have authority and control over all steamers the property of native guilds as long as they are in the employment of the Emperor of China. This is necessary because the men in charge of these vessels are all foreigners, who, under pretext of being in Government employment, claim exemption from all supervision, and then furnish supplies to the rebels, to the very serious detriment of the public service. Moreover, it is a fact that steamers owned by Chinese subjects do, under cover of a foreign flag with which they stealthily provide themselves, engage in smuggling and every kind of illegal practice.

Third. Captain Osborn and myself agreed that there must be provided beforehand, and deposited in a foreign bank, a sum of money about sufficient to cover the pay and maintenance of the force for four years, so as to satisfy Captain Osborn and the officers and men that their pay would be punctually paid, it being apprehended that the pay would not be forthcoming, which might lead to refusal to work on the part of the crews; therefore this arrangement was made. In the meantime we agreed that, until the arrival of the men in China, the vessels and their equipment would be the security for the claims of the force.

I have the honour to submit to your Imperial Highness a copy of the agreement in thirteen articles translated from the original English.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. N. LAY.

Inclosure 16 in No. 23.

The Prince of Kung to Sir F. Bruce.

(Translation.)

Pekin, November 2, 1863.

THE Prince of Kung makes a further communication in reply on the subject of the purchase of the steamers by the Chinese Government.

As Captain Osborn purposes disbanding the entire force which he has under his command, it is the duty of the Prince of Kung to set forth (beforehand) clearly and in precise terms the reasons why the Chinese Government has not been able to accede to the Agreement in thirteen Articles entered into between Mr. Lay and Captain Osborn.

1. Article 4 of that Agreement runs as follows: "Captain Osborn undertakes to act upon all orders of the Emperor which may be conveyed direct to Mr. Lay, and Captain Osborn engages not to attend to any orders conveyed through any other channel."

Now, as Captain Osborn is not a subordinate of Mr. Lay's, why should it rest with Mr. Lay to transmit the orders which Captain Osborn can alone obey. The Prince's letter of instructions to Mr. Lay only stated that when the purchase and equipment of the vessels should be completed they must proceed to Shanghai there to await orders for their distribution. There was no such language in it as that the commander of the vessels should receive his orders from Mr. Lay, and through no other channel. If that were the case then China would be placed completely in his (Mr. Lay's) hands. The Prince's letter of instructions had no such intention as this. For these reasons (the 4th Article) cannot be acceded to.

2. Article 5 runs as follows: "Lay, upon his part, engages to refuse to be the medium of any orders of the reasonableness (or practicability) of which he is not satisfied. Now, in regard to orders that could not be carried out, Captain Osborn could well have consulted with the Chinese high officers (on the spot); but if it were as (this Article) proposes, then the Chinese high officers could hold no communication with Captain Osborn, and thus important operations would be seriously impeded. Therefore this Article could certainly not be agreed to.

3. Article 10 provides that "Mr. Lay must, in addition, procure a sum of money about sufficient to cover salaries, wages, and other expenses for four years. For the

present, while in England, the vessels and their equipments must stand as security (for all claims)."

Now this Article shows that Mr. Lay cannot trust the Members of the Foreign Board, how, however, can the Prince so far trust Mr. Lay as to hand over to him, a single individual, such a large sum of money. Moreover, China has never followed such a rule as to pay four years' salary beforehand. (This Article) for these reasons cannot be agreed to.

The above three Articles are not only disadvantageous to China, but do not accord with the (Prince's) original letter of instructions. As for the less important objectionable points (in the Agreement) it is unnecessary to point them out one by one.

The Prince and the Members of the Foreign Board have seen that the said agreement in thirteen articles contains provisions very much at variance with the object which the Chinese Government had in view in the purchase of the vessels; and now that Captain Osborn is about to take home and disband the force which he has brought out, the Prince has to express his sincerest thanks to the British Government for its friendly intentions in allowing the equipment of the vessels, and in granting special permission to officers to come to China. His Highness must also thank Captain Osborn for all the trouble to which he has been put in procuring the fleet and in bringing it out to China. The Chinese Government will, as a matter of course, pay to Captain Osborn and to all his officers and men their salaries, wages, &c., and all their miscellaneous expenses up to the day of their arrival in England; and, in addition, will present 10,000 taels to Captain Osborn as a recompense for the (additional) trouble (to which he will be put). All these moneys to be given out of the sum that will be realised by the sale of the vessels.

The Prince would also request the British Minister to be so good as to suggest an effectual method by which the money spent in the original purchase of the vessels, guns, and equipments may be refunded to the Imperial Treasury of China.

As these vessels are not to be in the service of the Chinese Government, the Prince has also to request the British Minister to withdraw and cancel the Chinese flag at present used by them.

As the British Minister has already read the Prince's original letter of instructions to Mr. Lay, his Highness incloses, herewith, for his Excellency's perusal, a more particular and clear explanation of the important points in that letter.

A necessary communication addressed to Sir Frederick Bruce, K.C.B., &c.

Tung-Chih, 2nd year, 9th month, 21st day (November 2nd, 1863).

Inclosure 17 in No. 23.

Explanation of the more important Points in the Prince of Kung's Letter of Instructions to Mr. Lay.

(Translation.)

1. THE Prince's letter of instructions states:—"The Acting Inspector-General Hart has now come to the capital, and apprised (the Foreign Board) that all the arrangements connected with the purchase of vessels and guns he has officially handed over to the Inspector-General, Mr. Lay, to carry out on his behalf in England." Now when this office was discussing with Mr. Hart the question of the purchase by China of ships and crews, it was originally proposed that seven foreign officers, in addition to Captain Osborn, should be engaged, and that the rest of the men employed should be men from Hoonan, from Shantung, and Manchoos; that this is so, this office has at present the memorandum in Mr. Hart's own handwriting to show, and there was no talk of employing a large number of foreigners; and as Mr. Hart, according to his own statement, handed over officially to Mr. Lay "all the arrangements" connected with the carrying out of the scheme, it is plain he must have informed him of "all the arrangements" deliberated upon by the Foreign Office in conjunction with himself.

2. The letter again states:—"There are three important points; first, the purchase of the vessels, guns, gunpowder, coal, and miscellaneous articles for the use of the vessels; second, the arrangement of officers, gunners, and seamen, and others for service in the vessels, and the arranging the terms and conditions of every description of agreement (or of each class's agreements); third, the retention, as proposed, of a sum of money to meet the salaries and wages that may be settled by the agreements, and also to provide for the payment of compensations, and other items in time to come. The above three

points (the Prince) will leave the Inspector-General to dispose of, as he in his discretion may see fit."

Now it is perfectly plain from the letter that the phrase, "each class's agreements," only refers to the salaries of the officers and the wages of the men, and to nothing else, and that the expression "to dispose of as he in his discretion may see fit," refers merely to the several kinds of payments, and to nothing else.

3. The letter again states:—"The money already collected from the Custom-houses has been transmitted through Mr. Hart to Mr. Lay, and that still due should be, as collected, handed through Mr. Hart to Mr. Lay, who is alone charged with the responsibility of its disbursement."

Now the phrase, "alone charged with the responsibility," was used only in reference to the various payments, and nothing else.

4. The letter again states:—"China is in urgent need of the vessels and guns; efforts should therefore be made to effect their completion and dispatch with the least possible delay to Shanghai, there to await orders."

Now it is plain to the comprehension, even of a woman or a child, that the phrase, "to await orders," means nothing else than to await the Prince's orders; and Mr. Lay, while on the one hand not inserting in the agreements what the letter of instructions set forth, namely, that the force must await orders (at Shanghai), has on the other embodied in them arrangements he was never instructed to make.

For these reasons, therefore, these agreements cannot be acted upon.

Inclosure 18 in No. 23.

Sir F. Bruce to the Prince of Kung.

Sir,

Pekin, November 6, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Imperial Highness's despatches of October 25th and November 2nd, inclosing papers connected with the steam flotilla, and stating the reasons which have weighed with your Imperial Highness in declining to ratify the proposed agreements.

Your Imperial Highness will have observed that I have maintained the strictest reserve while this question was under discussion. It was for China and China alone to decide for herself on a matter so intimately connected with her internal administration, and I should have acted contrary to the spirit in which I am instructed to conduct the relations of Great Britain with China, had I endeavoured to press its acceptance against the convictions of your Imperial Highness, after the long and full discussion the subject has undergone. The British Government, in the belief that this scheme had met with your Imperial Highness's approval, had placed ships, officers, and men at your disposal; but it certainly did not intend to force them on your acceptance, in the event of your deciding that the conditions on which alone this force could act were such as you could not agree to. I shall not therefore discuss the arguments advanced in your Imperial Highness's despatch, on which it is not my province to pronounce any opinion, and I shall confine myself to expressing my sincere regret that the details of this scheme were not communicated to your Imperial Highness before the expedition left England, as much expense and embarrassment would have been thereby avoided.

My duty in this matter is to assist your Imperial Highness, as far as possible, in finding a way out of these difficulties, and I have much pleasure in acknowledging the just and liberal spirit in which your Imperial Highness is disposed to treat the claims of the officers and men engaged to serve in these vessels. A question may arise on the contracts entered into with these men as to the date up to which they are entitled to be paid, namely, whether up to the 30th of August of next year, or only up to the time of their arrival in England. This question I have no power to decide; but as I am anxious that the Chinese Government should be put to no unnecessary expense, I have instructed Captain Osborn that he is to take the opinion of a competent legal authority on the point, and to be guided by it. He is also to dispose of the vessels on the most advantageous terms, and remit the balance, after payment of expenses, to the Chinese Government. I can assure your Imperial Highness that you may have full confidence in him, and that after the handsome manner in which he has been treated by your Imperial Highness, no effort on his part will be wanting to justify it.

As there may be some difficulty in providing the funds necessary for the winding-up

of this affair, I will instruct the Consuls to advance what may be required out of the forthcoming payments on account of the indemnity, the sum thus advanced to form a lien on the ships, and to be repaid out of the proceeds of the sale. I feel assured that Her Majesty's Government will appreciate the considerate spirit in which your Imperial Highness has acted, and will willingly assist Captain Osborn in carrying out his instructions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 19 in No. 23.

Sir F. Bruce to Captain Osborn.

Sir,

Pekin, November 6, 1863.

AS you are aware, the scheme of keeping the ships of the flotilla in deposit awaiting instructions from Her Majesty's Government has been abandoned, and the Chinese Government has requested me to send the vessels to England to be disposed of. His Imperial Highness expresses his thanks to yourself for the trouble to which you have been put in procuring the fleet, and in bringing it out to China, and requests you to accept 10,000 taels in addition to your pay for the labour entailed upon you by it.

He further requests that the ships may be put under another flag. That, however, is a point which must be left to your discretion.

I have, therefore, to request that you will take charge of the vessels and men with a view to the disposal of the former in England, or in India, as you think best; the officers and men to be sent home and to be paid up to their arrival in England. But as the contract may be construed to give them a claim for pay for three months after their arrival, or up to the 30th of August, it will be advisable to obtain the opinion of counsel as to the liability of the Chinese Government, they having declined to accept the flotilla on the ground of their agent having exceeded his authority in the conditions attached to the scheme. You will feel with me, that our honour is involved in winding up this affair on terms as little onerous as possible to the Chinese Government.

I will give instructions to the Consuls to contribute what may be required out of the monies received by them on the indemnity account, to meet such part of the expenses of sending the vessels home as the Chinese Government is unable to provide for. The sum so advanced will form a lien on the ships, and to be deducted from the expenses of sale, or set off against the value of the ships and stores, should Her Majesty's Government decide on taking any of them back.

I think it but just to you to express my entire approbation of the honourable and dignified course you have pursued during the discussion of this question at Peking. An officer more alive to pecuniary advantages, less scrupulous as to the interests of Great Britain, and less careful of his own honour, might have admitted some unsatisfactory compromise as to his position, and might have trusted to an arbitrary exercise of the power wielded by him to have extricated himself from future embarrassments. By your firmness you have saved Great Britain from complications, and you have vindicated the honour of the British uniform in the eyes of the Chinese by refusing to accept an unbecoming position. However disappointing the result of your honourable wish to advance the cause of progress in China, you have the consolation of knowing that you have gained the respect and approval of persons of every nation who are acquainted with the course you have pursued.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 20 in No. 23.

Mr. Burlingame to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Pekin, November 7, 1863.

WHEN the Chinese Government refused the doings of its agent, Mr. Lay, and there was nothing left for Captain Osborn but to dissolve the force of the flotilla, the question was how it could be done with safety. I feared that the ships might fall into the hands of the Confederates, who are supposed to have agents in China, and then there was

the common apprehension from lawless men on the coast in the interest of the Taepings as well as from pirates, and the desire of the Daimios in Japan to procure steamers at any price.

It was clear that the Chinese could do nothing of themselves with the steamers, and that unless something were done by you, they would certainly fall a prey to one of these several dangers. In my solicitude, on account of the rebels in my own country, I made an earnest protest against the delivery of the ships to the Chinese. You responded in that spirit of comity which has ever distinguished our relations, that the ships should be taken back to England, and that no effort on your part should be spared to prevent them from taking a direction against the interests of my country.

Though subsequent events made it necessary for the ships to take the direction indicated by the desire of the Chinese themselves, still I should be wanting in appreciation of your conduct did I not mark it with my most heartfelt thanks, and at as early a period as possible bring it to the attention of my Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. BURLINGAME.

No. 24.

Mr. Hammond to Captain Osborn.

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 1, 1864.

I AM directed by Earl Russell to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23rd of November and its inclosures, giving an account of the circumstances which have led to the dissolution of the force organized under your command for service under the Emperor of China.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 25.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received February 9, 1864.)

My Lord,

Pekin, November 27, 1863.

AS I anticipated from the language of the Chinese Government, the failure of the flotilla scheme has led to their dismissal of Mr. Lay. This step is in accordance with their system, for they hold an employé responsible for the management of any business confided to him, and reward or degrade him according to the event.

At the same time they have acted fairly by him. They have allowed him 3,000 taels (1,000*l.*) a-month for the expenses of his establishment during his residence at Pekin; they allow him salary at the rate of 8,000*l.* a-year from the 1st of May, 1863, to the month of March next, by which time his accounts are to be made up, and they present him with 6,000 taels (2,000*l.*) as a gratification on leaving their service. I do not think that more could have been demanded, as the high salaries given to the Custom-house employés were fixed on the ground of the uncertainty of the duration of the employment, and it is impossible, in my opinion, to maintain that Mr. Lay's dismissal is a capricious act on the part of the Chinese, or that they had not fair ground to complain of his conduct, as the cause of the pecuniary loss which this Government has suffered, and of the censure to which the Members of the Foreign Board are thereby exposed. I do not admit that a man who serves the Chinese as an agent is entitled to exceed his authority, and if he does exceed it he must do so at his own risk, and take the consequences.

Mr. Hart is appointed in his place, and I trust that the change will make the Custom-house work more smoothly. He will reside on the coast, coming here when sent for on business, an arrangement which was found to work satisfactorily during Mr. Lay's absence in England. It is very desirable, with a view to the maintenance of the Custom-house administration, that the head of it should not be permanently at Pekin, for if he is he is supposed to act as the adviser of the Chinese in matters not appertaining to his office, and thereby incurs the odium of the errors they commit.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 25.

The Prince of Kung to Sir F. Bruce.

(Translation.)

Pekin, November 15, 1863.

THE Prince of Kung addresses a communication to Sir F. Bruce in reference to the failure of Inspector-General Lay to manage the business connected with the purchase of the flotilla in accordance with the instructions with which he had been furnished, in consequence of which a useless waste of the Chinese public money has taken place. The Prince would observe that the Chinese Government can only give to any person it may employ the power to transact business in its name, on condition that he is bound and able to act in his capacity as agent in such a way as that China shall reap an advantage in every particular.

In the present instance, however, Mr. Lay, while drawing salary from the Chinese Government to the extent of over 10,000 taels per annum, and while having been treated by them with uniform liberality, has failed to carry out satisfactorily the business of purchasing steamers, with which he was charged, and has wasted to no purpose the revenue of the country.

If Mr. Lay were a Chinese subject, either in a public or private capacity, it would be (the Prince's) duty to have him punished according to the law; but considering that he is an Englishman, it remains (for the Prince) to instruct him to return to England, as it is not expedient that he be further employed by the Chinese Government. Mr. Lay has been instructed to wind up all the affairs in his hands that are still unsettled, and to make up clearly and hand over all his accounts within a period of four months; and the Chinese Government, in order to show its generous compassion, will continue during these four months to give him his usual salary.

If Mr. Lay fails to hand in a clear account of all moneys, and to have all matters in his hands settled within the four months, the Prince will then again consult the British Minister as to how he may be compelled to do as he is required, and (will request) his Excellency to aid in bringing the matter to a satisfactory conclusion.

The Prince has now appointed Mr. Hart to the post of Inspector-General of all the Customs Affairs.

Inclosed are copies of the letters (of dismissal) to Mr. Lay, and of the letter appointing Mr. Hart Inspector-General of Customs, the purport of which the Prince would request the British Minister to communicate to the Consuls at the several ports.

A necessary communication.

Inclosure 2 in No. 25.

The Prince of Kung to Mr. Lay.

(Translation.)

THE Prince of Kung issues these instructions to Mr. Lay.

As you, the Inspector-General, have failed to carry out satisfactorily the flotilla scheme, with which you were charged, it is not expedient that the Foreign Board should continue you any longer in its employment, and accordingly Mr. Hart has been already appointed to succeed to the post of Inspector-General of Customs Affairs, and you are hereby commanded to cease discharging the duties of the said office of Inspector-General from and after the day on which you receive this despatch.

You are also instructed to hand over at once to the Foreign Board the various moneys in full now in your hands on account of tonnage dues, and to proceed to Shanghai; and then, within a period of four months, reckoning from the day you receive this despatch, to make up clearly all your accounts, both of income and expenditure, and to hand them over, each and all, together with all sums of money of every description, which you may have to return (to the Chinese Government), as well as all business you may have in hand, to Mr. Hart, the newly appointed Inspector-General, who, having taken them over, will report on the matter to this office, and await its instructions.

Though you are no longer in office, the Chinese Government, in order to show its desire to treat you with more than its bounden liberality, authorize you to draw your usual salary up to the end of the four months to which you are limited.

As the time allowed you is amply sufficient, you will not exceed it in the slightest.

Inspector-General Hart and the Superintendents of Customs at the various ports, have been written to on the subject, and this most important despatch is addressed to you in order that you may act in obedience to it.

Inclosure 3 in No. 25.

The Prince of Kung to Mr. Hart.

(Translation.)

THE Prince of Kung issues these important instructions to Mr. Hart, for his information and guidance.

Mr. Lay has been dismissed from the post of Inspector-General of Customs, and has been instructed to proceed to Shanghai to wind up everything still unsettled by him, and We (knowing that) you, from the date of your entering the Customs to the present time, have in all cases acted harmoniously and with success, hereby appoint you to the post of Inspector-General of Customs Affairs. You will reside and transact all business at Shanghai; and if any important question arise, you are authorised, as heretofore, to come to the capital as occasion requires, to report and deliberate thereupon.

You will report, as it may be necessary, all matters of daily occurrence at the several ports both on the northern and southern sea-board, and on the Yang-tsze, to their Excellencies Li or Chung, as the case may be, Ministers Superintendents of Trade, and will abide by their instructions.

The late Inspector-General, Mr. Lay, has been given a period of four months within which he is to transfer all business into your hands, to make up carefully all his accounts, both of income and expenditure, to hand them, together with all sums of money he may have to return (to the Chinese Government) over to you, the Inspector-General.

You will therefore, on receipt of this despatch urgently press Mr. Lay to transfer immediately into your hands all matters with which he has been charged, and which are still unsettled.

Your prudence, tact, and experience are known to all, both Chinese and foreign, and it will behove you to be still more careful and diligent, so as to justify your present appointment.

A copy of the letter (of dismissal) to Mr. Lay is inclosed herewith for your instruction and guidance.

Their Excellencies the Ministers Superintendent of Trade have been written to on this subject.

Inclosure 4 in No. 25.

The Prince of Kung to Sir F. Bruce.

(Translation.)

November 20, 1863.

THE Prince of Kung addresses a communication to Sir F. Bruce.

The ex-Inspector-General of Customs, Mr. Lay, has informed this office that he is anxious to return to England at once; that he can produce detailed accounts of the money spent by him in the purchase of the steam flotilla, and of the sums assigned to him for the monthly expenditure of the vessels; and that the balance in hand is still considerable. He therefore prays the Prince to give him authority to go over these accounts with the newly-appointed Inspector-General, Mr. Hart, to whom, after they have been thoroughly investigated, the books and all sums of money still on hand are to be handed over for transmission to the Chinese Government. He prays that Mr. Hart be instructed to issue a clear discharge on the accounts; and that, should any error in these or deficiency in the moneys be (afterwards) discovered, the responsibility should rest with Mr. Hart in both cases. He also states that he has requested Sir Frederick Bruce to guarantee that nothing unsatisfactory in the settlement shall take place.

Although Mr. Lay has failed to manage successfully the business of the flotilla, the Prince takes into consideration that he has been for several years in the employment of the Chinese Government, and has discharged the duties of the office of Inspector-General with great zeal. Although he will start for England before the termination of the four months (to which he has been limited), the Chinese Government will not calculate (his pay) by so many months, but will allow him 8,000 taels, to be paid out of the sum hitherto

allowed for the expense of the residence of the Inspector-General at the capital, which will cease from and after the 5th day of the 10th Chinese moon, being the 15th of November, 1863. This allowance to be conditional on Mr. Lay's handing over, on his arrival at Shanghai, the accounts of the flotilla and the several sums now in his hands, clearly and satisfactorily made out.

In addition to the above, the Prince will still further show his generous consideration for Mr. Lay by giving him a sum of 6,000 taels to defray his travelling expenses to England; this sum to be deducted from the money which he has still to return to the Chinese Government.

In reference to Mr. Lay's statement, that he has requested Sir Frederick Bruce to guarantee that there will be nothing unsatisfactory in the transference of the accounts, the Prince calls to mind that the British Minister, in a late despatch (November 6, 1863), observed that, it is his duty in this matter to assist the Prince of Kung as far as possible to find a way out of these difficulties. The Prince hopes that his Excellency, having thus professed his willingness to assist the Chinese Government, will direct Mr. Lay, in transferring the books to Mr. Hart, to investigate the accounts with scrutinising care, so as to avoid ambiguity or mistake.

The Prince has issued to Messrs. Lay and Hart letters of instruction, copies of which are herewith inclosed, together with an approximate statement of the accounts of the flotilla rendered by Mr. Lay.

A necessary communication.

Tung Chih, 2nd year, 10th moon, 18th day (November 20, 1863).

Inclosure 5 in No. 25.

Memorandum by Mr. Lay to the Foreign Board.

(Translation.)

November 20, 1863.

THE sum of 251,960*l.* 2*s.* 1*d.* was transmitted to me in England, in bills at six months (I will calculate with Mr. Hart whether this sum in Chinese money corresponds with the amount of the bills he transmitted). I will give Mr. Hart minute accounts as to how this money was expended, and also a statement of the loss suffered in consequence of my having to cash the bills before they came due.

2. When I came to Shanghai I drew on the Shanghai Customs for 120,000 taels, but as the Customs had no money in hand, I made arrangements for a loan to that amount on their account, the terms being that the sum should all be repaid with interest by the Shanghai Customs within twelve months. Afterwards, as the Amoy Customs sent up an extra sum of 20,000 taels, I diminished the amount of the loan to 100,000 taels.

(The reason why this money was required was as follows:) When I was in England I received frequent letters from Mr. Hart, at Shanghai, urging me to hurry out the ships, and accordingly (with a view to save time), I bought on credit in England the stores and equipments that were still required, together with the store ship and despatch boat, stipulating that the prices should be paid as soon as they reached Shanghai. My first intention was to use (for this purpose) the Customs Guarantee Fund of 120,000 taels deposited at Shanghai, but as I feared that this sum might have to be carried to the fund set apart for the purchase of the steamers (Mr. Hart having told me that there was still a considerable debt under that head), I was compelled to ask permission to borrow 120,000 taels; I found, however, afterwards, that it would be some time before the stores, &c., would arrive, and that I could apply [the Guarantee Fund] as proposed. For this reason the 120,000 taels were never drawn, though I still retained in my hands the authority to do so, in order to be prepared to meet any other expenditure which Captain Osborn might have to incur. I diminished the sum to be borrowed, however, by 20,000 taels, inasmuch as the Fuhkien Customs sent in to the steamer fund an extra sum to that amount. I shall ascertain, in conjunction with Mr. Hart, how much the Shanghai Customs has already paid (to the loan account). As this sum of 100,000 taels has not been drawn or made use of, I shall return to the Foreign Board the documents connected with the transaction.

3. Previous to my departure from England, when I was not aware that certain sums of money had been sent from China, I gave a bond for 50,000*l.* to the Oriental Bank, in order that Captain Osborn might have a sum to draw upon. Afterwards, on my arrival in China, I found on enquiry that Mr. Hart did not know how much money had been sent home, the reason of his not knowing being that M. Meritens (Commissioner of Customs

at Foochow) had not reported the amount borrowed (and sent home) by him; accordingly, after my arrival in Pekin, I requested authority to draw from the Customs the sum of 150,000 taels. (After I left England) Captain Osborn received the money sent home from China (to wit, the sum borrowed and forwarded by M. Meritens), and did not draw upon the 50,000*l.* for which I gave the bond. The 150,000 taels has been apportioned between the different Customs, and paid up in the following manner:—

	Taels.			Taels.
Canton, to pay	.. 30,000	..	..	has paid 30,000
Swatow	.. 20,000	..	..	.. 20,000
Foochow	.. 30,000	..	..	.. 10,000
Amoy	.. 20,000	..	..	.. 10,000
Shanghai	.. 20,000	..	..	.. 20,000
Kiukiang	.. 30,000	..	..	
Total	.. <u>150,000</u>	..	..	.. <u>90,000</u>

These are all the sums of the payment of which I have been informed up to yesterday, November 19th, 1863; for any other sums that may have already been paid in by the Customs, and of which information has not reached me, I shall account separately.

4. The allowance for the maintenance of the flotilla, at the rate of 75,000 taels per month, will amount, for the three months commencing August 1st and ending October 31st, 1863, to 225,000 taels. This sum has been apportioned and paid up in the following manner:—

	Taels.			Taels.
Canton, to pay	.. 30,000	..	has already paid	10,000
Swatow	.. 15,000	..	..	5,000
Amoy	.. 18,000	..	..	6,000
Foochow	.. 102,000	..	..	34,000
Kiukiang	.. 30,000	..	..	10,000
Shanghai	.. 30,000	..	..	..
Total	.. <u>225,000</u>	Total paid	..	<u>65,000</u>

The amounts received for the first of the three months have already been reported (as above) and sent in, but I have not received the second or third months' allowances. If any farther sums have been paid over on this head, I shall account separately for the sums so paid with Mr. Hart.

5. There is deposited at Shanghai a (Customs) Guarantee Fund of 120,000 taels. This sum of money was deposited in the Oriental Bank, from April 1861, the date of my departure for England, to April 1863, and 12,000 taels interest at five per cent. per annum has accumulated thereon. Prior to April 1861, owing to the unsettled state of affairs, the sum was only temporarily lodged, and did not produce any interest; this sum, principal and interest, I shall return immediately to the Chinese Government.

6. The cost of the vessels, guns, and warlike stores, and all salaries, wages, and expenses incurred up to the arrival of the flotilla in China, will be paid out of the item of 1,070,000 taels.

7. The entire cost of maintaining the flotilla after its arrival in China will be charged against the monthly sum of 75,000 taels, provided by the Customs, beginning at August 1st and ending October 31st, 1863.

This sum of 75,000 taels was originally intended to cover all expenses for salaries and wages, for ammunition, &c., for stores and coal, for rewards and compensations for wounds, and for every kind of unforeseen expenditure. As, however, the flotilla has never come into action, there must be a large balance of this allowance for the three months to be returned to the Chinese Government.

8. Of the 375,000 taels allowed for taking the flotilla home, Mr. Hart and myself will account for 162,000 taels (being the estimate for salaries and wages), according to the accounts rendered by Captain Osborn; Sir F. Bruce and Captain Osborn will account for the remaining 213,000 taels, being the sum estimated to cover miscellaneous expenses.

Inclosure 6 in No. 25.

The Prince of Kung to Mr. Lay.

(Translation.)

THE Prince of Kung issues important instructions to Mr. Lay.

Whereas the sum of 1,070,000 taels, in all, has been sanctioned by His Majesty at the request of the Foreign Board to be applied to the purchase of steamers and munitions of war, and a further sum of 225,000 taels has also been sanctioned for the expenses of the fleet for the three months commencing August 1st and ending October 31st, 1863, the two sums amounting in all to 1,295,000 taels; instructions were given to hand over these sums of money to you, the ex-Inspector-General, and their disbursement was entrusted to you alone. These moneys, therefore, might from time to time have all been paid over to you. You have now stated, however, to the Foreign Board that of the first item, you received in England only 251,960*l.* 2*s.* 1*d.* (you will calculate with Mr. Hart, you say, whether the equivalent of this sum in Chinese money corresponds with the amount which Mr. Hart transmitted to you by bills); that after you came to Shanghai you made a loan on behalf (of the Chinese Government) of 120,000 taels, which you diminished afterwards to 100,000 taels, in consequence of the Fuhkien customs having sent in an extra sum of 20,000 taels towards the fund for the purchase of the ships, that this money has not been drawn or made use of yet, and that you will return the documents connected with the transaction (to the Chinese Government). Again, that after your arrival in Peking you requested authority for the several custom-houses to set aside for you in all 150,000 taels; that of this sum you have only received 90,000 taels, the balance not having yet been paid up; that of the sum allowed for the monthly expenditure of the flotilla you have received the amount for one month (August), but that you do not know for certain whether the remainder has been paid in or not; that you have full and particular accounts to show how much of these moneys has been received and spent, and how much has not. You state, moreover, that you will hand over in full to the Chinese Government the 120,000 taels of customs' moneys, together with two years' interest thereon, amounting to 12,000 taels, which was placed in your hands as a guarantee fund in 1861; that you will now hand in a memorandum of all the moneys, and that, when you reach Shanghai, you will hand over all accounts and sums of money in your hands to Mr. Hart, who will give you a clear discharge thereon; that Mr. Hart will be responsible for any mistakes in the calculation, and that Sir Frederick Bruce will guarantee that the accounts, &c., will be handed over satisfactorily. You have also handed in a memorandum to the above effect, to which you have affixed your signature.

The Prince is addressing a despatch to Sir F. Bruce on this subject, and also to the Imperial Commissioner Li (Governor of Kiangsoo), who will instruct Mr. Hart to act in accordance herewith, and to receive over the documents connected with the loan. You are also instructed to lose no time in starting for Shanghai, so that you may immediately hand over all accounts, and all sums of money in full, of every description, which you may not have expended to Mr. Hart, who will take them over after due examination, and will send in his report on the matter to the Imperial Commissioner Li for transmission to this office.

Inclosure 7 in No. 25.

The Prince of Kung to Mr. Hart.

THE Prince of Kung issues instructions to Mr. Hart.

(The first part of the letter is a quotation from the foregoing letter to Mr. Lay from its beginning down to the end of the paragraph ending—"To which you have affixed your signature.")

The Prince is addressing despatches on this subject to Sir F. Bruce and the Imperial Commissioner Li. Mr. Lay has also been instructed on the subject; copies of the despatch to Sir F. Bruce, and the letter to Mr. Lay are inclosed herewith for your instruction and guidance. You will immediately on the arrival of Mr. Lay in Shanghai examine minutely into all the flotilla accounts, and ascertain what moneys he has still in hand unexpended. You will take the accounts and money over, and give a clear discharge thereon when you have received everything over satisfactorily. You will make your

report to the Imperial Commissioner Li, who will submit it to the scrutiny of this office.

You will, in conjunction with Mr Lay, closely investigate (all accounts), and conscientiously go over all the calculations so as to avoid the slightest error or omission. If there be any mistake the responsibility will rest with you alone.

If any other sums, over and above those mentioned in this letter, have been given over by any of the Custom-houses on the seaboard, or on the Yang-tze, to Mr. Lay, and are still unaccounted for by him, you will ascertain the facts (in reference to them), and report (to this office) accordingly.

A most important letter of instructions.

No. 26.

Earl Russell to Sir. F. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 15, 1864.

I HAVE received your despatch of November 19, inclosing copies of correspondence connected with the refusal of the Chinese Government to confirm the arrangements made by Mr. Lay in regard to the vessels to be employed in their service under the command of Captain Sherard Osborn, and reporting the course you had yourself pursued with reference to this matter; and I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve of your conduct in this respect.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

Correspondence respecting the Fitting Out, Dispatching to China, and ultimate Withdrawal of the Anglo-Chinese Fleet under the Command of Captain Sherard Osborn; and the Dismissal of Mr. Lay from the Chief Inspectorate of Customs.

*Presented to the House of Commons by Command
of Her Majesty, in pursuance of their Address
of February 9, 1864.*

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PAPERS



RELATING TO

THE AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

(In continuation of Papers presented to Parliament in
March 1863.)

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.
1864.

LONDON:
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


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Papers relating to the Affairs of China.

No. 1.

Mr. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received January 27, 1863.)

(Extract.)

Peking, September 24, 1862

I HAVE the honour to forward copy of a despatch from the Foreign Board, on the proceedings of Mr. Consul Sinclair with reference to a lorch called the "Pearl," which brought a cargo of salt to Foo-chow. Salt is a prohibited article, and it appears she had committed a further irregularity in taking it in at a port not open to trade. By the Treaties signed at Tien-tsin, the vessel, as well as the cargo, were liable to seizure and confiscation, but Mr. Sinclair took upon himself to set her at liberty, and had her towed out of port by the gun-boat stationed there.

As Mr. Sinclair has not reported the case to me, I have addressed the inclosed despatch to him, requesting an explanation of the circumstances, and, at the same time, expressing my disapproval of the course pursued, and pointing out to him its injurious effect on the attempts I am making to place the relations of Great Britain and China on a sound international footing. I have further informed the Foreign Board that, though I am unable to enter into the details of this and other cases of arbitrary proceedings on our part which have been complained of, I have issued instructions which will, I trust, prevent the recurrence of these acts.

His Imperial Highness, in the inclosed despatch, points out, with considerable force and truth, the inconsistency of such acts with the language I have held since I have been at Peking. I regret that we should have given him cause for a triumph, but I am partly consoled by the recognition of just principles of international dealing contained in his own despatch.

The language in which the admission is conveyed proves that the Prince understands and appreciates, in some degree, their value.

Her Majesty's Government will see that the Prince refers to two other cases, in which Government junks have been seized and destroyed by our vessels of war. Neither of these cases have been reported to me.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

The Prince of Kung to Mr. Bruce.

(Translation.)

Peking, September 20, 1862.

THE Prince of Kung, &c., makes a communication.

His Excellency Wensiang has already handed to Mr. Wade a copy of a note received from M. de Meritens, Commissioner of Customs at Foo-chow, upon the case of the "Pearl," a vessel carrying smuggled salt; and Mr. Wade has replied to his Excellency to the effect that the proceedings adverted to were inexplicable; and that with the instructions issued to the Consuls, it was to be hoped that there would be no recurrence of them.

On referring to Tariff Rule 3, the Prince finds salt declared contraband, and both import and export of it prohibited; and in Article XXXVII of the British Treaty, it is

laid down that within twenty-four hours of a vessel's arrival her papers, &c., shall be delivered to the Consul, and that within twenty-four hours more she shall be entered by the Consul, and the nature of her cargo reported by him to the Customs; the master being liable, should he not report his ship, to a fine of 50 dollars a-day. It is farther laid down in Article XLVII of the Treaty, that vessels unauthorizedly trading at other places along the coast (than those declared lawful by Treaty) are liable to confiscation with their cargoes.

In the present instance, the "Pearl" entered port on the 26th of the 3rd moon (April 24th), but was not reported until the 30th, that is, not within the specified time. Her cargo was salt, a contraband article; she had no manifest; and Kin-mun (Quemoy), though near the port, is not a port open to trade. Thus she committed several offences against Treaty. The course pursued by M. de Meritens was extraordinarily lenient, but Mr. Consul Sinclair has not only refused to take the steps required by Treaty, but has, without authority (or, contrary to law) issued to the vessel a port clearance, and has taken upon himself to dispatch a man-of-war to take the vessel out of port, with her original cargo of smuggled salt on board.

This proceeding, as Mr. Wade's note observes, is, indeed, "inexplicable." His note says, further, that the instructions issued to the Consuls will, it is to be hoped, prevent the recurrence of the like for the future. Be it so: but he says nothing of the steps to be taken in the case of the "Pearl." There are also the cases of the three junks unauthorizedly burned at Chou chia-hsü, and of the five junks forcibly carried off from Tung-chiang-chi. [In neither instance] have the Consuls compensated (the Chinese Government for the damage done), nor have they reported the circumstances. The Prince is at a loss, consequently, to know what the functions of a Consul are. Here is now another case in which plain breach of Treaty has been committed, and (the Consul) has done whatever violence seemed to him good. If such conduct be not punished, it will be imitated with increasing frequency, and to a more serious extent. How will it be possible to manage any matter properly?

The British Minister, on all occasions, shows a respect for the Treaty, but Mr. Consul Sinclair, by his way of acting, while he treats the Treaty with disrespect, shows no respect either for the British Minister. Is it not in the power of Her Britannic Majesty's Representative to make the dignity of his position felt and his orders obeyed by a Consul? This is, in the Prince's opinion, equally "inexplicable;" and he accordingly addresses the British Minister, trusting that if his Excellency does hold the Treaty inviolable, he will call on Mr. Consul Sinclair to bring the "Pearl" back into port, to be there proceeded against, or else that he will issue a circular to the Consuls to detain the "Pearl" at whatever port she may enter, and hand her over to the local authorities, to be dealt with as the Treaty requires, for example's sake.

Were a Chinese mandarin to commit a plain breach of Treaty in a case in which native and foreigner were parties, he would be punished forthwith. Mr. Sinclair's act of wanton violence is no common offence. The Prince cannot doubt that the British Government has a way of dealing with such, and His Highness trusts that for the sake of example the British Minister will deal with this case impartially. His Highness trusts that his Excellency will, at the same time, inform him regarding the compensation due for the junks burned and carried off, and the restitution of the articles taken out of them, at Chou-chia-hsü and at Tung-chiang-chi.

As the (foreign) Commissioners of Customs are responsible for the prevention of smuggling, they are of course authorized at any and every port to search and make seizure, and it is very important, therefore, that the British Minister should inform the Consuls that they are not to take a high tone or resort to violence (when search or seizure is in question). In his despatch of the 26th August, his Excellency complained that the Customs subordinates at I-ching, when levying duties on foreign vessels at that place, were in the habit of extorting fees on their own account, and that even vessels laden with lawful cargoes were also detained by these employés (for purposes of extortion). It is unavoidable that vessels going up the river should be duly searched, as, until [this is done], there is no knowing which vessels are carrying salt and which are not. The Prince has written to the provincial authorities to impress in the strongest terms upon the Customs subordinates that they are only authorized to make search for (interfere with the carriage of) salt, as it is contraband, and that they are not to extort money. His Highness hopes that the British Minister will, on his part, with equal impressiveness, enjoin the merchants to observe the Treaty religiously, and so to avoid exposing themselves to the proceedings consequent upon trading in the prohibited article of salt.

A necessary communication, addressed to the Honourable Mr. Bruce.

Tung Chih, 1st year, 8th moon, 27th day (September 20, 1862).

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Mr. Bruce to Consul Sinclair.

Sir,

Peking, September 22, 1862

THE Foreign Board has complained to me officially of your proceedings in the matter of the "Pearl."

I have to request of you an explanation of the circumstances under which you took upon yourself to call on a gun-boat to take the vessel by force out of port. In the meantime, I have to observe that whether the Chinese authorities were right or not in claiming to confiscate the vessel, the course you adopted is utterly indefensible. You have taken upon yourself to solve, by what is virtually an act of war, a question which the Chinese Government state their authorities at Foo-chow offered to refer to Peking. You have placed me in the dilemma of weakening Consular authority by disavowing your acts, or of attempting to justify what is both unjustifiable in principle and inconsistent with the scope and end of the language I have held to the Imperial Government on the relations established between the two countries by the presence of a Minister at Peking.

I am, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

No. 2.

Mr. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received February 3, 1863.)

(Extract.)

Peking, October 6, 1862.

IN my despatch of the 24th of last month I inclosed translation of a letter on the case of the "Pearl," at Foo-chow, in which the Prince of Kung complained of the destruction of junks on the Yang-tze River.

I have now the honour to inclose a further despatch, with my reply thereto, which gives the particulars of three cases.

In the first case, a collision, attended with loss of life, appears to have taken place between foreigners and Chinese, in consequence of which three war-junks were destroyed, as stated in the former despatch on the subject, by a British steamer.

In the second case, the said steamer is alleged to have proceeded to Kiang-yin, and to have there taken and destroyed a trading junk.

In the third case five war-junks at a revenue station on the Yang-tze River had levied, apparently, an illegal tax on some trading vessels. They were seized and carried off as a pledge; but, though the money was returned, the junks, as the Prince states, have not been given up.

I have received no report of these cases, and I have consequently addressed the inclosed despatches to Sir James Hope and to Mr. Consul Medhurst. I have also written to Mr. Adkins, at Chin-kiang, to give me any information he may be in possession of on the subject.

The Prince has not complained of the proceedings of the gun-boat near Hankow, which was sent by Mr. Consul Gingell to release two junks laden with teas on Messrs. Dent and Co.'s account, detained in consequence of a demand of excessive transit duties. The Custom-house officer and the gun-boat were carried off in addition to the junks. I suppose that the Governor-General, feeling that he was in the wrong, has not reported what took place.

Redress by force was necessary formerly, when we had no access to the Imperial Government, and no hopes of a complaint against a high provincial officer being attended to; and even now it will be more speedily obtained by force than through diplomatic correspondence. But, as the Prince very justly remarks, this mode of action renders the presence of a Minister at Peking useless, and stultifies the main argument by which I hope to recommend it; namely, that of arranging these disputes amicably, through the Representatives of the two Governments. It also leads to deplorable errors; for we cannot ascertain the whereabouts of Government cruizers, employed to levy taxes on vessels employed in the salt-trade; and it is too much the practice to treat any armed Chinese vessel as a pirate, or, at least, as acting without proper authority, if she ventures to stop a junk trading under European colours. Their authority is, no doubt, often abused for purposes of extortion; but the interference with junks and lorchas under foreign flags is

due, in a great measure, to the fact that they are extensively employed in smuggling prohibited articles.

I see with pleasure that Captain Osborn is about to organize a preventive service on behalf of China; for it will be impossible for our gun-boats to do this duty on the Yang-tze River without committing acts which will be found difficult to justify on any international principle, and which will create and keep up a bad feeling on the part of the Chinese authorities and people.

The truth is that the Chinese Executive is so seldom bold enough to assert its rights against foreigners that they are in the habit of despising it, and of never hesitating in employing force against it. In other countries a revenue-cruizer is often evaded, but it is very rarely that the smuggler comes to blows with it.

Inclosure 1 in No. 2.

The Prince of Kung to Mr. Bruce.

(Translation.)

Peking, October 1, 1862.

THE Prince of Kung makes a communication.

In the case of the collision that occurred between the inhabitants of Chou-chia-hsü, in the district of Jukao, and certain foreigners who had unauthorizedly proceeded to the river port in question, the issue of which collision was the destruction of three war-junks, which were burnt by the foreigners, the Chinese Government cashiered and degraded the officer in charge of troops on the spot for his mismanagement of the affair, and his Highness applied to the British Minister to inquire into and punish the British officers who, without any understanding with (the Chinese authorities) took on themselves to burn and destroy these junks, as the circumstances of the case may appear to his Excellency in strictness to demand.

On the 29th day of the 7th month, Tuhsinga, General commanding the Manchu garrison of Nanking, in a supplementary Memorial addressed to the Throne, acquainted His Majesty that after having burned the war-junks at Chou-chia-hsü, the foreigners proceeded to Kiang-yin, and off that place destroyed a trading junk which had come up from Shanghae, and carried off a large number of persons who were passengers on board her. His Majesty thereupon instructed Tuhsinga, by Decree, to ascertain and report the number of people abducted from Chou-chia-hsü, on the occasion of the fray between the foreigners and the inhabitants at that place, and also the particulars of the destruction of the merchant-junk burned upon the river, and the names and surnames of the passengers carried off from on board her.

The General now reports to His Majesty that at Chou-chia-hsü, where the three junks were burnt, one brave belonging to the Marine was drowned, and that fifteen persons, soldiers, braves, or followers, are missing; that twenty-nine guns were sunk, but that three have been recovered. With respect to the trading junk from Shanghae which was burnt, and the passengers of which were carried off, he reports that the Fu-tsiang (Brigadier) Hwang Ting-sheng's elder brother, Hwang Tê-sin, had engaged his friend Yang Afu and two others to go with him in a junk hired by Yen Kwo-tung, who was taking a passage in her from Shanghae to the junk squadron stationed off Kuachow, to see his younger brother (the Brigadier). They had got out on the river, when they fell in with some foreigners, who, on the ground that the junk was a pirate, forced every one on board over the side, took away everything that was in the junk, and having burned the junk, carried all her passengers as prisoners to Shanghae. The district magistrate having examined Hwang Tê-sin and his companions, released them on the security of Hwang Ting-sheng (the Brigadier). The despatches, trunks, and other things belonging to Hwang Tê-sin, which the foreigners removed, had not been restored to him, and the Governor of the Province (Li) was engaged in making such inquiry and arrangements as the question demanded.

The Prince has to observe that in a former instance five native gun-boats were carried off at Tung-chiang-chi, in the district of Lu-ho, by foreigners who alleged that the revenue station (off which were the junks were lying) had robbed them of 1,000 dollars. The Ti-tu (Commander-in-chief) of Kiang-nan, Li Shi-chung, sent an officer with 730 taels (about 243*l.*) to make good their loss. The money was received, but the junks were not released.

In the present instance at Chou-chia-hsü, war junks have been burnt, guns thrown overboard, braves have been destroyed in the fire, several men of various denominations are missing; while off Kiang-yin a trading junk falsely denounced as a pirate has all her passengers forced out of her, their baggage is all carried off and the junk herself is burnt. The Prince has written to desire the General Tuhsinga to send up an accurate list of the articles of baggage in the trunks which Hwang Tê-sin has lost, and a detailed account of their value; also to report carefully whether there were or were not any other articles (than those now generally reported), money, &c. On receipt of his reply the Prince will again address the British Minister.

In the meantime His Highness has to communicate to his Excellency a list of the junks destroyed and the soldiers, braves, and followers, burnt or carried off in the affair of Chou-chia-hsü and Kiang-yin, together with the articles which have disappeared on those two occasions. Hwang Tê-sin and his friends having been released on security by the magistrate of Shanghae, the Prince does not here take them into account; but His Highness does hope that (without waiting for the report affecting their losses) the British Minister will, when he has received the whole of these circumstances, at once take into consideration the measures justice requires should be adopted with reference to the vessels destroyed in the two cases adverted to, the life taken, and the property carried off, in order to the prevention of further reclamation on the part of the sufferers; and that his Excellency will inform His Highness of his decision. The Prince begs there may be no delay in a matter so important.

A necessary communication.

Statement of Particulars in the case of the Junks destroyed and Persons carried off by Foreigners.

At Chou-chia-hsü:—Three junks burnt; one brave destroyed in the fire; fifteen soldiers, braves, and followers missing, belonging to the division of the Admiral of Kwang-tung; twenty-nine guns sunk, three recovered.

Off Kiang-yin:—One trading junk burnt; one master, one passenger (Yen Kwo-tung) made prisoners; four passengers (Hwang Tê-sin, Liang-Afu, Sü Kwei-an, Hwang Ting-pien), property belonging to these four not returned. Statement applied for to General Tuhsinga.

Inclosure 2 in No. 2.

Mr. Bruce to the Prince of Kung.

Sir,

Peking, October 6, 1862.

I HAVE received the despatch of your Imperial Highness relative to the destruction of certain junks, in the neighbourhood of Chou-chia-hsü and Kiang-yin, and I shall lose no time in transmitting copies of it to Shanghae and to the naval authorities, with a view to obtaining such information as to persons concerned in those acts and the circumstances of the case as may enable me to deal with them. The account previously furnished to your Imperial Highness by the Chinese authorities was so vague that, although I wrote immediately on the subject, I fear there may have been some difficulty in tracing the acts to the parties who committed them. I do not even yet know whether the junks were destroyed by ships of war or by private vessels, nor whether the persons responsible were British subjects or not.

Your Imperial Highness may rest assured that I am most anxious to put a stop to these violent proceedings, and I shall gladly see the Chinese Government in possession of a Marine Executive which will release Her Majesty's naval forces from the punishment of piratical acts in Chinese waters. For twenty years this task has been imposed upon them, and the Chinese communities at Foo-chow, Amoy, and Ningpo have constantly petitioned them for assistance against pirates, and have been indebted to them for the preservation of their lives and property; but the difficulty of providing interpreters is very great, the officers are obliged to rely on the information of coolies in their employment, and the similarity of rig and equipments between war-junks and pirates is apt to lead to mistakes.

I avail, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 2.

Mr. Bruce to Vice-Admiral Sir J. Hope.

Sir,

Peking, October 4, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a letter addressed to me by the Prince of Kung complaining of the destruction, by some persons unknown, of junks in the service of the Imperial Government on the Yang-tze River. I am anxious to obtain information which will enable me to deal with these cases should the destruction of these junks have been our act.

In the meantime it will be of great assistance to me at Peking if the rule be strictly observed of not interfering by force in any case unless it is necessary to preserve the lives and property of Her Majesty's subjects at the ports. By this I mean in the case of popular riot or violence on the part of "braves" who are not under control; for I do not consider that illegal exactions by the Chinese authorities justify us in resorting to force. As long as Her Majesty's Government maintains a Legation at Peking the Imperial Government must be appealed to in the event of an abusive exercise of authority by its provincial delegates; and in the event of such abuses not being put a stop to, it must be held responsible, and be obliged to make good the losses consequent on such acts. To appeal to force, without a reference to Peking, is to resort to the system which the Treaties of 1858 were intended to terminate, and to expose our interests to be endangered, should we meet with a Governor as obstinate and ignorant as we found in Yeh at Canton.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 2.

Mr. Bruce to Consul Medhurst.

Sir,

Peking, October 4, 1862.

I INCLOSE copy of a despatch from the Prince of Kung, on the destruction of some junks on the Yang-tze River, and I wish you to furnish me with any information you can obtain on the circumstances that led to the acts complained of.

If applied to for advice by the naval authorities, I request you to be very cautious in recommending the employment of force in any case where it cannot be justified on the principles laid down in my circular. You must bear in mind that one result of the establishment of a Mission at Peking is that acts which we committed without remark, while the Imperial Government affected to treat, as unworthy of notice, the proceedings of the "outer barbarians," now form the subject of correspondence between it and myself, and they are not slow to point out that while I am reproaching them with breaches of Treaty committed by local authorities, we ourselves commit acts of violence which are not justifiable, according to the principles of international intercourse I am urging them to adopt.

I am, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

No. 3.

Mr. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received February 3, 1863.)

My Lord,

Peking, October 11, 1862.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 6th instant, respecting the acts of violence perpetrated by Europeans on the Yang-tze River, when in command of lorchas and junks, I have the honour to inclose copies of two despatches from Mr. Adkins, Vice-Consul at Chin-kiang, which throw some light on the subject.

It appears that many of these craft are really owned by Chinese, who hoist foreign flags, or flags not easily distinguishable from foreign national flags, and hire European desperadoes to assist them in carrying on a smuggling trade in salt, in defiance of the Chinese revenue stations.

The circumstances of the case reported in Mr. Adkins' despatch of the 2nd ultimo are very obscurely stated; in the depositions of the two Chinese witnesses, the flag carried by the assailant's boat is called "American," but it is described as a flag with

arrow red and white stripes. It is not stated that anything was taken out of the boat, though the attack seems to have been of a piratical nature.

Mr. Adkins says, very justly, towards the close of his despatch, that these outrages will lead to a system of retaliation on the part of the Chinese, which will be highly disadvantageous to respectable traders and travellers on the river.

I see no effectual remedy but the organization by the Chinese of a proper steam-service to police the river, which will supersede the inefficient and disorderly cruisers now employed by the Chinese Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 3.

Vice-Consul Adkins to Mr. Bruce.

Sir,

Chin-kiang, September 2, 1862.

FROM the inclosed papers your Excellency will learn some particulars of a very brutal outrage committed near this port by ruffianly foreigners. The facts of the case became known to me on the 30th ultimo, though the murder was committed on the 13th June last.

It was reported to me that three junks belonging to Mr. A. Little, of Kiu-kiang, had been seized at Ichêng, and loaded with salt by the mandarins without the consent or knowledge of their owner, who was awaiting their arrival, they having passed this port early in June. Hoping at all events to save one of the junks, which was loaded with wine and furniture, Mr. Little despatched a Chinese to this port to make inquiries. This man found the three junks at Ichêng, as was reported. Two had large cargoes of salt, but one was empty and without a crew. Having identified the vessels as his master's property, he applied to me to get them released. On referring to the Traffic Register of this Consulate, I found that the three junks indicated had been reported and cleared by me as British vessels early in June. Moreover, the Chinese sailing-masters had been cautioned by me against loading with salt.

The creek in which the junks were found by Mr. Little's Chinese servant is about sixty *li* from Silver Island. It is one of the entrances to the Grand Canal, and is a favourite resort for native craft. It is also a military station, and some dozen or t war-boats are always there or in its immediate vicinity.

As the vessels had been recognized, I thought it best in the first instance to have them brought to this port, intending to hold an investigation in conjunction with the Taoutae, with the view of ascertaining whether the owner of the junk was entitled to compensation for the detention of his vessels by the Chinese authorities. I accordingly despatched the constable of this Consulate with orders to bring the three vessels with their cargoes into this port. After an absence of a day and a-half he returned with two of them, and stated that he was unable to move the third, as the crew had with one exception abandoned her. I therefore engaged a crew, and sent the constable back with them to bring the junk down. She arrived in due course. On the morning after her arrival I learnt the reason of her abandonment by her crew. My informant was the man who had remained by the vessel. He stated that on the 17th of the 5th moon (13th June) while the junk was anchor at Lao-hu-chiu, a place about three *li* below the creek where the constable found her; she was boarded by two Europeans and some Ningpo men from a foreign boat. The foreigners were armed, one with a pistol, the other with a sword. One of them hauled down the British flag, and then both commenced an attack on the crew of the junk; the one with a sword cut down a passenger, the one with a pistol shot the Lao-pau (Captain) through the body. After the murder was committed, the foreigners went back to their own boat and proceeded up the river. The junk, too, weighed anchor shortly afterwards, and on arriving at the creek before-mentioned was abandoned by her crew, who were afraid to proceed further in her.

At first I disbelieved the whole story, it seemed too horrible for credence. The man insisted on the truth of his statement, however, and produced another witness, an old woman, the mother of the murdered man. Her story coincided with his in every particular. She also informed me that the body of her son was still on board the junk in a coffin. I at once determined on having a post-mortem examination made of the remains, hoping to be able to discover the wound, and perhaps the bullet that had inflicted it.

The Taoutae readily assented to the opening of the coffin, and expressed a desire to be present at the inquest with the Prefect and Magistrate. To this arrangement I at once

agreed. I was fortunate in being able to receive the services of the surgeon of Her Majesty's ship "Slaney." That gentleman performed a most disagreeable task in the most careful and conscientious manner.

The truth of the witnesses' statement was greatly corroborated by the existence of such a wound as would be caused by a pistol-bullet passing through the body. Dr. Egan's report will best describe it to your Excellency.

I much regret that such an outrage should have been committed within twenty miles of this Consulate, on board a British vessel, and I not be informed of it by the authorities of the place. Such supine conduct on their part makes my position a most unsatisfactory one. I am well aware that the river is likely to be overrun by foreign blackguards knowing no law and under no control; the more so that the Chinese authorities themselves shirk all responsibility and take no steps to protect their countrymen.

Your Excellency will doubtless remember my allusion to a similar outrage in a letter from this Consulate of the 7th June last.

The fact of the murder having been committed by a person sailing under the American flag of course precludes further active interference on my part. I could not refrain, however, from having the case publicly investigated, feeling certain that unless the Chinese can be induced to bring such offenders before proper authorities, a system of retaliation must soon obtain which will be highly disadvantageous to respectable traders and travellers on this river.

I have, &c.
(Signed) T. ADKINS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 3.

Vice-Consul Adkins to Mr. Bruce.

Sir,

Chin-kiang, September 23, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatch with its inclosures.

The proceedings to which His Highness Prince Kung refers were not set on foot by any action or representation of mine. Chou-chia-hsü is nearly 100 miles from this Consulate.

I inclose for your Excellency's perusal an original letter which was received by me on the 14th of July. It was handed to me by a Chinese sailor belonging to a junk sailing under English colours. The bearer knew nothing about the contents of the letter, but I learnt from him the name of the place at which it was written. I took no steps in the matter, because I had heard by a steamer which arrived some days previously to the letter that three vessels of war were close to the spot.

The Europeans who caused the disturbance were in Chinese employ. It is a common practice to hire a foreigner to "take care of the boat." By this is meant hoisting a foreign flag when passing a native custom-house, and bullying any official who may get in the way.

I have heard rumours to the effect that the foreigners in this instance molested the kept woman of a Cantonese sailor. She screamed out, and her protector went to her assistance, got beaten, but returning with reinforcements drove the foreigners into the water.

I have, &c.
(Signed) T. ADKINS.

No. 4.

Mr. Bruce to Earl Russell. — (Received January 26, 1863.)

Extract.)

Peking, November 5, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to forward a despatch from Mr. Consul Medhurst, at Shanghai, with its inclosures, which throws light on the difficulties which are consequent on the pretensions advanced by Her Majesty's Consuls with reference to the Chinese who inhabit within the so-called foreign concessions. It will be seen that the Consuls claim to exempt these Chinese from the taxation imposed by their own authorities, so that they are to be relieved by our interference from sharing in the expense of defending Shanghai.

I can quite understand that a large Chinese population may be accumulated to the benefit of land speculators, if they find they are exempt from taxation, and submitted to very inefficient control.

The Taoutae, in his letters, alludes to the advantage of the proposed registry for the capitation tax, as a means of detecting and expelling bad characters. For these purposes it is notorious that the foreign police are totally useless, and that the settlement swarms with bad characters, ready to plunder the foreigners on any convenient opportunity.

We cannot look for the protection the Chinese Government is bound to afford, under Article XVIII of the Treaty, if we exempt a large number of its subjects from the jurisdiction of their authorities.

Inclosure 1 in No. 4.

Consul Medhurst to Mr. Bruce.

Sir, *Shanghai, August 14, 1862.*

I REQUEST your advice on the subject of a correspondence I have had with the Taoutae, and the copies of which, with translations, I inclose herewith.

The Chinese authorities are undoubtedly entitled to impose any tax they choose on their own subjects, but in this instance those subjects are resident within limits the jurisdiction over which the authorities have long ago practically conceded, and the protection of which has devolved entirely on ourselves. The security which this protection has afforded has been the main attraction to the large number of Chinese who have immigrated into this settlement, and now that they are here it seems scarcely fair that the very power to which they have fled for protection should be looked to for aid in imposing taxes upon them; taxes, too, not intended for their own benefit, but destined, even if not misused, to meet the needs of the Government that has forfeited their confidence.

I explained this to the Taoutae in a conversation I had with him after he had received my reply, and he admitted that he was only justified in proposing the measure by the terrible straits to which he was driven for money. He pleaded however that, after all, the funds he needed were for the maintenance of the war against the rebels, whom the Chinese in the settlement and ourselves had as great an interest in quelling as himself, and that if there was any objection to his exercising a jurisdiction within the limits, it would suit his purpose just as well if we collected the tax, and, having defrayed out of it what we needed for military expenses, handed the balance to him to be put to the general account.

I told him I would suggest this proposal to you, but could not undertake to give it my support, as even if it were decided that the assessing power was in our hands, we should not be likely to impose a tax of the kind or at the rate which he contemplated.

I beg you will do me the favour of an early reply to this letter, as the Taoutae is very anxious to have the question settled.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 2 in No. 4.

The Taoutae Woo to Consul Medhurst.

(Translation.)

Shanghai, July 1, 1862.

I WRITE in consequence of a letter received from one Wang, expectant Taoutae and Superintendent of the Tai-shan Salt Contributions, that the number of people living in the foreign settlement at Shanghai must needs consume a large quantity of salt; that the officer Yu had accordingly hired a number of men to sell it, but a very small quantity had been disposed of; that it is evident therefore that it is smuggled; that having received orders to supervise the salt trade, it behoved him to devise some means of regulating it, that the taxes might be paid and the salt contractors not lose; that he had assembled the head men to discuss the subject, and proposed to establish the Lo-tai-seng salt-shop in the French Concession, and the Chang-cheang-shun salt-shop in the English Concession to supply the two settlements, the permits hitherto issued being withdrawn. But as it was to be feared that bad characters would take advantage of the foreign character of the place, and induce the police to throw obstacles in the way, it was necessary that the English and French Consuls should be written to that they might direct the police to arrest any smugglers, by which means the Government sales would increase and the legal trade flourish. That he

had directed therefore the two shops to open, and begged me to write to the two Consuls to give the necessary orders.

I have therefore written to the French Consul, and do also to you to beg you will direct the police to assist in arresting any illicit traders.

Inclosure 3 in No. 4.

The Taoutae Woo to Consul Medhurst.

(Translation.)

Shanghae, July 5, 1862.

I WRITE to ask your co-operation in a matter by which I may remedy the insufficiency of the taxes to meet the large and most necessary expenditures.

At the end of the last year I established a committee which when your countrymen and the French assisted us against the rebels were called upon to pay for rent, coolies, roads, batteries, the destruction of houses, boats, rice, firewood, artillery, lascars, &c., &c., to the amount of 50,000 or 60,000 taels a month, besides 200,000 odd for the troops brought down from Nanching, to meet which they were only able to collect some 100,000 taels in all, a sum quite insufficient.

The above claims, moreover, are for the protection of Shanghae and must be paid. While the Treasury and contribution receipt being insufficient for the purpose to which they are devoted, the pay of the troops, it is absolutely necessary to lay on some new taxes to procure the funds so urgently required.

I therefore on the 15th of the 4th moon wrote you with reference to three taxes I proposed imposing, they being in accordance with Treaty, to wit, a tax on native produce, an increased tax on opium, and a capitation tax, subsequently writing further letters on the subject.

With reference to the two first taxes, you have already written me that you have referred them to Her Majesty's Minister for consideration, and that it behoveth to await his decision; but the capitation tax is entirely Chinese and does not affect foreigners at all, and I see no reason therefore why the Chinese residents should not pay it.

Again, the great majority of Chinese residents on the French and English settlements are Che-chiang and Keang-si refugees who have not paid their proper taxes, and who have fled there since the great collection of the allied troops, and who carry on their business solely by their protection; and as unless the troops are maintained the people cannot continue to enjoy security, as they are innumerable, I have proposed to divide them into three classes, the first paying five dollars, the second one dollar, the third half a dollar per head, children and women being exempted, and one collection being final.

In registering them for the tax, moreover, one will be able to discover any bad characters that may be here.

This cannot be considered squeezing, and a double advantage will result from it. It appears, moreover, in accordance with foreign laws, and has already been put in practice as far as the city and suburbs are concerned; but I have to request you will appoint some one to take cognizance of the natives, whether householders or in foreign employ, in the British settlement, as I am at my wit's end to obtain the enormous sums required for the defence of the place, and this is the only way open to me to meet them.

As the matter concerns us both I trust you will co-operate with me without delay.

Inclosure 4 in No. 4.

Consul Medhurst to the Taoutae Woo.

Sir,

Shanghae, July 16, 1862.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your two letters dated the 1st and 5th instant, the one asking me to co-operate with you in imposing a capitation tax on all Chinese residents within the British limits, the other announcing the establishment of licensed salt-dealers in the British and French Concessions, whose right of monopoly you wish to have protected.

The local authorities are no doubt entitled to impose on their own subjects any tax or monopoly which does not interfere with foreign Treaty rights; but as regards those natives who reside within these limits, I am not in a position to recognize such a right, as it has been a matter of understanding for years past between the local authorities and this Consulate that the jurisdiction of the former over their own subjects living within these

limits shall only be exercised through and with the consent of the British Consul, and with the large Chinese population now depending on our protection and sharing our interests, it would be inexpedient to allow of any departure from this rule.

I shall send copies of your letters and this reply to the Hon. Mr. Bruce.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 5 in No. 4.

Mr. Bruce to Consul Medhurst.

Sir,

Peking, November 5, 1862.

IN reply to your despatch of the 14th August last, requesting my advice as to the proposals made by the Taoutae for the taxation of Chinese subjects within the limits of the so-called British Concession, I have to observe that there is nothing in the Treaties which warrants me in interfering in any way in such questions. The Taoutae is entitled to levy taxes as he pleases; and as long as he merely seeks to impose taxes on persons resident in the Concession, which are paid by those living in the city and suburb, I see no reason for objecting to it at a time when it is our interest as well as that of the Chinese that the Government shall not be deprived of its resources.

A heavy responsibility will rest on the Consul of any port should his action in such matters lead to the disbanding or mutiny of the highly-paid force under foreign officers which the Chinese have embodied by our advice.

I am, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

No. 5.

Mr. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received March 3, 1863.)

My Lord,

Peking, December 2, 1862.

I THINK it advisable to inform your Lordship of the course I have pursued in cases of seizure and confiscation of goods for evasion of duties by the Chinese Custom-house. I therefore inclose the particulars of a case in which sixty-three bales of silk belonging to Messrs. Hanbury and Co., for which no transit-duty certificate had been taken out, were seized by the Chinese and confiscated for having attempted to evade the Customs barrier near Shanghai, established for the collection of inland duties.

The principle I have laid down is, that in such cases the Chinese authorities are bound to prove that the breach of regulation which exposes the goods to confiscation has been committed, and that if the fact is denied on affidavit they must furnish equally satisfactory evidence on their side in support of their charge. If not, I consider that restitution may be demanded or compensation required.

I do not find that there is any disposition on the part of the Chinese authorities to throw difficulties in the way of a full investigation, and as in such cases it is not difficult to ascertain whether the offence has been committed or not, I do not apprehend that the foreign merchant is likely to suffer injustice.

I may observe that a case arising out of a charge of evading inland duties is not likely to recur; for I have stated as the rule to be observed in future, that if a British subject purchases produce on his own account in the interior, and intends to have his property recognized and protected as British property on its way to the port of shipment, he is bound to cover it by taking out a transit-duty certificate. If, on the other hand, he thinks it more for his interest to buy produce and bring it down uncertificated, it will not be entitled to any special protection as British property, but will be subject to such charges and regulations as the Chinese authorities may choose to impose.

I conceive this to be the meaning of the Rule No. 7, which was substituted for Article XXVIII of the Treaty of Tien-tsin, and that most embarrassing questions will be avoided by adhering strictly to it. The object of the Rule was to substitute one unvarying charge for the arbitrary exactions of provincial authorities, where Her Majesty's subjects bought or sold goods in the interior. But it was not intended to interfere between the Chinese Government and its own subjects.

I may also remark, that if the Chinese are satisfied with this interpretation of the Rule, they waive, in some degree, the right they might claim on a strict interpretation of its terms; for it is expressly agreed that permission to export produce which cannot be

proved to have paid the transit dues may be refused until payment is made of the amount, whereas, hitherto, the Chinese Government has not insisted on proof of such payment in the case of produce which is bought by the exporter at the port of shipment.

I have had the advantage of perusing the joint opinion of Her Majesty's Attorney-General and Messrs. Wingrove Cooke and Hannen, on the powers of the Chinese Custom-house under the Treaties, and on the liability of Her Majesty's subjects employed in the Chinese Custom-house for acts committed in the performance of their duty. It confirms the views I have maintained on this subject, as expressed in my different despatches, excepting on one point, namely, the right of the Chinese Government to withhold a port-clearance until payment is made of fines for breaches of Regulation. This right does not exist, in the opinion of the above learned Counsel. I have directed Her Majesty's Consul at Shanghai to be guided by the principles therein laid down.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 5.

Mr. Bruce to Consul Medhurst.

Sir,

Peking, May 2, 1862.

WITH reference to the sixty-three bales of silk belonging to Messrs. Bower, Hanbury, and Co., reported to you to be confiscated, I have to observe that the account of the transaction given in the Taoutae's letter differs entirely from that given by the Chinese boatmen.

The depositions of Mr. Hanbury and Mr. Leech, as they were not in the boats at the time, have no bearing on the question at issue, which is simply, Did the boats attempt to pass the barrier without reporting, or not?

The Taoutae asserts that the boats containing the sixty-three bales forced their way by the barrier; that they were pursued for a *le*,* and taken; and that there was a foreigner on board, who declared there were no goods, and that they were discovered on examination.

The Taoutae is bound to support these statements by the evidence of the persons who made the seizure.

If he does not, I must assume that the statements of Messrs. Bower and Hanbury's boatmen are correct. You cannot insist on hearing the case in a Consular Court, but you are entitled to have the evidence on which the Taoutae proceeds communicated to you.

The Chinese authorities are entitled to levy the half transit-duty on silk brought down uncertificated; and you will warn Her Majesty's subjects that non-compliance with the system laid down in the Tariff-rules for their protection exposes them to increased risk and detention.

I am bound to state that the disappearance of Leech from the boats, taken in connection with the pretension that the half-duty was not legally leviable on uncertificated produce, is a suspicious feature in the case.

I am, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 5.

Consul Medhurst to Mr. Bruce.

Sir,

Shanghai, July 12, 1862.

IN pursuance of the opinion recorded in your despatch dated the 2nd May last, I called on the Taoutae for the depositions of the persons who made the seizure of Messrs. Bower and Hanbury's silk, and he has sent me the inclosed, which certainly go to prove that the boats containing the silk had passed the reporting station when the Custom-house agents interfered. I have shown the depositions to Mr. Hanbury, the head of the firm concerned, and he has addressed me a letter, copy of which, with its inclosure, I beg to submit for your information.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

* About a third of a mile.

Inclosure 3 in No. 5.

Messrs. Hanbury & Co. to Consul Medhurst.

Sir,

Shanghai, July 12, 1862.

WE beg permission to offer a few remarks after a perusal of the affidavits on the strength of which his Excellency the Taoutae has thought fit to confiscate and sell off sixty-four bales of silk belonging to ourselves, without any trial or hearing of our defence.

Inclosed is declaration of our Mr. Hanbury, showing that for a period of nine years' trading at this port, this is the first accusation of an attempt to evade duty that has been brought against him. It is, therefore, a peculiarly hard case that 5,000*l.* worth of property should be summarily confiscated by virtue of the statement of two tide-waiters in the employ of the Taoutae, who, as they receive a share of the spoil, are interested in the confiscation, but whose evidence is totally at variance with the four affidavits handed you some time since; viz.:—

Two from boatmen in our employ who were on the boats at the time of seizure;

Charles Brooks, Englishman, in our employ, present at the seizure;

De Wit C. Deming, American, not in our employ, but present at the time of seizure.

We feel sure Her Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary will not permit this gross violation of all rules of English law and equity, and will not allow us to suffer so severely because the Taoutae chooses to ignore the evidence we produce to rebut the charge of his two interested employés, and to judge the matter by Chinese law, not even allowing us, the defendants, a hearing.

We particularly call attention to the fact that the tide-waiter James Kennard, who boarded the boats, in his declarations fails to state how far the boats were from the Custom-house junk, called the barrier, when they were seized, and that Moses Jagger, the other tide-waiter, only speaks from hearsay on this point; while, on the other hand, all our witnesses are most explicit in declaring that the boats, when seized, were close to the barrier, "within hail," "within stone's throw," &c. The case turns on this point altogether, in our opinion, and the balance of the evidence in regard to it we submit is largely in our favour.

We further beg distinctly to state that there is no barrier at the place where the boats were seized, but a junk anchored in the river, and the existence of which was unknown to our employés when coming down the river, the Custom-house business formerly being done entirely on shore.

(Signed) BOWER & HANBURY.

Inclosure 4 in No. 5.

Declaration of Charles Brooks.

I, CHARLES BROOKS, a native of Portsmouth in England, make the following declaration of my own free will:—

I have been engaged for many months in the service of Messrs. Bower, Hanbury and Co.; my duties were the conveyancing of silk and other goods purchased in the interior down to Shanghai, but I have now left their employ. On the 19th day of January last, I arrived from the interior with a quantity of silk, about sixty-four bales in all, I believe; I was in company with Joseph C. Leeds, also in the employ of Messrs. Bower, Hanbury and Co., but he preceded me and passed the barrier before the silk-boats arrived.

Charles Deming was in company with me when I arrived at the barrier, but not in the same boat; he went with the expedition as a friend of Mr. Leeds, and was not in Messrs. Bower, Hanbury and Co's. employ.

In coming down the river, usually I have been in the habit of stopping at the Custom-house, near the Tong-ka-doo French Cathedral, and the boats were proceeding there on this occasion, and they were hailed by the Custom-house junk anchored in the stream; this junk was newly placed there, and until hailed I was not aware it belonged to the Custom-house. We stopped at once, and our boats with the silk in came alongside the Custom-house junk. I never received any instructions to attempt the evasion of any duty, and I had no intention of doing so on this occasion; when the boats were seized they were between the Custom-house junk and the Custom-house, within stone's throw of both.

When the boats were seized the Custom-house officer did not accuse us of attempting

to evade any duty ; he said other boats had lately passed without paying duty, and probably the Taoutae would seize our boats in consequence.

(Signed)

CHARLES BROOKS.

Declared to before me,

(Signed)

JOHN MARKHAM, *Her Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul.*

Inclosure 5 in No. 5.

Declaration of De Wit C. Deming.

I, DE WIT C. DEMING, a native of Providence, Rhode Island, in the United States of America, make this declaration of my own free will :—

On the 19th day of January last I returned to Shanghae from an expedition into the silk-producing districts, whither I had, merely as a friend, accompanied Joseph C. Leeds, he being in the employ of Messrs. Bower, Hanbury and Co. then, and I being without employment.

The boats that accompanied us contained in all about sixty-four bales silk, and on nearing Shanghae Mr. Leeds, who was anxious to arrive soon, went on before and passed the barrier first, and myself with Charles Brooks, also in the employ of Messrs. Bower, Hanbury and Co., came down after with the silk-boats. On arriving opposite the Custom-house junk, anchored in the river near the French cathedral at Tong-ka-doo, we were hailed by those on board, and the boats went alongside the junk ; at the time they were hailed the distance was not more than thirty yards between our boats and the Custom-house junk.

There was not any attempt or intention of evading the payment of duty, or of going past the barrier without duly stopping.

(Signed)

DE WIT C. DEMING.

Sworn to before me,

(Signed)

G. F. SEWARD, *United States' Consul.*

Inclosure 6 in No. 5.

Declaration of Thomas Hanbury.

I, THOMAS HANBURY, English merchant, of Shanghae, in the Empire of China, do solemnly and sincerely declare as follows :—

That I have been resident in Shanghae for a period of nine years ; that during that time I have carried on business as partner in two mercantile firms. That during those nine years no case of attempted smuggling was ever charged against myself, or the firm in which I was a partner. That my present and former firm has always paid duties regularly and punctually, according to the established tariff rates.

That as regards the seizure of sixty-four bales of silk on the eighteenth of January last as they were being conveyed from the interior to Shanghae, I declare that no instructions were given by myself or any one in my office to attempt the evasion of duty, or to run past the barrier ; further, I declare that those accompanying the silk, and in the employ of my firm, would not have been benefited by the evasion of transit duty. Also, that the position of the barrier had been recently changed, and a junk anchored in the stream employed, instead of a station on shore, and that those in the boats coming from the interior were not aware of this fact. Forty-two bales of silk coming from another district were lying at the barrier at the time the sixty-four bales were seized, thus proving what was the custom of my firm in regard to stopping at the barrier.

At the same time I was of the opinion that the levying of transit dues from British merchants at said barrier, on produce brought down by them without certificate, was illegal, and totally at variance with the notification of Her Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary, published for general guidance by Her Majesty's Consul on the 23rd September, 1861, and which reads as follows :—

“ 1st. That the British merchant has nothing to do with the payment of transit duties, unless the goods are carried into the country, or brought down from the place of production under certificate as British property. It is optional to the British merchant to take out the certificate or not as he pleases, but if he does not, and he buys or sells at the port of shipment, he has nothing to do with the payment of any duty but the one specified in the Tariff on imports and exports.”

And I make this solemn declaration conscientiously believing the same to be true.

(Signed)

THOMAS HANBURY.

Inclosure 7 in No. 5.

Declaration of James Kennard.

I, JAMES KENNARD, of Shanghae, in the Empire of China, tide-waiter in the Imperial Maritime Customs, Shanghae aforesaid, do solemnly and sincerely declare as follows:—

That on or about the 18th day of January last I was on duty on board the Custom-house junk stationed at the south barrier, when between the hours of 5 and 6 P.M. I observed several boats passing down the Poo-tung side of the river. All the boats which pass down the river are bound to pull up at my station, in order to pay the transit dues; and if they refuse to stop, one of my duties is to follow them up. That accordingly I started with two Chinamen from the said junk, and overtook three of the said boats, and immediately boarded them and inquired if they had any silk on board, to which they replied in the negative. That I searched the whole of the three boats, and on board two of them I discovered a large quantity of silk, amounting on the whole to sixty-three bales. That the said boats which were so searched by me as aforesaid, formed part of a large convoy consisting altogether of twelve boats or thereabouts, all sailing under the English Union jack, and in charge of two Europeans. That I was unable to search all the said boats, and am therefore unable to state whether the remainder had any silk on board or not. That I put one of the Chinamen in charge of one of the said boats, and took charge of the other myself, and made them fast alongside the Custom-house junk, and the next morning I reported to Mr. Jagger, the tide-surveyor, what I had done. That a few days afterwards I received orders from the said Mr. Jagger to take both the said boats up to the Custom-house at Shanghae, which I accordingly did. And I make this solemn declaration conscientiously believing the same to be true, and by virtue of the provisions of an Act made and passed in the 6th year of the reign of His late Majesty King William IV, entitled an Act to repeal an Act of the then present session of Parliament, entitled “An Act for the more effectual abolition of Oath and Affirmations taken and made in various Departments of the State, and to substitute Declarations in lieu thereof, and for the more entire Suppression of Voluntary and Extra-judicial Oaths and Affidavits, and to make other provisions for the Abolition of unnecessary Oaths.”

(Signed) JAMES KENNARD.

Declared at my office in Shanghae, this 16th day of June, 1862, before me,
(Signed) ED. LAWRENCE, *Notary Public, Shanghae.*

Inclosure 8 in No. 5.

Declaration of Moses Jagger.

I, MOSES JAGGER, of Shanghae, in the Empire of China, tide surveyor to the Imperial Maritime Customs, Shanghae, do solemnly and sincerely declare as follows:—

That on or about the 18th day of January last I was at my station at the south barrier, in the performance of my duty, which is to inspect all boats passing down the south barrier on their stopping to pay the transit-dues. That between the hours of 5 and 6 P.M. on that day I observed a large convoy of boats passing on the Poo-tung side of the river, instead of pulling up at my station as they were bound to do. That some of the men in my employ on board the Custom-house junk accordingly followed up the said boats, and searched them to ascertain if there was any silk concealed on board any of them. That when the said boats had gone about three quarters of a mile past the station three of them were, as I am informed and verily believe, overtaken by the men in the Custom-house junk who had pursued them, and were boarded, and the men in charge were asked if they had any silk on board,—to which they replied in the negative. That James Kennard, one of the men who had pursued the said boats, then searched them; and upon lifting up the hatchways discovered sixty-three bales of silk in two of the boats, but none in the other. That the said James Kennard then placed a Chinaman (one of the crew of the junk) in charge of one of the said boats, and took charge of the other himself, and had them both brought back to the station, and immediately reported to me what had taken place. And I further solemnly and sincerely declare that I reported the same to the official mandarin who acts with me at the said station; and he, as I am informed and verily believe, thereupon wrote to the Taoutae of Shanghae, who instructed me to have the said boats brought up to Shanghae and delivered over to the Imperial Maritime Customs, which was accordingly

done. And I make this solemn declaration, conscientiously believing the same to be true, and by virtue of the provisions of an Act made and passed in the sixth year of the reign of His late Majesty King William the IVth, entitled "An Act to repeal an Act of the then present Session of Parliament entitled 'An Act for the more effectual abolition of Oaths and Affirmations taken and made in various Departments of the State, and to substitute Declarations in lieu thereof, and for the more entire suppression of voluntary and extrajudicial Oaths and Affidavits, and to make other provisions for the abolition of unnecessary Oaths.'"

(Signed) MOSES JAGGER.

Declared at my office in Shanghae, this 16th day of June, 1862.

Before me,
(Signed) ED. LAWRENCE, *Notary Public, Shanghae.*

Inclosure 9 in No. 5.

Mr. Bruce to Consul Medhurst.

Sir,

Peking, November 5, 1862.

I HAVE gone carefully through the papers bearing on the claim of Messrs. Hanbury and Son for restitution of sixty-three bales of silk confiscated by the Taoutae of Shanghae for attempted evasion of the inland dues.

I regret to say that a perusal of the evidence forwarded in your despatch of the 12th of July last leaves no doubt in my mind that the boats formed part of a number that attempted to pass the Custom-house barrier without reporting, and that they were overtaken and seized in the act.

The evidence of Brooks and Deming is untrustworthy. According to their account they were neither pursued, boarded, nor searched. It is evident that they felt the attempt to evade payment of the duties would be established were it admitted that they had past the barrier to such a distance as rendered it necessary to send a boat after them, and had denied the existence of silk on board; and they have consequently suppressed the facts in their affidavits, although they have not positively denied them.

There is nothing to shake the testimony of Kennard and Jagger, and the facts deposed to by them establish a clear case of attempted evasion of duties, subjecting the articles to confiscation.

You will therefore inform Messrs. Hanbury that I cannot bring forward their claim for restitution.

I am, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

No. 6.

Mr. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received March 3.)

My Lord,

Peking, December 10, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch I have addressed to Mr. Consul Sinclair on the course to be pursued in cases where the Chinese authorities and the Consuls differ as to the penalty which by Treaty is to be imposed on vessels breaking the Customs laws. Also on the power of the Custom-house to seize contraband goods on board ship without a Consular warrant, and on the liability to confiscation by the Chinese of a vessel which enters a Treaty port with a cargo taken in at a place not open by Treaty.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure in No. 6.

Mr. Bruce to Consul Sinclair.

(Extract.)

Peking, December 9, 1862.

I HAVE just received your explanation of the case of the "Pearl." The deliberate seizure and confiscation by the Chinese authorities of a vessel under Treaty is not

such an act of "force" as justifies the Consul in having recourse to violent measures, even if he should doubt the soundness of the view taken by them of Treaty rights. It is an abuse of authority, for which redress is to be sought and damages claimed from the Imperial Government. It rests with the Minister to decide, after communication with the Imperial Government, by what measures the claim is to be enforced. The Consul is not entitled to employ force. It is absolutely essential that you should bear in mind the distinction between acts of violence committed by persons without authority, for which the Chinese Government is not responsible, and abuses of authority committed by its employés, for which it is responsible. The first class of acts is to be met by "force," the second class is to be met by "protests."

According to the highest legal opinion, contraband goods, on board a British ship, can be seized by the Chinese authorities without a Consular warrant. It is desirable that such a warrant should be applied for, in order that disputes may be avoided, but if there are contraband goods on board a British ship, the officers of the Chinese Customs may enter and seize them without a Consular warrant; and if resisted by the master, the latter will be guilty of the same offence as if he had resisted a Custom-house officer in British waters in the discharge of his duty. The French Treaty recognizes the right to confiscate vessel and cargo trading at a non-Treaty port, and I have no doubt, under the British Treaty, as to the right of the Chinese to seize a vessel which brings to a Treaty port a cargo taken in at a place not open by Treaty; and on a vessel entering the port with a contraband cargo on board, such cargo becomes confiscable, whether landed or not.

The fact that the Consul has no power to deal with such cases, does not deprive the Chinese Government of its right to pursue and seize a vessel guilty of clandestine trading, whenever they can catch her in their waters, as long as she has on board the cargo illicitly shipped.

It is not by petty smuggling along the coast that the commercial interests of Great Britain will be advanced.

The case of the "Pearl" must be discussed before I can pronounce positively; but in the meantime I may state that I do not consider the vessel liable to confiscation if she took in her cargo under a license issued by a competent Chinese authority, and had she been seized under such circumstances I should have obtained damages for the act; but though the seizure might have been unjustifiable, you were not justified in doing more than protest.

No. 7.

Sir E. Lugard to Mr. Hammond.—(Received March 9.)

Sir, *War Office, March 9, 1863.*
I AM directed by the Secretary of State for War to transmit to you, for the information of Earl Russell, the accompanying copy of a despatch from Brigadier-General Staveley.
I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD LUGARD.

Inclosure in No. 7.

Brigadier-General Staveley to Sir G. C. Lewis.

Sir, *Head-Quarters, Shanghai, January 8, 1863.*
I HAVE the honour to report, for your information, that the country around Shanghai remains clear of rebels.

A field force, now patrolling the country, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hough, 2nd Belooch Regiment, came yesterday upon a rebel outpost at Ludagow, six miles beyond Kading, numbering 200 men, who fled as soon as the force came in sight.

Lieutenant Wood, Royal Artillery, commanding a detachment of twelve men of the Royal Artillery, mounted on ponies, gave chase and captured eleven of them and one pony.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. STAVELEY.

No. 8.

Sir E. Lugard to Mr. Hammond.—(Received March 17.)

(Extract.)

War Office, March 17, 1863.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for War to transmit to you, for the consideration of Earl Russell, the inclosed extract of a despatch from Brigadier-General Staveley.

Inclosure in No. 8.

Brigadier-General Staveley to Sir G. C. Lewis.

(Extract.)

Head-Quarters, Shanghai, January 8, 1863.

THE Chinese authorities having applied to me to place an officer of Her Majesty's service in command of the Ward force, *vice* General Burgevine, whom they have dismissed, I have the honour to report, for the information of His Royal Highness the General Commanding-in-chief, that I have appointed Captain Holland, Royal Marine Light Infantry, to the temporary command.

It appears that General Burgevine was ordered to proceed with the force for the attack on Nanking without, as he says, his being consulted on the matter. Steamers had been hired, but at the last moment General Burgevine refused to go. His men at this time were clamouring and in mutiny for want of pay. General Burgevine having represented this to the Chinese authorities, they showed him the money, which was ready for them, and would be issued so soon as the troops embarked. Seeing that he could not obtain the money in any other way, he took it by force, and distributed it to his men. The authorities thereon requested me to seize and hand him over to them, which I refused to do.

No. 9.

Consul Medhurst to Earl Russell.—(Received March 23.)

My Lord,

Shanghai, January 22, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, copy of a despatch dated this day, addressed by me to Mr. Bruce.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 1 in No. 9.

Consul Medhurst to Mr. Bruce.

(Extract.)

Shanghai, January 22, 1863.

IN common justice to General Burgevine, I have now the honour to submit a copy of a letter written in vindication of his conduct, which has since appeared in the public papers, signed by himself and friends.

With respect to the last paragraph of the ex-General's letter, I have to state that I have made a point of writing to the Governor to ascertain under what commission Burgevine had served, and I have been informed, in reply, that he had held the command by special nomination of the Governor, which was given him previously to the transmission of any Memorial to the Throne on the subject, and that a Memorial had now been sent to Peking reporting his dismissal. Woo, Taoutae, Director-General, has also contradicted Burgevine's statement as to the mode in which he had received his commission in the accompanying notice, a copy of which he is trying to get published in the same paper in which the vindication appeared.

General Burgevine still lives on board the "Confucius," one of the Emperor's steamers, and gives out that he only allows his command to remain in abeyance until he can refer to Peking on the subject. Meanwhile negotiations have been brought to a close between General Staveley and the Governor for the appointment of a British officer to the joint command of the force with a Chinese nominee, and a set of rules, of which I inclose copies, in Chinese and English have been agreed to for the future conduct of the corps.

Inclosure 2 in No. 9

Statement by General Burgevine.

IN referring to the late occurrences in Shanghae relative to the alleged robbery and violence in the house of Takee, I beg the indulgence of the public to make the following explanation:—

On Friday the 2nd instant I came to Shanghae from Sung-kiang, for the purpose of receiving money promised on that day for the payment of the men. On landing I was informed that it was all ready; in fact, I suppose it at that moment on board one of the steamers about to start. I went at once to Takee's to thank him for so punctually keeping his promise, but was met with language so abusive that I determined to return at once to Sung-kiang, and have no more personal dealing with him. I found that place in almost a state of mutiny; proclamations posted that the men would have the heads of the mandarins; that they were starving; that they would dispose of their arms and clothing to procure food, and were ripe for an *émeute*. I ordered a general parade at 2 P.M. for the purpose of explaining why they had not been paid.

Previous to this, however, I received a letter from Takee, saying the money was all ready, and urging me to send for it immediately. Captain Holland received a letter to the same effect. On the strength of this promise I guaranteed that the troops should be paid in two days.

I left at once for Shanghae, but on my arrival there next morning was coolly informed that Takee had not only denied writing the letter, but still refused to send the money. I immediately proceeded to his house with a small portion of my guard who usually accompany me. There was no forcible entrance, no confusion, the men standing quietly at "Order arms" while Takee's comprador removed the money. I was aware of the responsibility of the course I was taking, but felt justified in so doing by the critical state of affairs in Sung-kiang. There was no time for deliberation: it was truly a question of money or the existence of the force and the lives of the European officers. The money had been appropriated for the use of the troops, and was immediately paid to them on its arrival at Sung-kiang. The only part of the affair I regret is having struck Takee.

In regard to the Nanking expedition, had the Chinese authorities kept faith with me in furnishing funds necessary to insure its success, the expedition would have started long since. It would have been madness to have appeared under the walls with men without winter clothing, and guns without ammunition. Moreover, the English and French authorities, both naval and military, protested against withdrawing so large a force from Sung-kiang. The troops being in arrears and discontented, and large amounts unpaid for arms, ammunition, and supplies for the expedition, I made it a point that all these claims should be paid before our departure. On this being refused, the expedition was still further delayed, and the Chinese authorities finally crushed it by withdrawing all the chartered steamers in so hurried a manner that there was not time to remove all the guns and stores on board. There was no intention on my part to deceive the Chinese Government in this matter, and I should have most assuredly carried out the plan except for the opposition and obstacles thrown in my way. So far from there being unanimity among the Chinese authorities, nothing has pleased the Governor more than the failure of the expedition. He has long been jealous of the growing power of the force, and it is his avowed intention to crush it, or else put a Chinese officer in command, over whom he would have unlimited control.

The misunderstanding between the Chinese and myself has been still further augmented by my refusal to allow them to form the plan of campaign. The force at the present time is in a very efficient state; the men are well armed and clothed, and under good discipline: the artillery particularly is in a splendid condition, both as regards men and guns. The cause of all those troubles has been the delay of the authorities to furnish the necessary funds.

With reference to the notice in the paper of my dismissal, it was premature as I had not received any official communication to that effect. As my commission proceeds from the Imperial Government at Peking, I do not recognize the right of the local authorities to deprive me of the command without the sanction of the Emperor. In the meantime I only consider myself off duty until the decision from Peking has been received. The printed notice could not have been worded in more offensive terms, and was evidently prepared with the intention of injuring me in the estimation of the public.

(Signed) H. A. BURGEVINE.

Shanghae, January 10, 1863.

Statement by Captain Ludlum.

I was present at the house of Takee, a Chinese merchant, on Sunday, January 4, 1863, in company with General Burgevine, and Captain Jones of His Imperial Chinese Majesty's steamer "Korjeor." I entered the house first; both doors were wide open, and no one attempted to prevent me from going in.

Inside I was met by Takee, who saluted me, saying, "Good morning." I returned his salutation. He then asked me where General Burgevine was, and also said, "The money is all ready, more soon; better my see Mr. Burgevine." One of his compradores, who was standing by, then also said, "The money is all ready; can catchee coolie. Take, go away."

The money was brought out voluntarily, no compulsion whatever being used either on entering the house or obtaining the money.

To the within-mentioned facts I am prepared to make affidavit if required.

(Signed) JOS. K. LUDLUM,
Commanding steamer "Zingari."

Statement of the Officers belonging to the Disciplined Chinese Force.

Sung-kiang, January 10, 1863.

We, the undersigned officers of the "Ward Force" commanded by General Burgevine, do hereby protest against the late action of the Chinese authorities in his affairs.

We are perfectly satisfied that he has always acted in a straightforward and open manner, and he has never been accused of the slightest offence against the military laws recognized by European Powers; we do not now, nor did we ever, consider ourselves liable to punishment by any others.

In reference to the late occurrence in Shanghai, we know nothing more of that affair than that it was absolutely necessary to obtain the money immediately for the preservation of the force and the safety of the European and the Chinese officials.

We also protest against the brutal attempt of the Chinese authorities to obtain the head of General Burgevine (50,000 taels being the sum offered for it) or for his secret apprehension. Should such a thing take place, we solemnly pledge ourselves not only not to serve the Chinese authorities any longer, but would make such representation to the Imperial Government at Peking as would lead to the just punishment of his murderers.

(Signed) W. G. Barclay de Tolly, Major.

H. Hayes, Major.

P. S. Rohde, Major.

James Edward Cook, Major.

J. D. Morton, Major.

J. H. Cleary, Brevet Major.

Wm. H. Porter, Major and
Paymaster-General.

Geo. M. Bates, Staff Surgeon.

Dr. Rutter, Surgeon.

Wm. J. Pegus, Captain 1st
Battalion.

John Malone, Captain.

Geo. R. Gibb, Fort Adjutant.

W. Duncan McLeod, Captain.

T. J. Maunder, Captain.

Joseph Attenelli, Captain.

M. Neill, Captain.

David Loudon, Captain.

Charles Smith, Captain.

William P. Belcher, Captain.

Alfred Silverthorne, Captain.

C. A. A. Tookey, Lieutenant.

James Chidwick, Captain.

M. Bannon, Captain.

— Manning, Captain.

Thos. Pinder, Chief Armourer.

W. Waters, Captain.

A. H. Ackerman, Paymaster

John E. Luxton, Captain.

G. Brook, Captain.

R. L. Mc Ginniss, Light Artillery.

J. Tumblety, Captain.

R. A. Cullis, Quartermaster.

Thos. Gaughan, Captain.

F. Tapp, Captain.

John Watson, Captain.

August Olsson, Lieutenant.

Amos Escott, Lieutenant.

Patrick Hartney, Gunner.

William Murphy, Gunner.

John Doyle, Gunner.

Michael Malley, Chief Clerk.

E. W. Blackwood, Captain.

James McNaughten, Captain.

James Lynch.

Joseph Pilcher.

Wm. Brennan, Captain.

E. Williams, Captain.

E. M. Murrant, Captain.

S. C. Hillman, Military Store-keeper.

John I. Gibbon, Captain.

J. C. Kirkham, Captain.

Inclosure 3 in No. 9.

Notice.

(Translation.)

REPORT has come within our hearing of a card published by Burgevine to the import that, because his commission as Commander of the Ever Victorious Army proceeded from the Imperial Decree, therefore he recognizes the right of no one other than the Emperor to remove him from his post; that he will represent to the Court at Peking concerning the whole affair; and that in the meantime he considers himself still in command.

Reviewing the fact that Burgevine was a Colonel under General Ward, and was appointed by the Footae, on the decease of the latter, to succeed in the command only out of consideration for the British Admiral Hope, who recommended him and pledged for his good conduct. But fearing lest Burgevine might not conform to the laws and regulations of our country, the Footae also appointed Taoutae Woo and Taoutae Yang to the joint command, the seal of office being delivered to him by the Footae, waiting for an opportune season to memorialize the Emperor concerning the whole proceeding. Lately, because he disobeyed the orders of his superiors, committed personal violence on a mandarin, and robbed the public funds, he has been, in the sight of Chinese law, guilty in the highest degree, and even according to foreign law such a rebellious and treasonable subject cannot be tolerated in the service. Under these circumstances, the Footae has memorialized the Emperor for his degradation from the command of the Ever Victorious Army, and will soon receive the result of his representations, which assuredly cannot be otherwise than his dismissal from service, and his being dealt with according to law.

Burgevine is scarcely aware that Le Footae is the Governor of a province to whom all officers civil and military are amenable, to whose rule all are subject, and in whom rests the decision whether an officer is to remain in office or to be dismissed therefrom. The statement that Le Footae cannot remove him from his post is ridiculous, and could not but proceed from his utter ignorance.

Seeing from his assertion that Burgevine virtually recognizes the Imperial Decree, it is strange that he did not obey the Decree commanding him to go to Nanking.

The Footae has already written to General Staveley on the subject of putting the Ever Victorious Army under the joint command of foreign and Chinese officers to be hereafter appointed; and if Burgevine considers himself still in command, he is disgracing himself to the last degree.

Inclosure 4 in No. 9.

Agreement for placing the Ever Victorious Army under the Joint Command of Chinese and Foreign Officers appointed by his Excellency the Footae and Brigadier-General Staveley.

Article 1. THE force shall be placed temporarily under the joint command of Captain Holland, and Captain Gordon shall be recommended to Peking as joint commander, and to regularly enter the Chinese service. The Footae appoints Futsiang, Le Heng Sung, to the joint command.

Art. 2. No expeditions shall be undertaken beyond the radius of thirty miles without previous discussion with the allies (England and France); but in reference to sudden expeditions within those limits their consent shall not be required.

Art. 3. A Chinese officer of the fourth or fifth grade shall be placed under the orders of the joint Commanders as Provost Marshal, to carry out such punishments as they shall order, who shall always be on the spot. Another officer of the same rank shall be appointed under their order to superintend the commissariat and pay off the force, who shall also be always on the spot. A third officer shall be appointed to take charge of the military stores, who shall report from time to time to the Footae.

Art. 4. Three good linguists shall be appointed permanently to the force.

Art. 5. The discipline and internal economy of the force shall be in the hands of the joint Commanders, and they shall be both present, in person or by deputy, at all issues of pay or rations to the force.

Art. 6. Orders on the Hae-quan Bank for six months' pay shall be issued twice every year, payable as due monthly, the amount to be settled when the standing of the force is arranged.

Art. 7. The strength of the force shall be 3,000; but if the Custom-house receipts should fail, this number may be eventually reduced.

Art. 8. No foreign officer of the force shall be dismissed without a Mixed Court of Inquiry, the sentence of which must be confirmed by the Footae, and which sentence cannot be reversed without the concurrence of the British General. No officer shall be appointed to the force by the Chinese Commander without the concurrence of his British colleague.

Art. 9. The Commanders shall not interfere with the civil jurisdiction of Sung-kiang and its suburbs.

Art. 10. The civil authorities shall carry out the wishes of the joint Commanders in all matters connected with the defence of the city; but no public works shall be undertaken without their consent.

Art. 11. No purchases of arms, ammunition, or military stores of any kind shall be made without the written consent of the Footae.

Art. 12. The British Commander shall rank as equal with the Chen-tae or Footae, and shall be given a proper Chinese designation corresponding thereto, but shall be under the orders of the Footae.

Art. 13. The British Commander is only to leave the force (if at his own request) with the consent of the British Commander-in-chief, obtained and signified through the Consul. If the Chinese are dissatisfied with the Commander, they shall not dismiss him without a judicial inquiry (in which the Consul shall take part), and due notice to the British Commander-in-chief. In either case three months' notice must be given. All subordinate officers are to be appointed at the discretion of the joint Commanders, due regard being paid to the 8th Article.

Art. 14. That the number of coolies employed by the force shall be reduced, 100 per 1,000 soldiers only being allowed, and their pay put on the footing of those employed in the Footae's camp, viz., 3 taels per mensem.

Art. 15. That the hospital expenses be reduced; the force to be put, as regards sickness, wounds, &c., on the same footing as other Chinese troops.

Art. 16. That the foreign officers of the force shall receive certain pay, but no extra allowances.

(Signed) C. W. STAVELEY,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Her Majesty's Forces in China.

No. 10.

Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 24, 1863.

HER Majesty's Government have considered, in communication with the Law Advisers of the Crown, your despatch of the 10th of December last, in which you inclose a copy of the instructions which you addressed to Mr. Consul Sinclair on the course to be pursued in cases in which the Chinese authorities and Her Majesty's Consul may differ with regard to the penalty which by Treaty should be imposed on vessels breaking the Chinese Customs laws, and on the power of the Custom-house to seize contraband goods on board ship without a Consular warrant, and also on the liability to confiscation by the Chinese of vessels which enter Treaty ports with cargoes shipped at a place not open by Treaty.

I have now to state to you that the instructions in question contain a just and proper exposition of the principles which ought to regulate the conduct of Her Majesty's Consuls towards the Chinese authorities in dealing with cases of a similar nature.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 11.

Sir E. Lugard to Mr. Hammond.—(Received March 27.)

(Extract.)

War Office, March 26, 1863.

REFERRING to my letter of the 17th instant, I am directed by the Secretary of State for War to transmit to you, for the information of Earl Russell, the accompanying further despatch from Brigadier-General Staveley.

Inclosure 1 in No. 11.

Brigadier-General Staveley to Sir G. C. Lewis.

(Extract.)

Head-Quarters, Shanghai, January 17, 1863.

WITH reference to my letter of the 8th instant, informing you that, at the request of the Chinese authorities, I had placed Captain Holland, R.M., Light Infantry, in temporary command of the Ward Force, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the conditions I have made with the Governor of this Province, under which a British officer is placed with a mandarin in joint command of the force.

This measure became absolutely necessary, in consequence of there being no officer belonging to the Ward Force fit to succeed General Burgevine, who had been displaced in the command, and to avoid the consequences which might arise from the defection or sudden dissolution of so large a number of men.

Colonel Forrester, the next senior to General Burgevine, and whom I suggested to the authorities to place in command, is in bad health, and has declined the appointment.

In drawing up the agreement with the Governor I endeavoured to induce him to keep the force up to 4,500 men; but as you will perceive by the conditions, it is not only to be reduced to 3,000 men, but an opening is left for a still further reduction hereafter. On this latter point I have entered a protest; 3,000 men, trained as they now are, being actually necessary to assist in the defence of the thirty miles' radius.

Tsung Kwo-fan is the Governor-General of the three Provinces of Kiang-su (in which Shanghai is), Ngan-hwui, and Kiang-se.

He is the Viceroy, and holds a higher position than the Governor-General of any other Province.

Le, who resides here, is Governor of Kiang-su alone, and therefore subordinate to Tsung Kwo-fan, whose residence ought to be at Nanking or Foo-chow; but as both these places are held by the Tae-pings, he resides at Ngan-king, on the Yang-tze-kiang.

The Governor here, Le, and the Treasurer, Lien, are Tsung Kwo-fan's friends and protégés, and are expected to provide him with the necessary funds to feed his army in the Valley of the Yang-tze.

In the event of this force becoming extinct, the officer commanding Her Majesty's troops at Shanghai might soon, and perhaps during the hot season, find himself with Kading, Tsing-poo, and Sung-kiang, invested by the rebels, and the Chinese as usual imploring him to succour their garrisons.

He could spare a column to go to the relief of one of these places, but after driving the enemy from this, and proceeding to the relief of another, the rebels would certainly return to the place he had just left.

On these grounds I would urge the necessity of insisting on this force being kept up in an efficient manner to at least 3,000 men.

I have learnt, on very reliable authority, that Tsung Kwo-fan's tactics are to drive the Tae-pings in this part of China into the triangle formed by the Yang-tze-kiang from Nanking round by the sea to Hang-chow, at the head of Hang-chow Bay and a line drawn across from Nanking to Hang-chow, and then to starve them into submission. He has now his forces posted along a line from Wu-hu, on the Yang-tze, to Yen-chow-foo, high up the river on which Hang-chow stands. He has 30,000 men watching Nanking, 10,000 at Wu-hu, 10,000 at Ning-que and Yen-chow-foo, and some 50,000 more in support at Nganking and elsewhere.

The Governor-General of Che-kiang, in which province Ningpo is, has 40,000 men at Yen-chow-foo, and guards the south from that city eastward to the sea, communication being open between all these troops. From this line the whole country is clear of Tae-pings to the Province of Sz'-chuen, on the borders of Thibet, where are another body of these rebels, not settled in cities, but continually on the move. These two bodies of Tae-pings form the whole rebellion, and one of Tsung Kwo-fan's objects is to prevent their junction. The insurgents in Kwang-tung have no connection with these, and are not numerous or formidable.

I purpose proceeding up the Yang-tze next week, when I shall endeavour to obtain an interview with Tsung Kwo-fan, and urge him to keep up the Ward force, so as to be able to co-operate with him.

P.S.—Since writing the above I have received the Governor's reply to my Protest, in which he states that the rebels are gradually receding from the thirty miles radius. This is not true; they still hold the cities next beyond those captured by the allies,

but refrain from showing themselves between those cities, for fear of falling in with the patrolling columns of the allies.

Inclosure 2 in No. 11.

Agreement for placing the Ever Victorious Army under the Joint Command of Chinese and Foreign Officers appointed by his Excellency the Footae and Brigadier-General Staveley.

[See Inclosure 4 in No. 9.]

Inclosure 3 in No. 11.

Brigadier-General Staveley to Consul Medhurst.

Sir,

Head-Quarters, Shanghai, January 12, 1863.

I REQUEST you will be good enough to inform the Governor of the Province, with reference to his application to me to place an officer in joint command of the Ward Force, that I think it very desirable, if possible, that Colonel Forrester should succeed to the command, in which case I should continue to furnish officers and non-commissioned officers as instructors to the force. If, however, there be reasons why Colonel Forrester cannot take up the command, I am prepared to place Captain Holland, R.M., in temporary joint command, and to recommend Captain Gordon, R.E., for the permanent joint command, on the amended conditions herewith transmitted.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. STAVELEY.

Inclosure 4 in No. 11.

Brigadier-General Staveley to Consul Medhurst.

Sir,

Shanghai, January 16, 1863.

I REQUEST you will have the goodness to inform the Footae that although I have signed the conditions under which a British officer is to have joint command of the "Ward force," I did so because a further reference to him would have caused a delay which would have, under the circumstances, been inexpedient.

I desire, however, that he should understand that I protest against that paragraph where he leaves an opening for a further reduction of the force below 3,000.

I enter my protest against this, because I think that 3,000 men of that force are absolutely required to take the share in the defence of the thirty-mile radius which I consider the Chinese Government ought at the very least to take.

I request, therefore, that you will urge his Excellency to erase the paragraph in question before sending it to Peking.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. STAVELEY.

Inclosure 5 in No. 11.

The Footae Le to Consul Medhurst.

(Translation.)

IN reference to the agreement that Ward's force is to number 3,000 men, the provision for further reduction was added for fear of the insufficiency of the customs revenue to meet the current expenses.

Considering also that the rebels are daily receding beyond the thirty-mile radius of Shanghai, there is no necessity for a greater force to defend the place. This question of number is to be consulted according to the times, and cannot be settled beforehand.

Seeing that both parties willingly signed to the articles of the agreement, there can be no protest after the act.

If General Staveley should insist on cancelling the provision in question, and if I should again wish to cancel some other phrases, how can the document be an agreement.

You will be pleased to inform the General of my opinion on the subject.

No. 12.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(Received March 30.)

(Extract.)

Admiralty, March 27, 1863.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send you herewith, for the information of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, an extract from a letter of Rear-Admiral Kuper, dated the 14th February, relating to the state of affairs in China.

Inclosure in No. 12.

Rear-Admiral Kuper to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

(Extract.)

February 14, 1863.

THE following is an extract from a despatch of the 8th instant from the senior officer at Shanghai, describing the state of affairs in that quarter:—

“The rebels continue to remain beyond the limits assigned them.

“The city of Chiang-shu, which is sixty miles in a north-west direction from Kahding, has lately submitted to the Imperial authority. Information having reached the Chinese authorities that the city of Tai-tsan, situated on the north bank of the Leho, about eighteen miles from Kading, in the same direction as Chiang-shu, is weakly defended, an expedition, composed chiefly of Ward's troops, will be sent in a day or two to take it.

“Robberies having been committed on some junks belonging to the British merchants Fletcher and Co., and a French merchant, M. Dupuis, by some boats belonging to the rebels at Nanking, Lieutenant Lee of the ‘Slaney,’ accompanied by Mr. Thomas Adkins, Her Majesty's Consul at Chin-kiang, obtained an interview with the Chung Wong, who punished the offender and made ample restitution.”

All is quiet in the vicinity of Ningpo.

No. 13.

Consul Medhurst to Earl Russell.—(Received April 1.)

My Lord,

Shanghai, February 4, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, copy of a despatch addressed by me on the 31st ultimo to Mr. Bruce.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure in No. 13.

Consul Medhurst to Mr. Bruce.

Sir,

Shanghai, January 31, 1863.

THE Tae-ping cause is beginning to show signs of weakness in this vicinity. Chang-shu, a large district city north of Soo-chow, and Fushan, a smaller town close to the Yang-tze, and which till now has harboured a nest of pirates, who have committed serious ravages on the river junk trade, have both sent in their submission to the Imperial authority, and garrisons have been despatched hence to receive charge of them. Tac-tsang, the next town north-west of Kah-ding, had also offered to give in its allegiance, but the Chief having been recalled to Soo-chow, his subordinates feared to open the gates to the Imperialists when they arrived to receive charge, and an expedition, consisting chiefly of men of Ward's Brigade, has been organized to proceed against it, when it is expected that the place will fall an easy prey.

A glance at the map will show the importance of these towns as a basis of operations against Soo-chow, and the Chiefs there must see their danger, for they have already sent a force to endeavour to recover Chang-shu: but Governor Le intends to meet the movement by advancing some of Ward's Brigade beyond Tac-tsang to that town.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

No. 14.

Consul Medhurst to Earl Russell.—(Received April 1.)

My Lord,

Shanghai, February 4, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, a copy of my despatch of the 30th ultimo to Mr. Bruce.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 1 in No. 14.

Consul Medhurst to Mr. Bruce.

Sir,

Shanghai, January 30, 1863.

MR. ALABASTER has returned from the mission to Sung-keang on which, as I reported in my despatch dated the 16th instant, I had allowed him to go. The result is told in the accompanying interesting memorandum, from which much may be gleaned, not only as to the present circumstances of Ward's Brigade, but as to the cause of its defects hitherto, and its chances of improvement hereafter. Mr. Alabaster, from his knowledge of the language and the confidence placed in him by the Chinese authorities, appears to have slidden insensibly from the particular duties he undertook when he left this into the position of a general mediator between the Brigade and the Mandarins, and to have done material good in that capacity; and I am not sorry that it has so happened, for some soothing influence was sadly needed to still the troubles and arrange the confusion which mismanagement and misapprehension had brought about. The authorities are so pleased with what has been effected, that they have asked Mr. Alabaster to present himself monthly about pay day to give them the benefit of his tact and tongue, and I have consented to his doing so in a private capacity so as not to commit the Consulate to any future disagreements which may arise between the force and their masters.

One important point has been determined by Mr. Alabaster, which will go far to prevent future misunderstandings, and that is, the injunction laid on the Commander of the Brigade to take no share in the civil administration of Sung-keang. General Ward from his position and power fell naturally into the mistake of interfering with the Civil authorities of the city, and Burgevine endeavoured to maintain what Ward had gained. Hence much injustice on the one side and heart-burning on the other, which had very much to do with the quarrel that ensued. I had previously had complaints made to me both by the authorities and people of this interference, and when negotiations were started between General Staveley and the Taoutae for the appointment of a successor to Burgevine, I suggested that a clause should be inserted in the agreement rendering it obligatory on the foreign commander of the Brigade to avoid any such usurpation. I am happy to say the General accepted the suggestion, as you will observe from Article 9 in the Agreement copy of which I inclosed in my despatch dated the 16th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 2 in No. 14.

Memorandum.

HAVING been requested by the Chinese authorities to do so, I, with your permission, proceeded to Sung-keang to arrange the affairs of the ever-victorious army, generally known as Ward's Force.

On arrival we found everything quiet, the men being aware of the arrival of the pay, and positively refusing to do anything likely to delay its issue. The officers were in a somewhat excited state, threatening to resign in a body, &c., under the belief that their services were indispensable, and that by concerted action they could force the concession of their demands, and fearing the proposed modifications of the force would seriously curtail their emoluments; but were pacified by the assurance that anything affecting their position would be submitted to them for acceptance before coming into operation, and that, should they be unwilling to serve, their resignation would be promptly accepted.

The next day the grievances of the Chinese authorities (civil and military) and gentry were entered into, mainly consisting of attempted usurpation of Civil authority by the Commanders of the force, and a few local grievances; and Captain Holland having no desire to be Civil as well as Military Commandant, some points were conceded at once, while others were compromised to the satisfaction of both parties.

The muster and payment of the men was then proceeded with, nearly 4,000 answering to their names out of a nominal roll of about 4,300, and deserters and those absent without leave were struck off. The men, as a body, were average; but with the exception of the Body Guard, a portion of the Artillery, and some four or five companies of Infantry, they did not seem in a very high state of either drill or discipline.

The next thing was to inspect the articles in store, which was easily done, there being, notwithstanding the enormous bills against the Chinese Government, very little to show; and, having done that, the only thing left was to arrange the basis on which the force was in future to be carried on.

The first articles were to limit the power of the Commandant. Ward had always looked forward to something more than a mere military command; had tried for, and, during the pressure from the rebels, obtained, large power over Sung-keang; and Burgevine had claimed the civil as well as military jurisdiction over the place. The authorities, useless under Ward, were indignant under Burgevine; and it was made a prime point that the Commandant of the force should, while maintaining his right to undivided jurisdiction over his own men, acknowledge the Civil authorities as the proper persons to deal with civilians. This was at once agreed to; the difficulty of deciding cases in which civilians and soldiers were equally engaged being got over by the concession that the Commandant should sit with the Civil Magistrate in the event of such occurring.

The joint command presented some difficulties, the Chinese General being a man of the coarsest type, and gifted with less intelligence than even the ordinary run of Chinese military mandarins; but happily it was discovered that he had boasted of being well versed in European drill, and being shamed by an exhibition, before the Chinese Commissioners, of his utter ignorance, he was compelled to consent to remain in the back-ground, as far as actual interference with the force was concerned, until he should attain greater proficiency.

The financial articles come next. The force, exclusive of military and commissariat stores and military works, had cost some 80,000 taels monthly. Five or six steamers, to which a reckless allowance had been made, had been employed by the force chiefly to convey messages or officers desirous of visiting Shanghai for amusement. A fleet of 32 gun-boats and 400 men had been attached to the force, who had invariably steadily refused to do anything for it: 700 coolies were borne on the rolls, and all coolie-work had had to be done by outside coolies: 600 taels a-month had been expended for candles only, and everything had gone on the same extravagant scale. By simply dismissing the useless men, reducing the force to its effective strength, cutting off the superfluous steamers, &c., a saving of 30,000 taels monthly was shown, and General Holland hopes to be able to effect a still greater retrenchment.

Such were the articles; and, everything having been discussed, it was agreed finally that—

That the Military Commandant of the force should confine himself to his military, and not interfere with the civil, jurisdiction of the place.

That proper discipline should be introduced, and the force be no longer a band of licensed robbers, useful against the Changmaos, but more to be dreaded even than them in time of peace.

That the foreign Commandant should bear in mind the Chinese nature of the force, and not, as Ward and Burgevine, strive to make it, not only foreign in discipline and drill, but anti-Chinese in feeling.

And lastly, that the force should be rendered effective and all superfluities unsparingly cut off.

The force therefore now stands as a force of 3,000 men, with 300 coolies and 100 boatmen and a proper complement of officers, two steamers and thirty-two boats being attached to it, besides a sufficient staff of linguists, writers, executioners, &c., &c., and should General Holland be able to make it effective and useful, there seems every disposition on the part of the Chinese authorities to keep it up. They are quite determined, and it would seem justly, to abstain from supporting a force which, like this, has hitherto been entirely anti-Chinese, and taken every opportunity to subvert their authority; but they are well aware of the advantage of an European drilled and led force, and if they see a new spirit infused into it, would be anxious not only to maintain but to increase it.

A great deal depends upon the head, who unless gifted like Ward with consummate

tact and favoured by fortunate pressure from without, or thoroughly acquainted with the Chinese manners and customs, must necessarily come into direct antagonism to the Chinese authorities. The habit of thought and *modus operandi* of the Chinese are so distinctly opposite to ours that it is difficult to avoid giving offence, even if somewhat acquainted with them; but for an ordinary Englishman, with nothing but Chinese linguists, who, if (which they rarely are) capable, simply give a literal rendering of what passes, it is impossible to avoid misunderstanding. Holland, who now is most popular with all, was two months back, simply for want of some one who could explain as well as translate, so misunderstood that petitions were presented to the Footae against him by every one who could do so, and in some instances, where the lack of explanation had been on his side, with justice; points had daily come up which it had been found impossible to settle, and irritation had so accumulated that without Burgevine's overt offence a crash must needs shortly have occurred, whereas on this last visit nothing was brought forward which was not found susceptible of satisfactory accommodation. Indeed, so plain did the cause of former disagreements appear that the authorities and gentry united in begging me to go up at least once a month, stating their willingness to submit patiently during my absence to any grievances, in the assurance that as soon as they were properly explained they would be removed or redressed.

Indeed, the Commandant requires to be as much a diplomatist as a soldier with any Chinese. I believe with this force, as it at present stands, it is impossible to introduce European routine; to be able to carry it out with any army, every officer, commissioned or non-commissioned, requires to be brought up to it; and were the proper staff forthcoming, I believe it would be impossible to introduce our method into a Chinese army, the mind of every individual of which is so incapable of comprehending and so unwilling to accept a matter so foreign to their traditions. They are capital irregulars, but I believe nothing will make them anything else, and it is undoubted that the foreign forces who have been most successful with these Chinese officers, whether English or French, here or at Ningpo, have been sailors free from prejudice of rule; they were more ready with expedients, and have got over difficulties quite insurmountable had they attempted to overcome them by the regular traditional course.

Proceeding to the officers, it seemed that the force had a far too large a number; the few Chinese captains of companies were far smarter and more reliable than the Europeans in a similar position; their men were cleaner, in better drill and order, and during the late troubles their companies were the only ones that would turn out for duty. Some Europeans are required, but if they were good men, three or four to a battalion would, it is the opinion of all I have asked, be amply sufficient. A first, second, and third in command who could and would work would be far more useful than twenty or thirty ever getting in each other's way and never doing anything under the pretext that everything to be done came into some one else's province. The number has already been reduced by General Holland, and he proposes to do so, I believe, largely still; the Europeans, when in such numbers as they have been hitherto, having proved more unmanageable and troublesome than the rest of the force put together.

But should even General Holland or his successor prove a perfect commander, and so manage that no difficulties like those hitherto should occur, it is of paramount necessity that the revenue of the force should be secured. The present Footae has a reputation for honestly carrying out his engagements, but beyond the difficulty of trusting any Chinese official whatever in pecuniary matters, there is the danger of his being removed or superseded, and it is rarely that you find a mandarin who even has, like him, the mere reputation of carrying out what he engages to perform; but although the Chinese may expect the Commander to do impossibilities in the way of drilling and organizing the army (kept constantly in the field), in the intervals of the fights, to do anything with his men he must pay them regularly. The Chinese are patient: although, unless encouraged by the laxity or misconduct of their officers, they would not mutiny so soon as in the late case in Sung-keang, they would be utterly useless unless regularly paid; and to make this certain the money should be paid into the bank by the Custom-house authorities at the commencement of every month. No orders, no agreements, without this are of the slightest use.

With reference to the expenses of the force, reduced as they now are, they are still susceptible of retrenchment. So soon as Captain Osborn's fleet comes out, the force should be able to do with one steamer, and that a little despatch-boat; the staff of foreign officers could be largely reduced, and the innumerable channels through which money is at present squandered stopped, dependent of course on the funds that really reached it coming in regularly.

For its use it has hitherto been ever victorious when backed by European force, however small, and it is susceptible of great improvement; but at present, although ready

enough to advance, it has not learnt to retreat, and a check at any moment would lead to a total rout. Invaluable, joined to a small number of our troops, it is unsafe without them.

(Signed) CHALONER ALABASTER.

No. 15.

Sir E. Lugard to Mr. Hammond.—(Received April 2.)

Sir, *War Office, April 2, 1863.*
I AM directed by the Secretary of State for War to transmit to you, for the information of Earl Russell, the inclosed copy of a despatch from Brigadier-General Staveley.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD LUGARD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 15.

Brigadier-General Staveley to Sir G. C. Lewis.

Sir, *Head-Quarters, Shanghai, February 8, 1863.*
I HAVE the honour to transmit, for your information, a copy of a letter I have addressed to the Honourable F. Bruce with regard to the Ward force being employed in the capture of the rebel city of Tai-tsan, the rebel garrison of which is said to be wavering in its allegiance to the Tae-ping cause.

The thirty-mile radius continues clear of rebels, and the remains of the towns and villages are being rapidly re-occupied and country cultivated.

A surveying patrolling party, under Captain Gordon, Royal Engineers, which returned on the 25th ultimo, traversed the whole country on the south side of the Woo-sung River, called the Poo-tung side, and found the inhabitants returned to their villages, cultivating the land, and expressing confidence that they would have no more visits from the Tae-pings.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. STAVELEY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 15.

Brigadier-General Staveley to Mr. Bruce.

Sir, *Head-Quarters, Shanghai, February 4, 1863.*
I HAVE the honour to report, for your information, that the rebel walled towns of Changshu and Fushan, immediately to the north-east of Kading, have given in their allegiance to the Chinese authorities, and that 600 men of the Ward force have been placed in the latter town, in consequence of its having been since its surrender threatened by the Tae-pings from Soo-chow.

I have since had an application from the Footae for my consent to the Ward force being employed under Captain Holland for the capture of Tai-tsan, sixteen miles north-west of Kading, and just on the thirty-mile radius.

I have consented to the force going on this expedition, but have only permitted Captain Holland to command the force as far as the Leho River, the boundary agreed upon by Vice-Admiral Protet and myself.

Captain Holland will, however, accompany the expedition, to be able to report to me the result of the operation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. STAVELEY.

No. 16.

Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 8, 1863.

I HAVE to state to you that Her Majesty's Government entirely concur in your views and approve the instructions which you have addressed to Her Majesty's Consul at Shanghai, as reported in your despatch of the 5th of November last, with regard to the proposals made by the Taoutae for taxing Chinese subjects who reside within the limits of the so-called British Concessions.

The lands situated within the limits of the British Settlement are without doubt Chinese territory, and it cannot reasonably be held that the mere fact of a residence within those limits exempts Chinese subjects from fulfilling their natural obligations.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 17.

Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 9, 1863.

I HAVE had under my consideration, in communication with the proper Law Advisers of the Crown, your despatch of the 2nd of December last, showing, with reference to the confiscation by the Chinese Custom-house of sixty-three bales of silk belonging to Messrs. Hanbury and Co. of Shanghai, the course you had pursued in cases of seizure and confiscation of goods for evasion of duties; and I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the general course pursued by you in such cases is right and proper, and that in the individual case of the seizure of Messrs. Hanbury's silk you formed a correct opinion, upon the evidence, that neither restitution nor compensation could be demanded or required for the confiscation of the silk by the Chinese authorities.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 18.

Sir E. Lugard to Mr. Hammond.—(Received April 13.)

Sir,

War Office, April 11, 1863.

REFERRING to that portion of the despatch addressed to the Honourable Sir F. Bruce by Brigadier-General Staveley, a copy of which was transmitted to you in my letter of the 2nd instant, in which he states that although he had consented to Ward's force, under Captain Holland, being employed in the capture of Tai-tsan, he had only permitted Captain Holland to command the force as far as the Leho River, that being the limit of the boundary within which the operations of the British forces were agreed to be restricted, I am directed by the Secretary of State for War to transmit to you, for the information of Earl Russell, the inclosed extract of a letter from the Military Secretary to the Field Marshal Commanding-in-chief, pointing out the objections entertained by His Royal Highness to the course thus adopted in depriving the force of its commanding officers at a time when the services of the latter would be most urgently required.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWARD LUGARD.

Inclosure in No. 18.

Major-General Forster to the Under-Secretary of State for War.

(Extract.)

April 8, 1863.

HIS Royal Highness cannot but apprehend that the decision of Her Majesty's Government communicated in your letter of 29th January last that the British officers and men who have been detached from their regiments as instructors of the Chinese troops shall act with those troops in the field against the Tae-pings within a radius of thirty miles from the city of Shanghai, cannot but lead to confusion, as under these circumstances the force, in the event of hostilities being commenced close to, and afterwards carried beyond, the extent above mentioned, the force would suddenly be deprived of commanding officers and left to fight without them because the thirty-mile radius had been passed.

Such an arrangement the men would never understand, and the result would be that they would look down upon their officers.

No. 19.

Mr. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received April 17, 1863.)

(Extract.)

Peking, December 23, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch from the Prince of Kung, protesting against the attempt to sue before British Tribunals British subjects in the service of China for acts done by them in the exercise of the authority confided to them. Also copy of a Mandamus issued by the Supreme Court of Hong Kong to Mr. Consul Medhurst, directing him to try the case of *Bowman v. Fitzroy*, for seizure of goods, as a Customs officer, to which case the Prince alludes.

From a careful perusal of sections 4 *et seq.* of Her Majesty's Order in Council of the 13th June, 1853, it appears to me that both the wording and the intention confine all proceedings in cases of breach of rules and regulations for the enforcement of Treaties to the Consul and to the Chief Superintendent of Trade. In case a British subject is dissatisfied with the decision of the Consul, the remedy lies in an appeal against his decision to the Chief Superintendent of Trade, and if the Chief Superintendent of Trade fails in his duty, the authority to which he is responsible is that of the Chief Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The Chief Superintendent in cases arising under this section is the Supreme Court in China; it is for him to prescribe to the Consul the course he is to pursue, and the Supreme Court at Hong Kong cannot interfere in such matters without producing confusion.

Your Lordship will understand the importance I attach to a strict adherence to this division of authority, as I am aware that if Her Majesty's Government decide that a suit against the Chinese Government can be brought before a British Tribunal under colour of an action against a British subject in Chinese employ for an act performed by him in execution of his duty, the Chinese Government will cease to employ British subjects in its Custom-house, and will substitute for them foreigners of other nations, whose Governments do not hold them personally responsible in such matters. In that case I should be deprived of the influence which, as British Minister, I ought to exercise, considering the stake we have in China, or I should be obliged to oppose the introduction of foreigners into the Chinese service. Either alternative would prove fatal, in my opinion, to the success of the policy I have endeavoured to inaugurate at Peking, namely, that of strengthening the Chinese Executive, while introducing ideas of administration favourable to the gradual and pacific development of trade.

In my despatch of December 2 I referred your Lordship to a joint opinion given by Sir W. Atherton and other able Counsel to the effect that the Chinese Custom-house is by Treaty entitled to confiscate goods in certain cases, and that, if it exercises this power unjustly, redress must be sought against the Government by diplomatic proceedings. Also, that for acts done by a British subject in its employ, the Chinese Government is responsible, and that were an action to be brought against him before a British Tribunal for any act done in the exercise of the authority conferred on him by the Chinese, it is a sufficient defence to plead the authority under which he acted.

In this case, had Messrs. Bowman and Co. in the first instance brought an action against Mr. Fitzroy for having seized their goods, it would, technically speaking, have been advisable to allow the plaint to have been entered, and Mr. Fitzroy to have set forth his defence on record. The action would then have come to an end. But a long

correspondence and several interviews took place with the Chinese Superintendent of Customs on this case, in which that officer, very properly, treated the act as done by his authority, and accepted the whole responsibility of it.

When the case was referred to me, no sufficient ground existed, in my opinion, for demanding compensation; and it did not appear to me advisable to direct the Consul to go through the farce of summoning Mr. Fitzroy, after the complainant had recognized the act as done under the authority of the Chinese Government.

If any further argument were required to show that the Order in Council does not contemplate cases against the Chinese Custom-house, it is to be found in the fact that the only penalty which can be imposed under it is a fine of 500 dollars, or imprisonment for three months.

It would be a very advantageous operation for the Chinese Government to be able to confiscate a cargo through its foreign employé, and to escape further liability on payment of a fine of 500 dollars, or by the imprisonment of its foreign employé.

However, the point at issue between me and the Supreme Court is one of jurisdiction. I deny that, in cases under the 4th section of the Order in Council, the Supreme Court can dictate to the Consul what he is to do. These cases are exclusively within my province, subject to the instructions I may receive from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Whether I ought to have ordered a trial *pro forma* under the circumstances of this particular case, it remains for your Lordship to decide; but I know that the Chinese Government would have denied the competency of the Court to enter into the merits of the case, and that we should not have been further advanced, in obtaining compensation, had the Consular Court entered judgment against the defendant.

I may mention that an analogous case happened while I was in Egypt. The director of the transit was an Englishman, and some goods having been destroyed on the railway, owing, it was alleged, to a want of proper precaution, a suit was begun for damages in the Consular Court against him. The defendant demurred to the competency of the Court, on the ground that the railway belonged to the Egyptian Government, and that the claim ought to have presented against the Government. The defence was held good, and the plaint was dismissed. The propriety of the decision was not called in question. The principle is the same as that which directs that when damages are sought for an injury inflicted by a carriage, the action lies, not against the driver, but against the owner of the carriage.

I inclose copies of documents connected with Messrs. Bowman's claim, which will show that, so far from their having been treated with harshness, they were dealt with leniently by the Chinese authorities. The excuse of unintentional error is not made out, for the size of the bales in itself was sufficient to show that the quantities were mis-stated, and should have led to a voluntary offer, before seizure, to amend the description; while the forcible carrying off the bales, in spite of the tide-waiter's remonstrances, was an offence which exposed the agent of Messrs. Bowman to serious punishment, had it been brought forward against him. If the Chinese Custom-house is to be efficient, it must apply penalties rigorously and without exceptions; for if a merchant of one nation is let off, the merchants of other nations claim the same indulgence. National jealousies are called into play, and efficient Customs administration becomes impossible.

Inclosure 1 in No. 19.

The Prince of Kung to Mr. Bruce.

(Translation.)

Peking, October 24, 1862.

THE Prince of Kung makes a communication.

The Prince has been informed that the British firm of Bowman and Co., of Shanghai, who, in describing certain goods landed by them, returned to the Customs the number of pieces as much less than was found to be the case, in consequence of which they were confiscated by the Superintendent of Customs, have petitioned the Law Court of Hong Kong to call before it Mr. Fitzroy, the (Foreign) Commissioner of Customs for Shanghai, alleging that the above penalty was wrongfully inflicted.

The Prince is not versed in British law, but (it appears to his Highness) that such a proceeding is as inconsistent with the Treaty as it is at variance with justice (or reason).

It is laid down in the Treaty, Article XLVI, that the Chinese Customs shall adopt whatever measures seem best fitted to secure the protection of the revenue; and in

Tariff Rule 10, that the high officer charged with the superintendence of foreign trade is at liberty to engage British subjects to aid in the prevention of smuggling.

Accordingly in the 12th moon of the 10th year of Hien-fung (January 1861) the Prince addressed a despatch to Li Tai-kwo (Mr. Horatio Lay), expressly appointing him Inspector-General of Customs, and directing him to engage a number of Englishmen of good character to assist in various subordinate offices (in the protection of the revenue) at the different ports.

In the spring of the 11th year (1861), Mr. Lay applied for leave to return to England for the benefit of his health, and the Prince in a second despatch instructed Mr. Fitzroy and Mr. Hart to administer the functions of Inspector-General together jointly, Mr. Fitzroy continuing to discharge the duties of Commissioner at Shanghai, his proper station.

In the 7th moon of this year (August 1862), the firm of Bowman and Co., of Shanghai, applied to the Customs for a permit to land 80 bales of 25 pieces each of long cloths, making 2,000 pieces in all. Thirty bales had been landed and stored in the godowns of the firm, when a lot of twenty-two bales was stopped by the tide-waiter, on account of their bulk, and, on his report, the Superintendent sent a watcher to weigh them. In the meantime, however, the firm, without waiting to have the goods inspected, had lodged eight bales in their godowns, so that but fourteen were left in the vessel. These, on examination, were found to contain fifty pieces each, and the Superintendent, on the ground that fewer pieces than the correct number had been returned, detained the fourteen bales, and wrote to the Consul to request that he would send a constable to the premises of Bowman and Co. to take possession of the eight bales lodged in their godown.

The following day the representative of the firm went to the Custom-house, and protested that the entry of 2,000 bales was a clerical error, and that there had been no intention whatever to evade the duty.

As this statement was not made until after the error was detected, it is plain that the erroneous entry was made for the purpose of evading the duty, and the confiscation of the goods, for example's sake, was consequently unavoidable.

The Consul, however, begged so hard for a lenient construction of the case, that it was agreed that the whole should not be confiscated, but only the twenty-two bales of which cognizance had been taken on the day of the seizure.

The Prince has reviewed the case as reported to him by the Taoutae of Shanghai (the Superintendent of Customs), and he cannot find any fault with the course pursued by that officer. But, supposing his decision incorrect, why did not the merchant aggrieved apply to his Consul to move the British Minister to look into the matter as the Treaty requires? It is evident that the merchant regards Inspector-General Fitzroy as acting on his own responsibility. He is not aware that Tariff Rule 10 expressly states that British subjects will be engaged merely to assist in the administration of the Customs; that they have no independent authority; that it is the Superintendent of Customs who possesses the independent authority. If the Superintendent of Customs commits himself, on the representation of the British Minister to that effect, it would be, of course, competent for the Prince to investigate his conduct; and if he were found to have done wrong, the sufferer by his wrong would, of course, have to be indemnified.

If the foreigners engaged were to act in defiance of the Superintendent's instructions, the Superintendent would either displace the offender himself, or would move His Highness to dismiss him. The foreigner exercises no irresponsible authority. But the object of engaging foreigners to assist in the Customs was the prevention of smuggling; and of what use will they be if, at the moment they are seizing contraband goods, their action is to be stopped by the interference of foreign officials? The Commissioners of Customs being foreigners, it has become necessary to engage foreigners as tide-waiters also; and this being so, why should the merchant pretend that it is the Commissioner (only) that he wants to have summoned? If any trick to which the merchant chooses to resort is to be the rule, will he not in time to come be summoning the Superintendent himself? But surely, by parity of reasoning, if a Consul commits an error, it will be competent for an Intendant or Prefect to subject him to judicial inquiry, will it not? In a word, if an English merchant be dissatisfied with the acts of the Customs at any port, the proper course is a reference of the question by the Chinese and British authorities respectively to the Prince and the British Minister, who will then be enabled, after due consideration of the question together, to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion. The business of the Chinese Customs cannot be treated as matter of litigation. It would not be right to summon even their tide-waiters at random (or wantonly): *à fortiori* it is wrong to arrogate the power of summoning their Inspectors, who discharge a

higher order of) official duties. Still less can there be any difficulty about the course to be pursued where duties are evaded by merchants; they must be dealt with according to the Treaty, the circumstances must be considered as justice requires, the case reasoned upon consistently with the facts, and this is all that is required to close the question; there is no occasion for judicial proceedings.

These are the Prince's opinions, and he doubts not that they are shared by his Excellency the British Minister.

A necessary communication addressed to the Honourable Mr. Bruce, &c.

Tung-Chih, 1st year, 9th moon, 2nd day (24th October, 1862).

Inclosure 2 in No. 19.

In the Supreme Court of Hong Kong.

Crown side. July 28, 1862.

Johnson & Co. v. W. H. Medhurst.

UPON reading the affidavit of Francis Bulkeley Johnson, it is ordered that the said Walter Henry Medhurst do, upon the expiration of one month from the date of the service of this rule upon him, show cause before the Supreme Court of Hong Kong, at the Court House, Queen's Road, Victoria, why a writ of mandamus should not issue out of the proper office of the said Supreme Court of Hong Kong, directed to the said Walter H. Medhurst, ordering him to proceed to hear and determine, as Her Britannic Majesty's Consul at Shanghai, a certain charge against the applicants of infringement of the provisions of the Treaty between Her Britannic Majesty and the Emperor of China, in respect of eighty bales of shirtings imported by them in a certain vessel called the "Capriolane" to Shanghai aforesaid, in accordance with the application of the said applicants to the said Walter H. Medhurst so to proceed, dated the fifteenth day of February last past, and why the costs of and attendant thereupon, and of this application, should not be paid by the said Walter H. Medhurst, and why the said Supreme Court of Hong Kong should not make such further or other rule or order herein as may be necessary or expedient.

Upon the motion of Mr. Edward H. Pollard.

By the Court,

(Signed) T. S. HUFFUM, *Acting Deputy Registrar.*

Served on me, August 7, 1862.

(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 3 in No. 19.

Woo, Taoutae, to Vice-Consul Markham.

(Translation.)

October 30, 1861.

I WRITE under the following circumstances:—

On the 5th day of the present moon (8th October), Messrs. Johnson and Co. applied for a permit to land eighty bales of shirtings from the English ship No. 3,634, describing them to contain twenty-five pieces each, or 2,000 pieces in all, and a permit was accordingly given them, which they kept till yesterday, when they landed twenty-two of the bales, which were at once perceived by the watcher named Fang to contain more than twenty-five pieces each, and as he saw that the eighty bales would contain 4,000 pieces, and that they reported too little by one half, he prevented the landing, and came to the Custom-house to report the case.

On this, contrary to all expectation, Messrs. Johnson and Co., taking advantage of the absence of the Custom-house officer, carried off eight bales into their godowns, when the officer returning stopped the remaining fourteen bales, and went to the hong to demand those already carried off from a servant of the hong named Huc, who was very bostreperous, and said he would carry the other fourteen bales off too, and Fang had great difficulty in persuading him to allow the fourteen bales to be detained.

As, therefore, Johnson and Co. have broken the Regulations, both in reporting goods falsely and landing them by force when stopped by the Customs officer, I shall

feel obliged if you will issue a warrant to enable me to send an officer and to seize for confiscation the eight bales carried into the hong, and I shall feel obliged if you will arrest the Cantonese Huc, and send him to me for examination.

Inclosure 4 in No. 19.

Woo, Taoutae, to Vice-Consul Markham.

(Translation.)

November 3, 1861.

I WRITE again with reference to Messrs. Bowman and Co.'s case.

Messrs. Bowman and Co. having, by applying for a permit to land certain shirtings, described them as less in quantity than they really were, and when the goods were stopped by the Custom-house officer, taking them into their go-down, broken the Regulations, I applied to you for a search warrant to enable me to send an officer to seize and confiscate the eight bales they had carried off, and requested you to send me their servant Huc for trial.

On this you came to see me, and said that the business of the house was carried on by a clerk, that he was a youngster, that he had no intention to err, and that he would give up the eight bales for confiscation, but begged that the rest might be given up; and I, willing to deal extraordinarily leniently with the case, allowed the fifty-eight bales which had not been landed to be so on payment of the proper duty: but he must be ordered to give up the eight bales he carried off, and I write again, therefore, to request you to issue a search-warrant to enable me to send an officer to seize them, and to confiscate them, with the fourteen bales already in my possession, in accordance with the Regulations; and at the same time I beg you will send me the Cantonese Huc for punishment, as a warning to others.

I beg you will do this without delay.

Inclosure 5 in No. 19.

Vice-Consul Markham to Woo, Taoutae.

Sir,

Shanghai, November 4, 1861.

I HAVE the honour to hand you the warrant you applied for, to take eight bales of grey shirtings out of Messrs. Johnson and Co.'s go-down, which you have confiscated on the ground that they are smuggled. At the same time, I beg again to bring to your Excellency's notice that I firmly believe the act was unintentional on the part of Messrs. Johnson and Co.; and as the error would be sufficiently punished by the forfeiture of the eight bales in question, I must trust that you will allow the other fourteen, which are still at the Custom-house jetty, to be landed by the merchants, or I shall be compelled to lay the matter before his Excellency Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary at Peking.

(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM.

Inclosure 6 in No. 19.

Woo, Taoutae, to Vice-Consul Markham.

(Translation.)

November 7, 1861.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th of November, &c.

Immediately on its receipt I dispatched an officer, protected by your warrant, to Messrs. Johnson and Co.'s go-down, and seized the eight bales that had been forcibly carried there, the other fourteen bales, which I detained in the first instance, having already been confiscated.

The whole eighty-one bales should have been confiscated by rights, but, in consideration of the arguments and applications preferred by you personally, I have agreed that the twenty-two bales only should be confiscated, and allowed the merchants to take delivery of the remainder on payment of the proper duty, and consider I have been extraordinarily lenient in doing so, as this is the second time the merchants offended, they having on a former occasion landed thirty bales the number of pieces in which was falsely reported.

If this had been a clerical error, they should have gone to the Custom-house, and corrected it, instead of which they attempted to land twenty-two more, and only found out their mistake when their goods were seized; and it is evident, therefore, that the false description was intentional, and not an accidental mistake.

Again, when my officer stopped the goods, they took advantage of his going to report it to carry off eight bales by force, and if he had not been quick back to the jetty, the other fourteen bales would also have been carried in; besides which they aggravated their offence by the threat made by some of the people in the hong to beat the officer when he went there to demand the eight bales back.

I shall be very glad, therefore, if you report the case to Mr. Bruce; for if all these cases were reported to him he would know how bad merchants are, how many difficulties there are in my way. The confiscation was brought on by the merchant himself, and I was forced to my present course of action.

Inclosure 7 in No. 19.

Statement of J. L. Vogeler.

In the Supreme Court of Hong Kong, Crown Side.

FRANCIS BULKELEY JOHNSON and Alfred James How, trading under the name or firm of Johnson and Company versus Walter Henry Medhurst, Her Britannic Majesty's Consul at Shanghai.

John Leopold Vogeler makes oath and says:—On the 1st of October last, being in the employ of the Imperial Customs as landing waiter at the Custom-house jetty, Mr. Gilmore ordered me to go down to Bowman's jetty, and look after some bales which had been entered at the Custom-house as containing twenty-five pieces each, belonging to Johnson and Co. I accordingly went and found that the boat contained fourteen bales, but the mate's order stated that the twenty-two bales had been delivered out of the ship into the boat. I inquired of the Chinese landing-waiter what had become of the eight bales; he answered through the interpreter that they had (Johnson and Co's people) taken them into the go-down. I thereupon asked him who had given them permission to let the eight bales pass, as they apparently contained fifty pieces; he answered that the go-down man struck him and forced him away from the jetty. I ordered the boatmen to leave the jetty, and gave the boat in charge of the Chinese landing-waiter to take round to the Custom-house jetty. After I saw the boat safely anchored I reported the fact to Mr. Gilmore and told him the boat was there, and that by all appearance the bales contained fifty pieces. I also reported to him that the Chinese landing-waiter had been struck by the go-down man; he asked me if he had any marks to show; I said I did not ask him, and I had not seen. The fourteen bales were some days after taken into the Custom-house go-down and opened, and found to contain fifty pieces; I opened one or two of the bales myself.

Sworn to before me at Her Britannic Majesty's Consulate, Shanghai, this eleventh day of August, 1862.

(Signed)

JOHN MARKHAM, *Her Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul.*

Inclosure 8 in No. 19.

Mr. Bruce to Consul Medhurst.

(Extract.)

Peking, November 3, 1862.

I HAVE had before me the papers connected with the claim of Johnson and Co. for restitution of twenty-two bales of grey shirtings confiscated by the Taoutae of Shanghai.

With respect to the merits of this particular claim, I am clearly of opinion that the circumstances of the case, and the violent conduct of the agents of Messrs. Johnson and Co., were such as not only justified the seizure of the twenty-two bales, but would have justified the seizure of the eighty bales had the Taoutae availed himself of his undoubted right to seize and confiscate them.

If the application to land had contained an error in the description of another parcel of goods, and had that error been against the merchant, there would have been evidence of an absence of fraudulent intent, and good ground would have been afforded for claiming a remission of penalty. But the statement of the offending party, that fraud

was not intended, is not sufficient ground on which to found a claim for restitution; for it is perfectly clear that unscrupulous traders would never hesitate in making a statement to that effect, when their fraudulent mis-description was discovered, and the consequence would be that the honest merchant would be exposed to an unfair competition with those who, from time to time, would succeed in eluding the vigilance of the Custom-house officers.

You will inform Messrs. Johnson and Co. that I do not consider myself at liberty to claim the restitution of their goods. It is open to them, if dissatisfied with my decision, to appeal to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to whom I will forward any statement they may wish to make.

No. 20.

Mr. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received April 13, 1863.)

My Lord,

Peking, December 24, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copies of two despatches from the Prince of Kung, with my replies thereto.

No. 1 from the Prince states the substance of a petition from the junk interest at Shanghai remonstrating against the Decree permitting the exportation in foreign bottoms of pulse and bean-cake from the northern ports, and proposing that they should not be allowed to land such cargoes at Shanghai. Had this question been debated at Shanghai, the junk interests would have succeeded in 1861 as they did in 1858 in preventing the concession. They are powerful, and their dread of competition with foreign vessels is perfectly well founded. Insurance will decide the shipper in favour of foreign vessels whenever they can be freighted. But as grain is sent up on Government account, and the tonnage required to convey it is very large, it is probable that this trade will remain in a great measure in their hands.

I do not think the Government here is much influenced by the commercial theory of protection to native industry; but it dreads very justly offending any considerable interest, and I should doubt the policy of the concession did I not think that the effects of the change will be slow and gradual. From the date of the Prince's despatch it is clear that the petition is founded not on any experience of the results of the Decree, but on the anticipation of what is likely to take place.

The despatch Inclosure No. 3 contains three proposals of his Excellency Kwanwen, the Governor-General of Hoo-kwang, intended to meet the defalcation in the inland revenue which he anticipates from the operation of the transit-duty clause. The supplies of Tseng Kwo-fan's army are in a great measure provided by Kwanwen's provinces, and a deficit in this branch would seriously affect that General's chances of success. I am in hopes notwithstanding Kwanwen's assertions, considering the great impetus to the Hankow trade given by the opening of the Yang-tze River, that the receipts of the Government will increase. But the malversation of the inland Custom-houses will be checked, and the gains of the employés will suffer, and I infer that Kwanwen's suggestions are prompted by a regard rather for their pockets than for the public purse. The officers of the Chinese Government are very badly paid, and from time immemorial have calculated on the indirect profits they are enabled to make out of their posts. The weakness of the Government in the provinces renders it necessary to proceed with great caution even in measures which will benefit the State, if they are of a nature to produce discontent among its officers. These reforms to be effected with safety must be accompanied by increased force and vigour in the Executive of China.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 20.

The Prince of Kung to Mr. Bruce.

(Translation.)

Peking, August 19, 1862.

THE Prince of Kung makes a communication.

The Prince has received a despatch from Li, Acting Governor of Kiang-su, to the effect that, in accordance with his instructions, he had directed the Commissioners of Finance and the Taoutae to give notice to the mercantile community that the restriction

on the trade in beans had been abolished in the first moon of the year (February), and that foreign merchant-vessels would be at liberty henceforth to carry and sell them; but that a petition signed by the junk owners Wang Yung-shing and others had now been presented to him through Wu Hsü, Taoutae and Superintendent of the Kiang-hai Customs, the purport of which is as follows:—"Since the interdict on trade in the northern waters was removed, the coast population have been wont to build junks and go to sea, each man, much to the advantage of some other locality, carrying and dealing in the produce for which his native place was remarkable. These have been their chief means of subsistence for upwards of two centuries, and no matter under what head aid has been called for by the State, the junk trade has ever been foremost with its contributions. In the carriage of grain by sea, for instance, the mercantile community generally do their part in finding the necessary amount of southern grain; but the transport of it to Tien-tsin devolves entirely upon the junk trade; it is no slight help to the finances of the State and the means of the people. And this is the reason why, when the Treaty was negotiated, a clause was inserted stipulating that foreign merchants should not be authorized to ship and carry the beans of New-chwang and Têng-chow; which clause has been so far the rule. The ports opened to foreigners are the marts of trade, nine-tenths of which foreign nations have already possessed themselves of. The two ports left, New-chwang and Têng-chow, are the only chance of the junk trade; and if these are caught in the net as well, the junk trade of China will be ruined at once; and with this sole way by which the coast population gain a livelihood blocked up, where is money for the army to come from now, and where will means of transporting the grain supply come from hereafter? The consequences of opening this trade to foreigners are very serious." They add, "At Tien-tsin the bean trade is not an object, for there are no beans to ship; but at Têng-chow and New-chwang foreign vessels can take good care of themselves without it, trading as they do in everything but beans. If, for some reason, it has been agreed that the bean trade shall be opened to them at all the ports, the reservation of the one port of Shanghae to the native carrier and dealer would still, to a certain extent, open one side of the net and save the native community. For this reservation, therefore, your Petitioners present their prayer, signed by their whole body; and having stated their whole case, request that it may be laid before the Throne."

The Intendant (Taoutae) who is also Superintendent of Customs, remarks on the above, that the large junks called the "sha-tan" belonging to Kiang-su and Che-kiang, in their voyages north find a variety of cargoes, but that the gross of their return cargo when they go south is beans, and that consequently the largest native trade done at Shanghae has always been the trade in beans. There is, therefore, perfect truth in the averment of the petitioners, that to put it in the power of foreigners also to ship and carry this article, would be to enable them in one morning to engross the trade on which the junk interest has been entirely dependent, that the ruin of the junk trade would be the consequence, and that this would seriously affect the questions of war supplies and the transport of grain by sea to the capital. Still the proposed modification having been duly considered, and on submission to His Majesty having received the Imperial sanction by Decree, it is scarcely possible that this should be reversed. He (the Taoutae) would therefore suggest, as a compromise, that the prayer of the petitioners should be graciously accorded; that to and from every other port foreign merchant-vessels should be allowed to trade in beans, but that at Shanghae the old agreement (or the Treaty as it was) should stand, and the carriage of beans remain in the hands of the native merchant. This would leave some ground under the feet of the Chinese merchant, and it would undoubtedly be to the advantage of the regular revenue and the voluntary contribution funds.

The Taoutae's proposition, in the opinion of the Governor, is dictated by a feeling of compassionate consideration for the Chinese merchant, and a proper regard for the means required to meet the expenditure of the army, and the transport of grain by sea, while it does not after all conflict with the relaxation of the interdict proposed (or agreed to).

The Treaty, as the Prince understands the question, refused permission to the foreign merchant to carry beans, in the first instance, because the number of native dealers who looked to this trade for a livelihood was very large. The trade was interdicted to the foreigner by Treaty, because his participation in it would have been detrimental to the business by which the native dealer subsisted himself. At a subsequent period his Excellency the British Minister wrote to represent that beans were an article of (comparatively speaking) so little value that it was impossible foreign merchants should hope to monopolise the trade, and that shipment of it would be only made by them in order that their ships might not return southward in ballast. The Prince, as it will be remembered, thereupon addressed a memorial to His Majesty the Emperor, who was pleased to authorise the trade by decree. But his Highness, having now perused the petition nume-

rously signed by the junk trade, the paper presented through the Taoutae to his Excellency Li, Governor of Kiang-su, and by him transmitted to the Prince, is of opinion that the case of the junk-owners is one thoroughly deserving of commiseration, and that in accordance with their humble request while the bean trade is left open to foreigners at all the other ports, at Shanghae the old agreement (or the Treaty as it stood) should stand, and the carriage of beans be reserved to the native dealer; that so in some degree some ground may remain to the Chinese merchant, while northern bound foreign vessels, having still the right to carry beans to all ports but Shanghae, would be spared the inconvenience of having to return south without cargoes.

It is the duty of the Prince to make this communication to the British Minister, and he will be obliged to his Excellency for an early reply.

A necessary communication.

Inclosure 2 in No. 20.

Mr. Bruce to the Prince of Kung.

Sir, Peking, December 12, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of a despatch from your Imperial Highness stating the substance of a petition from certain owners of junks, remonstrating against the removal of the restriction against the shipment of pulse and bean-cake in foreign vessels, and recommending that foreign vessels with such cargoes on board should not be permitted to discharge them at Shanghae.

I must observe, on this proposal, that its effect would be to neutralize, in great measure, the advantages of the permission accorded last winter by your Imperial Highness, for the trade in imports to the Northern ports is conducted chiefly from Shanghae, and the and the vessels employed in it ship pulse and bean-cake as a return cargo. It is therefore impossible for me to consent to the present proposal.

The Trade Returns for the year not having as yet been forwarded to me, I am unable to test the correctness of the statements in the petition as to the effect of the removal of the restriction on the junk trade; and I may remark that the petition is no evidence on the subject, for it must have been drawn up early in the season, and before the effects of the change could have made themselves manifest. Considering, however, that the foreign trade on the coast is passing every year more and more into steam-vessels—a class of ships which cannot be employed profitably in carrying articles of such bulk and of so little value as pulse and bean-cake—I am not disposed to admit the accuracy of the petitioners' statements.

I may remark that Her Majesty's navy effectually prevented the insurgents, while in possession of Ningpo and Chapoo, from fitting out naval expeditions against the North; and that Captain Dew, at the request of the Chinese authorities, has lately destroyed a piratical fleet of 200 vessels which was levying tribute on the Islands of Chusan, and would have co-operated willingly with the Tae-pings. I regret, therefore, that the present proposal should have been brought forward, as the moment is ill-chosen for an attempt to deprive us indirectly of an advantage given to us only a twelvemonth ago.

I avail, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 20.

The Prince of Kung to Mr. Bruce.

(Translation.)

Peking, October 18, 1862.

THE Prince of Kung makes a communication.

In the regulations forwarded by his Excellency Kwanwen, Governor-General of Hu Kwang, for the general regulation of trade on the Yang-tze-kiang, there were three, namely, the 11th, 12th, and 13th, affecting the levy of transit duties, and which, as they slightly modify the present regulations of the Customs (or in force at the different Custom-houses), he has requested His Highness to submit to his Excellency the British Minister.

It becomes the Prince's duty to forward a copy of these three regulations as a supplement to the list already communicated, and His Highness will be obliged to the British Minister to inform him whether there be in them anything objectionable.

A necessary communication.

Inclosure 4 in No. 20.

Précis of Three Articles to Regulate the Collection of Transit Duties up the Yang-tze Kiang.

(Translation.)

ARTICLE 11. Proposed that certificates of transit duties on goods passing through Hu-peh and Hu-nan should be issued only at the Kiang-han kwan (Hankow Customs); on goods in Kiang-si and An-hwui, only at Kiu-kiang; on goods in Kiang-su only at the Kiang-hai kwan (Shanghai Customs). These two additional articles, to a certain extent, would modify (the Treaty condition) so as to facilitate its operation.

Art. 12. Merchants desiring to carry imports either in their own custody or that of a foreign agent from the port of entry, have issued to them by the Customs of that port a certificate that the Customs have inspected the goods, as particularised in the application, and that they are bound for such a point. This certificate the merchant produces at the Customs Receiving Office, and having paid into it the half Tariff duty due on the goods, presents its receipt for the money to the Customs, who thereon issue to the applicant a note (or pass) which enables the merchant to carry his goods, free of war tax, to the point specified in his application, no matter how distant this may be from the port. But the merchant is not obliged to take out this certificate at all, and goods going into the country, if not covered by such a certificate, become liable, whether in charge of foreigner or native, to the operation of the (local) laws already in force under which the war taxes are imposed. If, therefore, a foreign merchant, having already disposed of his goods to a native merchant, shall obtain a certificate by fraudulently representing the goods to be his own, the goods shall, on discovery of the fraud, be confiscated; and whereas, at the present moment, military requirements produce a pressing demand for funds, the Customs above enumerated have moved (his Excellency Kwanwen or His Highness the Prince) to notify that the following distinctions will be made between foreign and native goods:—broad cloth, camlets, clocks and watches, shirtings, foreign wood, such articles being *bonâ fide* foreign, can be covered by transit certificate; but sea-weed and other articles which are produced in China, as well as abroad, shall, for the present, not be so covered.

Art. 13. Any foreign merchant desiring to bring down produce to an open port either in his own charge or in that of a foreign Agent, can apply through his Consul to the Customs for a certificate. The merchant states in his note where he is going and what produce he wants to buy, and the Customs, on receipt of the Consul's application, forward to him for the merchant a triplicate certificate and a blank pass. The merchant takes these to the interior, and having purchased his produce submits it to the inspection of the first barrier it has to pass, and deposits there one of the triplicate certificates, on the face of which is entered the quantity of produce purchased. The barrier enters on his pass the amount of his produce, seals it, and returns it to the merchant, who is then authorized to proceed. When he arrives at the barrier nearest his port he produces his pass, and the amount of his produce being found to correspond with the entry, he clears it of the transit duty at the Custom-house of his port, and then takes it past the barrier.

Should the produce be unaccompanied by a transit certificate, it must pay the war tax charges imposed by the rules already in force at every barrier it has to pass.

But whereas oil, grain, and timber are articles consumed by the poorer classes, and there would be consequently much embarrassment attending the transit of these, it is proposed to issue no passes for them, and to punish any Chinese and any linguist who may combine with him in demanding a pass for the same, besides confiscating the goods.

Inclosure 5 in No. 20.

Mr. Bruce to the Prince of Kung.

Sir,

Peking, December 22, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of the despatch from your Imperial Highness containing three regulations proposed by his Excellency Kwanwen affecting the levy of transit duties.

It appears to me, after mature consideration, that these proposals are in fact a curtailment of the privileges secured by Treaty to Her Majesty's subjects. I have little doubt, now that there is a Custom-house opened at Han-kow, that merchants who wish to export the produce of those provinces will take out their certificates at Han-kow, and bring it down to shipment at that port. If, hitherto, transit certificates have been taken out at

Shanghai for that purpose, this inconvenient method was resorted to because the Han-kow authorities refused to grant the facilities which by Treaty they were bound to afford.

The object his Excellency Kwanwen has in view will now, therefore, in great measure be attained; but looking to the disturbed state of the country, and the possibility of the road between the producing districts and Han-kow being intercepted, I cannot agree to a regulation which might prevent the merchant from availing himself of the safest route to another Treaty port.

I must remark that two of the regulations proposed by his Excellency are open to serious objection, both as being inconsistent with Treaty rights and as leading to endless embarrassment. The Chinese and foreign merchants, if it is for their interest to carry imported goods under certificate into the interior, can always arrange the transaction in such a way as to make it impossible to prove that the goods are not foreign property, and the attempt to seize them will lead to constant disputes and claims which will far outweigh any advantages to be derived from it.

I am also convinced that his Excellency's fears as to the decrease of the revenue will prove unfounded, and that if he will direct his efforts to facilitate and develop the export trade in oil, wood, &c., which has sprung up since Han-kow has been opened to commerce and the highway of the river rendered accessible to shipping, your Imperial Highness will find that the Imperial and local revenue will largely benefit. The half-transit duty and the full export duty are quite as heavy an imposition as such articles will bear without giving rise to smuggling and corruption, and the advantage of the certificate system is that the Government has in its hands the means of verifying that the full amount of duty has been really received; whereas, I know positively that the system of levying heavy duties at different inland barriers leads to evasion, and to corrupt compromises between the trader and the revenue officers, to the great prejudice of the revenue and to the serious detriment of the State; for every smuggler is an ally to the insurgents.

I am, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

No. 21.

Mr. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received April 13.)

My Lord,

Peking, January 3, 1863.

THE Chamber of Commerce at Hong Kong having addressed me on the subject of a complaint by Messrs. Scott and Co. against a decision of Her Majesty's Consul at Canton, I have replied in the inclosure, stating my reasons for not entertaining a complaint unless it is forwarded by the aggrieved party himself.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure in No. 21.

Mr. Bruce to the Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce, Hong Kong

Sir,

Peking, November 29, 1862.

I HAVE received the letter which as Secretary to the Chamber of Commerce you have addressed to me, on the subject of Messrs. Adam Scott and Co.'s complaint on account of duty charged on re-exported goods.

I am very glad to hear from the Chamber of Commerce on all general questions connected with the Treaties with China, and their operation; and such practical suggestions as may be made by that body will always meet with my most careful consideration.

But when there is a case of complaint which, if well-founded, may be the foundation of a claim for redress against this Government, I cannot proceed in the matter unless the document containing the substance of the complaint is made and signed by the complainant himself, and is transmitted to me through the Consul, in order that he may make such observations on it as he may think fit. In this way the delay of reference may be avoided, and I may be enabled to pronounce a definitive decision at once.

As I do not feel at liberty to deal with this case without a previous report from Mr. Consul Robertson, I have to request that Messrs. Adam Scott may forward to me, through him, a remonstrance against his decision, in the usual manner.

I am, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

No. 22:

Mr. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received April 13.)

My Lord,

Peking, January 4, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to forward translation of a despatch from the Prince of Kung, by which your Lordship will see that the Chinese Government have adopted a national flag, for which they claim the same privilege as that accorded to other nations.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure in No. 22.

The Prince of Kung to Mr. Bruce.

(Translation.)

Peking, October 22, 1862.

THE Prince of Kung makes a communication.

It is the usage of foreign vessels to fly a national ensign, so easily recognized that a glance suffices to show, at any distance, that such or such a vessel is a Government vessel, and the removal of this ensign is prohibited.

The war-vessels of China have flags which enable them to be distinguished; and to those already in use there is now to be added a "Dragon Ensign." The flag will be three-cornered. That carried by large vessels will measure ten Chinese feet in the perpendicular; that of small vessels seven or eight Chinese feet; its length along its other sides may be varied at discretion. The ground will be yellow, and on this will be designed a dragon, with his head toward the upper part of the flag. This will, to a certain extent, make the flag recognizable the moment it is seen.

The proposal having been submitted to the Throne, His Imperial Majesty has issued a Decree instructing the naval forces of all the provinces to adopt it; and the Prince trusts that the British Minister will forthwith signify to the officers of the British navy in different parts of the Empire, and to all British vessels, that whenever they meet the above-described "Dragon Ensign," they are to regard it as the Government flag of China; that, as with foreign flags, the removal of it is an unauthorized proceeding; that if it be removed (the offender) will be punished for violation of the rule (*lit.*, steps will be taken as in the case of violation of prohibitions); and that no matter what the cause of quarrel, or what the rights of the question, the violation of the prohibition must be severely punished before any further discussion.

The Prince hopes the British Minister will issue most positive instructions on this subject.

A necessary communication, addressed to the Hon. Mr. Bruce, &c.

Tung-chih, 1st year, intercalary 8th moon, 29th day (October 22, 1862).

No. 23.

Mr. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received April 13.)

My Lord,

Peking, January 6, 1863.

I REQUEST your Lordship's instructions on the XLVIIth Article of the Treaty of Tien-tsin.

The following case has arisen:—A British lorch (schooner) took in a cargo of salt at Chin-chew, a port not opened by Treaty, and proceeded with it to the port of Foo-chow-foo. The Chinese authorities claim the right to confiscate vessel and cargo under the Treaty. The Consul disputes it, and he is sustained by the Attorney-General of Hong Kong, on the ground that the vessel is not liable to confiscation unless she is seized in the act of trading at the port itself at which by Treaty she is not entitled to trade.

I do not agree with this construction, as I conceive that the vessel is committing a breach of the Article, and is liable to the penalty as long as she continues with the cargo on board, and attempts to dispose of it in China. This description of trade deserves no favour. It is carried on chiefly by lorchas, which craft are the cause of almost all our difficulties on the coast. They are generally owned by Hong Kong or Singapore Chinese, who assume a Chinese or British character as it suits them. They call them-

selves Chinese to evade the restrictions of the British Treaty, and British to evade what they call "squeezes," that is to say, the payment of dues levied on Chinese traders.

Should the opinion of the Attorney-General prevail, either the object of the Article, namely, the suppression of this illegal trade, will be defeated, to the detriment of our reputation for good faith, or collisions will take place between the clandestine traders and the Chinese authorities. It appears to me indefensible in argument to say that a vessel taking in a cargo at a prohibited place may be seized, but that if she is found with it on board taking that cargo to another Chinese port she cannot be seized; for such is the view maintained by the Attorney-General.

If we wish to avoid collisions and misunderstandings, we must act on the broad principle that when a vessel deliberately breaks the Treaty by going to a place she ought not to trade at, she forfeits all claim to protection.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

No. 24.

Mr. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received April 13.)

(Extract.)

Peking, January 20, 1863.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 22nd of November last,* on the Regulations of Trade on the Yang-tze River, I have the honour to inclose an article from the "China Mail," to which I beg to call your Lordship's particular attention.

I may observe that, before Great Britain abandons entirely the policy hitherto pursued in China, which has led to the execution of Treaties between it and foreign Powers, it will be necessary either to obtain the assent of the Chinese Government to the proposed change, or at least to have the same system adopted by the other Treaty Powers; for if the latter were to object, they would encourage the Chinese Government to confine British traders within the limits enforced by the general Treaties, and collisions would infallibly take place. Great Britain is not the only country from which a foreign element could be drawn to re-organize the executive branches of Chinese administration; and I am at a loss to discover on what ground it can be maintained that the Chinese Government is not at liberty to employ foreigners in its service, if it chooses. Russia, if I am not mistaken, owes much of her progress to the foreigners taken into her service by Peter the Great and his successors; and I think the Chinese are sufficiently aware of the advantages they can derive from this foreign aid, not to forego it.

No doubt, if the Chinese Executive were to continue in its former condition, the proposed policy would be favourable to the interests of the large houses in China, for their command of capital would give them a decided advantage, and they would conduct their trading operations in expensive vessels, heavily armed, which would overawe opposition. But this monopoly would not be beneficial to the manufacturing interests of Great Britain, and the calculations of its promoters will be defeated if the Chinese are in possession of a naval force. Supposing that they were able, in defiance of it, to carry on a clandestine trade at small places along the coast, they would be debarred, without difficulty, all access to the rivers and large ports. It is not worth while, however, to discuss a scheme which is only put forward to justify, by establishing an exceptional state of affairs, proceedings which, in ordinary cases, would be treated simply as smuggling and as breaches of Treaties. The result of this doctrine, and of the acts to which it gives rise, is to convey to the Chinese Government the impression that foreign merchants observe no rule or restriction, unless it is supported by force; and as I have to explain that we cannot employ our force to prevent these illegal acts, the Chinese Government feels that the organization of an efficient preventive service is indispensable.

It is of importance that the Yang-tze trade should be conducted so as not to diminish the Chinese revenue, as the extension of the privilege to other ports than those of Hankow and Kiu-kiang will depend materially on the financial results of this partial experiment.

I trust your Lordship will cause the article of the "China Mail" on the Yang-tze trade to be published. It is an admirable exposition of what trade will become if regulations are not observed, and of the motives which prompt opposition to our attempts to re-organize the Chinese administration, and it points out the improved position England will occupy when it is seen that she has faithfully and honestly made use of her position at Peking to do good to China as well as to herself.

* See "Papers relating to the Rebellion in China," presented to Parliament in March 1863, No. 102.

Extract from the "China Mail" of December 11, 1862.

THE YANG-TZE TRADE.—Our contemporary the "Shanghai Recorder," in his issue of the 29th ultimo, draws attention to the Revised Regulations for Trade on the Yang-tze River. We may say at the outset, with regard to this new journal, that it gives decided promise of being conducted in a manner that will not discredit journalism in this part of the East. As a centre for political intelligence, Shanghai will always hold a position in China, and at present its proximity to the theatre of war (for by no other name can the existing disorders be designated), renders it still more important as a medium of intelligence between the Empire of China and the nations of the West. We therefore quote freely, with due acknowledgments, from the Shanghai press, and it is only due to the "Recorder" to say that it has already increased our means of information. We therefore speak with perfect respect of our contemporary when we say that his remarks on "the Revised Regulations" indicate that the Chinese question does not seem to be entirely understood by him. We may be wrong, and the line of argument adopted by the "Recorder" may be the result of mature deliberation after a thorough investigation of all the facts in the rise and progress of foreign relations with the Celestial Empire. To say, as our contemporary does, that "China is not for the Chinese alone, but for the commonwealth of man," is merely to utter a general truism in one sense of the proposition. In another sense, however, it is to propound a principle which only opens the door to aggression and injustice. On the one hand, if we interpret the proposition "China is not for the Chinese alone, but for the commonwealth of man," in the same sense as we should interpret such a phrase as "A man should not live for himself alone," we merely express a great moral duty that pertains to a nation or to an individual. The truth of the proposition no one will be at the trouble to question. But the fulfilment of the duty referred to is one that rests with the individual or the nation alone, and for which either is accountable solely to the Moral Governor of the universe. With the omission of such duties by men or nations we have absolutely nothing to do. But there is a dangerous sense in which our contemporary's proposition may be understood, a sense under which acts of injustice and inhumanity have been perpetrated in China already, and may be again, if we resume such principles of action. Our contemporary is too honest to leave us in doubt as to the sense in which he desires his proposition to be understood. A return to the old state of affairs which existed before Treaties were framed for the regulation of trade is what he desires—a right to trade at any part of the coast whatever, and settle terms as to import duties with the local mandarins. This we know to mean that foreign trade shall be subject to no rules and to no supervision. We are sorry that we cannot compliment our countrymen on the mode in which, when beyond supervision and uncontrolled by rules, they have heretofore conducted their trading operations in China. From the captain and crew who did not scruple to bombard a village and hold it to ransom, up to the largest mercantile firm that did its business with the minimum amount of violence and the maximum amount of profit, China trade presented in former days a sorry spectacle to the world generally. Whether the "Recorder" is aware of it or not we cannot tell, but it is pretty well known how terms are made with the local mandarins in places not open by Treaty to foreign trade. The local authorities are very glad to get any terms they can from a well-armed vessel of English build; and we scarcely think that an intimate acquaintance with the past history of such a traffic would greatly strengthen our contemporary's arguments for its resumption; or, if what he says be true, for its continuance. He tells us, on good enough authority we suppose, that at this moment, in the Yang-tze River, "a very large and lucrative trade in smuggled goods is actually carried on." He laments bitterly that the new Regulations provide for the services of revenue cruisers: he asks fretfully what a Chinese revenue cruiser is; how it is to be distinguished; how many times a day it may stop a vessel; who is to remunerate the shipowners for loss of time, tide and wind; and what is to be done to the captain who deliberately runs down a revenue cruiser or pitches a revenue officer over the side. Though he thus assumes great efficiency on the part of the Chinese Revenue Service, he elsewhere seeks to enforce his arguments by attributing great inefficiency to the Chinese Government in their Preventive Service. That is to say, he first blames the Government for having no Preventive Service, and then he complains because they are about to get one. The following extract will show what we mean:—

"The Manchou Government possesses no adequate means of enforcing its regulations; and were those regulations systematically set at defiance, it could no more close the Yang-tze than it could close the Thames. But, moreover, it would appear that it has never entered the minds of those who guide Chinese affairs to calculate what is the

minimum bribe for which a native official will wink at the maximum infringement of rules arbitrarily laid down. How few vessels have been seized within the last year on the Yang-tsze while engaged in a prohibited trade, and yet we cannot close our eyes to the fact, that in spite of custom-houses, revenue cutters, and all the other preventive paraphernalia, a very large and very lucrative trade in smuggled goods is actually carried on."

This is plain enough: "in spite of custom-houses, revenue cutters, and all the other preventative paraphernalia" (the last phrase is rather obscure), "a very large and a very lucrative trade in smuggled goods is actually carried on."

If the Manchou Government is railed at for possessing "no adequate means of enforcing its regulations," why should it, in the same breath, be railed at for taking steps to provide "adequate means," in the shape of the revenue cruisers whose advent our contemporary laments in exact proportion to their prospective efficiency? There is no middle course between having Rules for the regulation of trade, with Consuls to see those Rules enforced, and the throwing open of every creek on the coast of China to the mercy of lawless buccaneers, or large firms of every nation. If our merchants expect protection for themselves, their property, and their agents, they must adhere to the terms of the Treaty under which we can demand that protection on their behalf; but if they insist on doing a very lucrative trade in smuggled goods on the plea that there is no preventative service of an efficient sort, they must not complain if the Emperor, with our advice and assistance, provides a fleet of cruisers that can neither be bribed by dollars nor frightened by big guns. Our contemporary, however, is not, in the present instance, we should hope, the exponent of a wide-spread feeling.

The present course now adopted by the authorities of Peking was spoken of so far back as 1859, and felt to be necessary in order to render the Customs scheme complete. The merchants and others among whom the idea of a Foreign Customs Collectorate originated, have always urged the necessity of an efficient Preventative Service in order to complete the scheme and render it effective for the purpose intended. It is even affirmed that a fleet of cruisers, each capable of giving a good account of the largest smuggling vessel now afloat in Chinese waters, would have been had from England though no rebellion had ever existed. The opinion here and elsewhere certainly is, that Sherard Osborn's fleet is for service against the rebels, and would never have been organized but for that purpose. We have reasons for doubting this: the idea of such a fleet has long been in existence, and the presence in England of a high officer of Foreign Customs is the first good opportunity that has offered for carrying out the idea, on to which that of warfare has undoubtedly been engrafted. Be that as it may, the new Regulations for trade on the Yang-tze show that operations against Nanking, if they be undertaken by Captain Osborn's fleet of gunboats, are not expected to absorb all his attention: it seems to be assumed that he will be able to spare time for the supervision of the river trade. There is even a likelihood of Captain Osborn's fleet being used to prevent unlawful trading on the coast, as well as in the river.

It must be confessed that England has begun to build up in China much of what she threw down by her earlier policy. She is determined, at least, that future wars with China shall not arise out of mercantile embroilments, where it is difficult to affirm positively who is most in the wrong; she is determined, too, that if the English nation is, to its loss, represented in China by a class who do not scruple to carry on "a very large and lucrative trade in smuggled goods," it shall also be represented by those who will endeavour to turn the national revenues into their legitimate channel, and see that the Treaties are observed and our own countrymen controlled.

Let China be as faithless towards us as she may, we shall at least be able, when another collision takes place, to challenge the criticism of neutral nations as to the undeviating faithfulness with which we have performed our portion of the Treaty, and wrought for the interests of the Empire.

No. 25.

Mr. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received April 13.)

My Lord,

Peking, January 26, 1863.

THE Chinese Government has issued the accompanying Decree of amnesty.

I have strong reasons for believing that disunion and discontent prevail among the Tae-ping bands, and that numbers, including some of the principal leaders, would abandon the cause if they believed that their lives would be spared.

Were the Treaty Powers to guarantee it, an amnesty would be largely embraced; but

there are, in my opinion, insuperable objections to guaranteeing pardon from molestation to such a class of men as the Tae-pings are. It is not to be expected that the brigands and pirates to be found in their ranks will abandon entirely their criminal pursuits. To prevent their punishment, if they really committed crimes hereafter, would disorganize the country; and to distinguish between a real and a vindictive case against an ex-rebel is a task no foreign Minister can perform.

I am not without hopes, however, that this Decree—issued by the present Administration, and alluding with approbation to the course Tseng Kwo-fan has already pursued—may be productive of good effects, and it will enable foreign officers in the Chinese service to prevent local officers from putting to death deserters.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure in No. 25.

Imperial Decree.

(Translation.)

ON the 1st day of the 12th moon of the 1st year of the reign of Tung-Chih (19th January, 1863), the Grand Secretariat had the honour to receive the following Imperial Decree:—

“While, on the one hand, ever since the war in the provinces began, orders have been issued to the military to go forth and extinguish utterly the cause of that terrible disorder, the venomous influence of which was inflicting cruel suffering upon the people; upon the other, with equal frequency have Decrees from the Throne enjoined upon the Generals conducting the different campaigns the duty of greatly compassionating those who, constrained by the rebels to join them against the Government, had been thrust upon the spears of the army in the capacity forced upon them of counterfeit (*sc.*, rebel) officials; and they, the Generals, have been instructed that if any would bring over a number of their fellows to their allegiance, they should be allowed to reform themselves (unharmd).

“And accordingly, whenever a report has been forwarded from any of the armies in the field that certain from among the rebels have rescued themselves and have returned to their allegiance, we have in all instances forgiven them the past, and have considered how best to place them in comfort (or, security); nor has any one who, when our forces appeared before it, surrendered a city, or who, after returning to his allegiance has done us service by destroying the enemy, been left without a liberal reward immediately bestowed.

“So was it with Hung Sung-hai and those who with him brought over, at a moment’s notice, a large number of followers, and surrendered a city. Their past offence was forgiven them, their merit was recorded, they were liberally recompensed. Thus was our graciousness made manifest; nor can there be any of our people, even of those who are still in the hands of the rebels, who have not seen this and heard it.

“It is but too possible at the same time that our officers and troops do not second as they should the goodly purpose of the Emperor, whose desire it is that man should live, and that when those who are in extremity would present themselves to tender their submission, they in some cases notwithstanding meet with a violent death.

“Tsêng Kwo-fan, Li Hung-chang, and Tso Tsung-tang, are at the head of large forces to destroy the rebels in the Kiang Provinces and Cheh-kiang; the terror of their arms fills the rebels with consternation. Those in Nanking are in extreme difficulty, and very shortly when the troops shall have invested the city on all sides, it will fall without further trouble.

“Now, inasmuch as there are in that city, fallen as it were between fire and water, a number (it is to be feared no few) of our subjects, who though serving the rebels with no good will, but forced by them to act, may yet be unable to rescue themselves from them, let Tsêng Kwo-fan and his colleagues declare by proclamation that if any one now constrained to grow his hair and to take part in repelling the force engaged in the siege of Nanking shall faithfully return before the city fall, to his allegiance, his submission shall be accepted, whether he have been a long time or only recently on the side of the rebels, and when he shall have given up his arms and horse, these high officers shall consider whether he is to remain and serve with the force under them against the rebels, following in every respect the precedent of Hung Tsung-hai; or if he prefer not to serve with the army, the local authorities shall be desired to send him to his own district, or otherwise to provide for him so that he shall not be without a home. Nor are the troops to be allowed

t despoil him of any property he may bring with him. If they plunder him, or murder him, they shall be dealt with at once as the military code requires; and if their misdeeds be not noticed and punished by those commanding them, the moment their remissness is discovered we will command the Generals their superiors to denounce them, and punish them with all possible severity.

"And if in any other quarter in Kiang-su or Cheh-kiang, at Soo-chow or Hang-chow, whether in town or country, there be any who shall kill a rebel and return to his allegiance, or who shall submit himself with his head duly shaven; we command that the same course be followed in his case, that his past be not inquired into, that he be not wantonly put to death, lest the earnest desire to return within the pale of civilization be thereby let and hindered.

"When this proclamation, which once more affectionately appeals to the people, shall have appeared, it will behove all those now constrained to adhere to the rebels to see their error, and themselves to find out a means by which their lives may be preserved. Let them not tarry till the city is stormed, when the gem and the pebble burned in the same conflagration, repentance will be too late.

"Let Tsêng Kwo-fan, Li Hung-chang and Tso Tsung-tang print this Decree upon yellow paper, and post in every direction, that men may know how great is our desire that the living may be overshadowed as with a canopy (by our goodness), and that all may be allowed to lead a new life. Respect this!"

No. 26.

Mr. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received April 13.)



My Lord,

Peking, January 26, 1863.

IN continuation of my despatches of the 10th of December and 6th of January last on the case of the "Pearl" at Foo-chow, I inclose a further despatch to Mr. Consul Sinclair on the subject.

The Prince of Kung has addressed me a letter arguing against the construction put by the Attorney-General of Hong Kong on the Article of the Tien-tsin Treaty, and begging me to submit it to your Lordship. I cannot have it translated in time to go by this opportunity, but I may say that he takes the same view of the Article as I do. Indeed, the construction put upon it by the Attorney-General is at variance with the intention of the Treaty, and cannot be reconciled with good faith in the eyes of the Chinese.

Steam is being so largely developed on the coast and on the rivers of China that I am in hopes the legitimate trade will pass out of the hands of the lorchas, &c., altogether. Nothing will conduce so much to peaceful relations as the disappearance of this class of vessels, and I therefore recommend that no protection be given to them when they engage in clandestine trade.

I have, &c.

(Signed) **FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.**

Inclosure in No. 26.

Mr. Bruce to Consul Sinclair.

Sir,

Peking, January 24, 1863.

WHERE a vessel is engaged in a trade prohibited by Treaty, the clearest evidence must be adduced by the owner, if he tries to defend the proceeding by establishing in her favour an exceptional case.

The "Pearl" was bound, therefore, to have produced when she entered the port of Foo-chow, the permission of a competent Chinese authority to carry salt, and this document ought, on the face of it, to have shown that it was given to her as a British vessel; for I cannot allow that individuals of Chinese extraction, whether subjects of the British settlements at Hong Kong or Singapore, are to take advantage of their origin so as at one and the same time to evade restrictions put upon British trade by Treaty, by representing themselves as Chinese, and then to evade what they call the exactions of the Chinese authorities by claiming British protection.

I am, therefore, of opinion that the document given by the Tung-an authority was not sufficient to save the "Pearl" from the consequences of the breach of Treaty committed

by her in trading at a port not open by Treaty, and in bringing a prohibited cargo to Foo-chow; for it does not state that it was issued to a British-owned vessel, and it gives the Chinese and not the British name of the craft.

I have to instruct you to execute strictly the Treaty in the matter of clandestine and prohibited trade, particularly as against lorchas and small sailing-craft engaged in the coasting trade. The class of men who sail these vessels, and their lawless and violent proceedings, make peaceful progress difficult, and do much to keep up a feeling of alarm and aversion to foreigners among the authorities and the population of China. You must be aware from your experience at Ningpo that it is the employment to be found in these vessels which keeps up the class of lawless foreign adventurers which infests the ports, and is the hot-bed of crime on the coasts of China.

I have also to observe that the Chinese Government in employing foreigners in its Custom-house is doing what foreign Powers have advised her to do, and following a system of improvement which in other countries has led to the best results. I expect Her Majesty's Consuls to set an example to foreign communities of treating with respect the gentlemen who hold these important offices, and who are not inferior to them either in character or social position. It is your duty in this way to strengthen their influence with the Chinese provincial authorities, as it is to that influence that we must look for the peaceful execution of Treaty privileges, and for the gradual introduction of progressive ideas into Chinese administration which will enable us to accommodate its maxims to the growing development of trade.

I am, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

No. 27.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(Received April 15.)

Sir,

Admiralty, April 13, 1863.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith for the information of Earl Russell, an extract from a letter dated the 25th February last from Rear-Admiral Kuper, reporting the state of affairs in China.

I am, &c.
(Signed) C. PAGET.

Inclosure in No. 27.

Rear-Admiral Kuper to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

(Extract.)

February 25, 1863.

AFFAIRS in the north of China generally continue in a satisfactory state, although I have heard from private sources, since my last report, that a body of Ward's Chinese troops, destined for the capture of Tai-tsan, had met with a repulse near that town, suffering considerably in killed and wounded, and losing one or two guns.

The official report of this reverse has not yet reached me.

His Excellency Colonel de Raasloff, Danish Minister, has passed through Hong Kong on his way to Shanghai, in furtherance of the object of his mission to the Court of Peking.

No. 28.

Consul Medhurst to Earl Russell.—(Received April 17.)

My Lord,

Shanghai, February 22, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy of a despatch addressed by me, under this date, to Sir F. W. A. Bruce.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 1 in No. 28.

Consul Medhurst to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Shanghai, February 22, 1863.

THE expedition reported in my despatch dated the 31st ultimo as being about to start with the intention of reducing the rebel position of Tai-tsan has been repulsed, and with such severe loss to the attacking party in officers, men, guns, and material, that the attempt has had to be given up for the present, and the force brought back to head-quarters at Sung-kiang.

I inclose a newspaper narrative of the affair which gives, I believe, a fair account of what occurred.

This is the first severe reverse sustained by the "Ever-victorious Brigade," as Ward's force is officially designated, and it is the more unfortunate in that it has happened in this their first action since the force was placed under military command, and its general condition and discipline improved under the new arrangement.

I have not heard General Staveley or Captain Holland give an opinion as to the cause of defeat, but report seems to be clear in attributing it to a mistake as to the nature of a moat that had to be crossed at the last moment, and not to any failure on the part of the men, who appear to have behaved with proper coolness and courage both at the onset and afterwards in the equally dangerous retreat.

Immediately on the receipt of the news here General Staveley despatched a suitable force of regulars to Kahding, to protect that point in case the Tae-pings should push on after the retreating Imperialists. They did not, however, venture beyond their own lines, and the force was returned to Shanghai, after patrolling the country in two or three directions beyond Kahding. They found no Tae-pings in the open country on this side the River Liu-ho, and the Imperialists were left strongly posted at Wyconsin, just outside of Kahding, and between that town and Tai-tsan.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 2 in No. 28.

Newspaper Extract.

EXPEDITION OF THE SUNG-KIANG TROOPS UNDER GENERAL HOLLAND AGAINST TAIT-SAN, AND THEIR DEFEAT BY THE TAE-PING REBELS.

(From our own Correspondent.)

AT daybreak on the morning of the 10th February, the rain, which had been pouring down all night, began gradually to clear away, until about 9 o'clock, when the first artillery boat left Sung-kiang, it had almost ceased. After proceeding about a mile up the creek the leading boats halted to allow the remainder of the convoy and the troops to assemble. A little before 11 the leading column issued from the North Gate, and half-an-hour later the whole force was in movement along the right bank of the creek towards Pao-kiang. It was only when beholding the whole expedition assembled that one realized how large a force Soon-kiang was able to send into the field. This is the largest expedition that has yet left the city; it consisted of more than 2,500 men, all well armed and equipped, besides 22 pieces of cannon, with abundance of ammunition. The boats contained ample supplies of pork, rice, fire-wood, cooking apparatus, tents, scaling-ladders, and even lanterns; in short, all requirements had been fully provided for. The following is a list of the guns:—

2	8-inch mortars,	200 shells.	
4	5½ ditto,	300 shells.	
4	32-pounders,	200 shot and 200 shell.	
10	12-pound howitzers	} 200 round shot and shell.	
2	4-2.5 ditto		

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There were 700 artillerymen to work them.

Many delays took place during the first day's march, in consequence of the number of broken bridges found. However, as the precaution had been taken to bring portable bridges, made of planks lashed across bamboo ladders, they offered no serious impediment to our progress. The horses and ponies had, of course, to swim such creeks as were not

fordable, the bridges being too slight to bear their weight. Earthworks had been thrown up alongside of many of the broken bridges, showing that the rebels had evidently once had an idea of defending them. Just as it was getting dark, another of these impassable creeks was encountered, and as no sign of village could be seen as far as the eye could reach, the order was given to halt for the night. There was no shelter, we were in the middle of an open grassy plain, and it was really admirable to see the cheerful manner in which the men, who had been marching from about 10 in the morning, set about collecting grass to light fires, rolling themselves up in their single blanket for a night's rest.

Those who had been able to sleep through the cold frosty night were roused at daybreak on the following morning by the sound of bugle and drum, and all were soon busily engaged in cooking their breakfasts. Some of the cargo-boats containing the 32-pounders had not been able to get past a broken bridge at the foot of the Pu-ka-say hills, about a mile below the halting ground. However, this morning, some of the coolies stripped, got into the water and passed ropes round the sunken blocks of granite, which were hauled by main force out of the way. The remainder of the boats came up about 8 o'clock, and by half-past the whole force was on the move for Pao-kiong, which was now about ten miles off. A little the other side of Sung-ku we marched over the battlefield of the Imperialists, and entered Pao-kiong about half-past 2. After passing over the fine stone bridge leading into Pao-kiong the troops turned to their right, leaving the town, into an open space, where each company, as it came up, formed column and piled arms. The men then fell out and brought their tents, which they pitched in the intervals between the rows. The boats did not arrive till about half-past 3; but by five o'clock the tents were pitched, fire-places built, fires lighted, and rations in the boilers (two of which were served out to each company). The rations for each company of 100 men were two bags of rice and half a pig. The tents are good serviceable ones, and tolerably large, made after a French pattern. Four are allowed to each company.

Early on the morning of the 12th we were again *en route*. The previous evening several of the boats were sent on to Sung-kiang-ku to help form a bridge over the creek, which is there of great breadth, so that when we reached it, at 8 A.M., no delay occurred. The bridge had been formed just to the west of some stockades. The mandarin in command of the Imperialists there had given all his war-junks, sixteen in number, which were moored side by side; a large junk moored stem and stern, and seven of General Holland's boats, completed the communication. After filing over this bridge the troops turned on to the road, which here leaves the creek. It leads through En-din to Wong-cha-dza. The boats reached Sung-kiang-ku as soon as the troops, and immediately pushed on, without waiting till the crossing was effected, as they had much further to go (on account of the winding of the creek). My boatman could not at first be induced to move beyond this point; but finding entreaty not of much avail, he at last went on with the rest. At half-past 11 the boats reached a point where a small creek branches off to the west towards En-din. Here the Imperialists have lately constructed four large stockades, in which 1,100 men are encamped; half of these accompanied us to Tai-tsan. The head mandarin was anxious to know whether any European troops were going to join in the attack. He said he had not been much troubled with the rebels lately, as they had nearly all retired to Tai-tsan, Quin-san, and Soo-chow.

At Wong-cha-dza there were about 3,000 Imperialists, who had entrenched themselves strongly within stockades. There may have been more, but it was impossible to get any information on the subject from the Imperialist soldiers; and when I inquired of the mandarin he replied first one thing and then another, till having no other subterfuge left, he wound up by saying he did not know. Rebel spies appear to be dealt tolerably severely with, and the head of one was hanging up with a warning written over it. All along the line of march from Wong-cha-dza, I had noticed a number of stockades on the left, and on arriving at Wy-con-sin I went out to inspect them. There were nine of them, garrisoned by some 5,000 of the Footae's men, some of whom are armed with muskets and bayonets. They threw them up about four days ago, when they arrived from Lu-tu-chow, where they had been expecting us, as they thought we should march on Tai-tsan by way of the Lee-ho creek. But this means of access has been blocked up by the rebels. Directly the mandarins heard of the arrival of our force, a body-guard was ordered off to Kahding to escort thence the Footae's brother. The men composing this body-guard are all fine fellows, well-dressed and armed with muskets. Their pay is a trifle more than four taels a month, but they are frequently in arrears. It was arranged so that, as soon as Holland advanced on Tai-tsan, this force should march in a north-westerly direction between the latter city and Quin-san; as it would thus protect our left flank and cut off the rebels, in case Tai-tsan had been taken and they had endeavoured to retreat on Quin-san: but they afterwards accompanied us to Tai-tsan.

It rained early on the following morning, but a breeze springing up from the northwest, it cleared towards 8 o'clock; and it was determined to march on Tai-tsan without further delay. A good road runs from Wy-con-sin along the bank of the creek towards Tai-tsan. Soon after the troops got clear of the Imperialist stockades, they formed up beside the road and waited till the boats came up, and the whole force then moved on together toward Tai-tsan, for about three and a half miles; but after that the creek diverges to the right and winds a good deal, so that the boats were some distance behind when the troops halted, about a mile from Tai-tsan, to enable them to come up. In the meantime, the Imperialists also began to arrive with a grand blowing of trumpets and display of flags. Some of these were sent into a neighbouring village to get doors, windows, tables, &c., to form a bridge over the creek which here intercepted our further advance. A little distance the other side of this creek, the rebels had constructed a stockade, and as we could not yet get at it, General Holland brought up the guns and opened fire: this was continued for nearly two hours, without the rebels showing the slightest inclination to leave. At the end of that time Holland returned to the boats and embarked a couple of hundred men, intending to storm it; but, as it afterwards turned out, the distance by the creek was nearly four miles; though, from the spot where the artillery was placed, it was only about half a mile. In the meantime seven Europeans crossed the creek in a small dingy, and the moment they appeared the rebels left, apparently not a hundred strong. This was the beginning of the mistakes; had General Holland reconnoitered a little, instead of throwing away so much ammunition to little purpose, he would have ascertained how few men were left there—in all probability merely to watch the movements of the attacking party. Directly the rebels began to run, a tremendous cheer burst from the Imperialists, who had pushed on some men armed with muskets towards a little cover, whence they fired across the creek at their adversaries. Rows of stakes had been here driven into the creek by the rebels, and the boats had to be delayed some time until these could be pulled up. By the time all had passed it was more than five o'clock, so the force was halted for the night, and the rations served out. The Imperialists showed no lack of activity, as they had their tents pitched and an entrenched camp formed before it was dark. The guns were landed and got into position during the night, and the rebels made a sortie against them, but were driven back after some sharp firing, principally by the Rifles, who were turned out to oppose them. After their repulse a few shells were fired at intervals, to show we were on the alert, and they did not again disturb us.

About daybreak on the following morning, the rebels received large reinforcements from Soo-chow, who were greeted with immense cheering. Shortly afterwards fire was opened from two 32-pounders, eight 12-pound howitzers, and four mortars.

This continued for between four and five hours, after which time General Holland ordered the assault, and then our disasters began. The mandarins had assured him that there was no creek running round the walls, but only a dry ditch. He did not think it necessary to assure himself of the truth of this by personal observation, but took their word for gospel. Captain Graham, with twenty of the body-guard, volunteered to plant the ladders against the breach; the gallant fellows picked up the ladders with a cheer which, as it turned out, caused one-half of the confusion that ensued, as it was taken up by the Rifles, who were in the front, and then by the 1st Battalion, who, being behind, did not know what was going on, but seeing the parties with ladders run forward, and hearing the cheers, rushed past their officers to join, as they thought, in the assault. About forty yards from the wall, all arrived together at a deep moat which the men could not ford. In the absence of bridges they were all huddled together on the bank—a mark for the fire of the defenders, who now manned the breach in hundreds—and kept up a fire which told fearfully on the masses of the trained troops. A ladder was thrown across the creek, and a few men with several officers crossed on it, but it was too weak to bear their weight and broke, and the Chinamen did not fancy another attempt at such a novel mode of crossing. A serjeant-major of the Rifles here performed an act of bravery which no European could have outdone. He rushed to the front with Ward's flag, and stood there alone, a mark for the enemy's bullets, for several minutes, calling on his men to advance. It is extraordinary that though six bullets pierced his clothes, not one struck him. In the meantime, the few who had crossed the creek attempted the breach, but most fell in the attempt; poor Maunder fell here, shot through the heart; a few reached the top, but only to be shot, or knocked down by bricks which, at such close quarters, the rebels used with deadly effect. Unable to cross the moat, and tired of standing to be shot down like sheep, the men retreated; seeing which, Colonel Barclay, who, since Colonel Forrester's retirement, is second in command, ran to the guns, and fired a few shell at the breach. Finding

that the guns were still manned, the men ran behind them, and halted under their protection.

General Holland now ordered the guns to the rear, and determined on a retreat. All were safely conveyed there save the two 32-pounders, which were so deeply sunk in the soft swampy ground that they could not be removed. General Holland did not wait to see their fate, but started off in his chop for Wy-con-sin. The other boats followed his; and now began the run of mandarin soldiers, stragglers from the Soon-kiong troops, coolies, and boatmen, which has given rise to the report that the disciplined Chinese also had all fled in disorder. Such was not the case; the Rifles in the front, under their Commanding Officer, Major Cooke, who deserves every credit for the admirable way in which he kept his men together, fought well for an hour and a-half or two hours longer, in the endeavour to save these guns, and were well supported by the 1st Battalion. Major Cooke, it will be remembered, is the officer who commanded the Shang-yu expedition, in conjunction with Le Brethon.

The rebels made a sortie from a neighbouring gate at this time, but were gallantly repulsed by Le-ai-dong, who charged them with a body of mandarin troops. A number of them also poured through the breach, but were held in check by the firing of the Rifles and 1st Battalion. Every effort was made to save these guns: a ball from a 6-pounder, which the rebels had on the walls, killed two men while they were hauling at the ropes, and still their comrades continued their efforts. But it was useless: the carriages had sunk to their axle-trees, and could not be moved. Seeing that the men were falling thickly to no purpose, Colonel Barclay now ordered a retreat. It would have been impossible even to spike the guns save at a terrible loss of life: the rebels seemed to have marked them for their especial prey, and concentrated on them such a hail of shot that no one could approach them. They were abandoned, but the retreat was conducted steadily and in good order on Wy-con-sin, the men facing about at intervals, and firing at their pursuers to keep them in check. A number of mandarin troops retreated in an orderly manner along with them.

The following day 1,500 men of the Sung-kiang force fell in there. General Holland went on in his boat to Sung-kiang: the troops followed, and arrived there on Tuesday evening.

The rebels fought admirably, and were all well armed with European muskets. A mistake was made in placing the guns so close to the walls: the artillerymen were shot down as they stood beside them, as there was no cover. I doubt much whether their fire did much execution among the garrison, as it was all concentrated on one point of the wall, which of course they took good care to avoid. When the troops advanced to the assault, however, they stood gallantly in the breach, and fired point-blank at them.

The loss of the Sung-kiang force cannot yet be correctly ascertained, as stragglers will probably drop in for some days to come. At the present time it consists of about 500 killed, wounded, and missing. Twenty casualties occurred amongst the Europeans. Captains Maunder, Macarthy, Macleod, and Bosworth killed, and twelve other officers, besides four marines, wounded. Among the former are Captains Graham, Murray, Tapp, Silvertown, and Dunn. The latter is shot through the groin, and, it is feared, will not recover.

No. 29.

Mr. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received April 17.)

(Extract.)

Peking, January 20, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a very interesting report from Mr. Brown, one of the Student Interpreters, of an expedition he made with Lieutenant Howarth, of Her Majesty's gun-boat "Weasel," to examine the coal mines in this neighbourhood.

Lieutenant Howarth having been directed by Sir James Hope to ascertain whether coal, for steam purposes, could be furnished for the use of Her Majesty's ships at a reasonable rate, I directed Mr. Brown to accompany him as interpreter. This duty he performed very well, his acquaintance with the language rendering him capable of performing it satisfactorily.

Inclosure in No. 29.

Memorandum.

ON the 18th of October last I accompanied Lieutenant Howarth, R.N., on a visit to the coal districts situated in the mountains to the west and north of Peking, with the object of investigating the possibility of obtaining coal, of a satisfactory quality, at a suitable price, and in sufficient quantity, for the supply more especially of the steam-vessels of Her Majesty's naval squadron on the China Station, and generally for foreign consumption at the open ports.

Some time ago Lieutenant Howarth obtained at Tien-tsin, from amongst several samples brought thither for foreign use by native merchants, a few tons of coal of a quality which he found to be admirably adapted for steam purposes. It was sufficiently bituminous and combustible to be easily ignited, and not too much so, so as to choke the draught-pipes or flues with soot. This particular variety, he was told, was brought from mines in the hills to the west of Peking. One other sample, which was not in sufficient quantity to allow of its burning qualities being tried, but which from its appearance was judged to be serviceable, was brought from mines situated, according to the indefinite information attainable, somewhere to the north of Tien-tsin, in the direction of Jéhol, and not far from the banks of the Lan-ho River.

These two mines, or sets of mines, Lieutenant Howarth proposed to visit, and personally investigate the difficulties that lay in the way of obtaining the coal in any required quantity at the nearest seaport.

Our investigations, therefore, were directed to the ascertaining—

1. The price of the coal at the pit mouth, together with its actual and possible supply.

2. The means and cost of transport to the nearest convenient dépôt.

3. The possibility of applying European skill and capital to the working of the mines, and to the facilitating and cheapening the cost of transport.

As the two places we intended to visit are in nearly opposite directions with reference to Peking, we found it would be more convenient to make two separate journeys of it, returning to Peking after visiting the mines to the westward, and setting out afresh for the north-east.

By inquiring of the coal merchants in Peking we ascertained that the only mines to the westward known to them which produce the coal answering to the description of Lieutenant Howarth are at a place called Chai-t'ang, situated we found in the heart of the mountains almost due west of Peking, about forty miles distant in a straight line. Owing, however, to the direction in which the ranges of hills and intervening valleys run, the road to the place is very much lengthened, and the distance to be travelled is little short of sixty-five miles.

For the first twenty-five miles of the journey we were obliged to proceed in a north-westerly direction, and for the rest of the way in a south-westerly.

We reached the places early in the morning of the third day from Peking, and found Chai-t'ang to be a fair sized village in the middle of a small mountain valley, about two and a half miles long, by one mile broad, the coal mines being situated in the sides of the hills surrounding the valley, and at a distance of from one to two miles from the village. In making our inquiries we were assisted by the petty mandarins of the place, who with much civility sent for the owners of the coal for us, and requested them to be as definite as possible in their answers to whatever questions we might put to them. We explained at length to them, and to the mandarins, the object of our visit; that we wished to ascertain the possibility of having coal from their mines conveyed at a sufficiently cheap rate to Tien-tsin or Taku for the use of foreign steam-vessels; that if a scheme with such an object in view were found practicable, the quantity required annually would not be less than 18,000,000 to 20,000,000 of catties (10,000 tons); that the object of our present visit was not to buy, but to find out whether such a quantity could be supplied, and if so what the price would be, including original cost and carriage when the coal reached Tien-tsin.

The information we obtained from the inquiries we made, as well as from our own observations both at the mines and at various places along the road, in reference to the three principal points which we considered necessary to investigate was as follows:—

1st. The lowest price at which the proprietors of the mines would undertake to supply the coal at the pit's mouth is at the rate of $1\frac{1}{2}$ taels of silver per 1,000 catties, or, expressed in English money and weight, about 16s. per ton; and the maximum quantity which they thought themselves capable of raising with their present facilities would be

125,000 catties (70 tons) per day. At the time of our visit, owing to the very slight demand for that variety of coal, not more than half-a-dozen miners were at work, and the amount brought to the surface did not exceed 4 or 5 tons per diem, part of which indeed was converted into coke before leaving the valley.

2ndly. The only means of carriage that at present is, or over certain parts of the road can be, employed is on muleback, these animals or donkeys being alone able when laden to overcome the difficulties of the road. As to the cost of carriage separately we were unable to arrive at any definite reliable information. This arose partly from the natural antipathy of the Chinese to give answers to the point, and partly because as the persons from whom we could obtain the information were necessarily the owners of mules for hire, and being convinced that our object was sooner or later to hire mules, their answers to our questions were dictated less by a desire to give the requested information than with the hope of driving a profitable bargain with us. The price demanded for the mere hire of their mules when compared with the known price of the Chai-t'ang coal in Peking was simply ridiculous. This coal is at the present time delivered to foreigners resident at Peking at the rate of about 6 taels per ton. Knowing this, and taking into account the relative distances of the places, it would be easy to calculate what the price of coal ought to be when brought to Tien-tsin or Taku.

As Tung-chow is only 40 *li* (13 miles) farther from Chai-t'ang than Peking is, or less than half a day's journey (indeed going direct from Chai-t'ang to Tung-chow, the addition to the distance would not be so much), and as there is cheap water communication from Tung-chow to the sea, this coal ought, under judicious management, even with the present expensive mode of carriage, to be procurable at Tien-tsin for, at the most, 8 taels per ton. Good English coal at the same place could not cost less than 12 taels per ton. Reckoning, therefore, the prime cost of the coal at 2½ taels per ton, the remainder (5½ taels) would represent the cost of carriage.

3rdly. In reference to the employment of foreign capital and skill in the working of the mines, we made a few inquiries. The owners, in the first place, professed themselves unwilling either to sell or let the mines. We then explained to them the nature of our foreign machinery, by the use of which a great saving in labour was obtained, and asked them if such machinery was brought to them, would they be willing to employ it at a reasonable charge. They immediately replied that they could not do so, as all the inhabitants of the surrounding district depended on the working of the mines during the latter end of autumn and winter for their livelihood; and if such machinery as we described were employed, many persons would necessarily be thrown out of employment. We did not succeed in making them comprehend that the more machinery was employed, the more men would be required to assist the machinery.

In reference to facilitating and cheapening the cost of carriage, it will be necessary to describe briefly the nature of the road over which the coal is brought.

I have stated above that the distance from Peking to Chai-t'ang is about 65 miles, or, in Chinese phraseology, 190 *li*. As far as a small village called Yang-fang, 70 *li* from Peking, the road is in a north-westerly direction, skirting the western hills, and is, over the alluvial soil of the plain, passable for carts or camels. At Yang-fang we passed round a spur of the hill range, and for the next 30 *li*, as far as a small village called Kou-chia-k'ou, we ascended a rough stony valley, at first 2 or 3 *li* in breadth, but contracting finally to as many hundred yards. The ascent to this point is perfectly gradual, and scarcely perceptible, and a sort of cart-track, evidently, from its appearance, little used, reaches as far as the above village. The gravel and rough stones which form the bed of the valley are, for the most part, the broken and evidently water-worn fragments of the two varieties of rock that mainly compose the range of hills, namely, a hard bluish limestone underlying a coarse compact sandstone.

From Kou-chia-k'ou to Chai-t'ang is 90 *li*, and the road all the distance is a mere mule-track, threading its way among the rough stones, and at times large boulders, that are thickly strewn about. The valley winds considerably among the hills, but there is little rise or fall in the ground, with the exception of two difficult passes, which are together about 15 *li* in length. The first of these is about 20 *li* beyond Kou-chia-k'ou, and is called Fo-t'ou-ling. The valley at the place seems to be brought to an abrupt termination by a spur from the hills running across it. The road is continued and the pass surmounted by a rudely-paved narrow path, which winds up the face of the hill, and rises about 800 feet in less than as many yards; descending, however, more gradually into the valley on the other side. The second pass is 25 *li* farther on, and is known by the name of Hsia-po-ling. It is not so high, but quite as steep and difficult as the first. The descent from its summit on the south-west side is by a long and tedious path that, for 10 *li*, runs along the side of an almost-perpendicular rocky hill, at the foot of which run the waters of

the Huen-ho, or "Muddy River." The path at the place is compelled to keep to the side of the mountain, inasmuch as the bed of the river completely fills the bottom of the valley below, not leaving sufficient space for a continuous track at either side. Though considerable care has been expended upon the construction and paving of the narrow pathway, still there is occasional danger in passing along, owing to the perpetual, and, at times, sudden, ascending and descending of the track, the height of which above the bottom of the valley varies from 10 to 60 or 70 feet.

At about 12 *li* from the commencement of the pass, the path leaves the hill side, crosses the Huen-ho by a rude plank bridge, strikes off from the river side up another valley, and for the remaining 33 *li* meets with no farther difficulty except the roughness of the road and the necessity of perpetually crossing and re-crossing a shallow stream that winds down the valley.

The existence of these two difficult passes renders the employment of any animals in carrying the coal except well-trained mules or donkeys impossible: and the coal from the Chai-t'ang mines is consequently much dearer when brought to Peking or Tien-tsin than the coal from other mines along the range which are accessible to camels. One of these cost originally little more than a mule, while its daily expense compared with the latter is not more than one-fourth, and the quantity it carries at least twice as much. The employment of these animals therefore, where possible, would materially diminish the cost of transport, which item according to the above rough estimate constitutes full two-thirds of the price at Tien-tsin. Now the distance over which mules must of necessity, in the present state of the road be employed, is not more than 90 *li*; and allowing this we could see no reason why camels or carts should not be employed to carry the coal for the remaining distance, about 130 *li*, as far as Tung-chow. Such an arrangement would certainly diminish the cost to an appreciable extent, and is quite practicable without any serious outlay. As to the saving that could be thus effected, we in our limited time were unable to obtain sufficiently definite data to calculate its exact amount, but from the answers to our questions on the subject we were convinced it would be considerable.

It may not be out of place to state that there are merchants at Tien-tsin, both native and foreign, who are quite prepared to form a company with the object of bringing such coal as is obtained at the Chai-t'ang mines in any quantity down to the sea-coast. These merchants are not determined to content themselves with the present available means of transport, but are quite prepared to invest considerable capital in the undertaking even to the making of a tramroad or railroad over part of the way, if such were considered necessary or profitable. Whether such a work would pay or not we could not take upon ourselves to say, but certainly to an unprofessional eye part of the country to be passed over in the direction of Chai-t'ang seems to be peculiarly adapted for laying down a line of rail. The first 130 *li* from Tung-chow is almost a dead flat, of which the first 100 is a dry firm alluvial soil, and the remaining thirty what seems to be the gravelly bed of an ancient river. Beyond this 130 *li*, however, little could be profitably done except to improve slightly the existing road by removing rough stones and filling up holes, rendering it thereby more passable, and therefore speedier for the mules going backwards and forwards.

If such a railway as I have alluded to were constructed, it is more than probable that it would not be confined to the carrying of coal alone, as at one point in its course, near its farthest extremity, it would approach to within three miles of the southern mouth of the pass through which all the traffic between China and Mongolia and Russia goes to and fro, and merchants, both native and foreign, would naturally avail themselves of the facilities it would offer.

In addition to the above, we made a few inquiries in reference to the working and ownership of the mines, the result of which it may not be unnecessary to state. We were told that the hills in which are the mines at present in operation are the property of two men, natives of the village of Chai-t'ang; that the ground has been property in their families for generations; and that they have in their possession title-deeds proving their ownership. These two men have entered into partnership, and joined their properties. They pay all the expenses of working the mines, and share all the resulting profits in common; by this means preventing the possibility of competition, or of one underselling the other.

The method adopted in working the mines is simple enough. The stratified beds of the district have all a considerable "dip," and the coal is in consequence often found "cropping out." The mine is accordingly commenced at the surface, and the shaft, so to speak, follows the bed of the coal, descending often at an angle of 30° or 40° to the horizon. Rough stairs are constructed up the shaft, the projecting edges of which are protected from being worn away by round pieces of wood fastened from side to side of the

pit. The coal is brought to the surface either on men's shoulders by means of the ordinary carrying pole, or drawn up in small sledges, which, being shod with narrow pieces of iron not unlike skate-irons, run lightly over the round bars of wood with which the steps are faced. A double rope is attached to the sledge in the form of a large loop, and the miner placing this over his shoulder, drags the whole up, himself walking on all-fours.

When water breaks into the mine, which not unfrequently happens, their only means of getting rid of it is by carrying it to the surface in buckets. This process is necessarily slow, and when the water gains upon them, as it often does, the pit is necessarily abandoned, and another opened.

Fire-damp is also not an unfrequent enemy, and as there is nothing like an attempt at ventilation, and the lamp in use is open, and of the rudest construction, accidents are of common occurrence, and the best working mines have often to be given up on account of the presence of the dangerous gases. Owing, therefore, to all these drawbacks, but a small fraction of the available coal in any of the pits is brought to the surface. Indeed, from all we all we could ascertain the coal seems to be practically inexhaustible.

The men employed in working the mines are the ordinary labourers of the neighbourhood, who during the summer months assist in cultivating the ground, and it is not until the harvest has been secured that they take to the mines. There is little inconvenience found to result from this arrangement, inasmuch as during the hot weather the coal is in scarcely any demand.

The miners are paid either by the day or by the amount of work done; and we were told that the wages of a single man averaged about 150 small cash per diem, which, taking into account the relative value of silver and copper at the place, is equal to about 8*d.* English money.

The mines to the north-east of Peking, which produce what is known at Tien-tsin as the Lan-ho coal, being much more distant, and our information as to their whereabouts being very indefinite, the time occupied in our second journey was necessarily much longer than in our first. However we at length discovered the mines to be situated about 620 *li* to the north-east of Tien-tsin, on the north side of the great wall, and in the neighbourhood of the Lan-ho River. The distance of the mines from the sea is about 650 *li*, and the river is navigable for small boats all the way. About 160 *li* nearer the sea than the coal-mines are, there is a small town called Sa-ho-ch'iao, situated on the bank of the river; the mines can only be reached by passing through this town, and on our arrival there we found large quantities of coal stored up, which we were told were brought down from time to time and laid up for future sale, the place being a convenient *dépôt*, as roads branch out from it in every direction. On making further inquiries on the subject, we found we could obtain at Sa-ho-ch'iao our desired information in reference to the price and mode of conveying the coal, without visiting the mines themselves. No doubt personal investigation on the spot would have been likely to give collateral information not obtainable by mere hearsay; but as going up the river against the stream would necessarily be tedious, and as we had already spent considerable time on our journey, we did not think it advisable to add four or five additional days, with all the attendant expenses, when the gaining of any additional advantage was by no means certain.

The principal mines from which the Lan-ho coal is brought are at a place called Ching-ko-yao, and the mode of working them is similar to that adopted at Chai-t'ang. The price of the coal at the pit's mouth we found to be exactly the same as that of the Chai-t'ang coal, namely, 1½ taels per 1,000 catties, or 16*s.* per ton.

The mines, we were told, are close to the banks of the Lan-ho river, and the coal is brought down in small boats, each carrying 3,500 catties or about 2 tons. Owing to the existence of rapid shallows at many places along the river, both above and below Sa-ho-ch'iao, boats carrying larger burdens than this cannot be employed. When the coal arrives at the mouth of the river, it is put on board junks and transported to whatever part along the coast it may be required. We were informed that the boats generally occupied about seven or eight days in going from Sa-ho-ch'iao to Tien-tsin, and the freight usually paid for a small boat-load for the whole distance is little more than 4 taels. Adding to this the original cost of the coal, together with the cost of bringing it down as far as Sa-ho-ch'iao, we calculate roughly that the Lan-ho coal could be delivered in Tien-tsin or Taku for about 6 taels per ton, that is, 2 taels less than the probable price of the Chai-t'ang coal.

As the water communication already existing to the Lan-ho coal mines is necessarily cheaper than any other, little could be done in that quarter to facilitate and cheapen traffic, except, perhaps, deepening the shallow rapids at one or two places along the river, so as to allow boats of larger burden to pass up and down.

I may add that since my return to Peking I have received a short note from Lieutenant Howarth, in which he states that since his return he has tried the Lan-ho coal, and finds it to be, though of very fair quality, still much inferior to the Chai-t'ang coal, and that the latter, though much dearer and more difficult to obtain, is worth all the difference in price and trouble.

The general result of our inquiries and observations may therefore be summed up as follows:—

1. That coal of a satisfactory quality, and in apparently unlimited quantity, can be procured at two places at least in the mountains to the north and west of Peking; that one of these places is little more than 200 miles from the sea, with water communication all the way, and that the other place is less than 200 miles from the sea, with a navigated river nearly two-thirds of the way.

2. That the coal is obtainable at Tien-tsin or Taku at a cheaper rate than any other coal of corresponding quality.

3. That it is more than probable that a moderate investment of capital, backed by European skill and energy, would so far cheapen the cost of carriage as to make the conveying of the coal to other parts of the seaboard of China a profitable speculation.

Peking, December 8, 1862.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN McLEARY BROWN.

No. 30.

Mr. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received April 18.)

(Extract.)

Peking, February 9, 1863.

IN continuation of my despatch of the 8th of September, 1862,* I have the honour to inclose copy of a despatch from the Prince of Kung, on the loss of property of a mandarin on board a junk destroyed on the Yang-tze River by one of Her Majesty's cruizers, under the impression that she was a piratical vessel; also of my despatch to His Imperial Highness on these and similar cases, inclosing the information supplied to me by Sir James Hope.

I have taken upon myself to indemnify the Chinese officer Hwang Tehsin at once, as I think it important to sustain the credit of the Foreign Board, and as I have no doubt of the *bona fides* of the claim and of its justice, I am anxious that Chinese applicants should see that the Foreign Board is able to obtain justice for them.

Inclosure 1 in No. 30.

The Prince of Kung to Mr. Bruce.

(Translation.)

Peking, December 12, 1862.

THE Prince of Kung makes a communication.

The Prince has already informed the British Minister of the destruction of junks on the river, in one instance at Chou-chia-hsu, and in a second instance off Kiang-yin, and has inclosed his Excellency a list of the persons, soldiers, braves, employés, or passengers who were burned in the junks, or carried off from them, as also of the effects missing.

His Excellency has replied that violent proceedings of this nature were not at all to his taste, and that he should at once call on the Consul at Shanghai and the officers of the navy for an explicit report upon these cases, on receipt of which he would again address the Prince.

His Highness assumes that the Consul has by this time replied; to what effect the Prince does not know, but he makes no doubt that the British Minister will deal equitably with the cases in question, and he awaits his Excellency's reply with earnest anxiety.

His Highness has written to Tuhsinga, General commanding the Manchou garrison of Nanking, to examine the return made by Hwang Tehsin of property missed by him, and is now in receipt of a reply from the General to the effect that Hwang Tehsin and the rest of the party had made out an account of the trunks, &c., removed by the foreigners, in which was given the value of every article separately. This he requests the Prince to

* See "Papers respecting the Rebellion in China," presented to Parliament in March 1863, No. 61.

examine and forward to the British Minister that he may give orders to have the sufferers indemnified.

The reports appearing to the Prince to have neither suppressed facts nor exaggerated them, it becomes His Highness's duty to forward a copy of the articles missed by Hwang Tehsin to his Excellency, who he trusts will send instructions to the Consul at Shanghai to look into the matter and deal with it impartially, and without loss of time to close this case, and thereby to tranquillize the minds of the community. It is most important that there should be no further delay.

Appended is an inventory of boxes, clothes, and other effects, with a note of the value of each, the total being 423 taels 8 mace 7 candarines.

Also are missing ;—

1. The passport of Wang-ting-hu, Tu-szu (a Major) in the Hiang-shau Division of the army or navy of Kwang-tung.
2. Four despatches in his charge.
3. Four despatches in charge of Wu-ti-wen, Pa-tsung (an Ensign) of the Yang-kiang Division of the navy of Kwang-tung.

Inclosure 2 in No. 30.

Mr. Bruce to the Prince of Kung.

Sir,

Peking, February 8, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your Highness' despatch of the 12th December, inclosing a list of the property belonging to Hwang Teh-sin, a mandarin who was passenger in a junk destroyed off Kiang-yin by a ship of Her Britannic Majesty's Navy.

I wrote as I promised your Highness to Admiral Sir James Hope for further information, and from his reply I learn, that having received several complaints of the capture of British junks, and the murder of British subjects on the river, he had despatched a gun-boat to capture the aggressors. In the neighbourhood of Lang-shan certain junks were pointed out by respectable people as pirates. The gun-boat sent a boat to examine them. It was fired on and some of the crew wounded. On the arrival of the wounded men at Shanghai, Sir James Hope sent up the "Sphinx," a larger steamer, to the spot. Her boats with those of the gun-boat entered the creek where the boats of the latter had been beaten off, and there found three Canton junks. The largest of these, that which had fired on the gun-boat's people, was deserted. The other two were suspicious-looking craft, and as several respectable-looking villagers on shore averred that these junks had been plundering them for some time past (a statement corroborated by a small mandarin), the commander of the larger steamer caused them to be set on fire. Two other junks forming part of this squadron disappeared, but on the 14th July, off Kiang-yin, the steamer fell in with and burned a Cantonese armed vessel against which the Commander had strong suspicions. He continued to cruise on the river for some days, and off Fuh-shan one of his boats was fired upon by a party of rebels whom he dispersed, &c., &c.

The Admiral inclosed the reports of the officers commanding Her Majesty's steamers engaged in this affair, and concludes his despatch with the following remarks: "The truth is that the Canton men-of-war junks in the Yang-tze do no good whatever, either in protecting the people against the rebels or any other way; while, on the other hand, they oppress the people wherever they go and plunder the junks in passing whenever they have the opportunity of doing so.

"There are, at this moment, a gang of 300 Cantonese at Plover Point who plunder every junk that passes that they can get hold of the moment I withdraw a gun-boat from watching them, and I have reason to believe that the Cantonese junks are in league with them."

Sir J. Hope's energy and zeal in the defence of Shanghai and in preserving the inhabitants of the surrounding districts from plunder and massacre are well known to your Imperial Highness. The Admiral was informed that the position of Plover's Point was occupied by pirates, the natural allies of all rebels in China, and the officers sent to examine the places were confirmed in this opinion by the inhabitants and even by a Chinese officer.

A short time since Captain Dew destroyed a fleet of pirates at Chusan at the request of the Chinese authorities, and these officers, at the request of the people, destroyed these

junks, which the popular voice, as well as the appearance of the vessels themselves, pointed out as Cantonese and as piratical. The vessel destroyed off Kiang-yin was supposed to belong to the same piratical band.

I trust that the speedy arrival of the steam flotilla which your Imperial Highness has so wisely ordered will make it unnecessary for Her Majesty's ships to do the police of the waters of China, and will relieve the Chinese Government from the necessity of employing these Cantonese vessels, which make use of their authority to oppress the people and extort money from peaceful traders.

As early as last autumn I wrote, however, to the Admiral to request that strict orders might be given on no account to destroy junks on the river, unless a competent Chinese authority requested that they might be dealt with as pirates; but that, in all cases where complaints are made against an armed junk, she is to be detained, if necessary, until her character can be ascertained, and until the matter can be investigated by the superior Chinese authority in whose jurisdiction she is found. I trust, therefore, that no such cases as those complained of will happen again; Her Majesty's Government being most anxious that all cases of complaint should be brought before your Imperial Highness, and be settled amicably according to the usages in force among friendly nations. I am also prepared to indemnify at once Hwang Teh-sin for the property belonging to him that was lost on board the junk destroyed off Kiang-yin; and I will instruct the Consul at Shanghai to pay the sum of 423 taels 8 mace 7 candarines to any person who may be authorized to receive it on account of Hwang Teh-sin and give a receipt for it in his name.

I have not received any reply as to the acts complained of near Kiu-kiang and Lu-ho, but I trust that the Regulations adopted for the river-trade, and the institution of a national flag, will prevent the recurrence of acts which arose from the disturbed state of the river, and the difficulty of distinguishing between the acts of a legitimate Chinese authority and the proceedings of unauthorized people.

It is very desirable that public notice should be given at Shanghai and Hankow of any Customs stations on the river.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

No. 31.

Sir E. Lugard to Mr. Hammond.—(Received April 18.)

Sir,

War Office, April 18, 1863.

REFERRING to your letter of the 9th January last,* in which you explain the conditions upon which officers and men may be permitted to accept service under the Chinese Government, I am directed by the Secretary of State to transmit to you, for the consideration of Earl Russell, the inclosed copy of a despatch which has been received from Brigadier-General Staveley on the subject.

The Secretary of State will be glad to be furnished with the opinion of Earl Russell as to the answer which should be returned to the inquiry contained in this despatch.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWARD LUGARD.

Inclosure in No. 31.

Brigadier-General Staveley to Earl de Grey and Ripon.

Sir,

Head-Quarters, Hong Kong, February 1863.

IN consequence of your letter of 24th December, approving of a British officer being placed in command of the Ward force, and having also received the new Order in Council, dated the 9th January, 1863, wherein permission is granted to naval and military officers to accept service under the Chinese Government, I have the honour to inform you that I purpose placing Brevet Major Gordon, R.E., in command of the Ward force, immediately on my return to Shanghai, which will be in the course of two or three weeks.

With reference to your letter of the 10th January, in which you state that those officers who accept service under the Chinese Government, in accordance with the new Order in Council dated 9th January, and who will be on the half pay and not on the full

* See "Papers relating to the Rebellion in China," presented to Parliament in March 1863, No. 81.

pay of regiments, are not restricted to the neighbourhood of the Treaty ports, but are at liberty to act in any part of the country their services may be required, I request that I may be instructed to what extent the above quoted letter (particularly as to acting outside our boundary at Shanghai) will apply to Major Gordon and the officers it is necessary for me to appoint, pending your approval, to assist in organizing the Ward force.

The following officers have been strongly recommended by their respective commanding officers as likely to prove of the greatest assistance to Major Gordon in rendering the Ward force an efficient body of men. For this reason I shall give them leave to act under Major Gordon, pending your approval and that of His Royal Highness the Field Marshal commanding-in-chief.

I beg leave to suggest that Major Gordon and above alluded-to officers, namely, Lieutenant Wood, Royal Artillery, Lieutenant Danvells, 31st Regiment, Lieutenant Kingsley, 67th Regiment, Lieutenant Cardew, 67th Regiment, Captain Clayton, 99th Regiment, and Ensign Stevens, 99th Regiment, be allowed to retain their names and rank in their respective regiments during the uncertain period they may be required by the Chinese Government, but only to receive the half-pay of their rank while so employed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) C. W. D. STAVELEY.

No. 32.

Sir E. Lugard to Mr. Hammond.—(Received April 18.)

Sir,

War Office, April 18, 1863.

REFERRING to my letter of the 11th instant relative to the expedition about to be undertaken by the Chinese Government against the rebels at Tai-tsan, I am directed by the Secretary of State to transmit to you, for the information of Earl Russell, the accompanying copies of a despatch and its inclosure from Brigadier-General Staveley, in which he reports the failure of this expedition.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWARD LUGARD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 32.

Brigadier-General Staveley to Earl de Grey and Ripon.

Sir,

Head Quarters, Hong Kong, February 28, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to forward for your information, a copy of a despatch that I have sent to Sir Frederick Bruce, at Peking, reporting the failure of the expedition of the Ward force for the capture of Tai-tsan.

I have, &c.

(Signed) C. W. D. STAVELEY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 32.

Brigadier-General Staveley to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Head Quarters, Shanghai, February 21, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to report for your information the failure of the expedition of the Ward force for the capture of Tai-tsan, with the loss of four officers killed and ten wounded, and 200 Chinese killed and wounded.

I had already explained to Governor Li that the force as yet was not sufficiently organized to undertake such serious affairs as the capture of walled towns, but he was bent on the Tai-tsan expedition coming off, urging that if the force could not undertake so simple an operation it was not worth keeping up. Under these circumstances, and as he had already shown every disposition to reduce the force, I thought it impolitic to protest further in the matter.

Having ascertained from Mr. Alabaster, interpreter in the Consular service, that notwithstanding my refusal to allow Captain Holland to command the expedition, the Governor had determined to send the force without him, and knowing that there was not

a single officer competent to take charge of it, I decided on permitting Captain Holland to accompany it, so that there might be, at all events, one person present capable of maintaining some degree of order. As it turns out it is fortunate that I did so, for I am satisfied that had Captain Holland not been present, instead of two guns reported as left under the walls, the whole of the guns would have been lost.

The strength of the attacking force was 2,400 of the Ward force, with four 32-pounders, ten 12-pounder howitzers, two 8-inch mortars, besides 5,000 of the Governor's troops armed with percussion muskets.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. W. D. STAVELEY.

No. 33.

Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 21, 1863.

HER Majesty's Government approve the answer of which a copy is inclosed in your despatch of the 9th of February, and which you returned to the note from Prince Kung respecting the destruction of Chinese property by Her Majesty's cruizers on the River Yang-tze.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 34.

Mr. Hammond to Sir E. Lugard.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 21, 1863.

I HAVE laid before Earl Russell your letter of the 11th instant, and its inclosure from the Military Secretary at the Horse Guards, respecting the restriction imposed upon Captain Holland not to accompany Ward's forces beyond the thirty miles' radius from Shanghai; and I am to state to you, in reply, for the information of the Secretary of State for War, that Lord Russell does not deny that there is an inconvenience in the state of things pointed out by the Field Marshal Commanding-in-chief, but that Her Majesty's Government cannot allow British officers who are only temporarily detached from their regiments, to be making war upon the Tae-pings all over China. The remedy is obviously to limit the operations of those troops, so long as they are commanded by officers in the active service of Her Majesty's Government, to the neighbourhood of the Treaty ports.

The Chinese Government would probably then find it to their advantage to retain the British officers, and not employ these troops in general operations against the Tae-pings.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 35.

Mr. Hammond to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 22, 1863.

I AM directed by Earl Russell to transmit to you, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Minister in China,* inclosing a copy of a communication from Prince Kung relative to the national flag adopted by the Chinese Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 36.

Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sr, *Foreign Office, April 23, 1863.*
 HER Majesty's Government approve the answer of which a copy is inclosed in your despatch of the 3rd of January, and which you returned to the letter from the Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce, respecting Messrs. Adam Scott and Co.'s complaint on account of duty charged on re-exported goods.

I am, &c.
 (Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 37.

Mr. Hammond to Sir E. Lugard.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 23, 1863.*
 I HAVE laid before Earl Russell your letter of the 18th instant, inclosing a copy of a despatch from General Staveley, inquiring to what extent the decision of Her Majesty's Government, with regard to officers on full pay of Her Majesty's army not accompanying the allied troops beyond the thirty-mile radius from Shanghai, is to apply to Major Gordon and the other officers whom General Staveley has selected to assist in organizing Ward's force.

I am to state to you, in reply, for the information of the Secretary of State for War, that it appears to Lord Russell that the only rule Her Majesty's Government can lay down for the Chinese service, is that those officers who choose to go on half-pay with the Queen's licence, should be at liberty to serve in any part of China they please, but the officers who retain their regimental rank should keep within the thirty-mile limit.

I am, &c.
 (Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 38.

Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, April 27, 1863.*
 WITH reference to Mr. Brown's interesting Report on China coal mines inclosed in your despatch of the 20th of January, I have to observe that it would facilitate the perusal of such papers if the Chinese weights, moneys, and distances were in every case reduced to their English equivalent.

You will express to Mr. Brown my approval of his Report.

No. 39.

Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 27, 1863.*
 I INCLOSE, for your information, copies of a correspondence with the War Office relative to the employment of British officers in operations against the Tae-pings.*

I am, &c.
 (Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 40,

Mr. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received May 21.)

My Lord,

Peking, February 24, 1863.

IN continuation of my despatch of the 26th January, I have the honour to inclose copy of a further despatch from His Imperial Highness the Prince of Kung on the subject of the "Pearl," with my reply thereto.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 40.

The Prince of Kung to Mr. Bruce.

(Translation.)

Peking, January 25, 1863.

THE Prince of Kung makes a communication.

On the 20th of the 11th moon (9th January) the Prince received the British Minister's despatch regarding the shipment of salt at Quemoy by the "Pearl." His Excellency says that the vessel was not liable to confiscation, but that the salt on board her was so liable, and that the Chief Magistrate of Tung-an was undoubtedly to blame for issuing to the "Pearl" a permit to carry salt. The district of Tung-an, in the province of Fuh-keen, is, it would appear, a district in which it has been usual to pack salt for exportation (to other parts of China), and the issue of tickets (passes, permits) is a measure designed to assist the Executive in the prevention of smuggling. The vessel to which in this case the permit was given, calling herself the "Chen-chu" ("True Pearl") (the authority issuing the permit) would suppose her to be a Chinese vessel, and, if the master of the "Pearl" proposes to lay the blame (of her illegal trading) on the local authorities, because the Magistrate issued this permit, the Prince would observe that if he knew that that the applicant was a foreigner, the Magistrate is culpable for having issued the permit, but that if the party applying was a Chinese, and that the permit was made over (sold) by him to the foreign merchant, then the blame lies not on the Magistrate, but on the individual who made the *mald fide* application. Besides, the permit bears on the face of it the words "not to be parted with;" but when the vessel was first detained by the Customs, after her entry into Foo-chow, the merchant interested did not produce this permit, and the violation of the condition that it was "not to be parted with" rendered the vessel liable to seizure and inquiry on the part of the Customs, whether (the original applicants for the permit was) a Chinese or a foreigner. Salt, moreover, being an article trade in and carriage of which is interdicted to the foreign merchant by the Treaty, the merchant interested had no right, when no certificate accompanied the salt, to object to the penalty the Customs would have imposed. The High Officer (Attorney-General) resident at Hong Kong has informed Mr. Consul Sinclair that the vessel (to be liable to confiscation) must have been seized *flagrante delicto*, and that she could not be seized and confiscated when she had entered one of the open ports. If this be so, if a vessel that has been trading at other than an open port can only be confiscated if she be there taken, and cannot once she shall have left the place, it appears to the Prince that foreign merchants may go on smuggling to all eternity without it ever being possible to confiscate either ship or cargo. A foreign merchant, falsely describing himself as a Chinese, may under his assumed name ship salt at any place not open under Treaty, and, having carried it out of port, tranship it on board a foreign vessel, or, without any such transhipment, may hoist a foreign flag when about to enter a Treaty port. The XLVIIth Article of the Treaty, with its plain provisions, will thus be little more than waste paper, and it is more certain than ever that this is not the last case of smuggling that will be heard of.

The British Minister has apprised the Prince that he has submitted this opinion of the Attorney-General of Hong Kong to Her Britannic Majesty's Government, and His Highness would urge upon his Excellency the expediency of appending to his despatch the arguments advanced by the Prince in this communication.

Inclosure 2 in No. 40.

Mr. Bruce to the Prince of Kung.

Sir,

Peking, January 29, 1863.

I HAVE received the despatch of your Imperial Highness stating the grounds on which it is contended that the "Pearl" was liable to seizure on her arrival at Foo-chow-foo, and that the permit to ship salt exhibited from the Tung-an authorities being given to a vessel with a Chinese name, and not to the "Pearl," cannot be held to cover her.

On the latter point I concur with the views expressed by your Imperial Highness, and I have explained to Mr. Consul Sinclair that a permit from a Chinese authority to ship a prohibited article will not be sufficient to protect a vessel unless it is given to her under her English name, or states that it is given to her as a British-owned vessel.

On the first point I cannot give positive instructions, contrary to the opinion of the Attorney-General of Hong Kong, until I have consulted Her Majesty's Government. I have already submitted the case to it with observations in the sense of those contained in the despatch of your Imperial Highness, but I will transmit by the speediest route the despatch itself, which will receive an attentive consideration.

I have, &c.

(Signed) **FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.**

No. 41.

Mr. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received May 21.)

My Lord,

Peking, March 7, 1863.

IN my despatch of the 26th of January last, I alluded to the difficulties encountered by the Chinese Government in the disposal of the Tae-ping insurgents, arising from the habits of plunder and licence which had become to them a second nature.

In his despatch giving an account of the robbery committed on the Rev. Mr. Gray and his companions, in the disturbed districts near Canton, Mr. Robertson states that the brigands who are now ravaging those districts are insurgents who submitted to the Imperialists near Nanking, and were sent back to their native province. The return they make for this act of clemency is to recommence their career of pillage and massacre.

I have, &c.

(Signed) **FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.**

Inclosure in No. 41.

Consul Robertson to Mr. Bruce.

(Extract.)

Canton, December 23, 1862.

ON hearing of this, I represented to the Bishop the imprudence of such a step, considering that the borders of the Province were overrun with banditti, who had submitted as rebels in the neighbourhood of Nanking, and on being sent back to this Province, had taken to brigandage, and were ravaging the northern part of the Province in every direction. His Lordship at once acceded and returned to Hong Kong.

No. 42.

Mr. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received May 25.)

My Lord,

Peking, March 12, 1863.

IN continuation of my despatch of the 20th of January last, I have the honour to inclose copy of a despatch from Mr. Vice-Consul Adkins, which will prove that the complaints of the Chinese as to the use made of opening the Yang-tze River for the supply of arms and provisions to the insurgents are well founded. I have urged the Prince of Kung to put a revenue steamer at Chin-kiang to overhaul all boats, native as well as foreign, that go up the river; for, if this trade be not stopped, we shall be exposed to the charge

of having misled the Government when we induced it to open at once Kiu-kiang and Hankow, and our legitimate and growing trade with those two ports will be seriously jeopardized.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 42.

Vice-Consul Adkins to Mr. Bruce.

Sir,

Chin-kiang, February 16, 1863.

ON the 28th ultimo I received a letter from Mr. Dymes, representing Fletcher and Co. at this port, informing me that two of their junks had been plundered by the rebels at Nanking, and that junk "F, No. 9," was detained with her cargo. I was informed also that two of her crew had been made prisoners.

I placed the letter in the hands of Lieutenant Lee, the Senior Naval Officer at this port, and informed him that should he think proper to proceed to Nanking I was ready to accompany him.

Whilst I was writing a letter to this effect the Commissioner of Customs came to my office, and informed that M. Dupuis, a French subject, had complained to him of a similar occurrence on the same day and at the same place. I therefore added a postscript to my letter, and inclosed also the claim of M. Dupuis. I thought myself justified in doing so, because the French Government is unrepresented at this port.

On the following day Lieutenant Lee got his vessel, the "Slaney," under way, and proceeded to Nanking. That evening we anchored about six miles below Nanking, at the entrance to the Tsao-hea Creek.

On the morning of the 29th I landed with Lieutenant Lee's communication to the insurgent authorities, which I handed to the Head of the Tien-hae kwan, for transmission to the proper quarter. I was told when I delivered it that an answer might be expected on the evening of the following day.

From the anchorage of Her Majesty's ship "Slaney" we could see the junk "F, No. 9," with her ensign and house-flag flying, at anchor close to a large square fort on the opposite bank. In the course of the afternoon Lieutenant Lee steamed across the river, and anchored alongside her. He then dispatched a note to the Chief in command of the fort requesting the immediate release of the two Chinese sailors who had been taken from the junk. The Chief was also informed that his lawless conduct had been reported to his superiors in the city. Some hours elapsed before a reply was received. When it did come, it was apologetic and stated that the stolen articles had all been recovered, and were then in the fort. A low Cantonese, who was the bearer of the reply, seemed determined that Lieutenant Lee and myself should go ashore then and there, though it was pitch dark at the time. He was told that no further communication could take place with the fort until the prisoners were released. If then the Commander of the fort wished to see Lieutenant Lee he could come on board Her Majesty's ship "Slaney."

Early next morning the two men were sent on board the "Slaney." About 8 o'clock the rebel chief himself came on board. He was evidently alarmed at what had been done, and declared emphatically that it had taken place without his knowledge. He handed Lieutenant Lee a list of things which he said were in the fort awaiting his acceptance. On looking over the list, I saw at once that hardly one of the stolen articles was included in it. That afternoon a messenger arrived from Nanking, with a message to the effect that in consequence of that day being a sabbath no public business could be transacted, and that a reply to Lieutenant Lee's communication could not be dispatched till the following day.

On the 31st Lieutenant Lee recrossed the river. He wrote a second despatch to the authorities, again requesting them to recover the stolen property or else pay the money compensation. A more detailed list of the missing property was inclosed in this letter.

Shortly before midnight a reply was received to Lieutenant Lee's first letter. I inclose a translation of this paper for your Excellency's perusal. The bearer of it was urgent on behalf of the Chung Wang that Lieutenant Lee would go into the city and pay that Prince a visit. He was told to await a reply on the following day.

I urged upon Lieutenant Lee the propriety of complying with the Chung Wang's request. I felt certain that no treachery was to be apprehended, and I felt anxious to see the state of affairs in the rebel capital. It was arranged, therefore, that Lieutenant Lee

and myself should proceed in the "Slaney's" gig to the city gate (Han-si-mên), where a chair would be provided for Lieutenant Lee and horses for myself and the two officers of the "Slaney" who were to accompany us.

We were conducted into the city by the messenger who brought out the Chung Wang's letter.

The aspect of the streets has improved considerably since I visited the place in July 1861. Building is going on to some extent, and there are a few shops open. The streets were clean, and I only saw one dead body.

I must confess that I was somewhat astonished at the Chung Wang's residence. I had on a previous occasion visited a Wang in Nanking: the dirty den he chose to call a "fu" much resembled the yamun of an official in an orthodox Chinese city. In this instance, however, the case was different. The building was quite new, substantially built, and tastefully decorated with gilding and mural paintings. The Chung Wang, who was dressed in magnificently embroidered robes, received us in person, and conducted us through a handsome suite of apartments to a large and handsomely furnished hall. He proceeded to business at once, and expressed his regret at what had happened. He said that it was the wish of the Tien Wang to avoid all collision with foreigners, and alluded to the events at Ningpo and Shanghae as having mainly influenced this policy.

I told him that the right of navigating the Yang-tze, conceded by the Imperial Government, was considered highly important by foreign nations, and that the detention of foreign vessels by the insurgents had compelled Lieutenant Lee to take the steps he had done.

When we went over the list of stolen property with him, he said that the junk "F, No. 9," would be returned with her cargo, except seven bales of paper which would be paid for. The other claims would be paid in full. This was done: the sycee was packed in our presence, and conveyed to the "Slaney's" gig. One other circumstance occurred which, though it might indicate a desire on the part of the rebels to punish those who make difficulties with foreigners, was highly disagreeable.

The Chung Wang mentioned casually that the rebel soldier who had been foremost in the robbery had been apprehended by his order, and would be beheaded. I begged him not to take such extreme measures. I was still speaking when in walked the executioner with a reeking sword, and kneeling at the feet of the Chung Wang, reported that the man had been decapitated. The Chung Wang then turned to Lieutenant Lee, and asked if he wished to see the head. This was of course declined, but as we rode out of the "fu" our horses could hardly avoid trampling on the still bleeding head.

I was much struck while at Nanking with the abundance of foreign arms and ammunition.

Percussion muskets are very common, and percussion caps are sold retail in the city at 2 cash each.

I regret to say that the Chinese Government have to thank foreign traders for this state of things. Lying up the creek at the mouth of which the "Slaney" was at anchor, was an American Ningpo boat. I boarded this vessel, and asked the person who seemed to be her owner or supercargo to show me her papers.

He complied with considerable alacrity, but refused to allow the papers to leave his hands, remarking, "If I give you the papers you will read the boat's name, and get me into trouble at Chin-kiang."

On my return to the "Slaney" I reported these circumstances to Lieutenant Lee, who ordered the master of the boat to come on board. On board the "Slaney" he became more communicative, and told us of his dealings with the rebels, and how he managed to get muskets and powder past the Chin-kiang Customs. He said that a short time previous he had brought up 500 muskets and 500 lbs. of powder from Shanghae. He flew foreign colours while passing the native Custom-houses, but on getting near Chin-kiang hauled them down, and passed up as a native boat. When we saw him he was disposing of a cargo of rice at an enormous profit. He said that he paid no duties or dues of any kind, and that the rebels encouraged him to come and trade with them. I heard from one of the rebels belonging to the Tien-hae kwan, who went with Lieutenant Lee and myself to the city gate, that this American had sold them a good many arms, but not so many as another whose name he did not know, or would not tell—who, he said, had sent them up a "whole ship-load" two months before. I may add that on the evening of the day before we left Nanking a large American schooner and an American Ningpo boat anchored at the mouth of the creek off which we were lying. The people on board had communication with the shore, and some large boats went alongside the schooner. Both the craft were there when we left the next day, though the wind was perfectly fair for proceeding up the river.

The rebels seem to take no notice of the Imperialist force at present encamped outside the south gate. They say they will go away before long. As for the Imperialist war-boats (of which there are some 300 in the vicinity of Nanking), they are as nearly as possible useless. The very indifferent artillery of the rebels is quite enough to keep them at a most respectful distance.

There is no doubt that a considerable rebel army has, within the last month, crossed the river at Nanking, and is now operating in the provinces of An-hui and Kiang-su.

Your Excellency will perceive that the claim made by Fletcher and Co.'s agent was settled in full by the rendition of the two first items on the list, less seven bales of paper, and by a money payment for the others. M. Dupuis' claim was also settled in full. This appeared to Lieutenant Lee and myself a satisfactory termination to the business, and Her Majesty's ship "Slaney" returned to Chin-kiang.

The most difficult part of the whole transaction now commenced. Fletcher and Co.'s agent declared that he was not satisfied, and wished to make it appear that his principals had further claims upon the sum total recovered from the rebels. He stated that more than seven bales of paper had been removed from "F, No. 9;" that ninety-seven bales had been damaged, and that the junk herself had been injured while in the hands of the rebels. To this I altogether demurred. The European who was in charge of "F, No. 9," when she was seized by the rebels, was on board Her Majesty's ship "Slaney" all the time we were at Nanking. It was his duty to have ascertained the actual damage done to his employer's property, that the original claim might have been made accordingly. He took no steps in the matter, and I therefore peremptorily declined to make any deductions from the amounts due to the Chinese sailors of the three junks, as claimed in their behalf by Fletcher and Co.

I have, &c.
(Signed) THOS. ADKINS.

No. 43.

Mr. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received May 21.)

My Lord,

Peking, March 14, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copies of a despatch to Admiral Kuper on the proceedings at Ningpo, and of a despatch to General Staveley on the late changes in the Chinese drilled corps.

I regret that any misunderstanding should have taken place between Mr. Burgevine and the Chinese authorities, for he is well spoken of by every one, and the force while under his command achieved the greatest success it has had over the insurgent force; and I am inclined to think that the error he committed in the events that led to his quarrel with the Governor, namely, that of using violence to obtain the money necessary to pay his troops, was prompted by the good motive of preventing the force from breaking up. But the state of things detailed in the report of Mr. Alabaster, on his visit to Sung-keang; the usurpation of Civil authority there, first by Ward and then by Burgevine; their oppressive conduct towards the Chinese, and the waste and extravagance of the corps in general,—have in my opinion awakened, very justly, the alarm of the Chinese authorities as to the dangers that may result from a large body of Chinese disciplined and led by the the class of Europeans to be found among the officers of that corps.

While, therefore, I am desirous of seeing General Burgevine's services properly acknowledged, I think the time is come for taking the force out of the hands of adventurers, and of placing it under officers whose position in the military service of their own country is a guarantee both for their military knowledge and for their economical organization of the force. This is more particularly necessary in a force which is organized primarily with a view to the defence of Shanghai, for the foreign interests are large and tempting, and the force which is to protect them ought to be one that can be thoroughly relied upon.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 43.

Mr. Bruce to Rear-Admiral Kuper.

Sir,

Peking, March 14, 1863.

WITH reference to late proceedings in the neighbourhood of Ningpo, I wish to remark that the instructions of Her Majesty's Government do not authorize the employment of Her Majesty's forces in any operations beyond the defence of Ningpo itself and such a radius as its garrison may be enabled to protect.

If French officers wish to carry on operations against the Tae-pings beyond the above-mentioned limits, they should be informed that Her Majesty's forces cannot be moved in support of them, and the Chinese authorities ought to be remonstrated with, if these distant operations are undertaken, and Ningpo exposed to risk from the absence of a garrison. Our policy is to protect the ports against any assault, not to make war on the Tae-pings, and this distinction must be borne in mind.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 43.

Mr. Bruce to Brigadier-General Staveley.

(Extract.)

Peking, March 12, 1863.

WITH reference to the late proceedings at Shanghai, I am very anxious it should be borne in mind that we are not making war on the Tae-pings. Her Majesty's Government has approved of Shanghai and the radius round being saved from the ruin that would befall our commercial interests were that port to fall a prey to this civil war, and it has approved of aid being given to the Chinese in disciplining their troops, and liberty is, I understand, to be granted to officers in Her Majesty's service to enter that of the Emperor of China.

Such officers as take advantage of that permission will be at liberty to serve in any part of the Empire and against its domestic foes, but they will then bear a Chinese and not a British character, and Her Majesty's Government will not be responsible for the acts done by them in that capacity.

But officers lent to discipline the Chinese are not, in my opinion, justified in serving beyond the radius; they can only serve for the protection of Shanghai and the radius, and in improving the military organization of the Chinese.

I think it would be well to come to a clear understanding on this subject with Le, Foutae, and that you should concert with him a plan for the defence of our common position, which would gradually enable us to reduce the number of troops at Shanghai, and consequently the expenses of the occupation; for I look with dread at the consequences of the financial difficulties that must result from the present rate of expenditure.

As respects Ward's corps, I regret that circumstances should have led to a misunderstanding between Mr. Burgevine and the Governor, as the accounts I had received of the former led me to think that he was well fitted for the post. But as this breach has taken place, it appears to me that the great amount of foreign property at Shanghai renders it desirable that this force should be commanded and officered by men who are not adventurers, and who afford a guarantee, by the position they occupy in the military service of their own country, that they are both competent and to be relied upon; otherwise we should be constituting a force which would be as dangerous to us as the insurgents themselves.

I should prefer that the military men employed by the Chinese Government should not belong to the great Treaty Powers, on account of the jealousies to which the employment gives rise.

But in the meantime, and provisionally, steps must be taken to keep the force together, and to improve its organization, with a view to constitute an efficient garrison for Shanghai.

Whatever assistance we give the Emperor of China is at present indirect, and based on our own, not on his, interests.

No. 44.

Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 23, 1863.

I HAVE received your despatch of the 14th of March, inclosing copies of letters which you had written to General Staveley and Admiral Kuper respecting the organization of "Ward's Force" of Chinese, and the limits within which Her Majesty's military and naval forces should confine the assistance to be given to the Imperial cause, and I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government concur in your views as recorded in those letters.

Her Majesty's Government do not, however, consider it essential that "Ward's Force" should be commanded by an officer a subject or citizen of a non-Treaty Power; the main point is that he should be competent to command.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 45.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(Received May 28.)

Sir,

Admiralty, May 28, 1863.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send you herewith, for the information of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a letter dated the 30th March from Vice-Admiral Kuper, with copy of its inclosure, relating to the state of affairs at Chinese Consular ports.

I am, &c.

(Signed) W. G. ROMAINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 45.

Vice-Admiral Kuper to Secretary to Admiralty.

Sir,

"Euryalus," at Yokohama, March 30, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that by the latest accounts from the Chinese Consular ports the state of affairs continued tranquil, the only exception being at Tamsuy, with reference to which I forward herewith an extract from a letter of the 18th ultimo, from Lieutenant Temple, commanding the "Staunch," stationed between that place and Foochow.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS KUPER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 45.

Lieutenant Temple to Vice-Admiral Kuper.

(Extract.)

Foo-chow, February 18, 1863.

MR. SINCLAIR, Her Majesty's Consul at Foo-chow, has inclosed me a despatch from Mr. Braune, Vice-Consul at Tamsuy, in which that officer represents the place to be in a disturbed state, and requests the presence of a man-of-war, and the interference of the provincial authorities at Foo-chow.

I in consequence met two of the Prefects at a conference at the Consulate, when these matters were represented to them, and yesterday the Consul received a note from the first Prefect of Foo-chow, accompanied by a despatch for the Taoutae at Tamsuy temporarily restored, which I shall take with me to Tamsuy, as soon as Mr. Sinclair is convinced that the Provincial Government have done all that they promised.

No. 46.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(Received May 30.)

Sir,

Admiralty, May 28, 1863.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send you herewith, for the information of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a letter dated the 30th March, from Rear-Admiral Kuper, with copies of its inclosures, relating to the repulse of Ward's Chinese troops on the 16th February last, before Tai-tsan.

I am, &c.

(Signed) W. G. ROMAINE

Inclosure 1 in No. 46.

Rear-Admiral Kuper to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

ir,

"Euryalus," at Yokohama, March 30, 1863.

I BEG leave to forward herewith, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, a copy of a letter from Captain Borlase, of the "Pearl," late senior officer at Shanghae, detailing the particulars of the reverse met with by Ward's Chinese troops before Tai-tsan, on the 15th February, and alluded to in my general letter of the 25th of the same month.

2. Inclosure No. 2 is an extract from a further report from Captain Borlase, showing the steps taken by the Brigadier-General at Shanghae to check the advance of the rebels.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. L. KUPER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 46.

Captain Borlase to Rear-Admiral Kuper.

ir,

"Pearl," Shanghae, February 22, 1863.

ON the 15th February the Sung-keong or Ward's force attacked Tai-tsan, and succeeded in making a breach with their 32-pounder guns.

On advancing to storm the place, however, they were met with such an overwhelming force of rebels who had assembled there from Soo-chow and the neighbouring district that they were driven back with a loss of about 200 men, and were obliged to leave two of their 32-pounder guns behind.

The General had strongly objected to Ward's force being employed on this service, and had refused to give Captain Holland permission to cross the boundary.

Le, the Footae, however insisted on the force going, whether Captain Holland accompanied it or not; the force, he said, was of no use if it could not be employed in such a service, and he talked not only of reducing it, but of entirely disbanding it. It was my opinion, as well as that of General Staveley, that it would be impossible for Captain Holland to continue to command the force if it went without him. The General, therefore, let Captain Holland go, at his own risk of the consequences.

I consider it to be most fortunate that he did so, as had Captain Holland not been present, the whole of the artillery would have been lost.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JNO. BORLASE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 46.

Captain Borlase to Rear-Admiral Kuper.

(Extract.)

"Pearl," Shanghae, February 22, 1863.

ON the 16th instant the Imperialists having been defeated in an attempt to take Tai-tsan, Brigadier-General Staveley took 500 Infantry and two Armstrong guns to Kading, for the purpose of checking the rebels should they attempt to cross the boundary.

It being the wish of the General to send his supplies by the Woo-sung creek, which was deep water all the way to Kading, I caused the boats to be towed by the gun-boats to the entrance of the creek.

The troops return to-day, the rebels not having shown themselves on this side of the boundary.

No. 47.

Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir, *Foreign Office, June 5, 1863.*

HER Majesty's Government have considered, in communication with the Law Officers of the Crown, your despatches of the 6th and 26th of January and 24th of February, and their inclosures, respecting the further questions which had arisen in connection with the case of the "Pearl," namely, as to the extent to which, under the XLVIIIth Article of the Treaty of Tien-tsin, the Chinese authorities have the power of confiscation in the case of a vessel which has taken on board a prohibited cargo at a prohibited port.

It appears from these papers that you support the view taken by the Chinese Government of its right to confiscate both vessel and cargo, but that Consul Sinclair and the Attorney-General at Hong Kong contend that the vessel is not liable to confiscation unless she is seized in the act of trading with the port itself at which by Treaty she is not entitled to trade.

I have now to state to you that Her Majesty's Government do not see any reason for narrowing the construction of the language of the XLVIIIth Article of the Treaty so as to defeat its plain and avowed object, and that Her Majesty's Government concur with you in thinking that the Chinese authorities have power to confiscate the "Pearl," as well as her cargo.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 48.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(Received June 13.)

Sir, *Admiralty, June 12, 1863.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send you herewith for the information of Earl Russell, a copy of a letter dated the 14th of April last, from Rear-Admiral Kuper, and of its inclosures, respecting the proceedings of Captain Dew of the "Encounter" at Show-shing; and I am to state that my Lords have desired the Rear-Admiral to inform Captain Dew that he exceeded his instructions in taking part in hostilities beyond the prescribed limit of thirty miles.

I am, &c.
(Signed) C. PAGET.

Inclosure 1 in No. 48.

Rear-Admiral Kuper to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, *"Euryalus," at Yokohama, April 14, 1863.*

WHEN Captain Dew reported to me the death of Acting Lieutenant Tinling of the "Encounter," from the effects of a wound received under the walls of Show-shing, I considered it my duty to inquire under what circumstances the deceased officer had been engaged in hostile operations at that place, situated at some eighty or ninety miles from the city of Ningpo.

2. The accompanying copy of Captain Dew's reply, although it states that the officers had the strictest orders not to act against the Tae-pings, shows that he and his officers were present to prevent any false step being taken by the disciplined force, though, as it would

appear, taking a part in hostilities beyond the prescribed limit of thirty miles, and I have informed Captain Dew that in so doing I consider he exceeded his instructions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS L. KUPER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 48.

Captain Dew to Rear-Admiral Kuper.

Sir,

"Encounter," Yokohama, April 13, 1863.

IN reply to your memorandum of the 28th ultimo, calling on me to report under what circumstances the late Acting Lieutenant Tinling, of this ship, was engaged in hostile operations at Show-shing, I have to state that Acting Lieutenant Tinling had accompanied me to the front, whither I had gone to watch the proceedings and prevent, if possible, any false step being taken by the Chinese disciplined force, which would at once have imperilled Ningpo. Though both Acting Lieutenant Tinling and the other officers with me had the strictest orders not to act against the Tae-pings, or run any risk by exposing themselves, still I hold myself responsible for the fate of this young and promising officer.

I am, &c.
(Signed) R. DEW.

No. 49.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(Received June 13.)

Sir,

Admiralty, June 12, 1863.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send you herewith, for the information of Earl Russell, a copy of a letter of the 14th instant, from Rear-Admiral Kuper, inclosing an extract from a letter from Captain R. Dew, of Her Majesty's ship "Encounter" (a copy of which is also inclosed), reporting the evacuation of Show-shing by the Tae-pings.

I am, &c.
(Signed) C. PAGET.

Inclosure 1 in No. 49.

Rear-Admiral Kuper to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir,

"Euryalus," at Yokohama, April 14, 1863.

BE pleased to inform the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that no intelligence of importance has reached me from any of the Chinese Consular ports.

2. The evacuation of the city of Show-shing, eighty or ninety miles from Ningpo, as described in the inclosed extract from a report from Captain Dew of the "Encounter," has restored the Province of the Chi-kiang to the undivided control of the Imperial Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS L. KUPER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 49.

Captain Dew to Rear-Admiral Kuper.

(Extract.)

"Encounter," April 12, 1863.

ACTING on the discretionary orders contained in your Memorandum of the 23rd of February, I did not deem it advisable to leave Ningpo till the large city of Show-shing, then being besieged by the Imperialists, had fallen, there being a report that Chung Wang, with 50,000 men, was coming to its relief, and the withdrawal of the "Encounter" from Ningpo at that time would have caused a panic. I am glad to inform you that Show-shing was evacuated by the Tae-pings on the 20th ultimo, and that they were driven across the Hang-chow Bay with loss; thus restoring the Che-kiang province to the Imperialists, and making the presence of a gun-boat only necessary at Ningpo.

No. 50.

Mr. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received June 17.)

My Lord,

Peking, March 30, 1863.

WITH reference to the mode of proceeding in cases of breaches of the Custom-house Regulations, contained in the Treaties with China, I have the honour to inclose the accompanying letter to Mr. Consul Harvey. It embodies the views of the United States' Minister, as well as my own, on this rather complicated question.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure in No. 50.

Mr. Bruce to Consul Harvey.

Sir,

Peking, March 30, 1863.

WITH respect to the imposition of a penalty on the "Blackburn," I have to direct your attention to the legal opinions on the powers of the Chinese Government under Treaty forwarded by me to Mr. Consul Medhurst.

I apprehend in such cases that the Chinese authority is at liberty to seize and confiscate goods landed in breach of regulation. This power of confiscation extends, however, only to goods in process of landing, not to the cargo which remains on board.

If the Chinese authorities wish to impose a fine under Treaty, they must address a complaint to the Consul, and you must hear the case in the usual way, but without Assessors. The Chinese are not entitled to impose a fine indirectly by withholding the ship's papers until it is paid; unless, indeed, the Consul should refuse to hear the case. If the Consul decides improperly, an appeal lies to the Minister.

Certain breaches of regulation are punishable by a fine, the amount of which is specified in the Treaty. Where the words "not exceeding" are attached to the penalty, you are at liberty to award such proportion of the extreme penalty fixed as you may think just under the circumstances of a case; but where a specific sum is fixed without such qualifying words, the fine becomes an obligation due under Treaty to the Chinese Government, and you have no option but to inflict the amount specified, on proof of the breach of regulation. You can only bring forward, subsequently, such circumstances in mitigation to the notice of the Chinese authority as may tend to show that he ought to be satisfied with less than the whole penalty.

This proceeding is in the nature of an equitable appeal, rather than the exercise of a legal right.

With respect to this particular case, I have to observe that it is the duty of the Minister to state general principles, and of the Consul to apply them to particular cases, and that there is great inconvenience and irregularity in the Consul shrinking from the performance of his part in a matter so simple. Neither I nor the Chinese Government can arrive at any satisfactory conclusion on the question, whether the whole penalty, or a portion of it, or none at all, ought to be levied. There may be equitable considerations in favour of the master; on the other hand, there may be a general contempt shown for regulations which may make it necessary for the Superintendent of Customs to exact the full penalty, whenever regulations are infringed. The hesitation that has been shown at Shanghai, in facing the unpopularity of recognizing the rights of the Chinese Government under Treaty, and in enforcing the obligations of Her Majesty's subjects in Custom-house matters, is the real cause of that want of an amicable understanding which gives rise to cases such as the present; and I am convinced that if you will consult with the Chinese authorities, whether native or foreign, in a suitable spirit, showing a disposition to recognize the rights of China if they respect those of Great Britain, you will not find any difficulty in settling these particular cases, or if you do find difficulty, I will have it removed.

I request you to come to a clear understanding with Mr. Hart or Mr. Fitzroy on the substance of this despatch, and state to these gentlemen that I think it most desirable for the interests of the Chinese Government that local matters should be as much as possible amicably settled at Shanghai itself, and that in exacting fines they would do well always to make allowance for *bond fide* extenuating circumstances. Their position is a delicate one, and they ought to avoid the appearance of harshness.

I have the authority of Mr. Burlingame, the Minister of the United States, for stating that he concurs in the principles herein laid down.

I am, &c.

(Signed)

FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

No. 51.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received June 17.)

(Extract.)

Peking, March 30, 1863.

DREAD of diminished revenue is the great obstacle we have to encounter in the Yang-tze arrangements, and the establishment of Custom-houses at the ports in the interior has in this respect favourably disposed the local authorities to trade. In order to make permanent and specific progress we must show that we do not propose to sacrifice the interests of China. If we cannot succeed in conciliating these interests, we are only preparing the way for a reaction against our privileges which will, sooner or later, leave us no means but force of protecting them.

No. 52.

Mr. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received June 17.)

(Extract.)

Peking, April 8, 1863.

DURING winter, bands, consisting of brigands in considerable numbers, had penetrated the southern part of this province from the mountainous districts of Shan-tung, destroying the unwallled villages and pillaging the peasantry. The Governor-General of the province, being unable to drive them back, was degraded, and his Excellency Tsung-how, the Superintendent of Trade in the northern ports, who resides at Tien-tsin, was named Acting Governor-General, and charged with the duty of restoring tranquillity. This officer has taken great interest in the drill of the Chinese troops at Tien-tsin and Taku, and finding, on his arrival at the disturbed districts, that the troops on the spot were not sufficient, he applied for the assistance of the trained force. Mr. Acting Consul Gibson represented to me that they were not fit to act without the presence of Captain Coney, of Her Majesty's 67th Regiment, and the military instructors; and as the bands to be repressed have no political character, and are merely plunderers, I sanctioned this officer's accompanying the men. I further permitted Mr. Gibson to go with the force, as his Excellency Tsung-how had expressed a wish to have that gentleman as a medium of communication, and because, the river being then frozen, business at Tien-tsin was at a stand-still. I was also desirous of having from him an exact account of the nature and extent of this anarchical movement.

Unfortunately, Mr. Gibson, having undertaken to make a reconnaissance, came upon some of these bands, whom he charged and dispersed, but in doing so received a wound from a spear above the eye, which threatened serious consequences. I am glad to say, however, that he is recovering, and I hope he will be restored to duty shortly.

I regret very much this accident to Mr. Gibson, who has proved himself a zealous and efficient Consular officer.

Inclosure in No. 52.

Captain Coney to Sir F. Bruce.

*Tsien-kia-tchang, 13 miles north-north-east of Lien-tsen,
on the West Bank of the Imperial Canal,
March 9, 1863.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report to you that I arrived at Ouy-shien, the head-quarters of the Imperial army, with the Chinese disciplined troops* on the 4th instant, and put myself in communication with the Commissioner Choong-heou, Acting Governor of the Province of Chi-li, from whom I learnt that the rebels were in force to the south-west, the nearest body being some ten or twelve miles distant, but were kept in check on the west side by large bodies of both cavalry and infantry. The Governor's object appeared to be to drive the rebels south into the Honan province; but as they still threatened north, either for the purpose of crossing the canal at this place, where it is easily forded, or passing to the west of Ouy-shien, and so escaping north again, I deemed it advisable to remain a day at Ouy-shien awaiting their movements.

Mr. Gibson, who had preceded me, I found on my arrival about to start immediately with 550 cavalry, to be increased to 800 on the march, for the purpose of making a recon-

* 2 Battalions of Infantry, 800; 1 battery of Artillery, 6 field-pieces; 2 8-inch mortars, 2 5½-inch mortars.

naissance, and also preventing the rebels crossing the canal at this point, but with strict injunctions from me, under whose orders he placed himself, not to molest them in any way unless they attempted either to cross or fly. It appears, however, by what I learn from an European who accompanied him—Stewart by name, late serjeant 31st Regiment—that Mr. Gibson attacked a body of Infantry about mid-day (5th), who gave way, suffering a loss of some fifteen or twenty. Later in the day he engaged a large body of Cavalry, when I am sorry to say he was severely wounded by a spear immediately above the left eye. No loss on either side. The Imperial Cavalry appeared to have behaved most badly, not one-tenth having attempted to follow Mr. Gibson into action. The report, however, that night to the Governor at Ouy-shien was “a successful engagement; some 400 or 500 rebels killed and wounded; no casualty on the Imperialist side save Mr. Gibson, slightly wounded.”

Not receiving any communication from Mr. Gibson, I proceeded at once (6th) south-eastward to Chia-pou-se, the Governor sending orders for the troops on the west side to move eastward, and close in, so as if possible to drive the rebels towards me; at the same time directing this point, Tsien-kia-tchang, to be occupied. On arriving at Chia-pou-se, I found Mr. Gibson not slightly, as reported, but badly wounded (the eye itself is I believe not damaged); he was, from over-excitement and fatigue, feverish and unconscious, and it was not until the evening of the following day, the 7th, that he recognized me. About 2 o'clock on the morning of the 8th, I received a communication from the Commandant of this post, requesting I would come at once to his assistance, the rebels having appeared in large numbers on the opposite bank of the canal, and he feared they would force a passage. I accordingly got under arms before dawn, and came to him bringing the disciplined troops, some 250 Cavalry and two field-pieces, also the two 5½-inch mortars, sending Mr. Gibson under escort back to Ouy-shien. The rebels are in great force on the other side, but I think it impossible for them to cross, certainly at this point. They show in great numbers at night, and in the day-time reconnoitre in small parties of three and four. This day a sentry, contrary to orders, fired, and some twenty of the picket took it up, and shot one of the reconnoitring party at a long range. This I regret, as my object is not to molest them unless in mass.

The result of the closing in of the troops was the driving the rebels across the canal, and chiefly it appears at this point, which does not appear to have been held sufficiently in time. One mandarin reports an engagement, when closing, in which he killed some 400, the rest dispersing; but I am inclined to put but little faith in his statement.

The province I believe is at this moment clear of rebels—at least they have dispersed; but I fear when the troops are withdrawn, they will re-appear in as large numbers as formerly.

The country through which we have passed has been sadly laid waste, and very many villages either totally or partially burnt; the towns for the most part deserted; all gates closed and barricaded. At the French Jesuit Mission at Chiang-chiang, we found the priests prepared to fly—this at a distance of about 130 miles north. I am accompanied by the Père le Boncq, who volunteered his services as interpreter, and of great assistance have I found him, especially in the absence of Mr. Gibson.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. CONEY.

P.S. *March 10th.*—I have just received a communication from the Governor at Ouy-shien, reporting Mr. Gibson still unconscious. Le Père le Boncq starts at once to see him, but I trust ere this Dr. Annesley, from Tien-tsin, will have arrived; he promised, if possible, to follow us in a few days.

A. C.

No. 53.

Vice-Consul Markham to Earl Russell.—(Received June 17.)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, copy of a despatch addressed by me, on the 17th instant, to Sir F. W. A. Bruce.

Shanghai, April 18, 1863.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM.

Inclosure 1 in No. 53.

Vice-Consul Markham to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Shanghai, April 17, 1863.

IT is with much pleasure that I have to report the complete success of Major Gordon's first expedition in command of the Sung-keong force for the relief of Chan-zu, which was accomplished on the 6th instant, with the trifling loss of two men killed, and one officer and two men wounded.

I beg to inclose an interesting Memorandum on the operations, handed me by Major Gordon.

Respectfully, &c.
(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM.

Inclosure 2 in No. 53.

*Memorandum on Operations undertaken for the Relief of Chanzu in the Spring of 1863.**Head-Quarters, Sung-keong, April 11, 1863.*

ABOUT the latter end of January a large city, Chan-zu, situated about sixty miles north-east of Soo-chow, thirty miles from Tai-tsan, and about seventy miles above Woo-sung, tendered its allegiance to the Imperial Government. The Governor of the province (Footae) sent immediately a mandarin of rank to this city, which is some twelve miles from the Yang-tze, and is surrounded by a high wall which envelopes part of the Muirhead Hills. A large creek leads from Yang-tze through the village of Fu-shan to Chan-zu, and thence to Soo-chow. This village of Fu-shan is situated about three miles from the Yang-tze, and has a notoriety for being a pirate station, and for its importing arms into the rebel country.

The Footae therefore detached some of his troops in gun-boats, and a small force of 500 men and one gun, under Major Brennan, of the Sung-keong force, to take Fu-shan, and thus open the communication with the Yang-tze. Chan-zu was now closely beleaguered, and upwards of five Wangs, with some 30,000 to 40,000 troops, invested it. The garrison consisted of 300 Cantonese (who were executed soon after its investment for treachery), and 8,000 rebels who had come over. Two Frenchmen were among the garrison who had been rebels. The country people flocked in in great numbers, and the number of inhabitants were thus much increased. There was a year's rice, but no powder for the troops.

To return to Major Brennan's expedition, it will suffice to say that the troops landed at the joss-house, and after two or three days' fighting in the village near the same, and on the opposite side of the creek, they found it was hopeless to push matters any further, and therefore re-embarked and returned.

The Tai-tsan expedition being on the eve of departure nothing further was done till after the repulse, when the Footae again agitated the question, and this resulted in another expedition consisting of 200 Artillery, with four 12-pounder howitzers, and the 1st Battalion, some 650 strong, being sent with some of the Footae's troops. This expedition landed on the other side of the creek to joss-house, and after driving the rebels into the two Fu-shan stockades took possession of the village and country about Fu-shan. The Imperialists strongly entrenched themselves on the beach and on the four or five isolated hills about the neighbourhood, and then Major Tapp, of the Artillery, who commanded the expedition, got his guns in position, and made his attack. This attack was made on the eastern stockade; but owing to the want of a bridge, and also from the immense reinforcements the rebels threw into the place, it failed, and the troops took up their position, to wait for reinforcements, in the village of Fu-shan, some 900 yards from the rebel stockades.

Reinforcements were sent off on the 4th April, and after some small delay (the "Zingari," Indian steamer, running aground, whereby two men were killed by the cable, and through fogs on the Yang-tze River), the expeditionary reinforcement, consisting of 200 Artillery, with one 12-pounder rocket, 32-pounder gun, and two 12-pounder howitzers, and two cohorts, and the Ningpo battery of 500 men, landed at the Imperialists stockades. On the 5th the 12-pounders, which had been put on board ship, were landed and dragged up to the point (viz., the village of Fu-shan), the 32-pounder in boat was sent up the creek under a strong escort, and landed at the village.

It is necessary now to return to Chan-zu. The rebels on hearing of the intended attack on Tai-tsan, sent off part of their troops, and on the repulse of the attack on this place they returned with the two 32-pounders they had captured and a man of the 1st battalion whom they had taken prisoner, and to whom they gave three European's heads with orders to this man to take them into Chan-zu, and show the people that they had repulsed the attack, and that they had better give up their Chiefs and return to rebel rule. The Head man of Chan-zu refused to let the prisoner in, but took the heads and burned them; the man was afterwards sent about his business by the rebels, and went into Chan-zu. The rebels now got the two 32-pounders into position some 500 yards from the wall, and, with five Europeans who were with them, they bombarded the wall for three days doing trifling damage; they then burst the 32-pounders through using their own shot, and sent them off to Soo-chow. This is gathered from the Head man of Chan-zu garrison, who had his information from some of the rebels who had served the guns, and who had afterwards deserted. The rebels now tried to blow up the walls, and made several attacks by ladders keeping the garrison very much on the alert. In these attacks the officer sent up by the Footae had his eye knocked out by a stone, and was shot through the turban. This would show the attacks were serious, as it must have been a vigorous attack to call him to the walls and into such a prominent position. The rebels now sold the garrison various things at extravagant prices, getting by these means a good deal of plunder in the city. The Chan-zu Head man heard of the attack of Major Tapp, and was sadly cast down. The rebels held every gate, and had made a breastwork around the same which defied the garrison to escape; some spies, however, from time to time got out.

To return to Fu-shan. The position taken up by Major Tapp was excellent, and it was determined to make the attack from this point.

The rebel stockades were divided by a creek, on the left bank of which was the wall of the ruined city of Fu-shan, some 300 years old; the east wall of this formed a capital approach to the edge of the creek opposite the east stockade, and the creek running parallel to this wall gave good protection to the troops for the assault. The rebel stockades were some 300 yards long and 60 yards wide, and from the south-east angle of the ruined wall alluded to, and where the column debouched, no fire could be brought to bear. The arch of the ruined northern gateway gave a good position for the 32-pounders, distant some 600 yards from wall of stockade; from this place the country was commanded. The four 12-pounder howitzers were put in front, and clear of its line of fire, and the cohorns to the right and left of the 32-pounders, which could enfilade the east and west faces of the stockade attacked. The 32-pounders' object was—

1. To silence the guns in front attacked.
2. To enfilade the two faces alluded to.
3. To make a breach.
4. To see that the rebel reinforcements were kept from our flanks.

Another 12-pounder howitzer was put on the west of the city wall, so as to keep a fire on the bridge which united the two rebel stockades.

The Imperialists were to keep the right flank clear.

The Ningpo Battery and two companies of Rifles were placed under the east face of the ruined wall, and had to keep up a musketry fire to their left; in the creek were the boats for bridge; the 1st Battalion were in reserve, two companies being thrown out as skirmishers towards the stockades, so as to cover the 12-pounder bearing on the bridge.

The rebels during this time did not molest us; they kept up a desultory fire, and showed in great strength in rear of the stockades; 1,000 Canton men were said to be in rear, and they are said to be the men who kept the Fu-shan garrison from retreating, or coming over to us.

April 6.—It being low water at 10:30 A.M., the guns opened at that hour, and after a hot fire for thirty-five minutes the point of attack was so damaged that no fire to speak of was kept up; being only 60 yards in extent the number of guns was terrific, and although after every shot the rebels would fire from one or two loopholes, it was evident they had no chance. The rebel reinforcements now swarmed up, and the 32-pounder having fulfilled its duty as to a breach, the boats were pushed up and the troops passed over, the 1st Battalion skirmishers pushing up and joining the right of the stormers. The 32-pounder now sent its shell into the rebel reserves, truly formidable as far as flags are concerned, but they were stopped by three or four rounds. The storming party now pushed through both stockades, and in a disorganized state some few men ran over to the rebels who were coming up to the reserve. A valuable officer was here wounded, Captain Belcher. The troops being very little in hand, were not fit to attack the dense masses of rebels close to the place, and therefore it was determined to halt in the stockades and make sure of the capture; the guns, also, that had been used had to be got together

before we could advance to Chanzu, nine miles distant : about forty rounds had been fired from the 32-pounder and thirty rounds from the 12-pounders.

It was determined to advance on the 7th April, but on that day the rebels retreated, evacuating two very strong lines of stockades situated between Fu-shan and Chanzu, and clearing away for some thirty miles. The road from Chanzu to Fu-shan is very wide, the country very fairly cultivated, but the villages gutted as usual. No people had then, on the 7th, returned, but they were coming back when we returned. About half-way from Fu-shan to Chanzu were the head-quarters of the rebel Chiefs, near which thirty-four men of the Footae's soldiers had been crucified and burnt with hot irons on their chests. These men had been taken from boats which had been cast on shore during a storm. A cargo-boat marked "O. & Co., No. 2," was found near here; it appears it was captured off Fu-shan five months ago, and the crew of five Englishmen executed. The rebels had a very strong position in front of the north gate, and had evidently pressed the garrison hard—their scaling ladders were lying about. The city of Chanzu is partly in ruins; its creeks are full of boats; and although the lower parts of the houses are closed, there appear a great number of inhabitants in them—these are the peasants of the neighbourhood who came in for shelter; the walls are well manned and have verandahs over them.

The Head man lives in a very fine joss-house; he receives with great state, and is surrounded by the subordinate Chiefs, good-looking intelligent young men of 25 or thereabouts, who are Colonels. These Chiefs are well dressed in silks and embroidered shoes, and large pearls in their caps. There is no crowding in of the servants, but much more style than is usual in great mandarins' houses.

The Head Chief is a middle-aged man; he has five wives, who are covered with bangles of gold, and a large retinue. He had a most care-worn look, and expressed greatly his misery during his beleaguering.

On the evening of the 7th eleven mandarin hats were taken in, with the flags of office, and as the rebels had disappeared from the neighbourhood, and the Chanzu rebels who had come over and Imperialists had together some 15,000 men, the expedition returned, leaving a small garrison at Fu-shan.

The rebels who fought at Fu-shan, and many others, are said to be very willing to come over, and the good faith shown by the Imperialists at Chanzu will have great influence.

The mandarin discipline is very strict, and the smallest breach of discipline is punished by death.

The loss of the force was: one officer severely wounded, two men killed, and two wounded.

(Signed) C. G. GORDON, Major,
Commanding Sung-keong Force.

No. 54.

Sir E. Lugard to Mr. Hammond.—(Received June 18.)

Sir, War Office, June 17, 1863.
I AM directed by the Secretary of State for War to transmit to you, for the information of Earl Russell, the accompanying copy of a despatch from Brigadier-General Staveley, inclosing the copy of a letter which he had addressed to Her Majesty's Minister at Peking, in which he reports the result of an interview with the Viceroy of Hu Kwang.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD LUGARD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 54.

Brigadier-General Staveley to Sir G. C. Lewis.

Sir, Head-Quarters, Shanghai, April 16, 1863.
I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a letter addressed by me to his Excellency Sir Frederick Bruce, K.C.B., relative to my visit to Hankow for the purpose of an interview with the Viceroy Tsang Kwo-fan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. STAVELEY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 54.

Brigadier-General Staveley to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Head-Quarters, Shanghai, April 16, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to report for your information, that having made an excursion up the Yang-tze River as far as Hankow, I had an interview with Quan, the Viceroy of Hu Kwang, who informed me that only two-tenths of the Province of Sze-chuen was occupied by the rebels (the Nien-fei rebels), and that were it not for fear of these the revenue of Hankow would be much greater; a large number of native traders not having the means of going to the latter port for traffic,

He complained that he had to provide the Viceroy and Commander-in-chief Tseng Kwo-fan with funds for his army in the valley of the Yang-tze, whereas the authorities at Shanghai provide scarcely any.

I also had an interview with the Viceroy Tseng Kwo-fan, who was on a tour of inspection of his troops; he informed me that a large body of Tae-ping rebels had crossed the Yang-tze from Nanking, and were endeavouring to form a junction to the westward with the Nien-fei rebels, and that he was making arrangements for driving them back on Nanking. The Tae-pings had got as far as the east side of Poyang Lake, and he had a force on the west side.

The Nien-fei rebels have a force at Hing-chu in the north of Ngan-whei Province.

Tseng Kwo-fan's tactics are, he informed me, to drive the Tae-pings into the corner formed by the mouth of the Yang-tze and Hang-chow Bay, as I informed you in my letter of the 17th of January, 1863.

I was detained a few days in an Imperialist camp at Wuhu, on the Yang-tze waiting for a steamer, and the amount of suffering I observed among refugees who had sought protection under the guns (such as they are) of the place was truly deplorable; this is the state of things at all the Imperial stations on the river.

Tseng Kwo-fan complained that vessels with European flags on board, and whom he cannot interfere with, keep Nanking supplied with provisions.

Captain Sherard Osborn's vessels, should they arrive, will no doubt be able to put a stop to this.

I am of opinion that if Nanking, Foo-chow, and Hang-chow were taken, there would be an end to the Tae-ping rebellion, and this might be effected by raising a force of 10,000 Chinese, organized by European officers, to co-operate with Captain Osborn's squadron.

The European element would no doubt be costly, but would in the end prove a great saving if successful, considering the money wasted on the large army in the valley of the Yang-tze, whose system is not to capture by assault, but to sit down for years before a place in the hope of starving it out.

I have, &c.

(Signed) C. STAVELEY.

No. 55.

Sir E. Lugard to Mr. Hammond.—(Received June 20.)

Sir,

War Office, June 20, 1863.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for War to transmit to you, for the information of Earl Russell, the accompanying copy of a letter from Major-General Brown, commanding the forces in China, together with its inclosure, on the subject of the proposal to reinstate General Burgevine in the command of the "Ward's Force."

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWARD LUGARD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 55.

Major-General Brown to Sir G. C. Lewis.

(Extract.)

Head-Quarters, Shanghai, April 22, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your information, a copy of a letter received this day from Sir Frederick Bruce, relative to the reinstatement of Mr. Burgevine to the

command of the Ward Force, and beg to inform you that, at an interview this afternoon with Le, Footae, on the subject of Sir F. Bruce's communication, he expressed himself decidedly against the instructions received from Peking, viz., the reinstatement of Mr. Burgevine to his former command, and declined to supersede Major Gordon (in whom he has already learnt to rely) without making further reference to his own Government.

I purpose writing at once to Sir F. Bruce, supporting the Chinese authorities at Shanghai, expressing a wish that Major Gordon may still be allowed to retain his command until more definite instructions be received by Le, Footae, from Peking; Major Gordon having already done so much towards the organization of the force under his command.

Inclosure 2 in No. 55.

Sir F. Bruce to Brigadier-General Staveley.

Sir,

Peking, April 10, 1863.

THE Chinese Government having informed me officially of the charges brought against General Burgevine, I took occasion to examine them at length, and I am perfectly satisfied that General Burgevine acted from a regard to the interests confided to him, that he was sacrificed to an intrigue of some Chinese subordinate officers, and to the jealousy entertained by the Governor towards the Chinese drilled force, against which he thought he might strike a first blow with safety on account of General Burgevine being an American.

Now if foreign officers are to have any security in the Chinese service, and if honourable men are to be induced to enter it, it is absolutely necessary that they should be sustained against the intrigues and injustice of local authorities, and I have therefore cordially joined in recommending the Chinese Government to replace General Burgevine in the command of Ward's Force.

Of General Burgevine's intelligence, tact, and good sentiments, I have formed a favourable opinion, and the fact of his being cosmopolitan, though nominally American, renders me very desirous that his restoration to command should be effected, and that he should receive, as hitherto, every assistance from the officers of Her Majesty's service.

General Burgevine will be accompanied by a Chinese Commissioner to settle the affair with the Governor, and I shall be very glad if you will use your influence in furthering these views, and that you will explain to Major Gordon that this is not a step taken on any comparison of his merits and those of General Burgevine for the command, but in pursuance of the general policy of seeing justice done to foreigners in the Chinese service to whatever nationality they belong.

I have, &c.

(Signed) **FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.**

No. 56.

Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 23, 1863.

HER Majesty's Government approve the instruction of which a copy is inclosed in your despatch of the 30th of March, and which you addressed to Mr. Consul Harvey, stating your view of the course of proceeding to be adopted by Consuls in cases of breaches of the Custom-house Regulations contained in the Treaties with China.

I am, &c.

(Signed) **RUSSELL.**

No. 57.

Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 23, 1863.

HER Majesty's Government approve your views with regard to conciliating the Chinese, as set forth in your despatch of the 30th of March last.

I am, &c.

(Signed) **RUSSELL.**

No. 58.

Mr. Layard to Sir E. Lugard.

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 23, 1863.

I HAVE laid before Earl Russell your letter to Mr. Hammond of the 20th instant, transmitting copies of a letter and its inclosure from Major-General Brown on the subject of the proposal to reinstate General Burgevine in the command of "Ward's Force;" and I am, in reply, to state to you, for the information of the Secretary of State for War, that Her Majesty's Government see no reason to interfere in this matter.

I am, &c.

(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 59.

Sir E. Lugard to Mr. Hammond.—(Received June 23.)

Sir,

War Office, June 23, 1863.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for War to transmit to you, for the information of Earl Russell, the accompanying copy of a despatch from Brigadier-General Staveley, together with its inclosure from Major Gordon, the officer now in command of the "Ward's Force," in which he reports the capture of Fu-shan from the Chinese rebels, and the relief of the garrison of Chang-shu.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWARD LUGARD.

Inclosure in No. 59.

Brigadier-General Staveley to Sir G. C. Lewis.

Sir,

Head-Quarters, Shanghai, April 17, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to report that the rebel city of Chang-shu, twenty miles to the north-east of Kading, the garrison of which had a short time since given in its allegiance to the Emperor, has for some time been invested by the Tae-pings.

The Tae-pings had also recovered the town of Fu-shan, situated between Chang-shu and the Yang-tze River, thus cutting off all communication with Chang-shu.

Two expeditions composed of detachments of the "Ward's Force" and the Imperialist troops which had been sent by the Governor of the province for the capture of Fu-shan and the relief of Chang-shu had failed, when, on the 3rd instant, Major Gordon, half-pay Royal Engineers, who had just been placed in command of the "Ward's Force," attacked Fu-shan, captured it, and drove back many thousands of rebels, and relieved the garrison of Chang-shu.

Major Gordon appears to have performed this service with much ability and judgment.

I herewith inclose a copy of his report.*

I have, &c.

(Signed) C. STAVELEY.

No. 60.

Vice-Consul Markham to Earl Russell.—(Received July 1.)

My Lord,

Shanghai, May 5, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to forward for your Lordship's information, copy of a despatch addressed by me, on the 27th ultimo, to Sir F. W. A. Bruce.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM.

* Inclosure 2 in No. 53.

Inclosure 1 in No. 60.

*Vice-Consul Markham to Sir F. Bruce.**Shanghai, April 27, 1863.*

Sir,

ON receipt of your despatch I addressed the letter of which I inclose copy to his Excellency the Footae, but up to the present moment I have received no reply thereto. General Brown has however shown me a letter he received from the Footae, on the subject of General Burgevine's reinstatement to the command of the Sung-kiang force, in which he most positively refuses to displace Major Gordon and reinstate General Burgevine. The authorities here, together with the mandarins, gentry, and people of Sung-kiang, object to Burgevine's reinstatement on the following grounds:—That it is likely to lead to a renewal of the disturbances, riots, and mutinies, to which the force has hitherto been prone. That Burgevine has never worked harmoniously with the mandarins, and is consequently unlikely to do so now. That in addition to his unfitness from want of knowledge of the Chinese, he is likewise physically unfit for the command of troops in the field; that the force, if given over to him, would immediately become again an anti-mandarin, uncontrolled, but well-armed rabble, dangerous alike to foreigners and Chinese. They also state, and with reason, that if Burgevine is reinstated, all the British officers who have joined the force, and to whom it is indebted for its present efficiency and future standing, will send in their resignations.

At an interview I had with Major-General Brown on the subject, he showed himself much opposed to the reinstatement of Burgevine, and he said, that should Major Gordon be removed, the force would likely become of little or no use, but perhaps a source of trouble. As General Brown informs me that he is writing to you, he will give you his views in full.

General Burgevine called on me last Saturday, and mentioned his intention of proceeding to Peking by the "Island Queen," starting from this to-morrow, should the Footae still refuse to recognize him as the Commander of the Sung-kiang force.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM.

P.S., April 28.—Since writing the above I have received an answer to my letter to the Footae, which I send up in original, as there is no time to copy it. A translation of a letter to the General, word for word the same, is sent up by him.

J. M.

Inclosure 2 in No. 60.

Vice-Consul Markham to Le, Footae.

Sir,

Shanghai, April 23, 1863.

I HAVE received a despatch from Her Majesty's Minister at Peking, informing me that General Burgevine comes back to Shanghai with a Chinese Commissioner, for the purpose of being reinstated in command of the Soong-keong force. Her Majesty's Minister further states that he cordially sustains this decision of the high authorities at Peking.

Presuming your Excellency has received a communication of similar purport, I have the honour to request you will, with as little delay as possible, inform me what steps your Excellency intends to take in this matter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM.

Inclosure 3 in No. 60.

Le, Footae, to Vice-Consul Markham.

(Translation.)

April 24, 1863.

THE officer Gordon having received command of the ever-victorious army, having immediately on doing so proceeded to Fu-shan, working day and night, having worked harmoniously with the other Generals there, having exerted himself and attacked with success the walled city, and relieved Chang-zu, and at once returned to Sung-kiang, and organized his force for further operations to sweep out the rebels, having proved himself

valiant, able, and honest, I have congratulated myself, and memorialized His Imperial Majesty to confer on him the dignity and office of Tsung-ping, to enable me to consider him as part of my command.

This Memorial I sent up on the 25th day of the 2nd moon. On the 5th of the 3rd moon I received a letter from the Tsungli yamun, that during the 2nd moon Burgevine had taken on himself to enter Peking, and proceed surreptitiously to the American Legation; that while they were taking steps on this they received a number of letters from the American Minister, to the effect that Burgevine repented him. They also received a strong letter from the English Minister in his favour; that in their opinion Burgevine should be dealt with according to law for striking a mandarin, and taking forcible possession of public moneys; but as he was guaranteed by the English and American Ministers, had already expressed contrition for his fault, and had proceeded to Shanghae, to be dealt with by the chief military authorities of the Province, they thought perhaps the rule might be departed from, and an opportunity given him to turn over a new leaf, and they had, therefore, sent an officer to accompany him to Shanghae, for the Footae to do what he thought best; that if Burgevine did really proceed to Shanghae, and expressed contrition for his offence, the Footae might decide on the line to be taken.

Now had a Chinaman committed the offence of which Burgevine has been guilty, he would long ere this have been seized and severely punished; but, perhaps, being a foreigner, he did not fully understand Chinese customs, and he has in days gone by exerted himself in our service, and received a wound. As he has represented this at Peking, and the various foreign Ministers have spoken strongly in his favour, and as the Tsungli yamun have written leaving the decision to me, and not distinctly ordered me to give him the command of the force should he repent him, and acknowledge his fault, I must change my course with regard to him, and not cut off entirely his chance of repairing his fault.

But with regard to the Ward Force, as when Burgevine had the command, there was no regularity about its expenses; as he allowed it to be disorderly and mutinous, disobedient to orders, and a pest to mandarins and people; as he gave no account of the manner in which he expended the 90,000 taels which Takee had got together for the Nanking expedition, and which he took thence; and as he made up claims for over 300,000 taels of debts, causing Taoutaes Woo and Yang to be degraded and involved, so that to this moment they had been unable to extricate themselves,—I cannot give him command of the force, again to increase vain expenses, and suffer future difficulties.

Again, since Gordon has taken the command he has exerted to himself to organize the force, and though he has had but one month has got the force into shape. As the people and place are charmed with him, as he has already given me returns of the organization of the force, the formation of each regiment, and the expenses, ordinary and extraordinary, in the clearest manner, wishing to drill our troops, and save our money, it is evident that he fully comprehends the state of affairs, and in the expedition he is preparing his men delightedly obeyed him, and preserved proper order: I cannot therefore remove him without cause.

As, moreover, should the report be spread about that Burgevine has come back to Shanghae to resume the command, the various officers and petty officers will be insulted, and the service will suffer, I feel it right to make the letter I have received from the Tsung-li yamun public, together with my intentions with regard to it, that both Gordon may be fully satisfied as to his position and the officers may pay no attention to idle reports.

I have therefore forwarded you herewith a copy of my memorial to the Emperor, and beg you to tell Gordon to feel every confidence, to organize the force jointly with his Chinese colleague, to look for orders to me only, to pay no attention to rumours, and to relax in consequence, and should any of the officers who were in the force in Burgevine's time, and who have since been dismissed, spread idle reports in Sung-kiong, or stir up doubts and plots in Shanghae, causing the men to get disturbed and mutinous, I have written to the General to assist him to seize and deport them, that discipline may be maintained. The Tsung-li yamun has, in referring Burgevine's case to me, shown extraordinary regard for foreigners, and I myself have no desire to show favour to one to the disadvantage of another, at one time severe and at another lenient, but look merely to what is best for the armies, and least dangerous to the State. And as Gordon carries on his duties well, I cannot displace him; should he not do so hereafter, I will then consider what is to be done. I have therefore made up my mind, and besides replying to the Tsung-li yamun memorializing His Majesty to settle the case, and instructing Major Gordon of my decision, I write to inform you, and trust you will give him similar instructions.

Inclosure 4 in No. 60.

Memorial.

AGAIN, the English officer Gordon having taken command of the ever-victorious army, Chang-zu and Chaowen being hard pressed, and the troops at Fu-shan few in number, your Minister ordered him to proceed to their assistance; this he did without delaying an instant, day or night, and arriving there, worked harmoniously with the other Generals, attacked and recovered the city.

The English General Staveley had already told your Minister that Gordon was valiant and intelligent, and the best of all the English officers in Shanghae, and since he has been in command he has ever and anon been to see your Minister to arrange measures, desiring to attack and sweep out the rebels on all sides. He has also endeavoured to discipline, organize, and get under control the force, which was in a very bad state, and has the very best intentions.

Last winter General Staveley agreed, with your Minister, that the foreign officer in command should rank with a Chentae or Taoutae, and it seems right, therefore, that Gordon should do so, and the temporary office and dignity of Chinese Tsung-ping is therefore respectfully craved for him, that your Minister may command and direct him; the commission to be cancelled when everything is over, and he returns to his native country.

Respectfully leaving the decision to His Imperial Majesty, &c.

No. 61.

Sir E. Lugard to Mr. Hammond.—(Received July 2.)

Sir,

War Office, July 2, 1863.

REFERRING to my letter of the 20th, and Mr. Layard's reply of the 23rd ultimo, relative to the retention of Major Gordon, R.E., in the command of the "Ward's Force," I am directed by the Secretary of State for war to transmit to you, for the information of Earl Russell, the accompanying copy of a further letter from the Major-General Commanding in China, together with its inclosures on the subject.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWARD LUGARD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 61.

Major-General Brown to Sir G. C. Lewis.

Sir,

Head-Quarters, Shanghae, May 4, 1863.

WITH reference to my previous correspondence by the last mail, relative to Sir F. Bruce's despatch touching the removal of Major Gordon from the command of the Chinese forces, I now beg to forward copy of my letter addressed to Sir F. Bruce, and likewise the Footae's letter to me, explaining his reasons for wishing me still to retain Major Gordon in command, and to which I have acceded.

Major Gordon has again taken the field with the Chinese forces, and only yesterday reported to me the capture of Tai-tsan, one of the greatest strongholds of the rebels, and most stoutly defended to the last, from the prestige of their two former victories against the Imperialists and the force under Major Holland.

The result, I hope, will be the capture of another rebel stronghold, Quinsan, in a few days; and with the continued success of Major Gordon in the field, it will enable me, I hope, with safety to withdraw the greater part of the European troops from Shanghae, which I have in contemplation, garrisoning Shanghae with the native troops, consisting of the Belooch and 22nd Regiments, and also (if I can accomplish it) with a force of disciplined Chinese.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. G. BROWN.



Inclosure 2 in No. 61.

Major-General Brown to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Shanghai, April 17, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch addressed to Brigadier-General Staveley, dated Peking the 10th instant, informing him of your having recommended to the Chinese Government, that General Burgevine should be reinstated in the command of Ward's force.

The reasons as stated in your despatch, I am not prepared in any way to combat, regarding them as entirely political.

But on military grounds I must be excused in taking a very different view, and leaving the affair entirely in the hands of the Chinese Governor.

On the receipt of your despatch I at once communicated with the Footae on the subject to receive his instructions; and his reply is herewith forwarded for your information, and from which you will perceive that it is his determination still to retain Major Gordon in the command: and if any influence is to be exercised by me in this matter, I must be candid in stating that I incline to support the Governor, rather than counsel the removal of Major Gordon, a military officer of Her Majesty's service whose great ability and physical energy render him so well fitted for the command, and with whom I would have no hesitation at any time to co-operate in the field, but would pause ere I committed myself to make any movement in conjunction with a Chinese force not disciplined by or under the control of a British Commander.

And I may here mention, from information which has reached me, I have reason to believe that Major Gordon's removal, if carried out, will bring with it the retirement of every officer of Her Majesty's service connected with the Soon-kiong force.

At present there is every *esprit* with all now serving under him, and no lack of good men prepared to join the forces if Major Gordon is retained in the command.

The force is now arriving at a state of discipline most favourable, and if left (in my opinion) in the hand of a judicious military commander, and assisted by officers from Her Majesty's service, might become the nucleus for the formation of a larger force; but of this I feel sure—that no good will be derived by the Chinese Government if the force is ever left entirely in the hands of a band of men who have not the slightest military reputation, and nothing whatever at stake.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. G. BROWN.

Inclosure 3 in No. 61.

Le, Footae, to Major-General Brown, April 24, 1863.

[This is *verbatim* the same as Inclosure 3 in No. 60.]

Inclosure 4 in No. 61.

Memorial to the Emperor.

[See Inclosure 4 in No. 60.]

No. 62.

Mr. Hammond to Sir E. Lugard.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 6, 1863.

I HAVE laid before Earl Russell your letter of the 2nd instant, inclosing copies of a despatch from Major-General Brown, and of a letter which he had addressed to Sir F. Bruce, under date of the 17th of April last, stating his reasons for desiring that Major Gordon should be continued in the command of Ward's force; and I am to state to you in reply, for the information of the Secretary of State for War, that Lord Russell concurs with Major-General Brown in this matter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 63.

Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 9, 1863.

WITH reference to the letter addressed to you by Major-General Brown on the 17th of April, of which a copy has been forwarded to me by the War Office, I inclose a copy of a letter which I have caused to be addressed to that Department,* from which you will see that I have expressed my concurrence in the view taken by Major-General Brown as to the expediency of retaining Major Gordon in the command of Ward's force.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 64.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(Received July 17.)

Sir,

Admiralty, July 16, 1863.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send you herewith, for the information of Earl Russell, a copy of a letter from Vice-Admiral Kuper, dated the 5th May, with copies of its inclosures, relating to the state of affairs at Treaty ports in China, and the destruction of a piratical junk in the neighbourhood of Hong Kong by Her Majesty's gun-boat "Grasshopper."

I am, &c.

(Signed) C. PAGET.

Inclosure 1 in No. 64.

Rear-Admiral Kuper to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir,

"Euryalus," at Yokohama, May 5, 1863.

BE pleased to inform the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that the state of affairs at the various ports in China, which does not admit of being classed under the general report of tranquillity, is described in the accompanying extracts of despatches from the several Senior Officers and from the Acting Consul at Tamsui, in Formosa.

2. To that forwarded by Captain Nolloth, from Hong Kong, is appended the copy of a correspondence relative to the destruction of a piratical junk by the gun-boat "Grasshopper."

3. With reference to Lieutenant Dayrell's, of Her Majesty's gun-boat "Cockchafer," report of his endeavour to discover certain piratical vessels which had recently done much damage to the rice junks in the neighbourhood of Amoy, this officer has been informed by Captain Nolloth that, in cases of piracy on the coast where British or European property has been plundered, or special case come to his knowledge, it will be proper for him to convey to the local authorities, through the Consul, any information which he may have obtained, and that it will generally be their duty, and not his, to take active measures under such circumstances. Lieutenant Dayrell will subsequently have received my Standing Order No. 10† (copy of which was forwarded for their Lordships' information), containing definite instructions as to the mode of dealing with vessels suspected of piracy.

4. It is not apprehended that anything serious will occur at Tamsui, notwithstanding the representation of the Acting Consul; the firms most interested in the tranquillity of the place considering that there is no good ground for anticipating much interference from the men alluded to by Mr. Braune.

5. I have been obliged to acquaint this gentleman that the services to be performed by the squadron under my orders will prevent my detaching a gun-boat expressly for the protection of British interests at Tamsui, but that the "Staunch," stationed between that port and Foo-chow, has been directed to visit Tamsui as often as other duties will admit of her doing so.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS L. KUPER.

* No. 62.

† Inclosure in No. 73.

Inclosure 2 in No. 64.

Captain Nolloth to Rear-Admiral Kuper.

(Extract.)

Hong Kong, April 11, 1863.

TRANQUILLITY prevails in the city of Canton, but the Consul informs me that the country south-westward of it is in a disturbed state, and that it is in some degree probable that trouble may eventually arise, the interference of the Canton authorities to maintain order having been resented by the contending parties. At present, however, the disturbance is local, and not insurgent.

A piracy, with murder, having been committed close to Green Island, I dispatched the "Grasshopper" in pursuit, under charge of Lieutenant Walker (Lieutenant and Commander Bennett then being still in hospital), who succeeded in destroying the pirate junk.

I forward correspondence on the subject.

Inclosure 3 in No. 64.

Mr. Mercer to Captain Nolloth.

Sir, *Hong Kong, March 24, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a special Report made by the Captain Superintendent of Police.

As the boat attacked is registered, and belongs to this Colony, I think it might be well if steps were taken to search the neighbouring waters for the piratical craft, and should you agree with me on this point, the master of the passage-boat will be directed to hold himself at your orders.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. T. MERCER.

Inclosure 4 in No. 64.

Special Report.

HU-YAT-WING, master of the passage-boat No. 773, Hong Kong, states, yesterday, at noon, he left Chua-chow, having on board salt fish and seventeen or eighteen passengers, with a crew of thirteen men. When near to and outside of Green Island his boat was attacked by a large Hakow boat, having more than twenty men on board, who fired (when only at distance of twenty-five yards) about twenty shots, killing four men and wounding three others. This fire was returned by the passage-boat, having on board three muskets, which, together with the fact of this vessel being so close to this harbour, caused them to abandon further their piratical intentions, after which they left in the direction of the Cap-suey-moon Passage. Can identify the vessel, if seen, but not any of the pirates.

(Signed) N. QUIN, *Captain Superintendent.*

Hong Kong, March 23, 1863.

Inclosure 5 in No. 64.

Lieutenant Walker to Captain Nolloth.

Sir,

"Grasshopper." Hong Kong, March 25, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, pursuant to your orders of yesterday, I proceeded in Her Majesty's gun-boat "Grasshopper" in search of the piratical Ha-kow boat mentioned in the inclosed Report, and found her on shore near Chain-wan, inside the Island of Chung-que, about 6 o'clock last evening. The junk had just been deserted, the cable cut, and food still cooking on deck. She was immediately recognized by the Chinese on board.

The Chinese fishermen reported that about twenty-five men had gone over the hill, with muskets, on the gun-boat appearing round the point.

Being unable to get her afloat, I gave orders for her to be burnt, which was done.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHAS. F. WALKER.

Inclosure 6 in No. 64.

Mr. Mercer to Captain Nolloth.

Sir,

Hong Kong, March 26, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of Lieutenant Walker's report of the destruction of the piratical junk mentioned in the special report of the Captain Superintendent of Police of the 23rd instant, and request you will accept my best thanks for the prompt manner in which you have acted in this matter, and I beg you will convey to Lieutenant Walker my acknowledgment of the service he has rendered the Colony.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

W. T. MERCER.

Inclosure 7 in No. 64.

Lieutenant Dayrell to Captain Nolloth.

Sir,

"Cockchafer," Amoy, March 27, 1863.

HAVING been informed that the pirates about Amoy had been doing much damage to the river junks, &c., I have the honour to inform you that I proceeded on a cruise in the gun-boat under my command on the 19th of this month, taking a Chinese pilot with me, so as to be able to examine the coast more thoroughly; and returned to Amoy on the 21st. On my return I anchored the gun-boat off an inlet opposite Notch Island (about twenty miles to the southward of Amoy); from this position the mast-heads of several large junks could be seen over the land, apparently at anchor off the town, which is well known to be principally inhabited by pirates. As the pilot stated that the gun-boat could not be got up to this place except at the top of very high water, I determined not to attempt it until I should have your permission to do so.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

EDMD. M. DAYRELL.

Inclosure 8 in No. 64.

Lieutenant Temple to Captain Nolloth.

(Extract.)

Pagoda anchorage, River Min, March 19, 1863.

SINCE my letter of February 18th I have visited Tamsui, arriving on the 25th ultimo and leaving on the 6th instant. The place was tranquil, although an attack on the English settlement had been planned for the nights of the 16th and 17th of February; but as the residents had been forewarned by the mandarins, and were well armed and prepared, and the mandarins kept their own people on the alert, firing guns and muskets at short intervals, the robbers gave up their project, and the new year passed off quietly.

Strong breezes and current prevented my return to this port till the 10th.

Foo-chow is quite tranquil.

Inclosure 9 in No. 64.

Consul Braune to Rear-Admiral Kuper.

Sir,

Tamsui, Formosa, March 14, 1863.

A SHORT time since, an attack was made on the yamun of the Chinese Superintendent of Foreign Affairs in Formosa, and the armed band who made the attack were assembled under the excuse of preventing foreigners, by force, from buying land and building houses. I at once took the proper steps with the local and provincial authorities, and proclamations were issued forbidding any interference with foreigners in the exercise of their Treaty rights.

The persons to be guarded against are a band of emigrants from Chin-chew, who live in our quarter of the town, and monopolize the coolie business. They may amount to 200 or 300 able men, most of them of one family name. Such is the dread of this band entertained by the mandarins that they dare not seize any influential members of it, for it has a practice of releasing them by force. They are constantly threatening foreign houses,

and keep the residents in continual anxiety. At the China New Year I had to land men from the British brig "Croukban" on two consecutive nights. On the different occasions when they have stolen foreign property I have never been able to obtain the slightest redress, for the reasons above stated. These being the men with whom we have to deal, your Excellency will perceive that the mandarins' proclamations are waste paper.

On a recent occasion I tried to induce one of the headmen to sign some title-deeds as witness, but he absolutely refused, saying it would embroil him with these Chin-chew men.

Messrs. Dent and Co.'s agents have received instructions to build, and will probably commence in a month or six weeks; and I trust you will be able to station a gun-boat here for two or three months, that the first step may be made in safety.

A collision of some sort is very probable, but with a gun-boat in port these men would receive a lesson which would teach them caution in meddling with foreigners, and her presence might prevent any outbreak whatever.

It is impossible for four or five Englishmen to defend themselves against a mob of ruffians who own no law but their own pleasure, nor is it their business to do so; that is the part of the local authorities, but unfortunately they are as helpless as we are, and I could bring many cases to prove it.

I trust your serious consideration will be given to these things; I think a collision must occur sooner or later, and the sooner it occurs and affairs are settled the better. Moreover, British property will be in serious danger when building commences.

I am, &c.

(Signed) GEO. C. P. BRAUNE.

No. 65.

Mr. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received July 21.)

(Extract.)

Peking, April 13, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to inclose an extract of a despatch from Mr. Consul Medhurst.

Inclosure in No. 65.

Consul Medhurst to Mr. Bruce.

(Extract.)

Shanghai, February 4, 1863.

THE cotton produced in this vicinity has of late been largely taken up for export to Great Britain, to supply the wants of the market there; twenty vessels, of 15,066 tons, having been more or less laden with it between the 5th December last and the present date. At a rough estimate the amount thus exported may be calculated at 8,580,000 lbs., equal to about 21,450 American bales of 400 lbs. each; and this is only a commencement of a trade which promises to increase largely during the next few months.

No. 66.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(Received August 8.)

Sir,

Admiralty, August 7, 1863.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send you herewith, for the information of Earl Russell, a copy of a letter from Vice-Admiral Kuper, dated the 26th May, with copy of its inclosure from Lieutenant Bosanquet of Her Majesty's gun-boat "Flamer," relative to the state of the Chinese disciplined forces in the province of Ningpo.

I am, &c.

(Signed) W. G. ROMAINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 66.

Vice-Admiral Kuper to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir,

"Euryalus," at Yokohama, May 26, 1863.

BE pleased to lay before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty the inclosed copy of a letter from Lieutenant Bosanquet of the "Flamer," stationed at Ningpo, describing the state of the Chinese disciplined forces in that province.

2. I have brought this subject under the notice of Sir Frederick Bruce, with a request that he will take such steps as may appear desirable for improving the relations between these troops and the Chinese authorities under whose immediate control they are placed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS L. KUPER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 66.

Lieutenant-Commander Bosanquet to Commander Strode.

(Extract.)

"Flamer," Ningpo, May 19, 1863.

I BEG to address you on the subject of the unsatisfactory state of the Chinese disciplined forces in this province.

The Franco-Chinese force now consists of about 1,500 officers and men under French officers. The Anglo-Chinese force it was agreed between the Taoutae here and Captain Dew should be kept at 1,000 men, unless more were required, with a fixed monthly payment for the same of 12,000 dollars, and I know that both the Taoutae and the Chinese are perfectly well satisfied with this force. Unfortunately the Taoutae is subject to the Footae of the province, who is making efforts to have all the disciplined forces disbanded, being probably prejudiced against the same, as may also be any succeeding Taoutae or Footae, whereby the continuance of the force, and consequently the defence of this part of the province, is placed on a most precarious footing, being subject to the caprice of the high Chinese officials. Great efforts have been made, and assistance afforded, by Her Majesty's Government in this neighbourhood, both as to supplies of munitions, drilling troops and otherwise, but I am afraid without effect; the last supply of munitions brought by me from Shanghai and handed over to the Taoutae by Captain Dew, viz., 1,000 Tower muskets, 100,000 rounds of ball cartridges, besides guns and other stores, I ascertained, too late to remonstrate, have been handed over to the Taoutae and his undisciplined troops, which is almost throwing them away.

The Anglo-Chinese force, I have every reason to be satisfied with; the Commander, Colonel Cooke, is a good and honest officer, and the discipline and monetary arrangements are satisfactory. It is almost needless to say that the expense of this force is not severely felt by the Chinese, as the payments into the Treasury of this Taoutaeship (consisting of three "foos" or first class cities) for the last quarter was 1,000,000 dollars, and of course as this tract of country is now cleared of rebels, it must necessarily increase; also if the disciplined troops are discharged, braves will take their place.

I have the honour to lay this statement before you in case you should deem it necessary to communicate on the subject to Her Majesty's Minister at Peking, who might take steps to have matters put on a more satisfactory footing by arrangements with the Government at Peking. I would also suggest the advisability of Colonel Cooke receiving a commission from Peking. I have desired Mr. Forrest, Acting Consul here, to allow remonstrances to be made out in Chinese for me, addressed to the Taoutae, who is at present too sick to be seen, and to acquaint him that Her Majesty's ships being elsewhere engaged, he must not count on immediate assistance should the rebels, as is very probable they will, return to this neighbourhood. Mr. Forrest has entered into the subject with the Taoutae, and these remonstrances will take effect for a short time, but will have no permanent result.

"Vulcan," Shanghai, May 20, 1863.

Forwarded for the information of the Commander-in-chief.

(Signed)

A. C. STRODE.

No. 67.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(Received August 8.)

Sir,

Admiralty, August 7, 1863.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send you herewith, for the information of Earl Russell, a copy of a letter from Vice-Admiral Kuper, dated the 26th May, with copy of its inclosures, from Lieutenant Bosanquet, of Her Majesty's gun-boat "Flamer," reporting his proceedings in destroying piratical junks near Ningpo.

I am, &c.

(Signed) W. G. ROMAINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 67.

Vice-Admiral Kuper to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir,

"Euryalus," at Yokohama, May 26, 1863.

I TRANSMIT herewith, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, the copy of a letter from Lieutenant Bosanquet, of the "Flamer," reporting his proceedings in the capture and destruction of certain piratical junks in the neighbourhood of Ningpo, on the 6th and 8th instant.

2. Whilst commending the zeal and gallantry displayed by Lieutenant Bosanquet, and the officers and men under his command, in the operations described, I have considered it right to express to that officer my regret that he should have attempted landing so small a force as a gig's crew in the presence of a large band of pirates, by which the lives of valuable officers and men were exposed to imminent risk, and a boat was lost.

3. I have also desired Lieutenant Bosanquet's attention to the instructions in my Standing Order No. 10,* as to the mode of dealing with vessels suspected of piracy.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS L. KUPER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 67.

Lieutenant-Commander Bosanquet to Commander Strode.

Sir,

"Flamer," Ningpo, May 10, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to report, that on account of the frequent complaints made of numerous pirates being in this neighbourhood, and as I mentioned as my intention in my last letter, I proceeded out in search of pirates on the 5th instant, and arrived at Sheipoo the next morning early, where I seized two piratical vessels, one of which I destroyed, and the other kept for further use; also I handed over three suspicious Canton junks to the authorities there, to be adjudicated by them.

Having at this place received information and a pilot, I left on the morning of the 8th instant for Choee, a bay on the mainland next below Station Island. On rounding the south point of the bay (3.30 P.M.), I observed about ten piratical vessels; six of these immediately weighed, and took up a position on the mud in a small cove out of sight of the gun-boat, which could not at that time of tide get closer than 2,200 yards.

Having put one of the hawsers in the piratical vessel mentioned as taken above, and manned and armed my two boats, I proceeded in to attack, and found the largest vessel, a Canton lorcha, swung broadside on to command the approach, which, with the others, on my coming in sight opened fire. Having run my junk as close as possible, that is to say, aground at 800 yards off, I made use of the howitzer, and then took to the boats, which were received on advancing with grape and gingalls. When closing, the pirates evacuated their vessels, and blew up their lorcha.

I immediately sent the second gig, manned and armed, under charge of Mr. Bradbury, the senior Engineer (Mr. Chamber, Second Master, remaining in charge of the gun-boat, and Mr. Norcott, the gunner of the junk, covering the landing), to seize the other junks about three-quarters of a mile to the northward, which duty he performed; but shortly after the pirates came down behind a bank in force, and renewed the attack, when the ammunition (two gigs) ran short, they had to retreat to their boat, followed by

* Inclosure in No. 73.

the pirates, continually reinforced; and they had eventually to leave the boat, having failed in getting her afloat (ebb tide), and retire over the mud until they got to a sampan, which brought them off.

I regret that Mr. Bradbury was severely wounded in this operation. He behaved with great gallantry, as did also Mr. Goodwin, Assistant Engineer.

The pirates then retired, taking the boat, but the whole of the junks were taken, and destroyed.

The next day (9th) I received information that five other piratical vessels secreted in this bay had got away during the night, and that all the pirates (Cantonese) had evacuated the place, but I seized one lorch, and burnt two others off the small walled village of Chokee.

I then returned to Ningpo. Probably this bay will still continue to be a piratical station, as it offers great facilities for that purpose, and the mud and shoal water extends out so far that a gun-boat can only get close in at high water.

The casualties are—

Mr. Thomas Bradbury, Assistant Engineer 1st Class, severely wounded—ball in the neck.

William Jamieson, A.B., severely wounded—ball through side.

Thomas Harding, Quartermaster—contusion of foot from langrage.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

G. STANLEY BOSANQUET.

No. 68.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(Received August 10.)

Sir,

Admiralty, August 8, 1863.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send you herewith, for the information of Earl Russell, a copy of a letter from Vice-Admiral Kuper, dated the 26th May, with copy of its inclosure, relating to the capture by Lieutenant Walker, of Her Majesty's gun-vessel "Opossum," of some pirates in the neighbourhood of Kowloon.

I am, &c.

(Signed)

C. PAGET.

Inclosure 1 in No. 68.

Vice-Admiral Kuper to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir,

"Euryalus," at Yokohama, May 26, 1863.

BE pleased to lay before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, for their information, the inclosed extract from a general letter from the Senior Officer at Hong Kong, containing the particulars of the capture by Lieutenant Walker (in charge of the "Opossum" tender) of a portion of a band of pirates, who had recently committed depredations in the neighbourhood of Kowloon.

2. This is the second occasion on which this officer has rendered good service to the Colony in the pursuit and capture of pirates.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

AUGUSTUS L. KUPER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 68.

Captain Nolloth to Vice-Admiral Kuper.

(Extract.)

"Princess Charlotte," Hong Kong, May 16, 1863.

HAVING been informed on the 12th that a Hong Kong registered boat, with several men and women, had been carried, off Kowloon, to a large village a few miles off on the main land, and that one of the men had been sent back to this port for a ransom of 100 dollars, Lieutenant Walker, in the "Opossum" tender, was directed to proceed to the spot in the night, and landing with a party under the guidance of the above-mentioned

native, he succeeded in rescuing the captives and seizing three of the pirates, returning to this anchorage on the following forenoon.

The pirates were handed over to the police.

The captured Hong Kong boat having been hauled up high and dry some distance up a river, it was not thought prudent to attempt to bring her away; the owners were only anxious to save their persons on being liberated, and she was burnt, and the party returned to the gun-boat before daylight showed the numerous villages the smallness of the force landed. The village or town is surrounded by a wall, and is said to contain 1,000 inhabitants.

The Acting Governor has expressed by letter his thanks for the service rendered by Lieutenant Walker.

No. 69.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received August 11.)

My Lord,

Peking, April 30, 1863.

IN continuation of my despatch of the 7th of March, I have the honour to inclose an abstract of a Decree from the "Peking Gazette," stating the terms granted to an insurgent Chief who has returned to his allegiance.

It is possible that he has delivered over some town to the Government, and come over with his followers.

I have, &c.

(Signed) **FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.**

Inclosure in No. 69.

Abstract of Imperial Decree.

(Translation.)

IN a further despatch from Li Hung-chang, the Governor of Kiang-su, special mention is made of a rebel Chief, Lo-kwo-chung, having submitted and returned to his proper allegiance. His Majesty accordingly rewards said penitent, gives him the post meantime of a Colonel, and allows him to wear the buttons and honours of a General.

(April 29, 1863.)

No. 70.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received August 11.)

My Lord,

Peking, April 30, 1863.

REFERRING to my despatch of September 8, 1862,* I have the honour to state that Mr. Medhurst, before leaving Shanghai, published the letter to him which formed inclosure in that despatch. The publication has done good by clearing up the misapprehension that prevailed as to the real position of foreigners at the Chinese ports open to trade, and as evidence that Her Majesty's Government will not agree to any system which does not respect the territorial rights of the Chinese Government, and its exclusive jurisdiction over its own subjects. This exclusive jurisdiction of China over Chinese, and of each foreign nation over its subjects, is the foundation on which the international relations of China with the outer world is based.

I am glad to say that M. Berthemy inclosed to the French Government the paper containing my correspondence with Mr. Medhurst, as expressing the views entertained by him on this delicate question. They are fully concurred in by the Russian and the American Ministers.

The British and American communities have appointed a Committee to prepare a scheme for the Municipal Government of the large part of the Settlement inhabited by them, in conformity with these principles, and I hope that, with the aid of their experience, a system may be found which will meet the requirements of the place, and to which the Chinese Government will give its assent.

The growth of Shanghai is wonderful; its population is estimated at 1,500,000,

* See "Papers relating to the Rebellion in China," presented to Parliament in March 1863, No. 62.

and it bids fair to become soon the most important city of the East. The Chinese flock to it on account of the security it enjoys, and the silk manufacture, which was destroyed by the Tae-ping occupation of Soo-chow and Hang-chow, is taking root at Shanghai.

It is a subject of great satisfaction to me that our resolution to save Shanghai from the destruction that menaced it at the hands of the Tae-ping hordes has not only been productive of great benefit to trade, but has afforded a safe asylum and an escape from ruin to so large a body of the industrious and respectable native population.

I have, &c.

(Signed) **FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.**

No. 71.

Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 14, 1863.

HER Majesty's Government have had under their consideration, and they have consulted the Law Officers of the Crown upon your despatch of the 23rd of December last, and its inclosures, respecting the protest of Prince Kung against the attempt made to sue, before British tribunals, British subjects in the service of China for acts done by them in the exercise of the authority confided to them.

I have now to state to you that it appears to Her Majesty's Government that you have fallen into an error by confounding two distinct questions, viz., a question relating to the infringement of rules made under the Order in Council of the 13th of June, 1853, and a question as to alleged civil liability as between British subjects in the Consular Courts in China.

It appears to Her Majesty's Government that you are mistaken in treating the question which you have referred to them for decision as depending upon the 4th and following Articles of the Order in Council. Those Articles relate to the infringement of the Treaty and other Regulations, and to the punishment of such infringements by penalties, and not in any way to civil suits.

But in the present case a difference has arisen between "British subjects," that is, the complainant and the person complained of are both British subjects. To such a case the 12th Article of the Order in Council applies, and the Consul of the district is competent to hear and determine the matter. His decision is subject to an appeal to the Chief Superintendent if the sum in dispute does not exceed 1,000 dollars, but if it exceed that sum, then to the Supreme Court of Hong Kong, and not to the Chief Superintendent. This proceeding before the Consul will be "a suit of a civil nature," and Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the suit ought to be entertained under Article 12 of the Order in Council. But Her Majesty's Government also think that the Court which should entertain it would be bound to give judgment for the defendant, upon the fact of his employment as a Chinese functionary in the Chinese Customs being either admitted or proved, for Her Majesty's Government conceive that a British subject so employed is not civilly answerable in the British Consular Courts for acts done by him in his official capacity.

There remains the question as to the power of the Supreme Court at Hong Kong to issue a mandamus to the Consular Court, and, so far as Her Majesty's Government are aware, such a power cannot be assumed by the Court at Hong Kong, which is, without such authority, merely a Court of Appellate, and in some cases of concurrent, jurisdiction.

I shall only further observe that these difficulties have arisen from an event not expressly contemplated in the year 1853, viz., the employment of British subjects in the service of the Emperor of China. Her Majesty's Government consider that such persons do not, by virtue of that service, cease to be "British subjects" under the terms of the Order in Council; although, in respect of acts done by them officially in the service of the Chinese Government, when such justification is pleaded and proved, they ought not to be holden civilly liable in the Consular Courts.

I am, &c.

(Signed) **RUSSELL.**

No. 72.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received August 15.)

My Lord,

Peking, May 25, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a letter which I addressed to Brigadier-General Staveley, in reply to the announcement of his having resigned the command of Her Majesty's land forces in China. I consider it to have been a very fortunate circumstance that the troops left in China at the close of the war should have been commanded by an officer of Brigadier-General Staveley's qualifications. The discipline he enforced among the men, and his courtesy and tact in dealing with the authorities, made the occupation as little disagreeable to the people and Government as possible; and, personally, I have received the most cordial support and friendly aid from him on all occasions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure in No. 72.

Sir F. Bruce to Brigadier-General Staveley.

Sir,

Peking, April 9, 1863.

I HAVE received your despatch informing me that your resignation of the command in China has been accepted, and that Major-General Brown is shortly expected to arrive.

Permit me, Sir, to say that I shall always retain a lively sense of the valuable assistance and cordial co-operation I have received from you in dealing with our mutual difficulties.

I may be permitted to state that the consideration and courtesy which have characterized your intercourse with the Chinese authorities, both at Tien-tsin and Shanghai, have materially contributed to reassure this Government on the friendly nature of our co-operation in the defence of the latter town from pillage and ruin.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

No. 73.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received August 15.)

My Lord,

Peking, May 25, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a Standing Order from Rear-Admiral Kuper to the Captains and Commanders of Her Majesty's ships in China, relative to the conduct to be observed by them when falling in with suspicious Chinese vessels. This Order, I think, meets fully the difficulties of the question.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure in No. 73.

*Standing Order No. 10.**"Euryalus," at Yokohama, April 18, 1863.*

COMPLAINTS having frequently been made by the Chinese Government to Her Majesty's Minister at Peking, of the destruction of junks by Her Majesty's ships, for alleged acts of violence or oppression, I deem it necessary to issue the following instructions for the guidance of the officers in command of Her Majesty's ships under my orders, which may at any future time be employed on the coast or in the rivers of China:—

Chinese vessels are on no account to be destroyed by Her Majesty's ships unless the officers in command are requested by a competent Chinese authority to aid in doing so; nor unless, on the sea coast of China, a pirate is caught in the act of piracy.

Where a junk is suspected of illegal practices, she may be detained by Her Majesty's ships, and handed over to the nearest Chinese authority in order that her proceedings may be investigated.

Should there be reasonable ground for suspecting a junk, in the Yang-tze River, of illegal practices, she may also be detained and handed over to the Chinese authorities, but she is not to be destroyed by Her Majesty's ships.

The attention of the officers in command is also drawn to the fact that trade on the Yang-tze River is confined to the ports of Kiu-kiang and Hankow, and that if junks or lorchas, owned or manned by foreigners, proceed up creeks, or attempt to trade at other places on its banks, they must do so at their own risk.

By a strict adhesion to the Rules herein laid down, it is hoped that security will be given to trade without exposing Her Majesty's officers to remonstrances against acts of violence which in many instances cannot be justified.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS L. KUPER,
Rear-Admiral and Commander-in-chief.

To the Commodore and the respective Captains, Commanders, and
Officers commanding Her Majesty's ships and vessels under my orders.

No. 74.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received August 10.)

(Extract.)

Peking, June 12, 1863.

I INCLOSE a despatch to Major-General Brown on the subject of the employment of British officers in "Ward's corps." It is to be regretted that he did not support General Burgevine's restoration to the command, as our direct action would thus have been confined to Shanghai itself; and unless this Government be persuaded to take the Customs revenue out of the hands of the local authorities, and apply it to the support of the steam flotilla and a properly organized military force, to be directed from Peking, I do not think that the re-establishment of the Imperial authority can be effected.

Inclosure in No. 74.

Sir F. Bruce to Major-General Brown.

Sir,

Peking, June 11, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter informing me of the advice you had given to the Governor Le, with reference to General Burgevine's restoration to the command of the disciplined Chinese.

I regret very much not having had the pleasure of seeing you at Peking before this question came under discussion, as I think I could have explained to you that looking to the general tone of the instructions of Her Majesty's Government, as well as to the situation of affairs in this country, it is not expedient that British officers should command Chinese troops in the field against the insurgents, beyond the limits of the radius deemed necessary for the security of the ports where they are stationed. Of the sound policy of this restriction I am fully convinced, and in supporting General Burgevine's claims to reappointment I was guided by my desire that the force should not be broken up, and at the same time that the action of British officers should be confined to the protection of our own legitimate interests.

I am further of opinion that unless the force be properly constituted, and relieved from the necessity of obeying the orders of the local Governors, it will do no real and permanent good, and that the officer who commands it will speedily find himself in a position which is neither compatible with his professional reputation nor with what is due to the character of a British officer.

Under these circumstances I must decline accepting the responsibility of authorizing the employment of British officers beyond Shanghai and the radius of thirty miles. Within these limits I am quite prepared that they should act at the head of Chinese troops, provided that such arrangements are made for their pay as will put it out of the power of the mandarins to withhold the supplies necessary to keep faith with the men. But I do not consider that the force should exceed what is required for the defence of the city and radius.

I have informed the Chinese Government of my objections to the employment of British officers in the field.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Mr. F. Peel to Mr. Hammond.—(Received August 19.)

Sir, *Treasury Chambers, August 19, 1863.*

WITH reference to previous correspondence on the subject of the Canton claims on the Chinese indemnity, I am commanded by the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury to transmit to you, for the information of Earl Russell, the inclosed copy of a Report by Mr. Arbuthnot of this office, communicating the result of inquiries made by him in conjunction with Sir R. Alcock and Sir H. Parkes.

I am desired to state that my Lords concur in the several suggestions contained in this Report, and to request that you will move Earl Russell to communicate this document to Sir Frederick Bruce.

I am further desired to state that the result of this investigation was communicated; by direction of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to Mr. Gregson, M.P., Chairman of the East India and China Association, and that the consequence of that communication has been a proposal made by him on behalf of the principal claimants in this country, accepting a final settlement of their claims on the following basis:—

1. The Government to give a cash order on China for interest on the claims, from the date of loss to the date of payment of the principal, at the rate of 4 per cent. per annum;

2. The merchants to relinquish all further claims on the Government;

3. The sum allowed as above to be payable in China on the receipt of instructions, which will be despatched forthwith.

I inclose, by their Lordships' direction, a copy of the Memorandum signed by all the principal claimants in this country, accepting these conditions.

Their Lordships, referring to the difficulties alluded to in the concluding part of Mr. Arbuthnot's report, which would attend the examination of the claims to interest in detail, and to the doubts raised regarding the title to interest in respect of a considerable portion of the admitted claims, are of opinion that the proposed settlement is a liberal one towards the claimants; on the other hand, as it appears that in the event of the due payment of the remaining portion of the indemnity by the Chinese Government, a sufficient surplus will remain to compensate Her Majesty's Government for the risk which will be incurred by a further payment to the merchants in anticipation of receipts applicable to their claims, their Lordships are of opinion that the Government will be justified in accepting the proposal.

My Lords request that you will move Earl Russell to communicate the inclosed documents to Sir F. Bruce and to Her Majesty's Consul at Canton, with the necessary instructions for the payment of the further admitted claims, and of interest on all claims on the basis proposed.

In respect of the computation of the date up to which payment of interest is allowed, I am to state that it appears to my Lords that the same will most conveniently be fixed by adopting the date of the certificate in each case as the date of payment of principal.

I am to observe that as the Memorandum has been signed by all the principal claimants, my Lords feel that they are justified in accepting it as tendered on behalf of the whole body, but it will be necessary that each party should, on payment being made to him for interest, give a receipt in acknowledgment thereof, as accepted in full satisfaction of the claim to which it refers.

I am, &c.
(Signed) F. PEEL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 75.

Mr. Arbuthnot to the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury.

My Lords, *Treasury Chambers, August 14, 1863.*

IN pursuance of the instructions conveyed by your Lordship's Minute of the 9th ultimo, I have, in communication with Sir Rutherford Alcock and Sir Harry Parkes, examined the papers relating to the Canton claims on the Chinese Indemnity Fund, which have been transmitted by direction of Earl Russell.

As, at the date of your Lordships' instructions, Sir Rutherford Alcock was about to leave England for the Continent, and Sir Harry Parkes was not then in London, I have not had the opportunity of simultaneous conference with those gentlemen; but Sir Rutherford Alcock first went very carefully with me through the whole of the documents furnished by the Foreign Office, and Sir Harry Parkes afterwards examined them in the same manner.

By this mode of proceeding the general results of the first examination were tested by the second one, while some doubts which had arisen on points of detail were settled by the more recent information which Sir Harry Parkes was enabled to furnish; and as I feel assured that both my colleagues in the inquiry will, in the main, agree in the conclusions which I have formed on the subject, I feel it right to submit them at once to your Lordships, rather than incur the delay of postponement until we could meet for the purpose of framing a joint Report.

By the Treasury Minute of the 8th August, 1861, your Lordships agreed to allow, in anticipation of receipts from the Chinese Government on account of that portion of the Chinese indemnity which is applicable for compensation to British merchants, the issue of certificates entitling the holders to the immediate payment of one-half of the admitted claims for losses consequent on the destruction of the factories at Canton, and to the payment of the remaining half in a year after the issue of such certificates.

The claims which had been then wholly or partially investigated by Sir R. Alcock, under directions from Lord Elgin, were divided into four classes, viz.:—

	£	c.
Class A.—Consisting of claims which were admitted by Sir R. Alcock (but in some cases with reservation) amounting, in the whole to ..	1,529,009	25
Class B.—Consisting of claims, conditionally allowed, subject to further proofs, amounting to ..	118,208	56
Class C.—Consisting of claims which had been referred for the decision of Lord Elgin, amounting to ..	135,347	59
Total claims adjudicated upon, or referred to Lord Elgin ..	1,782,565	40
Class D.—Consisting of claims for consequential or speculative losses which were excluded from Sir R. Alcock's investigation, amounting to ..	1,006,057	76
Total claims preferred for losses incurred by British subjects ..	2,788,623	16

Besides these, certain special claims, not included in the foregoing category, were reserved for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government.

In the instructions conveyed to Sir Frederick Bruce by Earl Russell, in pursuance of your Lordships' Minute, his Excellency was authorized to issue certificates for payment to the claimants in Class A, and also to such of the claimants in Classes B and C as on further examination he might consider entitled to admission, reserving any doubtful cases for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government. The claims under Class D were reserved for further consideration.

The documents now transmitted show the proceedings of Sir F. Bruce in pursuance of these instructions, and bring down the steps taken by Consul Robertson, under his direction, for the discharge of admitted claims, to the 21st January, 1862.

Consul Robertson has been instructed to furnish Reports of his proceedings up to a more recent date; but the statements now forwarded show the amount of claims which have been finally admitted by Sir F. Bruce, and are in course of payment, if not already paid. They also show his opinions on claims which are reserved for the decision of Her Majesty's Government, and his reasons for rejecting others.

The general financial results of the proceedings are thus sufficiently developed to enable Her Majesty's Government to deal with undecided claims, and to approach the subject with the assurance that the full extent of admissible claims on the Indemnity Fund is now before them.

From the Report of Consul Robertson at the date above referred to, it appears that the certificates then issued amounted to 1,451,283 dollars 19 cents, and that other certificates were payable, though not then issued, amounting to 77,435 dollars 81 cents.

These sums must be taken subject to the correction of a few errors in computation, which, however, affect the general result in a very trifling degree. On examination, it appears that the certificates enumerated by Consul Robertson comprise nearly the whole of the claims in Schedule A, after a few unimportant corrections and reservations: they comprise also a considerable portion of claims in Class B, and some of Class C.

Besides the claims for which certificates have been prepared, the following have been passed as good by Sir F. Bruce, but had not been paid at the date of Consul Robertson's Report, viz.:—

No. in the Original Schedule.			8	c.	8	c.
46	Queen's factory gardens, property destroyed	..	..	..	10,000	0
47	Public gardens, ditto	..	..	..	10,000	0
108	Canton bowling-alley, ditto	..	..	..	6,600	0
117	Margesson, H. D., ditto	..	..	..	240	0
124	Park, R. D., ditto	..	..	..	747	41
			..	..	27,587	41
	The following claims had not been applied for :—					
29	Ebrahim, S.	..	300	0		
40	Tyers, R.	..	500	0		
					800	0
	Proof was wanting in the following cases :—					
8	Cama and Co.	..	16,000	0		
14	Mohammedbhoy Dossabhoy	..	2,400	0		
					18,400	0
	Due to foreigners in British Embassy :—					
85	Pereira, for property	..	475	0		
125	Barradas, D. I.	..	1,636	0		
130	Xao, Antonio	..	908	32		
					3,019	32
	Admitted on special grounds :—					
139	Seamen's Bethel	..	7,000	0		
78	Lyall, Still and Co.	..	3,094	80		
					10,094	80
	Besides the foregoing claims admitted by Sir F. Bruce, there is a claim by Jardine, Matheson and Co., on account of error and omission in the original award, which appears to be well founded	..	22,100	0		
	There is also a claim from the representatives of Mr. Cowper, deceased, for loss of property, which has been overlooked on account of its being blended with the larger claim for compensation to his family for the loss of his life ..	..	3,000	0		
					25,100	0
	Total claims due, but not brought to account ..	..			85,001	53
	Which, with the certificates paid	..	1,451,283	19		
	Or, payable	..	77,435	81		
					1,528,719	0
	Makes a total of	..	..	..	1,613,720	53

with which the Indemnity Fund is already charged.

The whole of the claims in Class D, which come under the description of consequential damages, speculative losses, travelling expenses, and personal inconvenience, have been rejected on principle by Sir Frederick Bruce. There appears to be no ground for questioning the propriety of this decision.

I have now to bring under the notice of your Lordships the claims which Sir F. Bruce has reserved for the decision of Her Majesty's Government.

The first consist of claims for loss of professional income, or business suddenly broken up by the destruction of the factories.

Sir F. Bruce, in his despatch No. 44 of the 9th of May, 1861, submits these claims for favourable consideration, and suggests that one year's income should be allowed in each case.

On this principle I submit the admission of the following claims :—

No. 11. Mac Gregor and Co., bill-brokers and auctioneers, for 8,400 dollars.

The claim advanced in this case is for 11,900 dollars, but as the profits are stated at 700 dollars a-month, 8,400 dollars only should be allowed on the principle proposed by Sir F. Bruce.

No. 85. Max Fisher, bill-broker and auctioneer, for 9,128 dollars, the estimate of one year's income.

The amount claimed is 11,188 dollars, but this includes items for the agency of the steamer "Willamette," insurance agency, and expenses of removal, which do not come within the rule applied in the other cases.

No. 39. Dr. Dickson, for 12,000 dollars.

Dr. Dickson is a medical gentleman whose professional income chiefly consisted of fixed allowances from firms. These he states to have amounted to 583 dollars 5 cents a-month; and he claims a further sum on account of money paid for his business, the goodwill of which he estimates at 5,000 dollars. The claim appears to me to be reasonable.

No. 104. Dr. Kenny, for 12,000 dollars.

This is also a claim for the loss of medical practice. Dr. Kenny states his professional income at 7,500 dollars, and he estimates the total amount of his losses at 22,500 dollars, including loss of drugs, destruction of furniture, and other casualties. The claim as stated does not admit of accurate definition, and as I am informed that his practice was not greater, if so great, as that of Dr. Dickson, I have proposed that he should receive the same amount of compensation as that claimed by Dr. Dickson.

No. 77. Osmond Cleverley.

This claim was put forward when he was still living, and it will now merge into that preferred by his widow in consequence of his death.

(Total admitted claims for professional losses, 41,528 dollars.)

Three foreigners have preferred claims for compensation for losses arising from the destruction of the British factory, viz. :—

Herman Schaeffer, for 6,274 dollars.

This claimant is a Prussian by birth, but he was expatriated, and had been domiciled at Hong Kong since 1851. As he was living under British protection I submit that the claim be allowed.

I. der Vander Hoeven, for 19,182 dollars.

The claimant is a Dutch subject, and frankly admits in his application that he has no title to British protection. The claim rests on the ground that the loss of his property was closely connected with the destruction of the factory. His house was, in fact, pulled down by order of the British Admiral in the hope of saving the factory. The claim may fairly be admitted on this ground.

J. A. Tinnaway claims 30,000 dollars.

The claimant is a Turk, who gained a precarious living as a hanger-on of the British community. He had some books, chemicals, and a few natural specimens, on which, though of little value, he set great store. He was so poor that, in the year of the destruction of the factory, he was unable to pay the rent of the room which he occupied. His estimate of the value of his so-called library, and other property destroyed, is preposterous, and he has no valid claim. He might perhaps be allowed some relief (say 1,000 dollars) on considerations of charity.

The next class of special claims arise from the destruction of vessels by the Chinese. Under this head—

No. 33. Y. J. Murrow claims, for the loss of the “Thistle,” 30,000 dollars; the lorch “Anonyma,” 4,000 dollars; and for the loss of charter and employment of postal steamers, 62,604 dollars. Total, 96,604 dollars.

Mr. Murrow had established a nightly postal communication between Canton and Hong Kong, which was put an end to by the piratical destruction of two of his vessels. He conducted the service under an agreement with the principal British firms. He has a claim to payment of the value of the vessels destroyed, on proof thereof. The claim on account of the charter-party would raise (as observed in Sir F. Bruce’s despatch of the 17th June, 1862) the general question of compensation for consequential losses, a class of claims which has been generally rejected. Mr. Murrow might, however, be allowed, as in the case of professional claimants, one year’s income from the postal service. As this income was derived from subscriptions from firms, the amount will admit of proof.

The remaining claims under this head arise from the destruction of the “Queen” steamer. This steamer carried passengers and goods between the ports of Canton, Hong Kong, and Macao. It was a British vessel, but sailed under the Portuguese flag in order to obtain privileges at the port of Macao. A body of Chinese ruffians got on board as passengers, and, rising on the crew at night, murdered them, and carried the vessel into Canton, where she was destroyed. Yeh, the Chinese Commissioner, refused compensation, on the application of the Representatives of Portugal, on the express ground that the vessel was notoriously British, and was for that reason seized and destroyed. Sir Frederick Bruce recommends, under these circumstances, that compensation should be given to the owners of the cargo on board, but he considers that the owners of the vessel have no claim, as they forfeited British protection by sailing under a foreign flag.

There can be no doubt of the soundness of this decision on general principles, and if there be the slightest reason to suppose that the owners of the “Queen” hoisted the Portuguese flag for the purpose of avoiding consequences to which the British flag would have exposed them, they would have no claim for consideration. But it does not appear that such motives existed, and the piratical character of the attack upon the vessel takes the case out of the ordinary principles of the law of nations. I submit, therefore, that, as an act of grace, the claim of the owners of the “Queen” may be allowed on proof of value. If this recommendation be agreed to by your Lordships, the payments to be

allowed on account of the destruction of this vessel will be, for the cargo, seven claimants, 44,985 dollars; for the vessel, 43,508. Total, 88,493 dollars.

Two claims advanced on behalf of, 1st, Mrs. Cleverley, and 2ndly, Mrs. Cowper, on account of the death of their husbands through treacherous attacks of the Chinese, complete the list of special claims:—

1. The late Mr. Osmond Cleverley was a marine surveyor. He held the office of Lloyd's Surveyor at Canton, and was also employed by various firms, from whom he received fixed allowances. He had, besides, general business, which brought him considerable additional income. He was on board the "Queen" steamer as a passenger on the night of the murderous attack upon the crew. He defended himself against the assailants with great gallantry. In the contest he killed four, and wounded several others of the ruffians, but, having received a severe wound in the thigh, he jumped overboard, and was afterwards picked up by a lorch. The rest of the passengers, with the captain and crew, were murdered. While still alive, Mr. Cleverley preferred a claim for loss of property, and for the loss of professional income. The first was admitted, but, as I have already observed, remains unpaid; the second rested on his impaired ability, on account of his wound and sufferings, to pursue his avocations with his former energy, and on the consequent necessity of giving up his general business and confining his labours to the employment for which he received fixed pay from the firms.

At the time of the presentation of his first claim to compensation, Mr. Cleverley referred to the loss of his casual income, which he estimated at 240 dollars a-month. At this time he had recovered from the first shock on his system arising from his wound, and he expressed a hope that, through the soundness of his constitution, his life would be preserved, though with a loss of physical power. In this hope he was disappointed; he was obliged to return to England, where his health declined from the effect of the injury, and he died in June 1861.

Mr. Cleverley did not, however, confine his claim to compensation for loss of income, for in a memorial to Sir John Bowring in June 1857, he urged a claim for a grant of 120,000 dollars on the ground that he was wounded in defence of British property, as although the vessel was flying Portuguese colours the property on board was wholly British owned; that there was evidence to show that the attack was concocted by persons in the employment of the Provincial Government at Canton at a time when hostilities were being carried on between the Provincial Government and Her Majesty's forces, and could not, therefore, be considered as an act of private piracy; and, further, that as a British subject sustaining injuries while on board the vessel of a country at peace with China, he had a right to claim full compensation from the Chinese Government.

There appears to be sufficient evidence to show that the attack on the "Queen" was planned by the Chinese in the hopes of gaining the reward for the capture of European steam-vessels offered by the Chinese Government, but in this instance Yeh had refused to pay the reward on the ground that the vessel was not British, and had taken measures to punish the captors for an act of piracy. On the other hand, when the Portuguese demanded reparation, Yeh refused on the ground that the vessel and cargo were virtually British property.

The Queen's Advocate, to whom the papers were referred, reported that he was of opinion that Her Majesty's Government were not justified in enforcing Mr. Cleverley's claim.

The special claim urged by Mr. Cleverley on the ground of services in resisting captors seems to have been discountenanced by the opinion of the Queen's Advocate; but that officer observed that if the British subjects suffering by the "Queen's" capture should induce Her Majesty's Government to take up their case it might be possible for Her Majesty's Government to interfere, either in support of the Portuguese Government or otherwise, and to obtain something for Mr. Cleverley.

Acting upon this view, it appears to me that Mr. Cleverley's claim may fairly be considered on the ground on which compensation has been awarded to the owners of property on board the "Queen," and is now recommended to the owners of that vessel.

In estimating the value of Mr. Cleverley's income, I have to observe that he was a highly respectable man, much esteemed by his employers, and that there is no reason to doubt the correctness of his statement regarding his general emoluments. From careful inquiries made by Sir Harry Parkes, it seems that his fixed allowances from firms would amount to at least the same sum, and that his whole income may fairly be taken at from 480 to 500 dollars a month at the time of the murderous attack upon him. He was then in the prime and vigour of life (about 40 years of age), and he has left a widow and three children. It is impossible to bring to any accurate pecuniary test the

value of a man's life to his family in such a position. Taking, however, a somewhat arbitrary, though I think liberal, view, I submit that one-half of Mr. Cleverley's income may be regarded as having been applicable to his family, and that ten years of that amount may be allowed to his widow. This would give her a sum of 30,000 dollars as compensation for the loss sustained through the death of her husband, besides the sum of 5,889 dollars awarded to her late husband for loss of property.

Having regard to the loss of income which her husband sustained during the last few years of his existence, I consider that whatever rate of interest may be ultimately allowed to the claimants should be computed in Mr. Cleverley's case from the date of the capture of the "Queen" steamer.

2. The second claim on account of death is from Mrs. Cowper. Her son, Mr. J. C. Cowper, had established docks at Whampoa, and was carrying on a lucrative business at the time of the outbreak of hostilities with the Chinese. He had brought out his father from this country and employed him as superintendent of one of his yards, at a salary of 200 dollars a month. A party of Chinese, in a boat, having induced old Mr. Cowper to come to his window, under pretence of delivering a letter, dragged him out and carried him off. He was never seen again, but it is supposed that he was murdered in prison at Canton. A claim was advanced by his son on behalf of the widow and daughters, who were dependent on him, for compensation for the loss of their means of support, and also for loss of property. In support of the first claim, it is represented that Mr. Cowper, Senior, though 60 years of age at the time of his seizure, was a hale man, of vigorous constitution, and that there was every probability that he might have continued in active employment for ten years more. On this ground, the value of his life is estimated at ten years' purchase of his annual income. I consider this estimate of the claim untenable. It cannot be admitted that the reasonable expectation of life and unabated vigour for a man of sixty, in a tropical climate, is ten years, and, as I observed in the case of Mr. Cleverley, the whole professional income of a person in active employment cannot be regarded as belonging to his family. I submit that half the income, as in the other case, should be taken as the basis of computation, and that five years should be allowed as compensation to the widow. This would amount to 6,000 dollars, with the addition of 3,000 dollars already recommended for the loss of property. Any interest to be hereafter allowed should be computed on both sums from the date of the seizure.

It is satisfactory to be able to observe that a plea urged by Mr. J. C. Cowper, in aggravation of his mother's distress, is now happily removed. He stated that, in consequence of the destruction of his docks and business, he was not in a condition to render assistance to his widowed mother and his sisters. He was at the time fully warranted in taking this gloomy view of his prospects; but he received compensation for the loss of his own property, and I have learnt that, through his activity and enterprise, he has succeeded in re-establishing his docks at Whampoa, and is now carrying on a thriving trade.

If your Lordships approve of my recommendations, the extreme liability on account of the principal sums payable for special claims will be 289,077 dollars, which, added to the amount of claims already admitted (viz., 1,613,720 dollars 52 cents) will make a total present charge of 1,902,797 dollars on the Indemnity Fund.

It will be necessary, however, to make a reserve for claims which, though for the present rejected or set aside, on account of insufficiency of evidence, may be hereafter established. In this class I observe a claim forming part of a larger claim (No. 74) by Messrs. Dent and Co., for 40,000 dollars placed in the hands of a shroff for exchange into sycee. This claim was transferred to Class C for further investigation, but no decision is reported. The transaction appears to have taken place the day before the destruction of the factories, when warning of impending danger had been given; and it is probable that the claim may not have been pressed on consideration of the loss having been incurred through unnecessary risk. It is desirable, however, that the question should be decided with a view to a closing of the indemnity account.

Allowing for all contingencies of this nature, the admitted and special claims will be covered by about 2,000,000 dollars. The difference between this sum and 2,000,000 taels of sycee will be applicable to the payment of reasonable interest to the claimants, when the whole amount of the indemnity shall have been paid by the Chinese Government. The exact amount of such difference cannot be now stated, as it will depend on the rates at which the several payments on account of the indemnity shall have been received and converted into dollars; but in round numbers it may be assumed that about 700,000 dollars will be at the disposal of Her Majesty's Government, beyond the sums paid or payable for admitted claims.

Although the consideration of the disposition of this surplus need not arise until the last payments shall have been made by the Chinese Government in liquidation of the whole indemnity of 8,000,000 taels, it may be convenient that I should now bring under the notice of your Lordships the several points which will arise in settling the amount of interest which may be fairly payable to the several claimants.

I understand that the notion has been suggested that interest at the rate of from 10 to 12 per cent. should be allowed as the measure of the probable profit which would have been derived from the goods destroyed. I conceive that a claim to interest at this rate cannot under any circumstances be allowed. The indemnity of 2,000,000 taels was exacted from the Chinese, not to secure to British merchants anticipated profits, but to reimburse them for losses; and the highest rate of interest to be claimed in any case should be measured by the value of money (using the term employed in mercantile parlance) prevailing in China at the time. But this would apply only to goods, by the sale of which profits might have been expected. It would not apply to property in fixed investments, in great part of a perishable nature, such as houses, plate, and furniture; and it appears that one-third of the amount of claims passed by Sir R. Alcock as justly chargeable consisted of property of this description, viz., claims passed: property, 1,179,139 dollars; goods, 514,949 dollars. Total, 1,694,088 dollars.

The rate of interest allowable for this portion of the claims would depend on the character of the property destroyed, and would in no case, I apprehend, amount to anything near the sum which might be fairly claimed in respect of merchandize. Besides the question of the rates of interest to be allowed in each case, the Government would have some claims by way of set-off against those of the British merchants. In the first place there would arise a claim for interest on the advances made in payment of the principal of the admitted claims, in anticipation of the receipts of the Chinese indemnity, upon which the payments were properly chargeable. A claim on the part of the Government would also arise in respect of the cost of the conversion of sycee into dollars. The indemnity to the merchants is chargeable on the receipts of sycee silver, but payments were made to them in dollars at a time when dollars bore a considerable premium. The charge to which the Government has been subjected on this account should be ascertained before the claims for interest are admitted. The examination of these points would involve intricate calculations; and I submit for the consideration of your Lordships whether it may not be desirable, both in the interests of the claimants and the Government, that measures should at once be taken for ascertaining the amount which may properly be allowable in each case on a final settlement of the claims.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. ARBUTHNOT.

Inclosure 2 in No. 75.

Circular.

3, Lombard Street, July 28, 1863.

THE Undersigned having received, through Mr. Gregson, M.P., from the Chancellor of the Exchequer a proposal for the settlement of the claims for interest on the amount of the admitted claims for destruction of property at Canton in 1856, request the opinion of those interested as to what steps should be taken in regard to it. An immediate reply is requested by the Chancellor, so that the needful arrangements may be made by him previous to his leaving town. In explanation of paragraph 2 of the proposal, the Undersigned have to add that they understand it to refer to the question of interest only on the admitted claims. The unadmitted claims will be dealt with separately by the Government.

(Signed) MATHESON & Co.

China Claims. Memorandum for Basis of a final Settlement.

1. Government to give a cash order on China for interest on the claims from the date of the loss to the present time at 4 per cent. per annum.
 2. The merchants to relinquish all further claims to the Government.
- July 27, 1863.

We are in favour of the offer being accepted.

For Jardine, Matheson & Co.,
(Signed) MATHESON & Co.,
And 15 other signatures.

Mr. Gregson having inaccurately described in the annexed Memorandum the term to which interest was to be reckoned, begs to submit the following correction, which embraces the understanding he came to with the Chancellor of the Exchequer :—

Instead of the words "to the present time," read "to the dates of payment of the principal."

(Signed)

MATHESON & Co.,
And 15 other signatures.

No. 76.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received August 20.)

My Lord,

Peking, May 28, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copies of three despatches, with their inclosures, from Mr. Vice-Consul Adkins, at Chin-kiang, reporting various murders committed by foreigners and Chinamen employed on board lorchas trading on the Yang-tze River.

I have signified to Mr. Adkins my warm approval of the judicious course pursued by him in the two cases of murder committed by American citizens.

I beg to draw attention to the remarks of Mr. Adkins on the nature of the trade carried on by these sailing vessels, and on the prejudicial effect it exercises on the disposition both of the people and of the authorities towards foreigners.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 76.

Vice-Consul Adkins to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Chin-kiang, April 27, 1863.

I REGRET to have to inform you that the ruffianly conduct of certain foreigners bids fair to create a most unfriendly feeling among the natives here.

On the afternoon of the 26th ultimo a Chinese named Wang Yu-ju was brought to this Consulate. He was apparently in great pain; and on my asking him what was the matter, showed me a wound in his stomach evidently caused by a bullet. He also told me that the foreigner who had wounded him had killed a Hankow man, named Hu Cheu-kuang, outright, without the least provocation. I was also informed that the Chinese living near the scene of these occurrences were much incensed at what had taken place, and that a disturbance was to be apprehended.

Leaving the wounded man in charge of the servants of this Consulate, I proceeded to the spot, a village abreast of the anchorage, on the northern bank of the river, called Chi-hao-kou.

I found the body of the murdered Chinese lying in front of a low grog-shop much frequented by foreigners. At first no one would give me any information as to who had shot the man. I was about to go away in disgust, when a Canton boy volunteered to point out the boat on board of which the foreigner then was. I took him into my boat, and he conducted me to the American lugger "Woolee."

Having been informed that Ross, the master of the "Woolee," was an Englishman, I went alongside intending to arrest him. I saw, however, that the arrest could not be made without endangering the lives of some of the unarmed men who formed my crew, for the ruffian was swaggering up and down the deck, armed with pistol and sabre.

Under these circumstances I ordered the boat to push off from the "Woolee," and went on board the British steamer "Shandon." My intention was to remain on board the "Shandon," and watch the "Woolee" closely, thinking it probable that her master would try to escape as night closed in.

I had been on board the "Shandon" about half-an-hour, when Ross commenced to shout for a boat. He was answered from the "Shandon," and a Chinese sampan was sent, with orders to bring him on board. He got into the sampan, and came on board the "Shandon." He was immediately arrested, and put in irons. He was drunk, and of course denied having shot any one.

On the following day he produced papers, proving that he was an American. On this I went to the Taoutai, and after telling him the particulars of the case, urged him to take the matter up. He promised to do so, provided I would keep Ross in custody.

This I agreed to do. Meanwhile the ball was extracted from the wounded man by Dr. Egan, of Her Majesty's ship "Slaney," and an inquest held on the body of Hu-cheu-kuang. Dr. Egan's Report is herewith inclosed.

I informed Ross that he had been handed to me for safe custody by the Chinese authorities, and that he would remain under my charge until sent to his Consul at Shanghai.

It was not until the 1st instant that the Chinese authorities took any steps to procure witnesses. On that day a man named Hu Chih-heu came to me, and said that he knew the foreigner who shot Wang Yu-ju and Hu Cheu-kuang. To test his credibility I had Ross put into the cell of another prisoner. I then introduced the witness, and asked him which of the two was the person he identified. He at once pointed to Ross.

The Taoutae's Men-shang was present at the time, and took a note of what occurred.

The Taoutae seemed to think that the deposition of this witness was sufficient, and wanted to send Ross down to Shanghai at once.

I thought differently, and advised his Excellency to adopt the course most resembling foreign procedure in such cases. I suggested that the Magistrate of Chiang-tu (Yangchow), in whose district the murder was committed, should hold a Court on the spot, before which Ross and the producible witnesses should be severally examined in each other's presence. I volunteered my services on Ross's behalf.

Accordingly on the 9th instant the Prefect of Chin-kiang, the Magistrate of Chiang-tu, and myself, met at Chi-hao-kow. Ross was there in irons. The witnesses were examined in his presence, and their depositions having been interpreted to him by me, he had the opportunity of cross-questioning them. He put no questions, and indeed made no attempt to defend himself, his only plea being that he was drunk, and did not know what he was about.

I took a note of the proceedings, and made each witness affix his mark or signature to his deposition.

On the 30th March I wrote to the United States' Consul at Shanghai, informing him of the case and of the Taoutae's intention to send Ross to Shanghai. In the course of a few days I received a reply from Mr. Porter, the Deputy Consul, requesting me to send the prisoner down in the American steamer "Fire Dart" on her next downward trip. I complied with Mr. Porter's request. All the depositions went to Shanghai along with the prisoner.

I trust, Sir, that you will approve of my having assisted the Chinese authorities in this matter. I have endeavoured to make them understand the importance to them and to us of their showing the people in this neighbourhood that the foreign rowdy who has no Consul to keep him in order is under the control of the local authorities, and that they are able to ensure his punishment.

I very much fear that the foreigners trading on this river in sailing boats are almost without exception men without principle or character—outlaws in fact, who have no regard for Treaties or Regulations, and who look upon the Chinese as made for them to prey upon. Their drunken and debauched habits have made an impression even upon the Chinese.

I have, &c.
(Signed) T. ADKINS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 76.

Certificate.

ON Friday, March 27, I saw Wang Yu-ju, a Chinaman. He was suffering from a wound of a pistol-ball in the abdomen. The ball had entered about 2 inches below and to the left side of the navel, and passed under the skin for about 3½ inches towards the left side, where I found it.

This Chinaman is now nearly well.

I inclose the ball in the paper marked No. 1.

On Saturday morning, the 28th March, I saw the body of Hu Cheu-kuang, a Chinaman. A pistol bullet had entered his chest between the third and fourth ribs on his left side, and passed directly inwards. I found the ball on the opposite side, under the skin, between the fourth and fifth ribs.

This ball will be found in the paper marked No. 2.

(Signed) FRANCIS EGAN, L.R.C.S.

Inclosure 3 in No. 76.

Vice-Consul Adkins to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Chin-kiang, April 27, 1863.

ON the 29th ultimo a number of Chinese came to this Consulate with a petition; they represented that they belonged to some cargo-boats bound to Shanghai under the French flag, and the property of Messrs. Markort and Co. Their complaint was that the foreigner who had charge of the boats had, in conjunction with two other Europeans, forcibly taken several of the men belonging to them on board a Ningpo boat, and then confined them, tying their tails to a beam.

Knowing the intimate relations existing between Major Kleczkowski, the Commissioner of Customs at this port, and the Minister of France at Peking, I at once informed him of the case. He immediately dispatched a Customs officer, who, with the constable of this Consulate, proceeded to release the confined Chinese, and to arrest the foreigner in charge of the cargo-boats. The constable did not return until past midnight.

I saw him next morning, and he reported that after searching all the cargo-boats and the Ningpo boat, as directed by the Chinese, he had failed to discover any one tied up as described; he had, however, taken a man named Short, who was in charge of the cargo-boats, into custody.

I recognized the fellow at once as having formerly been in command of a British junk on this river. At once concluding him to be an Englishman, I commenced to interrogate him as to his doings on the previous evening; this took place in the office, and I was about to dismiss the fellow with a caution, when my attention was called to another part of the building: there to my surprise I saw a man, evidently seriously wounded, lying on a stretcher; he too said that he belonged to the cargo-boats, and had been shot by the foreigner in charge on the previous evening. He gave his name as Hsiang Tsao-teh. Along with him were several persons (Chinese) who were present at the time.

Dr. Egan saw the wounded man, and pronounced that the wound was a mortal one. I therefore took his deposition at once in Short's presence, as also that of the other witnesses.

Short, of course, denied his guilt, and further declared that he was an American; he had no papers to prove his nationality, but as I ascertained he had always been known as an American on the river, I deemed it my duty to let him have the benefit of his plea as far as I was concerned.

It struck me that I could not send him to Hong Kong for trial without first ascertaining his true nationality; as this was doubtful, he was handed over to the Taoutae here.

His Excellency requested me to detain him in custody until he could be sent to the French authorities at Shanghai.

Meanwhile the wounded man lingered on in intense agony; he was seldom in his right mind, but in his lucid intervals he begged that we would kill him if we could not alleviate his sufferings.

He was carefully attended night and day; but once he broke loose from his keepers, and in his frantic delirium tried to hang himself on the halyards of the flagstaff: failing in that he tried to jump into the river and drown himself. On the 3rd instant he died.

On the morning of the 4th instant I was present when Dr. Egan made a post mortem examination of his body.

Eventually the Taoutae determined to send Short to Shanghai by the Customs schooner "Halcyon." It would thus be for the French Consul-General, in conjunction with the American Consul, to decide his nationality. Should he turn out to be an Englishman, he could be returned to me; should he be an American, he would remain with the United States' Consul.

In a letter received from Mr. Seward, yesterday, he acknowledges him as an American. I hope his crime will meet with the punishment it deserves.

I endeavoured to ascertain the native place of Hsiang-tsao-teh, thinking that I might be able to collect a sum of money to forward to his relations. He himself, however, was seldom able to talk rationally, and his companions knew nothing of him.

It is much to be lamented that men like Short are so common on this river. It is not too much to expect that the whole population of the river districts will become hostile to foreigners before long.

In point of fact, the river-trade, as carried on in sailing-boats, is fast degenerating into piracy. The insurgents at Nanking are alone benefited by the traffic.

I have it on good authority that, on the 14th instant (about), no less than nineteen foreign boats were discharging at Nanking.

Respectfully, &c.
(Signed) THOS. ADKINS.

Inclosure 4 in No. 76.

Certificate.

ON Monday, March 30, I saw Hsiang Tsao-teh, a Chinaman. He was then suffering from peritonitis, and in his back was a bullet-wound, to the left side of the third lumbar vertebra. On passing a probe into the wound, I found the vertebra was fractured.

The man lingered on until Friday, April 3rd, when he died from peritonitis and enteritis, consequent on the wound.

In the post-mortem examination I found the transverse process of the third lumbar vertebra fractured, and a wound, evidently made by a bullet, entering the abdomen at a part corresponding to the external wound and fracture of vertebra. The intestines were perforated in several places by ulceration, and the fæces extravasated.

I could nowhere find the bullet, and am of opinion that it entered the intestinal canal from whence it was expelled through the rectum during an attack of diarrhoea which he had the morning after I first saw him.

That the wound was made a bullet, and the man's death the consequence thereof, I have not the slightest doubt.

(Signed) FRANCIS EGAN, L.R.C.S.

Inclosure 5 in No. 76.

Vice-Consul Adkins to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir, *Chin-kiang, May 5, 1863.*

ON the 2nd instant the master of the British steamer "Waratah" reported to me the finding of the American lorcha "Fox," derelict near this port. He also reported that the bodies of the European master and his Chinese wife and child were on board her. As soon as I possibly could, I went on board the lorcha in company with Dr. Egan, of Her Majesty's ship "Slaney."

It is not my intention to attempt a description of what I saw in the vessel's cabin. Suffice it to say that the mangled corpses of the three persons were there just as the murderers left them. The man's head was nearly severed from his body, and his bowels protruded from a gash in his abdomen. The woman, who from her position and attitude must have been endeavouring to protect her husband, was stabbed and cut in twenty places. The child, an infant of six months old, had been brained by a hatchet. The cabin was in great confusion; all the boxes and lockers in it had been broken open, and their contents strewed about. The whole place reeked with blood.

The crew had of course left the vessel, but the female servant of the woman, a native of Shanghae, remained behind. I have taken her deposition and forwarded it to the United States' Consul at Shanghae. It is to the effect that the murder was committed by the crew.

I fear the perpetrators of this outrage will escape. Five days elapsed before the murder was reported.

As the foreigners who killed recently two Chinese at this port have been brought to justice, it is but fair to expect that the Chinese authorities will do their utmost in the present case.

Respectfully, &c.
(Signed) THOS. ADKINS.

Inclosure 6 in No. 76.

Certificate.

Chin-kiang, May 5, 1863.

ON Saturday, May 2, 1863, I examined the bodies of three persons on board the American lorcha "Fox," one male, a European, one Chinese woman, and a child about six months old.

The bodies were on the port side of the vessel in the after cabin, and were in the following positions :—

1. The body of the European was on a locker, the left leg doubled up under him, the right hanging down over the side of the locker; his left arm was thrown across under him resting on the locker, the right hanging down by the side.

2. The body of the woman was in a sitting position by the side of the man; her head thrown slightly back, her right arm resting on the bed, her left hanging down by her side, and her trousers drawn down.

3. The child was lying on the bed between the two, with a walking-stick in its hand.

In the back of the man's neck was a frightful wound, made apparently with a hatchet or sword, and nearly separating the head from the body. This wound could be seen without moving the body. On moving the body, the left hand was seen resting on a sword which was lying sheathed at the head of the bed; the hand was cut across in several places, apparently with a sword. The man's abdomen was ripped open and the bowels protruding.

The woman was stabbed over the body, thighs, and back, in about twenty places, and under the left collar-bone there was a deep stab, made apparently with a spear; this last wound must have been fatal. On the back of the neck there was a wound apparently made with the same weapon as inflicted the wound in the man's neck, although not nearly so severe.

There were several sword wounds on the wrists, hands, and head.

The child's skull was fractured with some blunt instrument.

(Signed) FRANCIS EGAN, L.R.C.S.

No. 77.

The Bishop of Victoria and Bishop Boone to Earl Russell.—(Received August 20.)

My Lord,

Shanghai, June 17, 1863.

A letter signed "Eye-witness" (of which a copy is herewith inclosed) recently appeared in the "North China Herald," detailing certain cruelties with which rebel prisoners were said to have been consigned to a slow and agonizing death by order of the Chinese authorities, and in the presence of British officers within a few miles of this city.

A letter was inserted in the same newspaper from the Bishop of Victoria, earnestly calling upon the anonymous writer either to come forward publicly, and in his own name, to substantiate the statements, or to communicate personally with the Bishop himself for their due authentication. A copy of this letter is also inclosed.

The writer of the letter signed "Eye-witness" has, in answer to that appeal, attended in the presence of the Undersigned, and positively re-asserted the facts stated in that letter.

Another eye-witness also testified before us to having seen the occurrences adverted to: and, on hearing "Eye-witness's" published letter read to him, fully confirmed every statement, with the sole exception of the final scene of decapitation. This second eye-witness stated to us that he was so overpowered by the spectacle of the prolonged tortures described in the published letter, that he felt unable to remain on the spot, and retired before the actual beheading of the rebel prisoners terminated their sufferings.

The two eye-witnesses are, for certain reasons, very reluctant to give their names publicly. But we beg leave to certify to your Lordship that both of them are gentlemen of the highest respectability and undoubted credibility; and that no reasonable doubt appears to rest upon the truth of the facts certified to in our presence.

We respectfully submit to your Lordship the facts of the case, in order that you may adopt such measures as you may deem most conducive towards stopping these atrocities.

We remain, &c.

(Signed)

G. VICTORIA.

WM. J. BOONE,

Missionary Bishop, Episcopal Church United States to China.

P.S.—A copy of this letter has also been addressed, *mutatis mutandis*, to his Excellency Sir Frederick Bruce at Peking.

Inclosure in No. 77.

Extract from the "North China Herald" of June 13, 1863.

TREATMENT OF REBEL PRISONERS.

To the Editor of the "Daily Shipping and Commercial News."

Sir,—As the letter of "Observer" published in your issue of the 5th is alike calculated to mislead the public as that of "Justice and Mercy," I am induced to come forward and state the true facts of the case; neither on the one hand exaggerating the atrocities committed, nor on the other palliating the cruelties perpetrated.

It is quite evident that "Justice and Mercy," in his laudable anxiety to bring the offenders to justice, seized on an "idle rumour," and, as such, a gross exaggeration, while it is equally evident that "Observer" could not have been a spectator of what he has written, or he would not have asserted that the hapless victims of Imperialist cruelty "gave no external manifestation of suffering." Though no expression of pain escaped their lips, their contracted limbs, clenched hands, and ghastly and contorted features spoke but too truly of the fearful agony they were enduring. So expressive of intense agony were their countenances, that after gazing on them for a moment, I turned away sick at heart, unable longer to witness their sufferings.

The facts are as follow:—About 11 o'clock A.M. on the day following the capture of Tai-tsan (Sunday, May 3rd), seven prisoners were brought into the Imperialist camp near Wy-con-sin, being stripped perfectly nude; they were each tied to a stake, and tortured with the most refined cruelty. Arrows appeared to have been forcibly driven into various parts of their bodies, heads, region of heart, abdomen, &c., from whence issued copious streams of blood. This mode of torture falling short of satiating the demoniacal spirit of their tormentors, recourse was had to other means. Strips of flesh were cut, or rather hacked (judging from the appearance presented, the instrument seemed too blunt to cut) from different parts of their bodies, which, hanging by a small portion of skin, presented an appearance truly horrible. In no case however were their eyes injured, as stated by the person who signs himself "Justice and Mercy." For hours these wretched beings writhed in agony. About sunset they were led forth more dead than alive by a brutal executioner, who, sword in hand, thirsting to imbrue his hand in blood, seemed the very incarnation of a fiend. Seizing his unfortunate victims, he exultingly dragged them forth, mocking and insulting them, and then, by hewing, hacking, and using a sawing motion, he succeeded eventually in putting an end to their sufferings by partially severing the head from the body. Such are the bare facts, which can, if necessary, be fully substantiated by other eye-witnesses.

In conclusion, I would ask you, Mr. Editor, if in affording aid to the Imperialist cause, and in permitting British officers to enter the service of the Emperor of China, we are not morally responsible for these atrocities, if we do not raise our voice against and show our utter abhorrence of such revolting barbarities? Possessing, as our Minister at Peking does, the confidence of the Imperialist Government, could not his powerful influence be exercised in the cause of humanity, and remonstrances addressed to those in authority which might prevent a recurrence of similar cruelties on prisoners taken by troops commanded by a British officer?

I am, &c.

(Signed) AN EYE-WITNESS.

To the Editor of the "Daily Shipping and Commercial News."

Sir,—My attention has been called to letters which have recently appeared in your paper signed "Justice and Mercy," "Observer," and "An Eye-witness," adverting to the sanguinary atrocities alleged to have been perpetrated on Chinese rebel prisoners near Shanghae.

Seven of these wretched victims of cruel pagan warfare are said to have been tormented by a slow and agonizing death by order of the Chinese authorities, and *in the presence of British officers serving by permission of the British Government* in the Chinese Imperial force in this neighbourhood.

The letter in your number of to-day purports to be written by an "Eye-witness," and is couched in terms of moderation and in a spirit of apparent truthfulness.

In the name of British Christians sensitively alive to the moral aspect of our country before this pagan population—in the general interests of our holy religion and the

prospects of Christianity in this land—in the character of a Christian Minister and Bishop in this furthest outpost of Christendom, on the frontiers of a heathen Empire—I earnestly call upon “Eye-witness” and others who may have been present, to stand forth before the public, and to communicate in their own name, and with their individual signatures, a circumstantial statement respecting the revolting barbarities said to have been practised in their presence and actual observation.

At all events, I ask “Eye-witness” and others, through the medium of your pages, to communicate with me by letter or by a personal interview, and to enable me to bring their statements *duly authenticated* to the public notice of the British authorities in China and at home, with all the weight which my personal and official advocacy may enable me to bring in furtherance of the cause of Christian humanity and mercy.

I remain, &c.
(Signed) G. VICTORIA.

Shanghai, June 10, 1863.

No. 78.

Earl Russell to Consul Robertson.

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 22, 1863.

IN accordance with the suggestion of the Board of Treasury I inclose copies of a letter from that Department and of a Report by Mr. Arbuthnot on the subject of the Canton claims;* and in anticipation of an authority to that effect which you will receive from Sir F. Bruce, I have now to instruct you to pay the further admitted claims, and the interest, on the basis proposed in the inclosed papers.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 79.

Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 22, 1863.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith copies of a letter from the Treasury and of a Report by Mr. Arbuthnot on the subject of the Canton claims.*

In accordance with the suggestion of the Treasury, I have also transmitted copies of these papers to Mr. Consul Robertson, with instructions to pay the further admitted claims and the interest, on the basis proposed; but it would be desirable that those instructions should be repeated by Her Majesty's Legation at Peking.

I inclose, for your information, a copy of my despatch to Mr. Robertson.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 80.

Major-General Crofton to Mr. Layard.—(Received August 23.)

(Extract.)

War Office, August 22, 1863.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for War to transmit to you, for the perusal of Earl Russell, the accompanying letter from Major-General Brown, commanding the troops in China, inclosing two Reports from Major Gordon, Royal Engineers, of the capture of Tai-tsan and his last success before Quang-san.

Inclosure 1 in No. 80.

Major-General Brown to Major-General Forster.

Sir,

Head-Quarters, Shanghai, June 5, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to transmit, for the information of His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding-in-chief, the accompanying two Reports from Major Gordon of the capture of Tai-tsan, and his last success before Quang-san.

Connected with the operations before the former place, I had a field force acting in conjunction, as a support, moving on the extreme edge of our boundary, at Wy-con-sin and its proximity, within some three or four miles of Tai-tsan, which was of great assistance to Major Gordon in his operations.

The force (strength as per margin*) was under the command of Captain Murray, R.A., who handled it with much judgment.

Quang-san having fallen, Major Gordon now proposes to make it his head-quarters, from its strategical position, which I approve of; and as the Footac intends to make Tai-tsan his head-quarters, I shall bring it within the boundary, thus giving the Imperialists every confidence to hold it, knowing that they could receive support from me at any moment. The distance from Shanghai is not more than twenty-eight miles; and, I think, it will make our boundary more complete and stronger as a position.

I take this opportunity of reporting that the wing of the 5th Bombay Native Infantry, in the ship "Gorilla," will leave Shanghai for Bombay about the 8th instant; and a battery of Royal Artillery and Her Majesty's 31st Regiment I hope to get away in about a fortnight, ships having been taken up: but as this is the first time that troops have been embarked from Shanghai, great difficulties have been experienced in obtaining sufficient water-casks for the troops for so long a voyage.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

W. G. BRO W

Inclosure 2 in No. 80.

Report of Operations before Quang-san by the Sung-kiong Force, under the Command of Major Gordon, R.E., between the 25th and 31st May, 1863.

Quang-san, May 31, 1863.

THE troops, consisting of some 2,300 Infantry and 600 Artillery, left Sung-kiong on the 25th of May, 1863, and marched to Tai-tsan; on the 26th of May, to Lokopan; and on the 27th of May reached the East Gate of Quang-san, and encamped close to the Imperialist stockades. The rebels, in great strength, were on the right flank of these stockades, some 800 yards off, and had constructed there three stockades of their own.

On the 28th, the 4th and 5th Regiments and some Light Artillery advanced to attack their right flank, whilst the Imperialists moved to their left flank. After some desultory firing from the mortars and rockets, the flanks of the rebels became seriously threatened, and they vacated the stockades in haste, hotly pursued by the 4th and 5th Regiments and by the Imperialists.

The rebels numbered some 10,000 to 12,000 men, and were commanded by Tien Wang and Tsah, the late Head-man of Tai-tsan. They were pursued to the small West Gate, when the force returned, and our loss was some five men wounded.

The rebels from the East Gate had made a sortie at the time of the attack on their stockades, which was soon repulsed.

On the morning of the May the little steamer "Hyson" proceeded to Tsin-Edin, a village, or rather station (some 7 miles from West Gate, Quang-san, and 15 from Soo-chow) on the main and only road to Soo-chow. This road is good, but has to cross very large bridges, and to follow narrow causeways, sometimes only from 3 to 4 feet wide for 20 or 30 yards, with deep creeks on the inner side. The road follows the bank of the creek without deviation the whole way, and the creek itself, like all creeks about Quang-san, is extremely large, some 90 to 200 yards wide and 15 feet deep, widening

* 60 Royal Artillery; 80 Lascars; 2 howitzers; 2 5½-inch mortars; 80 31st Regiment; 150 Beloochees; 150 5th Bombay Native Infantry.

sometimes into lakes, or sheets of water. The country round is flat, for the most part, and well cultivated, but the people are well protected by the large creeks from inroads of the rebels.

This road is the only one existing between Quang-san, Tai-tsan, Ka-ding, &c., to the south-east, and Chan-zu to the north-west, and it is scarcely conceivable that the rebels should have overlooked such an important fact. Here, after the capture of Sinpo, one single steamer could have accomplished the fall of all the above-named places by remaining on this line, either at Small Edin or some other points on the same road.

At the head of the junction of the Soo-chow Creek (as I would call the one leading from Stone Bridge, Shanghae, to Lokopan, past Sukung-ku) with the creek from Soo-chow Quang-san, the rebels had constructed two stockades (A and C) on the creek, and one behind, of stone (B).

When the "Hyson" arrived at the stakes at Sung-kiong, about 800 yards from the stockades, a very large force was proceeding from Quang-san to Soo-chow, with innumerable boats of all sizes. These were shelled from a 32-pounder, and some sunk and some destroyed.

These troops still continued to pass after the "Hyson" had turned, and as she had remained over three hours, some idea may be had of the force. Hundreds and hundreds of boats passed in the time that the "Hyson" remained at stakes. It was then determined to take these stockades, and see the effect, as well as to secure a base which would protect our siege-guns, &c., should it be thought advisable to change from East to West Gate. In consequence, the Light Artillery, with 400 of the 4th or Rifle Regiment, a few Body Guard, and some 500 Imperialists, started with the "Hyson," and also in gun-boats, and arrived at stakes at 11 A.M. The Rifles were landed on the left bank, and then pushed on towards the edge of the creek to the left of the stockades.

As soon as the force had come in sight, masses of rebels began rushing from the districts about Quang-san towards Soo-chow.

The stockades looked well manned, and there was some appearance of a hard fight at hand. However, the stakes being pulled up, and the "Hyson" free to go on, was almost crippled by the crowd of Imperial gun-boats, but contrived to push through them up the creek, and the Rifles closed in, when the rebels left the stockades.

And now comes an account of a flight almost unprecedented. The Rifles were directed to throw a force into Stockade A, on the road to Soo-chow, and to pursue towards the town, while the "Hyson" turned at the Stockades A and C to the left, pursuing towards Soo-chow.

About five miles from Stockade A, near the village of Edin, the "Hyson" came to us. A splendid bridge over the creek, arched high enough to allow her to pass without lowering her funnel; and at this bridge was found a very finely-cemented stone stockade, or fort, carefully finished in every way.

It was about two miles from this place that the "Hyson" overhauled the rebels, and followed them slowly up. The creek was positively jammed up with their boats, and at the bridge at Edin the crush was awful. For miles ahead the whole creek was covered with them, and as if to compete with this there was the crush of the troops (rebels) whenever they came to any narrow place such as a bridge, and that when the "Hyson" was passing under the bridge at Edin, the rebels had scarcely ceased filing through their stockades. The "Hyson" stopped to shut up the entrance of the stockades, and take away the bridges, to prevent the rebels, who were in confusion all over the country, from getting a point where they could rally on.

A very large mass of rebels came in from the south over the arch bridge. The "Hyson" then steamed after them, and at Small Edin passed another stone stockade, two miles from Edin, likewise vacated. This was situated at a most important point.

The "Hyson" still continued following them up, and at three miles beyond Small Edin passed another stockade, not of much account, and also vacated. This was near the ruins of a bridge over the creek.

The "Hyson" pursuing, proceeded a mile or so further, and turned when in sight of East Gate of Soo-chow, and about one mile distant from Soo-chow, firing a shell into the rebels as they defiled over the last bridge spanning the main creek. The wall and pagoda of Soo-chow were plainly visible. All this time rebel stragglers had been dropping into the Soo-chow road from all parts, and as the "Hyson" had to continue her work all the way back, sometimes being so close on masses of rebels that she was obliged to resort to some measure to get clear of them, and so adopted the novel expedient of using her steam whistle, which, singular as it may appear, had the desired effect. Their confusion was indescribable, and it may be said that the road from the Stockade A to Soo-chow was on the 30th instant a sight not easily forgotten. Mounted men would try and gallop by the steamer not six yards

from her; others positively rode or tried to ride past when she was alongside the road. The grape and canister must have told fearfully, owing to their numbers.

To return to the "Hyson." When she got to Stockade A, the most tremendous fire was being kept up from our stockades and the Imperial gun-boats, and things did not appear pleasant from the panic-stricken state of the Imperials, being surrounded by numbers of rebels.

The "Hyson" now proceeded up towards Quang-san, and drove the dense yelling masses of rebels back, step by step. These men were the Quang-san garrison trying to escape, and nothing but the absolute necessity which existed of preventing them from carrying the weakly stockades by mere force of numbers justified our firing into them; but it was imperative, and the rebels were desperate.

We had not ceased shelling until 2:30 A.M., and on returning found a dense mass of 300 rebels, who gave up their arms, and surrendered. This at once gave the news of the evacuation of Quang-san, which was also known by the force at East Gate about the same time. Certainly 6,000 to 8,000 prisoners would have been taken had there been troops to collect them. Ku Wang himself is cut off, and is said to be wandering about the country, and I should think the whole garrison of Quang-san was a perfect loss to the rebels, as, from the tremendous creeks that have to be crossed, no men can pass unless in boats, armed and in numbers, and the plight of those who came in after trying another route was pitiable.

This has been a most disastrous affair for the rebels. There have been most violent disputes in Soo-chow between Tien Wang, a Cantonese who commands the gun-boats, and Wang, which led to bloodshed, and the Cantonese Wang is now outside the West Gate with his boats. His men are greatly dispirited, and being cut off from Soo-chow, as every one seems to say he is, and of which he is the chief, will not improve his position.

The prisoners say that they (the rebels) have sent their wives out of Soo-chow to Nanking, and have built up the East Gate.

The rebels have a foundry here, and were commencing to make shell. They have two 18-pounders, good guns, on the East and South Gate, which were worked by Englishmen, now said to be wandering about the country. Ku Wang also has two Englishmen with him.

I should imagine the loss killed in action and drowned to be 600, and prisoners 1,500. Loss of Sung-kiong force—killed 2, drowned 5.

(Signed) C. G. GORDON.

Inclosure 3 in No. 80.

Report of Operations by the Sung-kiong Force under the Command of Major Gordon, R.E., between the 25th of April and the 9th of May, 1863.

THE Sung-kiong force started from North Gate at 7 A.M. on the 25th of April, and marched by Old Syngpo to Powo-kong, some eighteen miles, when it halted for the night. The Heavy Artillery and the steamer "Hyson" had proceeded to Syngpo the day previous, and were engaged in removing the buttresses of the bridges at North and East Gates, in order to allow the steamer to pass through. This took till the 26th, when the "Hyson" came up to Totsun, where another bridge barred the way. The force marched on the 26th to Loko-pan, crossing the main creek to Soo-chow by a bridge of boats at Tsiding-kong. On the morning of the 27th, information was received from Tai-tsan that the rebels had refused to come over. The history of the affair was this:—When Chan-zu gave in its allegiance, Tai-tsan was wavering; but the head rebel, Tsah, wanted the Footae to make a show of attacking it, to save his face. This caused Holland's attack, which, however, seems to have quite altered affairs. The Chung Wang came to Tai-tsan the day after Holland's repulse, and gave large rewards to all concerned, and also left from 2,000 to 3,000 of his own troops there. However, after Fushan was taken and Chan-zu relieved, the Footae began negotiating with Tai-tsan again; and eventually his brother, with some 2,000 Imperial troops, went up and made stockades close to the South Gate. Tsah lured them on; and a day, the 26th, was fixed to give over the city, on which day the Footae's brother and his men went towards the town; part of his men had entered the Gate when one gun was fired, and rebels came down on them from West and East Gates, and took some 1,000 prisoners and lots of muskets, with

their camp equipments, &c. The Footae's brother escaped with a spear-wound in the rump. Tsah then cut off some 300 heads of the Footae's soldiers, and kept some to send to Soo-chow; others were sent away to Quang-san.

There appears to have been some difference of opinion on the subject between the rebels, as there are signs of a fight between the rebels themselves at the South Gate, and some thirty or forty rebels are there lying dead. Tsah's intended treachery was known among the garrison, and it seems odd that the Footae should not have guessed it through his spies, as the other Chinese General who occupied Wan-tze-jow always distrusted Tsah. Four hundred mandarin hats and a good many suits of Imperial clothing were sent in to the rebels, in expectation of the city coming over, in which case the troops were to assist the Soon-kiong force against Quang-san. The news arrived at Lokopan on the 27th (the day was wet), with a note from the Chinese General Sing that he could give no assistance towards reducing Quang-san. It was then determined to change the destination of the force to Tai-tsan, and, consequently, on the 28th the force marched across country to Wan-tze-jow, the artillery joining it there. On the 29th the troops marched to South Gate, of Tai-tsan, where the Leho River joins the Wy-con-sin creek, and where the rebels had a stockade; this was not held when the force first arrived, but they (the rebels) soon came down to it. And as the evening set in wet, and the artillery did not come up till late, the arrangements were made for the attack next day; however, at dusk, Captain Kirkham, with his company, crossed over and found the stockade vacated: this point was important to the force, and arrangements were made to hold it until the capture of the city. The 30th being wet, the troops remained at South Gate; and on the 1st moved up the creek towards the West Gate, where the rebels had two large and strong stockades; after some manœuvring and delay in getting the troops into position, the two 8-inch howitzers were landed, and one 32-pounder, with some of the smaller guns, and opened fire with precision: the troops were gradually advanced to overlap and threaten the rear of the stockade, when, after a few rounds, the rebels ran, and the two stockades were taken possession of.

On the 2nd of May the 1st Regiment was moved early towards the North Gate to prevent the retreat from that point, and to cover the left flank. About 12, noon, fire was opened from two guns, and, by degrees, more guns were brought into action, till, at 2 P.M., every gun and mortar was in action, the troops being under cover. As the defences got dilapidated, the guns were advanced, and at 4:30 P.M. the boats were moved up and the assault commenced: the rebels swarmed to the breach, and for ten to twelve minutes a hand-to-hand contest took place, canister being fired into the breach from this side of the ditch, and a heavy musketry fire kept up; at last the Ningpo Battalion found its way in, and the rebels fled. Two Frenchmen were shot in the breach, one American, James Smith, who had been two years with the rebels, and three of the 5th Bombay Native Infantry were also killed, and Private Hargreaves was afterwards taken prisoner, severely wounded. He states that he deserted on the 12th of March with Thomas Moodie and Joseph Miles, 31st Regiment; they came from Honkue settlement to Tai-tsan, and formed the body-guard of head Chief. Enfield metallic ammunition was found in the rebel Chief's house. The two Frenchmen begged hard for mercy; they had been in the force some twelve months, and had commenced the wheels and trails of field artillery for the rebels. There had been four men of the 5th Bombay Native Infantry; they are said to have fought well, but unwillingly; they had begged an Englishman, who had been at Soo-chow selling arms, to intercede with Chung Wang for them, but Chung Wang would not let them go.

The headman Tsah's snake flags remained in the breach till the last, and he himself was shot in the head; he lost one of his three wives, who fell into the arms or hands of the Chinese General Sing. Two blue-button mandarins were found in this man's house tied up, and were released, with some hundred of the Footae's soldiers who were packed into houses for transport to Soo-chow. The headman Tsah had prepared one of his houses with powder and a slowmatch, which blew it up at midnight on the night of the capture; this did no damage.

The rush at East Gate must have been great, as there were numbers drowned in the ditch, and trampled to death in getting away. The rebels had made a raid towards Chan-zu a week before, and got in an enormous amount of live stock; the place was also full of boats. Several despatches, with Tsah's umbrella, mandarin cap, and numerous mandarin "chin-chin" cards (the Footae's among the number) were found.

The despatches relate to the importance of holding out, and give directions to the headman to kill all the "imps."

The headman gave out gold medals to all the Europeans before the fight; some three of these medals were taken. From information received, it appears that the Chung

Wang arrived at Tai-tsan after Holland's fight, and took off the 32-pounders; the report is that one only has burst.

By the capture of Tai-tsan, the town of Chiking is cleared, and communication with Chan-zu opened.

The rebels retreated by small roads towards Soo-chow, leaving musketry, &c.; they took two days to get to Quang-san by these bye-roads, and were not let in at that place. It should have been mentioned that the little steamer "Hyson," owing to her very light draught of water, was able to arrive via Lokopan and Quang-san, at 3 P.M. on the day of attack on Tai-tsan, having taken a stockade between Quang-san and Tai-tsan, and killed some of the fugitives. She did not land any men, but merely fired two or three shell from her 32-pounder when the rebels retreated. She came up close to Tai-tsan. Her appearing so suddenly must have had a great effect on the Tai-tsan garrison.

On the 3rd May the troops halted at Tai-tsan, and on the 4th May moved towards Quang-san by a good road alongside of the creek, or rather river. Quang-san is ten miles from Tai-tsan, and is situated at the foot of a hill rising abruptly from the plain. It seems a large city, but the wall looks old and weak. The force encamped at East Gate, on which is mounted a heavy gun (32-pounder); the next day it moved to South Gate, and thence to Main Creek, where it remained till the Imperialists could entrench themselves, which they soon did, and leaving the "Hyson" with the force, returned to Soon-kiong.

The following are the casualties of the force engaged in the attack on Tai-tsan:—

Killed.—Captain Bannen, 4th Regiment, and 20 men.

Mortally wounded.—20 men.

Wounded.—8 officers, 73 men.

(Signed) C. G. GORDON.

No. 81.

Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 24, 1863.

I CONCUR in the approval which you have expressed to Mr. Adkins of the judicious course pursued by him in the two cases of murder committed by American citizens, as reported in your despatch of the 28th of May.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 82.

Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 24, 1863.

I HAVE received your despatch of the 25th of May, and I concur with you in the view you take of Rear-Admiral Kuper's Standing Order No. 10, prescribing the conduct to be observed by Her Majesty's naval officers when falling in with suspicious Chinese vessels.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 24, 1863.

I LEARN from a joint letter which has been addressed to me by the Bishop of Victoria, and by Bishop Boone, on the subject of certain cruelties stated to have been inflicted by the Chinese authorities on rebel prisoners in the neighbourhood of Shanghai, that they have also drawn your attention to this painful subject.

I am well aware that you will have shared the indignation and disgust with which I have read the account of these cruelties. I hope that the newspaper statements have been much exaggerated, but you must exert every effort to put a stop to such atrocities.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 84.

Earl Russell to the Bishop of Victoria.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, August 24, 1863.

I HAVE had the honour to receive the letter addressed to me by your Lordship and Bishop Boone, in which you call my attention to certain cruelties stated to have been inflicted by the Chinese authorities on rebel prisoners in the neighbourhood of Shanghai.

It is, I trust, needless for me to assure you and Bishop Boone that I have read the account of these cruelties with indignation and disgust. It is to be hoped that the statements to which you refer have been much exaggerated, but Her Majesty's Government have not delayed to instruct Her Majesty's Minister at Peking to do all in his power to stop such atrocities.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 85.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(Received August 31.)

Sir,

Admiralty, August 28, 1863.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send you here with, for the information of Earl Russell, a copy of a letter dated the 24th June last, from Vice-Admiral Kuper, reporting the state of affairs in China.

I am, &c.

(Signed) W. G. ROMAINE.

Inclosure in No. 85.

Vice-Admiral Kuper to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir,

"Euryalus," at Yokohama, June 24, 1863.

BE pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that the Senior Officers of Her Majesty's ships at Hong Kong and Shanghai report the continuance of tranquillity at the Chinese Consular ports generally.

2. From the latter port I am informed that the Anglo-Chinese forces under Major Gordon, Royal Engineers, captured the town of Tai-tsan on the 2nd instant, and that of Quang-san on the 28th ultimo. The last-named place is to be made the head-quarters of the Anglo-Chinese troops in that Province.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS L. KUPER.



No. 86.

Sir E. Lugard to Mr. Hammond.—(Received August 28.)

Sir,

War Office, August 27, 1863.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for War to transmit to you, for the information of Earl Russell, the accompanying copy of a letter from the Officer Commanding Her Majesty's Forces in China, with its inclosures, on the subject of the alleged ill-treatment of rebel prisoners by the Imperialists.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD LUGARD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 86.

Major-General Brown to Earl de Grey and Ripon.

My Lord,

Shanghae, June 22, 1863.

VARIOUS statements having appeared in the several journals published in Shanghae concerning the treatment of rebel prisoners, and alleged torture of some few taken at the capture of Taitsan, I have the honour to forward the said statements for your information, numbered according to publication, and entertaining the opinion that some inquiry might be probably called for from the circumstance of the Bishop of Victoria expressing a determination—and, to quote his own words, “to bring the same to the public notice of the British authorities in China and at home, with all the weight which his personal and official advocacy may enable him to effect,”—I would be the first in the field to meet any attack, and to express my surprise that the Bishop of Victoria, in reading the several statements in the newspapers, before publishing his own letter, did not condescend to ask me in my official capacity as General Officer Commanding Her Majesty's Forces, if I could furnish him with any reliable information, when he would have learnt that I had not been silent in the matter; and the public of Shanghae were somewhat late in agitating the affair, though supported on one side by “justice and mercy,” calling for “retribution” against the Imperialists, and on the other side by a professed rebel at heart, Yang Chong, at their very door, linked to no one single virtue, but a thousand crimes, glorying in his nefarious and disreputable traffic of selling arms to the rebels.

To explain the case I must here mention, that a report was made to me by Captain Murray, R.A., commanding a Field Force in support of the attack on Taitsan, soon after his return to head quarters, of the Imperialist's cruel treatment of their prisoners.

I took the report to Her Britannic Majesty's Consul (Harvey) without delay, and expressed my desire that the Futai should be informed of the same, and to urge upon him to send out an order at once to all his mandarins in command, forbidding any cruelty to be exercised upon captured prisoners; and further, if any report was again made to me of a similar nature, I would cease to act with his troops. Lieutenant R. Cane, R.A., who has been six years in China, and has some knowledge of the Chinese language and customs, was the first who reported the circumstances to Captain Murray, and the letter of the former officer called for by my report, is here annexed, and details I think everything most clearly.

I have no reason to believe otherwise than that the Futai is equally anxious to be as humane as possible to his prisoners. Some hundreds were lately captured at Quang-san, and so far from being cruelly or severely dealt with, have actually, to a great extent, been incorporated by Major Gordon into his own Regiments; and I have also asked for some to be sent down to me from Quang-san to be drilled with, and attached to, the batteries of Chinese Artillery Gun Lascars, which are under the command of the Officer Commanding Royal Artillery, who reports them most useful and efficient.

Major Gordon was also lent by me some 50 of these drilled Gun Lascars for his attack on Quang-san, and speaks most highly of them. I have now only to draw attention to “eye witness” statement, who would actually allow the public to believe that men undergoing extreme torture, such as he describes, with various wounds, from whence issued copious streams of blood, could not only exist from 11 a.m. till sunset, but then be able to be led out for execution; leaving one to suppose that he was present the whole time. Whereas, the Editor, in his remarks on the Bishop's letter, to remove any apprehension as to the non-influence of British Officers who were on the spot, states that the

treatment the prisoners were undergoing was only discovered ten minutes before their execution. This alone, I submit, stamps the whole statement as highly coloured and greatly exaggerated.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. G. BROWN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 86.

Lieutenant Cane, R.A., to the Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General at Shanghai.

Sir,

Shanghai, June 11, 1863.

IN reply to the inquiry of the Major-General Commanding, I have the honour to inform you, that on the 3rd May, 1863, I was present at Waikongsum as acting Field-Adjutant to a force under command of Captain A. Murray, Royal Artillery. In the afternoon of that day, I was taking a walk for exercise with several other officers along the main road towards Ko-lung-sung, and in passing between two Imperialist's stockades, our attention was attracted by a number of men—I think 7 or 8—naked and tied to posts. On approaching, I found they were Chang-mao prisoners, all with very long hair (showing that they were rebels of long standing), and with the very peculiar complexion and physiognomy which have been frequently noticed as acquired by men who have spent much time among the Taepings.

These men had evidently been sentenced to the punishment of the "Ling-che," or "slow and ignominious death"—what we call "cutting into a thousand pieces,"—and it was also evident that they had been spared as much as possible, and little more than the form of this horrible punishment carried out. Each man had a piece of skin, not flesh, about 4 inches by 2, partly stripped from one arm and hanging down; and one or two arrows had been pushed (apparently not shot) through the skin, in different places. There was very little blood about the ground, and the men did not appear to be in pain; one was crying out very loudly that he was a Shanghai coolie, and ought not to be put to death as a rebel; he had, however, very long hair. I asked a low Chinese officer present, what they were; he told me "they were old and well-known rebels—two of them officers, and that they were about to be beheaded—he said that they had been exposed from mid-day" (it was about half-past 4 or 5 o'clock p.m. when I saw them). At the same time, I saw an official approaching to superintend the execution, and not being anxious to witness the spectacle which I had often seen before, I withdrew. From what other officers, who remained, informed me, I gathered that decapitation was performed at once in the usual manner, except that the sword employed was blunt, and the executioner inexperienced. I saw no other signs of torture whatever, and considered that these men were, taking into account Chinese law and customs, rather mercifully dealt with. A dead Changmao lay some distance off, who had been treated in a similar manner to the others, in addition, a slight incision had been made from his breast to his groin, but from the absence of blood, I think this was done after death.

On my return to Waikong, I reported what I had seen to Captain Murray, Commanding, who desired me to visit the camp next morning, and to take notice of the occurrence, which I did, by mentioning it to a fourth-rank Military Field Officer, the senior in the camp. I told him, we English did not like such punishments; that if a man deserved death, we executed him at once, and did not expose or mutilate him. I expressed general disapproval of what had been done, and said the English Commanding Officer was much displeased at it, and if anything of the sort was attempted again, would march up, and put a stop to it, and that I hoped it would not again occur during our stay. He replied "that he did not himself approve of it, but that I must recollect that a large number of the rebel prisoners taken at Taitsan had been pardoned by the High Imperial Officers, permitted to shave their heads, and employed as soldiers or labourers; and that it was not possible to restrain the Imperial soldiers from taking some vengeance for the treatment which the rebels had inflicted on 300 or more of their comrades who had been entrapped into Taitsan, on a false promise of the surrender of the place. These men, he said, "were almost all put to death, and very many of them had their bodies wounded, and cotton put over their wounds, and set on fire," and were otherwise badly tortured (this I understand was really the case). He added "that the Chinese General Officer then in command at Wy-con-sin, Kwoh Ta-jin, was mercifully inclined, and anxious not

to be severe with the rebel soldiery," many of whom had been carried away forcibly, and compelled to serve in the ranks of the Taepings.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ROBERT EMMET CANE.

N.B.—1,100 men were sent up to take possession of Taitsan by the Futai, they were entrapped, and out of the above number, only some 300 were rescued by Major Gordon, on the fall of Taitsan. 350 are known to have been beheaded a few days before the capture, and the remainder are still unaccounted for.

Inclosure 3 in No. 86.

Extracts from the "Daily Shipping and Commercial News."

TREATMENT OF REBEL PRISONERS.

To the Editor of the "Daily Shipping and Commercial News."

Sir,—Much has been said of the innate cruelty of the rebels in China, and arguments innumerable have been derived therefrom, favouring the introduction of a foreign element to crush the rebellion. We question much, however, whether a more diabolical act has ever been committed than that which took place after the capture of Taitsan. Some Imperial soldiers it appears took seven rebels prisoners—after piercing their eyes out with arrows, they saturated their clothes with oil, then applying fire, roasted the miserable wretches alive. This is no idle tale, more than one Englishman saw the deed done and heard the cries of the unhappy victims, powerless alike to help or to save. It is of little use to expatiate upon the exquisite pain this mode of torture must have caused. Retribution should be exacted, and that speedily.

Yours faithfully,
JUSTICE AND MERCY.

Shanghai, June 3, 1863.

EXAGGERATED ACCOUNTS BY ALLEGED ENGLISH EYE WITNESSES, OF CHINESE EXECUTIONS.

To the Editor of the "Daily Shipping and Commercial News."

Sir,—In your issue of this day, there appears a letter signed "Justice and Mercy" purporting to be no "idle tale," but the evidence of more than one Englishman who saw seven rebel prisoners who had been captured by Imperialist soldiers at the time of the recent operations against Taitsan, put to death by burning, their eyes, having previously been pierced out by arrows, and their clothes saturated with oil to facilitate combustion. Now I cannot but regret that the local press should give a ready insertion to statements of this kind without due inquiry into the amount of truth pertaining to them; the more so, after the manner in which the public mind, not only in England but over the civilized world, has been lately harrowed by the diabolical and revolting falsehoods which appeared in an Indian paper, in the form of a letter professing to be the account of an execution of Taeping prisoners, men, women and children, witnessed at Shanghai, at which English and French officers were described as calmly looking on at atrocities of the most frightful and disgusting nature. The "no idle tale" of your correspondent belongs to an analogous class of narration, being a gross exaggeration and misrepresentation of a military execution which took place shortly after the capture of Taitsan. The following are the facts, to the correctness of which there are English officers now in Shanghai to testify, who were eye witnesses of what actually occurred:—

Seven rebel prisoners who escaped from Taitsan were captured by the Imperialists and brought into the Chinese camp near Wy-con-sin, where a field force, consisting of Royal Artillery, the 31st Regiment and the Beloochees was at the time stationed, affording "moral support" to the disciplined Chinese while they were attacking Taitsan, these seven prisoners were condemned to death by Chinese martial law. About eleven in the forenoon they were each tied to a stake, and each had four small arrows with little flags at the end (official emblems of death) stuck into them. In no instance was any injury whatever done their eyes. They were kept thus exposed to public gaze until sunset, when they were taken down and beheaded in the ordinary way. While they were tied up, they gave no external manifestations of suffering: on the contrary, they seemed

to display remarkable indifference. Such are the unvarnished facts, and it occurs to me that the following extract, from a leading article in the Edinburgh "Scotsman" of 28th March last, on the Taeping rebellion, might not unprofitably be perused by those, who not content with the horrors with which this unfortunate province is sufficiently pregnant, draw on their imagination, and fabricate those which do not exist :—

"Altogether, the Taeping cause may be dismissed, and so may the dismal lies which were invented and circulated as to atrocities said to have been committed by mandarin troops on women and children taken prisoners near Shanghai. These inventions have been abundantly refuted, but they are still of importance as a warning to respectable persons in this country not to give ready heed to anonymous stories from China, and as illustrating the deadly and diabolical falsehood had recourse to, in order to back up the Taipings, by some low European scoundrels in China who supply arms to them and otherwise find advantage in the disorder and misery which they produce. It is scarcely too much to say the correspondent of the "Times of India" who could sit down and deliberately invent stories, detailing them in a horribly minute manner, of greasy horrors too shocking to mention, must be only a shade better than those capable (if there be any) of such acts ; yet the full examination entered into by Admiral Hope leaves no doubt that the only executions on the occasion referred to were the simple beheading, usually at one stroke, of fifty-two male rebels who were selected out of about a thousand prisoners, and after careful examination, were condemned to this punishment on account of the peculiar crimes they had committed."

I trust that in your publication for home, you will give insertion both to the letter of "Justice and Mercy" and this reply, that the English public may be able to judge of the little reliance to be placed on statements relating to China and the Chinese, which from their local origin, might reasonably be supposed to have veracity as their basis.

In making these remarks, I do not imply for one moment that your correspondent "Justice and Mercy" has been actuated by other than purely philanthropic and creditable sentiments in penning the communication he has sent you ; all I say is, that he has been previously misinformed.

I am, Sir, your most obedient Servant,

Shanghai, June 4, 1863.

OBSERVER.

[For Letter from "An Eye Witness," see Inclosure in No. 77.]

To the Editor of the "Daily Shipping and Commercial News."

Sir,—In your paper of this morning I notice what purports to be a refutation of the charges brought by your correspondent "Justice and Mercy," against the Imperial Chinese Military Authorities. It is a little singular, that the Imperialists and their friends should be continually put to the trouble of disproving charges of this nature, while no one ever thinks of making any such accusations against the Taipings.

It is however more particularly to the extract from the Edinburgh "Scotsman" sent you by "Observer," that I wish to draw attention : "These inventions have been abundantly refuted, but they are still of importance as a warning to respectable persons in this country not to give too ready heed to anonymous stories from China, and as illustrating the deadly and diabolical falsehoods had recourse to in order to back up the Taipings, by some low European scoundrels in China, who supply arms to them and otherwise find advantage in the disorder and misery which they produce."

Now in the mind of the gifted and temperate individual who penned the article from which the above is extracted, what is necessary to constitute one of the low European scoundrels referred to ? Is it merely the fact that he sells arms and munitions of war to the rebels ? Then the Lord have mercy on the merchants of England in general, and the ship builders of the Clyde in particular. Is it the fact that he helps to prolong a cruel civil war, and is the indirect means of the commission of sundry barbarities ? In that case the low scoundrel is not without companions in his deadly and diabolical iniquity, in the persons of such men as Admiral Hope and General Staveley.

Now I have sold a good many thousand muskets to the rebels, and hope to sell a good many thousand more. Those at Taitan which did such execution, were, I am happy to say, some of my importation. I have, however, a great objection to be called a low

European scoundrel, and should feel obliged if your correspondent "Observer," who of course endorses the opinion expressed in the extract he sends you, will take up his Scotch cudgels and come on. For obvious reasons I don't send my name, but I think you can hardly refuse to discuss both sides of the question.

Yours, &c.,

YANG CHONG.

[For Letter from the Bishop of Victoria, see Inclosure in No. 77.]

Remarks by Editor "Daily Shipping and Commercial News."

We trust that the Bishop of Victoria's stirring appeal to those who were eye witnesses of the atrocious cruelty perpetrated on the rebel prisoners after the capture of Tait-san, to place him in possession of reliable details of the affair, will not be in vain. Numerous rumours, reports, assertions of similar inhumanity on the part of the Imperialists towards their conquered enemies have at different times been circulated; but we believe no case has occurred susceptible of such undoubted verification as the present. We speak advisedly, knowing the authenticity of "Eye witness" statements—which we unhesitatingly endorse; and knowing that others besides him were witnesses of the facts he relates. True, he only saw the victims of mandarin cruelty a few minutes before an end was put to their sufferings by the sword of the executioner; he did not see the arrows driven into their bodies, nor the blows inflicted which stripped the flesh in ribbons from their arms. But he saw the results of these inhuman acts—the clenched hand, the look of agony, the arrows sticking in the bodies, the pools of blood from the wounds, and the hanging strips of flesh. He saw, too, the crowning act, after the craving for human suffering on the part of their tormentors had been satisfied—the execution which previous atrocities had rendered a mercy. Even this opportunity of torture was too tempting to let slip; to have decapitated the victims with a single blow would have been too nearly verging on humanity; accordingly they are dragged to a convenient spot, with every species of mockery, and their heads were "hacked and hewn" from their bodies. These men were captured by the Imperialists mainly through the instrumentality of troops disciplined by Europeans and led by a British officer, and unless we use every exertion to prevent a repetition of such inhuman cruelty, we become morally implicated in the deed. No remonstrances that can be made by Sir Frederick Bruce to the Prince of Kung; no threats that can be held out by General Brown to the Futai, can be too strong for the occasion. The latter possesses the power, if he can only be inspired with the will, to check such acts on the part of his subordinates; and a threat of total withdrawal of assistance unless he do so might probably be effectual. We have consistently supported the cause of constituted authority in China—not only on the conservative principles that it is constituted authority, but because we did not consider the rebels strong enough to upset the reigning dynasty, nor their acts or professions such as afforded hope that the government of the country would be improved by them. The movement has been so partial that the rebels are little else than an isolated body of fighting men; their numbers are great, intrinsically, but are nothing compared to the immense population of China; and the peasantry of the districts which they approach, or through which they passed, never declared in their favour—a sure sign that the movement has not the sympathy of the masses. We do not design to enter into a question which requires an essay rather than an article to discuss it; but merely allude to the subject, to add that, in affording the Imperialist Government this support, we have never asserted its members or its followers to be, individually, one whit superior to the Chinese. A Chinese is a Chinese, whether rebel or Imperialist; cruel in the infliction, and callous to the sight of suffering. It can make no difference in his natural disposition under whose banner he is ranged. We have ourselves seen headless bodies at intervals along the line of march of retreating rebels—victims of wanton cruelty; coolies who were too exhausted to follow farther their hard taskmasters, and had been slaughtered as a punishment for their inability. Between rebels and Imperialists, then, in this respect, there is nothing to choose; but we have espoused the cause of the latter, and become therefore morally responsible for such of their acts as are in any way dependent on our own. This is particularly the case with rebel prisoners taken by the Sungkiang Force; and we repeat that it behoves the British authorities to use every exertion to prevent a recurrence of such a scene as has dimmed one of the most brilliant successes which that force has yet achieved. We desire not to be understood to cast any reflection on Major Gordon in the matter; the executions took place at Wy-con-sin, a

distance of some miles from Tait-san, and no one will for a moment suppose that he could be cognizant of them. At the same time, to remove any misapprehension as to the non-interference of British officers who were on the spot, we may mention that the treatment the prisoners were undergoing was discovered only ten minutes before their execution.

That the matter will be brought to the notice of Government, we have no doubt; and we hope that Earl Russell will see occasion to address an urgent remonstrance to the Court of Peking, and to demand that stringent injunctions may be issued to the local mandarins, against a repetition of acts more worthy of savages than of a nation which boasts the most ancient civilization in the world. In impelling him to this measure, the Bishop of Victoria's representations will be of high value; and to enable the latter to make them in perfect confidence, and support them by authentic details, we again appeal to "Eye witness" and others who were present, to come forward privately, if they hesitate to do so publicly, and place his Lordship in possession of all the information in their power.

THE REBEL PRISONERS AT TAIT-SAN.

To the Editor of the "Daily Shipping and Commercial News."

Quang-san, June 15, 1863.

Sir,—Having received your issue of the 11th June this day, my attention has been drawn to a letter from the Bishop of Victoria respecting certain cruelties alleged to have been perpetrated on rebel prisoners by the Imperialists at Tait-san, and further repeating a statement that British officers serving in the service of the Chinese Government had witnessed these cruelties, I not only will answer that no British or other officer in the force witnessed these alleged cruelties, but while on the subject, I may be allowed to state that I am of belief that the Chinese of this force are quite as merciful in action as the soldiers of any Christian nation could be; and in proof of this, can point to over 700 prisoners taken in the last engagement, who are now in our employ; some even have entered on ranks and have done service against the rebels since their capture—but one life has been taken out of this number, and that one was a rebel who tried to induce his comrades to fall on the guard, and who was shot on the spot. It is a great mistake to imagine that the men of this force are ruthless; they will in the heat of action put their enemies to death, as the troops of any nation would do, but when the fight is over, they will associate as freely together as if they had never fought. Of the prisoners taken, some have gone to their houses, while the remainder are with us, without any guard or escort. The Imperialist General is said to have beheaded some of his prisoners, but as he and the principal part of his troops were rebels once themselves, I assume he acted on fair evidence. He, with myself, recruits from the enemy, and I cannot do the latter the justice of saying they know how to get good men.

In conclusion, I would much like anyone to see the prisoners (although it is a farce to call them so) now with us; and to question them as to their treatment, or wishes, he would find men of every province in possession of the rebels, who would esteem it the cruellest thing to send them out of the city, or to take them up to Soochow.

If "Observer" and "Eye Witness," with their friend "Justice and Mercy," would come forward and communicate what they know, it would be far more satisfactory than writing statements of the nature of those alluded to by the Bishop of Victoria. And if anyone is under the impression that the inhabitants of the rebel districts like their rebel master, he has only to come up here to be disabused of his ideas. I do not exaggerate when I say, that upwards of 1,500 rebels were killed in their retreat from Quinsan by the villagers, who rose *en masse*.

I have, &c.

C. G. GORDON, Major Commanding.

No. 87.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received September 18.)

My Lord,

Peking, June 23, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to forward copy of a despatch from Mr. Acting Consul Markham, at Shanghai, inclosing an interesting report by Major Gordon, R.A., of the

capture of Quang-san from the rebels by the disciplined Chinese force under his command.

The misunderstanding reported to prevail among the rebels at Soochow, shows how little real cohesion there is among the different chiefs.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. W. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 87.

Acting Consul Markham to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Shanghai, June 6, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the town of Quang-san fell on the 31st ultimo, and I beg to inclose a report by Major Gordon, R.E. From correspondence taken by him there, and examined by Mr. Interpreter Alabaster, of this Consulate, it appears that the force met and defeated by Major Gordon, was the pick of the rebel army, sent by Chung Wang for the relief of the place. There also appears to be a split between the Cantonese and other rebels in Soochow, a large number of the former having been executed. A report that Woo-Keong, a town situated some ten miles from Soochow, which is known to have been one of the great rendezvous of the Cantonese rebels, has sent in its allegiance, gives reason to believe that this misunderstanding between the two great rebel parties, has proceeded to great length.

I hear from eye witnesses that the country captured from the rebels in the late expeditions, is recovering its wonted prosperity; whereas, the country between Quangshan and Soochow, is still a desert waste.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. MARKHAM.

Inclosure 2 in No. 87.

Report on the Capture of Quang-san.

[See Inclosure 2 in No. 80.]

No. 88.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(Received September 28.)

Sir,

Admiralty, September 26, 1863.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send you herewith, for the information of Earl Russell, a copy of a letter by Vice-Admiral Kuper, dated the 23rd July, with copies of its inclosures, relative to the state of affairs in China, and recent successes of the Imperialists in the neighbourhood of Nankin over the Taepings.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. G. ROMAINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 88.

Vice-Admiral Kuper to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir,

"Euryalus," at Yokohama, July 23, 1863.

THE only intelligence of importance received from the Chinese consular ports, since the departure of the last mail, is contained in the accompanying copy of a letter from Lieutenant Lee, commanding the "Slaney," describing some recent successes gained by the Imperialist forces in the neighbourhood of Nankin.

These successes, at the present time, are the more important, as exhibiting in conjunction with those lately acquired by the Anglo-Chinese force under Major Gordon, in the vicinity of Soochow, the gradually increasing ascendancy of the Imperial cause.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS L. KUPER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 88.

Commander Lee to Vice-Admiral Kuper.

Sir.

"Staney," Silver Island, July 3, 1863.

ON my passage down from Hankow to this port, I observed, on passing Nanking on the evening of the 1st instant, that the Imperialists had very recently gained several important outposts and positions.

Having no interpreter on board, I determined to proceed at once for Mr. T. Adkins, and then to return with him to Nanking to ascertain the state of affairs. On the next day, however, I passed the "Hardy" on shore, with the consul on board, and it appears that he had left in her for Nanking on the 29th ultimo, in consequence of three Europeans who had been to the consulate a day or two previous, and reported that their boats, in company with several others, were lying in the Nanking Creek, when a large force of Imperialist war-boats made a sudden attack on the rebel outposts, which were taken with very little difficulty. The rebels, they state, fled in a panic, and all the boats in the creek were captured or burnt. Several Europeans were on board these boats, the majority of whom were either killed or severely wounded.

Having received on board Mr. Thomas Adkins, from the "Hardy," I returned at once to Nanking, and the following information was received from an Imperialist officer of high rank.

On the 23rd ultimo, at daybreak, a force of gunboats, under Yang-Tsai-fu, one of the Tseng Kuo-fan's leaders, ran past the rebel batteries, and attacked a fort on Theodolite Point. This was speedily taken, and three heavily-armed lorchas lying near were sunk. These lorchas are still sunk at the entrance of the creek, near Theodolite Point, with their masts just above water.

After this the attacking party captured three stone forts on the Nanking side of the Icaonhea Creek, and close to the city walls.

The next day the forces rested, and on the 30th they took a fort on the opposite side of the river, and in this position I found them on the evening of 1st instant.

During the conversation that took place, the officer informed me that he was in command of 10,000 troops, which the gunboats had brought down, and no doubt the Imperialists have now a large force on the Nanking side of the river.

The Imperialists have yet to take other forts before they get complete command of the water approaches to Nanking.

This attack, the most successful that has been made for some time, has completely put a stop to the illicit trade that has been carried on by Europeans in large lorchas carrying the American flag.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

WM. FREDK. LEE.

No. 89.

Acting Consul Markham to Earl Russell.—(Received October 1.)

My Lord.

Shanghai, August 4, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, copy of a despatch dated August 4, addressed by me to Sir F. W. A. Bruce.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

JOHN MARKHAM.

Inclosure 1 in No. 89.

Acting Consul Markham to Sir F. Bruce.

(Extract.)

Shanghai, August 4, 1863.

I HAVE to report a successful expedition from Quang-san, under Major Gordon, which resulted in the capture of the city of Wookong by the Chinese disciplined troops under his command. I beg to inclose a memorandum by that officer on his operations against the rebels between the 25th and 29th of July, which gives a full account of the taking of Wookong.

Rumours have been in circulation here for the last month, that General Burgevine was

raising men for a Foreign Contingent to help the rebels at Soochow. As I had no positive proof of the truth of these reports I refrained from reporting them to you, but within the last few days these reports have assumed such a serious aspect, that I feel it my duty to state the facts as I have heard them.

About three weeks ago General Burgevine suddenly disappeared from Shanghae, and rumours got abroad that he had raised a force of 300 Europeans, and taken them to Tientsing to join the Imperial Army. This, however, was ere long contradicted, and it was said that he had joined the rebels.

The United States' Consul has issued warrants for Burgevine's arrest, but I don't think it likely he will show himself in Shanghae again, and I fancy we shall next hear of him as leading the rebel army against Kwan-shan.

Inclosure 2 in No. 89.

Memorandum of Operations against the Rebels between the 25th and 29th July, 1863.

THE force, consisting of some 1,500 men, Infantry and Artillery, and the steamers "Firefly" and "Cricket," left Quang-san on the 25th, and arrived at 26th at the point where the creek connecting the Chung-hoo Lake, and the Grand Canal commences. The "Cricket" left here at day-break on the 27th, started for Karpoo, where the creek enters Grand Canal, on the west bank were situated two stone stockades, which were out-flanked and taken with little difficulty, and scarcely any loss to either side. The rebels who fled towards Soochow, were followed up for five miles. They retreated by the only road which runs along the west bank of the canal. The force halted for the night at Karpoo. The Imperialist General Ching, started that evening to Tung-ling, where about 2,000 rebels were posted, who had a few days before attacked the Imperialists, and taken from them five gun boats, and thirty small boats.

At day break, the troops started down the canal to Wookong, which is a small walled town some 800 yards on the west bank of the canal. The only road between Hangchow and Soochow, runs along the bank of the canal.

The rebels were found to be in occupation of a small stockade, on the east bank of the canal, near the junction of the latter with a large creek leading to Tung-ling; there was also a stone stockade, to the north of the city, some 700 yards from the North Gate. On the appearance of the force, they sent out a force to occupy this stockade, which they succeeded in doing, but the advance of the 6th regiment was so little in the rear of them, that they had to run out again in confusion, and lost some men. At the same time Colonel Brennan, with the 5th regiment, attacked and carried the small stockade, on the east bank, which was occupied by the 1st regiment, while the 4th and 5th regiments pushed on down the canal, and occupied a stone stockade, which was empty, and which commands the exit from the south gate of the city.

Every exit from the city, except by water through the Taho Lake, was now occupied, and there was no chance for the garrison for escape, these operations were over at 10 a.m.

Another stockade on the road to the south could be seen some mile and a-half distant; the gun boat flotilla, with the rockets, proceeded there, and found the stockade had been deserted, this stockade is situated on another creek, leading south from Tung-ling, and while the flotilla was there, a large force of rebels came down this creek in boats, having been driven from Tung-ling by the Imperialists. The flotilla attacked them, and captured some thirty boats, when the remainder went back, and soon after sent a rebel head man to propose a surrender, which being granted, 5 to 600 prisoners gave themselves up.

At the same time, another detachment of fugitives came down on the stockade taken by the 5th regiment, and occupied by the 1st regiment; the officer commanding, Major Gumblitz, allowed them to come close, and captured the whole party.

At day-break, on the 29th July, the rebels attempted to break past the stockade at South Gate, held by the 4th and 5th regiments, but failed, and they then sent out to the North and South Gates, to propose a surrender, which was acceded to, and the force entered the city.

The city is small, with a ditch round, and in fact, very easy of attack, from the point where it had been decided to make the same.

Some 3 to 4,000 prisoners were taken, but very little plunder, the rebel chief, who escaped the night before, had been made a Wang, or Prince, on the 27th July; and a

theatrical company, who had come to celebrate the affair, were captured in their robes.

During the 28th, the Soochow rebels made several attempts to take the stockades at Karpoo, which were held by the Imperialists, but the "Firefly" steamer kept them off, and at dusk they ceased their attacks.

The capture of Wookong cuts Soochow off from the south, and, what is of considerable importance, from Shanghae; thus the trade in arms with the rebels has received another blow at Wookong.

The casualties are three officers, Lieutenants Murdough and Baffeny wounded, and about 1 man killed, and 15 wounded.

The rebel loss—some 30 killed, and 20 wounded.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. G. GORDON,
Major Commanding.

No. 90.

The Bishop of Victoria to Earl Russell.—(Received October 2.)

My Lord,

Hong Kong, August 10, 1863.

I BEG leave to inclose to your Lordship a copy of a letter written by Dr. Murtagh, of the 22nd Bengal Native Infantry, from Soon-kiang, near Shanghae, relative to the subject on which Bishop Boone and myself addressed your Lordship on June 17th last. Dr. Murtagh's letter, by some unaccountable delay, only reached me yesterday by the post-office.

It is possible that I have made a clerical error in copying the signature of his name, which was previously unknown to me.

I remain, &c.
(Signed) G. VICTORIA.

Inclosure in No. 90.

Dr. Murtagh to the Bishop of Victoria.

My Lord,

Soonkiang, June 12, 1863.

HAVING seen your Lordship's letter in the public press, requesting those who witnessed the barbarities committed upon rebel prisoners at Wy-con-sin, to state what they know of the matter, I, as one of those who saw the men executed, would like to say a few words on the subject.

The letter of "Eye Witness," though in the main true, yet contains some serious inaccuracies. The prisoners were not taken by the disciplined force under Major Gordon, nor were there any of his officers present when they were tortured and executed; and, moreover, I do not think that any European was present while the arrows were being stuck in, and the wounds were being inflicted on the unfortunate victims. I was one of the first who went to the ground, and when I saw the prisoners—about four o'clock in the afternoon, the wounds inflicted on them had all the appearance of having been done for several hours.

The letter of "Eye Witness" states there were seven prisoners, whereas there were eight. There were two tied to one of the stakes, a man and a boy. There were also several executioners, three or four, I think. The officers present, were British officers in Her Majesty's Service; and almost immediately after they made their appearance on the ground, the prisoners were brought out for execution.

I may state that all the Europeans present showed the greatest abhorrence and disgust at the manner in which the prisoners were executed, but had no power to interfere.

I have, &c.
(Signed) THOS. MURTAGH.

Staff Assistant-Surgeon, detachment 22nd B.N.I.

P.S.—I send also a copy of Dr. Murtagh's letter to Sir F. Bruce at Peking.

No. 91.

Sir E. Lugard to Mr. Hammond.—(Received October 2.)

Sir,

War Office, October 1, 1863.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for War to transmit to you for the information of Earl Russell the accompanying copy of a despatch from Major-General Brown, together with its enclosures, from which it appears that Burgevine had joined the rebels, and that, in consequence of the failure of the local authorities to provide the necessary funds for the payment of the disciplined Chinese force, Major Gordon had resigned the command.

General Brown further reports that, owing to the threatening aspect of affairs in the neighbourhood of Shanghae, the 67th regiment had been detained at that station.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWARD LUGARD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 91.

Major-General Brown to Earl de Grey and Ripon.

My Lord,

Head Quarters, Hong Kong, August 12, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to forward for your information a copy of a report from Colonel Hough, commanding at Shanghae. From the contents you will perceive that "Burgevine," the late Commander of the disciplined Chinese, has joined the rebels, and enlisted in his service a number of Europeans of all classes, principally Americans, and matters I fear are again likely to become very serious at Shanghae.

Nothing was known of this movement of Burgevine when I left, and I shall proceed at once to the north by the first steamer leaving Hong-Kong.

I have also to mention that I have received an official from Major Gordon, commanding the Chinese disciplined forces, resigning the command, owing to the difficulties attending payment of the men by the "Futai."

I trust, however, that I may be able to do something in the matter to induce Major Gordon to withdraw his application, having no officer at my disposal to replace him, as in this officer are combined so many dashing qualities, let alone skill and judgment, to make him invaluable to command such a force.

I may also add, that owing to Colonel Hough's report, I have deemed it necessary to detain the 67th regiment at Shanghae for the present.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. G. BROWN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 91.

Colonel Hough to Major-General Brown.

(Extract.)

Shanghae, August 4, 1863.

IN forwarding the accompanying to your address, opened by me under the sanction accorded, I have the honour to state that I have since heard from Her Britannic Majesty's Consul that Major Gordon authorized him to tell his Excellency, the Futai, that under the present circumstances he would consent to hold command till all difficulty and danger vanished, but that directly tranquillity was restored, he would then resign. The circumstances being as follows:

Burgevine has gone over to the rebels with some Europeans collected here; the number varies with the different reports from 100 to 1,000, but 300 will probably be nearer the mark. From Captain Strode's information, Burgevine's terms with the Europeans are service one month and money paid down, and other information states unrestrained license to pillage every town they take, even Shanghae itself. The latter would be an idle threat even under the present reduced state of the garrison, but for the alarming defection of Major Gordon's force, who are all, it is said, traitorously inclined to side with Burgevine. Names of traitors are freely given, being those of Major Gordon's best officers of the land forces, as well as those commanding steamers. This, if true, would virtually be giving our siege train, now with Major Gordon, into the rebels' hands.

and to oppose which Captain Murray informs me we have not a gun of equal force. The Futai told Mr. Markham yesterday evening that Burgevine and 65 Europeans had seized the little steamer "Ki-fow" under the walls of Sunkiong, and taken her into Soochow, and had been made a "Wang" of the 2nd class and Commander of all the rebel forces. The Futai also said that a report had reached him of Quang-san, Major Gordon's head-quarters, having been given up to the rebels by its garrison. Should this be true, the worst may be anticipated—Major Gordon a prisoner, the siege train lost, and the speedy advent of the rebels, commanded by Burgevine before this place—for it is idle to suppose that they would respect the 30 mile radius when they had no town outside with wealth enough to support their rabble hordes, which exaggerated reports put down at 800,000, of which they say 20,000 are disciplined by Frenchmen and Europeans long resident in Soochow. In the present imperfect knowledge of affairs, to move out would be perhaps to leave Shanghai open to the rebels, who can choose their own route and whose advance would be only known by the country people flying before them and the smoke of burning towns. I trust to hear from Major Gordon to enable me to act decisively, of which I need not say I will send you the earliest information.

Under the above circumstances I need not say that I must detain Her Majesty's 67th regiment and every available man, and trust you will approve of it.

I might perhaps mention here that although Her Majesty's 67th regiment show a large per centage on the sick list, I believe there are no bad cases, and that there are but a few recurrent cases of cholera in the garrison.

Inclosure 3 in No. 91.

Major Gordon to Major-General Brown.

Sir, *Head Quarters, Quang-san, July 25, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to forward a copy of a letter which I have been compelled to write to the Futai of the province, and to request that you will inform me of the mode of proceeding necessary to be followed in order that I may be retained as short a time as possible in this command.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. G. GORDON.

Inclosure 4 in No. 91.

Major Gordon to the Futai of Shanghai.

Your Excellency, *Head Quarters, Quang-san, July 25, 1863.*

IN consequence of monthly difficulties I experience in getting the payment of the force made, the non-payment of legitimate bills for boat-hire and munitions of war from Her Britannic Majesty's Government, who have done so much for the Imperial Chinese authorities, I have determined on throwing up the command of this force, as my retention of office in these circumstances is derogatory to my position as a British officer who cannot be a suppliant for what your Excellency knows to be necessities, and should only be too happy to give.

As my resignation of this command will necessitate the knowledge of the British Minister and General, I have forwarded to them copies of this letter, and have to add that I will remain in command of the force only till such time as I shall have received their replies.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. G. GORDON.

Inclosure 5 in No. 91.

The Governor of Kiang-Su to Colonel Hough.

(Translation.)

August 4, 1863.

THE Governor has received a Report from the Prefect of Sung-Kiang from the officer in charge of the drilled troops at that place, informing that the Chinese steamer "Ka-Jow," whilst on her return from this place to Sung-Kiang, was suddenly

seized and carried off to Soo-Chow by a large band of desperadoes. One of the men on board this steamer subsequently made his escape, and reported that he had personally seen Burgevine at the head of this band, and as the man in question has heretofore been for upwards of a month residing in the same place with Burgevine, he is thoroughly well acquainted with his appearance, so there is not the slightest doubt of his having accurately recognised him on this occasion.

On receipt of this report, the Governor feels that the fact reported is really astounding. A short time ago, when it was rumoured that Burgevine had secretly visited Soochow in the interest of the rebels, and had levied a force and obtained supplies of arms and artillery for them, he at once wrote officially to the American consul, Seward, desiring him promptly to cause Burgevine's arrest, and decide upon the proper action to be taken in his case. He next heard that Burgevine had left Shanghae at noon on the 29th July for Hu-Chow and Soochow to rejoin the rebels, and he at once sent orders to all the military stations and barriers en route to seize and send him into Shanghae. All this is on record, and while these measures are being taken, Burgevine has the audacity to head a gang of desperadoes in carrying off the "Ka-Jow" steamer to Soochow. His lawlessness and rebellious designs are now patent to every eye. Should disaster hence accrue to our military movements, trade cannot be carried on in security, and thus the matter is one in which foreigners and Chinese alike cannot remain quiescent. Yet the American consul, on the receipt of the official despatch above referred to, has delayed replying with a report of the measures he has taken for arresting this man, and thus a great calamity has been fostered.

In addition to forwarding an official communication to Mr. Consul Seward and to the French Consul-General, desiring that steps may be alike taken for the capture of Burgevine, the Governor has to communicate herewith with the honourable commandant, whom he begs to take prompt measures for causing the co-operation of the British naval and military forces with the police and Chinese troops in the field with a view to the seizure of Burgevine, and to his severe punishment in satisfaction alike of foreigners and of Chinese. He cannot be allowed to escape. This is the Governor's most earnest hope, most earnest prayer.

No. 92.

Mr. Hammond to the Bishop of Victoria.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 5, 1863.

I HAVE the honour, by direction of Earl Russell, to acknowledge the receipt of your letter to his Lordship of the 10th of August last, enclosing a copy of a letter which has been addressed to your Lordship by Dr. Murtagh, as to certain cruelties which are alleged to have been inflicted by the Chinese authorities on rebel prisoners in the neighbourhood of Shanghae.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 93.

Acting Consul Markham to Earl Russell.—(Received October 8.)

My Lord,

Shanghae, August 14, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to forward for your Lordship's information copy of my despatch addressed to Sir F. Bruce.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM.

Inclosure 1 in No. 93.

Acting Consul Markham to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Shanghae, August 11, 1863.

SINCE writing my despatch of 4th instant, the report therein contained has been confirmed. On the 1st instant, the steamer "Ka Jow," belonging to the

Chinese Government, left this place for Soonkiang, conveying Dr. Macartney late of 99th regiment, and now in the service of Futai, and towing a barge with the Soonkiangfoo on board. She arrived there early on the morning of the 2nd, and Dr. Macartney landed. He had not been on shore many minutes, when one of the Europeans he left on board came running to him, and reported that Burgevine, at the head of some thirty foreigners, had boarded the "Ka Jow" and taken her. She was anchored under the walls of Soonkiang for security. Dr. Macartney, who is in the Futai's service, immediately called out as many men as he could get at that short notice, and followed the steamer along the bank of the creek, first attempting to get the barge that he might sink her at the entrance, and thus prevent the steamer from getting out. The Chinese on board, however, had carried the barge off, and she was not to be seen. When Dr. Macartney's party got within shot of the steamer, those on board opened fire upon him, and he then retired as she was just entering the river. The "Ka Jow" is supposed to have reached Soochow in safety, as she has not been seen on the river or in any of the creeks leading to that city; she had on board a 12-pound howitzer.

Yesterday I received the letter of which I inclose copy, from Major Gordon, and Colonel Hough also gave me the extract from a despatch he had received, and of which I also forward copy.

I have only this moment heard that a vessel leaves in the morning for Tientsin, and have barely time to communicate these facts. It puts beyond all doubt Burgevine's intentions, and makes me place confidence in the rumours I have heard, and which I communicated in my last despatch. I enclose a proclamation signed by all the Treaty Consuls, which we have caused to be posted and distributed through the foreign settlements.

The Futai has, on my earnest representation, promised that the force shall not be again in arrears of pay, and also that he will at once disburse all just claims connected with it. I trust this will put Major Gordon more at his ease.

Colonel Hough has sent out a column to Wy-con-sin, with orders to go on to Taitsan should Captain Murray (the officer in command) see fit, in order to support Major Gordon in the event of his having to fall back on the latter place; and to protect the siege train Major Gordon proposes sending back.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. MARKHAM.

Inclosure 2 in No. 93.

Major Gordon to Lieutenant Cane.

(Extract.) *August 7, 1863.*

I LEFT Shanghae on the night of the 1st August, and arriving at Quang-san the next morning, had to send off to Kahpoo to reinforce that station, seriously threatened by the rebels. Captain Gammell having proceeded to Shanghae on the 3rd, I wrote by him to inform the Commandant of the state of affairs. I proceeded with the "Cricket" steamer to Kahpoo the next day and took in a small reinforcement. The rebels were in great force on all sides, and had during the previous night assaulted the stockades, coming up to the edge of the ditch, being led by Europeans in considerable numbers. They had with them an American howitzer and shell. The evening of the 5th August they repeated their attack, but were again driven back. They numbered some 40,000 men, and had a considerable number of Europeans with them. They blew up one gun boat with shell, and as the steamers I have are open to destruction from their missiles, I sent orders for more infantry and artillery (light) to reinforce the stockades and thus enable me to bring out of danger the steamers. The day and night of the 6th August passed quietly, the rebels extending round and burning the villages. They returned back on the night of the 6th August, and have apparently given up the attack. The reinforcements came in on the evening of the 7th August, and I am now en route to Quang-san for the day.

From prisoners we know that there are 200 to 300 Europeans in Soochow; that they are drilling men now; that they are making shell. From all appearance, Burgevine is at Soochow, the rebel prisoners describing his person exactly as being the Chief European. I am induced to hold on to Kahpoo, as it cuts the communication off from Soochow to Shanghae, and as long as we can hold on to Quang-san and Kahpoo the rebels will try no advance to Shanghae.

I have determined to move all siege guns to Shanghae, and also the ammunition, for fear of their being surprised at Quang-san. If I had a hundred Europeans I could with

safety keep it where it is, but now Europeans can introduce themselves into the city, and at night might surprise our magazines.

Having no officer fit to undertake the defence of Kahpoo and to keep the rebels in check, I am obliged to be moving between the two places, Quang-san and Kahpoo, continually, so as to relieve my anxiety. I shall take the heavy guns down to Tait-san.

I will inform the Commandant that I have no staff of any kind, and therefore hope he will understand that my writing must necessarily be somewhat scanty; however, I will do my best to keep him well informed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. G. GORDON.

P.S.—The Futai seems not to be well aware of the danger which his camps run of being captured, and is obstructing me with his objections to pay legitimate claims.

The Futai has, I believe, offered 10,000 dollars for General Burgevine.

Inclosure 3 in No. 93.

Major Gordon to Acting Consul Markham.

(Extract).

Quang-san, August 7, 1863, 5 P.M.

I HAVE just returned from Kahpoo, where we have had a tremendous fight for three days. The rebels with their foreign allies came on at dusk and made desperate endeavours to get into the stockades; coming up to the edge of the ditch and throwing light balls into the interior. There are a great many Europeans among them, and they had the American howitzer, one shell from which blew up a gun boat. They appear to-day to have retired, so I took advantage of it to come here, but go back to-night, D.V. As long as I can hold Kahpoo, which is in reality Wookong, they cannot come down on Shanghae.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. G. GORDON.

Inclosure 4 in No. 93.

Notice.

WHEREAS it has come to the knowledge of the Consuls of the Treaty Powers with China, that enlistments are being carried on with illegal intentions, warning is hereby given that the strongest measures will be taken against such proceedings, and any persons who are found to be employed in the same will be arrested, and treated with the utmost rigour of the law.

All vessels or boats suspected are liable to be searched by vessels stationed for that purpose, or by agents so appointed.

(Signed) V. MAUBOUSSIN,
JOHN MARKHAM,
GEO. SEWARD,
GEO. BASIL DIXWELL,
TH. PROBST.

No. 94.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received October 21.)

My Lord,

Peking, July 14, 1863.

THE Bishop of Victoria and other gentlemen at Shanghae forwarded to me a letter enclosing a printed account by an "Eye Witness" of cruelties practised upon seven prisoners captured at Tait-san, of which a duplicate was forwarded, I understand, to your Lordship.

I addressed a note, remonstrating against these barbarities to the Prince of Kung, and received the inclosed reply.

I am inclined to believe, though the punishment of decapitation is often awarded to rebels taken in arms in their hands, that the punishment of death by slow degrees has been exceptionally awarded in this instance, under the following circumstances:

The insurgents in Taitsan had been negotiating with the Governor of Kiang-su, for the surrender of the town. The leaders at Soochow, hearing of this, sent down a reinforcement of trustworthy men with directions to continue the negotiations. By this trick some hundred Imperialist soldiers were inveigled into the town, they were then seized, most of them put to death, and those who were still alive, were found in a lamentable condition on the capture of the place. I think that the atrocities described were committed by the soldiery out of a feeling of revenge.

Major Gordon assures me that the accounts of cruelty to the insurgent prisoners are unfounded, as far as his knowledge extends. They are perfectly willing, and are frequently taken into the ranks of the Government troops. He has in his Body-guard men who have fought as Taepings, for some years, and who now fight with the same courage and fidelity against their former associates.

The punishment of death by slow degrees is described in the enclosed extract from Stanton's Penal Code.

I shall use my best efforts to put a stop to the infliction of this barbarous punishment, though I have to contend with the difficulty that it is sanctioned by law, and is always enforced against parricides, with whom insurgents are classed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. W. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 94.

Sir F. Bruce to Prince Kung.

Sir,

Peking, July 8, 1863.

I HAVE just received a letter from Shanghae, informing me that on the forenoon of May 3rd, the day after the capture of Taitsan, seven prisoners were seen by a foreigner in the camp near Wy-con-sin; having been tied each to a stake, they were tortured with the most refined cruelty. Arrows appeared to have been driven into their heads and bodies, from the wounds inflicted, by which issued copious streams of blood, strips of flesh had been hacked apparently with a blunt instrument from different parts of their bodies. In this condition they were left writhing with agony until sunset, when they were decapitated, not as is usual by a single blow, but by hacking and hewing until the head was partially severed from the body.

I cannot suppose that however grave the offence committed by these prisoners, the laws of China justify proceedings so deliberately barbarous. It is but a short time since your Highness obtained a decree, enjoining on the provincial authorities a careful abstinence from undue severity, and that practised in the present instance is not only useless, as a means towards the end of suppressing rebellion, but worse than useless. For while it cannot fail to provoke the disaffection of the people who witness these unauthorized atrocities, it will with equal certainty excite the horror of western nations. As the representative of a power whose subjects have been authorized to aid the Chinese Government in the cause of order, I cannot be silent, and it is my duty to warn your Highness that if these purposeless atrocities continue unchecked, the Chinese Government must be content to dispense with the support not only of England, but of every civilized State in the world.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. W. BRUCE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 94.

The Prince of Kung to Sir F. Bruce.

Peking, July 14, 1863.

The Prince of Kung makes a communication in reply.

THE Prince has to acknowledge the receipt on the 9th instant of the British Minister's despatch, acquainting him that his Excellency had just received a letter from an Englishman at Shanghae, stating that on the forenoon of the day after the capture of Taitsan, seven rebels were seen by a foreigner in the camp near Wy-Con-Sin, tied each one to a stake, with their whole body covered with wounds, which had the appearance of having been inflicted with cool and deliberate brutality; the criminals were allowed to

linger in that condition until sunset, when they were beheaded, but in a manner different from that ordinarily followed. The British Minister observes that such proceedings as these are nothing short of wanton cruelty, and that however grave the offences committed by these prisoners, he cannot suppose the laws of China sanction such barbarity. Such undue severity as that practised in the camp at Taitan not only provokes the disaffection of the Chinese people and excites the horror of all western nations, but is also useless, as a means to the end of suppressing rebellion.

The Prince would observe that the punishment inflicted upon criminals in China must by the laws be light or heavy in proportion to the crime of the individual, and that nothing can in the least be added to or taken from what the laws prescribe in each particular case.

Some time ago the Defence Committee at Shanghai forwarded translation of extract from a newspaper which gave an account of the execution of prisoners at Taitan, and which also stated that the story [of cruelties having been practised] was altogether false; a despatch had, however, already been addressed to Governor Li [requesting] him to enquire into the truth or falsehood of the report, and having ascertained the facts of the case to punish any parties [who may have been guilty of the alleged cruelty.] In consequence of the British Minister's communication on the subject, a further despatch has been sent to his Excellency Governor Li, urging him to take immediate steps to put a stop to such proceedings.

Copy of the extracts, translated from the Shanghai newspaper, is inclosed for the British Minister's perusal.

A necessary communication addressed to Sir Frederick Bruce.

Inclosure 3 in No. 94.

Extract from Staunton's "Penal Code of China."

Sixth Division.—Section CCLIV.

HIGH TREASON is either treason against the State, by an attempt to subvert the established Government, or treason against the sovereign by an attempt to destroy the palace in which he resides, the temple in which his family is worshipped, or the tombs in which the remains of his ancestors are deposited.

All persons convicted of having been principals or accessaries to the actual or designed commission of this heinous crime, shall suffer death by a slow and painful execution.*

No. 95.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received October 21.)

My Lord,

Peking, June 16, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Consul at Hankow, on the direct tea trade to England from that port.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. W. BRUCE.

Inclosure in No. 95.

Consul Gingell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Hankow, June 13, 1863.

TWO British vessels, the "Challenger" and the steamer "Annette," have just cleared from this port direct for England, the former carrying 821,761 lbs. of tea, value

* This mode of execution is not noticed among the ordinary punishments, but is particularly described in one of the notes subjoined to the original text. It has been termed in the works of the missionaries "cutting into ten thousand pieces," and appears to amount, at the least, to a licence to the executioner, to aggravate and prolong the sufferings of the criminal undergoing the sentence of the law, by any species of cruelty he may think proper to inflict. It is, however, understood to be the ordinary execution of the Emperor's prerogative of mercy to commute this terrible sentence for the milder one of death, by simply severing the head from the body; but there are certainly some instances in which, with a view to public example, or from other causes, this law has been rigorously executed.

234,885 taels, at 6s. 8d., equal to 78,295l. 10s., and the latter 592,650 lbs., value 156,640 taels, equal to 52,213l. 6s. 8d., and there are still in port three other British sailing vessels, viz., the "White Adder," of 914 tons; the "Celestial," 401; and the "Diana," of 223 tons, ready to take in teas, and having the same destination.

Freight—the "Challenger" received 9l. 10s. per ton, and the "Annette" is to receive 15l. per ton if she arrives in 85 days, and a reduced rate according to the number of days over that time, which it is considered will bring the freight down to about 10l., it being highly improbable that she will reach England in the time specified.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. GINGELL.

No. 96.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received October 21.)

(Extract.)

Peking, July 17, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch from Mr. Consul Gingell, reporting the final settlement of the land question.

I think Mr. Gingell deserves the highest credit for the tact and firmness he has displayed in managing this difficult affair.

I have not failed to bring to the knowledge of His Imperial Highness, the Prince of Kung, the favourable terms in which Mr. Gingell alludes to the conduct of the two Chinese officers named by the Viceroy to act with him in valuing the houses and removing the inhabitants.

It is a remarkable proof of the law-abiding habits of the Chinese that 10,000 persons should have been removed for the accommodation of foreigners without disturbance. I trust that the necessity for such a large displacement will be avoided in future.

Inclosure in No. 96.

Consul Gingell to Sir F. Bruce.

(Extract.)

Hankow, December 28, 1862.

I HAVE much satisfaction in reporting the entire appropriation of the lots within the British concession at this port, numbering in all 72, exclusive of the portion set apart by me for Government use.

From the whole concession 2,500 families have been removed, and, at a low computation, giving 4 persons to a household, not less than 10,000 persons have yielded up their property, and many hundred coffins have been exhumed. Notwithstanding so large a population has been displaced, and in all probability great inconvenience experienced by some, from no one quarter have I heard the slightest dissatisfaction expressed by the Chinese at the sums paid; on the contrary, I have every belief in affirming that each proprietor considered himself well and handsomely remunerated.

The difficulties in bringing the concession land to a final settlement have been very great, and continued through a period of one year and a-half. Almost daily attendance, sometimes in a burning sun, was necessary in order to arrive at just values of houses and buildings, subjecting all who so attended to much annoyance and frequent insult from the large crowd of idlers which continually pressed around.

I cannot close this despatch without bringing to your notice the two Chinese officers through whose exertions the concession ground was eventually settled. These two officers named were appointed specially by the Viceroy, and too much praise cannot be accorded them for the just and business-like manner in which they indefatigably discharged by no means desirable or pleasant office; and I trust that you will see fit to make favourable mention of them to the Prince of Kung, with a view to their advancement in the service.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received October 21.)

My Lord,

Peking, July 18, 1863.

IN my despatch of the 7th of March, 1863, I alluded to a despatch from Mr. Consul Robertson, as proof of the mode in which insurgents, who return to their allegiance, and are sent home by the Imperial Government, abuse the clemency extended to them.

I have the honour to inclose copy of that despatch, as it contains evidence of the risks run by Missionaries in entering disturbed districts, and of the complications to which the indiscreet zeal of some of them may give rise.

I doubt whether the cause of Christianity will be furthered by a course of proceeding such as that detailed by the Consul.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. F. BRUCE.

Inclosure in No. 97.

Consul Robertson to Sir F. Bruce.

(Extract.)

Canton, December 23, 1862.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency that early in this month the Bishop of Victoria arrived here, for the purpose of making a journey into the interior with the Reverend Mr. Gray, the British Chaplain at this port, their intention being to proceed by land to the Mei-ling Pass into the province of Kiang-su.

On hearing of this, I represented to the Bishop the imprudence of such a step, considering that the borders of this province were overrun with banditti, who had submitted as rebels in the neighbourhood of Nanking, and on being sent back to this province, had taken to brigandage, and were ravaging the northern part of the province in every direction. His Lordship at once acceded, and returned to Hong Kong.

Not so, however, his intended companion, the Rev. Mr. Gray; that gentleman intimated his intention to make a trip as far as Tsung-hwa, some thirty or forty miles distant, north-east from Canton, and asked me if he could do this with safety. I replied he could, but beyond that I would not sanction anyone proceeding, and that he must distinctly understand.

Subsequently, Mr. Preston, an English missionary here, applied for a passport to accompany Mr. Gray; I gave him one, warning him at the same time, as I had done Mr. Gray, and particularly against proceeding to the Tsing-yuan and King-yu districts, as both these and the adjoining district of Chang-ning, through which Mr. Gray had at first proposed to travel, were infested with bands of robbers.

Shortly afterwards, I heard that these two gentlemen, accompanied by Mr. Bonney, an American missionary, had left Canton on their tour on the 5th instant.

Nothing was heard of them until the 18th instant, when they returned to Canton under the protection of the Chinese authorities, having been attacked and stripped of everything by robbers in the mountain district of Chang-ning.

It appears that after leaving Canton, they pushed on at once for the Chang-ning district, intending to make a circuit, I suspect, by the Mei-ling Pass, and whilst within a few miles of the town, and in a narrow mountain pass, they were stopped by a band of robbers armed with matchlocks and swords, who pillaged them of everything, even the clothes on their backs, led them some distance into a retired glen, and appeared to take council whether or not to kill them. Subsequently they allowed them to go, and they found their way back to the village of Ma-te-tow, which they had left in the morning, and from thence through various other places and towns, being forwarded on by the authorities, who behaved in the kindest manner, supplying them with money, food, clothes and transport, until they reached Canton.

They lost five horses, all their baggage, missionary books, money, in fact everything they had with them.

I sent for Mr. Gray and Mr. Preston, and expressed to them my great disapprobation of their proceedings.

To the first I recalled the conversation I had had with the Bishop in his presence, and subsequently with himself, when he assured me he was going only as far as Tsung-

hwa, whereas he had made at once for Chang-ning, without any regard either for what he had said, or the trouble he might bring upon himself and Her Majesty's Consul, if anything should happen to him or his party; but by trouble to me, he must understand personal trouble, for to protect him or interfere in his behalf, after the warning he had received, I could not consider myself bound.

Of course he had not a word to say for himself, but became much distressed when I said I should report the matter to your Excellency.

As regards Mr. Preston, I told that gentleman he had acted wilfully against my instructions; that he had been granted a passport on the distinct understanding that he was not to visit disturbed districts, that those districts had been pointed out to him, and the first thing he did was to go there. That his passport distinctly stated the conditions of receiving it, and that by taking it, he accepted these obligations, and that I considered he had forfeited his right to have one. That I had not the least doubt, had they succeeded in getting through and returning by the Mei-ling Pass, it would have been a triumph for them, and a proof that the warnings of Her Majesty's Consul were all moonshine, and his orders of no consequence; but that I should suspend the issue to him of any further passport until I heard from your Excellency.

Of course he had less to say for himself than Mr. Gray. Mr. Bonney, being an American, I did not see.

It is really unfortunate that missionary labours should be entrusted to persons whose zeal outweighs every consideration of prudence and regard of consequences. Instance the case of these gentlemen, although Mr. Gray was more a companion than a missionary in this expedition, from their own showing, with a large cavalcade, they went from village to town preaching and distributing tracts wherever they stopped, and attracting large and not very orderly crowds to the great uneasiness of the local authorities doubtless, who fear nothing so much as a mob, and the consequences and responsibilities it brings on them; and not content with this, but they call on all the officials *en route*, and require from them guides and escorts, which are gladly given as a means of getting rid of the unpleasant visitors.

No. 98.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received October 21.)

My Lord,

Peking, July 18, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch addressed to me by the Prince of Kung, on the proceedings of small sailing craft on the Yangtze river. There is little doubt that his allegations are in the main correct. Mr. Adkins, in a late despatch from Chinkiang, on the lawless acts perpetrated by the Europeans who navigate the lorchas, informs me that they are almost exclusively occupied in furnishing supplies to the positions held by the insurgents.

I could not comply with the Prince's request, because there is a considerable number of junks employed in conveying produce from Hankow to Shanghai, and this trade would suffer materially were they to be stopped. M. Berthemy also informs me that he could not consent to the proposal, as the French trade on the river is almost entirely carried on in vessels of this class.

I have reason to believe that these lorchas are owned and freighted by Chinese, and that they are not entitled to hoist a foreign flag. The only efficacious remedy, as I have urged upon His Imperial Highness, is the organization of a proper revenue service. A steamer or two above Chinkiang will easily stop these abuses.

I am informed that these traders have received a heavy blow at Nanking. It appears that a number of lorchas, etc., were collected in the creek at that city, under protection of the forts that were stormed lately by the Imperialist forces. Their crews assisted in defending these forts, and on their capture, the boats and cargoes were seized and many of the foreigners and Chinese, who formed their crews, were slain, the remainder escaping with difficulty and in a most destitute state.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. F. BRUCE.

Inclosure in No. 98.

The Prince of Kung to Sir F. Bruce.

(Translation.)

Peking, April 14, 1863.

The Prince of Kung, &c., makes a communication.

ON the 21st instant (8th April, 1863), the Prince received a despatch from the Governor of Kiangsu, inclosing a statement from Mr. Fitzroy, Commissioner of Customs, to the effect that the revenue is being constantly evaded all along the Great River, and that vessels are loading and discharging without authority, on their passage up and down: the majority of the craft so engaged being native junks flying foreign colours. These junks are in reality owned by Chinese, who employ disreputable European traders to assume the proprietorship. Their Consuls give them a foreign flag, and they then start for the Great River and places prohibited by Treaty. The Shanghai Customs request the Consuls to punish (these offenders), but the Consuls do not act upon their application, and the consequence is that these merchants are emboldened to load and discharge cargo along the banks of the river, and, tempted by the large returns of the traffic, they furnish supplies to the rebels. There is no length to which the class of foreigners referred to do not go. A month ago, a junk, flying the French flag, which had been illegally taking in cargo along the river, was boarded by a tide-waiter of the Chinkiang Customs. The foreigner on board thereupon fired on him, and he had a narrow escape of being killed. It is evident from this that the masters of this class of junks are a set of worthless vagabonds.

The rebels in Nanking and that neighbourhood are now receiving all their supplies from native craft under under foreign flags. Should it be proposed to put down this practice at once, there is but one course to be pursued, namely, that a standard of tonnage should be fixed, and all ships whose burthen is below this be prohibited from trading up the Great River. Foreign steamers and large merchantmen are owned by well-to-do respectable merchants, and are not to be put in the same category with native craft plying under foreign colours; and even if their owners be not very honest men, it would not be worth their while to engage in such petty traffic.

What Mr. Fitzroy proposes therefore is that a rule be made, by which no foreign merchant shall be allowed to go up river with a vessel of any class, the burthen of which is less than 200 tons; and he begs His Highness to communicate with the foreign Ministers resident at Peking, and to request them to issue orders to the Consuls at the various river ports to act in accordance with this rule. His Highness would observe that instances of foreigners furnishing the rebels with supplies have been of late greatly multiplied. In addition (to evidence of an earlier date) His Highness received the other day a despatch from Tsêng, Governor-General of the Two Kiang, and from Li, Governor of Kiangsu, stating that in the city of Nanking rice had for a long time been very dear, but, as they had learned from rebels who had tendered their submission, it had now gone down in price, in consequence of large quantities, amounting from first to last to many myriads of peculs, having been brought to the rebels by foreign traders. These foreign merchants, eager to acquire the immense gains which result from trade with rebels, keep throwing in supplies in contravention of the law, and if no prompt measures be set on foot to stop the practice, it will be even more difficult (than it is now) to fix the date for the recapture of Nanking, &c.

This is perfectly plain proof that foreign merchants smuggle in supplies to the rebels, and the refusal of the Consuls to punish the offenders, even when informed of their proceedings by the Commissioner of Customs, makes it look as if trade on the Great River had been established for the sole purpose of furnishing the rebels with supplies.

The British Minister in (a notification) enclosed in one of his despatches, has declared that should merchant vessels carry up the river arms, powder, or other munitions of war, the local authorities should use the means in their power to arrest them, and that the Consuls would do their best to assist them (in the capture); a sufficient proof that the British Minister is as desirous as the Chinese Government of enabling it to suppress the rebellion.

Mr. Commissioner Fitzroy's proposal, that in order to do away with these abuses, a tonnage standard should be fixed for all vessels trading on the Great River, and that as a limit, no ship under 200 tons burthen should be allowed to go up river, appears to the Prince to be a very efficient course of action.

As in duty bound, His Highness has submitted a copy *in extenso* of the despatch from the Governor of Kiangsu to the British Minister, (and he trusts) that his Excellency

will immediately instruct the Consuls at the different river ports to notify to the mercantile communities there, that no vessel under 200 tons burthen will be allowed to trade on the Great River.

This will prevent worthless merchants from indulging in malpractices, will in some measure check the offence of furnishing supplies to the rebels, to the advantage both of military operations and of revenue.

The Prince hopes that the British Minister will do him the favour to look into the matter.

A necessary communication addressed to Sir Frederick Bruce, K.C.B., &c.
Tung-Chin, 2nd year, 2nd noon, 27th day. (14th April, 1863.)

No. 99.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received October 21.)

My Lord,

Peking, July 25, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch from Mr. Vice-Consul Adkins at Chinkiang, relative to a successful attack by the Imperialists on some of the rebel posts at Nanking, and the destruction of the lorchas carrying on trade there. These craft are largely owned and manned by foreigners, and sail under foreign flags; the Imperial Government is indebted to them for the supply of arms and provisions furnished to the insurgents, and we have to thank them for the constant scenes of blood and violence which have, I regret to say, inaugurated the opening of the Yangtze River.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. W. BRUCE.

Inclosure in No. 99

Consul Adkins to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Chinkiang, July 3, 1863.

THE Imperialists have gained most important advantages at Nanking.

On Sunday last three Europeans came to this Consulate. They reported that their boats, in company with many others, were lying in the Nanking Creek, when a large force of Imperialist war-boats made a sudden attack on the rebel positions. The rebels fled in a panic, and all the boats in the creek were captured. On board of them were many Europeans, the majority of whom were killed. One of my informants had his right arm nearly severed from his body, and the other two had sundry bullet holes in their coats and hats.

The day following, 29th ultimo, I started for Nanking in Her Majesty's ship "Hardy," hoping to be in time to witness some of the operations. Unfortunately the "Hardy" grounded about 10 miles below Nanking and it was not until the morning of Thursday that we were ready to proceed. As, however, Her Majesty's ship "Slaney" then made her appearance on her way from Hankow to Chinkiang, I went on board that vessel, and proceeded in her to Nanking. Having been absent from my post four days, I was anxious to return as quickly as possible, my stay at Nankin was therefore very short.

Summarily, the state of affairs is this:—On the 28th ultimo, at daybreak, a force of gunboats under Yang-Tsai-fu, one of Tsêng Kuo-fan's Lieutenants, ran past the rebel batteries and attacked the forts on the point of Chi-li-chow Island (Theodolite Point). These were speedily taken, and four heavily-armed lorchas, lying near, were burnt. After this, the attacking party captured the stone forts on the Nanking side of the Tsaohia Creek and close under the city walls. The force rested the next day, and on the 30th attacked and took the fort on the opposite bank of the river. In this position I found them on the morning of the 2nd instant.

I had a conversation with a person who I was told held the rank of Provincial Treasurer. He said he was in command of 10,000 land troops, which the gunboats had brought down the river. He was dressed like a common soldier, and at the time it struck me that his rank was assumed for the occasion. The fact that the Imperialists have now a considerable land force on the river side of Nanking is, however, indisputable.

At present the Imperialists have only invested the thin end of the wedge. They have yet to take a strong fort before they have complete command of the water approaches to Nanking. I think they will succeed in this, but even then the heavy guns mounted by

the rebels on the city walls and on the Shih-tsze-shan, just inside the walls, will, I fear, command all their positions.

The vagabond foreigners, whose illicit trading at Nanking has had so baneful an effect on legitimate trade, have at last met with their deserts. I can only say that I wish the Imperialists had made a particularly clean sweep of the whole brood.

I have, &c.

(Signed) T. ADKINS.

No. 100.

Acting Consul Markham to Earl Russell.—(Received Oct. 21.)

My Lord,

Shanghai, August 18, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to forward for your Lordship's information copy of my despatch of the 15th instant, addressed to Sir Frederick W. A. Bruce.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM.

Inclosure 1 in No. 100.

Acting Consul Markham to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Shanghai, August 15, 1863.

REFERRING to my despatch of the 11th instant, I beg to transmit copy and translation of a letter I received from His Excellency the Futai, reporting the capture of the "Ka Jow" by Burgevine, and requesting me to render him assistance in effecting his arrest, and of my reply thereto.

His Excellency addressed a similar letter to Colonel Hough, the Commandant of Her Majesty's Military Forces, and to each of the Treaty Consuls at this Port.

I have nothing further to report in reference to this matter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM.

Inclosure 2 in No. 100.

Acting Consul Markham to Li, Futai.

Shanghai, August 8, 1863.

THE Undersigned has to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatch of the 4th instant, with reference to the action of the American Burgevine, in plotting sedition, and joining the rebels at Soochow, and requesting the undersigned to obtain the assistance of Her Majesty's Naval and Military Forces in effecting his arrest and concerting defensive measures. The undersigned has already personally conveyed to your Excellency the assurance of his active support; and Her Majesty's Naval and Military Commanders have already, as your Excellency is aware, exerted every effort to provide for the safety of this neighbourhood, and to neutralize the ill effect of Burgevine's criminal designs.

But the undersigned would be wanting to his duty did he fail to bring before your Excellency's notice, in the most earnest manner, certain considerations which urgently require attention. It is manifest that the British forces at this port must be primarily employed for the defence of British property and interests, whilst in doing this they will be naturally as ready as has heretofore been the case to extend protection to the Chinese city and population; but that for active operations against the rebels, and the restoration of Imperial authority, your Excellency's own forces must be solely relied upon. The foremost among these forces is the body of troops under Major Gordon, and it is in consequence of the difficulties under which that Officer is labouring that the undersigned takes it upon himself to address your Excellency. These difficulties may be summed up in one sentence—the lack, namely, of proper supplies of funds; and as this is a defect which is daily increasing in gravity, the most disastrous consequences appear imminent unless steps are taken at once to alter the condition of affairs. For a force like Major Gordon's, which is manœuvred against the rebels with hitherto unparalleled rapidity, an efficient transport service is of

paramount importance, and this service has hitherto been excellently and faithfully performed by Messrs. Wheelock and Co., merchants at this port. On presenting their accounts for payment, however, they have been met with repeated refusals, or attempts to cause a reduction of their just claims, and at length, wearied with such treatment, they have despatched orders to Kwen-shan for the withdrawal of all their boats now in Major Gordon's service. They have further produced their books for the undersigned's inspection, and have proved to him that the charges they have hitherto been making for boats employed in the transport of artillery have been precisely the same as those made for common lighterage in this port. They have not placed the slightest additional charge for their services on the grounds that their boats are employed in hostile operations. It is not, however, with the design of pressing for payment to these merchants that the undersigned now addresses your Excellency; it is solely from anxiety on behalf of the maintenance of order that he entreats your Excellency to take into speedy consideration the necessity of providing funds for the support of forces on which so much depends, and of removing the embarrassments under which Major Gordon has been labouring. To this point he again begs leave to call your Excellency's most serious attention as to one of vital importance, and he takes the opportunity afforded by this reply of renewing his wishes for your Excellency's prosperity.

(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM.

No. 101.

Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 26, 1863.

HER Majesty's Government approve of your proceedings as reported in your despatch of the 14th of July last, with reference to the barbarities practised upon Taeping prisoners captured at Taitsan.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 102.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received October 28.)

My Lord,

Peking, August 3, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch from His Imperial Highness the Prince of Kung, informing me of the measures about to be taken to put a stop to the trade in arms and supplies which has been carried on with Nanking in vessels under foreign flags, commanded, if not owned, by foreigners. I am informed, on good authority, that fourteen of these vessels were at anchor in the creek, when the forts were attacked and taken, and that their crews assisted in the defence.

The Prince's proposal is a very moderate exercise of the belligerent rights of the Chinese Government, and will not molest the legitimate trade on the river. I consequently replied in the accompanying despatch, and I forwarded at the same time the inclosed despatch to Her Majesty's Consuls at Shanghai, Chinkiang, Kiukiang, and Hankow, expressing a hope that Her Majesty's subjects would see the expediency of discouraging this illegal trade, which embarrasses our relations with the Chinese Government and prolongs the state of anarchy, which is so prejudicial to China herself and to our interests.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. W. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 102.

The Prince of Kung to Sir F. Bruce.

(Translation.)

Peking, July 23, 1863.

THE Prince of Kung, &c., makes a communication.

His Excellency Tseng, Governor-General of the Liang Chiang, has reported to the Prince that, on the 15th day of the 5th moon, a vigorous attack on the rebels at Nanking was made by the naval and military authorities, and that the following positions were

captured, viz.: Chin-feo-chow, Hsia Kuaw, Isav hsie Chia, Yen tzu chi, &c., that the Imperial troops have advanced close to the walls of the city, and the Yangtze is now completely cleared of rebels. Could the rebel supplies be cut off, an early date might be fixed for the recapture of Nanking; foreign vessels, however, are constantly anchoring off the city, and, as his Excellency thinks that they furnish supplies to the rebels, he has already told off vessels of war, specially to cruise on the Yangtze, with distinct orders at once to fire upon any foreign vessels they may find anchored in the stream off Nanking. His Excellency prays the Prince to request the Ministers of the various foreign nations to issue orders that, until the recapture of Nanking, no foreign-owned merchant vessel shall anchor off any port of that city.

The Prince, seeing that Nanking was Chinese territory held by rebels, and that in accordance with Treaty regulations, foreign merchants ought not to resort thither, on a previous occasion, requested the British Minister to issue such orders as would put a stop to the contraband trade.

And now his Excellency, Tseng, having reported to His Highness that the rebels were receiving supplies from foreigners (a statement for which the Prince fears there are good grounds), and special cruisers having been appointed, with distinct orders to fire upon foreign vessels anchoring as before off Nanking, and supplying the rebels with arms and provisions; in which case the merchants will have brought misfortune upon themselves; His Highness would request the British Minister to give the foreign merchants distinct instructions that no foreign craft, whether upward or downward bound, will be allowed to anchor in the stream off Nanking; and at the same time, to issue such orders as will put a stop to their furnishing the rebels with supplies. His Excellency will thus render perfect the friendly and harmonious relations already existing.

The Prince awaits a reply from the British Minister.

Inclosure 2 in No. 102.

Sir F. Bruce to the Prince of Kung.

Sir,

Peking, July 26, 1863.

I AM in receipt of your Imperial Highness's despatch of the 23rd instant, and I congratulate your Imperial Highness on the important successes therein detailed at Nanking, which reflect much credit on the judgment that planned them, and the vigour with which they were executed.

I shall make known to British merchants that vessels are prohibited from communicating with Nanking, and from anchoring off it, and that if by disregarding the prohibition they are fired at and injured, they will have no ground for demanding compensation.

I take the liberty of suggesting that the customs at Shanghae, and at the river ports, should be instructed to notify to the masters of vessels navigating the river, that they will not be allowed to communicate with the rebel positions, nor anchor off the city, and that the Chinese Government has placed cruisers to enforce this order.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. W. BRUCE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 102.

Circular to Her Majesty's Consuls in China.

Sir,

Peking, July 26, 1863.

THE Chinese Government has informed me that it is about to place cruisers to prevent any communication by water with Nanking, and that with a view to rendering this measure complete, instructions will be given to them to fire on any vessel attempting to communicate, and on any vessel that anchors in face of the city.

You are aware of the importance of not permitting the legitimate trade on the Yangtze river to be compromised by proceedings, the effect of which is to protract the horrors of civil war, and to lead the Chinese Government to regret the valuable concession it made in opening the river.

I have to instruct you therefore to inform the British community, that vessels under the British flag are not entitled to communicate with Nanking, or to anchor in face of the city, or within such a distance of the position held, as may justify the suspicion that they intend to communicate with them, and that if they do so, and are fired upon by Govern-

ment cruisers, they will have no claim for redress, and will expose themselves to a revocation of the license to trade on the river.

I have no doubt that the British community will, by conforming to these regulations, enable me to avoid embarrassing questions with the Chinese Government on this delicate subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. W. BRUCE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 102.

The Prince of Kung to Sir F. Bruce.

Peking, August 3, 1863.

THE Prince of Kung makes a communication in reply.

The British Minister, in a despatch received on the 26th ultimo, after commenting on the fact that the Chinese forces under his Excellency Tseng, Governor-General of the Two Kiang had now gained a position close under the walls of Nanking, observed that he would make known to British merchants that vessels are prohibited from communicating with, Nanking, and from anchoring off it. His Excellency suggested that the customs' authorities at Shanghai and at the river ports, should be instructed to notify to the masters of vessels that they will not be allowed to communicate with rebel positions, or to anchor off the city.

The Prince was extremely gratified to have this evidence of the British Minister's sense of justice, and of his friendly desire for the suppression of the rebellion, and (the restoration) of peace to the country.

With reference to Nanking and its neighbourhood, His Highness has already requested Governor-General Tseng, of the Two Kiang, and Governor Li, of Kiangsu, to give strict orders to the cruisers that they are to keep up, to the best of their ability, a strict and vigilant look out; and to issue distinct and emphatic notices that if any of the former (illicit) practices be carried on (the ships so offending) will, according to the circumstances of the case, be confiscated or fired upon,

It will also be the Prince's duty, in accordance with (the suggestions conveyed in) the despatch under acknowledgment to request the high officers of the River Provinces to order the Superintendents of Customs at the several ports to issue notifications on the subject themselves, and also to request the Consuls of the different nations to notify to the masters of vessels that they will not be allowed to anchor off Nanking, or to furnish the rebels with supplies, and that if they take upon themselves to disregard this prohibition, the ship and cargo will either be seized and confiscated, or fired upon and destroyed.

A necessary communication addressed to Sir F. Bruce, &c.

No. 103.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received October 28.)

My Lord,

Peking, August 3, 1862.

THE merchants of Shanghai, having represented that the term of three months accorded for the re-exportation of produce brought down to Shanghai from the River Ports was too short, and affected injuriously their operations, I brought the subject, in concert with my colleagues, under the notice of the Chinese Government.

I have the honour to inclose the Prince of Kung's reply, consenting to the proposed extension of the term to one of twelve months, which I trust will prove satisfactory.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. W. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 103.

Sir F. Bruce to the Prince of Kung.

Sir,

Peking, April 18, 1863.

THE mercantile community of Shanghai have represented to me that the term of three months, allowed by Article 5 of the Yangtze regulations, for the exportation from

that port of produce brought down from Hankow and Kiu-kiang, is too short, and that teas and silk brought down for shipment to Europe, and entitled to a drawback, often cannot be shipped within the period specified. The drawback is therefore refused.

This is contrary to the spirit of the regulation, which was not intended to impose upon produce, shipped for foreign countries, an additional duty, and it is, therefore, a legitimate subject of representation. I am informed that, to meet the exigencies of trade, a period of twelve months should be allowed, within which the benefit of the regulation should be extended to the re-exporting merchant. The chief article of re-export is tea, and Your Imperial Highness is aware that this extension of the term allowed is not likely to lead to fraud on the Revenue, as the tea destined for foreign consumption is prepared in a different manner from the tea destined for local consumption.

I am ready to co-operate in preventing abuses on the Yangtze, and I trust Your Imperial Highness will be disposed to remove what is a fair subject of complaint on the part of the merchants.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. W. BRUCE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 103.

The Prince of Kung to Sir F. Bruce.

(Translation.)

Peking, June 25, 1863.

THE Prince of Kung makes a communication in reply.

The Prince received some time ago, a despatch from the British Minister, representing that the three months allowed for exportation of produce brought from one port of China to another port, and recovering by drawback of the half (coast trade) duty, was too short a term, and that it would be right to expand the term from three months to twelve.

On native produce carried down the Great River to Shanghae, merchants have to pay export duty, and in addition, a half (coast trade) duty. And where notice is given that any such produce is positively intended for re-exportation, the half duty is held as a deposit, and, if the produce be indeed re-exported within the three months, is refunded in the form of drawback, available for future payment of duties.

The British Minister having represented that the three months term is too short, the Prince now substitutes for that term, the term of twelve months. For the future, therefore, in the case of all produce merchants may carry down the Great River to Shanghae, —notice being given that the same is intended for exportation, if the same produce be indeed exported within the twelve months—the marks, packages, amounts, and weights being found by the Customs to correspond with those originally entered in the books, the equivalent of the half duty paid thereon shall be refunded to the merchant in the form of a drawback certificate.

The Prince is writing to the Ministers Superintendents of Trade, to send orders to the above effect to the different Custom-houses under their control.

It is further His Highness' duty to reply to the British Minister, whom he would request to inform himself of the contents of the despatch.

No. 104.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received October 28.)

(Extract.)

Peking, August 6, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a letter from some of the leading English and American residents at Shanghae, proposing a basis for Municipal Government at that place, and my reply thereto.

The French, American, and Russian Ministers had already agreed to the general principles, as stated in my despatch, on which such a body should be constituted, and I have no doubt that, if the municipality is so formed as not to give a preponderating influence to any one nationality, it may work harmoniously with the Chinese authorities, and produce great practical benefits.

Inclosure 1 in No. 104.

The Foreign Land Renters at Shanghai to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Shanghai, June 12, 1863.

AT a meeting of the Foreign Land Renters at Shanghai, held at Her British Majesty's Consulate on the 31st of last March, Mr. Consul Medhurst in the chair, to take into consideration the past, present, and future government of the Foreign Settlements at this port, we were appointed under Resolution No. 3 to act as a Committee to carry out the terms of Resolution No. 2, which was as follows :

"That, in accordance with the suggestion of the Chairman, a Committee be appointed to confer with the Treaty Consuls and recast the Land Regulations, in some such form as may meet the support of the Foreign and Chinese authorities, and to report to a future meeting of the practicability or otherwise of the measure."

In entering upon the duty entrusted to them, the Committee are sensible of the difficulties it involves, arising from the anomalous nature of the foreign position in relation to the Emperor of China as Territorial Sovereign, and his "de jure" jurisdiction over the large native population which has been brought together within the limits of the Foreign Settlement.

The object of this Committee is to endeavour to illustrate some practical measure which may reconcile the conflicting elements of the question, and in concordance with the spirit of Treaties, may lead to a satisfactory and sound system of local municipal Government, securing alike the interests of the Foreign body politic and the rights of the Territorial Sovereign.

The attention of the Committee has necessarily been specially directed to your Excellency's despatches to Mr. Consul Medhurst of July 3rd, September 8th, and November 5th, 1862, in which your Excellency maintains the right of the local Chinese authorities to impose what taxation they please on all Chinese subjects resident within the limits of the so-called Foreign Concessions, and expresses your Excellency's opinion that the collection of Chinese within these limits produces a most fertile source of misunderstanding with the native authorities, and that your Excellency is therefore convinced that Her Britannic Majesty's Government would wish to see the limits of the so-called British Concession reduced, so as to exclude the Chinese, rather than extended, so as to embrace a greater number of them.

The immediate duty of this Committee is to deal with facts as they are, but they consider it necessary in order to clear the ground on which their views are based, in making the subsequent propositions for the future government of the Foreign Settlement, respectfully to submit the following remarks.

In your Excellency's despatch of 8th September, 1862, to Mr. Consul Medhurst, after referring to the original character of the so-called British Concession, viz., as a certain space within which, by agreement with the Chinese authorities, British subjects might acquire land, so as to have the advantage of living together,—your Excellency proceeds to observe :

"But the character of the Concession has been entirely altered by the acts of foreigners themselves.

"Instead of being a Foreign Settlement it has become a Chinese city, in which a few foreigners reside amidst a large Chinese population."

From the first of these paragraphs we beg respectfully to dissent. The object of the Land Renters in the early years of this settlement was to carry out the original status contemplated in the regulations made by Mr. Consul Balfour and the Chinese Intendant of Circuit, dated 29th November, 1845, so as to remove the resident Chinese from the limits, and thus to isolate the locality for foreign occupation only.

This condition was altered in 1853, by the *laches* of the Imperial Government, who could neither protect their own subjects, nor fulfil their obligation under Treaty of protecting foreigners, and who yielded the city to the rebel chief Lew, and his bands.

Then began the influx of native Chinese into the Foreign Settlement, as stated in the report of the Committee on roads and jetties, presented to the Meeting of Land Renters held at Her Britannic Majesty's Consulate on the 11th of July, 1854, Mr. Consul Alcock in the chair.

"The capture of the city threw suddenly to our midst a crowd of houseless refugees, for the accommodation of some of whom numerous frail and dangerous tenements have been constructed, adding greatly to the risk of fire in the settlement ; while we have among us a large and mixed population of Chinese who throng the streets and litter them with filth by day, and disturb our repose and excite frequent alarms by their street brawls

and drunken revels by night, and should motives of humanity impel us to allow their longer continuance, a proper regard for our own health and comfort, as well as for the good order of the settlement, renders necessary some effective measures to keep them under control.

"Many who have not been provided with shelter on land have sought it in boats which lie along the bund, and often cluster about the jetties, offering serious obstructions to cargo boats, and those of a smaller class employed in communicating with the shipping; while others still crowd the southern extremity of the bund and neighbouring thoroughfares with booths and stands for the sale of merchandize, thus attracting numbers of idlers and vagrants who block up the way and almost prevent any communication with that quarter."

The capture by the Taepings of the important cities of Soochow and Hangchow in the autumn of 1860, and of Ningpo in 1861, reiterated this influx of Chinese to the Foreign Settlement to a much greater extent, attracted, as they naturally were, by the protection held out by the Allied Governments.

We hold, therefore, that no primary action of the land renters, however much they may have afterwards benefited in some points of view, was the cause of the present state of the settlement; the force of circumstances over which they had no control produced it, the leading elements being:—

1st. The inability of the Imperial Government either to protect themselves or their subjects, or to fulfil their obligations to foreigners, under Article I. of the Treaty of Nanking, and XVIII. of the Treaty of Tientsin, and

2nd. The policy of the British and French Governments in extending that protection which the Territorial Sovereign has been unable to afford either at Shanghai, or in the greater part of this province, and of Chekiang.

The Municipal system, and code of land regulations, framed in 1854, in view of the commencement of this anomalous position of affairs, were ratified by the Ministers of Great Britain, France, and the United States, in conjunction with the Chinese Intendant of Circuit; under such authority the system and land regulations have naturally been considered as giving a legal force to action taken in accordance with them, but we infer now from your Excellency's recent despatches on the subject, that such authority had no legal power, and that the right of the Chinese authorities within this Settlement, as well as in the city, remains unimpaired.

We grant the argument to your Excellency that, according to the strict letter of Treaties, this may be so; but we consider that practically, and according to the spirit of Treaties, it is not so, and that it is of very great importance to the future safety and well-being of this important port, that some restrictions be placed upon the actions of the local native authorities within the limits of the foreign Settlement. As among the proofs of the necessity of such restrictions, we may call your Excellency's attention to the taxes now being levied upon merchandize and articles of common use from all Chinese connected with foreigners or residing in the foreign Settlement. These taxes are constantly increasing in weight and number, and have already seriously affected business, some of them being tantamount to a direct additional impost on foreign trade, beyond the tariff dues as provided by treaties.

The local authorities having only a temporary interest in the place, and unguided by the ordinary maxims of political economy, look mainly to the amount they can extort, and there is no guarantee whatever that they may not, at any day, proceed to such extreme measures of taxation as to destroy a trade even now struggling to exist under the heavy burden it is made to bear.

Having premised so far, we would respectfully call your Excellency's attention, in the next place, to the existing character and condition of this place.

It has become a sea-port of great magnitude, no less than 270 vessels having been last year numbered at one time within its waters. It is the resort of people of all nations, including a large admixture of rough and lawless characters, and of a Chinese population collected from various quarters, and representing nearly all the provinces. This Chinese element combines with the European mercantile and missionary community to the formation of an improvised city.

For this city the present residents must perform hastily and at enhanced cost the various municipal works usually distributed in most places over many years and successive generations.

Moreover, in addition to these circumstantial difficulties, if the Settlement was delivered into the hands of the Chinese, the foreign landrenters at Shanghai would have to deal with the uncertain action of Asiatic officials, who, from the low scale of their legitimate remuneration, endeavour by exactions to add to their own resources during an

uncertain tenure of office, and, regardless of the important influence exercised upon the progress of material prosperity by the maintenance of health and order, are almost entirely indifferent to local requirements for this object.

Under such exceptional circumstances, and in view of the ordinary claims of reason and humanity, it appears just that in framing regulations for the government of the place, the strict letter of Treaties should yield to the spirit, if required, in order to provide for the safety of life and property.

It is not our desire, nor do we believe it to be necessary, to deviate from the spirit of Treaties in the suggestions we are about to offer, which we trust will be acceptable to the Imperial Government itself, provided it is made aware of the anomalous character of the place, and of the danger of attempting to govern it solely by Chinese agents and according to Chinese principles.

We would further submit to your Excellency that the privilege sought for by the land renters is required by them as a necessity, not as a coveted advantage; such privilege entails a vast deal of trouble and expense, which they would willingly delegate to a Territorial Government to whose honest and energetic action the responsibility of Government might be safely left. Such a Government, however, does not and is not likely to exist at Shanghai, and in its absence we are compelled to request for the foreign community, such powers of Government as may protect this settlement as far as may be in human ability, from the calamities of anarchy and pestilence.

If in order to make the system effective some concessions are asked of the Territorial Sovereign, he is not without his compensation in having order and health maintained in so very important a place to Chinese interests, whether viewed commercially or politically.

Our preliminary propositions are as follows:

1. That the new code shall be comprehensive in its application, and include all quarters occupied by foreigners—English, French, and Americans, or as many as will assent to be included.

2. That territorial jurisdiction should rest solely on grants from the Emperor or his representatives.

3. Civil and criminal jurisdiction must remain with the several authorities whose subjects and citizens reside here, the Chinese officers controlling the Chinese with the exception of Chinese actually in the employ of foreigners, arrests being made under warrants from the Municipal Council.

The Municipal authority, therefore, in criminal cases exceeding in importance a fine of dollars, would simply hand the offender over to the authority of the nation to which he belonged, and give proof of the offence, a public prosecutor being maintained for this object.

With civil cases it would have no concern.

4. If necessary, in order to obtain such grants of territorial authority, an arrangement to be made by which a certain tax or revenue, or per-centage of the revenue, shall be paid to the Imperial Treasury in lieu of all exactions or dues upon Chinese residents within the foreign quarters.

Should the general bearing of the scheme suggested meet with the approval of your Excellency, and if the representatives of other Treaty Powers in unison with the Imperial Government, we shall at once enter on the detailed arrangements necessary for its effective execution to be in turn presented for consideration and approval.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

THOS. MONCRIEFF.
EDWARD CUNNINGHAM.
H. DENT.
JAMES HOGG.
THOMAS HANBURY.
JAMES COCK.

Inclosure 2 in No. 104.

Sir F. Bruce to the Foreign Land Renters at Shanghai.

Gentlemen,

Peking, August 6, 1863.

I RECEIVED your letter of the 12th June, last month, and regret that owing to an oversight on my part, it has remained so long unanswered.

Before that letter reached me, certain propositions were laid before the foreign representatives at Peking by his Excellency the Minister of the United States, and received their assent as notified to the Consuls of their respective nations at Shanghai.

I extract the terms in which these principles were agreed to :

1. "That whatever territorial authority is established shall be derived directly from the Imperial Government through our Ministers.

2. "That such authority shall not extend beyond simple municipal matters, roads, police, and taxes for municipal objects.

3. "That the Chinese not actually in foreign employ, shall be wholly under the control of Chinese officers, as much as in the Chinese city.

4. "That each Consul shall have the Government and control of his own people, as now ; the municipal authority simply arresting offenders against the public peace, handing them over, and prosecuting them, before their respective authorities, Chinese, and others, as the case may be.

5. "That there shall be a Chinese element in the municipal system, to whom reference shall be made, and assent obtained to any measure affecting the Chinese residents."

I think that if these principles are adhered to, an arrangement may be arrived at, to which the consent of the representatives of the different Treaty Powers, and that of the Chinese authorities, may be obtained.

But I do not think they would, in the first instance, confer on the municipal body, any power to inflict fines on their subjects. Should the constitution and election of the municipal body be satisfactory, the Consuls might, perhaps, hereafter recommend that such a power in trifling cases should be given.

But to propose it at present would be to raise a question of little importance, which might endanger the success of the scheme.

Territorial jurisdiction is understood to mean the right to control thoroughfares and public buildings, public wharves and jetties ; to impose and collect taxes ; to establish and support a police ; to arrest for disturbances of the public peace, and bring to trial ; to license houses of public entertainment, public chairs, carriages, and boats ; to enforce sanitary regulations by fines of dollars or less, but not beyond.

I think the object to be attained is one authority for municipal purposes, whose jurisdiction will extend over all the so-called foreign concessions, for I think the existence of distinct bodies of police, and of separate Municipal Councils tends to produce conflicts of jurisdiction, and to perpetuate the mischievous error that the interests of different nations in China are distinct, whereas, in truth, they are identical, and are best promoted by union and common action.

I am, &c.

(Signed) F. W. BRUCE.

No. 105,

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received October 28.)

My Lord, *Peking, August 7, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch from His Imperial Highness the Prince of Kung, informing me of the settlement of three cases, regarding which complaints have been addressed to me from Amoy.

The substitution of drawbacks for exemption certificates will, I trust, obviate a fertile source of disputes.

The delays at Amoy arise, in part, from the Superintendent of Customs there being a delegate of the Tartar General at Foochow, which renders it necessary to refer to that officer for instructions when the Superintendent hesitates in assuming the responsibility of a decision.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. W. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 105.

The Prince of Kung to Sir F. Bruce.

(Translation.)

Peking, July 23, 1863.

THE Prince of Kung makes a communication in reply.

In the month of January last, the British Minister requested the Prince to issue

immediate orders to the Amoy customs to settle the cases of Messrs. Elles and Co., Boyd and Co., and Tait and Co., reported by Mr. Consul Pedder at Amoy.

This office, thereupon, wrote to the Tartar General at Foochow, instructing him carefully to investigate those cases; that officer now replies that he has made the requisite inquiries, and that the cases have been settled. A copy of his despatch is forwarded herewith, for the information of the British Minister.

A necessary communication.

Inclosure 2 in No. 105.

Despatch from the Tartar General at Foochow.

ON the 11th of March, 1863, I had the honour to receive the following despatch from the Tsung-la-Yamen :—

“Sir F. Bruce, British Minister, has forwarded to this office a despatch from Consul Pedder of Amoy, complaining that Elles and Co., having re-exported to Hongkong certain white shirting, which had already paid import duty, the customs authorities refused to grant them a drawback certificate, that Boyd and Co., having paid export duty on certain cottons at Shanghai, and having lost the receipt, paid duty (on it) a second time at Amoy; another export certificate having been received from Shanghai, the customs alleging that the twenty days allowed (for the production of such documents) had expired, refused to repay the deposit; that Messrs. Tait and Co., having received a drawback certificate on certain cottons which they were re-exporting to Hongkong, and tendering it in payment of duty on goods of another kind, the Amoy customs refused it.

“The British Minister requested that orders be given to the Amoy authorities to settle the above three cases in accordance with Treaty; we have to request, therefore, that you will examine into these cases and bring them to an immediate conclusion, &c.”

In accordance with this despatch, I gave orders to the (customs) officer at Amoy to inquire into the three cases, one by one, and to return me a full report, which was as follows :—

“Tung-Fu reports, with respect that Messrs. Elles and Co.’s goods were, during the second moon of Tung-chi, 1st year (March, 1862) shipped for re-exportation on board the steamer Ich’a (?), and that the firm in question thereupon applied for a drawback, my predecessor in office, Lieutenant Kwang, declined to give it, on the ground that Elles and Co., had not tendered the goods for inspection (previous to re-exportation) the Commissioner of Customs afterwards went in person to the office of the steamer, and consulted the books, from which he learnt that the number and marks of the boxes corresponded (with the original manifest), a drawback was therefore issued to Elles and Co. on the 27th of February, 1863.

Messrs. Boyd and Co. on the 19th of June, 1862, paid import duty on certain cottons, and in July or August produced a Shanghai export certificate (covering these goods), the period of twenty days allowed (for the production of such documents) had expired, and although it was in the power of the customs to overlook this, still the fact of the document produced being in English (alone) was a violation of the existing regulations. Boyd and Co. were, thereupon, instructed to procure and hand in a Chinese copy; this they refused to do, and persisted in urging their request for a repayment of the duty originally paid. In a conversation with the Inspector of Customs, that officer, after examining the document and deciding that it had really been issued by the Shanghai (customs), observed that it would not be advisable to agree to the merchant’s demands, as it would establish a (bad) precedent, still, as the firm kept demanding a drawback certificate in lieu of their money, it appeared to him necessary to accommodate the matter, and having first issued a drawback to the firm to instruct them to procure a Chinese copy of the export certificate from Shanghai, and so close the case. Upon these observations of the Inspector, and seeing that his desire was to deal with the case in an accommodating manner, I acted upon his advice, and on the 28th of February issued three drawbacks, representing in all 64 taels 4 mace; the English document has been given to Elles and Co. to be exchanged for one in Chinese at Shanghai. They certainly have not the original export certificate in their possession. Case of Tait and Co.—This firm re-exported to Hongkong a quantity of cotton goods on which they took out a drawback certificate, which they afterwards, on the 9th of August, 1862, presented in payment of duty on a quantity of opium, but as duty on opium is reckoned per box, and the import duty, hitherto collected, has been reported to the high officers as levied in this manner, I did not judge it expedient to break in upon (the round sum) by receiving drawbacks instead of money; for this duty

is unlike that raised upon miscellaneous articles which mostly consist of broken sums which can be added together in calculation. I therefore requested them to put aside the drawback and present it when they might have duty to pay on miscellaneous goods; finding, however, that the Treaty makes no distinction as to the goods for which drawbacks are presentable, and not daring to commit a breach of Treaty, I had referred the matter to the Commissioner of Customs for his decision as to the lawfulness of my proceeding, with a view of taking his advice as to my course of action, when, on the 7th September Elles came to the Custom-house requesting me to receive the drawback, being unwilling to await the Commissioner's decision. On the same day I agreed to their request, and accepted the drawback in payment of 633 taels 3 mace duty on opium.

These three cases, in connection with the granting of drawbacks and the receipt of duties, had been satisfactorily arranged before your Excellency's despatch reached me, &c.

I am of opinion that the inability of the Custom's officer to settle these cases at once, was the occasion of the English merchants bringing the charges they have done. Lieutenant Jung-fu having reported that these cases have been settled, I have now to report to the office the orders issued by me to that officer, and the course of action adopted by him.

No. 106.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received October 28.)

My Lord,

Peking, August 14, 1863.

IN continuation of my despatch of the 9th of February last, on the destruction of Chinese war junks, by Her Majesty's ships, I have the honour to forward a despatch from Prince Kung, in reply to mine, inclosed in the above quoted despatch.

I have not deemed it expedient to continue the discussion, as the instructions issued by Admiral Kuper, will prevent the recurrence of the acts complained of.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure in No. 106.

The Prince of Kung to Sir F. Bruce.

(Translation.)

Peking, February 20, 1863.

THE Prince of Kung makes a communication in reply.

On the 26th of the 12th moon, the Prince received a despatch from the British Minister communicating the results of his Excellency's enquiries regarding the junks destroyed on the Great River, and enclosing copies of various documents.

The Prince has perused the despatch and its enclosures with much attention.

In order to prevent the recurrence of causes of complaint, so far as junks are concerned, his Excellency proposes that vessels of the British navy, falling in with junks suspected of illegal practices, shall destroy them only if requested by a competent Chinese authority so to do, but that if a junk shall have been denounced as a pirate, and no such authority be present so to declare himself, the British navy shall be authorized to do no more than detain the junks and deliver them to the chief of the jurisdiction, in which they may have been found, for his investigation.

Instructions to this effect would anticipate the mischief complained of before it could show itself, and the Prince's view being much the same on this head, his Highness will make it his business to instruct the local authorities that, where junks doing things unlawful may be found, there will be no objection to officers of the British navy, if they are confident that such or such a junk has been engaged in piracy, detaining the said junk, and handing her over for examination to the local authorities.

The British Minister having made a like communication to Admiral Hope, it will behove commanders of steamers to abstain for the future from the precipitate destruction of junks upon no authority but their own.

His Excellency proposes farther that orders should be sent to Hankow and Shanghai to inform the Consuls of those ports, of the points along the river at which customs

stations and war-tax offices are established, that notice of the same may be issued by the Consul, and confusion of Government offices with offices not authorised by Government, prevented on the part of foreigners of all degrees (*lit.* the military and the people).

The number of Government offices established of late along the river, for the collection of the salt revenue and war-taxes is considerable; and it will be the Prince's duty to write to the Government of Hu-Kuang, the Two Kiang, Kiang-Si, and Kiang-Su, to ascertain precisely where these offices are, and then to instruct the Superintendents of Customs to communicate with the foreign Consuls, that they may issue notices to their respective communities.

With reference to the loss sustained by the officer Huang Tê-hsiu, for whom his Excellency expresses his readiness to pay the 423 taels odd, being the value of the property destroyed, to any person that may be appointed to receive it from the Consul at Shanghai, the Prince has written to his Excellency Li, Governor of Kiang-Su, to instruct the Taotai to make the necessary arrangements with the Consul.

To come now to the destruction of junks at Chow-Chia-Hsü and other places, it is the belief of his Excellency that Admiral Hope (moved in the first instance) *bonâ fide* in response to the appeal addressed him by the people, and that after (the destruction of the junks at Chow-Chia-Hsü) the junk seen off Kiang-yin was destroyed because she was suspected of belonging to the pirate fleet earlier (complained of).

The Prince is fully aware of the devotedness with which Admiral Hope has addressed himself to the task of defending Shanghai, and of his efforts in the cause of friendly relations, and his aim on this occasion, when he went in search of pirates, was, as on other occasions, the security of the people. But, as regards the commanders of steamers he sent, a careful perusal of their reports shews, that the junks in question were destroyed entirely on the statement of certain well-dressed people, and on the allegation of the well-to-do inhabitants of the village generally, supported by a small mandarin, that these junks had long been molesting the neighbourhood. And the Prince would ask whether these officers of the British navy are (or were) able to point out what individuals of the village population they were, and who was the small mandarin that made this charge.

Well-dressed and well-to-do people are not necessarily well-affected subjects, nor is a small mandarin necessarily a genuine mandarin. Who can say that in this case the parties (complaining) were not pirates in disguise, who, in their dread lest the Government vessels should arrest them, trumped up this story of the evil done by these junks, with a view to inciting the commanders of British steamers to destroy them? If Government vessels have been really molesting the people, the proper course would have been to bring the fact to the notice of the high officers of Government, in order that the guilty might be punished. The officers of the British navy did not communicate with the high provincial authorities, neither did they submit the case to Admiral Hope for his decision. This was culpable, inasmuch as they unauthorizedly assumed responsibility; but, seeing that they had received orders from Admiral Hope to proceed in quest of pirates, their summary destruction of four Government vessels was a wanton act of violence, which, as the British Minister admits, was quite wrong, and which in the Prince's opinion, is not to be accorded the indulgence that might be claimed for an ordinary error. His Highness, consequently hopes, that the British Minister, in concert with Admiral Hope, will impartially consider the offence of these officers, and will inflict upon them a penalty commensurate with the offence, and such as will deter them from a commission of acts of this kind, calculated to produce a breach of friendly relations.

Of the cases occurring on the river near Kiu-kiang and Lu-ho, the despatch under acknowledgment observes, that his Excellency is still without an answer to his queries regarding these cases.

It appears from the records, that on the 17th day of the 3rd moon (April) of last year, the Governor-General of Hu-Kuang (Kuanwên) wrote to say that his deputy in charge of the salt-gabelle offices of the Wu-Huang (Wu-süeh? and Huang-chau Fu) Collectorate had sent in a report that on the 16th day of the 2nd moon, a large foreign steamer came up the river and anchored off Wu (Wu-süeh?). She had in tow a lorcha, having on board a number of men armed with muskets and short swords (bayonets), who cut the cables of four Government boats mounting guns, and towed them alongside the large steamer. A linguist (or interpreter) presently came to the collector's office, and said that the steamer was from Kiu-kiang; that her coming was in consequence of a dispute with a war-tax office, and that as the matter in no way concerned the salt-gabelle office, the vessel seized should be forthwith returned. The vessels were all released shortly after, but a large number of their guns and other articles on board them were missing.

Mr. Consul Forrest also wrote (to the Governor-General?) that a British merchant having represented that his vessel had been stopped by a cruizer of his Excellency (the authority addressed), off the village of Hu-siao Tsun, near Wu-süeh, he, the Consul, had in person proceeded to Wu-süeh to Hsün-Ti, to make inquiries, and had carried eight guns and ten strings of cash back to Hsün-Ti, whither he hoped his Excellency would send an officer to receive the guns and the cash, which he, the Consul, would not fail to deliver up (would in no wise detain).

On receipt of this despatch the Prince addressed the British Minister. His Highness's despatch was dated the 29th of the 3rd moon (27th April, 1862), and enclosed copies of the papers received.

In the Luh-ho case, it was his Excellency Yuen (Yuen Chia-san), Director-General of Canal Transport (at this time one of the Imperial Commissioners of War in Ngan, Hwui, Ho Nan, &c.), who complained. On the 15th of the 5th moon of last year, he wrote to say that he had received a report from the *ti-tu* Li Shi-chung (of the seizure of certain war-junks, under the following circumstances):

About midnight of the 16th of the 4th moon, five native craft came sailing down the river, past a war-tax station, established at Tung Chiang Chi, near Luh-ho. They were found to contain a cargo of paper and sundries, and to have three foreigners. (The officers of the station) put certain questions, in reply to which the (Chinese) traders on board said that they were from Wu-hu, bound down stream, and that to guard themselves against the extortion of the rebel Customs' Station, whose charges were excessively high, they had agreed to give the foreigners on board 250 taels to see them past the rebel Custom House, intending, of course, duly to report themselves at the Government Custom Houses. (So far well). But, early in the morning, the foreigners left the place, and by-and-bye returned with a steamer, which towed away the five junks, armed with guns, that formed the guard of the office; and the interpreter on board her stated that, according to the foreigners in question, property to the value of 1,000 dollars had been taken, and that the five junks were seized as a set-off against the loss. The *ti-tu* (Li Shi-chung) at once inquired into the robbery alleged, and satisfied himself that none had taken place; but, fearing lest this might be the beginning of some misunderstanding, he sent an officer with 730 taels, as the equivalent of 1,000 dollars, and he wrote a despatch to the British Consul at Nanking, requesting him to restore the native gun-boats seized. The money was received, but the native gun-boats were not returned.

The above particulars were communicated by the Prince to his Excellency, in a despatch enclosing copies of the above correspondence, and dated the 17th day of the 5th moon (13 June, 1862). The perfect correctness of the statements in these two cases is vouched for by the official representations and communications (of the British officers) on record;* nor can the Prince understand how it is that so much time should have elapsed since the British Minister wrote to inquire into these cases, without his receiving an answer. His Highness hopes that the British Minister will press his inquiry, and insist on a speedy reply, and that as soon as this shall arrive, his Excellency will communicate in detail such information as he may receive to the Prince, in order that His Highness may forward it to the provincial authorities interested.

Upon the subject of the flag which Government vessels are to fly, the Prince has long since written to the Governor-General of the Two Kwang to decide on a proper flag with a dragon upon it, and then to wait for instructions, as to what steps farther should be taken, and His Highness will inform the British Minister what the Governor-General's decision is as soon as he learns it, and will send a circular of instructions to the navies of the different provinces to hoist the Government flag; but if in the meantime, before it is hoisted, British officers, unable to distinguish private vessels from Government vessels, should again, without further preface, commit acts of violence or war against these vessels, the Prince will assuredly be obliged to report their acts to the British Minister, and to request him to be so good as to bring the offenders to justice.

A necessary communication addressed to the Honourable Mr. Bruce.

Tung-Chih, 2nd year, 1st moon, 3rd day (February 20, 1863).

* The terms used, are those under which the Treaty provides Consuls shall "represent" a case to Chinese officials of higher rank than themselves, or "communicate" with their equals. The Prince's despatch of April 27, incloses one from Kuan-wên, Governor-General of Hu-Kuang, who cites Mr. Forrest's "representation" to him; and that of June 13 incloses copy of his Excellency Yuen Chia-san's despatch, on the case of Li Shüchung's junks, but it does not inclose the latter officer's communication to the officer whom he calls the Consul at Nanking, nor the reply of the latter.

No. 107.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(Received October 31.)

Sir,

Admiralty, October 29, 1863.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send you herewith, for the information of Earl Russell, a copy of a letter from Vice-Admiral Kuper, dated the 26th of August, with copies of its inclosures, relating to the state of affairs with regard to the Taeping rebels in the neighbourhood of Shanghai.

I am, &c.

(Signed) W. G. ROMAINÉ.

Inclosure 1 in No. 107.

Vice-Admiral Kuper to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir,

"Euryalus," at Yokohama, August 26, 1863.

THE accompanying extracts from reports, dated the 6th and 12th instant, from the senior officer at Shanghai, will show the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty the present state of affairs with regard to the rebels in that province.

2. It is feared that the secession of Burgevine to the Taipings may cause serious inconvenience and annoyance to the position of the Anglo-Chinese forces under Major Gordon.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. L. KUPER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 107.

Captain Strode to Vice-Admiral Kuper.

(Extract.)

"Vulcan," August 6, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Anglo-Chinese force under Major Gordon captured the town of Wokong, near Quang-san, on the 28th ultimo.

Since that General Burgevine, who has for some time been enlisting Europeans, has commenced active operations on the part of the rebels against the Imperialists.

On the morning of the 2nd instant he, with the assistance of a party of Europeans, captured the steamer "Ka-Jow," belonging to the Futai, seizing her while close under the walls of Soonkiang.

Apprehension is entertained for Major Gordon's force, in consequence of General Burgevine's popularity with the junior officers and men.

Measures have been taken to stop the enlistment of Europeans, and a proclamation has been issued to that effect.

Inclosure 3 in No. 107.

Captain Strode to Vice-Admiral Kuper.

Extract.)

"Vulcan," August 12, 1863.

ON the 8th instant a detachment of troops left Shanghai for Taitsan to garrison that town, and to receive all Major Gordon's siege artillery from Quang-san, from which place it was considered advisable to remove it. They consisted of half a battery of Royal Artillery, 300 Beloochee Native Infantry, 400 Kingsley's Anglo-Chinese, and 400 Franco-Chinese, under the command of Captain Murray, R.A.

Major Gordon's force has been attacked by about 4,000 rebels, joined with a force of Europeans, and have been fighting for three days. It has resulted in the defeat of the rebels; Major Burgevine is continuing to enlist Europeans, concerning which I herewith beg to enclose a printed copy of the proclamation.

Inclosure 4 in No. 107.

Notification.

WHEREAS it has come to the knowledge of the Consuls of the Treaty Powers with China that enlistments are being carried on with illegal intentions, warning is hereby given, that the strongest measures will be taken against such proceedings, and any persons who are found to be employed in the same will be arrested, and treated with the utmost rigour of the law.

All vessels or boats suspected are liable to be searched by vessels stationed for that purpose, or by agents so appointed.

(Signed)

J. MAUBOUSSIN,
Le Consul-Général de France.
JOHN MARKHAM,
H.B.M.'s. Acting Consul.
GEORGE SEWARD,
U.S. Consul.
GEORGE BASIL DIXWELL,
H.I.R.M.'s. Vice-Consul.
TH. PROBST,
H.P.M.'s. Vice-Consul.

No. 108.

Sir E. Lugard to Mr. Hammond.—(Received November 5.)

Sir,

War Office, November 5, 1863.

REFERRING to the previous correspondence relative to the Chinese force under the command of Major Gordon, I am directed by the Secretary of State for War to transmit to you, for the information and consideration of Earl Russell, the accompanying copy of a further despatch from Major-General Brown, in which he states that in consequence of the critical situation in which that force is placed, he may feel compelled so far to depart from the instructions he has received, as to allow officers on full pay to join the force, and serve beyond the limits of the thirty miles' radius.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

EDWARD LUGARD.

Inclosure in No. 108.

Major-General Brown to Earl de Grey and Ripon.

My Lord,

Head Quarters, Shanghai, September 3, 1863.

IN continuation of my despatch of 12th August last, I have the honour again to address you on the subject, and to state that since my arrival at Shanghai, clearly seeing the position of affairs with Major Gordon, his very critical situation left entirely in the hands of men who were formerly in the pay of the Ward force, and connected with Burgevine (who has already been tampering with some of the officers, and induced many to leave), I trust that although no reason at present presents itself to cause me to doubt the fidelity of those still remaining, yet for the safety of Major Gordon in his command, and the still greater responsibility of the number of guns and munitions of war in his possession, furnished to the Futai at the express sanction of the British Government, I feel I may be compelled, if extreme danger presents itself, to depart from my instructions restricting officers going beyond the radius without reverting to half pay, and to sanction officers as volunteers joining the Ward force, to lend every support to Major Gordon, granting them at the same time their full pay, in order to obtain their services. In this event, of its being necessary for me to adopt such a measure, I hope I may be justified in calling on Her Majesty's Government to support me in every way, when I must bring to notice the very circumstance, that should any treachery take place in Major Gordon's force, and his heavy park of artillery fall into the hands of the rebels, my position would

be most critical to defend Shanghai; having no larger description of ordnance to contend against that which might be brought against me. I therefore hold it to be my first duty to guard against such a possibility; and it must further be borne in mind that as this garrison has been seriously reduced in strength by the loss of the 31st regiment, a battery of Royal Artillery, and a wing of the 5th Bombay Native Infantry, I cannot be too watchful in adopting any steps to guard against my position being jeopardized in any way.

I may further add, that Major Gordon is still at Quang-san watching the rebels at Soochow, and should circumstances allow me, it is my intention to proceed to Peking to have an interview with Sir F. Bruce.

Since writing the above I have received a report from Major Gordon, stating that Burgevine had taken up his abode with his followers at Soochow, a very large and important city, situated in a straight line on the Grand Canal, about fifteen miles from Quang-san; and so long as it is held in force by the rebels, and a rendezvous for all adventurers, Shanghai cannot be considered as secure from attack.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. G. BROWN.

No. 109.

Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 7, 1863.

WITH reference to your despatch of the 6th of August, I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government approve the answer which you have returned to the letter addressed to you by certain of the leading British and American residents at Shanghai, proposing a basis for Municipal Government at that place.

As regards police regulations, it is clear that one set of regulations should be applicable to the whole foreign settlement, and should be established under a foreign head.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL

No. 110.

Mr. Hammond to Sir E. Lugard.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 9, 1863.

I AM directed by Earl Russell to state to you, for the information of Earl de Grey and Ripon, that in consideration of the circumstances set forth in Major-General Brown's report of the 3rd of September, a copy of which is enclosed in your letter of the 5th instant, his Lordship is of opinion that during the present critical state of affairs in the neighbourhood of Shanghai, British officers on full pay should be allowed to join the force under Colonel Gordon's command, and to serve beyond the 30 miles' radius.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 111.

Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 10, 1863.

I TRANSMIT herewith for your information, a copy of a letter which I have caused to be addressed to the War Department,* expressing my opinion that under present circumstances, British officers on full pay should be allowed to join the force under Major Gordon's command, and to serve beyond the 30 mile radius.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

* No. 110.

No. 112.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell—(Received November 16.)

My Lord,

Peking, September 8, 1863.

IN my despatch of the 18th of July, 1862,* I had the honour to report that I had disapproved of the burning of a junk at Hankow, on board of which were some "braves" who had committed assaults on foreigners, and Her Majesty's Government saw fit to concur in my objections to summary proceedings of that kind.

I have lately seen a gentleman who travelled last year in the province of Hoo-nan, which furnishes the most courageous and turbulent of the "braves" from whom the army of Tseng-Kwo-fan is recruited, and to which the junk belonged. He informs me that the destruction of the junk, which was not the property of the offending "braves" was known throughout the district, and both the Chinese authorities and Roman Catholic Missionaries attributed the hostile feeling of its inhabitants towards foreigners, to the burning of the junk, and to the subsequent disappearance of two of the "braves," who were alleged to have been burned on board of her. There is no truth in the latter report, but unless the men, who no doubt deserted, were to re-appear, it is impossible to disabuse the people of their false impression.

This gentleman and his companion were assisted and protected by the authorities, but they incurred considerable personal risk from the animosity of the people. In the provinces of Hu-peh and on the frontier of Sze-chuen, the Chinese were friendly and obliging.

The Hoo-nan people are considered the most audacious and warlike race in China, and the steps necessarily taken at Hankow, in consequence of the assaults committed by "braves," and of their attempts to seize junks employed in carrying foreign merchandize, have no doubt had a share in producing a bad feeling amongst them; but the testimony I have quoted proves the necessity of proceeding with great caution in a place so far inland as Hankow, as it will be impossible to guarantee the safety of travellers in the interior, if the animosity of the people is roused by what they consider an act of unjust violence.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

No. 113.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received November 16.)

(Extract.)

Peking, September 9, 1863.

GENERAL BURGEVINE, finding on his arrival at Shanghae that the Governor of the province refused to comply with the instructions of the Peking Government, and reinstate him in the command of "Ward's force," determined on returning to Peking, to obtain a settlement of his claims on the Chinese Government.

The Governor immediately renewed, in the most offensive form, the charges by which he had originally attempted to justify his dismissal, and dispatched, at the same time, the ex-superintendent of trade, and Governor Sieh, to support his views. This man, who has been long known for his intriguing character and retrograde views, was appointed a member of the Board of Foreign Affairs. Up to the date of his arrival at Peking, the language of his Excellency Wensiang to the American Minister, had been such as to lead me to hope that the charges of the Governor would be abandoned, that Burgevine's pecuniary claims would be fairly settled, and that my suggestion to find him employment at Tientsin, or some other place in China, would be adopted.

The bad influence of Sieh's presence soon made itself felt. The charges which had been abandoned, as untenable, were again brought forward, and Burgevine, despairing of justice, left for Shanghae. It was only after his departure, and by representations of the strongest character, that the Minister of the United States, induced the Government to

* See "Papers relating to the Rebellion in China," presented to Parliament in March, 1863, No. 43

withdraw these charges. But no employment was offered to him, and Burgevine entirely failed at Shanghai in obtaining payment of the sums due as pay, and for articles supplied for the use of the corps on his personal responsibility. Stung by this treatment, suffering in health from severe wounds received in the Imperial service, and ruined in his prospects, he, with a band of desperadoes of all nations, has joined the insurgents. A man who would have been a useful friend, has been thus converted into a dangerous enemy, and this result is due entirely to the injustice and perversity of the local authorities at Shanghai, to the weakness of the Central Government in allowing its orders to be disobeyed, and to that false confidence inspired in them by Major Gordon's successes, which led them to disregard suggestions which would have enabled them to remove Burgevine from the command at Shanghai, without driving him to take his last desperate step.

Until this event happened, the Imperialists had been steadily gaining ground. Shih Ta-kai, the ablest of the Taeping leaders, had been captured, and his corps broken up in Sze-chuen. The river defences of Nanking had been carried by storm, and the Chinese forces from Shanghai had driven successively the insurgents from all the positions they occupied between Shanghai and Soochow. Though a few of the bad characters of the coast were in the insurgent ranks, there was no leader of repute among them, and the field open in China to the more dangerous class of filibusters was being gradually narrowed by the substitution in "Ward's Corps" of a more reliable class as vacancies occurred.

I cannot form an opinion as to the influence Burgevine may acquire among the Taipings, or the success which may attend his efforts to organize them. The first effect has been to reduce Major Gordon and the Chinese troops to the defensive, and to put an end to his hopes of the speedy capture of Soochow, which would have given effectual security to Shanghai. I do not know what may be Burgevine's plan of operations, but I see there is a feeling at Shanghai that he will endeavour to organize an expedition and strike a blow at Peking. He could count on the support of the brigands in Shantung and Gan-hwuy, and success at Peking would certainly overthrow the present dynasty, whether it led to the establishment of the Taipings or not.

It is to be regretted that the question was looked upon at Shanghai as one to be decided by the relative qualifications for command of Major Gordon and Burgevine. Of the former officer I have always entertained the highest opinion, but I fear even his abilities will not compensate for the injury done to the Imperialist cause by the accession of Burgevine, &c., to the insurgent ranks, and I must further observe that the encouragement given to the Governor, in thwarting an arrangement suggested by the foreign ministers and recommended by the Central Government, tends to weaken the central executive, which it is our true policy to strengthen, and thereby to render more difficult the restoration of tranquillity, and less effectual our means of enforcing the observance of Treaties by remonstrance at Peking, instead of by violent action at the ports.

No. 114.

Major-General Crofton to Mr. Hammond.—(Received November 17.)

Sir,

War Office, November 17, 1863.

I HAVE laid before the Secretary of State for War your letter of the 9th instant, in which you state that Earl Russell is of opinion that it is advisable to sanction Major-General Brown's proposal to allow British officers on full pay to serve with the force under the command of Major Gordon, during the present critical state of affairs.

In reply, I am to request that you will call the attention of his Lordship to the enclosed copy of a despatch which was received from Major-General Brown by the last mail, from which it appears that he was about to send a detachment of 200 Beloochees to Quang-san to the support of Major Gordon. Earl de Grey is of opinion that this measure will accomplish in a more effectual manner the objects with which Major-General Brown proposed to allow officers on full pay to take service with the Chinese force; his Lordship considers it, therefore, advisable to sanction the proceeding, instructing Major-General Brown at the same time to adhere to the orders hitherto in force for regulating the terms on which British officers are allowed to take service under the Chinese Government.

Earl de Grey will, however, desire Major-General Brown to afford every facility to officers who are willing to go on half-pay to join the force under Major Gordon.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. CROFTON.

Inclosure in No. 114.

Major-General Brown to Earl de Grey and Ripon.

My Lord,

Head-Quarters, Shanghai, September 14, 1863.

HAVING in my despatch by the last mail brought to your notice the critical position of Major Gordon in command of the Chinese disciplined forces, owing to the movement of Burgevine, I have now the honour to state for your information, that I have visited Major Gordon's head-quarters at Quang-san, and inspected his small garrison, and found them to be in a very efficient state; and in company with Major Gordon I afterwards proceeded to visit the stockade, of the Chinese General "Ching," posted about a mile and a-half from, and facing the east front of Soochow, where Burgevine is now making his stand with the rebels. Soochow is a very large walled city, 12 miles in circumference, and will no doubt be stoutly defended, and taking into account the host of rebels inside, and the number of followers known to be with Burgevine, I consider it would be rash in the extreme for Major Gordon to hazard an attack with his present small garrison, unsupported by Europeans, to lead an assault; for however well disciplined his Chinese may be, still they must always be led by Europeans to storm a breach, and in the present uncertainty of the course about to be pursued by the naval force under Commodore Sherard Osborne, who has proceeded to Peking in order to have power conferred upon him to act in suppressing the rebellion. I have counselled Major Gordon to remain strictly on the defensive, and likewise the Chinese General "Ching," who has a fine body of men under his command, and his position I think well selected to hold out against any attack until support could be rendered him by Major Gordon. The position of that officer, however, requires my greatest consideration, from the small force to defend his garrison, and the great responsibility of a large park of artillery and munition of war in his possession, and from certain reliable information which I have obtained, Burgevine calculates upon this very weakness of Major Gordon to move out against him in force, deeming my instructions so binding that I could not venture out to his support, and in time might be able to subdue the garrison, and then to move on to Shanghai. To meet such a crisis, and to relieve Major Gordon from any immediate danger, I have resolved to strengthen him at once, and to detach for that purpose 200 men of the 2nd Belooch Battalion to garrison Quang-san, but not to move out, confining them simply to the defence of the city; moreover, so important do I consider Quang-san, in a strategical point of view, with a lofty hill rising to the very centre of the city, and commanding an uninterrupted view of thirty miles of country round, that it must, in my opinion, be held at all risks, as the greatest safety to Shanghai, and if supported by a moveable column at Taitsan, no body of rebels could move from Soochow in any direction, without being discovered.

I venture, therefore, to hope that this course which I have adopted will be approved of, and the very circumstance of Burgevine and a number of followers having taken part with the rebels, will warrant me in departing from my instructions.

I have to add, for your Lordship's information, that I proceed to-morrow to Peking, to have an interview with Sir Frederick Bruce relative to Major Gordon's force and his position with the Futai, which I consider most unsatisfactory, and cannot any longer be tolerated, when no reliance whatever can be placed in the Chinese authorities; and if the force under Major Gordon is to become effective as a Chinese army, it must not be subject to any local authority, but be brought under the Imperial Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. G. BROWN.

No. 115.

Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 19, 1863.

I HAVE to acquaint you that I concur in the views expressed in your despatch of the 8th of September last, with regard to the necessity of proceeding with caution in the adoption of coercive measures at inland places in China.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 116.

Mr. Hammond to Major-General Crofton.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 25, 1863.

I HAVE laid before Earl Russell your letter of the 17th instant, inclosing a copy of a report from Major-General Brown, stating the circumstances under which he had ordered a detachment of Belooches to garrison Quang-san in support of Major Gordon; and I am, in reply, to request that you will state to Earl de Grey and Ripon that Lord Russell concurs with him in thinking that this measure will be more effective and less objectionable than permitting British officers on full pay to join Major Gordon's force as previously proposed, and his Lordship, therefore, is of opinion that the course taken by Major-General Brown in this emergency should be approved, but that he should be, at the same time, instructed not to depart from the rule prohibiting British troops from serving beyond the thirty mile radius, except under circumstances of similar exigency.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 117.

Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 25, 1863.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 10th instant, I transmit to you herewith for your information copies of a further correspondence with the War Office* relative to the employment of British officers on full pay and British troops at places beyond the radius of thirty miles from the Treaty ports.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 118.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received December 14.)

My Lord,

Peking, September 17, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copies of a correspondence with His Imperial Highness the Prince of Kung, arising out of a complaint made by Mr. Vice-Consul Hughes, of the disorderly conduct of the "braves" at Kiukiang, when landed there to join the army of Tseng-Kwo-fan.

I have instructed Mr. Hughes to address his Excellency on the subject, as the most efficacious means of putting a stop to these proceedings, and I have authorized him, as I have every confidence in his discretion, to make use of force for the protection of the

* Nos. 114 and 116.

lives and property of foreigners at Kiukiang, should acts of violence be repeated, and should the Chinese authorities not carry into effect the suggestion contained in my letter, that these disorderly levies should not be allowed to disembark in the neighbourhood of foreign residences.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 118.



Sir F. Bruce to the Prince of Kung.

Sir, *Peking, September 3, 1863.*
I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Imperial Highness extract from a despatch from Mr. Hughes, Vice Consul at Kiukiang, on the conduct of the "braves" when passing through that place, and reporting on the unprovoked and murderous assaults on the Constable of the Consulate.

I have repeatedly urged your Imperial Highness to give orders that these troops, over whom their officers and the Chinese authorities seem to exercise little control, should not be allowed to land near the places where foreigners are settled. These men are ignorant of, or indifferent to, the existence of friendly relations between China and foreign powers, and the civil authorities are afraid of them, and, when appealed to, will afford no protection to foreigners against their excesses.

Under these circumstances, I am compelled to authorize the Consul to call in the aid of the naval authority, and to fire upon these men if they venture to attack unoffending foreigners.

If they treat us as enemies, and the Chinese officials do not protect us, your Imperial Highness must be aware that we shall mete out to them the same measure as they offer to us.

It is perfectly in the power of the Chinese Government to prevent the necessity of these violent measures, by preventing these bands from coming near the foreign quarter, and if it does not adopt my suggestion, it will be responsible for the consequences.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 118.

The Prince of Kung to Sir F. Bruce.

(Translation.) *September 7, 1863.*

THE Prince of Kung makes a communication in reply.

His Highness has received the British Minister's despatch of the 4th instant, relative to a complaint from the Consul at Kiukiang, to the effect that during the 5th moon, while the Hoonan braves belonging to General Chiang's division, were passing through Kiukiang, they made an unprovoked and wanton attack upon the Constable belonging to the Consulate, &c.

The Prince being convinced that the friendly relations existing between China and foreign nations demand that neither side be exposed to injury or insult, has directed his Excellency Shên, Governor of Kiangsi, to issue strict instructions to the officers within his own jurisdiction, and to those in command of troops passing through his territory, in future to exercise proper control over their soldiers, and prevent them from creating disturbances in places inhabited by foreigners.

A necessary communication.

No. 119.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell. — (Received December 18.)

My Lord,

Peking, September 18, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copies of a correspondence with his Imperial Highness the Prince of Kung, respecting a complaint made by Mr. Consul Caine, that the authorities at Swatow objected to sign passports in which the words "for purposes of trade" are inserted. The effect being to prevent the bearers buying produce in the interior.

The Prince's reply confounds the IXth Article of the Treaty with the VIIth Article of the Regulations of Trade, which provides for the payment of transit-duties on goods carried up country for sale. This I have pointed out.

The objection made to the insertion of the words referred to arises from a fear that persons armed with a passport in these terms will, by virtue of it, carry goods for sale without taking out a transit-duty certificate.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 119.

Sir F. Bruce to the Prince of Kung.

Sir,

Peking, September 10, 1863.

IN my despatch of June 16, 1863, I mentioned to your Imperial Highness that the Chinese authorities at Swatow refused to insert the words "for purposes of trade" in passports issued to British subjects.

I need not point out that this is a distinct breach of Treaty, and that I am entitled to expect that your Imperial Highness will without delay give such orders as will put a stop to this abuse. Your Imperial Highness is too enlightened not to perceive that serious complications will arise if the local authorities are permitted to violate Treaty stipulations with impunity.

I shall write to Mr. Caine, the Consul at Swatow, that he is to grant passports in the terms of the Treaty, and that British subjects may proceed with them into the interior, whether the Chinese authority signs them or not, and that the Chinese Government will be held responsible should any difficulty or obstacle be thrown in their way.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 119.

The Prince of Kung to Sir F. Bruce.

(Translation.)

September 12, 1863.

THE Prince of Kung makes a communication in reply.

The Prince has the honour to reply to the British Minister's despatch (of the 10th instant), in which his Excellency states that the Chinese authorities at Swatow had refused to insert the words "for purposes of trade" in passports issued to British subjects, and that, as the Treaty distinctly provides for the insertion of these words, his Excellency expects that immediate steps be taken to put a stop to this abuse, &c.

The Prince finds it laid down in the VIIth Article of the Rules appended to the Tariff, that, in the case of imports, notice being given at the port of entry from which the imports are to be forwarded, inland, of the nature and quantity of the goods, the ship from which they have been landed, and the place inland to which they are bound, the Collector of Customs will, on due inspection made, and on receipt of the transit duty due, issue a transit duty certificate; this must be produced at every barrier and visé. In the case of exports, when produce has been purchased by a British merchant in the interior, a memorandum showing the amount of the produce, and the port at which it is to be shipped, must be deposited at the first barrier, a certificate will then be issued to him; on arrival, at the last barrier, notice must be given to the Customs at the port, and the transit dues thereon having been paid, the produce will be passed. Any attempts to pass goods inwards or outwards, otherwise than in compliance with the rule laid down, or any attempt to effect illegal sales by the way, will be punishable by confiscation.

The way, therefore, in which these certificates (or passports) are to be issued, must be one in accordance with the distinct provisions of the Treaty, and it is against all reason that a Chinese officer should refuse to issue a certificate (or passport) to a British merchant applying for it in the way laid down in the Regulation.

The Prince shall at once instruct the Governor-General of the Two Kwang to issue orders to the Swatow Customs and to the local authorities, to act in accordance with Treaty regulations in the issue (of passports); and that there must be no violation of the VIIth Article of the Regulations, when a British merchant applies for a passport. Should the Chinese officials persist in not issuing (these passports), it will be the Prince's duty to denounce their conduct to the throne, that they may be punished.

The British Minister on his part ought to notify to British subjects applying for passports "for purposes of trade" in the interior to a Chinese officer; that a list of all the goods going up country should be noted in the (transit) duty certificate issued by the Collector of Customs; and that in the event of their going inland to purchase goods, the place for which they are bound, and the port at which they intend to ship the goods, also the fact that they must not make illegal sales by the way, on penalty of confiscation, ought to be noted in so many words in their passport.

Thus all disputes will be in future avoided (by) the foregoing, which is a plan of action in accordance with treaty regulations, &c., &c.

A necessary communication addressed to Sir F. Bruce, K.C.B., &c., &c.

Tung-Chih, 2nd year, 7th month, 30th day (September 12th, 1863).

Inclosure 3 in No. 119.

Sir F. Bruce to the Prince of Kung.

Sir,

Peking, September 18, 1863.

I HAVE received your Imperial Highness's reply on the subject of the refusal of the authorities at Swatow to issue passports according to treaty to persons desiring to proceed to the interior for "the purposes of trade."

Care must be taken not to confuse the IXth Article of the Treaty, which provides for the issue of passports, with the VIIth Article of the Regulations for Trade, which provides for a totally different object, viz., the payment of transit duties.

By virtue of the IXth Article of the Treaty, a British subject is entitled to obtain a passport for "purposes of trade." If he is going to take goods into the interior, he must give notice to the Custom house, with a description of the goods, and, having paid transit duty, he obtains a certificate to that effect.

But it may happen that he is not going to take goods for sale into the interior; but that he wants a passport to go into the interior, and purchase produce. In that case he is entitled to have "for purposes of trade" inserted in the passport, to prevent him from being molested in his operations; but he does not apply for a transit certificate. After buying the produce, he has to report it at the first barrier, where he has to receive the certificate.

If a British subject takes goods into the interior without a certificate, or if he attempts to bring produce past the nearest barrier without obtaining a certificate, he exposes his property to confiscation.

But the local authority is bound to sign a passport with the words "for purposes of trade" inserted in it, and if he refuses the Government will render itself responsible for the loss the merchant will incur in consequence of the refusal.

I must request your Imperial Highness to inform me distinctly whether fresh orders have been issued to the local authorities directing them to sign passports with the words "for purposes of trade" inserted in them; for the Swatow officials based their refusal on instructions received from the Foreign Board at Peking, and they stated to the Consul that they could not comply with the Treaty until these orders were revoked by your Imperial Highness.

I renew, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received December 14.)

(Extract.)

Peking, October 13, 1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL BROWN arrived here early this month to consult with me on the state of affairs at Shanghai. He furnished me with a copy of a letter from Major Gordon, expressing his desire to give up the command of the Chinese troops, and giving it as his opinion that the force, as at present constituted, is likely to prove a source of danger and embarrassment in future. Major Gordon ends by recommending that the plan initiated last year at Tientsin should be adhered to, and that, instead of collecting Chinese soldiers under foreign officers, assistance should be rendered to the Government in drilling Chinese officers as well as men, so as to dispense with foreign officers in the field.

My despatches written in the early part of 1862, and those I have sent since the intrigues against Burgevine led to his dismissal, will show my entire concurrence in Major Gordon's views. It was reluctantly, and in deference to the military and naval authorities, that I consented to our assuming the responsibility of defending the thirty miles radius round Shanghai, and I spared no effort to bring about an arrangement of Burgevine's dispute, so as to avoid the necessity of having to place an English officer at the head of the force destined to operate beyond the radius against Soochow. My views as to the course to be pursued in China, remain unaltered, and, indeed, are confirmed. If the disorder in this country were confined to the districts in which the Taeping insurgents are in arms, and if their defeat would restore tranquillity, it might be argued that any course of proceeding, likely to attain that end, would be sufficient, and that it would not be of much importance whether the Government reformed its military system or not. But such, unfortunately, is not the case. The Taeping insurrection has its root in, and derives its force from, the anarchical elements existing in many of the provinces, which the Chinese Government, owing to its defective military organisation, is unable to put down, and there is no ground for anticipating permanent improvement so long as that organisation is not improved. To effect this it is necessary that the central Government should form an Imperial force under its orders, which should be available in all parts of the country, and that it should not rely, as it has hitherto done, on the local militia of each province, which acts independently under its own provincial authority. In no other way does it appear to me that the empire can exist in its present form.

No doubt the employment of foreign officers to lead the Chinese troops in the field would produce the most speedy results. But this course is attended with serious political embarrassments. If the officers are English the jealousies of other foreign powers are excited. The Chinese are urged to place men under other foreign officers to guard against the dangers which may arise should this force become a tool in our hands. A spirit of jealousy is thus fomented among the different nationalities in this country, which may seriously embarrass the friendly relations among foreign Powers, and which may be turned to good account by the Chinese in resisting legitimate demands under Treaties.

On the other hand the employment of adventurers has led to a bad state of things at Shanghai, and eventually has become a means of recruiting the Taeping force, and of introducing a vagabond foreign element into the centre of China. The extravagant monthly sums paid to these men by the local authorities has led to an influx of adventurers from all parts of the world, to desertion of sailors from ships. These men are in quest of a livelihood, and when they find that the Chinese authorities decline to employ them they are easily seduced to join the ranks of the insurgents. It is very difficult to prevent this, for the Taipings have foreign agents in Shanghai, and the ex-territorial jurisdiction to which alone foreigners are subject, deprives the Chinese Government of the power it would otherwise exercise of putting a stop to this abuse of the Treaty-right of foreigners to reside at the open ports.

The formation by local authorities of troops under foreign officers has rendered far more difficult the task of those who sought to persuade the Prince and his advisers of the necessity of creating an Imperial military and naval force. The provincial high officers are averse to schemes, one effect of which will be to subject them more completely to the Imperial will; and the Peking Government shrinks from the responsibility which would be entailed upon it were the armed force Imperial and not provincial. The former from ambition and cupidity, the latter from timidity and dread of innovation, are in favour of any expedient which will relieve them from the necessity of military re-organisation, and it will, at the same time, place European science and energy at the disposal of a Governor.

General. They do not perceive, perhaps, fully the future dangers of such a course, or they trust to accidents and intrigue to provide the means of averting them. The successes of the forces commanded by English and French officers at Shanghai and Ningpo, have thus impeded rather than furthered the cause of improvement. Had these officers been aware of the treatment they would receive from the local officials, and of the intrigues to which they would be exposed, they would not have accepted a position so inconsistent with what is due to their self-respect. No officer could enter with a stronger desire to act with, and to serve the Chinese authorities than Major Gordon, and his equal temper, tact, and ability qualify him admirably for the task he undertook. But the ignorance, jealousy, and arrogance of the Chinese Governor have proved too much, even for him, and had it not been for his regard for the general interest, he would long ere this have thrown up the command.

My colleagues entertain the same opinion as I do of the risk incurred by the collection of these bands of adventurers, and of the impossibility of a foreign officer serving except under a commission issued by the Central Government; and I trust that, by our efforts, we may succeed in establishing a better system for the future, as far as the subjects of the leading Treaty Powers are concerned.

Inclosure in No. 120.

Sir F. Bruce to Major-General Brown.

Sir,

Peking, October 6, 1863.

WITH reference to the part to be taken by Her Majesty's troops stationed at Shanghai, in the military operations in that neighbourhood, I think it advisable to specify in writing the limits prescribed to it by the instructions and policy of Her Majesty's Government.

It is not our business to put down the Taeping insurrection, or to make war on the Taepings. Our exclusive business at Shanghai is to protect the port and the thirty-mile radius round it; and this we do, not from affection for the Chinese Government, but because we are afraid of great prejudice to our interests were the disorderly Taeping hordes to seize Shanghai.

We are in so far friendly to the existing Government that we are ready to assist them in organising a proper military and naval force for the restoration of tranquility; and for this purpose the Order in Council was framed. But if officers go into the Chinese service, we are not entitled to facilitate their operations by moving men, or placing garrisons in towns beyond the radius for their support, further than we should be if the corps assisted were commanded by a Chinese general. We are not entitled to lend them artillery, or men to work the guns, on any pretext. And I feel assured that Her Majesty's Government would have the greatest difficulty in supporting an officer who placed his troops in a position which led to a collision with the Taepings beyond the radius.

The situation of Europe is very critical; and unless the Chinese Government shows itself disposed to take up military re-organisation vigorously, and to treat with confidence and in a proper manner, the foreign officials it employs, I feel certain that the disposition of Her Majesty's Government to keep clear of complications in China will increase; and, in point of policy, the most effectual means of assisting the Chinese is to throw them entirely on their own resources. If they want guns, ammunition, &c., let them buy them; and if they do not support their foreign officers, let these officers resign at once. No good can result from Major Gordon's submitting to improper treatment, and putting up with lukewarm support.

I am, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

No. 121.

Acting Consul Markham to Earl Russell.—(Received December 18.)

My Lord, *Shanghai, October 24, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, copy of my despatch of the 16th instant to Sir F. W. A. Bruce, with its inclosure.

Since the date of the inclosed despatch, Burgevine, with some of his followers, has been given up by the rebel chiefs to Major Gordon, and arrived in Shanghai on the 20th instant.

I regret to say that unavoidable accidents prevented the terms agreed upon with Major Gordon for his surrender from being fully carried out, as the rebel chiefs, by voluntarily sending Burgevine, with demonstrations of respect, to Major Gordon's lines, have deprived his surrender of that character of signal abandonment of their cause which had previously been professed by Burgevine himself.

The report of Mr. Interpreter Mayers, alluded to in my despatch of the 16th instant to Sir F. W. A. Bruce, shall be forwarded by the ensuing mail.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM.

Inclosure 1 in No. 121.

Acting Consul Markham to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir, Shanghai, October 16, 1863.

I HAVE to report to you changes of an unexpected and striking character in the position of the foreigners who recently allied themselves with the rebels at Soochow. There is at present time only to furnish a brief outline of late events; but it will be my duty to forward by the earliest opportunity full details upon this important subject.

On the 28th September Major Gordon most successfully captured, with his Chinese force, the stockades occupied by the rebels on the Grand Canal, at the important junction known as Paotai Chiao, from the bridge of fifty-three arches existing there, and distant about 2,500 yards from the south-east angle of Soochow. This proximity to the city led to an amicable meeting on October 1st between the commander of one of Major Gordon's steamers and an American named Jones, Burgevine's principal adherent, who commanded the steamer "Kajow," which was captured and carried off to Soochow on the 2nd of August last. This meeting having led to others, and to interviews with Major Gordon, Burgevine and his followers, already alive to the failure of their hopes in the rebel service, resolved upon making terms, with a view to surrender. Major Gordon having hereupon requested my assistance in obtaining from his Excellency the Imperial Commissioner Li, and from the French and United States Consuls, assurances of amnesty for past proceedings, and having further requested the co-operation of Mr. Interpreter Mayers in bringing this matter to an issue, I allowed Mr. Mayers to proceed to Paotai Chiao, and authorized him to render such assurances as might be borne out by the tenour of a communication which I received from his Excellency the Imperial Commissioner on this subject. Mr. Mayers' report of the events which occurred between his arrival on the 7th and his return to Shanghai this day, will be forwarded without delay; and I am happy now to be able to inform you that twenty-six men and eight of the leaders of the foreign force were taken yesterday morning by Major Gordon from beneath the walls of Soochow, under a heavy fire from the rebels. Distrust on the part of the rebel leaders having been awakened, however, Burgevine and from forty to fifty others were detained on the preceding day within the walls, Burgevine himself being carried off a prisoner whilst in the act of making his way to a position on the outside, and the fate of this party is as yet unascertained. Certain of the leaders in this affair, who accompanied Mr. Mayers to Shanghai, and arrived here this morning, have prepared voluntary statements of their experience at Soochow, copies of which will be forwarded; and in the meantime a succinct account of the late proceedings has been furnished to a local paper, as all who effected their escape are equally desirous to testify as speedily as possible to the facts of their late history. A copy of this is inclosed.

The majority of the men recovered yesterday have, as I learn, volunteered to remain with Major Gordon, by far the greatest part having been originally taken to Soochow under the pretext of being engaged for positions in the Imperial service. Conjointly with the United States Consul I have resolved to offer no objection to this course on the part of our respective nationals.

At present I can only add, in continuation of the inclosed printed account, that information has just reached me of important successes obtained by the Imperial forces, who were attacked on the 12th instant by the army of the Chung Wang, supported by the "Kajow" steamer and the foreign force. The "Kajow" having been sunk early in the day by an explosion, after which the Europeans were ordered back to Soochow, the Imperial troops advanced, captured the wreck of the "Kajow," and her ammunition, and are said, after routing the Chung Wang's force, to have pursued him almost to the gates of Soochow. It is added that a very large number of rebels were slaughtered, together with several leaders of

note.

The defection of the foreign force cannot fail to produce a striking moral effect upon the

defenders of Soochow, and must undoubtedly prove such a warning as will suffice to deter Europeans for the future from engaging in an enterprise so hopeless as that of Burgevine and his followers. At the same time it is evident that a very determined struggle must be expected before the recapture of Soochow can be effected by the Imperial Government. With regard to Major Gordon's position, I shall be enabled shortly to address you more fully.

In Mr. Mayers' absence, I derived much assistance from Mr. Davenport, in the Interpreter's department.

Respectfully, &c.
(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM.

Inclosure 2 in No. 121.

Newspaper Extract.

LATEST FROM BEFORE SOOCHOW.—The following is a succinct account of the recent important occurrences in the neighbourhood of Soochow, which have resulted in the abandonment of the rebel service by the greater number of the foreigners who were engaged therein.

The Chinese force under General Gordon having assumed the offensive towards the end of September, the rebel stockades at Pa-ta-chow, on the Grand Canal, distant about 2,800 yards from south-east angle of Soochow, were taken on the 28th of that month.

This cut off all communication on the south-east of the city, whilst the stockades held by General Ching on the east barred the road to Quinsan. The greater part, indeed, the whole of Gordon's force, except a few detachments, have been stationed since the capture at Pa-ta-chow, and on 1st October, Captain Jones, the leading spirit of the Burgevine movement, communicated with Captain Davidson, of the "Hyson," actuated simply by a wish to renew an old acquaintance, and without any idea at the time of abandoning the rebel connection so soon. He, however, in connection with Burgevine, and all the foreign heads of the contingent, had many reasons to feel that their hopes were not likely to be realised, and that they were far less appreciated by the rebels than they had at first expected to find themselves, whilst their failure to obtain supplies of arms had brought them into distrust. The frank and straightforward manner of General Gordon eventually led the principal men to conceive the advisability of seizing an opportunity of withdrawing from what they saw was a hopeless cause, especially when they found to what an extent General Gordon was prepared to exert himself on their behalf. Several interviews took place, and it was at length arranged that on Friday, the 9th instant, the "Kajow," with the foreigners, and the gunboats which accompanied the steamer, should be brought out to meet a feint on the part of Gordon's force, and thus remove under cover of Gordon's two steamers to a place of safety. This plan would have been carried out, but for the unfortunate movement of the Imperial General Ching, who advanced on the north side of the city, and took some small stockades. The "Kajow" and Europeans were ordered up to attack Ching by the Chung Wang, and would have undoubtedly destroyed his force, had it not been for an obstruction which prevented the "Kajow" passing through the creek. Gordon's feint was made, and drew out a large force of Chang-maos on the south front, but of course was attended with no results. In the meantime, on the 10th October, the "Kajow" was ordered to follow the Chung Wang to a distance of about twenty miles, to attack the Imperialists in their stockades protecting the city of Chang-shu. The attack was made, and on the 12th, during its progress, the magazine of the "Kajow" exploded, blowing the gun overboard. The vessel sank in shoal water. The Europeans experienced some slight casualties, and were transferred to gunboats, one of which was blown up by carelessness, and fifteen foreigners were killed. In the course of this day an altercation took place between Burgevine and Jones, in consequence of the latter informing his chief that remarks had been made by both officers and men as to the state he appeared to be in. Burgevine fired his small revolver at Jones, and the bullet is now lodged below the left eye. The whole of the foreign party were shortly afterwards ordered back to Soochow by Chung Wang. On arriving at Soochow late at night, two of the officers proceeded by Burgevine's order to make arrangements for the delivering up of the foreign force, and a plan was decided upon with General Gordon, which was to be put into effect the following day, or the next morning, and by which it was hoped that every foreigner within Soochow would be enabled to reach the Imperial lines. On the following day, however, it was evident that the suspicions of the rebel leaders were aroused: egress from the city was forbidden to all foreigners, and it was thus impossible to remove to the south-east angle the sick, wounded, and others, who were within the walls. Burgevine and Morton succeeded in forcing their way through the east gate, and passed outside the wall towards the camp, where a portion of the force was stationed. On reaching this point, however, the Mo-Wang (the chief in charge of Soochow), under whose especial order the whole force had hitherto been, was met with his body-guard of 200 men, and Burgevine and Morton were compelled to return to the east gate. On approaching this point, Burgevine, in a way calculated to compromise his own safety, asked Mo-Wang whether he was about to be beheaded. The reply was merely an order to move on; no further intelligence has since been received of Burgevine. Morton contrived to obtain leave to return to the camp, under pretext of bringing up the remaining Europeans to the city. An anxious consultation amongst the few officers outside here took place, and being unwilling to abandon their comrades within the walls, as also uncertain of the possibility of availing themselves of the shelter promised by a second false attack arranged by Gordon on the following morning, they resolved on the desperate course of re-entering the city the next day, and of attempting to seize a silk steamer at Nanzing; thus, perhaps (should their lives not be sacrificed at the moment of their re-entry), regaining the confidence of the rebels, and securing a means of escape.

At daybreak on the morning of the 15th a rocket was fired from Gordon's lines, and his infantry, led by himself, advanced on either bank of the Grand Canal, to within a very short distance of the city walls; the "Hyson" and "Firefly" likewise approached the city. A heavy fire was opened from the rebel gunboats, but the foreigners still hesitated to advance, and were prepared to adhere to their plan of re-entering the city, when a further advance of the steamers was noticed, and they resolved to seize an opportunity which might never recur. A rebel boat containing one wounded man was made to drop down the canal, favoured by a strong north wind, and passed unnoticed in the confusion, whilst the small force was brought down in skirmishing order, as if to attack the steamers until cover was reached. They then retired into the Imperial stockades, to the number of twenty-six men, and seven officers; about fifty men and officers remained still within the walls, and their fate has as yet to be ascertained. The condition in which all these men were was pitiable in the extreme, and all testified great joy and gratitude on finding themselves within General Gordon's lines.

The majority of the men were seamen, who had been taken to Soochow from Shanghai, with very little idea as to their ultimate destination. Nearly all of these men volunteered to remain with General Gordon, whose straightforward conduct was the principal means of obtaining their security. A few of the remainder returned to Shanghai in the steamer "Firefly," and arrived here yesterday morning at 2 A.M.

One of the men who had been ailing for some days died very suddenly on board, just as the steamer was leaving Pa-ta-chow; the cause was supposed to be heart disease, accelerated by the previous excitement of the morning. We understand that previously to Burgevine's arrival at Soochow, about twelve Europeans only were attached to the Mo Wang in that city. Few, if any more than 100 men, are reported to have formed the Burgevine force; of these at least one-third had died of wounds and disease, and the remainder are disposed of as above detailed.

In the early part of his stay at Soochow, Burgevine proceeded to Nanking, and endeavoured to obtain from the Chung Wang a guarantee as to the position of his force and independent powers for action in the field; the promises made him at the time were never, however, realised; a mere pittance was paid to the men, whilst the officers received almost nothing. Personally, we understand, they were well treated and provided for; but it was evident from the very first that neither officer nor man would be allowed to leave should he wish to do so. They thus felt themselves in the power of men over whom no pressure from without could be brought to bear. With regard to the operations which have taken place between the capture of Pa-ta-chow on 28th ultimo, and the sortie of this party of foreigners from Soochow on the 13th, they may be summed up as follows:—

On the 9th instant, as previously mentioned, General Ching, with his usual rash courage and impetuosity, advanced on the north side of the city, and thus delayed the successful issue of the "Kajow" enterprise.

Gordon, occupying his central position at Pa-ta-chow end, whilst making his feints against the south front of the city, was preparing an attack on an important position of the rebels in another direction.

On Monday the 12th instant, it was determined that this attack should take place on the following morning, but late at night intelligence arrived of an advance by a large body of rebels from the south (Ka-shing-fu and Hu-chow-fu), who were threatening the city of Woking, which lies about twelve miles south of Pa-ta-chow, and was recaptured by Gordon from the rebels in July last. The direction of the expedition was in consequence instantly changed, and at midnight a force of about 500 men, with some artillery in gunboats (steamers being unable to act in that direction) moved down the Grand Canal. At daybreak next morning they passed the Imperial stockades outside Wokong, to the astonishment and delight of the garrison, who had experienced a severe defeat on the previous day.

The rebels, whose main force numbered from 20,000 to 30,000 men, were entrenched in an exceedingly powerful position in two stockades commanding the meeting of three branches of the canal. A flank movement was impossible, and they were boldly attacked on the front. A most severe and hardly contested action ensued—although displaying more courage than is usually accorded them by foreigners—the small force under Gordon could with difficulty sustain the heavy fire of the 6,000 or 7,000 rebels by whom the stockades were held, and who were three times reinforced. It was only when the gunboats were pushed within a few yards of the stockades that the rebels were finally driven out. They were pursued for five or six miles, and enormous slaughter might have resulted had the steamers been in action; their loss as it is upwards of 200 killed, wounded not known. On Gordon's side the casualties were exceedingly slight, his loss being but three killed and thirty wounded. The action lasted three hours, and the city of Wokong being effectually relieved, the expedition was brought back the same night to Pa-ta-chow. On the 14th, Imperial General Ching attempted unsuccessfully to capture a strongly fortified stockade a short distance from his own advanced lines. He went into action personally with a considerable force of his own men, some of the Franco-Chinese force attached to him, and the Soongkong Artillery, together with his own. The fire of his 18-pounders and field guns is said to have been very destructive; but an attempted advance of the Franco-Chinese was completely checked, and the endeavour to seize the stockade was necessarily abandoned with considerable loss. Upwards of 100 of his men were wounded, and Captain Bailey, in charge of his artillery, received a bullet-wound in the arm. The loss of the Franco-Chinese is not stated. At the latest date Ching had made no further advance. In addition to the Imperial force under this Commander a useful squadron of gunboats, to the number of about sixty, under Admiral Li, is co-operating in the pending movements, and maintains the safety of the water communication. The Admiral in command of this squadron is spoken of in high terms; together with his subordinate officers he has risen from the ranks, and gained great distinction in command of his present force at the capture of the forts opposite Nanking, on the 30th of June last. It is difficult to form a correct opinion as to the actual force of the garrison of Soochow. It is stated to amount to 65,000 fighting men, who form the army commanded by the Mo Wang; in addition to these the

Chang Wang, the immediate superior in rank of the Mo Wang, has brought down a land force from Nanking, and is ready to operate for the defence of the city. It was with a view of creating a diversion that he moved the other day in the direction of Chang-shu, but the loss of the "Kajow" and the defection of the foreigners will probably cause a change of plans.

No. 122.

Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 23, 1863.

I HAVE received your despatch of the 13th of October, explaining your reasons for thinking that, instead of collecting Chinese soldiers under foreign leaders, assistance should be rendered to the Imperial Government in drilling Chinese officers, as well as men, and I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government concur with you in thinking that, of the two modes of rendering assistance, the latter is the preferable one. But while the former method must be considered as exceptional and provisional, it would be unwise to put a stop to it prematurely. You will conclude, therefore, that the measures adopted must be continued for the present, and till Shanghai is free from all danger of capture; but as a permanent system, Her Majesty's Government would much prefer that the Imperial Government should be placed in a condition to defend its territories by means of Chinese officers and soldiers.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 123.

Acting Consul Markham to Earl Russell.—(Received January 19, 1864.)

My Lord,

Shanghai, November 7, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, copy of my despatch of October 27, 1863, addressed to Sir Frederick W. A. Bruce.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM.

Inclosure 1 in No. 123.

Acting Consul Markham to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Shanghai, October 27, 1863.

IN continuation of my despatch of the 16th instant, I forward herewith copy of the Report prepared by Mr. Interpreter Mayers, on his return from Major Gordon's head-quarters, giving an account of the occurrences in connection with the surrender of Burgevine's followers, and also copy of the statements made public, on successive occasions, by five of the leaders of this party, and by Burgevine himself, who has, since the date of my last despatch, returned to Shanghai. A supplementary statement by Mr. C. F. Jones, in contradiction of Burgevine's assertions, is also annexed.

I regret to say that, owing mainly to unavoidable accidents, the terms agreed upon between Burgevine and Major Gordon for the surrender of the former and his whole force have not been fully carried out. As already communicated, thirty-four foreigners escaped and surrendered themselves on the morning of the 15th instant, whilst Burgevine and some forty others were detained within the walls of Soochow; and a day or two subsequently, as I learn from Major Gordon, the latter adopted the course of addressing a letter to the rebel chief known as the Mo Wang, requesting that Burgevine, together with the wounded and other foreigners, might be given up to him. After some interchange of messages, it was notified to Major Gordon that the sick and wounded had been sent off on their way to Shanghai, via Nanking, and on the afternoon of the 19th, Burgevine was sent out to Major Gordon's lines, accompanied by ostentatious demonstrations of respect. The rebel chiefs seem dexterously to have availed themselves of this means of creating an impression in their own favour, Burgevine's surrender being made to appear as an act of friendship on their part, rather than as an abandonment by Burgevine of their cause. The latter

in his published statement has subsequently also taken the opportunity of revoking the reiterated assertions he made to Major Gordon, and his position is at present one which I fear is likely to cause some further trouble, though the influence he at one time enjoyed among a certain class of the American population of this place has undoubtedly been greatly weakened by his failure at Soochow, and the damaging revelations of his late associates. Owing to the amnesty originally obtained for himself and his party at the instance of Major Gordon, no proceedings for breach of the neutrality regulations have been instituted against him by his Consul, who, however, has reserved to himself the right of sending out of the country any American citizen who may have been connected with the rebel service; but I have received a despatch from the Imperial Commissioner Li, requesting me to use my influence with Mr. Seward, whom he has called upon to cause the immediate removal of Burgevine from China; alleging, with great justice, that his stay, if permitted, would undoubtedly prove a constant source of discord and danger. I believe, however, that the United States' Consul is in some measure doubtful of his power to remove Burgevine authoritatively.

Some twenty foreigners still remain at Soochow. Of these, one-half belong to the original party in the service of Mo-Wang, and include several French deserters, and the majority have undoubtedly reasons for preferring to stay with the rebels. The remainder are detained, I learn, to a considerable extent against their will, having been kept by Mo-Wang for the purpose of manning his heavy guns.

It is deeply to be lamented that Major Gordon, whose single-minded devotion, as well as his successes in the field, have entitled him to so much gratitude from the Chinese Government during the short period that has elapsed since he was permitted to take command of the disciplined force, should meet, on the contrary, with the obstacles alluded to in Mr. Mayers' Report, in the shape of the obstinacy and suspicion of the Imperial Commanders with whose combined movements his own in a measure must necessarily be connected. I see no hope, however, for a permanent removal of this ingrained distrust and jealousy, although I learn that during the last few days, owing probably to the representations made to the Imperial Commissioner, Major Gordon has experienced more satisfactory conduct on the part of his colleagues.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. MARKHAM.

Inclosure 2 in No. 123.

Mr. Mayers to Acting Consul Markham.

Sir,

Shanghai, October 17, 1863.

HAVING proceeded to Soochow for the purpose of communicating to Major Gordon the amnesty offered by the Imperial Commissioner, at his request, to the foreigners willing to abandon the rebel service, and of temporarily assisting him in his communications, I have to report a summary of the events that have occurred within my notice.

On reaching Major Gordon's position at the stockades of Pao-tai-chiao, on the Grand Canal, some 2,800 yards from the south-east angle of Soochow, on the 8th instant, I found that further communications, in addition to those announced in Major Gordon's letters of the 2nd instant, had passed with Burgevine and Jones, the two principal leaders, and upon my being able to give the assurance that all ulterior measures would be renounced by the Futai, as also that, on your own part and that of the United States Consul, the arrangements made by Major Gordon would, without doubt, be respected, there seemed every reason to hope that the surrender of the whole foreign force, together with the steamer "Kajow," would be effected immediately under cover of a false attack on the rebels to be made by Gordon's force.

The position of affairs at this moment may be shortly described as follows:—Major Gordon's position on the Grand Canal at Pao-tai-chiao, which he captured on the 28th of September, completely cut off the rebels from water-communication on the south-east, whilst it afforded a base of operation along the whole of the south and east fronts of the city. The communication eastward, in the direction of Kwen-shan (Quang-san) and Tai-tsang, was barred by the Imperial General Ching, who, with a force of about 10,000 excellent troops, occupied a chain of strongly fortified earthworks (stockades) stretching in a line, at a distance from the city-wall of about 1,600 yards, from the east gate towards

the north-east angle. The north and west fronts of Soochow alone remained free from blockade; and whilst on the north communication remained open with Wu-seih and Nankin, on the west the passage was free, by the Tai-hu Lake, to Hu-chow, Kia-Hing, and Hangchow. The only Imperialist force, in addition to that of General Ching and the 3,000 drilled troops under Major Gordon, was a large squadron of Chinese gun-boats, lately arrived from the Yang-tze, commanded by Admiral Li, which were doing useful service in the vicinity of Pao-tai-chiao.

It is necessary that I should here remark upon the impetuosity and deafness to all counsel or remonstrance which characterise Ching, and have been, from the first, both serious obstacles to Major Gordon, and of frequent detriment to the Imperial cause.

On the night of the 8th instant, an interview took place between Burgevine, with his comrade Jones, and Major Gordon; and on this occasion the former placed himself unreservedly in Major Gordon's hands, agreeing to surrender, if possible, on the following day, with the steamer "Kajow," and all his force, bringing out rebel hostages, if necessary, for the safety of any of the foreigners who might be left behind within the walls. Burgevine, however, even whilst arranging with Major Gordon the agreement in question (assigning, as his reasons for leaving the rebel service, his dissatisfaction with their treatment of himself and the failure of his hopes generally), still displayed the extravagance and obliquity of his nature in a proposition that Major Gordon should desert the Imperialist service with his force, whilst he, simultaneously, left the rebels with his own followers, and that both should join in an independent career of conquest. The indignation with which Major Gordon received this wild and insulting notion probably acted as a last argument in convincing Burgevine of the uselessness of his struggle, and impelled him to take advantage of the amnesty obtained for himself and his followers by Major Gordon's exertions.

Arrangements were made, as I have stated, for the surrender of the Burgevine party on the 9th instant, under cover of a false attack to be made by Major Gordon's troops on the south front of Soochow; but the obstinacy of the Imperial General Ching led to the defeat of this plan. He persisted in advancing during the 8th and 9th instant against some small stockades held by the rebels near the North Gate, and early on the morning of the 9th instant, the foreigners, with the "Kajow" steamer, were ordered away to resist his attack. Whilst Gordon's false attack remained, of course, without the expected result, the foreigners were advanced against Ching, who would, they assert, have been defeated, and probably captured, had not an obstruction in the channel of the creek hindered the progress of the "Kajow." On the evening of this day the above particulars were communicated by Jones, who was sent by Burgevine to Major Gordon for this purpose. The surrender was thus deferred, and meanwhile the rebel chiefs determined upon leading the steamer and their foreign auxiliaries to attack certain positions of the Imperial troops engaged in beleaguering Wu Seih, at a distance of about fifteen or twenty miles. I have strong reason for believing that, even at this moment, had a temporary success occurred, bringing Burgevine into greater favour with the rebel chiefs, both himself and many of his followers would have repudiated their engagement to surrender, and would have continued the struggle. I have, in fact, been given to understand that serious discussions took place on his proposing to Jones a plan for entrapping Gordon, even subsequently to the night of the 8th instant; but the more straightforward nature of his companion revolted against this proposal, and from this time a coolness appears to have existed between the two, until Burgevine's irritation, or else, as is suggested, his excessive indulgence in liquor, led him to attempt the life of Jones, and to threaten that of several others, on the 12th instant. The recital of this incident, as well as of the fate of the "Kajow" steamer, and the various movements which delayed the final event, will be found in detail in the accounts given by the various members of the force who returned with me yesterday to Shanghai, and who requested, during the passage, that I would take down their voluntary statements for publication.

During the interval of suspense caused by the withdrawal of the "Kajow" and the foreign party to the north side of the city, intelligence arrived (at about 7 P.M. of the 12th instant) confirming certain vague reports already received during the day, to the effect that the city of Wu Kiang (Wo Kong), about twelve miles south of Pao-tai-chiao, which was recaptured by Major Gordon, and handed over to the Imperialists in July last, was in serious danger from an attack by large bands of rebels, who had suddenly invested the place, and defeated that morning, with very heavy loss, the Imperial garrison. About 500 men of Major Gordon's force, with some artillery, were at this moment about to embark for the purpose of attacking a strong position near Soochow on the following morning; but their course was immediately changed, and Major Gordon left at midnight

with this force, for the purpose of relieving Wo Kong. This he effected next day, by entirely defeating the rebels, who, to the number of from 20,000 to 30,000 men, had been hurried up from Kia-hing-fu, by order of the Chung Wang, for the purpose of taking Wo Kong, and thus threatening Gordon's rear. They were to have been joined by a force of 30,000 men from Hu-chow-fu, but these, owing to the greater distance, had fortunately not arrived when Major Gordon fell upon the stockades which had been erected, and, after three hours' most determined fighting, at length drove the entire force to retreat, with severe loss. The stockades (as I learned from one of the rebel leaders who was wounded and made prisoner) were held by from 5,000 to 7,000 of the best of the rebel troops, who thrice reinforced the works, and possessed about 2,000 foreign muskets. In the absence of steamers the action was, I believe, somewhat critical; but the works were at length carried, chiefly, I was assured, through the determined gallantry of Major Gordon himself. The incapacity of the Imperial authorities has never been more apparent than in connection with this affair. Although the rebels had been for five days in close proximity to Wo Kong, no intimation of any kind was sent by either the civil or military officials to Major Gordon, and the information that was eventually received was rather accidental than otherwise. The Imperial General Ching had, indeed, been apprised of the danger, as a detachment of his troops formed the garrison of Wo Kong, but he withheld all knowledge of it from Major Gordon. He had previously been urged, on several occasions, to cause the removal of three bridges crossing the Grand Canal which prevent the passage of steamers to Wo Kong, but had taken no notice of the request, and in consequence the assistance of the steamers was not available either in the attack on the stockades or in the subsequent pursuit of the rebels. I had an instance of this commander's impracticable nature during the same day; as I proceeded, at Major Gordon's request, to his lines fronting the East Gate, for the purpose of requesting him not to employ a steamer which had been lent to him in a fruitless attack on the rebel position. Although listening with courtesy to my representations, based principally upon the paramount importance of securing the surrender of the foreigners before taking steps which might cause them to be involved in further hostilities, Ching remained unmoved in his determination to attack a point held by the rebels, and, on the following day, his resolution to this effect ended in a serious defeat. His force, including the Chinese drilled by a French officer, M. Bonnefoi, to the number of 200, were repulsed, with a loss of about 50 killed and 200 wounded. I have subsequently learnt, from the Imperial Commissioner himself, that at this very time so little comprehension had Ching of Major Gordon's character, that he wrote expressing doubts lest the latter should be contemplating a treasonable junction with Burgevine and the rebels.

Passing over other details, I come to the morning of the 15th, when, at 7 A.M., such portion of the foreign party as were enabled to make good their escape, were received, amid a heavy fire from the rebels, by Major Gordon under cover of his troops and steamers, and gladly gave themselves up. The narrative of their previous movements will be found in the statements prepared by their leaders, of whom eight, with twenty-six men, formed the party thus recovered. Burgevine, with some forty others, remained within the city, and their fate is as yet unknown. The leaders were all natives or naturalized citizens of the United States, but the men, who presented a most pitiable appearance, worn, tattered, and sickly-looking, were of eight nationalities. I append lists of both officers and men. Nearly all were armed with rifles, and some attempt had been made to teach them drill; but the great majority were sailors who had been induced by false representations to proceed to Soochow, with no idea as to the service they were actually intended for. The greatest part of these men volunteered to remain with Major Gordon; the remainder, with the leaders, were sent to Shanghai in the steamer "Firefly," by which I arrived yesterday morning.

It appears that the total number, all told, of Burgevine's force, was never higher than 103, to which may be added twelve foreigners who were in Soochow previously to his arrival there. If the statements of his followers may be trusted, he imagined himself capable with this force, and with such rebel troops as might be confided to him, to create a diversion in the Northern Provinces, if not to retrieve the positions already lost in this vicinity. The reasons for his failure are touched upon in the statement made by Captain Jones, who does not, however, take into account the still more certain cause existing in the inevitable dissensions among the leaders, and the unmanageable nature of the men composing the force. It is evident, moreover, that Burgevine counted upon a far larger measure of confidence on the part of the rebel chiefs than he actually enjoyed at any time. Whether their failure to support his extensive views arose from a clear insight into his actual character, or, as his late followers suggest, from inability to appreciate foreign assistance, I do not pretend to decide; but they apparently valued him mainly

as an agent for obtaining arms, and on their finding him unable to fulfil their hopes in this respect, they seem to have become careless with regard to the treatment shown him.

Having proceeded yesterday, by your permission, to call upon his Excellency the Futai, for the purpose of acquainting him, on my return, with what had passed, I may add a short statement of my interview. Characteristically enough, the Imperial Commissioner appeared to make light of the breaking-up of the foreign auxiliaries of the rebels, concerning whom he had manifested so much anxiety ten days previously; and so far from testifying any sense of gratitude to Major Gordon for his unwearying exertions on behalf of the Imperial Government, he rather took exception to the upright and considerate manner in which Major Gordon had carried out the arrangements for the surrender of the foreign party. In fact, it was plain that, relieved of the fears until lately excited by the presence of Burgevine at Soochow, the Imperial Commissioner at once began to indulge his jealousy and dislike of the foreign assistance which his necessities compel him to endure.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WM. S. F. MAYERS.

Inclosure 3 in No. 123.

List of Men lately in the Rebel Service, received from Soochow, October 15, 1863.

1. Henri Labourix. French, eleven months with rebels. Taken in junk near Nanking. Formerly in 3rd Regiment Chasseurs d'Afrique (French force).
2. Milistro Contro. Greek, twenty days at Soochow. Taken into Body Guard.
3. George Grey. Greek, four months. Taken into Body Guard.
4. Frank Theodoro. Italian, four months. Taken into Body Guard.
5. Giovan Vicento. Portuguese, two months. Taken into Body Guard.
6. John Warren. Scotch, three months. Taken into Body Guard.
7. John Hill. American, three months. Shanghai.
8. John Wilkins. German, three months. Taken into Body Guard.
9. Silas Rowan. American, three months.
10. Thomas Smith. American, three months. Taken into Body Guard.
11. Richard Highland. American. Taken into Body Guard.
12. George Müller. German, three months. Taken into Body Guards.
13. Peter Brick. German, three months. Taken into Body Guard.
14. George Waincup. England, three months. Taken into Body Guard.
15. William Macdonald. American, three months. Taken into Body Guard.
16. Edward Head. England, three months. Taken into Body Guard.
17. George Clerk. England, three months. Taken into Body Guard.
18. George Ryan. England, three months. Taken into Body Guard. Good.
19. John Maclean. Scotland, three months. Shanghai.
20. John Corman. Ireland, three months. Taken into Body Guard. Good.
21. Richard Walters. Wales, three months. Shanghai.
22. Justin Macarty. American, born in Ireland, three months. Shanghai.
23. Charles Ramsay. American, three months. Shanghai. Died on board "Firefly" (of heart disease?) at moment of leaving Gordon's stockades for Shanghai.
24. Cornelius Nicolson. Dane, three months. Taken into Body Guard.
25. Samuel Jones. American, three months. Taken into Body Guard.
26. E. J. Heckrath. English. Taken into Body Guard.

Summary.

British	..	..	..	..	..	9
American	..	..	..	..	..	8
German	..	..	..	..	..	3
Greek	..	..	..	..	..	2
French	..	..	..	..	..	1
Italian	..	..	..	..	..	1
Dane	..	..	..	..	..	1
Portuguese	..	..	..	..	..	1

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Taken into Body Guard 19.

N.B.—The remarks appended to the above names refer to the length of time each man was in the rebel service, and to his destination after having been rescued this day.

List of officers, lately engaged in the rebel service, received from Soochow, October 15th, 1863:—

1. C. F. Jones. American.
2. J. D. Morton. American.
3. W. H. Porter. American.
4. J. A. Whiting. American.
5. E. Cane. American.
6. W. Waters. Irish.
7. J. Rogers. English.
8. W. J. Barclay. Prussian.

Inclosure 4 in No. 123.

From the Shanghai "Daily Shipping and Commercial List," October 21st, 1863.

THE following voluntary statements by certain officers of the party of foreigners lately in the rebel service at Soochow (viz.: C. F. Jones, J. D. Morton, W. H. Porter, W. J. Barclay, and J. A. Whiting), having been taken down on their passage from Soochow to Shanghai, have been affirmed on oath this day before the undersigned, with the understanding that the said affidavits shall at no time be used for the purpose of legal prosecution.

(The statement of J. A. Whiting, owing to his absence, has not been sworn to.)

GEORGE F. SEWARD, *United States' Consul.*

Shanghai, Oct. 17, 1863.

Statement of C. F. Jones, lately commanding the steamer "Kajow":—

In July last, I was in command of the silk steamer "Yün-fa," belonging to Messrs. Fletcher and Co. I had previously commanded the steamer "Kajow" in the service of the Chinese authorities, and had occasion to feel deeply wronged by their action in withholding the pay due me for nearly a year's employment. I was acquainted with Burgevine, and aware of his intention to join the rebels; but I declined associating myself with him in this movement, so long as I should be in the service of other individuals. On the 2nd of July, I left in the "Yünfa" for the silk districts, and Burgevine, Hayes, and Townsend, with some attendants, took passage as far as San-li-jow, at which place they left me and proceeded to Soochow. Having subsequently left my employ, I joined Burgevine, and on the 2nd of August, in company with himself and others, seized the steamer "Kajow" at Sung-kiang. We proceeded in this vessel via San-li-jow and Nanzing to Hankow, and thence to Soochow across the Tai-hu Lake. We stayed about eleven days at Soochow, where Burgevine occupied himself in laying the foundations of a force, and we then proceeded in the "Kajow" to Tan-yang, about thirty-five miles below Chinkiang, on the Grand Canal, from which point we rode to San-ja (two days), and thence travelled forty-five miles by boat to Nanking. Captain Delly and six of Burgevine's body guard were with us. Burgevine's object in visiting Nanking was to obtain from the Chung Wang, who acts as viceregent under his immediate superior the Tien Wang, guarantees for placing his force on a proper footing, securing the position of his officers, &c. Our reception at Nanking was most friendly; we were lodged in one of the Chung Wang's palaces, and treated with every distinction. At the time of our visit there were only two foreigners in Nanking,—a Frenchman, who has this day left Soochow together with ourselves, and an Italian. We remained fifteen days at Nanking, and on our departure Burgevine was escorted with the highest honours to his boat. As regards the results attained, he was not at that time assigned an independent command, beyond the control of his own men, though his aim was to place himself at the head of a field force, with which to assume an independent action. A force of 2,000 rebel soldiers had been set apart at Soochow for drill, but of these not more than 1,000 could be instructed, owing to the paucity of officers. They were drilled by Major Morton to the use of the musket during our absence from Soochow; but there were not more than 250 stand of arms for this force, and although large numbers of the rebel soldiers were armed with muskets, their chiefs would not part with these to arm the new force. Burgevine was, however, given to understand that he should have as many men as he could procure muskets to arm. Could arms have been obtained, there would have been no difficulty as regards money for payment. I do not think that Burgevine entered the rebel service with a desire to revenge himself upon the Imperial Government; but he was impressed with the belief that he could in such wise retrieve the position of the rebels, as to cause the overthrow of the present dynasty, and to bring about the recognition of a Taeping Prince by foreign Powers. His reliance was upon an active sympathy among the merchants at Shanghai, upon energetic support from the rebels, and upon abstinence on the part of foreign Governments from action beyond the thirty-mile boundary. This he would not have infringed. Ere long, however, he found that, although assured of the sympathy of many of the leading firms at Shanghai, their assistance was less to be depended upon. It also appeared that the Taipings, though ready to avail themselves to the fullest extent of his services and those of his supporters, were

greatly disinclined to invest him with such a separate command as would have enabled him to operate around Soochow, or to cross, as he purposed, into the Northern Provinces. In the third place, he both witnessed the successes of Major Gordon, and saw that he was certain to receive support. Neither Burgevine nor myself have much confidence in a future for the Taeping cause—it is my own opinion as well as his that Soochow must fall, and one of its principal points of weakness is the extreme self-confidence of the rebel leaders. They entertain no fears as to the safety of the city, and building and decorations are in constant progress in their mansions. The communication with Nanking and the south-west is uninterrupted, and a considerable trade is carried on in the western suburb of Soochow.

Some time in September, Burgevine and myself went, via the Tai-hu, to Nanzing, and at this point the engines of the "Kajow," which required repair, were taken out and conveyed by myself to Shanghae, where they were put in order. Burgevine meanwhile entered into certain arrangements, which proved unsuccessful, upon which he returned towards Nanzing, joining me on the way. We reached Soochow on September 21st. The first question addressed to myself by the Mo Wang (the Commander-in-Chief at Soochow) had reference to the arms expected, and on learning that Burgevine had returned without supplies of this nature, his anger was very markedly expressed.

On the 1st October the "Kajow," under my command, advanced with two gunboats to meet Gordon's steamer, the "Hyson," and an engagement of three hours ensued. On the 2nd, at 4 A.M., impelled solely by a desire to hold friendly communication with an old acquaintance, I advanced along the bank within hailing distance of the "Hyson," and Captain Davidson came ashore and spoke with me for some time. At 7 A.M. I saw Major Gordon, who expressed deep regret at the step we had taken, and offered the utmost possible security in case we should desire to leave the Taeping ranks. I thanked him for myself, and in Burgevine's name, but declined his kind offer on the ground that we could not retrace the step we had taken. On my return to Soochow and reporting to Burgevine my interview with Major Gordon, he was greatly surprised; but expressed a wish to see Gordon himself. At 11 A.M. we visited Chung Wang, who had arrived some days previously from Nanking, and was occupying with his force a position outside the north-east portion of the city, and informed him of my interviews with the foreign officers. He expressed some surprise, but stated that he would have been glad had we induced an English officer to enter the city and converse with him. He was pleased to hear that two of Gordon's officers had promised to dine with us, and he enlarged upon the surprise occasioned him by the action of foreigners in becoming connected with the military service of the Imperial Government against him. I am perfectly confident that any European officer who might have visited the Chung Wang would have been well treated and sent back in safety: whilst the fact that the two officers did not keep their appointment eventually proved an additional cause of distrust towards ourselves. We were highly dissatisfied with the Mo Wang, who, unlike his superior, inquired why we did not carry off as prisoners the Europeans we had met. We told him our opinions on this subject.

At 4 A.M. on the morning of the 3rd October again visited the "Hyson," and received from Captain Davidson a letter written by Major Gordon to Burgevine, offering his assistance in obtaining every security to us in case we should wish to leave, and also proffering medical assistance in case of wounds.

On the 4th, at half-past 4 A.M., saw Captain Ludlam of the steamer "Firefly," with whom I had a long conversation on the subject of his joining the Taepings. He declined entering into the project, and expressed a strong opinion that the best course for ourselves was to relinquish our present position. I gave him a letter from Burgevine for Gordon. At 5 P.M. advanced near the stockades, but retired on being fired at. At this time we had no intention whatever of leaving the rebels, but on the contrary were planning the capture, if possible, of one of the steamers attached to Gordon's force. It was with this object in view that I walked out with Major Porter to reconnoitre.

The greater part of our force was occupying quarters near the Great Bridge (Mi-tu-chiao), crossing the Grand Canal at a distance of about 200 yards from the city wall; but a portion were living within the city. On the 6th again failed in an attempt to communicate with Major Gordon. On the 7th, at 5 A.M., went, accompanied by Burgevine, to the stockade, which we entered, and where we conversed with many of our old acquaintances. Were sent back by Major Gordon, who disapproved of our entering the stockade. We engaged to return in the evening to converse with Major Gordon.

Whilst these events were passing, no military movements had taken place. The Chung Wang and Mo Wang occupied their respective positions. In a recent skirmish outside the stockades, two Europeans of the Franco-Chinese force, which acted for a few days with Major Gordon, were taken prisoners whilst in a state of intoxication, and the Mo Wang at first insisted on their being summarily beheaded. Burgevine demanded that their lives should be spared, and after much discussion they were handed over to us, with the understanding that this practice should be pursued for the future in the case of prisoners. The Mo Wang, however, issued a proclamation hereupon, offering a reward of twenty dollars for a European head, and of fifty dollars for any foreigner captured alive. Burgevine remonstrated seriously against this document, and asserted that unless it were withdrawn it would be impossible for his force to fight any longer. The proclamation was not withdrawn.

At 8 P.M. on the 7th October, Burgevine and myself met Major Gordon on the bridge, 700 yards in advance of his stockades. The dispute respecting the issue of the proclamation, together with the general feeling of disappointment, both personal and with regard to the future prospects as to co-operation and to external assistance, had been turned over in our minds during the last few days, and at this interview with Gordon our withdrawal from Soochow was first seriously discussed.

At 8 P.M. on October 8th, again saw Major Gordon, in company with Burgevine. Made arrangements for delivering the steamer "Kajow," and men of the force, under guarantee of our individual security against ulterior proceedings. We at this time informed Gordon that we had received no pay during our service with the rebels, and that, although the men received a small pittance, only one or two of the officers had obtained an inconsiderable sum each. At the same time we both

expressed our feeling that neither of us could conscientiously serve against the rebels during the reduction of Soochow.

On October 9th was ordered to accompany Chung Wang with the "Kajow" to the North Gate, to act against the Imperial General Ching, who attacked the rebel stockades that day. Burgevine and about forty Europeans were with me, and we should have defeated, and probably captured, Ching, but for obstructions in the channel, which prevented the "Kajow" from advancing. In the evening, at Burgevine's request, had an interview with Major Gordon, with regard to the manner in which our withdrawal should be accomplished.

On the 10th October received orders from Chung Wang to advance towards Chang-shu, in which direction he had proceeded with a moderate force to threaten either that place or else the beleaguering force of Imperialists outside Wu-seih. The next day left Soochow at 7 A.M., and arrived close to Chang-shu at 3.30 P.M. Chung Wang had been engaged, but it was too late for us to go into action. The Imperialists were entrenched in stockades, supported by gun-boats. At 7 A.M. on the 12th engaged the Imperialists with our 12-pounder howitzer, and with two gun-boats in advance. The Imperialists fell back, leaving about fifteen gunboats in our hands. At 10 A.M. the "Kajow" blew up, owing either to a spark from the gun or a rocket from the enemy having reached the magazine. The steamer was rendered useless, and the gun blown overboard. Two Europeans were severely injured. The machinery was unhurt, however, and the hull can still be raised. At noon I went to Burgevine, who was lying asleep on board the 32-pounder gunboat, and asked him whether I should assist him to get ashore, as many of our officers and men were making remarks on the condition he was in. On his demanding the names of those who had made remarks, I declined giving them, and shortly afterwards again attempted to remonstrate with him, in company with another officer. On my again declining to give up names, Burgevine drew out his four-barrelled pistol, which he cocked and discharged at my head from a distance of about nine inches. The bullet entered my left cheek and passed upwards. It has not yet been extracted. I exclaimed, "You have shot your best friend." His answer was, "I know I have, and I wish to God I had killed you." I bled profusely, but did not become insensible. I am at a loss to account for this outbreak; but I am aware that serious differences of opinion had arisen between us of late, and especially with regard to the course it was right to pursue towards Major Gordon. I cannot, however, tell whether this, or momentary anger, was the cause of the attack upon myself. At 2 P.M. I left in a small boat for Soochow, where I arrived at 11 P.M.

On the following day (October 13) I visited Mo Wang at his outposts, about four miles to the south-east of the city, and informed him of our mishaps, for which he expressed much regret. I returned that night to the city; in the meanwhile Major Morton and Captain Smith, to whom the project in hand had previously been communicated, arrived from Chang-shu, having come down with Burgevine, Barclay, and Porter, and proceeded, by Burgevine's direction, to Gordon's stockades. They communicated the news of the loss of the "Kajow," and made arrangements for the sortie and reception of the remainder of the force. I was not acquainted with this until 9 P.M. on October 14th, when I learned that Burgevine had proposed, at 4 A.M., to proceed with such of the party as were outside the city, and to place themselves at once in Gordon's hands. I became alarmed, on hearing this, for the safety of ourselves within the city, and informed, for the first time, Delly and Ward, who were wounded by the gunboat explosion, of the plan in hand. They were delighted with the prospect of getting away. At 1 P.M. I was about to leave the city by the East Gate, when I met a European, who told me he had been denied egress. I then got out at the North Gate, and proceeded to the south-east angle in a boat. I here met Major Morton, with Porter and Barclay, who informed me that Burgevine had just been made prisoner whilst in the act of leaving the city. Strong suspicion seemed to have been excited by his disobeying an order of Chung Wang's, three times repeated, for moving up the two large gunboats, with the 32-pounders and the 12-pounder howitzer, to repulse Ching's movement against the East Gate. Morton and myself, with the others, being detained through the afternoon within the city, were unaware of the false attack by Gordon's force, which was being made to cover our expected retreat. Seeing little prospect of a successful withdrawal, I proposed this night that I should go down to Nanzing, seize one of the silk-steamers, and having brought her to Soochow, to contrive by this means to remove the whole party to Gordon's lines, after which the steamer should be returned to her owners.

At 6 A.M. on the 15th October we prepared to re-enter the city with the whole of our party, the boat containing a wounded man having actually begun to move, as we thought it the best course to adopt, although attended with great personal risk to all. We were not certain of the advance of the steamers, although aware that Major Gordon intended making a false attack. Just, however, as we were about to move, we observed the two steamers advancing up the canal, and on seeing them approach so closely, determined to seize the opportunity of escape. The rebel gunboats were firing on the advancing troops and steamers, and I ordered the men, to whom nothing had yet been said with respect to passing over, to advance in skirmishing order. They followed myself and the other officers down the bank. The boat containing the wounded man at the same time slipped down the stream. Having at length reached the cover of the steamers, we arrived safely at the stockades. The men, on reaching Gordon's lines, were overjoyed at their escape, and were delighted to accept the permission of Major Gordon to enter his force. A few preferred returning to Shanghai, and received a gratuity from Major Gordon. In conclusion, I observe, that although personally well treated by the rebel chiefs, we very early perceived how little confidence could be placed in them, and to what an extent our personal safety was jeopardized. We felt the impossibility of leaving their service should we wish to do so, and in a word, felt ourselves completely in their power. Our opinion with regard to the chances of success which the Taepings enjoy, and of the extent to which they appreciate the service of foreigners, are greatly altered since we first resolved to join them. With regard to Major Gordon's assistance in relieving us from such a perilous condition, I frankly confess that the affair could not, in my estimation, have been better designed, nor the plans more efficiently carried into execution, than those

which he effected for our safety. I shall, while I live, be under an obligation to him which I cannot discharge, and I hope he will receive my sincerest thanks.

C. T. JONES.

Steamer "Firefly," Oct. 15, 1863.

Statement of J. D. Morton, late holding the rank of Major in Burgevine's force:—

In July last I was induced to join Burgevine, under the impression that he was about to take command of an independent force. I was not distinctly aware of his intentions. I left Shanghai about the 27th of July, and arrived at Soochow about the 8th of August. Several other officers, and about 70 men, were already there. Until within the rebel lines, I was unaware of my actual destination. About 1,000 rebel soldiers have been drilled since my arrival, of whom about 250 are supplied with muskets. The total number of foreigners present has never greatly exceeded 100. Both officers and men have been very well treated, and supplied with abundant provisions, but were not regularly paid. About one quarter of the whole force of the rebels is armed with muskets and rifles—there are perhaps 30,000 foreign arms within the city. Chung Wang's body-guard of 1,000 men are armed with Enfield rifles. Since my arrival the difficulty of obtaining arms has been so great that only 47 stand have reached the city. The statements made to me are to the effect that 65,000 fighting men form the permanent garrison of Soochow under the Mo Wang, but I think this may very possibly be an exaggeration. In addition to these, the Chung Wang arrived on the 20th September, with, it is said, 40,000 men, and a further reinforcement was said to be on its way. The men I had assigned me for instruction drilled very well, but the deficiency in the supply of arms caused a feeling that the results which had been expected could not, in fact, be looked for.

I was made aware of Captain Jones' interviews with Captain Davidson of the "Hyson," but regarded them simply as friendly meetings. It was not until the 11th October, whilst moving towards Chang-shu, that Captain Jones broached the subject of withdrawing, and passing over to Major Gordon. After the "Kajow" blew up I proceeded with the news to Chung Wang, who appeared greatly annoyed, and said he would rather have had the "Kajow" than 50,000 taels. On returning with him from a reconnoissance, we saw at a distance of about 40 yards one of our gunboats blow up, and I was slightly wounded by a splinter. By this accident 12 foreigners were killed, and several wounded. The Chung Wang was greatly irritated by this accident. He proceeded to the boat, where Burgevine was lying asleep, and Burgevine shortly afterwards left for Soochow, without giving me notice. At about 5:30 p.m. the Chung Wang ordered me back, with the two large gunboats, and all the foreigners. After reaching Soochow, at about 8 p.m., Burgevine desired me to go and see Major Gordon. Captain Smith went with me, and we made the arrangements which eventually resulted in our escape. We returned to the city, and next day, about 4 o'clock, Burgevine awoke me, and proposed that we should immediately move, with such of the party as were outside, to Gordon's stockade. I declined to leave without the sick and wounded within the city. During this day I did my best to get as many as I could from the city into our position outside, at the Bridge, and passed to and fro twice. On my attempting, however, to leave for the second time by the South-east Gate (*Fu-mun*), I was stopped. Meanwhile the Mo Wang went out, and ordered the gunboats away to the East Gate (*Low-mun*), but the officer in charge refused to move without an order from Burgevine. The Mo Wang hereupon broke the party up, by placing the men in squads on board different gunboats. During this time I was inside the city, but about 4 p.m. Burgevine, Captain Smith, and myself, forced our way through the East Gate, and came past the South-east Gate, where we saw a number of our men. We told them to come down, but they were stopped by the soldiers. On reaching the High Bridge we encountered the Mo Wang, with 200 of his body-guard. He compelled us to return with him to the South-east Gate, at which point he allowed me to go back, under pretext of bringing in the rest of the party; but Burgevine, and all the foreigners in this neighbourhood, were compelled to enter the city. Whilst moving towards the Gate Burgevine proposed that we should seize Mo Wang, but knowing such an attempt to be worse than hopeless, I declined to join him. He then said to Mo Wang, "Are you going to take my head off?" in reply to which Mo Wang only ordered him to move on. I returned to the Bridge, followed by a guard, whom I persuaded, on arriving there, that it was impossible to get the men, tents, &c., into the city that night. I felt certain that my own life, and that of the remainder, would be in peril, were we to return to the city, and I consulted with Captain Jones and the other officers as to the best course to be followed. This morning our escape was effected. Eight officers and twenty-six men have come out, and there may remain within the city between fifty and sixty men and officers, including the two French prisoners recently captured. I am thoroughly certain that there is not a man who would voluntarily remain with the rebels. The only English deserter who was with the party was shot in the attack on Ka-pu.

With reference to the government of Soochow, I have seen no traces of civil administration, and supreme power is vested in Mo Wang, who is a native of Kwangsi, a man of medium stature, 29 years of age, apparently possessing much talent, and of very good education. He talks much of European politics and inventions, but as regards enlightenment, I do not place him higher than the ordinary class of Chinese. From what I have seen, I believe him to be energetic and courageous. He is not of a naturally suspicious temperament, and he is lenient in the exercise of his power. The government is entirely carried on by the military chiefs, who command respectively divisions of 10,000, 5,000, and 3,000 men. To each of these corps a proportion of 10 per cent. of coolies is attached, who gradually rise to the rank of fighting men. Every chief has the power of life and death, and some of the highest appear to stand on a footing of equality with Mo Wang himself. Besides the latter, there are several other Wangs (or generals) in Soochow, some of whom command divisions of 10,000, or discharge administrative functions. I am of opinion that the soldiers love the life they lead, as it affords them the utmost liberty, subject only to the orders of their chief. There are not more than

5,000 Cantonese in the city—the largest number of these men being at Nanking; of boys trained to fighting, there are not more than 200 at Soochow. The spirit of the soldiers is good, and they turn out to fight with alacrity. Any soldier who retreats in action before his commander retires, is punished with death. I have seen forty heads struck off in one day for offences of this kind. As regards commissariat arrangements, every chief has his own store, from which daily rations of rice, together with salt fish and vegetables, are issued. Latterly the soldiers have also received two dollars per mensem. I have seen two payments of this nature.

With reference to the shot fired at Captain Jones by Burgevine, previously to the explosion on board the "Kajow," an order was given me by Burgevine which would infallibly have placed, if executed, the whole force in great danger, and I was certain, from this and other symptoms, that he had been drinking too freely. After the shot was fired I was told of what had happened, and that Captain Jones was bleeding to death. I said, indignantly, that such an act as this must be inquired into; and on this reaching Burgevine's ears, he said to me, "I would as soon shoot you as Jones, if I hear any more talk about inquiry from you."

J. D. MORTON.

Steamer "Firefly," Oct. 16, 1863.

Statement of Wm. H. Porter, late holding the rank of Major in Burgevine's force:—

I arrived in Soochow on the 12th July, accompanied by Captain Waters and Captain Rogers. Major Hayes was then in charge, but there was no European force of Burgevine's as yet. There were about twelve foreigners with the Mo Wang, who had joined him at different times. About the 17th of July fifty-two men arrived from Shanghae in boats. About the 22nd nineteen more arrived; and subsequently a few additional men arrived in straggling parties. Burgevine's first interview with the rebel chief had taken place, I think, on the 3rd of July, and he left on the 4th for Shanghae. During the first two months of our experience of Soochow, everything we could expect was promised by Mo Wang, who assigned us about 1,000 troops for drill, but only a very small proportion of these men were in possession of muskets. Although large quantities of foreign arms were in the hands of their other men, they would not give them to the troops being drilled. About the end of September, when Burgevine returned from Shanghae, and was called upon to advance with these men against the Imperialists, he refused to do so unless they were armed. The Mo Wang hereupon removed the men, and returned them to their rebel commanders. Burgevine was there left in command only of his own foreign party, to the number of about ninety. His wound has for some time past compelled him to resort to stimulants, and on some occasions he has taken them in excess. On one of these occasions he fired at and wounded Captain Jones. On the 14th instant, in a paroxysm of this nature, Burgevine threatened to shoot both myself and Barclay.

For some time past I have been dissatisfied with the course of affairs with the rebels; and since the removal of the body of soldiers from our orders, they have proceeded rapidly to a crisis. The payment which had been promised us for the 18th of October was not made, and altogether not more than 3,000 dollars have been paid to officers and men. All of Burgevine's plans having failed, he determined to withdraw, and pass over to the Imperialists with all his officers and men. This would undoubtedly have been carried into effect, had not the suspicions of the chiefs been aroused, and our numbers divided on the 14th instant, when Burgevine was carried into the city a prisoner, and it was impossible to remove the whole of the remaining persons within the walls. On Major Morton's arrival at our encampment last night, a consultation was held; and on Captain Jones' proposal, to the effect that, as our force was so divided owing to the large numbers unable to get out of the city, a silk steamer might be seized at Nanzing, thereby possibly regaining the confidence of the rebels, and securing a means of escape for all, we resolved to re-enter the city next morning, although we felt that, on passing within the walls, we should enter what would most likely prove a prison, if not the scene of our immediate execution, whilst our being sooner or later sacrificed was extremely probable. This morning we were prepared to carry out this plan, when the near approach of Major Gordon with the steamers determined us to seize on the opportunity of escape, and we accordingly placed ourselves under their protection. I am well convinced that all who came out this morning sincerely rejoice in having succeeded in doing so; and I am also certain that, of those left behind, not more than one or two would remain were it possible to escape. I do not think there can be more than forty-one foreigners left in Soochow. I wish, finally, to express the feeling of extreme gratitude with which I am impressed towards Major Gordon for the extraordinarily considerate and straightforward manner in which our withdrawal was accepted and arranged, as well as for the active support by which our actual retreat was rendered possible.

WM. H. PORTER.

Steamer "Firefly," Oct. 15, 1863.

Statement of W. G. Barclay, formerly holding the rank of Colonel under Burgevine:—

Having only reached Soochow within the last five or six days, I know little of what has passed of late. I was with the party on board the "Kajow" on the 11th, and suffered slightly from the explosion. I made up my mind, from the first day of my arrival, to leave Soochow as soon as I could possibly get away. During the 14th October I was not allowed by Burgevine to enter the city, having been placed by him under arrest; and on Major Morton's arrival at our station near the Bridge, we consulted together and decided that the only chance for the safety of the whole party was to re-enter the city, though we were well aware of the danger thus incurred, and to await the seizure of a silk steamer, by which means all might be removed. We were prepared, this morning, to re-enter the city, when the sight of the steamers advancing up the canal induced us to throw

ourselves, with such of the party as were on the spot, under their cover, and thus secured our retreat.

W. G. BARCLAY.

Steamer "Firefly," Oct. 15, 1863.

Statement of J. A. Whiting, late holding the rank of Captain in Burgevine's force:—

On the 12th instant I was on board the gunboat upon which Burgevine was, with Captain Jones and one or two others. I did not hear all that passed between them, but I heard Burgevine say something to the effect that he would shoot any one who accused him of being in liquor, and Captain Jones himself, should he do so. He then drew his revolver, and shot Captain Jones in the face. Captain Jones exclaimed, "You have shot your best friend!" He replied, "Yes; and I am sorry I did not kill you!" I heard the pistol snap a second time, and am of opinion that Burgevine was in liquor at the time.

J. A. WHITING.

Steamer "Firefly," Oct. 15, 1863.

From the "North China Herald," October 24, 1863.

Statement by Burgevine:—

[THE following statement has been handed to us by General Burgevine for publication. It has been made from a desire to correct some misapprehensions which might otherwise arise from perusal of the preceding statements by his followers, and to place the position of affairs of Soochow in a correct light before the public. Had not the other depositions been published, Burgevine had, we believe, no intention of making any public statement whatever. The present one was not made before the United States Acting Consul, but drawn up privately by Burgevine, and handed to us by him for publication.]

Why the depositions of certain officers concerned in the late Soochow affair were ever made, or why they should be made public, is more than I can tell. The only reason I can assign is that they wish to exculpate themselves for their shameful desertion of their comrades. At the expense of others they have endeavoured to make out as strong a case against their commander as possible, evidently supposing that he would not return to contradict it. This, however, does not account for their conduct towards the remainder, who certainly had run the same risks and suffered the same hardships as themselves. I am, therefore, reluctantly compelled to lay before the public a carefully prepared statement, as it is the only one I intend to make.

It is unnecessary for me to enter into my reasons for joining the Taeping cause; suffice, they were neither mercenary nor revengeful. I have served them faithfully, and up to the present moment have not had the slightest idea of betraying them. The original agreement made between Mo Wang and myself was for a certain sum per mensem to be paid me, out of which officers' wages and other expenses were to be paid. I drew up a scale of wages which was translated into Chinese and approved by Mo Wang; the scale was liberal, but not more so than the dangers and hardships of the service demanded. Chinese soldiers were immediately selected from the Taeping ranks, and drilling commenced at once. Could I have procured three or four thousand stand of arms and accoutrements, with competent officers, I would soon have had as many drilled men, and matters would have been very different at the present time. I endeavoured to procure supplies, and for that purpose visited Shanghai twice; but, owing to various unfortunate circumstances, did not succeed. All the force, therefore, I had with which to carry on operations was the Europeans, less than one hundred effective men, and the small steamer "Kajow." With this force, however, I managed to keep the field until the unfortunate blowing up of the steamer and gunboats rendered further offensive operations impracticable. I never had any intention of maintaining a European contingent. The men were only for our own safety until I could be assured of the fidelity of the Chinese drilled troops. Then, such as were deserving, would have been retained as officers, and the remainder suitably disposed of.

I made several propositions to Chung Wang, none of which he could be induced to entertain. Had he done so the issue of the conflict might have been materially different. I proposed that, unless the foreign troops were withdrawn from the vicinity of Soochow, all the mulberry trees in the silk districts should be destroyed; if this should fail, to abandon both Soochow and Nanking, and concentrate the entire Taeping force on the North. I merely state the above to show that my ideas were not confined to leading a few Europeans in and around Soochow.

Owing to a variety of causes Mo Wang declined to fulfil his original agreement. In this, however, I must say that the blame does not altogether rest with him. I was unable, from various circumstances, to carry out a portion of my plan, in consequence of which the greater portion of the money due for the payment of arrears was decidedly refused. After this it became necessary to serve the Taipings on a very insecure basis, or else to leave them honourably. I chose to do the latter, should Chung Wang or Mo Wang continue to ignore the first agreement. Another reason, and one equally potent, was my extreme physical debility, which prevented me from being as active as the commander of such a force should be. It would have been easy enough at any time to provide for my personal safety; but I was bound in honour not to withdraw without providing also for the safety of the men whom I had induced to come with me, or who had afterwards voluntarily joined.

I never entertained any fear of leaving Soochow; the danger lay in Shanghai, where the men would have incurred the punishment due for infringement of the various Treaties. It was for this reason that I made a verbal agreement with Major Gordon, that should it become necessary to leave

Soochow he would guarantee the officers and men from prosecution. For myself I asked nothing, except a safe passage to Shanghai, where I was prepared to submit to the decision of the United States Consular Court. He agreed that all boats or arms it should be necessary to take should be returned to the Taepings immediately. To this I excepted the "Kajow," meaning to make her the means of recompensing in some measure such officers and men who had fought without emolument in the Taeping cause. It was distinctly understood between us, and with this agreement, neither Captain Jones nor any one else had anything to do, that no information concerning the state of Soochow was to be given, and that the entire force was to be disbanded by me after passing the Imperialist lines. After this any officers or men who would wish to enlist under Major Gordon would be at perfect liberty to do so. As most of the men had nothing to depend upon in Shanghai I should have advised them to embrace the liberal offers made to them. I recommended several officers to Gordon in case they should wish to join him afterwards. But this was done entirely to benefit them, and with no thought for myself. In this agreement with Major Gordon my sole object was to provide for the safety of the men; my own case was simply that of a resignation. Of whatever private agreements the officers may have themselves made I am unaware.

I will review the statements of a few of the officers who deserted, not the Taepings, but their own comrades. In a force such as I commanded, and in such a place, no subordinate can be allowed to cast the slightest reflection upon the conduct of the commander without lessening his authority to the manifest danger of all. It is not the first time I have been called on to act as I did in regard to Captain Jones, and, under similar circumstances, I should certainly again do the same. As I am not before a court of inquiry it is unnecessary to go into details; Captain Jones's account of the affair is substantially correct, and I feel great pleasure in bearing testimony to his veracity and candour whenever any affair with which he is personally acquainted is concerned. Our motives, however, were widely different, and naturally our opinions would follow the same tone. I must say, however, that the remarkably egotistical tone of his deposition has surprised me. I am sure that the only individual or immediate communication he ever had with Mo Wang concerned the sale of arms and ammunition in which he speculated. He was present but at one interview with Chung Wang, and that by my invitation. I question whether Chung Wang remembers his name. In regard to the assertion of the sympathy of many of the leading firms in Shanghai, I must say that I have had no communication on this affair with any firm whatever. Sympathy they might have felt, but as to assistance none was given. Had I received a little less of the former and more of the latter the denouement would probably have been different.

Major Morton's statement commences with a falsehood. That he knew he was proceeding to Soochow is certain from the fact that he assisted in the capture of the "Kajow," for which he received a thousand dollars as his share of the prize money. He had previously failed in an attempt at reaching his intended destination, having been unable to proceed further than San Li Quan within the rebel lines. After the gunboats blew up, I distinctly ordered him to get the 32-pounders which had been taken ashore on board again, and return to Soochow, I myself going in advance, so as to concert measures for the wounded being taken care of. Owing to the great number of boats in the creek, we were unable to reach the city until the next evening, and Morton himself was with me when we took up our old position on the Grand Canal. I sent him, together with Captain Smith, to Major Gordon for medical assistance, all our own medicines being destroyed, guaranteeing the safety of the surgeon if he would come. It appears from his own statement that he made other arrangements. The next morning I sent him into the city to bring out the wounded men, and procure a chair for myself, being unable either to walk or ride.

We afterwards entered the city together to head-quarters. I was compelled to lie down while he proceeded to make the necessary arrangements. The suspicions of the Taeping authorities had been excited by these various proceedings, and, unknown to me, orders were given to allow no foreigners out of the gates without a pass. This was communicated to me by Morton, who returned greatly disturbed after being refused egress. I sent for passes and procured them, and although hardly able to keep the saddle, rode out with Morton and Captain Smith. We went out at the east gate and met with no opposition. We rode slowly some three or four miles through several pickets without being challenged. On the summit of the bridge we met Mo Wang, accompanied by his usual attendants, and not by his body-guard. He asked me to go back with him to discuss matters. I motioned towards our camp, not 100 yards distant, but he shook his head in refusal. As the safety, as I imagined, of every one depended upon not showing any suspicion, I immediately turned my horse's head—first desiring Morton to bring every one into the city, together with the gunboats and the stores. He rode down to execute this order, since which time I have not seen him.

Captain Smith accompanied me to the Mo Wang's boat, outside the Foo Mun. We here passed two hours in friendly conversation; my boy, who is now with me, acting as interpreter. Mo Wang asked why the foreigners were discontented, and being told on account of not being paid in full, replied that on the ensuing day they should be satisfied, and that all who wished to leave should have perfect liberty to do so. Whether or not he was in earnest, I cannot say, but judging from what I knew of his character, I was willing to give him a trial. Towards dusk, he expressed his surprise that Morton had not yet arrived; but knowing the difficulty of moving boats, I felt no anxiety, and assured him of Morton's fidelity to myself. We parted soon after, he remaining in his boat, and Captain Smith and myself returning to head-quarters. Late in the night he came to see me, and we conversed a long time concerning the condition of the force. It was not until 9 o'clock next morning that I was informed of the desertion of Morton, after killing two of the picket. With a number of sick and wounded men, already under suspicion, I hardly knew what to expect, but never for a moment believed that they would proceed to extremities. I remained quiet for some time to see what action would be taken, and then sent to Mo Wang for passes for the wounded and others to leave the city, telling him that after what had taken place it would be best to let all foreigners go. He agreed with me, but expressed a desire that I should remain, and a few picked men who would volunteer.

Twenty men agreed to do so, including four officers. Of these ten were old residents amongst the Taepings. The officers were supplied with money, and the men would have been also had I deemed it advisable. Great excitement prevailed amongst the small Mandarins, in consequence of which the usual rations could not be procured. Neither passes nor boats could be obtained this day, and it was not until late on the next, that after extreme difficulty and labour, I managed, under my personal superintendence, to get thirty-four men, including wounded, out of the city, and as far as the North-east Gate. Here, as the night came on very dark, we were forced to lie up until the next morning. It was not a pleasant situation by any means; only those who passed the night in those boats can imagine it. I intended to proceed myself with the men to Nanzing, and then to take such measures as might conduce to their future safety. Up to this time no communication had been received from Major Gordon.

About midnight, Mo Wang sent me Major Gordon's first letter in English, which had arrived late in the evening, and requested me to return to the city, as there was considerable discrepancy between this letter and its Chinese translation. I immediately complied, much to the consternation of those who remained in the boats, who imagined that I would be beheaded or kept in confinement. The next morning I saw Mo Wang, who told me that the Chinese letter recommended him to cut off the heads of all foreigners remaining, as they intended to betray him to the Imperialists on the first opportunity. I explained the English letter to him, assuring him that the other was some villany on the part of Imperialists, knowing from old experience how such things are managed. He expressed his confidence in Gordon, and they asked me to send a European to the stockade to carry an answer. I selected one of the trustiest men I had, Lewis Wilson, and addressed a note to Major Gordon, begging him to restore the arms and boats taken by the men. He returned them, together with the present of a horse ready saddled, which greatly pleased Mo Wang, who repeatedly expressed his satisfaction at Gordon's conduct. The wounded left the same afternoon for Nanzing, I remaining in the city. The day after, being very much troubled with an old wound, and feeling that the want of confidence in foreigners would, for the present at least, prevent me from being of any service, I signified my intention to Mo Wang of proceeding to Shanghai, to obtain medical and other assistance. He made no objection, not even to my proposed route through the Imperialist lines at Pata-chow. He expressed a fear that the Putai would behead me, but I assured him that Major Gordon would guarantee my safety to Shanghai. I left in his own chair, accompanied by his body-guard, and with the usual military honours accorded to a Mandarin of the first rank. I also carried a letter from Mo Wang to Gordon, with the contents of which I am unacquainted. One European went with me, who returned next morning with some medicines, kindly forwarded by Major Gordon for the use of the volunteers remaining in the city.

In reference to the statements of Messrs. Barclay and Porter, their proclivities being well known, it is only necessary to state that I placed them under arrest for "skulking."

H. A. BURGEVINE.

Shanghai, Oct. 23, 1863.

From the "Daily Shipping and Commercial News," Shanghai, Oct. 27, 1863.

Captain Jones's statement in reply to the foregoing :—

To the Editor of the "Daily Shipping and Commercial News."

DEAR SIR,—I observed in to-day's issue of the "North China Herald" a statement by Mr. Burgevine of the late occurrences at Soochow, not, however, sworn to, as was that made by myself and brother officers, before the United States Consul.

As the tone of this document is such as to make it appear that we have acted in this matter in an unfair and underhand manner towards our late commander, I wish again to trespass on your space for a few observations, which I feel due to myself and others concerned.

First then, we did not wish to exculpate ourselves for our "shameful desertion of our comrades," on the contrary we did all we could for their safety, although well knowing Burgevine's proposition to Colonel Morton to leave the sick and wounded to their fate. Indeed, so far from working himself, as he says he did, to relieve their wants, it was Colonel Morton who attended to them, while he was in his bed.

He further accuses us of trying to make out a good case against him, thinking he would never return to Shanghai. To this I answer, that he and I were the instigators of the defection from the Taeping cause, for I confess I at once fell into his plans, glad of the opportunity to escape from what appeared likely to turn out unprofitably, and having, besides, for some time before lost confidence in his capacity to command.

Again, it was when the negotiations with Major Gordon were well advanced that I disagreed with him, with respect to a shameful proposition he made to me, and to which I refrained to consent, viz., to seize that officer while working in our cause.

Concerning my communications with Mo Wang, it is utterly untrue that I never but on one occasion had an interview with that chief.

I could in like manner contradict much of his statement, but I have no desire to do more than clear my own name and those of my friends from unmerited reproach. I pass over his not even attempting to explain his reason for firing at me; but I will observe, in conclusion, that all I have stated I am ready at any time to substantiate in any manner that may be required.

C. F. JONES.

No. 124.

Acting Consul Markham to Earl Russell.—(Received January 18, 1864.)

My Lord,

Shanghai, November 24, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to inclose for your Lordship's information copy of my despatch of the 20th instant, addressed to Sir F. W. A. Bruce.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM.

Inclosure 1 in No. 124.

Acting Consul Markham to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

British Consulate, Shanghai, November 20, 1863.

HAVING received a letter from Major-General Brown calling attention to the unsafe state of the Settlement, owing to the practices of Burgevine and others, I requested the Consuls of the Treaty Powers to meet at this Consulate for the purpose of discussion, on the 17th instant, and it was then agreed that all the foreign Consuls resident at Shanghai should be invited to meet on the 19th, with a view to devising some general measures for the maintenance of order.

I enclose herewith Minutes of the Meeting, and it will be my duty to inform you hereafter of the steps to be taken in accordance with the resolutions then adopted.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM.

Inclosure 2 in No. 124.

Minutes of Meeting of the Foreign Consuls at Shanghai, held at the British Consulate, November 19, 1863, for the purpose of taking into consideration the measures requisite for maintaining peace and order in the Foreign Settlements.

Present:—John Markham, Esq., Her Majesty's Acting Consul, *Chairman*; M. G. Chevreau Rameau, Gérant du Consulat Général de France; G. F. Seward, Esq., United States Consul; G. B. Dixwell, Esq., H.I.R.M. Consul; Th. Probst, Esq., H.P.M. Consul; H. W. Dent, Esq., Portuguese Consul; W. Keswick, Esq., Danish Consul; T. Kroes, Esq., Consul for the Netherlands and Acting Consul for Belgium; Edw. Cunningham, Esq., Swedish Consul; Jas. Hogg, Esq., Italian Consul; John Moore, Esq., Spanish Acting Consul; W. Schweman, Esq., Acting Consul for the Hanse Towns.

The proceedings were opened by the Chairman, who considered that the main object for which this Meeting had taken place was the discussion of a feasible plan for keeping order in the settlements, in view of the large number of dangerous characters who infest the place, affording facilities for the illicit enlistment of foreigners in the rebel service, and generally forming a fruitful source of disorder. As many of these vagabonds were of nationalities not represented here by Consuls, it was highly desirable that some measures should be taken into consideration for rendering such men amenable to authority.

M. Rameau thought that a joint tribunal might be constituted among the Treaty Consuls, who should adjudicate the cases of all vagabond aliens; but, after some discussion, it was generally thought that such a tribunal would be unable to act with sufficient efficiency, through lack of due legal powers, even though requested by the Chinese Government to assume the necessary functions.

Mr. Dent suggested that, with the exception of the Greeks, numbers of whom are known to be in and around Shanghai, almost every nationality is represented here by a Consul, and that the means of enforcing separate authority already really exists. The difficulty, however, is, with the means at command, to reach the criminal class, composed chiefly of deserters or discharged seamen from the shipping, over whose conduct ashore Consuls have very inadequate means of maintaining supervision.

Mr. Kroes thought that some restrictive measures might be devised to prevent the indiscriminate landing of unemployed seamen; but, taking into account the facilities for desertion, and the impossibility of preventing the discharge of sailors under certain circumstances, such measures were not generally thought practicable.

It was next suggested that in the case of subjects of non-represented powers, the Municipal Council might be deputed by the Chinese authorities to act in a manner similar to that prescribed in the Municipal Regulations for the American Settlement, but, Mr. Seward explaining that this clause is simply designed as a security for the collection of the taxes, M. Rameau thought that a council might be constituted, consisting of the senior naval and military officers on the spot, for the purpose of dealing with foreign offenders when unrepresented by Consuls. It was thought, however, that such a

council would clash with the municipal institutions, and be better represented by a combined action on the part of the Treaty Consuls.

Mr. Dent and Mr. Cunningham were of opinion that should the Chinese authorities agree to depute to the Municipal Council the power of dealing with unrepresented nationals, a system of registry might be instituted, and offenders of this class be severely dealt with under municipal regulations.

Mr. Keswick proposed that authority of this description should rather be deputed to a Committee of Consuls, if delegated at all, as he considered that no judicial powers could be placed in the hands of a municipal body of the nature existing at Shanghai. He saw valid objections to the exercise of judicial functions by a Municipal Council.

Mr. Dent was of opinion that inasmuch as the municipal authorities represented the entire body of foreign residents at Shanghai, they would be fitter depositaries of such powers than simply a limited number of representatives of certain foreign governments. The latter might also, it must be remembered, object to the exercise of authority by their Consuls over subjects of other nations; whereas, the municipal control is already general, so far as it goes, and requires only the sanction of the Chinese Government to be made effective and stringent in the case of offenders who now enjoy a practical immunity in the absence of Consular authority.

Mr. Cunningham thought that, inasmuch as it is quite feasible for the Chinese Government to depute their undoubted power in this matter to whomsoever they please, it would be by no means impracticable to institute a Board composed of four or five of the resident Consuls.

Mr. Dixwell pointed out the difficulty which would here require to be met, viz., the raising of funds indispensable for promoting the efficiency of such a committee. He inclined rather to see any delegated powers of the nature under discussion placed in the hands of the existing Municipal Council, who are already provided with a revenue, and with employés and police.

In view of the difficulty of deciding upon the most fitting depositaries of the authority considered requisite for dealing with subjects of non-represented Powers, the question was put in the form of the following resolution:

Proposed by Mr. Cunningham:

"Resolved that the Chinese authorities be requested to delegate to the foreign municipal authorities their powers over foreigners in the Settlement, who are not represented by Consuls."

Amendment proposed by Mr. Keswick:

That the words "a Committee of Consuls" be substituted in the above resolution for the words "foreign municipal authorities."

The resolution was carried without the amendment.

Mr. Dixwell next brought forward a second point, which he considered of great importance, viz., that many of the Consuls already established at Shanghai are not, in reality, vested with powers sufficient to enable them to deport dangerous characters. In his own case, for instance, he was not aware that he possessed any authority which would enable him to proceed against a Russian who should engage himself in the rebel service, were he called upon to take steps in such a case; but although, for his own part, and doubtless also on the part of his colleagues, there would be no hesitation to take responsibility in the case of dangerous offenders, he was of opinion that both himself and other Consuls similarly placed should take steps for obtaining from their respective Ministers the warrant to deal summarily with men whose deportation from China is really a necessity.

Mr. Probst concurred in this view, as he found himself similarly situated, and fully recognized the necessity both for decided action and for obtaining the requisite authority.

Mr. Kroes stated in this connection that, as regards his own nation, he is entitled to disown any Dutch subject who should enter into the military service of any foreign Power; and that such men would place themselves in the category of non-represented foreigners.

Mr. Dixwell continued that the main object of the meeting was undoubtedly to ascertain what powers are really possessed by the Consuls, and that its best result would be an application to the proper quarters for such authority as is found really requisite.

Mr. Dent was of opinion that the most effectual plan for checking the existing license and rowdiness would be strictly and impartially to enforce the neutrality provisions which already exist.

The following resolution was hereupon proposed:—

Proposed by Mr. Kroes and seconded by Mr. Rameau:

"That a Committee be named by the Consuls to draw up such regulations as may be thought necessary for the peace and order of the settlement; and that those Consuls who are not invested by their Governments with the power to deal summarily with dangerous characters, shall apply for such authority as is needed, pending the receipt of which they shall take upon themselves the responsibility of action."

The above resolution passed unanimously.

Proposed by Mr. Cunningham, and seconded by Mr. Moore:

"That the Consuls of the Treaty Powers form the Committee referred to in the foregoing resolution."

Proposed as an amendment by M. Rameau, and seconded by Mr. Hogg:

"That the Chairman of the respective Municipal Councils be included in the proposed Committee."

The resolution carried with the amendment.

Mr. Dent next suggested that the opportunity of this assembly might be taken for the purpose of discussing the dangerous condition of the American settlement, where the Municipal Council find great difficulty in preserving order by means of their police, owing to the large numbers of vagabond Malays, Manila men, and Cantonese who infest that settlement. He thought that, whilst the British and Spanish Consuls were the proper functionaries for dealing with the first two

classes, the Chinese authorities should be called upon to devise measures of restraint with respect to the Cantonese.

Mr. Moore stated that he was aware that between 200 and 300 Manilla men infest the purlieus of Honque, and that he has reason to hope a Spanish vessel of war will eventually be sent here for the purpose of removing these men.

Mr. Markham thought that it was, at all events, within the power of the Chinese authorities to prevent the indiscriminate straying of vagabond foreigners in the interior; and it was accordingly proposed by Mr. Markham and seconded by Mr. Keswick:

"That a joint communication to the Chinese authorities be adopted, urging upon them the necessity of apprehending any foreigners found in the interior unprovided with passports, and handing them over to their respective Consuls."

Carried unanimously.

Mr. Seward next suggested that much good might be effected, and valuable time saved, by regular meetings of the Consular body, as it had become evident, in the course of the present discussion, that questions of general moment are constantly occurring which might be very advantageously discussed. It was accordingly proposed by Mr. Seward, and seconded by Mr. Markham:

"That a meeting of the Consuls be held monthly, for the purpose of discussion and action upon such important subject as may from time to time arise; and that such meeting shall be held on the second day after the departure of the first English mail in the month."

Carried unanimously.

The meeting was hereupon dissolved, with a vote of thanks to the Chairman.

JOHN MARKHAM, *Chairman.*

No. 125.

Acting Consul Markham to Earl Russell.—(Received January 18, 1864.)

My Lord,

Shanghai, November 20, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of my despatch of this date addressed to Sir F. W. A. Bruce.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM.

Inclosure 1 in No. 125.

Acting Consul Markham to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Shanghai, November 20, 1863.

I REGRET to have to inform you that another and most daring piratical outrage has taken place, in the capture of the steamer "Firefly," employed with Major Gordon's force, which was carried off from this harbour, on the morning of the 15th instant, by a band of twenty or thirty armed foreigners, and taken in the direction of Soochow. As soon as this event became known, a small steamer just built by the Futai was prepared to follow in pursuit. While this was being done, Burgevine, who, at that time, still remained at large in Shanghai, went on board in the absence of the Captain, and shortly afterwards (at midnight) a party of unidentified foreigners attempted to force their way on board, but were repulsed by the Chinese guard, to whom information had previously been given by one of Burgevine's companions, that the latter had dispatched a messenger to summon a gang of his adherents, for the purpose of seizing the steamer. Burgevine was arrested by the Chinese guard, and handed over on the following day to the United States Consul; and I at the same time received a despatch from the Futai, calling upon me, conjointly with the French Consul, to use my influence in urging Mr. Seward to remove Burgevine from Shanghai. I inclose copy of this despatch and of my reply.

I have reason to believe that Burgevine is now in confinement. No information has yet been received of the whereabouts of the "Firefly;" but it is supposed she was carried off to Nanzing, with the hope of reaching Soochow through the Tae-hu Lake, though, owing to the closeness of the present blockade of the place, it is scarcely probable that this attempt will succeed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM.

Inclosure 2 in No. 125.

*Le, Futai, to Acting Consul Markham.**Shanghai, November 18, 1863.*

THE Futai has to address Her Majesty's Consul with regard to Burgevine, on whose behalf the Tsung-Ping Gordon heretofore interceded, representing that he was repentant of his transgression in having entered the rebel service at Soochow, and requesting that, as he had now escaped and been sent back to Shanghai, no further proceedings might be pressed against him. The Futai hereupon, animated by a sentiment of consideration, did not insist upon the infliction of the heavy penalty incurred, but wrote calling upon the American Consul to deport him, with all promptness, to his own country, restraining him, at the same time, from ever returning to China, in order that no further trouble may be occasioned, and that the good fame of Americans be maintained. The Honourable Consul was also simultaneously desired to communicate to the American Consul to that end.

A reply was hereupon received from the American Consul, stating that he was aware that Burgevine would never do any good in Shanghai, and that he should receive immediate injunctions to return to his own country. The Honourable Consul also replied, stating that he would speak with Mr. Seward on this subject. Subsequently, when the Honourable Consul, with his colleagues, visited the Futai, the latter took the opportunity of personally urging that Burgevine should be deported, in order that troubles be guarded against, and friendly relations cemented; whereupon the American Consul promised in person that he would act accordingly, adding that as soon as Burgevine's wound should be somewhat healed, he would at once send him home, and report the fact to the Futai. Many days having, however, elapsed, and no such report being received announcing the date of Burgevine's departure, the Futai was on the point of making further inquiry, when, on the 15th instant, he suddenly received information that the steamer "Firefly" had been seized, in the Captain's absence, by confederates of Burgevine, and carried off to Soochow. Before, actually, the Futai had given credence to this report, the officer in charge of his steamer, the "Firefly," notified him that Burgevine, accompanied by two foreigners, had forcibly made his way on board the steamer, stating that he wanted to go up in her to Soochow; and further, that he had dispatched a black man to Hongkew, with the intention, it was suspected, of collecting a band of desperadoes to seize the steamer, and carry her off for sale to the rebels at Soochow. Further, that at midnight three foreigners had actually come up in a boat and attempted to force their way on board the steamer, but were resisted by the military force on board, upon which Burgevine came from the cabin, and tried to find a knife for the purpose of cutting the steamer's hawser, and setting her adrift; and on an attempt being made to stop him by the linguist Chao-chih Kwang, he broke into violence and attacked the linguist, upon whom he inflicted a wound bringing blood, and further struck with his fists the officer and soldiers on board the steamer.

The Futai was overwhelmed with astonishment on the receipt of the foregoing report. Burgevine already by his enlisting with the banditti at Soochow had committed an offence of such magnitude, that whether judged by Chinese or foreign law, he had equally incurred the penalty of death. It was obviously the duty of the American Consul to inflict a fitting punishment, without waiting to be called on by any one to do so; whilst the Futai, for his part, acted with a leniency really beyond the ordinary bounds, in refraining from measures of extremity when he gave himself up, on repentance of his transgression, and in simply calling on his Consul to prevent further mischief, by sending him out of the country. The Consul having engaged to do this, how is it that he neither kept him under surveillance nor deported him, so that Burgevine has been allowed to be at large, and to work mischief in Shanghai.

With regard to his attempt again to reach Soochow, and his forcing his way on board the Futai's steamer, and his violent attempt to carry her off, the Futai has to observe that he believes the crime of piracy to be dealt with among foreign nations with even greater severity than that of joining the banditti in China; and there is the clearest testimony from a multitude of witnesses to prove that Burgevine, on his joining the banditti at Soochow, seized and carried off the "Kao-chiao" steamer from the Sung-Kiang creek. This, indeed, is admitted even by Burgevine himself; but on the grounds of his having made voluntary submission, he has not been called to account for past offences. Now, however, he still shows himself insensible of contrition. General Gordon's steamer, the "Firefly," is carried off at midnight of the 14th by twenty or thirty foreign desperadoes, and on the day after, Burgevine, with the American Townsend and others, board the "Firefly." Whilst deceitfully stating that he wanted to take passage in her to Soochow, he privily called together a band of his confederates, for the purpose of seizing the vessel; and hereupon Townsend came to the Futai's camp, with a statement of these facts. There can thus, apparently, be no doubt that the seizure of the steamer

"Firefly," on the previous day, must have been accomplished by a gang acting under Burgevine's direction.

Actions such as these are truly beyond the pale of human nature.

The Futai is aware that vagabonds of foreign nationalities at Shanghai are subject to the control of their respective Consuls, as regards the power of arresting and keeping them in order. But if their Consuls take no notice of them whatever, and leave them at liberty to seize and carry off Chinese vessels, then, for the future, when Chinese offenders commit acts of piracy on foreign merchant ships, the Chinese authorities might similarly decline to take up the matter. To what results could such proceedings lead?

The Futai handed Burgevine over to the American Consul, with the request that he would keep him under surveillance and proceed to bring him to trial; and the Consul hereupon called upon him and stated personally that he would for the future restrain Burgevine from further mischief, and not allow him to go a step beyond the foreign settlement; and that as soon as there should be an American steamer on her way home he would send Burgevine away. The American Consul, however, has repeatedly given his promise to take a step of this kind, and yet has never been found to take any real action. His wish is undoubtedly to screen Burgevine, but his motives cannot be divined. At Shanghai, however, the trading mart of all nations, Chinese and foreign officials have long been connected in the administration of affairs, and the provisions of the Treaties have hitherto been scrupulously adhered to on both sides, each mutually inculcating upon those respectively subject to their control the duty of orderly conduct. If now Burgevine, after the disturbances he has committed, be not dealt with in an equitable manner, and an united effort be not made to effect reform, numberless evils must accrue to both Chinese and foreign administration of public affairs.

In addition, therefore, to again urging the American Consul to keep Burgevine in close custody, and to deport him without delay, and also writing to a similar effect to the French Consul, the Futai has to communicate herewith with the Honourable Consul, whom he desires as speedily as possible to call upon Mr. Seward to deal with Burgevine with the stringency prescribed by law, and to deport him promptly to his native country, in order to remove a cause of disorders from the spot, and to maintain relations of harmony and good will.

A most urgent communication.

Tung-Chih, 2nd year, 10th month, 8th day.

Inclosure 3 in No. 125.

Acting Consul Markham to Le, Futai.

Shanghai, November 20, 1863.

THE Undersigned has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatch of the 18th instant, referring to the arrest of Burgevine on board your Excellency's steamer the "Feiong," subsequently to the seizure of the steamer "Firefly," and urging the Undersigned to call upon the United States Consul to effect Burgevine's immediate deportation.

In reply he has to state that with regard to Burgevine, the United States Consul, to whom your Excellency handed him over in conformity with the Treaty, will doubtless take such steps as are called for under the circumstances; and in respect of the more general question of the dangerous characters who seriously disturb the peace of Shanghai, the Undersigned has great pleasure in informing your Excellency that the Consuls of the Treaty Powers having met at this Consulate on the 17th instant, invited a general meeting of all the foreign Consuls resident at Shanghai on the 19th, for the purpose of consulting upon the measures rendered necessary under the present state of affairs. The result of their deliberations will be communicated to your Excellency by a joint address, and it is greatly to be hoped that by means of combined efforts to this end, a much-needed reform may be carried into effect.

The Undersigned avails himself of this opportunity to renew the expression of his esteem and regard.

(Signed)

JOHN MARKHAM.

No. 126.

Sir E. Lugard to Mr. Hammond.—(Received January 28.)

Sir,

War Office, January 27, 1864.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for War to transmit to you, for the information of Earl Russell, the accompanying copy of a despatch from the Officer commanding the garrison at Hong Kong, in which he reports the surrender to Major Gordon's force of Soochow, a large city lately in possession of the rebels, and that, owing to treachery on the part of the Imperialists, a great massacre had taken place within the city.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWARD LUGARD.

Inclosure in No. 126.

Colonel Reeves to Earl de Grey and Ripon.

My Lord,

Hong Kong, December 14, 1863.

I AM directed by the Major-General commanding Her Majesty's forces in China to acquaint you that Soochow, a large city lately in possession of the rebels, surrendered to Major Gordon's force on the 6th instant, but owing to some great treachery on the part of the Imperialists a great massacre took place within the city, which has placed Major Gordon in a very perilous position, as he has guaranteed the safety of any rebels remaining in the city after the gates were opened and the town handed over to him. Major-General Brown had embarked for Hong Kong, but when the news reached him, immediately landed, and proceeded at once to Soochow, to learn all particulars personally from Major Gordon.

He has desired me, therefore, to inform your Lordship of what had occurred, which will account for his being unable to write himself by this mail; and he has further authorised me to sign any documents absolutely requiring immediate transmission to England.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. M. REEVES.

No. 127.

Acting Consul Markham to Earl Russell.—(Received January 30, 1864.)

My Lord,

Shanghai, December 8, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to forward for your Lordship's information, copy of my despatch dated the 6th December, 1863, addressed to Sir F. W. A. Bruce.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM.

Inclosure in No. 127.

Acting Consul Markham to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Shanghai, December 6, 1863.

INFORMATION has just reached me of the fall of Soochow. The city was given up yesterday at 8 A.M.

It appears that the principal rebel Wangs had come to the conclusion that resistance was desperate, and that to surrender was their only chance. The Chung Wang, after his defeat some days ago by General Major Gordon, proposed to evacuate Soochow, raise the blockade of Nanking, and march in some other direction. The other leaders would not consent to this; and the result of their deliberations was that the Mo Wang was seized by his brother chiefs, who decapitated him, and the city was delivered up to the Imperialists.

I have as yet no details, but shall furnish you with them as soon as received.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM.

No. 128.

Acting Consul Markham to Mr. Hammond.—(Received January 30, 1864.)

Sir,

Shanghai, December 8, 1863.

I HAVE just heard, as the post is closing, that the city of Soochow was taken possession of by the Futai on the 5th instant, and that his Excellency refused to allow any of Major Gordon's disciplined men into the city, the consequence of which was that they mutinied, and his Excellency very nearly lost his head. Major Gordon had, however, sufficient influence to quiet them, and he has fallen back on Quang-san in disgust, leaving Soochow under charge of the Futai and General Ching.

I think it advisable you should hear the latest from that quarter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM.

No. 129.

Acting Consul Markham to Earl Russell.—(Received January 12, 1864.)

My Lord,

Shanghai, December 10, 1863

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, copy of my despatch of this date addressed to Sir F. W. A. Bruce.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM.

Inclosure 1 in No. 129.

Acting Consul Markham to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Shanghai, December 11, 1863.

I HAVE to report that, in consequence of the treacherous conduct of the Futai towards the Wangs who surrendered the city of Soochow, Major Gordon has retired to Quang-san. At his request Prince Wittgenstein came down to see General Brown, and confer with him. The Prince arrived just in time to stop the General, who was on board the mail steamer bound to Hong Kong. He at once came on shore, and has now proceeded to Quang-san.

I have no official news whatever even of the surrender of Soochow, but I inclose for your information a memorandum by Major Gordon relative to the events occurring at Soochow which appeared in this morning's paper, and which the editor informs me he inserted at Major Gordon's request.

I have nothing further at present to communicate.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM.

Inclosure 2 in No. 129.

Memorandum on the Events occurring between the 29th November and 7th December, 1863.

THE morning after the failure of the attack by night on the Low-mün stockades, General Ching came to me, and informed me that Lar Wang, Ling Wang, Kong Wang, and Pe Wang, with thirty-five Teenchwangs and their followers, had opened negotiations with him for the coming over of their troops, that these men composed their quarter of the garrison, and had possession of four out of the six gates of Soochow, viz., Sheh-mün, Tcha-mün, Tche-mün, and Low-mün, and that he had entertained their views, and had already seen Kong Wang. He said that they would have difficulty in disposing of Mo Wang, who was averse to a surrender; but that, if we resumed our attack on the Low-mün stockades, they would endeavour to shut him out of the city. I consented to the defection with a good deal of pleasure, as I considered that if the rebels fought we should lose heavily.

On the night of the 28th November, Chung Wang arrived in the city from Wusieh, and was present at the combat of the 29th. His arrival made a change in the state of affairs, and the disaffected were unable to carry out their intention of closing the gates on Mo Wang. They, however, sent over three Teenchwangs on the night of the 30th November, and proposed to remain neutral if we attacked the city, and would trust us not to touch their men or horses, their men to be distinguished by white turbans. These Teenchwangs told us that Chung Wang on his return to the city after his defeat had proposed to vacate Nanking and Soochow, and for the whole Taeping force to go down to Kwangsi, and in fact, give up the cause. The Mo Wang was averse to this, and proposed to remain and fight it out (I have since learned that he was most anxious to see me, and, I think, to see what could be done. This I learnt from two Frenchmen who came out after his death, of whom more hereafter). The other Wangs also did not meet the Chung Wang's views, as they intended coming over. Chung Wang then left the city, and proceeded to Wusieh. General Ching came to me on the 1st December, and asked me if I would like to see Lar Wang. I said no, unless it was necessary, and told Ching at the same time that if the Futai did not grant the Wangs sufficiently good terms as to induce them to come over, I thought our attack on the city might be foiled, as we had lost heavily in officers and men in the attacks of 27th and 29th November, and a little hitch with the bridge, which had to be 70 yards long, might cause a repulse. I told Ching on the same day that I could not see the necessity of my seeing Lar Wang. He however pressed it, and I consented to meet him at the North Gate that evening. I accordingly went and met Lar Wang in General Ching's boat. His first words were "that he wanted to obtain help from me." I answered I was most happy to help him, and then I told him that his proposal to remain neutral would be of no avail, and that I could not accept it, as I should be only deceiving him and his chief if I did so, inasmuch as if the city fell by assault, I could not, with an undisciplined force such as the one I command, restrain them from looting every one, and that therefore unless they could give a Gate, it would be better for them to fight, or else vacate the city. I then told the Lar Wang what I thought of the Taeping prospects, and the little chance of success. I said that I wanted to make the Imperialists and rebels good friends; that since the rise of the rebellion, the Imperialists had much changed, and did not dare, from fear of the foreign Governments, to perpetrate cruelties as heretofore. He said he would see with General Ching what he could do about the city, and that he had no fear of Mo Wang knowing of his having seen me, or of Chung Wang either—that he had enough troops to keep both in check. I then left, and General Ching told me the next day that Lar Wang had decided to see the other Wangs and to consult on the course of proceeding. The next day, the 3rd December, General Ching told me that Mo Wang had some idea of Lar Wang's negotiations, and wanted to decapitate him, but that Lar Wang was prepared. Lar Wang also sent out to tell General Ching that the other Wangs agreed to come over; that he personally wanted no command, but merely permission to retire to his home with his property, but that some of the other Wangs wanted to get commands of different sorts. He told me further that Lar Wang had some difficulty in seizing Mo Wang. On the morning of the 4th December, General Ching came to me, and told me that Lar Wang had determined and agreed with him to get Mo Wang on the wall of the city, and to throw him down and hand him over to us a prisoner. I went to General Ching, and told him I must have Mo Wang given over to me, to which he acceded willingly, and in fact joyfully, as he had known him in former days. I then went to the Futai, who was out; but I saw a very high civil Mandarin, named Pow, who undertook to tell the Futai that Mo Wang must be my prisoner. I told him to tell the Futai that I would secure his not giving any more trouble in China.

I had not come back to my quarters five minutes before General Ching sent me over two Frenchmen who had just come into the lines. They told me that that afternoon, at 2 P.M., all the chiefs had been assembled in Mo Wang's palace, and after a dinner they had offered up prayers, and adjourned to the great court, and having put on their robes, crowns, &c., Mo Wang mounted his throne and began an address, in which he stated their difficulties, and expatiated on the fidelity of the Kwangsi and Canton men. The other Wangs answered him, and the discussion got higher and higher, till Kong Wang got up and took off his robes. Mo Wang asked him what he was doing, when Kong Wang drew a dagger and stabbed Mo Wang in the neck. The Mo Wang fell over the table in front of the throne, and the other Wangs seized him and decapitated him in the entrance. They then mounted their horses, and rode off to their troops, Mo Wang's head being sent to General Ching. Mo Wang's men and the other troops looted the palace. There was no fighting in the city till the morning of the 5th, when the Lar Wang's men had some trouble with the Cantonese, and drove them out of the city, killing some fifty or sixty of them. General Ching's men advanced, and, with a small body, took charge of the Low-mun, my men being kept fallen in, as they were under stricter discipline than the Imperialist soldiers are.

On the night of the 4th December the rebels all shaved their heads. I went to the Futai, and, telling him that it would not do let my men remain idle, proposed to him to march on Wusieh if he would give the men compensation of two months' pay, as they had received no reward since I had taken the command. He objected to it; and I told him if he could only promise the matter could be settled—well. He still objected, and I then told him I should leave his service, and went myself to the city. The Imperialists had some men straying about, but not many. I went straight to Lar Wang's house, and saw him and all the Wangs. I asked him if all was right. He said that everything was satisfactory, and appeared quite secure. He had not seen Ching at that time. I went to Mo Wang's palace, and the body was where it had fallen. I then went out of the city, and arrived in time to see General Ching, who came to me on the part of the Futai, to arrange matters. It was now 4 P.M. I told General Ching that I was helpless in the matter. The colonels of regiments and the officers had little authority over them unless they used the harshest means, which they would not do in this question. General Ching offered one month's pay, and the officers refused it. I told Ching that it was not my intention to accept anything; but that I felt that, after the length of time the force had been fighting, it was only right the men who wished to leave should have the means of doing so.

Matters began to look bad, and I at last determined to make the men accept the one month's pay, which I did with difficulty, the men having made an attempt to march down on the Futai. I then, at the Futai's request, gave orders for the march to Quinsan. Ching told me at this time that the Futai had written to Peking, and said that he had extended mercy to the Wangs and the rebels. Next morning, after the troops had left, I started for the city, sending the two steamers to Wu-lung-chiao to meet me, as I expected to be able to retake the "Firefly" easily, from information I had received from the letters in Mo Wang's house, and from some Europeans who were with Mo Wang, and who had escaped. I went to the Low-mun, and there learnt that Lar Wang and the other Wangs and chiefs were to come out and see the Futai at 12 noon, and that the city would then be given over. I thought I had better see Lar Wang before I went out, so I called at his palace, and took him aside and asked him if everything was all right, and if he wanted me to do anything. He said no, that everything was proper. I told him I was going to the Tai-hu, and he said "Why not wait? I am coming to see you." I said it was important business, and that, unless he particularly wished it, or thought it unnecessary, I would not stay. He said very good, and I left. He passed me on his way to the Low-mun very soon after on horseback, with all the Wangs, going, as I supposed, to the Futai. I went then to Mo Wang's palace, and then to the east or Low-mun, to while away the time till the steamers could get round from Wai-quai-dong to Wu-lung-chow. From the top of the Low-mun I saw a large crowd of people near Ching's stockades, and thought it was the ceremony of submission going on. A few minutes after, perhaps 12.30 P.M., a large body of Imperial soldiers came up, and passing the gate, rushed cheering into the city, as they generally do into vacated stockades. I thought little of it, more than expressing my disapprobation to some of them. They, however, went on pouring in and firing off their muskets in the air, and yelling. Ching then came up and looked rather pale. I asked him if the interview was over, and if it had been satisfactory. He said that Lar Wang had not been to the Futai at all. I said I had seen him going with the others. He said no; that he could not say for certain, but that he thought he had run away. I said I could not make out what for, as I had just seen Lar Wang, and he said everything was all right. I asked Ching if there was any trouble. He said that Lar Wang had demanded the command of 2,000 men and of half the city of Soochow, the division to be a wall, and that the Futai had refused it, and also that he had let some of Chung Wang's men in. The latter part I knew to be false, but, strange to say, I believed the former portion. I asked him where Lar Wang could go to; he said that he would not go back to the rebels, but that he would go to some village and settle there. I thought the thing so strange that I asked Dr. Macartney, who was by me, to go to Lar Wang's house, and to see him, and tell him not to fear anything. Ching then told me that his men alone would be allowed in, and that there would be no looting; and, as I knew before that he had his men in good discipline, I had no fear, and therefore rode round the wall with him. He kept on firing volleys in the air, which I remonstrated at, and could not make out the object. He said it was merely to prevent Kwangsi men from doing anything to his men while they were taking possession of the city. I became uneasy about Lar Wang, and, at the south, or Pou-mun, I left General Ching, and rode off to Lar Wang's palace. I got there at dark and found it had been gutted. I was then met by Lar Wang's uncle, who asked me to come to his house. Being only with my interpreter I had no one to send to General Ching or for my troops; but the entreaties of this Teenchwang being so great, I agreed to do so, and therefore went with Lar Wang's family to his house. When I got there his men were all fallen in, and the streets barricaded. I wanted to send my interpreter for assistance, but they would not let him go. I therefore remained till 2 A.M., keeping away the Imperial looting parties. At 2 A.M. I sent my interpreter and an Imperial soldier who was with my horse, to get the steamers round to Wai-quai-dong to make the Futai answerable, and also sent for my body-guard. After he had started, the man who went with him came back and said he had been beheaded by the Imperialists. I remained till 4 A.M., and then went out to send orders to the steamers myself. I was taken by the Imperialists and detained an hour. At last I got to the Low-mun, and sent the body-guard to the Lar Wang's uncle's house; but it was too late; the Imperialists had entered and gutted it. I then went to the Low-mun, and met there General Ching, to whom I gave my opinion. He was most anxious to excuse himself, but I did not listen to him. At this time I did not know the Wangs had been beheaded. I then went down to Ching's stockades, and met Major Baily commanding Ching's artillery there. He said that General Ching was very much put out; that the Futai had ordered him to execute the Wangs, and had given orders to the troops to enter the city; that he had lost face, &c. Baily then told me that he had Lar Wang's son, and brought him to me. I refused any communication with General Ching. Lar Wang's son came to my boat, and, pointing to the other side, said it was there that the Wangs had been executed. I went over and recognized Kong Wang's, Lar Wang's, Sieh Wang's, and Sung Wang's heads, but the body of Lar Wang was not to be seen, having been buried. I took, at the son's request, Lar Wang's head. The bodies had been cut down the chest, and the wounds on the head were most horrible, showing the brutality of the executioners. I then was waiting for the steamers, as I had heard that there were some high persons still in custody, and I thought that I could frighten the Futai into giving them up. He, however, heard of my arrival, and went off to the city. I left him a note telling him my opinion, and then moved off with the steamers to Quinsan. I received, just before leaving, a letter from Fu-tzu-quai, telling me that a chief had come over with 3,000 men to my officer in command, and that he, the officer in command, had received them. I sent orders to him to inform the chief of the treachery, and to let him go, with his men and arms if he liked, or else to bring his troops to Quinsan.

This is a brief summary of the late events, which will prove to the Imperial Government a most fatal blow. I imagine that the Futai and General Ching arranged this matter, and know that it is viewed by the mass of Mandarins with disgust.

Lar Wang's son tells me that Chung Wang was willing to come over, and that all the people in the silk districts are the same, but how to come they know not. Is not this a time for foreign Governments to come forward and arrange the terms? The power is in this force, if the authority from Peking is given to it to act under some honest Chinaman. What is now to be feared is that foreigners will

join the rebels, and will thus cause the war to linger on, to the extermination of the unfortunate people on whom the burden falls, and to the detriment of trade of every sort. That the rebels really do not possess the qualities of government cannot be doubted. They merely hold cities, and let the villages govern themselves. The head chief may know something of the Christian religion, but I will answer for it that nine-tenths of the rebels have no real ideas on the subject. It is sincerely to be hoped that the Government will interfere at this time.

C. E. GORDON, *Major Commanding.*

P.S. Prince F. de Wittgenstein was present at most of the above occurrences, and can vouch for the correctness of the same.

No. 130.

Acting Consul Markham to Earl Russell.—(Received February 18, 1864.)

My Lord,

Shanghai, December 19, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to inclose for your Lordship's information, copy of my despatch of this date, addressed to Sir F. W. A. Bruce.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM.

Inclosure 1 in No. 130.

Acting Consul Markham to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Shanghai, December 19, 1863.

IN continuation of my despatch of the 11th instant, I have now to forward the inclosed copy of a Report by Mr. Mayers, with respect to the proceedings in which he became engaged at Soochow, at the desire of General Brown, presenting an account of the views expressed on the spot, concerning the recent lamentable transactions.

Since General Brown's return from Soochow, no further communication has passed with the Futai, but I have received several private advances from various confidants of his, intimating his anxiety to see matters placed, through intercession on my part, upon their former footing with Major Gordon. I have confined myself to replying in the tenor of General Brown's previous language to the Futai, wishing the latter distinctly to understand that, inasmuch as by his own act he has rendered it impossible for Major Gordon to serve with him, there is no alternative but to await the decision which may be pronounced upon this matter at Peking. In the meantime, the disciplined force remains at Quang-san.

The Consular body having met on the 16th instant, to discuss the recent events, General Brown laid before the meeting the Report he had received from Major Gordon. I inclose a copy of the minutes of this meeting; the Report itself having been sent to you by General Brown, as he informs me, I need not include. Some anxiety has been felt, lest the Futai should refuse to continue the payment of the disciplined force, in consequence of its inactivity, resulting from the present condition of affairs, but General Brown is of opinion, from the tone with which the Futai met him, that such an emergency is not probable; should it, however, arise, I trust that, by firm representations, so suicidal an act may be averted.

I have just learned that General Ching has resigned the command of his troops for the present, having requested sick leave; but whether this has taken place, owing to any disposition on the Futai's part to shift upon him the blame of what occurred (as is not improbable), I have not been informed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM.

Inclosure 2 in No. 130.

Mr. Mayers to Acting Consul Markham.

Sir,

Shanghai, December 14, 1863.

HAVING unexpectedly been required to discharge official duties, during the few days leave of absence you gave me, on hearing the fall of Soochow, I have to lay before you a report of my proceedings.

Having left on the 7th instant, I met Prince Wittgenstein on the following day, when half way to Soochow, and learnt from him with astonishment the particulars of the Futai's treachery and Major Gordon's withdrawal to Quang-san. I at once directed my course to the latter place, which I reached the same night. I found Major Gordon most powerfully moved by his feelings of indignation and abhorrence, and anxious to mark in an unmistakeable manner his own and the public sense of the wrong committed. On the following day I saw a mandarin of considerable rank, named Pwan, who arrived as a Commissioner from the Futai to endeavour to effect a reconciliation. This officer, who bears a good character for honesty, admitted without reserve the ignominy of the Futai's act; but, as I acted by Major Gordon's request, as interpreter, he implored me, for the sake of the country, to do all in my power to appease Major Gordon's mind, deprecating especially the idea of his abandoning the command, and thus inevitably causing the disciplined force to fall into disorder, and to desert most probably to the rebels. Major Gordon impressed upon Pwan not only the indignation he felt himself, but also the consequences to be expected in the revulsion of public opinion on its becoming known that these acts of treachery had been committed, and repeated to him his fixed resolve to hold no further communication with the Futai. I also pointed out to Pwan that, in the position in which the Futai had placed himself, it was impossible to expect that Major Gordon would do more than conscientiously act for the maintenance of obedience in his force, and for the prevention of disaster to the territory already reconquered from the rebels, until a reference to higher authorities should lay down rules for his guidance.

I endeavoured on this and other occasions to obtain some light on the subject of the Futai's breach of faith, which Pwan himself was the more ready to acknowledge, inasmuch as he himself is a native of Soochow, and interested in the preservation of the city from the pillage which actually befell it on the 6th instant. From what I gathered, it appeared very doubtful that it had ever been intended to keep the engagements entered into with the Na-Wang and his associates. Whilst it was alleged that the Futai was alarmed by the number of their troops, with whom he did not know what to do, it was also stated that General Ching was secretly fearful lest the Na-Wang should eventually supplant him as a commander, and had thus determined on his destruction. It appears that the chiefs, on reaching the camp on the 6th instant, were received with friendly demonstrations by the Futai, who mentioned to each the decoration and rank he was to expect from the Throne, and were then handed over to General Ching, who held them in colloquy until the executioners suddenly rushed upon them. No sooner was the deed committed, than the order was given for the troops to rush into the city on the east side, in the hope of terrifying the rebels, and driving them (as actually occurred) in panic through the western gates. The pillage which, under such circumstances, was inevitable, was also a further means of satisfying the demands of the troops for compensation.

Although anxious to return to Shanghai within the period of my leave, I was induced to await the General's arrival, which was expected in consequence of Prince Wittgenstein's report to him, and I spent the intervening day (the 10th) at Soochow, where I found the city completely gutted, and many conflagrations not yet extinct. Order, however, prevailed, and committees of mandarins were busily engaged in classifying the remaining inhabitants, who were being removed to their respective districts, whilst public distributions of food were also being carried on. I saw but one corpse bearing marks of violence, though the number of deserted infants, mostly perishing, was considerable. Not a single article of any value appeared to have been left in the quarter of the city I traversed, and loot was publicly sold by the soldiers in and around General Ching's stockades.

General Brown having arrived on the 10th, desired me to remain with him officially, and on the following day I proceeded with Captain Murray, R.A., to Soochow, to inform the Futai that the General intended to see him. The Futai appeared ill at ease, but assumed a confident air on receiving me, and remarking on my air of reserve, inquired whether I could not communicate what the General had to say without troubling him to come personally to Soochow, adding, "everything is quite right. is it not?" Suddenly

changing this tone, however, the Futai said "the fact is the men are killed, and cannot be brought to life again!" and continued deprecating any cessation of friendly feelings in consequence of an act which was justified by Chinese ethics, and in which foreign nations, however much they might differ from this view, had no concern. I would not enter into discussion, and having arranged General Brown's interview, withdrew to the house occupied by Pwan, where the latter renewed his supplications that the affair might be condoned. He asseverated that, notwithstanding the confidence assumed by the Futai, he was secretly repentant of his act, and would seek to atone for it by recommending to the Throne for employment the Na-Wang's adopted son, whom Major Gordon had rescued and taken to Quang-san. In a long interview, I pointed out to Pwan that I could not act as he wished, as mediator, and endeavoured to impress upon him the important bearing on foreign relations with China which the conduct of the Futai on meeting General Brown was likely to have. On his beseeching me to suggest some line of action which might lead to a reconciliation with Major Gordon, I observed that, in any case, the Futai would do well to abandon the confident tone with which he had encountered myself, and to acknowledge in an official manner the sense he was represented as feeling of his misconduct.

Among other things, Pwan enlarged greatly upon the mortification he felt on reflecting that, but for this act of treachery, the chiefs commanding the important cities of Hoochow and Kia-king, to the south of the Tai-hoo Lake, who were followers of the Na Wang, would undoubtedly have imitated his surrender. He attempted, in a circuitous manner, to relieve the Futai of blame by casting it upon Ching.

On the following day I accompanied General Brown from Quang-san towards Soochow, and on reaching the camps at Wai-Kwa-dang found that the Futai had come from the city to await the General's arrival. This was evidently intended as a conciliatory movement, but it was not attended by the presentation of any letter referring to the wrong committed, as I had inferred from my conversation with Pwan, might be expected. General Brown, on reaching the Pavilion, was received by the Futai with Ching and Pwan; and expressed to the former the feelings which had induced him to make this visit. The Futai was visibly disturbed, but evaded any acknowledgement that he had done wrong. Should he be declared to have offended, he would submit without a murmur to any punishment the Emperor might decree; but he was of opinion that, as the chief Chinese authority in the province, he was empowered to take what measures he thought fit with Chinese offenders. He did not, however, attempt to deny that he had implicated Major Gordon in the act committed, by prevailing on him to share in the preceding consultations. He next inquired what it was that General Brown required of him, and was informed that as a necessary preliminary, he was expected to declare the complete exoneration of Major Gordon from all share in the transactions of the 6th instant. This he hastened to asseverate was obvious. Major Gordon had known nothing of what took place; and General Brown continued to say that as further action on the part of Major Gordon, under present circumstances, would be impossible, the disciplined force would remain inactive, under his protection, until the Peking Government should pronounce upon what had passed. He warned the Futai, however, of the danger incurred, by the dissatisfaction prevailing among both officers and men, and stated that he had induced Major Gordon to sacrifice his own feelings by continuing to retain the command for the present, though this would be only on the condition stated above. The Futai signified the relief he felt on hearing that Major Gordon would continue in command, and remarked that he was content that the force should remain quiescent. On General Brown's taking leave of him, the Futai suddenly grasped me by the arm, and said: "I look to you to arrange matters, and prevent a breach of friendship!" He was evidently in an exceedingly anxious frame of mind; but I could only reply that the matter was out of my hands.

I trust I may be judged to have acted rightly in declining to fall in with the propositions I have referred to, having for their object to induce me to act as mediator, and to bring back Major Gordon to his former relation with the Futai. Even had it been in my power to remove the indignation with which Major Gordon was penetrated, I should still have considered the occurrence too grave to be smoothed over after a mere temporary protest; and I confined myself to keeping General Brown fully informed of everything that passed. I also took the opportunity, afforded by my interviews with Pwan, to point out the effect which I thought would probably be produced on public opinion abroad by the knowledge of the Futai's conduct; a consideration which caused him much uneasiness.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. S. F. MAYERS.

Inclosure 3 in No. 130.

Extracts from the "Daily Shipping and Commercial News," December 18, 1863.

MINUTES of a Meeting held at the British Consulate, Shanghai, December 16th 1863.

Present—Major-General Brown, Commanding H. B. M.'s Forces in China.
 G. F. Seward, Esq., U. S. Consul-General—Chairman.
 John Markham, Esq., H. M.'s Acting Consul.
 P. Chevrey Rameau, Esq., Gérant du Consulat Général de France.
 A. Heard, Esq., Russian Consul.
 G. B. Dixwell, Esq., Russian Vice-Consul.
 Henry Dent, Esq., Portuguese Consul.
 W. Keswick, Esq., Danish Consul.
 T. Kroes, Esq., Netherlands' Consul.
 Edward Cunningham, Esq., Swedish Consul.
 H. Moore, Esq., Spanish Consul.
 Jas. Hogg, Italian Consul.

Mr. SEWARD having taken the chair, General BROWN remarked that, having understood that on a previous occasion, no official report of the recent occurrences at Soochow had been laid before the Consular body, he was now prepared to lay before the Meeting the official statement from Major Gordon, commanding the disciplined Chinese force, with respect to the surrender of Soochow on the 5th instant, and the execution of the rebel leaders and pillage of the city.

The report was then read.

General BROWN observed that the course he had to take was plain. He should forward the report to Sir Frederick Bruce, in whose hands the decision with respect to the late events and to the future of the disciplined force must rest. It was obvious after the unworthy manner in which Major Gordon had been treated, and the treachery with which the engagements entered into with the rebel leaders, to which Major Gordon had been made a party, were violated, it would be impossible for Major Gordon to co-operate further with the Futai. Unless, in fact, the Government of Peking disavowed the latter's proceedings, and so re-constituted the force as to prevent a recurrence of similar acts, there would be no alternative but to withdraw altogether from active support of the Chinese Government.

Mr. KROES stated that he had heard from M. Bonnefoy, commanding the French force, to the effect that the rebel leaders, after entering into their agreement with the Futai, had sought to fortify themselves within the city, and to oppose further resistance.

General BROWN replied that in the interview he had with the Futai on the 11th instant, the latter did not attempt to advance any justification for his act, simply endeavouring to maintain that, granted he might be considered to have done wrong, foreign nations were not concerned in what had passed. He alleged nothing in justification.

M. RAMEAU inquired what course it was proposed to adopt for immediate action.

General BROWN replied that without by any means converting the disciplined Chinese into a British force, Major Gordon's connection with him, as a British officer, was such that he could not do otherwise than afford him protection and support, but that his instructions to him were to remain inactive, until the decision of the Imperial Government on this question shall be received. His attitude is to be one purely defensive, and he will cover Soochow, as a point indispensable for the safety of Shanghai. As regarded the retention of command by Major Gordon, he felt happy in having been able to see him still at the head of the force, since, were he to resign, as he is undoubtedly anxious to do, there can be no doubt whatever that the larger part would join the rebels, and carry to them an accession of strength which the Imperialists would be powerless to resist. Of this danger he had fully warned the Futai, who, he believed, was quite alive to it, and who expressed relief when he was told that Major Gordon would still remain in command.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM suggested that the Chinese are frequently blind to the most imminent dangers; and adverted to the confusion certain to ensue in case the Futai should refuse to continue the regular payments to the force.

Mr. DENT was strongly of opinion that a material guarantee for the payment of the force should be obtained, and thought that the Consular body, by virtue of their interest in the safety of Shanghai, were entitled to require such a provision. He enlarged upon

the dissatisfaction prevailing among the officers and men of the force, in consequence of the recent conduct of the Futai, and pointed out the serious danger that would result from mutiny owing to the withholding of payment.

The following resolution was next offered by Mr. MARKHAM, and seconded by Mr. KESWICK :—

“That this Meeting, as representing the whole foreign community, views with unqualified disapprobation the late proceedings of the Futai at Soochow, as acts of extreme treachery abhorrent to human nature, calculated to withdraw from the Imperial cause the sympathies of Western nations, and the aid of the gallant officers who have hitherto assisted them.”—Passed unanimously.

Discussion next ensued on the subject of the measures likely to be rendered necessary, pending the receipt of the views of the Government of Peking, and of instruction from the foreign ministers. It was considered by several Consuls advisable that the meeting should not separate without the adoption of some means for securing the pay of the disciplined force, whilst by others it was thought a matter beyond the province of the meeting to discuss, and an eventuality which might be left to be dealt with by the military authorities.

A resolution to the effect that a material guarantee should be obtained, securing the pay of the force, was proposed by Mr. CUNNINGHAM, and seconded by Mr. DENT, but was not carried.

The following resolution was proposed by Mr. HOGG, and seconded by Mr. KESWICK :—

“That this Meeting thanks General BROWN for the information afforded, and tenders him its cordial support in any conjuncture which may arise.” Carried.

A vote of thanks to the Chairman having been passed, the Meeting dissolved.

GEO. F. SEWARD.

Chairman.

No. 131.

Sir E. Lugard to Mr. Hammond.—(Received February 20.)

Sir,

War Office, February 26, 1864.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for War to transmit to you for the information of Earl Russell the accompanying copy of a despatch from Major-General Brown, commanding the Forces in China, inclosing a memorandum by Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon, giving the particulars of the capture of Soochow and of the events which followed it, with the copy of a letter which he (General Brown) had been induced by those events to address to Her Majesty's Minister at Peking on the subject.

Earl de Grey has signified to General Brown the approval of Her Majesty's Government of his proceedings, and also of the conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon on the same occasion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD LUGARD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 131.

Major-General Brown to Earl de Grey and Ripon.

My Lord,

Head-quarter, Hong Kong, December 26, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to forward the inclosed report of the particulars of the capture of Soochow, and the subsequent doings of the Futai, which has caused me to address Sir Frederick Bruce on the subject, and beg to forward a copy of my letter for your Lordship's information.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. G. BROWN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 131.

Major-General Brown to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Head-quarters, Shanghai, December 17, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to forward the inclosed report from Major Gordon, Royal Engineers, commanding the Anglo-Chinese Force in this Province, for the information of your Excellency.

The circumstances attending and preceding the occupation of Soochow by the Imperialists are so calculated to produce an impression on public opinion unfavourable to the line of policy adopted by Her Majesty's Government in China, that I trust I need not apologize for entreating your most earnest consideration of the whole subject.

I received the first intimation of events passing in Soochow by a hurried note from Major Gordon, which reached me during the forenoon of the 8th instant; a second note, which, although written previously, did not reach me until a later period, produced the impression that affairs were proceeding favourably, consequently I was so far from apprehending the gravity of the crisis, that I decided to carry out my intention of proceeding to Hong-Kong by the mail steamer, and was on board when Prince Wittgenstein despatched by Major Gordon, in the steamer "Tsatilee," brought a more complete and detailed narrative of events.

The additional information thus received determined me to accede to the urgent entreaties of Major Gordon, of which the Prince was the bearer, and to proceed to Quang-san, the head-quarters of Major Gordon's Force at once.

I arrived at Quang-san about 3 o'clock P.M. the following day, and immediately received from Major Gordon a report which differed but slightly from the more carefully compiled narrative enclosed. Major Gordon had been unable to express in writing the intense indignation and disgust with which the infamous and dastardly conduct of the Futai had inspired him.

You will perceive by Major Gordon's narrative that he was able to withdraw his Force from before Soochow to Quang-san only under the formal promise from the Futai of one month's pay to the officers and soldiers, and that it required all his influence to prevail on them to accept these terms. The subsequent treachery of the Imperial authorities had, however, destroyed the confidence of all ranks; their cruelties had turned the sympathies of Europeans in favour of the rebels, and I found it necessary in order to restore discipline, and to avert a perhaps total defection of the force, to take Major Gordon and his force formally under my command.

This move on my part, I am happy to inform your Excellency, had the best effect; all ranks now expressed their perfect satisfaction and reliance, and every symptom of hesitation disappeared from the force under Major Gordon's command.

I considered it expedient to have an interview with the Futai, with the view of hearing any explanatory statement he might have to offer, and to communicate to him my views on recent events, and explain the future relations between himself and Major Gordon.

I therefore despatched the interpreter to the Consulate (Mr. Mayers), accompanied by two of my officers, to convey to him my desire for an interview.

Having thus prepared the way, I proceeded the following day to Soochow, but was met at Ching's Stockade by the Futai, who had come out from the city to meet me.

I speedily ascertained that, though the Futai was prepared to take on himself the whole responsibility of the murder of the Wangs, and the sacking of the city, and fully to exonerate Major Gordon from all blame, he was either unable or unwilling to offer any exculpation, or explanation of his conduct, and it only remained for me to express my opinion and future intentions.

This I did in as few words as possible. I expressed the indignation and grief with which the English people, together with all the civilized nations of the world, would regard his cruelty and perfidy. I exposed to him my views on the impolicy of a fruitless severity which paralyzed his friends, and drove the rebels to desperation, at the time when we had good reason to believe they were prepared to capitulate and return to their homes in peace. I then informed him that I should insist on the promised reward of one month's pay; that I deemed it my duty to refer the whole matter to our Minister at Peking, and that pending such reference, Major Gordon had received instructions from me to suspend all active aid to the Imperialist's cause, further than protecting Soochow, knowing its importance to the safety of Shanghai, and warning the rebels to abstain from attacking his position. I concluded by expressing my unhesitating conviction, that after what had

occurred, my Government would withdraw all assistance hitherto afforded to the Imperial cause, recall Major Gordon, and all English subjects serving under him, and disband the Anglo-Chinese Force.

I left Quang-san the following day, and arrived here on the 14th instant. I purpose leaving this to-morrow for Hong-Kong, where I shall await with anxiety the receipt of your Excellency's views on these embarrassing events; and I trust that in my communication with the Futai, while expressing the honour and indignation we must all feel at the treachery and cruelty practised, I have left the door open for the adoption of any course of action you may be prepared to recommend.

I learn to-day, from apparently good authority, that "Woosie," a strong place on the Great Canal, has been evacuated by the rebels and occupied by the Imperialists, an event which will no doubt tend to strengthen the influence of the Futai at Peking.

Before closing this despatch, I trust your Excellency will not deem it out of place if, in a few words, I venture to express my opinion regarding the solution of affairs, which is, that every demand on the part of Major Gordon's force shall be paid in full by the Futai, embracing in the above all outstanding claims, all moneys paid by Major Gordon in obtaining the release of prisoners, secret service money, &c.; further, that every officer be paid a gratuity according to his rank and length of service in the force, the wounded provided for, and the force disbanded, and no foreigner of any nation to be allowed to enter the Chinese army, thus leaving the Chinese to fight their own battles, still myself maintaining the radius of Tait-san, although Quang-san is the real strategical position. To settle the question of claims a Mixed Commission could easily be appointed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. G. BROWN.

Inclosure 3 in No. 131.

Memorandum on the events occurring between the 28th November and 6th December, 1863, inclusive.

ON the morning of the 28th November the head-quarters were moved up from Waiquaidon to General Ching's stockades, and General Ching came to see me; he said that Kong-Wang had been to see him, and that he had proposed to come over with Lar-Wang, Pe-Wang, Ling-Wang, and Such-Wang, thirty-five (35) Trinch-Wangs, and three-fourths ($\frac{3}{4}$ ths) of the garrison of Soochow. General Ching asked me if I thought it a good thing: I told him that with the small force at my disposal, it would be a far safer mode and one more likely to bring the rebellion to a close than if we had to take the city by assault. He said that Kong-Wang was desirous to get Mo-Wang out of the way with his troops, and proposed to shut him out of the city if we renewed our attack on the stockades from which we had been repulsed in our night attack.

The attack of the 29th November has already been reported. After it General Ching came to me and told me that Lar-Wang had sent him a message to say that Chung-Wang had arrived at 2 o'clock A.M. on the 29th November, and had by his presence prevented the execution of their designs. General Ching came to me again on the 1st December to tell me that Chung-Wang had left the city at 3 o'clock A.M., and that Lar-Wang would send out three (3) Trinch-Wangs to him (General Ching) that evening. General Ching asked me to see them, which I did that evening in his boat, they having come into our lines. Some desultory conversation of no importance took place, and I left. On the morning of the 2nd December General Ching came to me again, and asked me if I would see Lar-Wang who he had agreed to meet that night; I said not unless there was any necessity for my doing so; he said he thought it would be a good thing, and finally urged me to go with him that night. I agreed to do so and went up to the evacuated stockades off the North Gate. Lar-Wang arrived at 9 o'clock P.M., and saw General Ching first. General Ching then asked me to come, which I did, and found Lar-Wang and two Trinch-Wangs whom I had previously seen in Ching's boat. Lar-Wang was a man of medium height, dark complexion, and about thirty years of age, with a very intelligent and pleasing countenance. He was a native of Woopoo, and dressed simply in silk, with a black handkerchief on his head. His first expression after seeing me was that he wished me to help him, to which I replied that I should be most happy if he could inform me of the way I could do so.

I should have mentioned previously that General Ching had told me that Lar-Wang had some difficulty about the Mo-Wang and his soldiers, and had proposed to General Ching that we should attack the city, and had promised that his men should remain neuter and wear white turbans if their property and lives were spared. I therefore at once entered into this question with Lar-Wang, and told him that the proposition General Ching had spoken to me of was impracticable, inasmuch if the city was assaulted and taken the pillage would be universal, and that I should be only deceiving him if I told him I could maintain the terms; that it would be better for him and his men to fight if they could arrange no other means, and that if they were desirous of coming over, and could make their terms with the Imperialists, they could give over one gate as a guarantee.

He said he would consult the other Wangs and see what could be done with respect to Mo-Wang and his men. I then asked him to delay as little as possible; he said he wanted to the 6th instant, and I told him that if General Ching asked me to wait I would do so. I then asked Lar-Wang to settle with Ching the terms of the compact. After having told him what I thought of the prospects of the rebellion, how anxious the foreign Governments were for the cessation of hostilities which led to nothing but misery to the inhabitants, how I longed to make the rebels and Imperialists good friends, &c., &c., I took leave, and left Lar-Wang and General Ching to settle matters.

I may here remark that the Imperialists had behaved very well in their negotiations with the rebels; the city of Changce had faith strictly kept with it and the Mandarin camps were full of chiefs who had come over from time to time.

I had therefore not the very remotest idea but that perfect faith would be kept with the Wangs. I expressed to Lar-Wang a hope that the negotiations might not be of much length, as I was apprehensive that Mo-Wang might hear of it. He replied that his men were sufficient to protect him, and that he did not care.

On the morning of the 3rd December General Ching came to me. He was in high spirits, and told me that my interview with Lar-Wang had been most successful, and he thought there was no doubt of their coming out. He came to me again in the afternoon, and I told him that after my heavy loss in officers and men on the 27th and 28th November, it could not be looked on as a certainty that I could take the city, as any hitch with the bridge, which was 70 yards long, might cause a repulse, and that therefore I looked on the Futai as bound to aid the negotiations with all his means. I saw the Futai immediately after and told him he must show mercy to these people, to which he gladly assented. I was the more anxious for this as I knew the disorders which were sure to arise if we took the city, many Mandarins having been to me to request that the women, &c., might be protected, as they were so numerous.

The morning of the 4th December General Ching came to me and told me that Lar-Wang had sent out to say that he had arranged with the other Wangs to get Mo-Wang on the wall to see our preparations for the attacks which were daily going on, and that they would then throw him down and have a boat with an escort to convey him to our side. I told General Ching that Mo-Wang must be my prisoner, to which Ching, who knew Mo-Wang before, gladly assented. I then went to the Futai who was out. I saw Paon, the Mandarin, who owns most of the property around Soochow, and who is of very high rank; he said he would tell the Futai, and I then told him I had asked what I had power to take, and that he must not refuse. I had not returned to my boat five minutes before General Ching sent me two Frenchmen who had ridden out of Soochow. This was at 4 p.m. They said that an assembly of all the Wangs had taken place at Mo-Wang's palace at 11 o'clock a.m., and that after a great dinner they had offered up prayers and adjourned to the great hall of reception. They had all put on their crowns and robes of ceremony and taken their seats on the raised dais. Mo-Wang mounted his throne and commenced a long discourse expatiating on their difficulties and praising the Cantonese and Kwangzi rebels, saying the others were not trustworthy (it appeared afterwards that Mo-Wang had some idea of what was going on and was anxious to try a *coup d'état* himself). Another Wang then got up and the altercation became hotter and hotter, till Kong-Wang got up and took off his robes. Mo-Wang asked him what he was doing. He drew a short dagger and stabbed Mo-Wang in the shoulder. Mo-Wang called out and fell over the table; the other Wangs seized him and dragged him down from the dais, and a Trinch-Wang cut off his head. The chiefs then mounted their horses and rode off to their troops. The head of Moh-Wang was afterwards sent to General Ching.

The Frenchmen said that Mo-Wang had been most anxious to see me for several days, that he had asked them to write to me and ask for an interview, he coming to see me in disguise.

Lar-Wang told General Ching afterwards that my letters which I had written to him respecting coming to terms fell out from his (Mo-Wang's) pockets when they seized him, and I found them myself near the raised dais.

I should have mentioned before that Lar-Wang had told General Ching the night of the 3rd December that Chung-Wang had assembled the chiefs after his defeat on the 29th November and had proposed to them to vacate Soochow and Nankin and return to the South. Moh-Wang would not accede to it as he hoped to hold the city, and had all his property there. The other Wangs knowing of the negotiations did not also entertain the idea. Another reason for Moh-Wang's holding out was that his father and mother were hostages at Nankin with Tien-Wang.

On the morning of the 5th December there was some musquetry to be heard in the city, but it soon ceased, and General Ching advanced some of his men to the East Gate, while some of our men went to the North Gate; but I soon withdrew them as I knew their propensities, and I then went to the Futai and asked him to give the men two (2) months pay, and let the force push on to Woosich and Chan-chiafou.

He objected, although the troops had had no remuneration for any of the places that had fallen, and had had very hard and continuous fighting. I told him I could not keep them in hand unless he assented, and gave him until 3 o'clock p.m., and after that time I could not remain in command. This was a hard fact, but both officers and men were of the same mind, and I had no option. I then went into the city and passed down to Lar-Wang's house, and there met all the Wangs. I asked them if everything had gone on properly and if they were content; they said yes, and appeared quite at ease. Their troops were in the streets and everything appeared orderly. I then went down to Mo-Wang's palace and tried to get his body buried, but the people would not touch it. I then went out to the troops who were under arms, and soon after General Ching came in on the part of the Futai to arrange terms. I referred him to the officers commanding regiments but they could not agree. Ching then came to me and begged me to try and get the force to accept one month's pay. After some demur I determined on making the force accept, as

night was coming on, and I was afraid of the troops within making an attack on the Futai as also on the rebels in the city.

I therefore assembled them, and addressing them I let them know that I had succeeded in obtaining one month's pay. The men made a slight disturbance, which was quickly quelled, and after one attempt to march down on the Futai, dismissed. I left a guard on the Futai's boat that night, and being apprehensive of further trouble if the troops remained, I marched them back at 8 o'clock A.M. on the 6th December, and anticipating no further trouble with the men, I ordered the steamers "Tsatilee" and "Hyson" round to Wuhlungchow, directing my chop to come up to the Pou-mün or South Gate. I then went into the city, to Lar-Wang's house, reaching it at 11:30 o'clock A.M. I had heard that the Wangs had to go out to the Futai at 12 o'clock noon, and that then the city would be given over. I should mention that General Ching had told me on the afternoon of the 5th December that the Futai had written to Peking respecting the capture of Soochow, and stating that he had amnestied the prisoners. At the Lar-Wang's house I met all the Wangs, with their horses saddled, to leave for the Futai. I took Lar-Wang aside and asked him if everything was all right. He said, yes. I then told him I had the intention of going to the Taho Lake to look for the "Firefly." He said he was coming down to see me and would like me to stop two or three days. I said, unless he thought there was an absolute necessity, the business I was going on was too important for me to stop; but that if he thought he had any reason for wishing me to stay, I would do so. He said "No," and I bid him and the other Wangs good-bye, and they all passed me a few minutes afterwards with twenty (20) attendants going towards the Low-mün, or East Gate, on their way to the Futai.

I went down to Mo-Wang's palace, and saw General Ching's men come down to bury Mo-Wang's body according to my request. I then went on to the East Gate, or Low-mün, to wile away the time until the steamers got round to Wuhlungchow, intending to go round the wall to the Pou-mün, or South Gate. Just as we arrived at the gate I saw a large crowd on the bank opposite the Futai's boat, and soon afterwards a large force of Imperialists came into the city and run off to the right and left along the wall and into the city, yelling, as they usually do when they enter a vacated stockade, and firing off their muskets in the air. I remonstrated with the mandarins and soldiers, as their conduct was liable to frighten the rebels, who might retaliate and cause a row. After a few minutes General Ching came in, and I noticed he looked disturbed. I asked him eagerly if the interview was over and had been satisfactory. He said the Wangs had never come to the Futai. I said I had seen them going, and asked him what could have become of them. He said he did not know, but thought they might have run away. I asked him what could have induced them to do so. He said they had sent out to the Futai to ask to keep twenty thousand (20,000) men, and to have half of the city, building a wall inside—that Lar-Wang had said before that he wanted only two thousand five hundred (2,500,) and that at another time he said he wanted no soldiers but merely to retire home—that the Futai had objected to his demand, and that he had told him to go to the Tch-mün, and stockade his men outside that gate, and that he supposed Lar-Wang had taken alarm and gone off. He said further that Lar-Wang had sent to Chung-Wang for assistance. I asked him if he thought Lar-Wang and the other Wangs had gone back to the rebels. He said no, but they would go back to their own homes and live there. I did not feel very well satisfied, and asked Mr. Macartney, who was by, to go to Lar-Wang's house and see if he was there, and to re-assure him if he was alarmed at anything. General Ching was anxious I should not go, and as I had no suspicion, I went round the wall with him to the Pou-mün, which we reached at 5 o'clock P.M. I had frequently returned to the question of Lar-Wang, but found that both General Ching and my interpreter seemed to evade the questions. When I got to the Pou-mün I told General Ching I should go no further as I felt uncomfortable about Lar-Wang, and also heard volleys of musketry in the city, but not of any great amount. I asked General Ching what it was. He said there were some Kwangzi and Canton men who would not shave, and they were driving them out of the city, having left two gates open for their retreat, but they were only frightening them out. General Ching then left, and I asked my interpreter what he thought of the state of affairs. He said that he thought the Imperialists, having got the city, did not care about keeping their agreement. I therefore decided on riding to Lar-Wang's house and seeing him if possible. I rode through the streets with my interpreter, which were full of rebels standing to their arms, and Imperialist soldiers looting. I went to Lar-Wang's palace, and found it ransacked. I met Lar-Wang's uncle, a second in command, and he begged me to come to his house and protect it. He then withdrew the female household of Lar-Wang and accompanied them to his house where there were some thousand (1,000) rebels under arms in a barricaded street. It was now dark, and having seen the state of affairs, I wished much for Lar-Wang's uncle to let my interpreter go, taking orders for the steamers to come round and take the Futai prisoner (as he, the interpreter, thought that the Futai had not yet beheaded the Wangs), and also an order to bring up my force. They unfortunately would not let my interpreter go, and I remained with them until 2 o'clock A.M. on the 7th, when I persuaded them to let him go and procure assistance. I had kept several bands from looting the house by my presence. About 3 A.M. one of the men who had gone out with the interpreter returned, and said that a body of Imperialists had seized the interpreter and wounded him. I was now apprehensive of a general massacre, as the man made me understand that the order I had sent had been torn up, and therefore went out to go to the Pou-mün to send by my boat additional orders, and also to look for the interpreter. I found no traces of him, and proceeding to the Pou-mün was detained an hour by the Imperialists. It was then 5 A.M., and I determined on proceeding for my guard to the Low-mün, or East Gate, hoping to be able to seize the Futai, and to get back in time to save the house of Lar-Wang's uncle.

I got to the Low-mün at 6 A.M., and sent on my guard to the house. It was, however, too late, it had been ransacked. I then left the city and met General Ching at the gate. I told him what I thought, and then proceeded to the stockade to await the steamers. As I was still ignorant that the Wangs had been beheaded. I thought that they were prisoners, and might still be rescued if the Futai could be

secured. When awaiting the steamers, General Ching sent down Major Bailey, one of the officers I had sent him to command his artillery, who told me that General Ching had gone into the city, and sat down and cried. He then, to alleviate his grief, shot down 20 of his men for looting, and sent Major Bailey to tell me he had nothing to do with the matter, that the Futai ordered him to do what he did, and that the Futai had ordered the city to be looted. I asked Major Bailey if the Wangs had been beheaded; he said that he had heard so; he then told me he had Lar-Wang's son in the boat and had brought him to me. The son came up and pointing to the other side said that his father and the Wangs had been beheaded there. I went over and found six (6) bodies and recognized Lar-Wang's head. The hands and bodies were gashed in a frightful way and cut down the middle. Lar-Wang's body was partially buried. I took Lar-Wang's head, and just then the steamers were seen coming up. The Futai, however, had received some warning and left for Soochow by some other route. I then went to his boat and left him a note in English informing him of what my intention had been and also my opinion of his treachery. I regret to say that Mr. Macartney did not think fit to have this translated to him.

The two steamers then left for Quinsan, and one was sent down with Prince F. de Wittgenstein to inform the general of the state of affairs; this officer had been with the force nearly a month and had been informed in detail by me of the whole that had passed as above related.

On the 8th December the Futai sent Mr. Macartney to persuade me that he could not have done otherwise, and I blush to think that he could have got an Englishman, late an officer in Her Majesty's Army, to undertake a mission of such a nature.

(Signed)

C. G. GORDON.

Major Commanding.

December 12, 1863.

P. S.—To continue. On the 8th Dec., I started with an escort and a steamer to General Ching's stockade to obtain Lar-Wang's body and some of his family, who had been retained prisoners in General Ching's stockade. These I obtained, and also the body.

General Brown arrived on the afternoon of the 9th, and took the protection of the force under his command. I had already spoken to the officers and got them to agree to leave the solution to the British general. The disgust and abhorrence felt by all of them was and is so great, as to lead me to fear their going over in mass to the rebels; but I have shown them that the sin would then be visited on the Chinese people, and not on the culprits who committed it. The rebels have no government at all, while the Imperialist can lay claim to some.

(Signed)

C. G. GORDON.

No. 132.

Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

Foreign Office, March 8, 1864.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT to you herewith copies of an Order of Her Majesty in Council revoking the previous Orders of the 30th of August, 1862, and 9th of January, 1863, by the first of which permission was granted to Mr. Lay and to Captain Osborn, and any British subject engaging and enlisting himself with them, to enter into the naval and military service of the Emperor of China, while by the second permission was given to all military officers in Her Majesty's service to enter into the military service of the Emperor of China.

The repeal of the first Order was a necessary result of the refusal of the Chinese Government to accept the services of Captain Osborn; while that of the second is intended to mark the dissatisfaction felt by Her Majesty's Government at the conduct of the Chinese authorities on the capture of Soochow, in setting aside the engagements under which alone that important city was, through the intervention of an officer belonging to Her Majesty's service though at the time acting with a Chinese force, restored to the Imperial Government.

I will not at present observe any further on the shocking scenes which occurred at Soochow. I shall shortly receive your report of your communications with the Chinese Government on this subject, when I shall be able more conveniently to address you on it.

I am, &c.

(Signed)

RUSSELL.

Inclosure in No. 132.

Order in Council, dated March 1, 1864.

At the Court at Windsor, the 1st day of March, 1864.

Present :

The Queen's Most Excellent Majesty in Council.

WHEREAS by an Order, dated the thirtieth day of August, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, Her Majesty was pleased, by and with the advice of Her Privy Council, to order that from and after the first day of September then next, it should be lawful for Horatio Nelson Lay, one of Her Majesty's subjects, and Sherard Osborn, a Captain in Her Majesty's Navy, to enter into the military and naval service of the Emperor of China, and to accept any commission, warrant, or other appointment under the said Emperor, and to accept any money, pay, or reward for their services, and to fit out, equip, purchase and acquire ships or vessels of war for the use of the said Emperor, and to engage and enlist British subjects to enter the military service of the said Emperor : and it was thereby further ordered, that it should be lawful for every British subject to enlist and enter himself by engaging and enlisting himself with the said Horatio Nelson Lay and Sherard Osborn, and no other person or persons whatsoever, in the military and naval service of the said Emperor, and to serve the said Emperor in any military, warlike, or other operations, either by land or by sea, and for that purpose to go to any place or places beyond the seas, and to accept any commission, warrant, or other appointment from or under the said Emperor, and to accept any money, pay, or reward for his service : Provided always, that the license and permission thereby given should be in force only for the term of two years from the said first day of September then next, unless, by Order in Council made in manner aforesaid, such period should be further extended :

And whereas by another Order in Council, dated the ninth day of January, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, Her Majesty was further pleased, by and with the advice of Her Privy Council, to order that from and after the sixteenth day of December, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, it should be lawful for all military officers in Her Majesty's service to enter into the military service of the said Emperor, and to accept any commission, warrant, or other appointment under the said Emperor, and to accept any money, pay, or reward for their services : and it was thereby ordered, that it should be lawful for all officers in Her Majesty's military service to serve the said Emperor in any military, warlike, or other operations, and for that purpose to go to any place or places beyond the seas, and to accept any commission, warrant, or other appointment from or under the said Emperor, and to accept any money, pay, or reward for their services : Provided always, that the license and permission thereby given should be in force only until the first day of September, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-four, unless by Order in Council made in manner aforesaid, such period should be further extended :

And whereas it has seemed fit to Her Majesty to revoke the said Orders :

Now, therefore, Her Majesty, by and with the advice of Her Privy Council, is pleased to order, and it is hereby ordered, that so far as relates to any acts to be done in Great Britain or Ireland, the said several Orders in Council, bearing date respectively the thirtieth day of August, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, and the ninth day of January, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, shall be, and the same are hereby revoked as from the day of the date of this present Order ; and that, so far as relates to any acts to be done within the dominions of the Emperor of China, or elsewhere than in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the said several Orders in Council, bearing date respectively the thirtieth day of August, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, and the ninth day of January, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, shall be, and the same are hereby revoked, as from the expiration of three calendar months from the day of the date of this present Order.

ARTHUR HELPS.

CHINA. No. 4. (1864.)

COMMERCIAL REPORTS

FROM

HER MAJESTY'S CONSULS IN CHINA,

FOR THE YEAR 1862.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.
1864.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.

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Commercial Reports from Her Majesty's Consuls in China, for the Year 1862.

No. 1.

Mr. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received May 21.)

My Lord,

Peking, February 15, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to forward a report from Mr. Consul Meadows on the trade and prospects of New-chwang. The chief trade in exports is in pease and bean-cake, and has arisen since the removal of the prohibition to export these articles, which was inserted in the Trade Regulations attached to the Treaty of 1858, and which the Chinese Government, at my instance, rescinded at the close of 1861.

I have, &c.

(Signed) **FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.**

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

*Report on the Consular District of New-chwang, with particular reference to its
Commercial Capabilities.*

British Consulate, Port of New-chwang, November 18, 1862.

I HAVE not considered it proper to call this paper simply a Trade Report. Such Reports are, as I understand them, mainly composed of tabulated statistics, and of these I have little or nothing to give. My experience of the Chinese Empire teaches me that it is impossible to obtain from Chinese sources materials for Tables of the kind alluded to that are not worse than valueless; worse, namely, because they would misinform inquirers, while no Tables only leave inquirers uninformed. As to foreign or Occidental sources at the open ports, the different nationalities which exist, even at the smallest, and the commercial rivalries which naturally exist between firms of the same nationality, render it next to impossible to obtain, even from them, reliable materials for Statistical Tables. Statistics could be furnished in large quantities and in all the usual varieties, and the materials could be exhibited in Tables of different headings, one showing this, the second that, the third the relation of this to that, and so forth; all this could be done if one were perfectly indifferent to furnishing what was false. I consider it dishonest to send in papers of that kind. It might be said, "Correct Tables may be given of the ships, at all events." But the shipping affords one of the last and strongest proofs of the impossibility of furnishing statistics that would not be deceptive and error-sprealing. Recent occurrences in the West have caused many sales of United States' vessels, such sales being merely nominal; and I have no doubt that several ships called British have entered this small port in which no British interests whatever were involved, which had nothing British about them but the flag flying over their sterns, that flag being there a flying falsehood.

With this explanation I annex Tables showing the amount of Occidental shipping that entered the port during the first season after it was opened, that of 1861; and also Tables of the goods imported and exported in them during that season, based on materials collected from the Occidental merchants, each of whom I requested to send in a summary of the business done by himself.

In this country Her Majesty's Consuls are charged with the exclusive civil and criminal jurisdiction over British subjects ashore and afloat, not only in their relations to each other, but to the Chinese populations, and to the subjects of other States settled at the ports. These duties, apart from the judicial labours which they directly cause, bring with them, on the English Consul at each port, a considerable amount of international discussion with the territorial authorities and with the Consular representatives of Occidental States, which cannot, in anything like a similar degree, come on Her Majesty's Consuls in countries where they exercise no judicial functions. In these latter countries, which, by the very fact of the Consuls not being charged with judicial functions, are pronounced civilized and Christian, not only is the time afforded them, but the means probably exist of obtaining materials more or less sufficiently guaranteed as to correctness for the compilation of Statistical Tables. But it may be doubted whether even in such countries British speculative transactions are influenced by, much less originate in, the half-yearly or yearly Consular Reports. Even there, it is probably the prompt, timely, and special advices of the interested agents which form the guide. Such is certainly the case in China. The Consuls here do not and could not by any, the fullest and minutest, accounts of the past amount of shipping and of goods increase the future amount of that shipping by a ton or of those goods by a bale. On the other hand, by sparing their powers for the prompt and full discharge of those other duties to which I have above referred; by striving to get justice done to their countrymen, and by taking care that they do justice to others; by seeing that they have the virtual enjoyment of their Treaty rights; and by preserving and promoting, as much as possible, peaceable if not friendly relations between them and the people of the country,—the Consuls can really do something to increase British trade, by thus establishing and maintaining the conditions of peace, justice, and order, under which alone trade can flourish. It is to such labours that I have had to devote myself since I came here, to open the Consular district by establishing the Consulate in May 1861; and these labours, in an utterly strange region, and somewhat disorderly locality, have fully taxed my working strength from that time to this.

The Consular district of New-chwang embraces the whole of Manchooria, as bounded by the Yellow Sea and the Chih-le Gulf on the south; by Corea on the south-east; by the Russian territories on the east and north, and by Mongolia on the west; and it also embraces the extreme eastern portion of Mongolia. British travellers, whether for trade, for pleasure, or for geographical or other scientific purposes throughout that region, are likely to travel under passports issued by this Consulate; and cases of shipwreck on its sea-bound southern border, together with any difficulties regarding inland travellers, are certain to be reported to and referred to it by the Manchoo and Chinese authorities.

Previous to the opening of this port, the only accounts we had of the region above particularized as the Consular district were the unfortunately scanty notices of the Romanist scientific missionaries in the service of the Emperor Kang-he, about 150 years ago; and all the Occidental maps which appear of it are merely reproductions in greater or less completeness of those drawn by them at that period. Within the last two years, the publication of Mr. Ravenstein's work has given to the British public a few slight notices of the northern portion of the region, that lying along the right bank of the Amoor, and a portion of the Sungari valley. Since the opening of this port, the southern portion from the Great Wall on the west, and down to Ta-lien-wan Bay on the (south) east, has been several times traversed by Englishmen, and Moukden has also been visited by them.

Manchooria consists of three provinces styled in the Imperial geographical dictionaries, the Tung-san-sang, the "eastern three Provinces" of the Empire. These are Shing-king or Fung-sang, Kirin, and Tsitsihar.

Fung-sang, the most southerly, in which this port lies, consists of the seaboard between the Great Wall on the west, and Corea on the east, with so much of the interior as extends to the line of palisades on the north-west, where it meets Mongolia, to about fifty or sixty miles beyond the palisade on the north-east, where it meets Kirin; and to some twenty to thirty miles beyond the palisade on the east, where it meets Corea. It includes the Leaou Peninsula, that which juts down southward toward the Shan-tung Peninsula, dividing the head of the yellow sea from the Chih-le Gulf, and marked as the "Regent's Sword" in many maps.

Kirin lies to the north-east of Fung-sang, and Tsi-tsi-har to the north-west of that. Both have been considerably reduced in size by the recent cessions to Russia.

This province, Shing-king, or Fung-sang as it is here commonly called, though thus reckoned a portion of Manchooria, is peopled mainly by a population of Chinese

descent. Though less literary, and though rougher in manner than their countrymen in the valley of the Great River, they differ, even in these points, very little from the inhabitants of Shan-tung, the birth-place of Confucius, and one of the oldest portions of China Proper. The most of the mandarins here are Manchooks, but neither they nor the other inhabitants of their race speak anything but Chinese; and they are hardly to be distinguished from the Chinamen of the province either by physical appearance or by manners. The real Manchouria lay, in fact, in the valleys of the southern affluents of the Amoor, more especially about the sources of the Sungari and the Hourka, in the southern portion of the province of Kirin. The region comprised within this province has long belonged to the Chinese nation; and 200 years ago it was the Manchooks who came into it as conquering immigrants, and made it the seat of their State for some time previous to their becoming masters of China Proper.

The chief physical features in Manchouria and that portion of Mongolia which I reckon in this Consular district are the valley of the Sungari and its affluents in the north, that of the Ya-loo in the east, and that of the Sira-muren, or the Leaou, in the west, together with the mountain-ranges which form the watersheds separating these three valleys. These are the Long White Mountains separating the Sungari and the Ya-loo valleys, and two continuations or spurs from that range, the one stretching in a north-westerly direction, and separating the upper portion of the Leaou valley from that of the Sungari; the other stretching in a south-westerly direction, and separating the lower portion of the Leaou valley from that of the Ya-loo. This latter mountain-range, part of which bounds our distant view at this port from south-south-west to east-north-east, is known here as the "Eastern" mountains. It might be not inappropriately named by us the Leaou mountains. Coming down from the north-east beyond Moukden, it passes away to the southward in the shape of the Leaou Peninsula, then dips under the Meaou Straits, showing here and there a peak as an island, and then again reappears as the Shan-tung mountain-range and forming the Shan-tung Peninsula.

Viewed commercially, the Valley of the Ya-loo must, I think, be considered as lying without this Consular district. The Ya-loo itself, and the river-ports lying at the head of the Yellow Sea, form the natural outlets and inlets for native and over-sea articles of traffic. Native craft bring to them, from Shanghai, foreign goods at a much less cost of transport than would be unavoidable for the sea-voyage to this port with the cart-carriage across the Leaou mountain-range. In that part of it which has been traversed by foreigners, from the neck of the peninsula to its southern extremity, it rises to heights of from 2,000 to 3,000 feet; and its breadth is considerable, the whole of the Leaou peninsula being nothing but a mountain-range from shore to shore. The range toward the north appears to become still higher.

I may state here that, throughout the peninsula, and for some not yet exactly-ascertained distance to the north, the range is entirely divested of timber, only a few patches of oaken brushwood being found among the higher peaks. Villages and hamlets exist in all the valleys. All the flatter slopes are cultivated, and where the steepness stops cultivation, the coarse grass is cut down in the autumn for fuel. Coal, however, exists, both on the peninsula and in a more northerly portion of the range. A hot spring is also to be seen in one of its western valleys, the pools formed by which are above blood-heat when the temperature of the air is below zero of Fahrenheit. The water is blackish, and has a sulphureous smell—that of sulphuretted hydrogen, I believe ("schwefel-wasserstoff-gas," in German). The peninsula produces millet and Indian corn in excess of what is required for the supply of the inhabitants, the surplus being, at present, mostly sent to Tien-tsin.

At first sight it might seem that, in a commercial point of view, the whole of the large Sungari Valley, with those of its two great affluents, the Nonni and the Hurka, should be considered as lying beyond this Consular district, because of their direct water-communication with the Russian ports at the mouth of the Amoor. There are, however, reasons for believing that, in spite of the watershed between the Valley of the Leaou and the Sungari, and the consequent land transport, this port may compete with Nicholayevsk at the mouth of the Amoor, as far as regards the introduction of foreign manufactures into the Sungari valley, and the exportation of any more valuable and less bulky products that the progress of commerce may discover in it. From the ice in its estuary, the Amoor is closed to navigation for seven, the Leaou for four and a half months at most. As to its five open months, Mr. Ravenstein speaking of its estuary, the Liman, says: "Its navigation is extremely intricate, and only to be accomplished with the aid of a good pilot, but even then vessels drawing above thirteen feet of water cannot enter the Amoor." This river, on the other hand, besides being perfectly free from ice for seven and a half months, is remarkably easy of access. Captain Ward, R.N.,

who made the Admiralty surveys, stated it to be much easier of access than Shanghae. So soon as a light ship is stationed at the bar and buoys are laid down, pilots will, except for the rules of the Insurance Offices, be unnecessary. For several days at each period of springs, vessels drawing eighteen feet water can cross the bar, the only real difficulty in the way. Further, vessels can lie at anchor outside of the bar in perfect safety, the only dangerous gales blowing here being northerly, and the head of the Leaou Gulf forming a good roadstead as regards them. It is a common practice for the larger foreign vessels to take in a portion of their cargo in the harbour, and the remainder outside the bar, in which latter operation they are rarely interrupted by the weather; while vessels drawing sixteen feet can load up in the harbour, and leave with ease. It may be fairly hoped that these great advantages will counterbalance the disadvantage of the land carriage between the Leaou and the city of Kirin; a little beyond which, commerce from this place will have the water communication at its command, equally with that which ascends the Amoor. Hence, if the Chinese provincial authorities are not allowed to throw artificial obstructions in the way of British adventure, our merchants here may hope to compete successfully with those of the Nikolayevsk in the valleys of the Sungari, Hurka, and Nonni. As to the Russian ports on the Gulf of Tartary, inland commerce from them would have to cross two mountainous watersheds to get to the nearest and smallest of these valleys.

As regards the valley of the Leaou itself, this port can have no rival, neither in the Russian territories nor on the coast of the Chih-le Gulf. That foreign manufactures are, and have been for years carried by Chinese from this Province down the Sungari, even to the Amoor itself, there can be no doubt; but it is mainly the Leaou valley that up to the present time has supported the trade of this port. And by the Leaou valley is meant that portion of it which lies beyond the north-western line of palisade, even more than the portion within the palisade. Chinese colonization has, during the last fifty years, been going on with great and increasing rapidity in the tract of Eastern Mongolia lying along the bounds of this Province; it has now penetrated from 200 to 300 miles beyond the palisades, in which quarter the mandarins say a man may travel for eight or ten days in a north-westerly direction without seeing any difference between the country around him, between the villages, roads, and cultivated lands, and those which he sees in passing through the oldest port of this province. To this colonization, this commercial and shipping town owes its existence as such; and as the colonization has been recent and unknown to Occidentals, so the existence even of this town, as a considerable trading place, was unknown till we came to it in the beginning of last year. How little it was known is proved by the work of a very painstaking inquirer, "The Middle Kingdom," by Dr. Williams, published in 1848. In describing Manchooria, he says: "Kin-chow is the port of Mookden, fifteen leagues from it, and carries on a considerable trade in cattle, pulse, and drugs . . . Kae-chow, another port lying on the east side of the Gulf, possesses a better harbour, but is not so much frequented." He altogether overlooks this town lying between Kin-chow and Kae-chow, though it exceeds both in population and commercial bustle, as its harbour surpasses theirs in depth and safety. This port is the port of Moukden, and of all other cities in the Leaou valley. The town has a variety of names. By the seamen and merchants of Central China it is called New-kow; by the seafaring people of the Gulf, Ting-kow; by the mandarins in their proclamations and official letters, Muh-kow-ying, but in conversation it is by them as well as by the shore people generally called Ying-tze, and that is the name the foreign residents also use. But the similarity of the term Ying-tsze to that of the River Yang-tze having seemed to me likely to cause confusion at a distance, I have adopted for letters a rendering of the first name, New-kow, *i. e.*, port of New-chwang. Though a great deal more than the "port of New-chwang," it is that among other things; and the designation has the advantage of bringing in the name of the city stipulated for in the Treaty as an open port and a Consular station.

The Leaou, it will be seen from a glance at a map, comes down from the palisade-barrier in a south-westerly course nearly parallel to the Leaou mountain-range. Throughout the whole of this stretch, it is believed, and certainly through the last portion of it, the river flows in a wide plain, elevated but a few feet above the sea, and where it opens on the latter, about seventy miles broad. When at a distance of about thirty miles in a direct line from its mouth at the head of the Gulf, the river receives its largest eastern affluent, that which, having its sources in the Leaou range, drains the country around Moukden and Leaou-yang, the second-best historically known city of the province. The point of junction is called Sancha-ho, known to sinologues as having been celebrated by the Emperor Keen-lung in a descriptive poem on Manchooria. For the writer of a Report on the commercial capabilities of the province, it is of some slight

interest, for the only timber that comes from inland directly to this port floats there into the Leaou; but for a poet, it is simply hard to conceive a place more uninteresting and unnoteworthy. There, if not sooner (no foreigner has as yet been further up it), the Leaou begins to make a series of wide sweeps to the right and left, forming in the plain a succession of flattened and irregularly shaped letters S. About one-half, and sometimes the whole, of each of the peninsulas thus formed is a reed marsh, while the concave portions of the river bank facing such peninsulas are comparatively high and dry. This town, Ying-tze, or the "port of New-chwang," is situated on the last complete sweep from east to west, on the left bank, and just where one of the above-described dry portions ends and a marshy peninsula begins. It consists of one long street running east and parallel to the river, and of shorter ones running at right angles to that main thoroughfare, northward to the river bank and southward into the plain. After passing the town the river curves up to a west-north-west direction; then, when about a mile and a-half off, it bends round again from west to east, passes in the easterly sweep of the S at the back of the town, and then, before it can curve again round to the west, meets the gulf. The port town stands, in fact, on the last piece of dry plain that lies along the left bank of the Leaou before it enters the sea. The above-mentioned sea-bar once crossed, the river forms an excellent harbour. The reach along which the town lies varies in depth from four to seven fathoms, with a breadth of about half-a-mile.

Foreign sailing-vessels could, as far as depth of water is concerned, proceed for some miles above the port-town, but there is no inducement for them to do so. A few large junks proceed up to a river-port called Teen-chwang-tae; but shallows that occur from time to time beyond that prevent any but river-craft drawing a couple of feet of water penetrating much further. A very small description of masted craft does, however, penetrate nearly up to the palisades; and no inconsiderable amount of produce is brought hither by the main stream and the Moukden affluent. New-chwang, the city opened to trade by Treaty, I, however, found to be quite inaccessible by water. It lies about three miles up a small branch of the by no means large Moukden affluent. In my yacht, a flat-bottomed craft drawing only $2\frac{1}{2}$ feet of water, I penetrated up the latter as far as the mouth of its New-chwang branch. But this I found unnavigable for the smallest description of row-boat. By land New-chwang is about thirty miles from this town; but by the curving river and its branches the distance is fully eighty miles. It is altogether an inland place, and even as such is of no commercial importance. It is called a city in virtue of some broken down walls that inclose a portion of it; and has a commandant and some 300 soldiers.

In the first reigns of this dynasty New-chwang was the great place of trade nearest the mouth of the Leaou; but about the end of the reign of Keen-lung, say about eighty or one hundred years ago, it was superseded by the above-mentioned river-port Teen-chwang-tae. About the fifteenth year of Taou-kwang, i.e., twenty-five years ago, this town, which had been gradually growing up, became the centre of the maritime trade of the province. This was partly owing to the then silting up of some higher portion of the river, but mainly to a monetary crisis and general failure among the bankers and large dealers of New-chwang, Teen-chwang-tae, and Kae-chow, one of the ports particularized in Dr. Williams' "Middle Kingdom."

Ying-tze, or the port of New-chwang, having attained its present position of chief outlet and inlet of the province and of Eastern Mongolia, is certain, from the natural advantages of its situation, to retain that position, and to increase rapidly. Apart from the buildings erected by foreigners during last season and that now closing, a considerable amount has been going on for the Chinese, and house-rent is very dear. The population has been estimated by some foreigners at 200,000, the number given by the mandarins. I myself do not think it exceeds 80,000.

It has been usual in this country for foreigners to settle themselves on unoccupied ground below the Chinese city opened to them. Here I found immediately below the town only a reed marsh, covered at high springs by two to four feet of water, and otherwise objectionable. I therefore selected and obtained from the authorities, for a British Settlement, a strip of land occupying about 1,000 yards of the river bank immediately above the Chinese town. In front it has the deepest stretch of river throughout the course of the Leaou, the soundings at low water very close in-shore being seven to nine fathoms. At back, each lot abuts on the one great road between the port town and the interior. The whole of the imports and exports of the place pass either in front or at back of each British lot; and hence, so far as site can command trade, the settlement promises all that could be desired. The non-British foreign merchants have settled in immediate contiguity.

The great export of the port is pulse, either as such or as pulse-cakes, and the oil expressed from them. Under no conceivable circumstances could these articles form return cargoes to Great Britain, but they furnish return cargoes to vessels that bring foreign goods from Shanghai, and give, besides that, employment to foreign shipping that it is found advantageous to send here in ballast, to convey them to Shanghai, Ningpo, and the ports further south.

Now it is a noteworthy fact connected with the trading prospects of this port, and one which distinguishes it, I believe, from every other in China, that its chief traffic, and the increase of it, does not depend on a tract of country which, however extensive, is already cultivated to its greatest extent and degree, and is filled with a population so dense as to admit of no increase. The increase of the foreign shipping, and of foreign commercial interests at this port, depends on that colonization of the prairie ("tsau-te," or "grass-lands") of Eastern Mongolia above mentioned, which is, humanly speaking, certain to go on, and is capable of practically-unlimited extension. In the first season of 1861 thirty-four Occidental vessels visited the port; this season we have had eighty-six; and next year about double that number is expected. At present the process is, perhaps, only that of substitution of Occidental vessels for junks; but the greater safety and cheapness of the transport by the foreign vessels cannot fail to add an impulse to the other causes of the colonization of the Mongolian plains.

The colonization of Mongolia is done under the authority of the Mongolian Princes, with the sanction of the Imperial Government; but in the Ya-loo Valley, and about the base of the Long White Mountains generally, an illegal colonization by Chinese squatters has been simultaneously going on, in defiance of the Manchoo authorities, who dare not proceed into the newly-settled region. The colonists are all outlaws by the fact of their being there, but no inconsiderable proportion of them are men who have committed crimes in this province and made their escape. They have established a Government of some kind, one feature of which is a rough penal legislation that knows few punishments but death. At its head is a Chief entitled the "Laou ta ko." Rendered literally, this means "Old Great Brother;" but a better idea is given of its significance to the Chinese if we employ the etymologically-similar term of "Signior" or "Seigneur" as applied to the Rulers of the European Republican States of the middle ages. The Chief in the Ya-loo Valley rules over a small but independent State, of growing importance. The inhabitants are agriculturists and gold or ginseng-diggers in the warm season, when they also hunt the deer for their soft-horn sprouts and float timber into the mouth of the Ya-loo; in winter they cut the timber and hunt fur-bearing animals. The timber used at Tien-tsin, and most of that used here, comes by sea from that newly-opened territory.

I close this Report with some remarks on the climate. In this one connection I can furnish some tabulated statistics that I know to be reliable. The accompanying register has, with the exception of the first fifteen days (from the 21st October to the 4th November, 1861), been entirely kept by myself, and the observations have been regularly made at the hours indicated. As they extend to the 5th November, 1862, they embrace one whole year. The instruments used were, two pairs of maximum and minimum thermometers, an aneroid barometer, and a rain-gauge, all made by Negretti and Zambra. The observations were taken twice daily, once in the morning, so soon as there was sufficient light to take them, and again in the afternoon, between 2 and 4 o'clock. The "additional" notes were made at these times, and also at other periods as occasion required.

The explanations on the first page of the register give further information as to the method of keeping it.

In the column of "greatest warmth" double entries appear from the 14th May to the 20th September. The highest of the two temperatures was that of a courtyard, the thermometer being in an angle altogether shaded from the rays of the sun, whether direct or reflected. The lower temperature was that of my sitting-room, into which the sun was prevented shining by Venetian blinds, but the glass windows of which were not closed, night or day. Where only one temperature is given within the above period, it is that of the courtyard.

One of the most characteristic features of the climate is the prevalence of strong winds. These follow, and we may assume, receive their direction from, the Leaou Valley and the mountains on each side. In the cold season N.N.E. and N.E. winds prevail, and in the summer S.S.W. and S.W.

In 262 mornings and afternoons, as recorded in the period from the 5th November, 1861, to the 31st March, 1862, there were 88 which had the wind either E.N.E., N.E., or N.N.E.; hence one-third of the wind in winter comes from north-easterly points.

In the same 262 mornings and evenings, there were 25 with the wind due north, or about one-tenth from that point.

In the same 262 mornings and evenings, there were 40 with the wind from W.N.W., N.W., or N.N.W.; hence about one-sixth of the winter's wind came from north-westerly points.

Again, $88 + 25 + 40 = 153$; and hence $153 : 262$ shows the proportion of the wind from the points between E.N.E. and W.N.W. inclusive.

The above inductions have reference, however, only to the duration of the wind. I have had no instrument for ascertaining its force. But viewing the great strength and steadiness, for two or three days at a time, of the N.N.E. gales, I should say that fully eight-tenths of the winter's winds came from north-easterly quarters.

What is said of the north-easterly winds in winter applies to the south-westerly winds in summer.

In each season, two or three days of the wind directly opposite to the prevalent one occur from time to time: N.N.E. wind in the hot season, and S.S.W. in the cold season. The course is usually thus: the wind will blow, say in summer, with unusual steadiness and force from the S.S.W., for the first day or two with a clear sky, then with clouds, which increase till the whole sky is covered. Rain will then sometimes fall, in greater or less quantity. With or without rain, the wind begins to blow strongly from N.N.E., changing in less than a minute. Then is often observable the phenomenon of a cold lower stratum of air blowing from the north, while above the hot air is blowing from the south. The flag at the head of the Consulate-mast, of 100 feet in height, will be blowing straight out to the S.S.W., while above, a dense mass of clouds, covering the whole sky, will be racing steadily to the N.N.E. Eventually the cold wind prevails in the higher regions also, and then, in a few hours, the clouds are driven off southwards, and several days of beautifully clear and dry weather follow.

Our rain we get either from the S.S.W., or still more westerly points; in other words, entirely from the Gulf of Chih-le. Our easterly winds, even the S.S.E. wind, are essentially dry. I presume the Leaou mountain-range, if not before it, those in Corea, cause the precipitation, before it can reach the Leaou Valley, of all moisture blown from the Pacific.

The record of the fall of rain and snow is not complete, though nearly so. In the first place, the gauge was not set up till the 19th December, 1861; and then, it will be seen by an entry of the 8th July, 1862, that on the night before the gauge had filled, so that the surplus could only be guessed at. But one inch and a-half for these omissions will, I feel certain, cover the deficiency, and as the registered quantity of rain is 20.99 inches, we thus have $(20.99 + 1.50 =) 22.49$, or say $22\frac{1}{2}$ inches of rain for the year; which, so far as Chinese accounts enable me to judge, has been wetter than the average.

One great advantage of the climate here consists in the fact that the cold season is eminently a dry one, and that when rain falls in the warm season the air becomes dry and refreshing immediately after the cessation of the rain, while those oppressive periods of damp heat that occur at Shanghae and Canton for days, and even weeks, are here unknown.

In my next Report I shall go more into details bearing on the trade of the port; at present I conclude by stating that the navigation must be considered as closing between the 10th and 15th November. Ice does not usually begin to float up and down the river till the end of the month. But the Chinese cargo-boatmen are obliged to dry-dock or beach their craft before the ground hardens. It is, consequently, very difficult to get a vessel loaded after the 10th, and after the 15th next to impossible. For the same reason, if a vessel should ground in the river in going out after the latter date, she cannot discharge a portion of her cargo into boats, but must throw it overboard, as the last British vessel of this season, which cleared on the 10th instant, has been obliged to do.

(Signed)

THOMAS TAYLOR MEADOWS,
Her Britannic Majesty's Consul.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

STATEMENT of British Vessels consigned.

Name of Vessel.	Registered Tonnage.	Remarks.	Name of Vessel.	Registered Tonnage.	Remarks.
Eagle	110	Badly on shore.	Lebanon . . .	1,000	Got on shore; had to discharge cargo.
Sea-bird .. .	110		Sea belle .. .	460	
Leonidas . .	697		Fawn	200	
Louisa	95		Colinsburgh ..	550	
Louisa	95		Earl of Chester ..	700	
W. H. Chandler ..	292		Harriet Armitage .	300	Totally lost.
Mona	400		Emma	200	
Fawn	200				

Inclosure 3 in No. 1.

STATEMENT of Foreign Vessels consigned.

Name of Vessel.	Country.	Registered Tonnage.	Remarks.	Name of Vessel.	Country.	Registered Tonnage.	Remarks.
Garland .. .	American	113	On shore badly.	Magnisserb ..	Hamburgh	405	On shore. On shore on the bar.
Ditto .. .	Ditto ..	113		Nordstern ..	Ditto ..		
Ditto .. .	Ditto ..	113		Saturnus .. .	Ditto ..		
Ditto .. .	Ditto ..	113		Greta .. .	Ditto ..	176	
Ditto .. .	Ditto ..	113		Ophelia .. .	Ditto ..	320	
Kate Hastings ..	Ditto ..	448		Madras .. .	Bremen ..	400	
Tzar .. .	Ditto ..	470		Ditto .. .	Ditto ..	400	
Horatio .. .	Ditto ..	460		Emma .. .	Ditto ..	250	
Resolute .. .	Ditto ..	750		Gaston .. .	French ..	373	On shore.
Indigo Shaw ..	Ditto ..	1,000					

Inclosure 4 in No. 1.

STATEMENT of Imported Goods.

Description of Goods.	Quantity sold by 1st December.	Average price in Taels.	Estimated value in Taels.	Quantity in Stock on 1st December.
From the Straits and Western Countries—				
Grey Shirtings	Pieces 75,234	Per piece 2 0 4	153,763	Pieces 38,800
White Shirtings	" 13,755	" 2 1 6	29,723	" 10,049
T-cloths	" 15,458	" 1 5 8	24,456	" 9,940
White brocades	" 1,000	" 2 0 0	2,000	" 1,999
Coloured brocades	" 1,250	" 2 3 5	2,937	
Velveteens	" 100	" 6 9 0	690	
White spots	" 3,951	" 2 1 6	8,348	
Coloured spots	" 1,150	" 2 1 5	2,480	
Lastings	" 40	" 11 0 0	440	
Coloured prints	" 3,500	" 1 7 7	5,725	
" furniture	" 1,100	" 1 7 3	1,903	
American drills	" 9,316	" 2 9 6	27,637	
" shirtings	" 3,100	" 2 4 3	7,545	
" jeans	" 3,180	" 2 6 3	8,365	
Chintz	" 100	" 1 4 5	145	Pieces 1,642
Dyed cotton	" 500	" 2 6 2	1,310	" 2,150
Domestics	" 1,209	" 4 6 4	5,615	
Grey drills	" 100	" 2 2 0	220	
Long ells	" 120	" 7 0 8	850	
Spanish stripes	" 138	" 13 0 0	1,794	Pieces 290
Damask	" 3,619	" 4 3 2	1,564	" 1,694
Camlets				70
Opium, Malwa	Chests 179	Per chest 693 9 1	113,810	Chests 21
Glass	Boxes 660	Per box 3 5 0	2,100	Boxes
Buttons				Gross 400
Elastic belts				Boxes 27
Iron rod	Piculs 8,293	Per picul 2 6 3	21,852	Piculs 6,325
Sapan wood	" 334	" 2 0 6	690	
From Southern China and Japan—				
Japanese cottons	Pieces 920	Per piece 0 3 6	333	
Tea cups	18,420	0 0 2	420	
Sea-weed	Piculs 50	3 1 6	158	
Sugar	" 267	3 5 5	950	Piculs 7,000
Tea				12
Hemp bags				28,000
Total			441,903	

Inclosure 5 in No. 1.

STATEMENT of Exported Goods.

Description.	Quantity despatched before closing of Port.	Average price per picul in Tails.	Estimated Value in Tails.	Description.	Quantity despatched before closing of Port.	Average price per picul in Tails.	Estimated Value in Tails.
	Piculs.	T. M. C.			Piculs.	T. M. C.	
Pulse ..	50,460	1 5 9	80,456	Oil ..	244	5 1 6	1,260
" cake ..	288,077	0 2 9	86,000	Hides ..	100	2 9 7	297
" oil ..	906	4 6 9	4,250	Horse hair ..	25	25 6 0	640
Bêche de mer ..	19	71 8 4	1,365	Tallow ..	1,124	5 5 0	6,182
Melon seeds ..	3,876	4 6 6	18,069	Wool ..	231	9 2 4	2,137
Ginseng ..	5	1,040 0 0	5,200	Gold ..	..	..	126,753
Indigo ..	658	4 8 6	3,202	Sycee ..	..	..	10,780
Liquorice ..	165	3 7 2	615				
Medicines ..	1,359	6 2 0	8,436				
					Total ..		355,642

(Signed)

British Consulate, New-chwang,
February 1862.

THOMAS TAYLOR MEADOWS,

Her Britannic Majesty's Consul.

Inclosure 6 in No. 1.

Method of noting Direction of Wind.—N., N.N.E., N.E.; E.N.E., E., E.S.E.; S.E., S.S.E.; S., S.S.W., S.W.; W., W.N.W., N.W., N.N.W. This gives a different note for every 22½ degrees.

Method of noting Force of Wind.—Very strongly, being the strongest winds we experience, as the hard blows from N.N.E. in winter; strongly; moderately; lightly; very lightly; calm.

MEM.—From October 31 to November 4, inclusive, the register was kept by a Chinese, but though under my direction was somewhat defectively kept. The most reliable are the thermometrical observations.

From November 5, onwards, all the observations are noted and entered by myself.

(Signed)

THOS. TAYLOR MEADOWS.

Date.	Greatest Observed Daybreak.	Greatest Wind in Afternoon.	Aneroid at Daybreak.	Amount of Rain.	Direction and force of Wind at Daybreak.	Direction and force of Wind at 2 to 4 P.M.	Aneroid at 2 to 4 P.M.	Additional Notes.
1861	o	o	Inches.	Inches.			Inches.	
Oct. 21	40	55	30.26	...	N. Lightly .	...	...	Sky clear in the morning; somewhat cloudy at mid-day, and clear in the evening.
22	38	59	30.34	...	W. Lightly .	N. Lightly .	...	Clear all day.
23	43	64	30.32	...	S. E. ...	S.W. .	30.14	Clear all day.
24	55	67	30.18	...	S. Strongly	S.W. .	...	Clear all day.
25	52	67	30.18	...	S. Strongly	...	...	Clear all day.
26	45	62	30.42	...	N.E. Strongly	N.E. Moderately	...	Clear all day.
27	43	49	30.36	...	N.N.E. .	...	...	Cloudy, with a little rain in the forenoon. Raining heavily in the fore.
28	42	52	30.36	...	N.E. .	...	...	Cloudy in the morning; afterwards quite clear.
29	37	52	30.44	...	N.E. .	...	...	Rather cloudy.
30	37	57	30.26	...	S.W. .	...	...	Clear all day.
31	44	62	30.30	...	S. .	S.W. .	...	Cloudy in the morning; clear in the afternoon.
Nov. 1	44	57	30.30	...	S.E. .	N.E. .	...	Clouds in a blue sky.
2	48	57	30.40	...	N. .	...	...	Quite clear.
3	34	57	30.22	...	S.W. Strongly	...	...	Clear in the morning; dull in the afternoon.
4	29	47	30.30	...	N.E. .	...	30.23	Quite clear.
5	38	60	30.08	...	S.S.W. Strongly	S.W. Very strong	30.00	At about 11 A.M. a thunder-storm came on and lasted several hours, accompanied by heavy showers of rain. At about 6 P.M. wind changed to N.E.; not strong.
6	37	60	30.24	...	N.E. Moderate	Various	...	Sky quite clear at daybreak; remained clear till dark.
7	35	44	29.92	...	E. Very light	N.W. Strong	29.74	Sky clear, with a few yellowish clouds above, and a blue bank of cloud to windward in the horizon. Wind gradually got round by N.E. and N. to N.W.; the sky getting duller and duller. At 4 P.M. sky all leaden with a few [?] .
8	29	35	30.06	...	N.N.W. Strong	N. Light	...	Sky clear at daybreak all over. Remained clear all day. Only a few clouds about sunset. Aneroid gradually rising.
9	25	42	30.44	...	E.S.E. Light	Calm	...	Sky quite clear.
10	25	56	30.38	...	S. Very strong, though steady	W. S. W. Still very calm and steady	30.34	Sky clear nearly all over. By 2½ P.M. the sky was nearly covered and the sun considerably obscured by a thin layer of whitish or yellowish cloud.
11	47	55	30.24	...	S. Strong and steady	S. Almost calm	...	Daylight. Sky overcast all over, with a light leaden shade of cloud. At about 5 P.M. it began to rain slightly.
12	44	46	30.21	...	Calm till 7 A.M.	N.N.E. Pretty strongly	30.25	Pretty heavy showers have fallen from 4½ to 6 A.M. to time during the night. At about 7 A.M. the wind began to blow from the north pretty strongly. At 12½ P.M. the sky was quite clear all over. Before rising to 46° at 3 P.M. the thermometer sank at about 10 A.M. to 40°.
13	33	42	30.24	...	N.N.E. Pretty strongly	N. Moderate	30.16	Sky quite clear at daylight. By 11 A.M. had got gradually overcast with greyish cloud. Wind still N.N.E.
14	37	46	29.94	...	E.N.E. Moderately	S. Moderately	...	Sky obscured all over at daybreak. At 8 A.M. it began to rain, and continued to rain from time to time heavily; at other times merely a few fine drops all day and during the night.
15	37	40	30.12	...	N.N.W. Pretty strongly	N.N.W. Pretty strongly	30.20	Daybreak sky obscured all over. The wind changed to northerly during the night, and came down hard at about 2 A.M.; a fine rain still spitting at 7½ A.M. and at 3 P.M. At 6 or 7 the sky cleared completely.
16	33	43	30.36	...	N. Moderate and steady	N.N.E. Lightly	30.32	Sky clear all over. Towards afternoon a few clouds collected in different points, but no cloud-bank. About 2½ P.M. it was nearly calm.

Date.	Greatest Cold before Daybreak.	Greatest Warmth in Afternoon.	Aneroid at Daybreak.	Amount of Rain.	Direction and force of Wind at Daybreak.	Direction and force of Wind at 2 to 4 P.M.	Aneroid at 2 to 4 P.M.	Additional Notes.
1861	°	°	Inches.	Inches.			Inches.	
Nov. 17	33	49	30.32	...	S.E. Light	S.S.W. Moderately ...	30.18	Sky quite clear all round. Clouds gathered about 10 A.M. The wind changed to N. for a short time; afterwards, about 1-2 P.M. got round to S.S.W.
18	40	49	30.18	...	N.N.E. Almost calm ...	N.N.E. Pretty strongly .	30.30	Sky quite clear except from fog-bank near the horizon. It has been a bright moon-light night. At 7 A.M. wind changed to N.N.W., and blew pretty strongly. At 10 A.M. changed to N.N.E., still blowing pretty strongly; sky quite clear.
19	32	45	30.39	...	N.E. Moderately	S.W. Lightly ...	30.32	Sky quite clear all over at daybreak. It got calm about 10 A.M., and afterwards changed to S.
20	34	48	30.40	...	N.E. Moderately ...	N.W. Moderately ...	30.44	Sky cloudless all over at daybreak. At 4 P.M. quite cloudless all over. A very fine day.
21	36	50	30.38	...	S. Moderately ...	N. Moderately ...	30.48	Daybreak, sky clear, except fog-bank low on horizon. By 2 P.M. clouds had gathered all over, and the glass had sunk to 34°; then the wind had changed to N., and by 4 the sky was clear all over, and the aneroid at 30.48.
22	29	50	30.50	...	N.N.E. Pretty strongly ...		...	Daybreak, sky clear all over. It got grey towards 4 P.M. and at night the sky was quite obscured and starless.
23	35	42	30.22	...	S.E. Very lightly ...	N.E. Variable and light ...	30.19	Daybreak, sky obscured all over; the ground was wet from a slight fall of rain, and fine drops were falling. At 3 P.M. the wind was, though variable, rather more northerly. Sky quite obscured, and a few drops of fine rain now and then.
24	23	29	30.42	...	N. Very strongly ...	N. Very strongly ...	30.48	After dark last night it began to clear with the northerly wind. At 10 P.M. it was quite clear; and during the night it blew hard, first from N.W. and . Daybreak, quite clear all over.
25	18	30	30.51	...	N. Moderate and steady .	N.E. Very lightly .	30.45	Daybreak, quite clear all over. Towards 3 P.M. a few light white clouds showed themselves.
26	26	39	30.34	...	S. Very light ...	W. Very lightly ...	30.33	Daybreak, a few light clouds in the nearly clear sky, and a fog-bank low along the horizon. At 3 P.M. rather more of the whitish clouds.
27	30	47	30.12	...	S.S.E. Moderately ...	W.S.W. Moderately ...	30.05	Daybreak, sky clear overhead, but light clouds about the horizon to southward. At 3½ P.M. light clouds to windward; but the day essentially a fine one.
28	31	45	30.16	...	S. Moderately ...	S. Moderately ...	30.12	Sky clear all over at daybreak. At 3½ P.M. sky still quite clear all over. A very fine day. About 9 P.M. it blew strongly from S., and continued doing so for some hours.
29	37	50	30.10	...	S.S.E. Moderately ...	S. Strongly ...	...	Daybreak, sky clear with the exception of a very few light clouds in the horizon. Towards dark the wind fell. During the night it was clear, and clearing calm, but towards daybreak got cloudy.
30	37	27	30.26	...	Calm	N.N.E. Very strongly ...	30.40	Daybreak, grey clouds all over. At 7 A.M. wind came down strong from north. Thermometer then 41°. It immediately cleared overhead to the northward, but along both horizons the clouds still moved from S. to N. At 7½ A.M. thermometer equal to 37°.
Dec. 1	19	26	30.45	...	N. Strongly ...	N.N.E. Strongly ...	30.48	At 11 A.M. equal to 26°, and blowing very strongly N.N.E.; aneroid . At 12 noon thermometer equal to 27°, after which it began to fall again. Sky quite grey since noon, and a little hail falling up till 10 P.M.
2	13	21	30.46	...	N.N.W. Moderately ...	N.E. Moderately ...	30.46	Daybreak, sky blue above; grey or lightly clouded all round the horizon. It gradually cleared, and at 4 P.M. the sky was cloudless.
3	12	26	30.39	...	S.E. Very lightly ...	S.E. Variable, very lightly	30.32	Daybreak, cloudless but with a little yellowish tinge on horizon. This yellow on the horizon soon disappeared and a very fine day ensued.
4	19	35	30.14	...	S.S.E. Lightly ...	Calm and variable and very lightly	30.08	Daybreak, cloudless all over. At dark, cloudless also.
5	25	30	30.04	...	N.E. Moderately ...	N.E. Moderately ...	30.06	Daybreak, cloudless all over. At 4 P.M. still cloudless. A very fine, and, in the sun, comfortably warm day. At 9 P.M. a good many clouds had gathered over the sky, though some stars were here and there visible.
6	22	27	30.02	...	S.E. Very lightly ...	N.N.W. Moderately ...	30.13	Daybreak, sky cloudless all over. A few clouds in the afternoon, which were all moving from S.W. to N.E., while below the wind was N.E.
7	15	24	30.28	...	E.S.E. Lightly ...	N.W. Lightly ...	30.34	Daybreak, broken clouds with clear sky between them all over. The clouds high up, moving from S.W. to N.E. At 9 A.M. it began to blow strongly from N.W. and soon after from N., the sky being entirely overcast and a little snow falling.
8	14	35	30.35	...	E. Moderately ...	S. Strongly	30.25	Daybreak, sky clear all over. A very fine day.
9	28	31	30.23	...	S.S.W. Moderately ...	N.N.E. Strongly ...	...	Daybreak, sky clear all over. Wind changed to S. at about 10 A.M.; about two hours afterwards clouds began to come up from S. and W., but only isolated, and it remained substantially a fine day till dark.
10	16	32	30.16	...	N.N.E. Moderately ...		...	Daybreak, cloudless overhead but a considerable fog along the horizon. At 7½ the thermometer had risen to 32°. At 8 A.M. the wind changed to N.N.E., and at 9½ the thermometer was 26°, and the aneroid 30.28.
11	16	40	30.13	...	S.E. Moderately ...	S. Strongly	30.03	Daybreak, sky cloudless all over. At 9 P.M. it was a calm clear night.
12	37	33	29.95	...	S.S.W. Strongly ...	N.E. Very strongly ...	30.14	Daybreak, cloudless all over; continued clear till dark; a very fine, and, for the season, warm day. The wind changed to due S. at about 10 A.M.
								Daybreak, clouds all over the sky, but with clear blue patches in the southern half of the dome; in the northern half they have collected to a dense grey mass, which is being added to by clouds coming up from windward. While the wind was S.S.W. the clouds above were moving more from S.W.

Date.	Greatest Cold before Daybreak.	Greatest Warmth in Afternoon.	Aneroid at Daybreak.	Amount of Rain.	Direction and force of Wind at Daybreak.	Direction and force of Wind at 2 to 4 P.M.	Aneroid at 2 to 4 P.M.	Additional Notes.
1861	°	°	Inches.	Inches.			Inches.	
Dec. 13	15	19	30.36	...	N.N.E. Strongly ...	N.N.E. Strongly ...	30.34	Soon after 9 A.M. wind direct W. At 12.20 in one minute it veered round to N.N.E. and blew hard. Thermometer, which had risen to 43°, began falling at once, and at 3 P.M. was 33° and still falling; sky then nearly clear all over.
14	10	22	30.38	...	S.E. Variable very lightly	E.S.E. Moderately	30.39	Daybreak, thick fog-like bank low along the horizon. Clear overhead but with a few white thin clouds. 3½ P.M. the clouds gradually increased, and now the sky is grey all over, the sun making his place only dimly visible through them.
15	15	32	30.24	...	S. Strongly	S. Strongly	30.16	Daybreak, quite clear all over. At 9 P.M. quite clear and calm.
16	23	23	30.24	...	N.N.E. Strongly	N.E. Moderately	30.38	Daybreak, light clouds on blue sky; but more clouds coming up from S.W. (though the flag shows the wind due N). By 10 A.M. the sky dull grey all over. About 11 P.M. a little snow began to fall; it was then nearly calm.
17	6	16	30.55	...	E.N.E. Moderately	E. Very lightly and calm	30.61	Daybreak, sky grey all over. About 5 to 6 A.M. (i.e., one or two hours before daylight) wind changed to N.N.E. and blew strongly. About noon it cleared all over.
18	8	24	30.58	...	E.S.E. Moderately	N.E. Moderately	30.64	Daybreak, quite clear from zenith to horizon. 4 P.M. quite clear. A remarkably fine day. Up to 10 P.M. still very fine.
19	10	21	30.52	...	N. Moderately	N.E. Moderately	30.40	Daybreak, clear overhead but a light bank of clouds on the horizon to windward. At 4 P.M. some appearance of sky (i.e., generally clear, with a few clouds).
20	13	33	30.30	...	S.E. Lightly	N.N.E. Very lightly	30.31	Daybreak, clear generally overhead, but a few clouds forming in the horizon, almost a bank. In the middle of the day sky quite obscured. At 4 P.M. partially clear again.
21	11	22	30.52	...	N.E. Moderately	N.E. Moderately	30.51	Daybreak, some clouds in the south-easterly hemisphere (i.e., to windward); otherwise clear. In the middle of the day it blew "moderately" from S.W. At 4 P.M. quite clear all over.
22	12	22	30.30	...	N.N.E. Strongly	N.N.E. Moderately	30.23	Daybreak, sky clear all over. At 4 P.M. quite clear.
23	5	9	30.33	0.10	N. Moderately	N.N.W. Strongly	30.40	Daybreak, dull brown clouds all over. At 3½ P.M. it began to snow, it being then dull all over. Between morning and that time it had cleared for a few hours. It was still snowing at bedtime.
24	-2	+5	30.47	...	N.N.E. Moderately	Calm	30.49	Daybreak, quite clear all over. The rain-gauge being put up yesterday and brought in to-day, and snow melted down, 0.10 of an inch (ten hundredths) of rain; during this fall clear, excepting in the west, where, at 4 P.M., there is a bank of cloud.
25	-3	+8	30.52	...	E. Almost calm	E. Lightly	30.55	Daybreak, quite clear. Quite clear at 4 P.M. Daybreak, quite clear all over. Cloudless at 2½ P.M.
26	-1	+15	30.56	0.02	S.E. Very light	S.E. Moderately	30.59	Daybreak, cloudy all over. "Ming-ping" (i.e., clear ice) all over the river, but it will most likely be broken up by the tide. Began snowing a little at 1½ P.M. At 4 P.M. dull all over, and still snowing slightly. At 11½ P.M. it began to blow strongly from a northerly direction (N.N.E. probably).
27	+10	+14	30.60	...	N.N.E. Strongly	N. Moderately	30.58	Daybreak, dull all over, now and then a flake of snow falling. At 3½ P.M. clearing; blue sky in places. Fall of snow since yesterday equal to 0.02 inches.
28	-1	+12	30.50	...	N.E. Moderately	E.S.E. Very lightly	30.46	Daybreak, clear all over. 4 P.M. quite clear. A very fine day. At 5 P.M. wind changed to S.E.
29	0	+21	30.36	...	S.E. Moderately	E.S.E. Moderately	30.31	Daybreak, quite clear all over; ice on river not moving. At 4 P.M. quite clear all over.
30	+9	+23	30.36	...	N.E. Lightly	N.W. Moderately	30.37	Daybreak, quite clear all over. 4 P.M. quite clear all over.
31	+10	+20	30.38	...	N.N.E. Moderately	N. Lightly	30.46	Daybreak, clear all over. At dark, still clear all over. A very fine day.
1862 Jan. 1	+4	+20	30.48	...	N.E. Very lightly	N.N.W. Very lightly	30.46	Daybreak, clear all over. At dark, quite clear all over. A remarkably fine day.
2	+7	+20	30.40	...	N. Very lightly	N. Moderately	30.45	Daybreak, clear all over. At 10 A.M. it blew rather strongly from N. and then moderated.
3	+4	+21	30.53	...	N.E. Moderately	N.W. Very lightly	30.54	Daybreak, sky quite clear. At 4 P.M. quite clear all over.
4	+7	+21	30.46	...	N.E. Moderately	N.N.E. Moderately	30.54	Daybreak, sky clear all over. At 3 P.M. still quite clear.
5	+4	+24	30.62	...	N.E. Moderately	N.E. Strongly	30.64	Daybreak, quite clear all over. At sunset, clear all over.
6	+2	+18	30.56	...	N.E. Moderately	N.N.E. Strongly	30.52	Daybreak, quite clear all over. At 4 P.M. quite clear.
7	+5	+22	30.53	...	N.E. Moderately	N.E. Strongly	30.48	Daybreak, quite clear all over. At 3½ P.M. still clear all over.
8	+7	+19	30.34	...	N. Moderately	...	...	Daybreak, quite clear all over. It was warm during the afternoon; little wind; and the thermometer probably 24° or 26°, but I neglected to note it.
9	+7	...	30.37	...	N.N.E. Moderately	N.N.E. Strongly	30.42	Daybreak, quite clear all over. At 4½ P.M. clear all over; but a good deal of dust flying, and producing a haze on the horizon.
10	+6	...	30.47	...	N. Moderately	...	...	Daybreak, a few clouds.
11	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	A fine cloudless day; wind northerly, but very light; temperature increasing as compared with the day before.
12	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	Much the same as yesterday; but still warmer towards evening.
13	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	During the 13th and 14th the wind was in the north, and in the sun it was thawing; this was the case in the Leon valley, between Ying-tze and Kin-chow; and doubtless, at Ying-tze also. It kept quite clear till the afternoon of the 14th, when it was partially covered with clouds.
14	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	Daybreak, sky nearly covered with clouds; but clouds not very dark.
15	28	36	30.40	0.05	S.S.W. Moderately	S.S.W. Moderately	30.42	Daybreak, sky dull all over; snowing a little.
16	22	22	30.43	...	N.E. Moderately	N.E. Moderately	30.52	At 4 A.M. it began to blow from N.; but snow had previously fallen, covering the ground. 6 P.M. it had cleared all over. Up to that time a little snow had fallen occasionally.

Date.	Greatest Cold before Daybreak.	Greatest Warmth in Afternoon.	Aneroid at Daybreak.	Amount of Rain.	Direction and force of Wind at Daybreak.	Direction and force of Wind at 2 to 4 P.M.	Aneroid at 2 to 4 P.M.	Additional Notes.
1862			Inches.	Inches.			Inches.	
Jan. 17	0	0	30.58	...	N. Moderately	...	...	Daybreak, quite clear all over.
18	4	...	...	...	...	...	...	During these eleven days I was absent on a journey to the extremity of the Leason peninsula. There (i. e., at the southern portion of the peninsula) it snowed a little on the 23rd, and blew very hard on the night of January 23-24. At Ying-tze I am told no snow at all has fallen; and the thermometer, has, I find, not fallen below the —4, at which I left it on the 17th.
19	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
20	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
21	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
22	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
23	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
24	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
25	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
26	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
27	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
28	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
29	+3	23	30.42	...	E. Lightly	W. Lightly	...	Sky quite clear all day.
30	+10	29	30.30	...	S.W. Moderately	N.W. Strongly	30.40	Daybreak, sky quite clear. Wind changed to N.W. at about 10 A.M. Quite clear all day.
31	+6	17	30.49	...	N.E. Moderately	N.E. Strongly	30.48	Dull all over at daybreak. At 2 P.M. still dull all over. Sun a white spot in the sky.
Feb. 1	+2	14	30.54	None	N.W. Moderately	N.W. Moderately	30.54	Daybreak, quite clear all over. No snow has fallen from yesterday's clouds. Clear all day. At noon blew strongly, so that the flag was taken down.
2	+1	17	30.50	...	S.E. Very lightly; almost calm	N.N.W. Moderately	30.48	Daybreak, quite clear all over, till night.
3	+5	24	30.39	...	S.E. Moderately	S.S.W. Strongly	30.32	Daybreak, quite clear all over, and at 3 P.M. also. The wind got round to W. and blew strongly in the forenoon.
4	+6	22	30.24	...	N.E. Moderately	N.W. Strongly	30.32	Daybreak, quite clear all over. Clear at 4 P.M. also.
5	+5	18	30.32	...	N.N.E. Very lightly	N. Lightly	31.32	Daybreak, quite clear. At 4 P.M. still clear.
6	+6	24	30.29	...	S.E. Very lightly	S. Lightly	30.29	Daybreak, clear all over. A remarkable fine evening.
7	+11	19	30.22	...	N.N.E. Strongly	N. Very strongly	30.24	Daybreak, dull all over. The N.E. wind must have begun after 1 or 2 A.M. this morning. 4 P.M., blowing very strongly, and a great deal of dust flying. Quite dull all over.
8	+2	15	30.31	...	N.N.W. Strongly	N.N.W. Strongly	30.26	Daybreak, quite clear all over; no snow has fallen. Quite clear at 5 P.M. A good deal of dust flying.
9	+6	30	30.40	...	S.S.W. Moderately	S.W. Strongly	30.44	Daybreak, quite clear all over. Quite clear at 3 P.M.
10	19	36	30.47	0.06	S. Moderately	S. Strongly	30.45	Daybreak, quite clear all over. The barometer has been steadily rising for thirty to forty hours, with a steady southerly wind, and a warmer atmosphere. 3 P.M., it has been very dusty during the day, and now the sky is quite overcast. Quite dull.
11	19	30	30.46		N.W. Moderately	N.N.W. Strongly	30.42	Daybreak, dull all over. About 2 or 3 A.M. it began to blow hard, northerly, and snow has fallen. About 10 A.M. it cleared; but about 2 P.M. a few clouds began to gather. After dark it was quite clear again.
12	10	24	30.58	...	N.W. Moderately	S. Lightly	30.54	Daybreak, clear all over. At 4 P.M. quite clear.
13	15	30	30.28	...	S.W. Moderately	N.N.E. Strongly	30.46	Daybreak, clear all over. The wind got round to the northern quarter at about 9 A.M., and has been blowing pretty strongly during a portion of the day. Quite clear at 5 P.M.
14	10	31	30.44	...	N.W. Lightly	S.W. Very strongly	30.24	Daybreak, quite clear. At 10 A.M. wind changed to S., and afterwards to S.W., blowing strongly, raising great quantities of dust.
15	22	29	30.48	...	N.N.E. Very strongly	N. Very strongly	30.55	Daybreak, sky slightly obscured by yellowish clouds, but blue largely visible. Wind wheeled to the northerly quarter between midnight and 4 A.M.; much dust flying.
16	10	27	30.60	...	N.N.E. Moderately	N.W. Moderately	30.47	10 A.M. clear all over. Quite clear at 4 P.M.
17	11	37	30.28	...	N.N.W. Moderately	N.N.E. Moderately	30.28	Daybreak, quite clear all over. At 4 P.M. quite clear all over.
18	15	37	30.09	...	S. Moderately	Not noted	...	Daybreak, quite clear all over. Cloudless at dark.
19	15	39	30.21	...	N.E. Moderately	...	30.20	Daybreak, quite clear all over. Towards afternoon there were a few clouds in the sky; but at night up to 12 there was a bright sky and moon.
20	20	43	30.14	...	S.E. Lightly	S.W. Very lightly	30.29	Daybreak, quite clear. Quite clear at 5 P.M.
21	24	38	29.95	...	S.E. Moderately	N.N.E. Lightly	29.96	Daybreak, a few yellowish clouds, chiefly in the horizon. 4 P.M., after gathering thickly over the N.E. portion of the sky these clouds disappeared, and it is now quite clear all over.
22	19	33	30.24	...	N.E. Strongly	N.W. Very strongly	30.26	Daybreak, clouds gradually obscuring the sky. Wind changed to N.N.E. after some hours of calm, at about 4 P.M.
23	14	29	30.34	...	N.N.W. Strongly	N.N.W. Strongly	30.47	Daybreak, quite clear; the wind began to blow hard from N. at about 4 A.M. At 4 P.M. quite clear; a good deal of dust flying.
24	9	24	30.58	...	N.N.E. Moderately	W. Nearly calm	30.48	Daybreak, quite clear. In the afternoon some light yellowish clouds.
25	16	33	30.28	...	S.S.W. Strongly	S.S.W. Very strongly	30.15	Daybreak, quite clear; a very fine morning. Quite clear at 5 P.M. About 6 P.M. the wind began to blow moderately, and later in the night strongly, from S.W.
26	27	41	29.98	...	S.S.W. Very strongly	S.S.W. Strongly	29.96	Daybreak, quite clear. 5 P.M. quite clear. Much dust all day.
27	29	43	29.86	...	S.E. Moderately	S.W. Strongly	29.86	Daybreak, blue sky, partially obscured by thin clouds; as the day wore on clouds increased. By 3 P.M. the sky was quite obscured by leaden brown clouds. Dust all day till dark, when the wind began to moderate.
28	21	35	30.18	...	N. Strongly	N. Moderately	30.22	Daybreak, very hazy high up around the horizon, but clear right over head. No dust. Dull in the middle of the day; clear again at 4 P.M. At about 11 A.M. the wind began to blow from the northern quarter.
March 1	17	33	30.26	...	Northerly; nearly calm	N. Moderate	30.22	Daybreak, quite clear. A very fine morning.
2	18	32	30.34	...	N.W. Lightly	N.N.W. Strongly	30.36	About noon it blew strongly from N.N.W. Daybreak, blue sky with a few large white clouds. Quite clear in the afternoon till dark.
3	15	35	30.44	...	N.N.E. Moderately	N.N.E. Moderately	30.50	Daybreak, quite clear; there were a few large white clouds during the day; but now, at 5 P.M. it is again quite clear.
4	17	33	30.44	...	S.E. Lightly	N.W. Moderately	30.59	Daybreak, clear except a haze on the horizon. White thin clouds gathered and nearly covered the blue sky towards dark.

Date.	Greatest Cold before Daybreak.	Greatest Warmth in Afternoon.	Anemoid at Daybreak.	Amount of Rain.	Direction and force of Wind at Daybreak.	Direction and force of Wind at 2 to 4 P.M.	Anemoid at 2 to 4 P.M.	Additional Notes.
1862	°	°	Inches.	Inches.			Inches.	
Mar. 5	18	35	30.38	...	S.E. Lightly ...	N.N.W. Strongly ...	30.40	Daybreak, clear over head, but cloudy on the horizon. At 3 P.M. quite clear.
6	18	37	30.42	...	S.E. Very lightly ...	W. Moderately ...	30.46	Daybreak, quite clear. A very fine morning. Quite clear at dark. A beautiful day altogether.
7	18	36	30.54	...	N.E. Moderately ...	W. Moderately ...	30.54	Daybreak, quite clear. Quite clear at 5 P.M.
8	18	32	30.46	Gauge not affected visibly	S.E. Moderately ...	N. Moderately ...	30.38	Daybreak, sky nearly covered with thin white clouds. Dull all over at about 12½ P.M., when a very few flakes of snow fell—so few as not to whiten the ground; the wind was then westerly, but soon got northerly. It snowed again between 4 and 6 P.M.
9	18	32	30.30	...	N. Lightly ...	N.N.W. Lightly ...	30.34	Daybreak, blue sky, with light yellowish clouds, more especially on the horizon. It gradually cleared, and at 5 P.M. scarcely any clouds are visible.
10	21	32	30.21	...	N.N.W. Moderately ...	W. Moderately ...	30.22	Daybreak, blue sky with light yellowish clouds, chiefly on the horizon.
11	18	32	30.38	...	E.S.E. Lightly ...	N.W. Moderately ...	For- gotten	Daybreak, quite clear. At 3 P.M. quite clear.
12	22	40	30.27	...	S.W. Moderately ...	S.S.W. Moderately ...	30.24	Daybreak, quite clear. Clear at 5 P.M.
13	22	40	30.31	...	N.E. Moderately ...	N.W. Strongly ...	30.38	Daybreak, quite clear. Quite clear at 5 P.M.
14	18	43	30.47	...	N.E. Moderately ...	W.N.W. Lightly ...	30.46	Daybreak, quite clear. At 5 P.M. a bank of light clouds had formed in the horizon, with thin white clouds in the horizon generally.
15	23	44	30.44	...	S.E. Moderately ...	S.S.W. Strongly ...	30.40	Daybreak, blue sky overhead, but haze high on the horizon. At 5½ P.M. clear all over, only a slight haze on the horizon.
16	28	51	30.28	...	S.S.E. Strongly ...	S.W. Very strongly ...	30.24	N.B.—In eight hours' time a difference of 25° in the temperature in the shade. Daybreak, clear all over. At 9 A.M. it began to blow very strongly, bringing up one continuous cloud of dust; this lasted till about 4 P.M., when with the same very strong wind the dust-clouds ceased, partly, I believe, because all the moveable dust between this and the sea, in a south-westerly direction, had been blown over us.
17	40	46	30.17	...	S.W. Very strongly ...	S.W. Strongly ...	30.25	Daybreak, sun just visible through a greyish shade of cloud all over the sky; little or no dust flying. Later, there was some dust, but not much; the sky gradually cleared. At 5½ P.M. it was clear all over, and the wind had abated to moderate; later it became calm.
18	28	40	30.63	...	N.N.E. Very strongly ...	N.E. Strongly ...	Omitted	Daybreak. During the night the blow came down from N.N.E. Towards evening the clouds nearly covered the sky.
19	22	49	30.51	...	N.E. Moderately ...	N.E. Moderately ...	30.40	Daybreak, quite clear all over. After, light clouds during the day in the sky.
20	25	51	30.32	...	N.E. Moderately ...	W. Moderately ...	30.28	Daybreak, a good deal of light cloud over a blue sky. 6 P.M., some appearance, with intervals, of entire clearness all day.
21	27	48	30.27	...	Southerly. Very lightly ...	S.W. Strongly ...	30.19	Daybreak, clear all over. Clear at 6½ P.M.
22	32	55	30.15	...	S.S.W. Strongly ...	S.S.W. Moderately ...	30.18	Daybreak, blue sky right over head, but clouds high up on the horizon all round;
23	34	55	30.09	...	S. Strongly ...	N.N.E. Moderately ...	30.22	no dust blowing yet. At 9 A.M. blowing very strongly, raising much dust. Blue sky soon after quite obscured by clouds.
24	33	53	30.24	...	N.N.E. Moderately ...	N.W. Moderately ...	30.20	Daybreak, sun's place dimly visible in a sky clouded all over; towards 2 P.M. clouds cleared off. About evening there were light white and yellow clouds in a blue sky.
25	34	51	30.15	...	W.S.W. Moderately ...	S.S.W. Very strongly ...	30.02	Daybreak, a little blue sky visible through clouds, which are becoming denser. At 8½ A.M. the wind got round to S.S.W., blowing strongly, when a few drops of rain fell, and then the sky began to clear. At 11 A.M. clouds only along the horizon; wind S.S.W. and strong.
26	41	59	29.93	So little as not to affect the gauge	S. Very strongly ...	S. Very strongly ...	29.74	Daybreak, clear all over. At about 9 A.M. it was blowing a storm from N., raining a continuous cloud of dust. At 5½ P.M. it has abated a little; overhead it is still clear, but high up, all round the horizon, the colour is leaden, whether caused by dust or vapour can hardly be decided. At 8½ P.M. wind changed to W.N.W., and blew very strongly; snow beginning to fall.
27	27	27	30.10	...	W.N.W. Very strongly ...	N.W. Very strongly ...	30.14	Daybreak, sky clear as to watery vapour or clouds commonly so called; but the air is so filled with dust, and to such a height, that overhead the blue sky is scarcely visible; while high up around the horizon there is a uniform dust or yellow-coloured cloud, through which the sun, at 10 A.M., is barely visible as a bright speck. At 5 P.M. some appearance of sky.
28	23	34	30.12	...	E. Moderately ...	N.N.W. Moderately ...	30.18	Daybreak, no watery, but some dust-clouds in the air, as yesterday.
29	30	50	30.28	...	W. Moderately ...	W. Strongly ...	30.04	Daybreak, clear overhead, but with a thin bank of cloud low along the horizon. Clear overhead throughout the day, but with more or less of haze on the horizon.
30	33	56	30.02	...	N.E. Strongly ...	N.E. Strongly ...	30.06	Daybreak, clear all over. 4 P.M., clear all over.
31	31	58	30.05	...	N.E. Moderately ...	N.N.E. Moderately ...	30.06	Daybreak, clear all over. At 6 P.M. a few light white clouds appeared in the otherwise blue sky.
April 1	34	57	30.00	...	E. Very lightly ...	W. Very lightly ...	29.88	Daybreak, white clouds covering the sky, and rising in darker colour and denser mass from the west, i. e., high up the wind is westerly. The Consulate flag veered round to the west about 9 A.M., and a haze took the place of the light clouds about noon.
2	34	54	29.82	...	Calm, or very lightly and variable	N. Strongly ...	29.86	Daybreak, a little blue sky visible through an increasing mass of cloud rising from S.W.; after blowing some time from S.W. wind changed to N.E., and afterwards to N. At 3½ P.M. patches of blue sky visible right over head; all the rest cloud.
3	37	55	29.98	...	Westerly. Nearly calm ...	W.S.W. Lightly ...	30.00	Daybreak, clear all over. Clear all over till dark.
4	35	55	30.24	...	N.N.W. Lightly ...	S.W. Lightly ...	30.28	Daybreak, clear all over. Towards 4 P.M. cloudy all over.

Date.	Greatest Cold before Daybreak.	Greatest Warmth in Afternoon.	Anemoid at Daybreak.	Amount of Rain.	Direction and force of Wind at Daybreak.	Direction and force of Wind at 2 to 4 P.M.	Anemoid at 2 to 4 P.M.	Additional Notes.
1862 April 5	32	56	Inches. 30.28	Inches. 0.25	S.E. Moderately ...	S.W. Lightly ...	Inches. 30.10	Daybreak, clear all over. Towards 4 P.M. cloudy all over.
6	36	41	30.10	...	N. Very lightly ...	N.W. Moderately ...	30.24	Daybreak, sky clouded all over; snowing, but snow thawing soon after falling. It began to clear up about noon; and at 5 1/2 P.M. is clear all over.
7	31	45	30.22	...	S. Strongly ...	Very strongly ...	50.09	Daybreak, clear all over. Clouds gathering from S.W. at 5 P.M.
8	33	52	30.02	...	S.W. Strongly ...	S.W. Strongly ...	30.00	Daybreak, cloudless sky, with a little haze low on the horizon. Towards 4 P.M. a few clouds began to come up from the west, and these kept on increasing till dark. At 8 1/2 P.M. it began to blow hard from N.
10	50	50	30.20	...	N.E. Lightly ...	S.W. Moderately ...	...	Daybreak, quite clear all over.
11	29	50	30.05	...	S.S.W. Very strongly ...	S.S.W. Strongly ...	30.01	Daybreak, clear all over. Some dust in the middle of the day, and clouds nearly covering the sky.
12	39	55	29.94	...	E.S.E. Lightly ...	N.N.E. Very lightly ...	29.92	Daybreak, a thin film of cloud nearly covering a sky. Towards 1 P.M. the sky was quite overcast, and a drop or two of rain fell; the wind then got N.W., and before dark it was quite clear.
13	35	51	30.00	...	N. Moderately ...	N.W. Moderately ...	29.97	Daybreak, dull all over; a little rain had fallen, but not enough to affect the gauge. Towards noon the clouds all cleared off.
14	40	50	29.81	...	S.W. Moderately ...	S.W. Moderately ...	29.68	Daybreak, sky cloudless, but with a band of haze along the horizon. At 7 P.M. the band of haze rising higher in the horizon.
15	35	59	29.94	...	N.E. Moderately ...	N.E. Moderately ...	29.95	Daybreak, clear all over. About sunset a high band of haze along the horizon.
16	37	52	30.02	...	N.N.E. Moderately ...	N.E. Strongly ...	30.14	Daybreak, clear all over; as the wind rose dust-clouds began to fill the air.
17	34	53	30.20	...	E.N.E. Very lightly ...	S.W. Moderately ...	30.10	Daybreak, clear all over; a very fine morning. At 5 P.M. dull all over.
18	47	57	29.92	...	S.W. Very strongly ...	S.W. Moderately ...	29.96	Daybreak, overhead clear, but the rest of the sky obscured with yellow dust-clouds. During the night it blew very strongly.
19	46	61	29.91	...	S.S.E. Moderately ...	W.S.W. Lightly ...	30.01	Daybreak, a yellowish dust haze; otherwise clear. At 4 P.M. clouds had come up from the west and covered the sky.
20	42	60	30.08	...	N.W. Lightly ...	S.W. Strongly ...	29.98	Daybreak, quite clear all over. At 4 P.M. still quite clear. The wind changed to S.W. about 8 A.M.; it was at first light, but gradually increased in strength.
21	50	61	29.92	...	S.S.W. Strongly ...	S.S.W. Strongly ...	29.78	Daybreak, a blue sky, but nearly covered with haze and thin cloud. At 4 P.M. blue sky with haze on the horizon, and some light clouds.
22	49	64	29.96	...	N.N.E. Lightly ...	W.N.W. Lightly ...	29.87	Daybreak, clear overhead, with haze on horizon. At 4 P.M. the sky was covered with thin cloud.
23	50	62	29.76	...	S. Moderately ...	S.W. Lightly ...	29.84	Daybreak, sky overcast and heavier clouds rising from S.S.W., to which quarter wind changed at 7 A.M. At 10 to 11 A.M. a thunderstorm of short duration came up from windward, accompanied by a shower that laid the surface dust, but did not affect the gauge. After that it got gradually clear overhead; but at 7 P.M. there were still clouds along the horizon.
24	48	49	29.90	...	N.N.E. Moderately ...	N.N.E. Very strongly ...	29.88	Daybreak, sky quite overcast by clouds, which kept moving up from the S.S.W., though the 100 feet high flag shows the wind to be N.N.E. below. At 8 A.M. a shower fell (not affecting the gauge), and it blew very strongly. The thermometer fell at 9 A.M. to 43°, and then rose again, by 3 1/2 P.M. to 48°.
25	42	45	29.82	...	N.N.E. Very strongly ...	N.N.E. Very strongly ...	29.96	Daybreak, sky heavily overcast. At 6 P.M. a shower of heavy drops fell, without affecting the gauge. At sunset sky still overcast, though somewhat lighter to windward. At 10 P.M. some stars were visible and clouds disappearing.
26	36	68	29.92	...	N.N.E. Strongly ...	N. Very lightly ...	30.01	Daybreak, clear all over. Towards sunset a few clouds coming up from W.N.W.
27	49	66	30.04	...	S.W. Moderately ...	W. Lightly ...	30.10	Daybreak, sky overcast all over. Cleared towards noon; and at sunset there were only a few light clouds in a blue sky.
28	44	78	30.18	...	N.N.E. Moderately ...	W.N.W. Moderately ...	30.19	Daybreak, sky quite clear. Quite clear at sunset.
29	50	67	30.21	...	S.W. Moderately ...	S.S.W. Moderately ...	30.18	Daybreak, light clouds along the horizon, but quite clear overhead. In the afternoon sky nearly obscured with light clouds.
30	52	67	30.13	...	S.S.W. Moderately ...	W.S.W. Moderately ...	30.10	Daybreak, quite clear all over; later, sky nearly covered from time to time with a light film of cloud.
May 1	54	56	30.03	0.30	E.S.E. Very lightly ...	N.N.E. Lightly ...	29.98	Daybreak, sky overcast all over. It began to rain at 6 A.M., and rained steadily, but not heavily, till about dark. At about 9 P.M. it began to blow more.
2	44	60	30.12	...	N.N.W. Strongly ...	N.N.E. Strongly ...	30.22	Daybreak, quite clear, except along the horizon, especially the horizon to leeward. At 10 A.M. wind was N.N.E. and strong. At 9 P.M. wind N.W. and moderate.
3	41	65	30.24	...	S.S.W. Moderately ...	S.W. Strongly ...	30.16	Daybreak, clear all over. Still clear at sunset.
4	61	63	30.16	...	S.S.W. Very strongly ...	S.S.W. Strongly ...	30.13	Daybreak, clear overhead, but with a cloudy haze along the horizon. Towards noon sky nearly overcast with light clouds.
5	53	71	30.14	...	W.S.W. Lightly ...	N.N.E. Lightly ...	30.20	Daybreak, sky overcast with a light film of cloud; film became lighter as the day advanced, but the sky did not clear altogether up.
6	48	63	30.12	...	N.E. Lightly ...	S.W. Moderately ...	30.02	Daybreak, clear right overhead, but the rest of the sky covered with a film of cloudy haze. As the day wore on wind veered to N.E., then settled in S.W., and the sky became more overcast. At 7 1/2 P.M. it began to rain steadily but lightly.
7	53	57	29.84	0.30	N.W. Very lightly ...	N.W. Very lightly ...	29.86	Daybreak, sky overcast all over. It has been raining lightly during the night, and still continues to rain. At about noon it cleared to windward and rain ceased. Since 4 P.M. till sunset wind very changeable and very light.
8	47	65	29.96	...	S.E. Lightly ...	S.S.W. Moderately ...	30.03	Daybreak, clear all over. Hazy on the horizon before sunset.

Date.	Greatest Cold before Daybreak.	Greatest Warmth in Afternoon.	Aneroid at Daybreak.	Amount of Rain.	Direction and force of Wind at Daybreak.	Direction and force of Wind at 2 to 4 P.M.	Aneroid at 2 to 4 P.M.	Additional Notes.
1862	o	o	Inches.	Inches.			Inches.	
May 9	52	71	30.02	...	S.S.W. Moderately	S.S.W. Moderately	30.01	Daybreak, clear all over. At sunset, clear all over. At 8 P.M. it was blowing lightly from N.N.E.
10	51	67	30.04	...	N.N.E. Very lightly	N.W. Very strongly	30.08	Daybreak, clear all over. At 9 A.M. it began blowing moderately from N.W. By noon it blew strongly from that quarter, and the air was filled with dust. By 3 P.M. it was blowing very strongly. About 7 P.M. wind quieted gradually. At 9 P.M. blowing lightly from N.W.
11	47	68	30.15	...	Calm	S.S.W. Moderately	29.98	Daybreak, clear all over; any air moving are northerly. A remarkably fine day. It was about 4 P.M. before it began to blow from S.S.W.
12	56	(82)	29.84	...	S.S.W. Moderately	N.N.E. Moderately	29.96	Daybreak, quite clear overhead, but a thin film of cloud high up all round the horizon; later, cleared entirely. There was a calm, and the wind in N.W. before changing to N.N.E.
13	55	(83) 71	30.09	...	S.E. Lightly	S.S.W. Moderately	30.12	Daybreak, clear all over. Clear all over at sunset.
14	59	(80)	30.17	...	S.S.W. Moderately	S.S.W. Strongly	30.17	Daybreak, quite clear all over. Clear all over at sunset.
15	62	(71)	30.15	...	S.S.W. Moderately	S.S.W. Strongly	30.17	Daybreak, blue sky overhead, with light clouds; high up all round the horizon a bank of haze and cloud. Clouds in a blue sky all day.
16	60	65	29.93	0.44	N.E. Moderately	S.E. Moderately	—	Daybreak, sky obscured with heavy leaden clouds, which still continue coming up from S.W., contrary to the wind below, though that is nearly strong. It cleared nearly with the N.E. wind, but afterwards became dull with the S.E., and began to rain about 9 A.M. At 9 P.M. the wind began to blow strongly from N.N.E.
17	55	66	29.73	...	N.N.E. Moderately	S.W. Moderately	29.76	Daybreak, dull all over. Clouds now all from N.N.E. At 6 A.M. began to clear. When the wind changed, about 3 P.M., to S.W. only a few light clouds left in that quarter. A shower, not affecting gauge, fell about 8 P.M.
18	54	(74) 66	29.86	0.34	S.W. Moderately	W.S.W. Moderately	29.84	Daybreak, clear all over, excepting a little haze around the horizon. The same haze, but no clouds, till 4 P.M.
19	56	62	29.73		S.S.W. Strongly	S.W. Strongly	29.82	Daybreak, dull all over; it has rained during the night and still rains. At 9 A.M. a few white clouds in a clear blue sky; wind S.W. At 3½ P.M. sky quite clear all over.
20	52	(65) 64	29.84	0.70	S.W. Lightly	W. Lightly	29.88	Daybreak, blue sky with some large clouds. Towards afternoon clouds increased, and a few drops of rain fell.
21	53	61	29.96	0.24	N.E. Very lightly	Calm	29.96	Daybreak, clouds in a blue sky. It rained heavily during the night. In the day, from about 11 to 1 P.M. it rained again; and afterwards cleared up. There was a little distant thunder. At sunset the air was pure and fresh feeling.
22	52	64	29.97	0.08	S.S.W. Lightly	W.N.W. Lightly	29.98	Daybreak, heavy clouds in a clear sky. At 5½ it rained in showers for an hour or two.
23	54	67	29.96	0.06	S.S.W. Lightly	S.W. Moderately	29.88	Daybreak, quite clear overhead, but with a few clouds and haze on the horizon; air fresh. At 6 P.M. a few light white clouds in a blue sky. A thunder-storm, with rain, at about 10 P.M.
24	59	(76) 68	29.93	...	N.W. Moderately	N.W. Moderately	29.95	Daybreak, clear sky overhead, with some white clouds near the horizon. At 4 P.M. clear all over.
25	58	(78) 70	29.90	...	S. Lightly	N.W. Moderately	29.74	Daybreak, blue sky, with a good many clouds. At about 6 to 7 P.M. wind changed to S.S.E., and blew strongly. A haze was all round the horizon; clear sky overhead. During the night began blowing strongly from a southerly quarter.
26	58	(78) 70	29.93	...	N.W. Moderately	N.N.E. Moderately	30.03	Daybreak, clear sky with a very few white clouds; wind changed to N.W. about an hour or two before daybreak. At 6 P.M. blue sky, with a good many white clouds.
27	60	(82) 73	30.04	...	S.E. Moderately	S.S.W. Strongly	30.02	Daybreak, blue sky, but with many white clouds, all moving up from the west pretty quickly. At 6½ P.M. same appearance of sky. The warmest day we have had yet.
28	65	(74) 71	30.08	...	S.W. Lightly	S.W. Lightly	30.00	Daybreak, blue sky with a few white clouds. At dark same appearance, but with some large dark clouds, from which a few drops of rain fell. It began to rain steadily, with little or no wind, at 9 P.M.
29	62	(74) 69	29.58	0.51 T.S. 0.02	S.E. Very lightly	W. Moderately	29.80	Daybreak, sky quite obscure. Clouds moving from N.W., contrary to air below. By 9 A.M. wind had veered round to W., and was blowing moderately; at the same time blue sky showed itself to W. At 2 P.M. a little thunder-storm (T.S.) At 7 P.M. a gust from W.N.W., with heavy rain, which did not, however, last long.
30	57	67	29.66	Last night and the forenoon 0.70	N.N.W. Strongly	N. Very strongly	29.70	Daybreak, dull all over. At 5 A.M. began to rain heavily and steadily. About 10 A.M. the wind had gradually got due N., and the rain ceased, and blue sky appeared to windward. In the evening quite clear all over.
31	59	(73) 70	29.84	0.05	E. Very lightly	S.S.W. Strongly	29.81	Daybreak; a shower about daylight, after which it became clear overhead; but there were still clouds near the horizon. About noon altogether clear.
June 1	62	(82) 72	29.72	...	S.S.W. Strongly	Calm	29.77	Daybreak, blue sky, with a number of white clouds. Afternoon, a bright cloudless warm day. At 6 P.M. it began to blow moderately from N.E. by N.
2	52	(61) 71	29.92	...	N.E. Moderately	N.E. Lightly	29.94	Daybreak, clear all over. 4½ P.M., quite clear. At 9 P.M. clear.
3	62	(61) 75	29.93	...	Calm	S.W. Moderately	29.88	Daybreak, quite clear. At 6 P.M. quite clear.
4	67	(76) 75	29.87	...	S.S.E. Moderately	Variable and calm	29.93	Daybreak, blue sky with a high haze cloud on the horizon, and a few light clouds overhead. About noon wind S.S.W. and strong. At 2 P.M. distant thunder, with light variable air and sultry calm. In the evening thunder again, without rain.

Date.	Greatest Cold before Daybreak.	Greatest Warmth in Afternoon.	Anemoid at Daybreak.	Amount of Rain.	Direction and force of Wind at Daybreak.	Direction and force of Wind at 2 to 4 P.M.	Anemoid at 2 to 4 P.M.	Additional Notes.
1862	°	°	Inches.	Inches.			Inches.	
June 5	67	(85) 77	29-95	...	W. Very lightly ...	W. Moderately ...	29-96	Daybreak, blue sky with some largish black and a few white clouds; a heavy dew has fallen during the night. At 10 A.M. wind S.S.W.; later, N.W., and blowing moderately. Towards night the N.W. wind had nearly cleared away all clouds.
6	68	(87) 79	29-98	...	N.E. Moderately ...	W. Moderately ...	—	Daybreak, clear sky with a very few white clouds. At 5½ P.M. sky nearly obscured by thundery bank of clouds rising from the horizon. At 9 P.M. a heavy black cloud, with lightning, rose from the W. and passed with a strong gust of wind, but without thunder.
7	68	(82) 77	29-96	0-10	S.E. Lightly ...	W.S.W. Moderately ...	29-92	Daybreak, blue sky with a few clouds. 7½ A.M. wind S.S.W. by W., and moderate; clouds increasing. At 5 P.M. fewer clouds again. At 9 P.M. a thunderstorm with rain came on from W.N.W.
8	67	(83) 78	29-92		Calm ...	W. Strongly ...	29-90	Daybreak, blue sky with clouds; soon after daybreak variable winds blowing moderately from nearly all western and southern quarters till 4 P.M., when we had N.W. strongly.
9	67	(83) 78	29-91	...	S.S.E. Moderately ...	W. Moderately ...	29-94	Daybreak, blue sky with a few white clouds. At 4 P.M. blue sky with rather more clouds.
10	68	(80) 75	30-02	...	S.S.E. Moderately ...	W.S.W. Moderately ...	30-05	Daybreak, quite clear. At 4½ P.M. white clouds obscuring the sun at times.
11	65	(77) 76	30-12	...	S.S.E. Moderately ...	S.W. Strongly ...	30-14	Daybreak, blue sky with thin streaks of thin white cloud. At 7½ blowing strongly from S.S.W., and clouds increasing. At 11 wind S.W. and strong; clouds fewer, &c.
12	69	(80) 77	30-10	...	S.S.W. Moderately ...	W.S.W. Strongly ...	29-98	Daybreak, blue sky with a few clouds; wind varied up till 6 P.M. from S.E. to W.S.W.; clouds increasing.
13	69	71	29-93	0-94	S.W. Moderately ...	W.S.W. Very strongly ...	29-82	Daybreak, blue sky nearly obscured with clouds which are rising more heavily from windward. At 9 A.M. it began to rain steadily; the wind, which had been nearly strong, abating to light. At about 2 it rose as it got more westerly. At 3½ very strong. At 5½ a little patch of blue sky visible; wind moderate.
14	65	(81) 77	29-82	...	E.S.E. Lightly ...	W.N.W. Moderately ...	29-78	Daybreak, blue sky with a few white clouds. Same at 5½ P.M. Before dark wind changed to N.E.
15	66	(87) 79	29-79	...	N.E. Lightly ...	N.E. Moderately ...	29-76	Daybreak, clear all over. At sunset quite clear.
16	72	(81) 77	29-78	...	S. Lightly ...	S.W. Strongly ...	29-68	Daybreak, sky clouded all over but not heavily; it cleared as the day advanced, and large patches of blue, with periods of sunshine, appeared. About 9 P.M. an electrical cloud came up from S.W., accompanied by a very strong gust of wind; no rain.
17	66	(77) 75	29-66	...	S.W. Moderately ...	W. Moderately ...	29-61	Daybreak, blue sky with a good many clouds. About noon nearly a clear sky; but towards 4 P.M. clouds rising in masses from W. At 6 P.M. a light shower, which did not affect the gauge; after which it began to clear.
18	65	(80) 76	29-67	...	Very light and easterly, and calms	W. Moderately ...	29-69	Daybreak, quite clear all over. At 5 P.M. quite clear.
19	67	(84) 80	29-62	...	S.S.E. Moderately ...	S.E. Moderately ...	29-53	Daybreak, quite clear. At 7 A.M. wind veered round to S.W., and increased in force till noon, when it blew strongly; a few white clouds began to come up from windward. About 4 P.M. wind veered round to S.E.
20	70	(88) 81	29-58	0-02	S.W. Very lightly ...	Variable and calm ...	29-54	Daybreak, thin foggy clouds that are disappearing before the sun, leaving blue sky and white clouds. About 3 P.M. heavy thundery-looking clouds gathered in different quarters. About dark a strong gust from S.E. A heavy shower early in the night.
21	71	(82) 79	29-50		S.W. Moderately ...	S.W. Strongly ...	29-51	Daybreak, blue sky nearly obscured by clouds, from which showers are falling. By 8 A.M. it was clear all over. Later in the day, cloudy, with much lightning, and a little thunder in the distance.
22	69	(75) 75	29-56	0-50 0-08	N. Moderately ...	W.S.W. Strongly ...	29-62	Daybreak, a hazy bank of cloud to the E. and N.E., otherwise blue sky with a few clouds. At 11½ some thunder, with a heavy shower from N.W. At 2½ P.M. another shower.
23	67	(79) 75	29-63	...	N. Lightly ...	S.S.W. Lightly ...	29-72	Daybreak, clear sky except along the horizon, where there are banks of cloud. A blue sky with very few clouds throughout the day.
24	66	(79) 77	29-74	...	E.N.E. Very lightly ...	W. Moderately ...	29-74	Daybreak, blue sky with large clouds; clouds increased with the change of the wind to W. at about 10 A.M. At 4 P.M. sky quite obscured. At 5½ P.M. wind changed suddenly to N.N.E., and blew strongly for a while; the sky clearing.
25	65	(83) 79	29-83	...	N.E. Very lightly ...	W. Lightly ...	29-84	Daybreak, quite clear all over. Later in the day a few white clouds. Wind variable, but chiefly W. and N.W.
26	71	(84) 79	29-86	0-02	S.E. Moderately ...	W.S.W. Moderately ...	29-86	Daybreak; before daylight it began to rain. Rained lightly, with S.E. wind, till 6 A.M., when the high up wind from N.W. began to clear the sky in the westerly quarter; the wind then settled highly in N.N.E.
27	70	(86) 82	29-85	...	S.E. Moderately ...	S.S.W. Strongly ...	29-78	At 4 P.M. blue sky with white clouds. Daybreak, quite clear all over. At 5 P.M. sun barely perceptible through clouds rising from westerly quarters.
28	71	(88) 83	29-79	...	S.S.W. Strongly ...	S.S.W. Strongly ...	29-76	Daybreak, clear overhead with a few clouds along the easterly horizon. At 4 P.M. clear all over. Dust flying to-day and yesterday. In the latter part of the night a thunderstorm and a shower.
29	76	(88) 83	29-77	0-01	S. Moderately ...	W.S.W. Moderately ...	29-77	Daybreak, blue sky peeping through clouds. Towards middle of day became quite clear. At 6 P.M. overcast again. Towards daybreak a heavy thunderstorm; a continuous roar of thunder.
30	76	(86) 84	29-80	0-17	Variable ...	S.S.W. Strongly ...	29-81	Daybreak, blue sky visible between heavy thunder-clouds; thunder and lightning, with rain. Rain and thunder ended about 10 A.M., when wind settled in S.S.W., and blew strongly by 11½ A.M.

Date.	Greatest Cold before Daybreak.	Greatest Warmth in Afternoon.	Anemoid at Daybreak.	Amount of Rain.	Direction and force of Wind at Daybreak.	Direction and force of Wind at 2 to 4 P.M.	Anemoid at 10 to 4 P.M.	Additional Notes.
1862	°	°	Inches.	Inches.			Inches.	
July 1	74	(87) 83	29.81	...	S.S.W. Moderately ...	S.S.W. Moderately ...	29.78	Daybreak, blue sky with a few light white clouds. During the day clouds more or less in a blue sky.
2	77	(89) 82	29.86	0.49 0.17	S. Moderately ...	S. Moderately ...	29.50	Daybreak, patches of blue visible through masses of clouds coming up from S.W. At 3 P.M. sky quite obscured, and a steady small rain began with wind. Calm.
3	70	(78) 77	29.46		W.N.W. Lightly ...	W.N.W. Moderately ...	29.47	Daybreak, patches of blue sky visible through low misty clouds coming down from windward, and giving out a few drops of rain. After keeping fair for some hours it rained again in the afternoon.
4	70	(87) 82	29.65		Very light, with easterly. Calm	S.E. Lightly ...	29.68	Daybreak, quite clear all over. About two hours before sunset a slight haze over the sky.
5	75	(84) 81	29.81	0.06	S. Moderately ...	N. Very strongly .	29.87	Daybreak, clear all over. At about 3 P.M. wind changed to N. and blew strongly, dark clouds coming with it, and completely obscuring the sky. At 7 P.M. it began to rain, and heavy showers fell till dark.
6	66	(83) Not taken	29.85	...	N. Moderately ...	N.N.W. Lightly ...	29.82	Daybreak, blue sky with a few white clouds; the same all day.
7	73	(82) 80	29.96	2.30+ 0.02	S.S.E. Very lightly	N.W. Lightly ...	29.94	Daybreak, blue sky visible through large low misty clouds. At 3 P.M. sky quite overcast and rain commenced; it rained lightly till dark, when it began to rain hard, and did so from time to time during the night.
8	66	(82) 78	29.82		N.N.E. Strongly ...	N.N.E. Lightly ...	29.86	Daybreak, sky overcast, and raining very heavily at times. During the night the rain-gauge filled, so that I do not know how much more than 2.30 has fallen. I let it off at 5 A.M., after which a little more rain fell. About 10 A.M. it began to clear up.
9	74	(76) 73	29.85	0.04	S. Very lightly ...	W. Lightly .	29.78	Daybreak, grey all over. By 6 A.M. some rain began to fall. At 7 P.M. noted and reset rain-gauge.
10	72	(76) 76	29.83	...	S. Moderately ...	S.S.W. Very lightly	29.80	Daybreak, grey clouds all over, and a few drops of rain at times. About 10 A.M. blew strongly from S.S.W., and the sky cleared somewhat.
11	71	(84)	29.80	...	S.W. Moderately ...	S.W. Very strongly	29.80	Daybreak, blue sky with large misty clouds coming from S.W.
12	72	(84) 81	...	...	S.W. Strongly ...	S.W. Strongly ...	29.92	Daybreak, blue sky partially covered with thin cloud-banks.
13	74	(83) 78	29.86	0.20	S.E. Moderately ...	W. Lightly .	29.72	Daybreak, grey clouds all over, and a little rain. It rained till about 2 P.M., when blue sky and sun reappeared.
4	74	(82) 80	29.66	...	S. Strongly ...	S.W. Strongly ...	29.68	Daybreak, blue sky overhead, with cloud along the horizon. At 4 P.M. blue sky, with clouds crowning it.
15	76	(82) 80	29.69	0.12	S. Moderately ...	W. Very lightly ...	29.76	Daybreak, blue sky with a good many clouds. At 5 P.M. sun barely visible as a light spot through a leaden-coloured sky. In the morning, at 6 to 7 A.M., a heavy thunder-storm.
16	75	(82) 80	29.80	...	Calm .	S.S.W. Moderately	29.82	Daybreak, misty clouds low down, nearly obscuring the blue sky. At 4 P.M. blue sky nearly covered by clouds, some heavy and dark. At 7 P.M. a squall with rain came up, with a heavy bank of cloud from N.E.
17	72	(85) 79	29.92	0.13	E. Very lightly ...	W. Moderately ...	29.91	Daybreak, sky obscured all over, and a drizzling rain falling. At 7 A.M. sun and blue sky began to appear. At 6 P.M. blue sky with a few white clouds.
18	75	(90) 84	29.93	...	E. Very lightly ...	N. Moderately ...	29.91	Daybreak, blue sky with a very few light white clouds. During the greater part of the day wind N.E. or N.N.E.
19	74	(85) 84	29.89	...	S. Lightly ...	S.W. Moderately ...	29.96	Daybreak, quite clear all over. At 5 P.M. quite clear. The wind gradually veered from daybreak to S.W.
20	76	(86) 83	29.82	0.11 0.05	S. Strongly .	S. Strongly .	29.72	Daybreak, blue sky with clouds coming from S.W. At 6 P.M. clouds now nearly covering the blue sky. During the night a heavy shower of rain fell.
21	79	(85) 81	29.69		S.S.W. Strongly ...	S.W. Moderately .	29.74	Daybreak dull all over and drops of rain at times. At about noon it began to clear up. At 5 P.M. clear sky, with only a few clouds.
22	76	(87) 83	29.84		S.E. Lightly ...	S.W. Moderately .	29.96	Daybreak, blue sky nearly covered with light coloured clouds. A few drops of rain fell in the morning, but the wind changed by 10 A.M. to S. and S.W. At 5 P.M. very few and white clouds. At 6 P.M. a squall with a shower, and thunder from N.E., after which it cleared.
23	74	(88) 84	30.07	0.05	S.E. Very lightly .	S.S.E. Moderately .	30.08	Daybreak, clear all over except a few misty clouds on the horizon. At 10 A.M. barometer 30.12. At 6 P.M. blue sky with a few white clouds.
24	77	(89) 85	30.10	...	S.S.E. Moderately	S. Moderately ...	30.04	Daybreak, blue sky with a few clouds low on the horizon. White clouds in the sky throughout the day.
25	76	(86) 84	30.00	...	S.E. Moderately ...	S.S.W. Strongly ...	29.92	Daybreak, blue sky with a very few white clouds. Clouds collecting all day; and at 4 P.M. sky quite overcast, except in N.E., where a little blue sky is visible.
26	78	(77) 79	29.82	0.08 1.62 0.92 1.63 0.46	S.S.W. Moderately	S.W. Strongly ...	29.71	Daybreak, sky quite overcast and rain falling. It began to rain about an hour before daylight. Thermometer rose before noon till 80°, and then began to fall. At 4 P.M. let off and readjusted the rain-gauge; still raining and blowing hard. At 7 P.M. again let off and readjusted the gauge, 0.92 had fallen in three hours. At 9.15 let off and readjusted the gauge, equal to 1.53.
27	75	(82) 79	29.73	0.20	S.W. Strongly ...	W. Very lightly ...	29.80	Daybreak, dull all over and rain falling. At about 10 P.M. yesterday it began to blow very strongly from S., and kept up for several hours, the wind being too high for rain in quantity hence only 0.46. Rain ceased and sky cleared about noon. Total fall of rain since about 3 A.M. yesterday, equal to 4.71 inches. At 4.15 P.M. a good many white clouds in a pure blue sky.
28	76	(80) 78	29.80	...	N. Very lightly ...	N.N.E. Lightly ...	29.84	Daybreak, blue sky visible overhead, but all else covered with light clouds. About noon it cleared, but towards evening became obscured again.

Date.	Greatest Cold before Daybreak.	Greatest Warmth in Afternoon.	Aneroid at Daybreak.	Amount of Rain.	Direction and force of Wind at Daybreak.	Direction and force of Wind at 2 to 4 P.M.	Aneroid at 2 to 4 P.M.	Additional Notes.
1862								
July 29	70	(83) 79	29-85	Inches. ...	E.S.E. Very lightly	W. Very lightly	Inches. 29-86	Daybreak, quite clear above, but a few light clouds along the horizon. At 6 P.M. quite clear all over.
30	72	(84) 81	29-86	...	S.S.E. Lightly	W. Very lightly	29-91	Daybreak, clear sky except low along the horizon, where there are light cloud-banks. At 6 P.M. blue sky, but somewhat obscured by a pervading haze and light clouds.
31	74	(87) 87	29-92	...	Calm	W. Lightly	29-95	Daybreak, clear sky with a very few light clouds on horizon. At 3½ clouds increased, somewhat particularly to windward, i.e., W.
August 1	73	(88) 83	29-93	...	N.N.E. Very lightly	W. Very lightly	29-91	Daybreak, quite clear all over. At 6 P.M. clear all over.
2	73	(89) 85	29-92	...	S.E. Very lightly	N.N.E. Lightly	29-89	Daybreak, quite clear all over. At 4 P.M. one or two white clouds in an otherwise quite clear sky.
3	75	(88) 84	29-92	...	N.N.E. Very lightly	N.E. Moderately	29-99	Daybreak, quite clear except a few white clouds in W. About noon barometer equal to 30. At 6 P.M. clear with a very few white clouds.
4	74	(89) 85	30-03	1-00	N.E. Lightly	Changeable and calm	30-05	Daybreak, blue sky with a few white clouds, more especially to E. and S.E. At 4 P.M. a good many clouds. At 5 P.M. a thunder-shower fell; and at 6½ it began to rain steadily. Before 10 P.M. (when I regulated the gauge) 1 inch had fallen.
5	74	(79) 78	30-07	0-80 0-54	S. Lightly	S.S.W. Lightly	29-86	Daybreak, dull all over and raining (during the night 0-8). At about 2 P.M. it fair'd; and at 5 P.M. blue sky to windward. After dark a shower fell, when it cleared again.
6	74	(81) 79	30-83	0-17 0-06	S.W. Moderately	S.W. Strongly	29-90	Daybreak, blue sky speckled high up with groups of white clouds (like sheep) apparently not moving; low down, heavy misty clouds passing from S.W., and discharging each a short heavy shower of rain. At 4 P.M. only white clouds passing from windward through a blue sky. Rain finished.
7	73	(83) 81	30-01	...	S.E. Very lightly	N.W. Lightly	30-09	Daybreak, blue sky with a few clouds high up passing from S.W., though the flag shows wind at S.E. At 5½ P.M. blue sky with still fewer clouds.
8	75	(82) 80	30-18	...	N.N.E. Moderately	N.N.E. Moderately	30-17	Daybreak, cloudy with patches of blue sky. At 5 P.M. same appearance.
9	72	(82) 80	30-12	...	N.N.E. Moderately	N.N.E. Strongly	30-06	Daybreak, clear blue sky with a very few clouds, chiefly on the horizon. At 5 P.M. same appearance. For the first time for several months dust has been in the air and entering the rooms.
10	71	(86) 81	30-01	...	N.N.E. Moderately	N.N.E. Strongly	29-97	Daybreak, quite clear all over. At 5 P.M. quite clear all over with the exception of one or two light white clouds. Dust entering rooms.
11	73	(89) 84	29-92	...	N.E. Very lightly	N.E. Moderately	29-89	Daybreak, quite clear all over. At 5 P.M. a very few light white clouds.
12	75	(87) 82	29-86	...	S. Lightly	W.S.W. Moderately	29-90	Daybreak, clear all over except along the horizon, where there is a low bank of white clouds. At sunset clear except a very few clouds near horizon. At 9 P.M. cloudless sky.
13	72	(88) 83	29-97	...	S.E. Moderately	W. Moderately	30-00	Daybreak, quite clear all over. MEM.—The easterly and south-easterly winds are here evidently dry ones. At 5 P.M. a good many white clouds had risen high up from westward.
14	75	(86) 81	30-03	...	S.E. Moderately	Calm	30-03	Daybreak, blue sky fully one-half covered by patches of white cloud. In the evening fewer and higher clouds.
15	72	(87) 82	29-98	...	S.E. Moderately	W. Moderately	29-92	Daybreak, blue sky nearly half covered with patches of high cloud. At 6 P.M. fewer clouds, which are moving up from E., though the wind at flagstaff-head is W.
16	74	(86) 82	29-88	...	S.S.E. Lightly	S.W. Moderately	29-82	Daybreak, quite clear overhead; a few light clouds on the horizon. At 5 P.M. same appearance. A bright day, with a few clouds.
17	77	(89) 85	29-82	0-86	S.S.E. Moderately	S.S.W. Strongly	29-73	Daybreak, blue sky with a few white clouds. As the wind got into the westerly quarter more clouds began to collect; but at 4½ P.M. it is still a bright sky. During the night about 1 to 2 o'clock it began to rain; wind then S. and W.
18	75	76	29-85		N.E. Very lightly	N.E. Lightly	29-84	Daybreak, dull all over and raining. At 9½ still dull, but rain stopped, equal to 0-86. At 5½ P.M. still dull all over, but no rain since 9½ A.M.
19	69	76	29-82		N.E. Lightly	W.N.W. Lightly	29-78	Daybreak, dull all over. At about 3 P.M. blue sky appeared partially. At 5 P.M. the clouds high up are passing from S.W. to N.E., though below the wind is W.N.W. or N.W.
20	67	(84) 78	29-82	...	N.E. Moderately	N.N.E. Strongly	29-82	Daybreak, quite clear all over.
21	67	(85) 80	29-89	...	N. Lightly	N.N.E. Lightly	29-90	Daybreak, quite clear all over. Towards evening a few light white clouds.
22	69	(86) 80	29-91	...	S.S.E. Lightly	N.W. Lightly	29-90	Daybreak, blue sky with a very few clouds low on the horizon. At 4 P.M. light white clouds scattered all over the sky.
23	70	(87) 81	29-92	...	S.E. Lightly	W. Moderately	29-93	Daybreak, blue sky with a very few clouds mostly on horizon. At 5½ a shade of dark clouds covering the horizon high up to windward, and rising. Lightning, without thunder.
24	71	(88) 82	29-97	...	S.E. Moderately	W.N.W. Lightly	29-97	Daybreak, blue sky with a very few clouds low on horizon. About 2 P.M. a black cloud, with thunder, came over from N.W., but no rain fell here. The storm passed to westward. At 4 P.M. clear sky with a few white clouds scattered over it.
25	72	(83) 80	29-97	...	S.E. Moderately	N.W. Lightly	29-97	Daybreak, blue sky with a few clouds near horizon. The barometer rose to 30° about noon; sky then got gradually obscured with calm below, and sultry feel. About 2½ P.M. wind veered to N.W. At 4 P.M. sky quite obscured.
26	69	75	29-89	0-12	E.N.E. Moderately	N.E. Moderately	29-77	Daybreak, in the early morning (say 1 to 2) it began to rain, with southerly wind. About daybreak wind changed to E.N.E.; little rain falling, and the thermometer going down. At 3½ P.M. it began to rain again, after having kept fair for some eight hours. Thermometer fell to 65° before beginning to rise again.

Date.	Greatest Cold before Daybreak.	Greatest Warmth in Afternoon.	Aneroid at Daybreak.	Amount of Rain.	Direction and force of Wind at Daybreak.	Direction and force of Wind at 2 to 4 P.M.	Aneroid at 2 to 4 P.M.	Additional Notes.
1863 August 27	67	73	Inches. 29.74	Inches. 0.23	N.N.E. Moderately	Calm	Inches. 29.81	Daybreak, dull all over, and a drizzling rain. At 6 P.M. dull all over, and a light misty rain falling. Gauge at 0.23.
28	70	75	29.92	0.06	S.S.W. Very lightly	S.W. Very lightly	29.99	Daybreak, dull all over; a little misty rain falling occasionally; as day broke rain-spitting ceased gradually, and by 2 P.M. blue sky was visible through the heavy misty clouds to W. and S.
29	71	(79) 76	30.00	0.18	S.W. Very lightly	N. Moderately	29.98	Daybreak, dull all over. Since midnight three heavy showers have fallen (0.18). At 7½ A.M. wind began to blow moderately from N., and blue sky appeared in that quarter; barometer 30.04. About noon barometer 30.04, after which it began to fall. From 7½ A.M. until 3 P.M. the upper clouds were still going from S.W. to N.N.E. At 6 P.M. wind N.N.E. and moderate; sky quite clear, except a few clouds on S.S.W. horizon.
30	65	(82) 77	29.98	...	N.N.E. Moderately	N.N.E. Moderately	29.91	Daybreak, quite clear except a few light clouds low on horizon. At 6 P.M. rather more clouds, but still a very bright day.
31	69	(85) 80	29.92	...	S.E. Very lightly	N.N.E. Moderately	29.95	Daybreak, quite clear except a few clouds near horizon. The wind changed to N.N.W., then to N.N.E., about 11 A.M. At about 6 P.M. the wind began to blow strongly from N.E.
Sept. 1	60	73	30.04	...	N.E. Strongly	N.E. Strongly	30.07	Daybreak, light grey clouds nearly covering the blue sky. At 10 A.M. sky quite covered, and sun visible only as a white spot. About noon barometer 30.10. At 5 P.M. duller still; sun not visible.
2	60	(77) 72	30.08	...	N.N.E. Moderately	N.E. Moderately	30.08	Daybreak, only a very little blue sky visible through grey clouds; as the day advanced the sky cleared. At 6 P.M. a fine evening, though with a good deal of cloud in the sky.
3	62	(79) 75	30.13	...	N. Lightly	W. Lightly	30.13	Daybreak, quite clear except a very little cloud and haze on the horizon. At 5 P.M. quite clear all over. At 9 P.M. still quite clear all over.
4	64	(83) 77	30.16	...	S.S.E. Moderately	W.S.W. Moderately	30.15	Daybreak, blue sky with a very few light clouds in S.E. and on the horizon. At 5 P.M. quite clear.
5	70	(83) 78	30.18	...	S. Moderately	S.S.W. Strongly	30.10	Daybreak, quite clear all over; wind veered to S.S.W. about 10 A.M., and clouds began to appear on windward horizon. At 6 P.M. blue sky half covered with clouds.
6	70	(79) 76	30.07	...	S.S.E. Moderately	S.S.W. Strongly	30.01	Daybreak, blue sky with light clouds scattered all over. At sunset similar appearance; clouds fewer, somewhat.
7	71	(81) 78	30.01	...	S.S.W. Strongly	S.S.W. Strongly	30.04	Daybreak, bluesky overhead, but with clouded horizon, and with light clouds passing from windward. At sunset it was much clearer; very few clouds visible.
8	71	(85) 80	30.09	...	S.S.W. Strongly	W.S.W. Strongly	30.06	Daybreak, quite clear all over. At 5 P.M. sky half covered with light clouds.
9	71	(80) 80	29.95	0.65	S.W. Moderately	W.N.W. Moderately	29.96	Daybreak, dull and raining. A thunder-storm came up from S.W. about 1 to 2 A.M., and it has rained from time to time since. At 9 A.M. wind changed to W.N.W., and it began to clear. At 6 P.M. wind again S.S.W., but sky quite clear, except a few white clouds low on horizon.
10	65	(80) 77	30.03	...	S.S.W. Moderately	S.S.W. Strongly	30.05	Daybreak, quite clear all over. At 4 P.M. quite clear all over; and also at 9 P.M.
11	70	(82) 79	30.10	...	S. Moderately	S.W. Moderately	30.12	Daybreak, clear all over. At 5 P.M. blue sky with very thin white clouds scattered over a large portion.
12	69	(81) 76	30.08	...	S.E. Moderately	N.W. Very lightly	30.04	Daybreak, sky nearly covered with light clouds. Towards noon it cleared considerably. At 9 P.M. quite clear.
13	62	(78) 75	30.06	...	N.N.E. Moderately	S.W. Moderately	30.02	Daybreak, quite clear all over. At 5½ a good many clouds in the sky, but still a bright day. Blowing strongly from S.W. during night.
14	73	67	29.98	...	S.W. Moderately	N.N.E. Strongly	29.98	Daybreak, sky quite covered with dark clouds. At 7 A.M. wind veered to W. and freshened; a few drops of rain falling. At 7½ a strong blow came from N.W. suddenly. At 8½ thermometer equal to 65°—a fall of 8° in one hour.
15	55	(71) 69	29.98	0.08	E. Lightly	S.S.W. Moderately	29.93	Daybreak, blue sky with a few light clouds high up, which are from S.S.W. to N.N.E. At 5 P.M. still fewer clouds, and only low on horizon. At 6½ P.M. a heavy bank of cloud which had been rising from N.W. burst in a violent gust from that quarter; up to the instant of the change the flag at mast-head had been kept fully blown out by S.S.W. wind. It blew very strongly for an hour or two, with a little rain as it lessened.
16	54	68	30.02	...	N.W. Strongly	N.W. Moderately	30.10	Daybreak, blue sky with a great many clouds. At sunset quite clear all over.
17	58	(73) 71	30.12	...	S.W. Lightly	S.W. Very strongly	30.12	Daybreak, quite clear all over; so also at 3 P.M.
18	65	(73) 71	30.18	...	S. Strongly	S.W. Moderately	30.15	Daybreak, blue sky overhead with white clouds passing over it, and horizon dull all round; it cleared as the day advanced. At sunset very few clouds.
19	60	(74) 71	30.15	...	S.E. Moderately	S.W. Strongly	30.07	Daybreak, quite clear all over. The wind changed gradually to S.W., from whence it blew till noon, and clouds then began to rise; and about sunset they were distributed all over the blue sky.
20	66	(74) 71	30.05	...	S. Strongly	S.W. Moderately	30.17	Daybreak, blue sky with large clouds passing over it from S.W. At about 1½ P.M. the sky was quite obscured, but then the wind veered to W., and it began to clear rapidly. About 4½ P.M. wind N.W.; and at 5 P.M. N.N.E., with sky nearly clear.
21	55	61	30.21	0.37	N.W. Strongly	N.N.E. Moderately	30.24	Daybreak, dull all over. About 6½ A.M. rain began to fall in thin showers of heavy drops. About 3 P.M. showers ceased, and it cleared in the northern quarter. Wind N.W., N., N.E., and S.W., at different heights, as shown by the clouds.

Date.	Greatest Onset Daybreak	Greatest Warmth Afternoon	Aeroid at Daybreak	Amount of Rain.	Direction and force of Wind at Daybreak.	Direction and force of Wind at 2 to 4 P.M.	Aeroid at 2 to 4 P.M.	Additional Notes.
1862 Sept. 28	58	66	30.24	Inches. 0.01 0.23	N.E. Very lightly .	N.W. Very lightly	Inches. 30.20	Daybreak, dull all over, but clouds apparently not dense; a shower fell before daylight. During the day repeated thunder showers; blue sky showing through the clouds at intervals. Rain-gauge at 5½ P.M. equal to 0.23.
23	58	71	30.31	0.01	N.N.E. Moderately	N.N.E. Moderately	30.33	Daybreak, sky covered with greyish misty cloud, not dense. About 4 A.M. wind began to blow from N.N.E., blowing strongly for about an hour. At 6.45 A.M. blue sky began to appear all over, and the sun to shine out. By 10 A.M. it was clear all over (immense numbers of geese and duck flying over to-day).
24	50	69	30.33	...	N.N.E. Lightly	N.N.E. Very lightly	30.32	Daybreak, clear all over. About sunset a very few clouds showed in one or two places.
25	52	72	30.31	...	S.E. Lightly	N. Very lightly	30.33	Daybreak, clear all over. Wind changed to N. about noon.
26	53	72	30.23	...	S.S.E. Moderately	S.W. Moderately	30.32	Daybreak, clear all over. At 4 P.M. clouds began to obscure the sky.
27	66	73	30.09	...	S.S.W. Moderately	S.W. Strongly	30.10	Daybreak, sky obscured with clouds all over, but not dense. At 7 A.M. blue patches showed themselves. At 4 P.M. nearly clear all over.
28	55	58	30.09	...	N.N.E. Moderately	N. Very strongly	30.20	Daybreak, clear everywhere except on the horizon to leeward. The wind came down from N.N.E. about 5 A.M., a little before daybreak. The clouds above kept rising from leeward, till about noon the sky was quite obscured. Towards evening the sky gradually cleared again.
29	41	52	30.39	...	N.N.E. Very strongly	N.N.E. Strongly	30.34	Daybreak, clear all over. At 4½ P.M. clear all over. At sunset a haze low on the horizon, but otherwise quite clear.
30	41	61	30.30	...	N.N.E. Very lightly	N.W. Very lightly	30.30	Daybreak, quite clear all over. Quite clear at dark.
Oct. 1	45	65	30.29	...	S.E. Lightly	W. Lightly	30.31	Daybreak, quite clear all over. At 4½ P.M. clear all over.
2	51	70	30.37	...	E.S.E. Moderately	N. Lightly	...	Daybreak, blue sky largely covered with light clouds. At 4 P.M. nearly clear all over.
3	52	71	30.37	...	N.E. Very lightly	W. Lightly	30.31	Daybreak, clear all over. At 3 P.M. sky quite obscured by clouds.
4	60	69	30.21	0.06	Calm	W. Lightly	30.13	Daybreak, sky obscured, but not with dense cloud; signs of blue sky appearing occasionally. At 3 P.M. sky as before. At about 5 the westerly wind increased to moderate and a slight rain began to fall, after which it cleared somewhat.
5	58	68	30.08	...	Calm	N.N.W. Moderately	30.04	Daybreak, sky partially obscured by the clouds. At 3 P.M. clear all over.
6	50	66	30.03	...	E.S.E. Moderately	S.S.W. Strongly	29.98	Daybreak, blue sky coated thinly with light white clouds. At 10 A.M. wind S. and strong. At 4 P.M. sky obscured all over with dense cloud. At 11.37 P.M. it began to rain, wind being still southerly.
7	52	54	29.90	0.94	N.N.E. Strongly	N.N.W. Strongly	30.13	At 5.30 A.M. wind came down strongly from N.N.E., the rain continuing. Daybreak, sky obscured all over, and rain falling. About 11 A.M. thermometer equal to 65°. At 3.45 sun began to shine through the clouds, and blue sky to windward. At sunset clear all over.
8	42	58	30.37	...	N.E. Very lightly	N. Moderately	30.37	Daybreak, clear all over. At 5 P.M. quite clear all over.
9	42	63	30.24	...	E.S.E. Moderately	S.W. Moderately	30.17	Daybreak, clear all over. At 3 P.M. a few clouds crossing the otherwise clear sky.
10	48	67	30.24	...	S.E. Moderately	S.W. Moderately	30.20	Daybreak, clear all over, with a little mist on the ground. A few clouds in the afternoon, but nearly clear all over at sunset.
11	56	70	30.27	...	S. Moderately	W. Moderately	30.20	Daybreak, clear all over. At 5 P.M. a good many light clouds in the sky.
12	55	66	30.25	...	S.E. Lightly	W.N.W. Moderately	30.21	Daybreak, a good deal of thin light cloud in otherwise blue sky. At 4 P.M. sky quite obscured, but not with heavy clouds.
13	50	60	30.21	...	N. Moderately	N. Strongly	30.26	Daybreak, a good many clouds in blue sky, but clearing up; later, the clouds increased again, and at 5 P.M. the sky was quite obscured.
14	43	55	30.37	...	N.N.E. Moderately	N.N.E. Strongly	30.37	Daybreak, a good many clouds in a blue sky; later in the day it cleared up, and the wind blew strongly.
15	37	57	30.38	...	N.N.E. Moderately	N. Moderately	30.38	Daybreak, clear all over. At 5½ P.M. clear all over.
16	37	53	30.37	...	N.N.E. Lightly	N.N.E. Very lightly	30.33	Daybreak, clear all over with the exception of the horizon, where there is a fog-bank. The fog or haze increased, and by 4 P.M. the sky was quite obscured. We are in doubt as to its being dust or light up.
17	45	61	30.27	...	S. Moderately	W. Moderately	30.23	Daybreak, cloud-bank high up along the horizon, and light clouds in the blue sky overhead. At 3½ P.M. dust-coloured haze on the horizon, but otherwise quite clear. Towards sunset wind became W.N.W.
18	41	60	30.38	...	N.N.E. Moderately	N.N.E. Lightly	30.33	Daybreak, quite clear except an even band of haze or dust-cloud about 15 degrees high all round the horizon. Same appearance about sunset.
19	50	60	30.17	...	Calm	W.S.W. Very lightly	30.09	Daybreak, clear all over except on horizon, where there is a haze like yesterday's. At sunset same appearance precisely.
20	54	61	30.06	...	S. Strongly	S.S.W. Very strongly	30.08	Daybreak, blue sky with a good many light clouds. At 4 P.M. same appearance.
21	54	68	30.18	...	S. Moderately	W.S.W. Strongly	30.23	Daybreak, blue sky with light clouds more or less spread over it. At 3 P.M. much clearer than in the morning, but still a few thin cloud streaks over head.
22	59	67	30.27	...	S.S.W. Strongly	S.W. Strongly	30.31	Daybreak, same appearance as yesterday afternoon. At 3 P.M. a thin film of cloud was uniformly spread over the whole sky, and was quite obscured.
23	49	60	30.42	...	N.N.E. Moderately	Moderately	30.38	Daybreak, blue sky in patches right overhead, all the rest covered with light clouds. At 3 P.M. no blue sky visible at all. It began to blow very strongly early in the night, and continued during the night to do so.
24	39	47	30.38	...	N.N.E. Very strongly	N.N.E. Strongly	30.40	Daybreak, sky obscured all over; sun a white spot in the clouds. At 3½ P.M. clear overhead, and only a few light clouds and cloud-banks near the horizon.

Date.	Greatest Cold before Daybreak.	Greatest Warmth in Afternoon.	Aneroid at Daybreak.	Amount of Rain.	Direction and force of Wind at Daybreak.	Direction and force of Wind at 2 to 4 P.M.	Aneroid at 2 to 4 P.M.	Additional Notes.
1862 Oct. 25	36	49	Inches. 30·24	Inches. ...	N. Lightly	S. Moderately ...	Inches. 30·05	Daybreak, leaden-coloured sky all over. About 1½ P.M. the wind changed to S. At 4½ P.M. it was quite clear except along the horizon. (NOTE.—This clearing up of the sky coincidentally with a change of wind from N. to S., and with a great fall in the barometer, is peculiar). It blew from S. during greater part of the night, and at times strongly. Before daybreak changed to S.W.
26	42	51	30·19	...	N.W. Moderately	W. Lightly	30·22	Daybreak, clear all over. At 5 P.M. clear all over.
27	40	47	30·17	...	N.N.E. Moderately ...	N.E. Moderately ...	30·34	Daybreak, clear all over except two small light clouds to the S.E. At 4½ P.M. clear all over.
28	28	42	30·54	...	N.E. Moderately ...	N.E. Moderately ...	30·60	Daybreak, clear all over (no haze on horizon); ice on water-jars 4-10ths of an inch thick, first this season. At sunset a little yellow haze low on horizon, otherwise clear all over.
29	29	46	30·65	...	N.E. Very lightly and calm	S.W. Very lightly and calm	30·58	Daybreak, slight haze all over the sky, and light clouds along the horizon. In the middle of the day it got quite clear, then haze on the horizon at sunset.
30	36	54	30·49	...	S.S.W. Moderately ...	W.N.W. Very lightly ...	30·48	Daybreak, cloudy, with large patches of blue sky. At 5 P.M. clear all over (it gradually cleared during the day), except a purplish haze-bank along the horizon.
31	46	60	30·40	...	S.S.W. Moderately ...	S.S.W. Strongly ...	30·40	Daybreak, quite clear except a band of yellow haze on horizon. Towards evening a few light clouds coming up from windward.
Nov. 1	50	60	30·38	...	S.S.W. Moderately ...	S.W. Strongly ...	30·34	Daybreak, clear overhead, but a yellow purplish haze high up on horizon. At 4½ P.M. a few light clouds crossing from windward.
2	52	61	30·17	0 26	S.S.W. Strongly ...	S.S.W. Strongly ...	30·02	Daybreak, haze all over, with cloud-banks on the horizon. At 3 P.M. a thunderstorm, with a shower of hailstones of the size of hazel-nuts, but globular in shape. At 4:35 P.M. wind changed to N.N.W. and brought down a large body of heavy clouds; thundering still in the distance. At 5:10 brilliant lightning and loud thunder (a violent thunderstorm) came down with the wind, and took about an hour in passing. A little before 6 it began to rain.
3	41	53	30·29	...	N.W. Lightly ...	S.W. Strongly ...	30·16	Daybreak, quite clear all over. Wind changed to S.W. in the forenoon. At 4 P.M. quite clear all over.
4	47	54	30·18	...	S.W. Moderately ...	N.N.E. Very strongly ...	30·31	Daybreak, clear overhead, but cloud-banks and thick haze on the horizon. White clouds gathered over the sky, but after the wind changed to N., about 11 A.M., they began to disappear.
5	33	46	30·44	...	Calm, and very lightly N. .	S.S.W. Very lightly ...	30·38	Daybreak, clear all over. At about midday the wind changed to S.S.W. At sunset clear all over.

(Signed)

THOS. TAYLOR MEADOWS.

No. 2.

Mr. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received May 21.)

My Lord,

Peking, February 15, 1863.

THROUGH the courtesy of the Foreign Commissioner of Customs I have obtained the inclosed account of the trade in foreign bottoms to and from the port of Tien-tsin during the year 1862.

It affords evidence of the advantages derived from the trade from port to port in Chinese produce having been thrown up to foreign vessels by the arrangement concluded between the Prince of Kung and myself in the year 1861.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure in No. 2.

RESUME of the Import and Export Trade carried on under Foreign Flags, at the Port of Tien-tsin, during the Year 1862.

IMPORTS.

Description of Goods.	Quantity.	Estimated Value.
		Taels.
Cotton, manufactured, British	1,074,111 pieces	2,377,685
" " American	106,202 "	368,485
Woollen, manufactured (broad cloths)	3,240 "	73,966
" " (narrow cloths)	8,303 "	100,590
Woollen and cotton mixtures	1,146 "	6,876
Metals, iron	84 piculs	210
" steel, Swedish	1,142 "	6,279
" lead	36 "	216
" quicksilver	343 "	17,169
" tin plates	184 "	922
Window glass	1,000 boxes	3,000
Matches	199 cases	10,000
Musical boxes	1,148 pieces	3,444
Watches	1,114 pairs	20,000
Clocks	505 pieces	5,050
Opera-glasses, stereoscopes, and other miscellaneous European articles		57,584
Opium	3,613 chests	2,441,160
" prepared	84 piculs	107,520
Various Straits' produce		52,132
" Japan ditto		95,562
" South China ditto		1,167,530
Sea otter skins		145,560
Hemp, from Yang-tze ports	846 "	9,302
Oil, ditto	6,693 "	53,547
Steel, ditto	738 "	7,376
Brick tea	11,138 "	55,688
Total		7,186,853

Total value of the Import trade .. 7,186,853 taels
At 6s. 2d., equal to 2,215,946*l*.

Total value of the Export trade .. 407,491 taels
At 6s. 2d., equal to 125,643*l*.

SHIPPING.

Inward.—	Vessels.	Tons.	Outwards.—	Vessels.	Tons.
With cargo ..	86 ..	21,561	With general cargo ..	51 ..	12,127
In ballast ..	1 ..	360	With ice ..	4 ..	1,433
			With cattle ..	3 ..	509
Total ..	87 ..	21,921	In ballast ..	29 ..	7,852
			Total ..	87 ..	21,921

DUTIES COLLECTED.

	T.	M.	C.	C.
Import duties	59,202	2	1	6
Export duties	12,474	0	5	9
Coast trade duties	19,934	6	9	2
Tonnage dues	1,802	5	0	0
Total	93,413	4	6	7

At 6s. 2d., equal to 28,802*l*.

EXPORTS.

Description of Goods.	Quantity.	Estimated Value.	Description of Goods.	Quantity.	Estimated Value.
		Taels.			Taels.
Almonds	1,441 piculs	12,970	Horns, deer, young ..	231 pairs	3,465
Alum	951 "	1,902	" " old ..	321 piculs	12,843
Beans and pease ..	8,408 "	16,816	Medicine	8,854 "	70,836
Bombazettes, Russian ..	102 pieces	1,530	Musk	137 catties	6,850
Broad cloths, ditto ..	65 "	2,600	Rhubarb	265 piculs	10,587
Dates	13,963 piculs	30,370	Skins, fox, lamb, marten, &c.		18,726
Flints and steels ..	1,390 "	11,125	Soap	8,643 "	30,250
Flour	900 "	2,250	Tobacco	2,911 "	40,752
Furs, ready made ..	1,723 pieces	16,574	Vegetables	7,842 "	19,605
Fustians, Russian ..	30 "	180	Wool	1,393 "	5,573
Ginseng	546 catties	2,184	Miscellaneous ..	..	88,261
Hair, camels'	67 piculs	670			
" goats'	207 "	413			
Hides, bullocks' ..	306 pieces	159	Total	..	407,491

No. 3.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received August 11.)

My Lord,

Peking, April 29, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to forward, herewith, a Report by Mr. Acting Consul Gibson on the trade of the Consular district of Tien-tsin for the year 1862.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure in No. 3.

Report on the Trade of the Consular District of Tien-tsin for the year 1862.

Section I.—Shipping and Navigation.

British and Foreign Vessels.—THE shipping returns for the year 1862 exhibit a slight increase in the number of British vessels engaged in the Tien-tsin trade, as compared with the number employed in 1861. The number of sundry vessels, including under that denomination all vessels sailing under German or other Continental colours, has decreased this year by more than one-half. The subjoined Table will fully illustrate the truth of these remarks:—

Shipping in 1862.					Shipping in 1861.		
Flag.				No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.
British	..	..	..	45	11,451	39	10,671
American	..	..	..	17	5,458	18	4,436
Sundry	..	..	..	24	4,652	54	11,454
Total	..	..	..	86	21,561	111	26,561

The decrease which the Returns exhibit in the number of Continental vessels visiting Tien-tsin in 1862 as compared with the number entered in 1861, is accounted for—first, by the paucity of light British vessels available last year for the traffic between this port and the south of China; and secondly, by the employment largely this year of small steamers. In the season of 1861, there was but a limited number of small British vessels procurable in China for the Tien-tsin trade. The consequence was, that British merchants had recourse largely to Continental shipping, the large British vessels at their command being altogether unsuitable for this trade. The increase of small steamers in 1862 connected with the Tien-tsin trade is, however, the principal cause of the decrease

of Continental shipping. These small steamers, nearly all of which hoist British colours, are undoubtedly by far the most convenient class of vessels for the traffic at this port. The city of Tien-tsin stands about sixty-five miles from the village of Taku, upon a river which, owing to its insignificant depth of water and tortuous course, is extremely difficult of navigation. At the mouth of this river (Peiho) there is a bar which renders it unsafe for vessels drawing more than 11 feet 6 inches of water to enter the Taku anchorage; while outside in the Gulf the weather is often so boisterous and the swell so high that vessels cannot discharge their cargo for several days together. The convenience, therefore, of a class of vessels able not only to clear the bar but to carry their cargoes right up this sixty-five miles of river navigation, to the very gates of the merchants' godowns, is very great. Two such vessels have run regularly this year between Tien-tsin and Shanghai, and several others have made occasional trips at moderate intervals.

There are, however, independently of those just enumerated, still further advantages to be gained by the employment of small steamers in this trade. Large vessels, unable to cross the bar, have to anchor at a distance of six or eight miles from Taku. Native boats have to be hired to proceed out into the Gulf for the purpose of transshipping the goods destined for Tien-tsin. The hire of these boats rates generally pretty high; the natives who work them, unaccustomed as yet to the ways of foreigners, are slow and stupid, and the amount of labour performed is, as a consequence, very often in inverse proportion to its cost. At certain busy seasons junks are hardly procurable for this transport service at any price.

In addition to all this, goods are constantly being lost by the native boatmen; bales and cases are often broken open and pilfered; and the trouble, expense, and loss of time consequently incurred by the merchant are most serious. As long, however, as the river transport remains in native hands, such grievances, although perhaps susceptible of some mitigation, will continue to exist.

The true remedy for this state of matters is to be found in the employment of steamers, which would render transshipment at Taku totally unnecessary, and thus destroy the evil at its root. Difficulties, essentially the same, although less serious in degree, are involved in transshipment effected within the inner Taku anchorage. From Taku all merchandise, on importation, has to travel sixty-five miles in native boats to Tien-tsin, *vice versa* on exportation, and the delays and losses to which it is subjected *in transitu* are by no means insignificant. Small steamers, drawing from 8 to 10 feet of water, running right up to Tien-tsin, will obviate all these inconveniences. For the reasons now briefly indicated, the increased employment of steamers in carrying on the traffic between Tien-tsin and the more southern ports of China may be confidently predicted; and the increase of steamers, unless indeed trade increases in an equal proportion, will probably cause a still further diminution in the number of sailing vessels.

2. *Coasting Vessels. Foreign. Native.*—The coasting vessels which frequent this port are of a mixed character. There is the foreign vessel as well as the native junk. The majority of the foreign vessels which enter at Tien-tsin arrive from some other ports of China; and the majority of foreign vessels which clear from Tien-tsin clear for some other Chinese port. The foreign goods which arrive here are mostly re-exports sent up from Shanghai. The vessels which trade at Tien-tsin are, therefore, in most cases engaged in a coast trade; probably not more than one or two vessels arrive here in the whole course of the year from Europe, India, or America direct. A few vessels, it is true, enter this port from, and clear from this port for, Hong Kong direct; but these constitute the only exceptions.

There is another circumstance to be noted with reference to the character of the shipping at Tien-tsin. Not only are the great majority of the vessels which enter this port employed in a purely coast trade, but a very large number of these vessels, though foreign-built, foreign-owned, and navigated under a foreign flag, are engaged in carrying native not foreign produce.

The produce of Southern China is transported largely to the North in foreign bottoms, and, conversely, the products of Northern China are largely transported to the South in foreign bottoms. Thus foreign vessels are not restricted to the carrying trade in foreign products and manufactures; they are, under certain Tariff Regulations, which will be more particularly referred to hereafter, permitted to participate in the carrying trade in native produce. This privilege, freely accorded by the Government of China, is of high and increasing value. The best proof of the statement now made will be found on examining the list of imports and exports given a little further on in this Report.

The junks are gradually disappearing from the highways of commerce. The more enlightened Chinese merchants no longer patronize them. A south-country junk makes but one voyage to Tien-tsin in the course of a whole year; the cargo cannot be insured, and the chances of her going to the bottom in bad weather as compared with the chances against a foreign vessel under like circumstances are great. Native merchants are now perfectly well aware of the enormous disadvantages involved in the employment of junks, and rarely entrust valuable cargoes to them when foreign shipping can be procured. Thus the competition of foreign vessels, coupled with the operations of the Insurance Offices, is rapidly driving the junk off the face of the ocean.

The following Returns of junks arriving at ports in the Tien-tsin district in 1862, although unavoidably defective in some respects, may be considered as approximately correct:—

TABLE showing the Number of Junks visiting Tien-tsin in 1862.

Description of Junk.	Number.	Tons.	Nature of Cargo.
Southern junks :—			
1. Canton	40	18,000	} Rice, sugar, tea, paper, medicine, fruit, preserves, silk-pieces, native hard- ware, prepared opium, birds' nests, &c.
2. Fokien	40	10,000	
3. Shanghai	47	7,050	
Northern junks :—			
3 masted	1,000	200,000	} Peas, beans, salt, fruit, vegetables, fish, wheat, barley, millet, medicine, gin- seng, &c.
2 "	1,500	225,000	
3 "	800	80,000	
Total	4,627	538,050	

With regard to the Shanghai and Fokien junks, it must be remembered that at least one-third of the whole arrived only two-thirds laden. Their nominal tonnage will therefore be about one-third more than the actual weight of merchandize brought by them to Tien-tsin.

The coasting trade carried on between the ports situated on the Gulf of Pecheli is still of considerable local importance. Not only native produce, but foreign manufactures are conveyed by the junks to the numerous seaports which stud the coast of the Gulf.

Junk-owners at Tien-tsin are numerous, and comparatively wealthy; and junks, except on the great highways of commerce, where they fail to compete successfully with foreign vessels, still pay well: money invested in native shipping still yielding, I am informed, a good return.

Not only does the Gulf coast swarm with junks, but the rivers in this district, comparatively shallow and difficult to navigate, teem with all kinds of native craft; and although the time must come when the principal carrying trade of China will be done by foreign vessels, the junks will still find employment on the numerous shoaly bays and secondary rivers.

Ports and Harbours.—The ports and harbours of this district exist simply as nature formed them. Nothing has been done by man to render them more accessible, safer, or more commodious than they naturally are. Civil engineering, except in its rudest idea, is not practised in this district; nor, putting aside the Grand Canal, do any works of public utility exist. The Great Wall cannot be considered an exception to this remark.

River inundations sometimes occur in this district, threatening the destruction of valuable land or the submersion of buildings; but in all such cases a few rude fascines, held together by piles, and backed up by earth, constitute the only remedy in use. If the waters prove permanently troublesome, the land is abandoned, and the buildings evacuated.

At the new British settlement, however, a bund 75 feet wide is being constructed which will afford great facilities for the loading and unloading of vessels. At Taku the inner anchorage presents no such facilities.

The navigation of the Tien-tsin River (Peiho), from its entrance all the way up to the city, might be very much improved at a trifling expense. The bar between Taku and the Gulf, about 400 yards in length by about 150 yards in breadth, could be cut; the river might be confined by a slight embankment, and the scour of the current thus obtained would keep the entrance free. At present no vessel drawing more than eleven feet six inches of water should attempt to cross the bar, even on spring tides. The north bank of the river is composed of hard mud, and is considered dangerous; the south bank

is formed of soft mud and is not dangerous. Jetties and other works for the facility of commerce, excepting such as are being constructed on the British settlement, do not exist.

Buoys, Lights, Light-houses.—Buoys, lights, and light-houses, there are none; though much needed in one or two localities. Some marks which were erected in 1861 for the convenience of vessels entering the port by that indefatigable officer Captain Gordon, R.E., and which proved of much service at the time, are no longer trustworthy. As regards the improvement of the river itself little is required. If it was deepened in one or two places, and if one or two of its more awkward bendings were got rid of by the formation of straight cuts, all that is absolutely requisite would be effected. It is, however, hopeless to expect that the local authorities, beset as they are with all sorts of financial difficulties, and destitute as they are of all energy and enterprize, will undertake improvements of this nature. But such moderate alterations and improvements as the tonnage dues levied by the Imperial Customs on foreign shipping are adequate to meet, should be carried out forthwith.

Junk-building.—Junk-building at Tien-tsin is by no means a flourishing trade. A few small junks and covered boats are turned off the stocks every year, intended mainly for river navigation. Junk and boat-building is a branch of industry which can hardly be said to exist at Tien-tsin.

Section II.—Trade and Commerce.

Foreign Trade: Imports.—Under this Section there is to be considered, first, the foreign trade, and secondly, the trade in Straits and Chinese produce.

The import returns for 1861, and the import returns for 1862, both given below, will sufficiently indicate the nature and extent of the progress made at Tien-tsin by foreign trade since the opening of the port.

RETURN of the Import Trade at the Port of Tien-tsin, for the period commencing May 1, and ending December 31, 1861.

Description of Goods.	In British Vessels.			In American Vessels.		In Miscellaneous Vessels.		Total Amount.		Total Value.	
	Pieces.	Pic.	cat.	Pieces.	Pic.	cat.	Pieces.	Pic.	cat.	Taels.	
Shirtings, grey	446,779	..	..	95,071	..	..	349,618	..	..	1,782,936	
„ white	82,242	..	..	26,156	..	..	91,364	..	..	399,524	
T-cloths, 24 yards	81,842	..	..	31,130	..	..	47,624	..	..	240,894	
Domestics	369	..	..	1,040	..	..	1,479	..	..	11,555	
Sheetings	3,680	..	..	8,425	..	..	14,540	..	..	79,935	
Jeans	1,434	..	..	7,580	..	..	10,095	..	..	57,327	
Drills	9,614	..	..	27,765	..	..	55,236	..	..	296,368	
Twills	695	..	..	..	..	..	581	..	..	2,552	
China cloth, imitation	5,840	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2,336	
Dimities	200	..	..	800	..	..	60	..	..	1,166	
Cambrics	..	..	..	..	..	..	480	..	..	720	
Lawns	100	..	..	300	..	..	400	..	..	1,040	
White figured shirtings	34,235	..	..	3,200	..	..	22,998	..	..	120,866	
„ brocades	20,547	..	..	4,350	..	..	17,835	..	..	85,464	
Dyed shirtings	1,700	..	..	1,548	..	..	2,549	..	..	17,391	
„ T-cloths	350	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	800	
„ twills	..	..	..	198	..	..	700	..	..	2,694	
„ cambrics (Turkey red)	699	..	..	..	..	..	2,200	..	..	8,117	
„ figured shirtings	9,299	..	..	1,120	..	..	5,147	..	..	38,915	
„ brocades	12,930	..	..	2,909	..	..	3,260	..	..	47,597	
„ damasks	4,820	..	..	740	..	..	1,880	..	..	34,968	
Chintzes and furniture	13,519	..	..	1,700	..	..	11,037	..	..	36,758	
Handkerchiefs	1,552	..	..	..	..	..	3,065	..	..	2,000	
Velvets	1,444	..	..	196	..	..	200	..	..	13,860	
Velveteens	..	..	..	417	..	..	640	..	..	8,456	
Blankets	359	..	..	..	..	..	75	..	..	911	
Bombazettes	70	..	..	990	..	..	..	..	..	1,050	
Camlets	1,205	..	..	200	..	..	580	..	..	38,850	
„ Dutch	..	..	..	3,140	..	..	..	..	..	4,400	
Lastings	772	..	..	24	..	..	560	..	..	49,142	
Long ells	2,283	..	..	300	..	..	600	..	..	20,349	
Broad cloths	58	..	..	493	..	..	90	..	..	15,689	
Spanish Stripes	682	..	..	..	..	..	550	..	..	17,250	
Pilot cloths	40	..	..	3,490	..	..	80	..	..	1,440	
Woollen and cotton mixtures	1,576	..	..	..	..	..	240	..	..	23,877	
Silk and cotton	80	..	..	..	..	..	200	..	..	2,350	
Metals:—											
Iron, nail, rod, and bar	..	1,185	66	..	433	68	..	2,421	55	10,102	
Iron-wire	..	..	10	8	..	..	..	110	0	600	
Lead	..	..	..	..	25	75	..	..	..	1,355	
Quicksilver	..	..	..	..	67	68	..	..	66	0	7,332
Spelter	..	740	24	..	405	82	..	498	0	13,152	
Steel	..	250	22	..	589	29	..	691	77	18,375	
Tin-plates	..	132	32	..	101	0	..	154	95	2,330	
Belts, elastic	1,375	..	..	506	..	..	533	..	..	2,500	
Buttons, brass .. gross	1,065	..	..	2,054	..	..	2,208	..	..	6,000	

Return of the Import Trade at the Port of Tien-tsin, &c.—continued.

Description of Goods.	In British Vessels.		In American Vessels.		In Miscellaneous Vessels.		Total Amount.		Total Value.
	Pieces.	Pic. cat.	Pieces.	Pic. cat.	Pieces.	Pic. cat.	Pieces.	Pic. cat.	Taels.
Umbrellas, silk	118	..	..	..	..	..	118	..	500
Window-glass .. boxes	1,687	..	1,099	..	4,908	..	7,694	..	24,620
Watches .. pairs	55	..	122	..	138	..	315	..	6,300
Thermometers .. doz.	9	..	..	..	..	..	9	..	275
Stereoscopic views ..	250	..	700	..	310	..	1,260	..	6,300
Stereoscopes ..	..	..	700	..	..	..	700	..	3,000
Clocks ..	100	..	..	..	4	..	104	..	1,500
Telescopes ..	..	..	170	..	2,638	..	2,809	..	7,500
Opium .. chests	829	..	387	..	266	..	1,482	..	948,480
Aniseed	..	..	..	..	319 51	..	39 51	..	5,112
Arsenic	..	18 23	..	..	..	..	18 23	..	118
Betel-nut	..	137 87	..	365 99	..	1,218 9	1,721 95	..	15,498
Bicho de mar	..	0 96	..	..	..	..	0 96	..	48
Birds' nests	..	0 38	..	..	..	0 43	0 81	..	1,215
Brass-ware	..	17 79	..	..	..	10 28	28 7	..	1,403
Camphor	..	..	..	0 9	..	25 50	25 59	..	384
Cardamoms	..	13 28	..	38 25	..	61 14	112 67	..	9,014
Cassia	..	1 47	..	..	..	69 32	70 79	..	1,062
Chestnuts	..	..	..	..	..	37 26	37 26	..	224
Cinnamon	..	..	..	10 0	..	..	10 0	..	350
Citron	..	..	..	..	..	1 47	1 47	..	29
Cloves	..	..	..	12 70	..	88 37	101 7	..	1,314
Copper-foil	..	11 55	..	2 40	..	7 20	21 15	..	1,904
Cutch	..	..	..	..	..	27 30	27 30	..	265
Dates	..	52 56	..	..	..	193 9	245 65	..	1,105
Dragons' blood	..	..	..	..	..	6 68	6 68	..	100
Earthenware	..	..	..	..	..	165 50	165 50	..	496
Fans	13,830	..	73,300	..	2,760	..	89,890	..	4,494
Feathers, peacocks' and kingfishers'	8,470	..	6,300	..	15,000	..	29,770	..	1,488
Galangal	..	..	..	3 36	..	..	3 36	..	20
Gamboge	..	..	..	2 58	..	..	2 58	..	52
Garroo-wood	..	..	..	..	..	11 85	11 85	..	592
Ginger, preserved	..	..	..	..	..	44 20	44 20	..	354
Ginseng	..	14 79	..	..	..	43 68	58 47	..	23,388
Glass-ware	..	2 78	..	1 60	..	17 18	21 56	..	1,078
Grass cloth	..	36 71	..	..	..	11 87	48 58	..	4,615
Gum olibanum	..	370 59	..	42 0	..	662 68	1,075 27	..	7,527
Hemp	..	549 90	..	..	..	..	549 90	..	6,049
Horns, buffalo	..	..	..	..	..	13 78	13 78	..	55
Indigo	..	52 59	..	..	..	91 45	144 4	..	4,321
Iron-ware	..	11 40	..	24 0	..	..	35 40	..	531
Isinglass	..	251 20	..	82 34	..	37 14	370 68	..	12,232
Lung-ngan	..	44 58	..	0 90	..	156 90	201 99	..	2,626
Lead, white and red ..	..	214 33	..	..	..	179 0	393 33	..	5,900
Lichees	..	..	..	..	..	52 78	52 78	..	475
Medicines	..	190 23	..	224 10	..	567 58	981 91	..	9,819
Mushrooms	..	102 19	..	25 66	..	117 83	245 68	..	8,599
Nutgalls	..	199 19	..	78 0	..	..	277 19	..	4,157
Nutmegs	..	8 82	..	6 0	..	86 42	101 24	..	3,037
Oil	..	475 78	..	947 25	..	..	1,423 3	..	15,653
Orange-peel	..	67 80	..	20 20	..	34 30	122 30	..	367
Paper	..	387 37	..	969 70	..	2,450 36	3,807 43	..	19,037
Pepper	..	322 48	..	389 69	..	968 26	1,680 43	..	12,603
Putchuck	..	74 50	..	12 0	..	43 36	129 86	..	2,337
Rattans	..	505 0	..	29 50	..	..	534 50	..	2,138
Resin	..	..	..	1 50	..	58 35	59 85	..	269
Rice	..	4,673 8	..	..	..	9,984 0	14,657 8	..	29,314
Sandal-wood	..	726 53	..	32 74	..	285 92	1,045 19	..	12,542
Sapan-wood	..	498 17	..	..	420	61 65	559 82	..	1,959
Seaweed	..	3,587 55	..	3,893 20	..	879 20	8,359 95	..	33,440
Sharks' fins	..	..	..	..	..	27 39	27 39	..	548
Shells	..	..	..	..	..	21 0	21 0	..	126
Silk piece goods	..	106 75	..	74 29	..	6 52	187 56	..	84,402
Sinews, cow and deer ..	..	98 61	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Skins, deer	2,200	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
" sharks'	..	..	..	..	420	..	..	..	210
Sugar	..	8,378 52	..	3,341 27	..	8,086 34	19,806 13	..	75,263
Tea	..	924 26	..	23 0	..	13 30	960 56	..	24,014
Tinfoil	..	9 81	..	27 0	..	4 50	41 31	..	372
Tobacco	..	557 10	..	847 1	..	556 20	1,960 31	..	23,524
Turmeric	..	..	..	24 40	..	61 50	85 90	..	472
Varnish	..	..	..	..	..	62 5	62 5	..	310
Vermilion	..	34 24	..	2 87	..	18 35	55 46	..	2,662

RETURN of the Import Trade carried on at the Port of Tien-tsin during the Year 1862.

Description of Goods.	British Vessels.			American Vessels.			Miscellaneous Vessels.			Total Amount.		Total Value.
	Pieces.	Pic.	cat.	Pieces.	Pic.	cat.	Pieces.	Pic.	cat.	Pieces.	Pic.	Taels.
Shirtings, grey, plain ..	327,264	..	..	34,700	..	..	103,873	..	..	465,837	..	1,648,128
" white, plain ..	52,155	..	..	17,800	..	..	49,947	..	..	119,902	..	263,784
" dyed, plain ..	2,891	..	..	1,850	..	..	3,489	..	..	8,230	..	23,044
T-cloths, grey, 24 yards ..	65,684	..	..	30,274	..	..	73,319	..	..	169,277	..	287,773
Domestics ..	2,284	..	..	..	..	..	2,299	..	..	4,583	..	25,206
Drills, grey, English ..	1,799	..	..	..	..	..	1,800	..	..	3,599	..	10,437
Twills ..	50	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	50	..	90
Figured shirtings, white ..	21,962	..	..	10,993	..	..	20,149	..	..	53,104	..	122,139
" dyed ..	7,899	..	..	5,498	..	..	12,239	..	..	25,636	..	74,344
Brocades, white ..	22,361	..	..	11,488	..	..	21,393	..	..	55,242	..	132,580
" dyed ..	7,650	..	..	11,642	..	..	17,193	..	..	36,485	..	109,465
Damasks, white ..	1,220	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1,220	..	5,124
" dyed ..	7,678	..	..	5,260	..	..	4,956	..	..	17,894	..	85,891
Turkey red cloths ..	3,755	..	..	3,650	..	..	120	..	..	7,525	..	18,812
Chintzes ..	15,289	..	..	28,015	..	..	39,669	..	..	82,973	..	132,756
" Japan ..	993	..	..	1,999	..	..	..	..	..	2,992	..	1,197
Handkerchiefs (dozen) ..	500	..	..	467	..	..	4,093	..	..	5,060	..	3,542
Dimities ..	1,200	..	..	2,000	..	..	..	..	..	3,200	..	5,120
Cambrics ..	..	..	..	900	..	..	..	..	..	900	..	1,440
Lawns ..	500	..	..	2,200	..	..	..	..	..	2,700	..	4,050
Muslins ..	..	..	..	1,000	..	..	400	..	..	1,400	..	2,100
Velvets ..	821	..	..	100	..	..	..	..	..	921	..	5,526
Velveteens ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	36	..	..	36	..	252
Fustians ..	22	..	..	164	..	..	..	..	..	186	..	744
Cottonades ..	720	..	..	2,930	..	..	1,339	..	..	4,989	..	12,971
Satteens ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	130	..	..	130	..	780
Cotton cords ..	40	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	40	..	400
Drills, American ..	4,200	..	..	36,815	..	..	15,064	..	..	56,079	..	213,100
Jeans ..	5,721	..	..	12,240	..	..	15,440	..	..	33,401	..	100,203
Sheetings ..	2,980	..	..	11,275	..	..	2,407	..	..	16,722	..	55,182
Broad cloths ..	37	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	37	..	2,220
Pilot cloths ..	40	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	40	..	1,220
Spanish stripes ..	807	..	..	816	..	..	1,420	..	..	3,043	..	66,946
Habit cloths ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	120	..	..	120	..	3,600
Long ells ..	930	..	..	740	..	..	1,540	..	..	3,210	..	22,470
Camlets, English ..	1,226	..	..	2,120	..	..	980	..	..	4,326	..	69,216
Lastings ..	397	..	..	320	..	..	..	..	..	717	..	8,604
Bunting ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	50	..	..	50	..	300
Woollen and cotton mixtures ..	..	..	..	1,146	..	..	..	..	..	1,146	..	6,876
Metals—												
Iron, nail, rod ..	..	84	0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	84	0
Steel, Swedish ..	..	167	0	..	..	..	..	974	72	..	1,141	72
Lead ..	..	20	0	..	16	0	..	..	..	..	36	0
Quicksilver ..	..	244	78	..	14	0	..	84	60	..	343	38
Tin plates ..	..	..	..	..	62	40	..	121	90	..	184	30
Belts, elastic (dozen) ..	77	..	..	86	..	..	..	..	..	163	..	200
Buttons, brass (gross) ..	380	..	..	148	..	..	470	..	..	998	..	1,000
Umbrellas ..	3,068	..	..	..	..	..	101	..	..	3,169	..	9,507
Thermometers (dozen) ..	7	..	..	8	..	..	3	..	..	18	..	540
Stereoscopes (dozen) ..	278	..	..	192	..	..	80	..	..	550	..	10,000
Stereoscopic views (dozen) ..	164	..	..	1,468	..	..	2,714	..	..	4,346	..	21,730
Microscopes ..	19	..	..	62	..	..	24	..	..	105	..	3,150
Opera glasses ..	366	..	..	6	..	..	294	..	..	666	..	2,664
Telescopes ..	9	..	..	38	..	..	2	..	..	49	..	500
Clocks ..	391	..	..	59	..	..	55	..	..	505	..	5,050
Watches (pairs) ..	563	..	..	212	..	..	339	..	..	1,114	..	20,000
Musical boxes ..	766	..	..	3	..	..	379	..	..	1,148	..	3,444
Needles (cases) ..	14	..	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	16	..	4,500
Matches (cases) ..	12	..	..	10	..	..	177	..	..	199	..	10,000
Hearth rugs ..	310	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	310	..	750
Coals (tons) ..	..	..	..	119	..	..	60	..	..	179	..	3,043
Window-glass (boxes) ..	600	..	..	200	..	..	200	..	..	1,000	..	3,000
Opium—												
Malwa (chests) ..	2,582	..	..	452	..	..	355	..	..	3,389	..	2,304,520
Patna (chests) ..	155	..	..	34	..	..	35	..	..	224	..	136,640
Prepared ..	..	82	2	..	..	..	..	1	98	..	84	0
Aniseed ..	..	97	50	..	135	50	..	277	90	..	510	90
Arsenic ..	..	285	60	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	285	60
Bamboo ware ..	..	132	76	..	..	..	..	4	49	..	137	25
Betel-nut ..	..	197	74	..	55	0	..	1,399	0	..	1,651	74
Beche-de-mer ..	..	147	33	..	146	0	..	15	75	..	309	9
Birds' nests ..	..	1	27	..	0	67	..	0	13	..	2	7
Brass ware ..	..	61	96	..	1	25	..	9	53	..	72	74
Buttons, brass (Canton manufacture) ..	..	293	96	..	2	58	..	48	10	..	344	64
Camphor baroos ..	..	1	5	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	5
Capoor cutchery ..	..	39	90	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	39	90
Caps, silk ..	5,220	..	..	7,370	..	..	..	..	..	12,590	..	2,518
Cardamoms ..	..	315	65	..	..	..	..	36	93	..	352	58
Cassia ..	..	172	35	..	..	..	..	165	6	..	337	41
China-ware ..	..	3	20	..	634	0	..	..	..	..	637	20
Cloves, mother ..	..	10	0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	10	0
Collars, silk and velvet ..	6,517	..	..	5,438	..	..	..	..	..	11,955	..	2,391
Copper, manufactured ..	..	1,807	86	..	..	..	..	9	85	..	1,817	71
" cash ..	..	..	..	..	247	23	..	..	..	..	247	23
" wire ..	..	4	95	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4	95
Cotton thread ..	..	32	30	..	..	..	..	6	70	..	39	0
Dates, black ..	..	225	10	..	22	50	..	..	..	..	247	60

Return of the Import Trade at the Port of Tien-tsin, &c.—continued.

Description of Goods.	British Vessels.		American Vessels.		Miscellaneous Vessels.		Total Amount.		Total Value.
	Pieces.	Pic. cat.	Pieces.	Pic. cat.	Pieces.	Pic. cat.	Pieces.	Pic. cat.	Taels.
Dye stuff	..	9 87	..	..	..	22 62	..	32 49	487
Earthenware	..	3 64	..	..	..	1 95	..	5 59	487
Eggs, preserved	..	..	6,000	..	..	..	6,000	..	56
Embroidery	..	1 71	..	..	..	12 97	..	14 68	8,800
Fans	32,003	..	3,300	..	2,425	..	37,728	..	1,886
Feathers, kingfishers'	8,668	..	..	..	10,000	..	18,668	..	933
" peacocks'	57,887	..	..	..	3,005	..	60,892	..	2,178
Fish maws	..	15 35	..	..	..	..	..	15 35	1,074
Flowers, artificial	..	2 95	..	..	..	..	..	2 95	300
" dried	..	33 13	..	4 0	..	..	..	37 13	400
Flower seeds	..	39 32	..	17 60	..	..	..	56 92	400
Gambier	..	75 53	..	..	..	..	..	75 53	302
Ginger	..	12 0	..	180 0	..	361 85	..	553 85	3,877
Glass-ware	..	50 66	..	..	..	13 85	..	64 51	3,225
Gold thread	..	0 72	..	..	..	..	..	0 72	1,152
" imitation	..	4 21	..	1 3	..	0 42	..	5 66	2,830
Grass cloth	..	9 87	..	8 33	..	25 52	..	43 72	4,153
Gum, dragons-blood	..	11 46	..	..	..	..	..	11 46	500
Myrrh	..	89 80	..	..	..	113 71	..	203 51	4,070
Gum olibanum	..	..	..	..	..	127 35	..	127 35	446
Hemp	..	436 61	..	498 99	..	..	..	845 0	9,302
Indigo, dry	..	307 80	..	8 15	..	44 41	..	360 36	10,810
Ink, Indian	..	..	..	7 0	..	..	..	7 0	500
Ink stones	..	3 45	..	..	..	..	..	3 45	170
Iron-ware	..	5 75	..	1 15	..	1 58	..	8 48	85
Isinglass	..	141 34	..	..	..	2 0	..	143 34	5,734
Ivory-ware	..	0 7	..	..	..	0 35	..	0 42	300
Jade-stone mouthpieces	1,499	..	100	..	..	..	1,599	..	800
Lead, red	..	126 86	..	..	..	..	..	126 86	2,043
" white	..	819 49	..	58 80	..	448 70	..	1,326 98	17,250
" yellow	..	56 7	..	20 0	..	..	..	78 7	1,065
Lily seeds	..	25 86	..	..	..	6 35	..	32 21	386
Lung-ngan (without the stone)	..	23 86	..	..	..	51 0	..	74 86	898
Lychees	..	48 64	..	..	..	6 54	..	55 18	300
Mats	5,100	..	..	..	..	..	5,100	..	3,570
Medicines	..	537 35	..	21 89	..	341 93	..	901 17	9,012
Mirrors	955	..	..	..	..	..	955	..	500
Mother-o'-pearl shell	..	..	..	5 99	..	..	..	5 99	800
Nankeens	..	100 98	..	9 55	..	0 16	..	110 64	4,425
Nutgalls	..	253 0	..	527 65	..	348 57	..	1,129 22	16,938
Nutmegs	..	30 69	..	..	..	65 32	..	96 1	2,880
Oil	..	2,708 9	..	1,019 57	..	2,965 74	..	6,693 40	53,547
Paper, superior	..	1,098 24	..	328 6	..	71 16	..	1,407 46	28,149
" inferior	..	3,697 78	..	2,756 25	..	..	..	6,454 3	25,816
Peel, orange	..	..	..	5 84	..	110 51	..	116 35	815
" pumelo	..	85 87	..	..	..	32 40	..	118 27	1,150
Pepper, black	..	100 0	..	..	..	523 0	..	623 0	4,984
Peppermint-oil	..	0 20	..	..	..	0 21	..	0 41	50
Plants	14,572	..	..	..	13,546	..	28,118	..	84,339
Preserves	..	47 34	..	32 0	..	..	..	79 34	800
Putchuk	..	55 50	..	..	..	..	..	55 50	1,212
Rabbit-skins	..	..	158	..	..	..	158	..	50
Rattans	..	..	..	20 0	..	275 0	..	295 0	1,032
Resin	..	200 0	..	..	..	131 12	..	331 12	1,490
Rhinoceros horns	..	1 33	..	..	..	..	..	1 33	1,000
Rouge	..	5 10	..	1 60	..	1 35	..	8 5	160
Salt fish	..	202 85	..	..	..	..	..	202 85	608
Sandal-wood	..	..	..	..	..	225 0	..	225 0	2,250
Sapan-wood	..	147 85	..	..	..	466 55	..	614 40	2,150
Sea-otter skins	..	..	7,278	..	..	..	7,278	..	145,500
Sea-weed	..	5,733 93	..	4,066 82	..	1,671 47	..	11,472 22	40,152
Sharks'-fins	..	20 17	..	35 0	..	6 82	..	61 99	1,860
Shell-fish	..	..	..	180 0	..	..	..	180 0	1,500
Shoes (Canton manufacture)	3,028	..	..	..	373	..	3,401	..	3,500
Silk-floss	..	15 72	..	0 25	..	..	..	15 97	6,388
Silk refuse	..	4 2	..	6 99	..	4 32	..	15 33	1,380
" piece-goods	..	469 57	..	398 21	..	138 64	..	1,006 42	503,210
" ribbons	..	110 91	..	2 13	..	0 30	..	113 34	17,000
" tassels	..	3 89	..	0 71	..	..	..	4 60	3,220
" thread	..	2 77	..	2 15	..	0 57	..	5 49	3,294
Silver thread	..	0 50	..	..	..	..	..	0 50	800
Snuff	..	14 83	..	3 0	..	..	..	17 83	1,070
Steel (from Yang-tze ports)	..	60 1	..	592 61	..	3 11	..	63 12	3,156
Sticking-plaster	5,600	..	4,100	..	..	145 0	..	737 61	7,376
Stockings (Canton made), pairs	513	..	..	..	69	..	9,700	..	290
Sugar, brown	..	2,141 10	..	3,285 18	..	8,582 26	..	14,008 54	49,030
" white	..	744 0	..	2,011 16	..	1,662 17	..	4,417 33	26,504
Tallow, vegetable	..	356 43	..	1,173 41	..	443 78	..	1,973 62	31,578
Tea, black	..	2,099 90	..	118 20	..	..	..	2,218 10	44,362
" brick	..	7,042 65	..	3,333 11	..	761 94	..	11,137 70	55,688
" Japan	..	53 60	..	23 73	..	..	..	77 33	1,160
Timber (planks, 89 feet)	38,865	..	13,000	..	8,138	..	50,003	..	1,130
" poles	1,000	..	..	..	178	..	1,178	..	400
Teak (cubic feet)	..	..	571	..	..	..	571	..	150
Tin-foil	..	196 59	..	..	..	8 30	..	204 89	6,147
Tobacco, prepared	..	3,028 29	..	1,473 93	..	893 90	..	5,396 12	64,753
Turmeric	..	105 90	..	..	..	281 27	..	387 17	2,516

Report of the Import Trade at the Port of Tien-tsin, &c.—*continued.*

Description of Goods.	British Vessels.		American Vessels.		Miscellaneous Vessels.		Total Amount.		Total Value.
	Pieces.	Pic. cat.	Pieces.	Pic. cat.	Pieces.	Pic. cat.	Pieces.	Pic. cat.	Taels.
Ultramarine	..	38 97	..	4 0	..	11 50	..	54 47	5,072
Vermillion	..	78 42	..	6 12	..	..	..	84 54	5,072
Wax, white	..	34 73	..	40 80	..	..	..	75 53	4,154
Wood-ware	..	38 24	..	..	..	..	..	38 24	1,147

RETURN of Goods Re-exported from the Port of Tien-tsin during the Year 1862.

Description of Goods.	British Vessels.		American Vessels.		Miscellaneous Vessels.		Total Amount.		Total Value.
	Pieces.	Pic. Cat.	Pieces.	Pic. Cat.	Pieces.	Pic. Cat.	Pieces.	Pic. Cat.	Taels.
Belts, Elastic . . . doz.	405	..	..	..	..	..	405	..	600
Blankets	..	..	..	..	321	..	321	..	1,000
Buttons, brass . . . gross	180	..	..	..	..	..	180	..	200
Camlets	..	..	35	..	300	..	335	..	5,360
Handkerchiefs . . . doz.	..	..	467	..	..	..	467	..	327
Lastings	..	..	60	..	..	..	60	..	720
Musical boxes	3	..	..	..	..	..	3	..	24
Opera glasses	298	..	..	..	..	..	298	..	1,192
Opium, Malwa . . . chests	35	..	7	..	..	..	42	..	28,560
Peel, orange	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	32 0	224
Putchuck	..	66 81	..	..	..	..	..	66 81	1,603
Shirts, grey	7,350	..	..	..	..	..	7,350	..	16,537
" white	2,000	..	..	..	..	..	2,000	..	4,400
" dyed, figured . . .	2,000	..	..	..	..	..	2,000	..	5,800
Silk piece-goods	..	13 42	..	..	..	..	..	13 42	6,710
Spanish stripes	60	..	..	..	..	..	60	..	1,320
Spelter	..	578 83	..	..	..	..	..	578 83	4,630
Tallow, vegetable . . .	..	259 62	..	..	..	..	..	259 62	4,154
Tea, brick	..	529 35	..	..	..	..	..	529 35	2,647
Tin	..	..	..	34 63	..	87 0	..	121 03	3,630
Velveteens	36	..	..	..	..	..	36	..	180

Manufactures: Cottons, Woollens.—The Returns exhibit a decrease in the quantity of cotton goods imported in 1862, as compared with the quantity imported in 1861. This decrease is easily accounted for by the enormous advance which has taken place in the price of goods manufactured of American cotton. Cotton manufactures aside, however, the Returns for 1862 compare favourably with the Returns for 1861.

The Returns of woollen manufacture still remain, however, very unsatisfactory. The trade in British woollens makes no progress. The decrease this year in cotton imports has been produced by a special cause, and when the cotton-market in Europe returns to its normal condition, there is every reason to believe that the trade at Tien-tsin in this branch of foreign manufactures will steadily increase; but no such expectation can be entertained with regard to woollen goods.

Opium.—On reference to the Tables of Imports it will be noticed that the Returns of Indian opium show a large increase in the quantity disposed of at Tien-tsin in 1862, as compared with the quantity taken off in 1861. This circumstance is accounted for chiefly by the destruction this year of the Shensi crop. Early in the season it was generally understood that the opium crop in Shensi would be short. Soon afterwards political disturbances of a very formidable character occurred in that province, which all but annihilated, for this year at least, the opium traffic. The price of the native (Shensi) drug has accordingly risen to such a high figure that the Indian opium can now compete with it in the market. In the normal condition of the opium market, the native drug is nearly one-half cheaper than the Indian article; the former sells generally for about 400 taels a chest, the latter for about 800 taels a chest: but at the present time a small quantity of Shensi opium is offered in the market at 650 taels a chest, that is to say, at about 250 taels a chest above its usual value. The quantity of Indian opium imported into this district depends altogether on the state of the Shensi crop. When the Shensi crop is deficient, the demand for Indian opium increases, and *vice versa*. There will, however, always be a fair trade done at Tien-tsin in the Indian drug, because native opium requires to be mixed with the stronger Indian drug to render it palatable to the Chinese consumer. Pure native opium is seldom used. The Chinese say that in its unmixed state it is flat and insipid. The quantity of opium consumed in the city of Tien-tsin, judging by the number of smoking-houses, must be enormous. The dram-shops of Manchester or Glasgow are not greater social nuisances than the Tien-tsin opium-houses.

Of the opium imported into Tien-tsin from 100 to 150 chests a month are purchased for consumption in the capital.

Produce of China and the Straits.—The favourable condition in which the Returns present the trade in Straits produce, and coupled with it the trade in native produce, next calls for a few remarks. The Returns under this head in 1862 compare very

favourably with the Returns for 1861. The trade is partly in foreign, partly in native hands. The Chinese traders, it must be admitted, compete with their formidable foreign rivals in this field in a manner not unworthy of their reputation as the ablest merchants of Asia. The division of labour which it is desirable should take place in trade, is, however, rapidly being determined. The trade in raw produce of all sorts will fall to the share of the foreign merchants; the trade in prepared commodities of a miscellaneous description will remain in native hands.

2. *Foreign Trade: Exports.*—With regard to the Tien-tsin export trade a very few observations will suffice. The Returns for 1862 exhibit a considerable increase as compared with the Returns for 1861. The great drawback to Tien-tsin, however, as a port of trade consists in the absence of any exportable article of much importance. The Export Returns subjoined will fully illustrate this statement:—

RETURN of the Export Trade carried on at the Port of Tien-tsin during the Year 1862.

Description of Goods.	British Vessels.		American Vessels.		Miscellaneous Vessels.		Total Amount.		Total Value.
	Pieces.	Pic. Cat.	Pieces.	Pic. Cnt.	Pieces.	Pic. Cat.	Pieces.	Pic. Cat.	Taels.
Almonds - - -	-	732 62	-	99 80	-	608 69	-	1,441 11	12,970
Alum - - -	-	609 0	-	82 0	-	260 0	-	951 0	1,902
Apples and pears - -	-	304 17	-	27 0	-	398 76	-	729 93	2,190
Beans and pease - -	-	690 0	-	170 0	-	7,548 0	-	8,408 0	16,816
Bombazettes (Russian)	102	-	-	-	-	-	102	-	1,530
Boots, satin (pairs)	200	-	-	-	-	-	200	-	600
Brass ware - - -	-	8 92	-	-	-	-	-	8 92	445
Broad cloths (Russian)	-	-	-	-	65	-	65	-	2,600
Chilli - - -	-	48 80	-	-	-	-	-	48 90	390
Copper, old - - -	-	19 43	-	-	-	-	-	19 43	311
Copperas - - -	-	-	-	373 80	-	-	-	373 80	6,728
Cotton - - -	-	-	-	-	-	74 0	-	74 0	1,110
Curiosities (cases)	16	-	2	-	7	-	25	-	2,000
Dates, black - - -	-	2,351 98	-	14 40	-	67 14	-	2,433 52	7,310
" red - - -	-	3,672 60	-	2,190 60	-	5,666 80	-	11,530 0	23,060
Dye-stuff - - -	-	3 60	-	-	-	-	-	3 60	72
Felt - - -	-	-	-	3 70	-	-	-	3 70	200
" caps - - -	100	-	260	-	2,900	-	3,260	-	1,043
" soles - - -	100	-	-	-	100	-	200	-	20
Fish-bone - - -	-	-	-	-	-	1 6	-	1 6	13
Flint-steels - - -	-	264 0	-	404 48	-	722 10	-	1,390 58	11,125
Flour - - -	-	470 90	-	344 0	-	722 10	-	1,390 58	11,125
Fur coats - - -	1,396	-	-	-	-	-	1,395	-	13,950
" jackets - - -	328	-	-	-	-	-	328	-	2,624
Fustians (Russian)	30	-	-	-	-	-	30	-	180
Ginseng - - -	-	0 60	-	2 73	-	2 13	-	5 46	2,184
Glass ware - - -	-	7 60	-	-	-	0 60	-	8 20	410
Gold thread (imitation)	-	8 51	-	-	-	-	-	8 51	1,276
Hair, camels' - - -	-	4 55	-	62 42	-	-	-	66 97	667
" goats' - - -	-	76 50	-	-	-	130 14	-	206 64	413
Hams - - -	-	302 15	-	17 0	-	59 66	-	378 81	6,061
Hides, bullock - - -	306	-	-	-	-	-	306	-	159
Horns, young deer (pairs)	231	-	-	-	-	-	231	-	3,465
" old deer - - -	-	-	-	-	-	321 7	-	321 7	12,843
Horse-tails - - -	-	-	-	4 20	-	-	-	4 20	42
Iron - - -	-	-	-	2 20	-	590 0	-	590 0	1,298
Leather - - -	-	67 37	-	-	-	-	-	69 57	1,252
Lily flowers, dried - -	-	603 0	-	-	-	140 0	-	743 0	4,458
Liquorice - - -	-	379 4	-	-	-	236 0	-	615 4	2,460
Maize - - -	-	382 0	-	172 0	-	600 0	-	1,154 0	2,308
Medicines - - -	-	4,296 83	-	198 86	-	4,358 86	-	8,854 54	70,836
Melon-seeds - - -	-	3,016 32	-	767 25	-	363 40	-	4,146 97	16,588
Mushrooms - - -	-	121 74	-	59 43	-	2 85	-	184 2	5,520
Musk - - -	-	1 37	-	-	-	-	-	1 37	6,850
Preserves - - -	-	3 60	-	196 98	-	72 10	-	272 68	5,453
Quartz - - -	-	189 42	-	-	-	183 69	-	273 11	1,492
Raisins - - -	-	49 53	-	134 80	-	297 64	-	481 97	4,338
Rhubarb - - -	-	69 60	-	195 8	-	-	-	264 68	10,587
Samschoo - - -	-	121 12	-	474 45	-	460 74	-	1,056 31	5,281
Sinews, deer and cow	-	1 87	-	-	-	323 20	-	323 20	1,131
Skins, fox - - -	-	-	-	-	-	0 50	-	2 37	25
" goat - - -	4,575	-	-	-	-	-	4,575	-	13,725
" lamb - - -	3,880	-	-	-	-	-	3,880	-	1,940
" land otter - - -	262	-	-	-	107	-	369	-	738
" marten - - -	755	-	-	-	-	-	755	-	264
" rat - - -	75	-	-	-	-	-	75	-	225
" seal - - -	297	-	-	-	-	-	297	-	104
" sea-otter - - -	20	-	-	-	-	-	20	-	60
" sheep - - -	30	-	-	-	-	-	30	-	600
Snuff - - -	4,722	-	16	-	612	-	5,350	-	1,070
Soap - - -	-	33 6	-	-	-	-	-	33 6	661
Straw braid - - -	-	5,392 94	-	1,589 90	-	1,660 22	-	8,643 6	30,250
Tallow, animal - - -	-	-	-	55 0	-	-	-	55 0	660
Tobacco, prepared - -	-	102 50	-	90 0	-	17 13	-	210 33	1,472
Vegetables - - -	-	932 93	-	1,794 21	-	183 75	-	2,910 89	40,752
Vermicelli - - -	-	1,305 80	-	3,397 80	-	3,138 57	-	7,842 17	19,605
Walnuts - - -	-	739 74	-	115 71	-	35 0	-	890 45	4,452
Wax, white - - -	-	492 51	-	46 0	-	149 96	-	688 47	2,410
Wheat - - -	-	64 10	-	-	-	-	-	64 10	2,564
Wool - - -	-	-	-	765 0	-	-	-	765 0	1,530
	-	534 90	-	593 67	-	264 77	-	1,393 34	5,573

(2).—RETURN of the Export Trade at the Port of Tien-tsin, for the period commencing the 1st May and ending the 31st December, 1861.

Description of Goods.	In 15 British Vessels. (Aggregate tonnage 4,267.)		In 6 American Vessels. (Aggregate tonnage, 1,026.)		In 34 Sundry Vessels. (Aggregate tonnage 8,021.)		Total in 55 Vessels. (Aggregate tonnage 13,204.)		Estimated Value.
	Pieces.	Pic. Cat.	Pieces.	Pic. Cat.	Pieces.	Pic. Cat.	Pieces.	Pic. Cat.	
Almonds -	-	744 86	-	286 81	-	790 2	-	1,821 69	14,574
Bean cake -	-	-	-	1,800 0	-	11,124 0	-	12,924 0	13,000
Camel's hair -	-	11 34	-	-	-	9 87	-	21 21	106
Copper wire -	-	-	-	-	-	6 50	-	6 50	227
Dates, black -	-	122 51	-	1,448 30	-	1,851 6	-	3,421 87	17,108
" red -	-	151 45	-	-	-	2,837 48	-	2,988 93	5,978
Felt caps -	10,100	-	-	-	-	1,300	-	11,400	1,368
" soles -	-	-	-	-	-	1,000	-	1,000	70
Flint steels -	-	-	-	-	2,258,800	-	2,258,800	-	5,647
Fish dried -	-	18 40	-	23 70	-	59 0	-	101 10	1,516
Fungus -	-	58 55	-	23 56	-	9 72	-	91 83	1,102
Furs, ready made -	1,561	-	747	-	2,258	-	4,556	-	50,000
Ginseng -	-	6 30	-	6 50	-	10 99	-	24 30	9,720
Grapes -	-	40 18	-	-	-	159 75	-	199 83	800
Hams -	-	68 40	-	39 6	-	82 22	-	189 68	2,466
Horns, deer -	-	1 70	-	-	-	-	-	1 70	85
" young pairs -	-	-	68	-	-	-	-	-	1,760
" goat -	-	-	-	-	-	5 92	-	5 92	118
Isinglass -	-	1 15	-	-	-	10 71	-	11 86	415
Lily flowers, dried -	-	60 48	-	59 85	-	860 70	-	981 3	5,886
Linseed -	-	-	-	-	-	77 50	-	77 50	465
Liquorice -	-	231 48	-	-	-	1,746 43	-	1,977 91	5,933
Medicines -	-	1,392 25	-	668 0	-	5,803 96	-	7,774 21	62,194
Melon seeds -	-	860 69	-	655 22	-	2,393 47	-	3,909 38	19,547
Mushrooms -	-	4 76	-	71 30	-	26 91	-	102 97	3,604
Oil -	-	244 78	-	-	-	709 0	-	953 78	3,815
Pears -	-	-	-	54 0	-	58 27	-	112 27	449
Peas -	-	21,064 0	-	-	-	65,392 2	-	86,456 2	103,747
Prawns -	-	-	-	-	-	31 0	-	31 0	620
Preserves -	-	-	-	-	-	9 12	-	9 12	182
Raisins -	-	-	-	2 0	-	74 26	-	76 26	534
Rhubarb -	-	1 20	-	280 16	-	145 14	-	426 50	15,780
Rope -	-	-	-	-	-	147 50	-	147 50	885
Samshoo -	-	97 0	-	23 4	-	679 5	-	799 9	4,795
Shoes, satin -	pairs 240	-	-	-	-	-	240	-	240
Silk, wild, raw -	-	23 80	-	25 61	-	70 69	-	120 10	30,000
Sinews, buffalo and deer -	-	20 57	-	-	-	109 99	-	130 56	1,958
Skins, goat -	-	-	-	-	24,625	-	24,625	-	2,500
Snuff -	-	23 0	-	-	-	0 26	-	23 26	465
Soap -	-	1,887 96	-	4,201 10	-	2,951 62	-	9,100 68	27,302
Straw braid -	-	-	-	-	-	27 0	-	27 0	675
" hats -	-	33 62	-	-	-	2 80	-	36 42	1,093
Tallow, animal -	-	233 22	-	-	-	-	-	233 22	1,866
Tobacco -	-	231 49	-	241 11	-	589 50	-	1,162 10	13,945
Vegetables -	-	1,337 69	-	227 45	-	903 94	-	2,469 8	6,173
Vermicelli -	-	27 24	-	30 82	-	102 54	-	160 60	562
Walnuts -	-	74 24	-	94 82	-	219 71	-	388 77	1,944
Wax, white -	-	159 2	-	103 74	-	23 87	-	286 63	10,032
" yellow -	-	-	-	-	-	7 0	-	7 0	105
Wheat -	-	500 0	-	-	-	-	-	500 0	1,000
Wool -	-	975 74	-	438 21	-	390 24	-	1,804 19	7,217

Furs and Skins.—The exportation of furs and skins has been considerable, but the bulk of the export trade consists of miscellaneous articles of no great value. The native traders are particularly well qualified to conduct this kind of trade, and, accordingly, a large quantity of the merchandize exported from Tien-tsin this year in foreign vessels was the property of natives.

Hides, Wool, and Tallow.—Hides, wool, and tallow ought to be abundant in this district, but these articles have hitherto not come down country in any quantity. At present there is a company being formed at Tien-tsin, having for its object to open a trade in Peking coal. If this enterprise succeeds, the prospects of Tien-tsin as regards its export trade will no doubt improve.

Gold Bullion.—Large quantities of gold have been exported from Tien-tsin in the course of this year. The gold is brought into the market in the form of bars, each bar weighing 10 taels, or $13\frac{1}{3}$ ounces avoirdupois. It is purchased at Tien-tsin for about taels 15.15 per tael, or $1\frac{1}{2}$ ounce avoirdupois; sold at Shanghai for about taels 16.20; and eventually at Hong Kong for about 23 dollars per tael. The gold is mostly sent on to India.

Much difference of opinion exists as to where this gold comes from; some persons think that it is mostly Russian gold. But this opinion seems to be untenable; for if Russia exports gold to China, that country must take away from China something of corresponding value. On the assumption, however, that most of this gold is Russian, such would not appear to be the case. It is safe, therefore, to conclude that the gold is mainly, if not entirely, native gold, derived from the valuable gold mines which are known to exist in Manchuria and other districts outside the Great Wall. A small quantity

of gold-dust and nuggets are brought down to Chang-chia-kow (Kalgan) by the Mongols. The gold thus obtained is sent to Peking, where it is cast into bars. It is said to lose about 5 per cent. in the process of casting. The fact that the gold bars are cast at Peking is a further proof that the precious metal is not Russian.

Brick Tea.—Brick tea, which appears in the Returns, was purchased for the Russian market. The Russian tea no longer reaches the north of China overland by way of Shansi. It is now shipped at Hankow for Shanghai, and transhipped at Shanghai for Tien-tsin; it then proceeds up the River Peiho to Tung-chow, near Peking, in boats. From Tung-chow it is conveyed on camels via Hsuen-hua-fu and Chang-chia-kow over the desert of Gobi to the frontier town of Kiakhta.

Russian Woollens.—The Russian woollen trade in this district is considerable, but it cannot be valuable. Indeed the Russian import trade, in North China at least, is essentially a large retail trade. The go-downs of Russian merchants are little more than stores. At Tien-tsin there are two Russian mercantile establishments. Their trade is not large, but it is respectable.

French Trade.—There are two French traders residing at Tien-tsin. Both deal in small merchandize, such as Geneva watches, stereoscopic views, &c. French trade is not yet developed, but ample facilities have been provided for its accommodation when it springs up.

German Trade.—There are two German houses at Tien-tsin. Their business is tolerably respectable.

American Trade.—Some idea of the American trade may be formed from the Import and Export Returns. There are only two American firms, Messrs. Russell and Co., and Messrs. Heard and Co., engaged in trade at this port, but their business is large and respectable.

Domestic Trade: Cottons.—The domestic trade of this district in home cotton manufactures is still considerable. The foreign cottons are cheaper than the native, look much better, and under certain circumstances are even more profitable; but the latter nevertheless are still extensively used. I have now before me samples of native cottons of the following sorts: first, a white fabric, 1 foot 2 inches, English, in width; its retail price $1\frac{1}{4}d.$ a foot; second, a blue cotton, 1 foot 2 inches, English, in width, price, $1\frac{3}{4}d.$ a foot; and thirdly, a very coarse white cotton, 1 foot 3 inches, English, in width, price $1\frac{1}{4}d.$ a foot. When the difference in width is taken into account, the foreign cottons are about one-half cheaper than the native; but native cottons wear better, and are, therefore, still generally preferred by the country people whose avocations are of a rougher description than those of the town population. Thus two yards of foreign cotton can be purchased for, say $9d.$; and will go as far towards making a jacket, as $3\frac{1}{2}$ yards of native cotton, which, assuming the quality to be equally good, will cost about $1s. 3d.$; but a jacket of the latter will wear twice as long under bad treatment as a jacket made of the former.

Since foreign cotton became so common among the people of this district, a vast number of dye-works have been established. In these dye-houses the white and unbleached cottons of Manchester are dyed light blue or black. Nearly the whole population, male and female, belonging to the middle and lower orders living in towns, wear these home-dyed foreign cottons. Unbleached and pale ash-coloured cottons are universally put on for mourning. The quantity of foreign printed goods used in upholstery within this district must also be enormous.

Woollens.—The domestic trade in woollens is limited. Russian cloth is a good deal employed in upholstery. English cloth, blue and grey, is worn in the shape of jackets by such people as can afford to buy it. In winter these jackets are lined with fur. As padded cotton jackets are equally worn in winter, and a great deal less expensive, woollen ones are rarely purchased by poor people. Wealthy persons prefer to wear the beautiful native silks.

Furs.—There is a considerable domestic trade done in furs and skins. These are brought from Manchuria, and the Mongolian Provinces of the Empire. The sheep and fox skins are good; but the finer furs are nearly all of inferior quality. During a residence of three years in this district, I have never seen a really first-rate ermine or sable robe. The prices asked by the native dealers for these indifferent furs are enormous. The best furs obtainable are sea-otter skins, costing, when made up into a long robe, about 150*l.*

Salt.—The salt trade carried on at Tien-tsin is of considerable importance. A brief account of it can hardly be considered superfluous in a Report of this kind. The salt trade is strictly a Government monopoly. The traffic is carried on under the supervision of an officer called the Yen-yün-sze, or Commissioner of the Salt Gabel, who has under

him a numerous staff of subordinates. Any person who wishes to engage in the business of preparing salt must communicate with the Department presided over by this officer, and receive from it a written warrant authorizing him to erect his salt-pans. The quantity of salt which he is permitted to manufacture is specified, and he must be careful not to exceed the prescribed limits. At Taku, where salt-pans abound, the price of salt previous to the payment of the Government duties is only one cash a catty, that is, $\frac{1}{5}$ th of a farthing for $1\frac{3}{4}$ ounces avoirdupois.

The merchant who purchases from the producer must also hold a warrant from the Salt Department. Its terms are specific; he must not purchase more than the warrant permits, and he must not purchase salt beyond the limits of the district, department, or circuit, stated in the document. After paying the duties levied by the Government upon the article, and after securing his profits, the salt merchant can afford to sell his salt at about 10 cash a catty, that is to say, at about 6d. per lb. This is in fact the retail price of salt; the profit secured on the commodity by the petty dealers being merely nominal.

The salt used in this district is all obtained by the evaporation of sea-water, and is abominably coarse and dirty.

Native Iron.—The iron which is purchased to a small extent at Tien-tsin for exportation comes from Shansi. Judging from the specimens of the ore procured from that province, the quality of the iron ought to be good. But this is not the case. The unscientific smelting apparatus employed by the natives amply accounts for the indifferent quality of the Shansi iron. The metal is generally dirty and porous.

Altogether the domestic trade of this Consular district is very considerable, and under the auspices of a more enlightened Government is capable of vast expansion.

Market prices of goods.—The Table of prices given below will furnish an idea of the average value of foreign imports in 1862. The quotations show the condition of the market previous to the receipt of advices intimating the advance of cotton goods caused by the civil war in America. The retail price on the quotations given below does not, so far as foreign cotton manufactures are concerned, exceed from 3 to 5 per cent.

TABLE 1, showing the Prices Current for Foreign Imports in 1862.

Description of Goods.			Description of Goods.		
Grey shirtings	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ catties	T. M. C. 1 8 4	American goods :—		T. M. C.
" "	6 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	2 1 5	Drills	40 yds. 30 in.	3 8 0
" "	7 "	2 3 0	Jeans	30 " 30 "	3 2 0
" "	7 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	2 5 5	Sheetings	Per piece	3 4 2
White shirtings	54 reed	1 9 1	Chintzes (English)	"	1 7 0
" "	56 "	2 0 0	" (Japanese)	"	0 4 2
" "	58 "	2 0 3	Damasks	"	5 0 0
" "	60 "	2 1 2	Velvets	Per yard	0 1 8
" "	64 "	2 2 5	Woollens :—		
" "	66 "	2 3 5	Spanish stripe (scarlet)	"	6 5
Coloured shirtings	Per piece	3 0 0	" " (assorted)	"	0 6 0
Spotted shirtings (white)	"	2 2 0	Lastings (scarlet)	Per piece	17 9 0
" " (coloured)	"	2 7 5	" (assorted)	"	15 4 5
Brocades (white)	"	2 0 0	Camlets (scarlet)	"	20 0 0
" (coloured)	"	3 1 5	Metals :—		
T-cloths	6 $\frac{3}{4}$ lbs.	1 5 8	Iron	Per picul	2 6 0
"	7 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	1 6 6	Steel	Per tub	5 0 0
"	8 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	2 1 5	Lead	Per picul	6 6 0
"	10 "	2 3 4	Tin plates	Per box	6 0 0
			Quicksilver	Per picul	56 5 0
			Window-glass	Per box	3 3 0

TABLE 2, showing the Prices Current for Indian, Straits, Japan, and Native Produce in 1862.

Description of Goods.			Description of Goods.		
		T. M. C.			T. M. C.
Pepper, black	Per picul	6 5 0	Japan produce :—		
„ white	„	11 5 0	Mushrooms	Per picul	20 0 0
Betel nut	„	5 0 0	Isinglass	„	26 0 0
Rattans	„	3 5 0	Beche de mer	„	38 0 0
Sapan wood	„	4 0 0	Tea	„	4 0 0
Sandal wood	„	7 0 0	Fekling	„	13 0 0
Tin	„	16 5 0	Hankow produce :—		
Sugar, Canton (white)	„	6 5 0	Tallow	„	9 0 0
„ „ (brown)	„	3 5 0	Wood oil	„	8 5 0
„ Amoy (white)	„	8 0 0	Rhubarb	„	36 0 0
„ „ (brown)	„	3 6 0	Hemp (white)	„	12 0 0
„ Swatow (white)	„	6 5 0	Brick tea	„	4 5 0
„ „ (brown)	„	3 4 0	Paper	Per bale	6 7 5
Sugar candy, Amoy (white)	„	7 8 0	Indigo	Per picul	62 0 0
„ „ „ (brown)	„	6 0 0	Arsenic	„	5 5 0
Japan produce :—			Indian opium :—		
Seaweed, long-cut	„	3 7 0	Malwa	Per chest	725 0 0
Gall nuts	„	9 0 0	Patna	„	620 0 0
Vegetable oil	„	8 0 0			

TABLE 3, showing the Prices Current for Exports in 1862.

Description of Goods.			Description of Goods.		
		T. M. C.			T. M. C.
Almonds	Per picul	10 0 0	Rhubarb	Per picul	30 0 0
Alum	„	1 6 0	Soap	„	3 5 0
Peas	„	1 4 0	Walnuts	„	3 5 0
Dates (black)	„	2 0 0	Wax (white)	„	40 0 0
„ (red)	„	1 8 0	Wool (fine)	„	25 0 0
Melon seeds	„	4 0 0	„ (medium)	„	15 0 0
Mushrooms	„	20 0 0	„ (common)	„	8 0 0
Oil	„	6 3 0			

The foregoing Table gives the average price which the articles enumerated brought in the Tien-tsin market. It will be remarked that the list of articles enumerated in the Export Table of Prices is very defective as compared with the general Export Returns. This at present is unavoidable, as the export trade of the port is mostly in native hands. Native merchants are generally unwilling to furnish foreigners with full details of their trade. For a very general idea of the value of the various articles imported and exported, reference may be made to the last column of the Import and Export Tables.

Operation of the Tariff.—The operation of the Tariff regulations is satisfactory. Foreign goods are imported under the Tariff rules attached to the Treaty of 1858. The Tariff regulations applicable to the coast trade in native produce carried on by foreign merchants are just and moderate. The rate fixed is a duty of 5 per cent. *ad valorem* at the port of shipment, and a further $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. at the port of discharge. Foreign ships and merchants are permitted, under these very moderate conditions, to participate in the native trade of China. The duties fixed by the Tariff are fairly levied, and no reasonable complaint can exist under this head. The $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. transit duty, however, on goods entered for an inland market has been the cause of some irregularity, but it is only fair to state that every effort has been made by the Superintendent of Customs, and with a large measure of success, to set the matter right.

Trading in the Interior.—As to the value of the privilege guaranteed to the foreign merchant by Treaty of carrying his goods into the interior markets, personally or by an agent, there can be no question, but experience proves that this right, indiscriminately granted, may be productive of great mischief. To insure a moderate amount of success in the interior a knowledge of the spoken language of the country is necessary, entire honesty of character is indispensable, good sense and some acquaintance with native usages are likewise required. But unfortunately the class of merchants who are most likely to avail themselves of the privilege referred to are exactly the sort of people most defective in these respects. The consequence is obvious; a misunderstanding arises between the foreign traders and the natives, the intervention of the local authorities is requested, the local authorities, when not corrupt, are generally stupid, and endless troubles and complications are thus generated, which it requires months to settle. Trade, of course, under such circumstances, is not to be thought of. Both foreigners and Chinese within this district are at present far too ignorant of each other to render the

operation of this right of access into the interior of much importance to the merchant. The employment of Cantonese as agents to conduct goods into the interior is impracticable. The northern people are jealous of their ascendancy, and entertain no great respect for their character.

Trade with the Mongolian Provinces.—The Mongolian provinces of the Empire might furnish wool and hides in large quantities; but a knowledge of the Mongolian language is a pre-requisite to any one who wishes to engage, with the least prospect of success, in this trade. Shansi agents sent into the desert to effect purchases would make the trade of no value either to the Mongolians or to foreigners.

The privilege, therefore, of free entrance into the interior, although of not much value to the trader at the present moment, may in the course of time, when he has acquired a knowledge of the language of the country, enable him to carry on his mercantile operations with advantage at such marts as Lama-miau, Chang-chia-kow, and Kwei-hua-cheng.

Rate of Exchange.—As to the exchange market nothing need be recorded further than the monthly rates which prevailed in the year 1862.

TABLE showing the Rate of Exchange on England during the Year 1862.

Month.	Rate per Tael.		Month.	Rate per Tael.	
	s.	d.		s.	d.
January	6	1 $\frac{1}{4}$ to 6	0 $\frac{1}{2}$	July	6 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ to 6 5
February	6	0	5 11 $\frac{1}{2}$	August	6 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ „ 6 3 $\frac{1}{2}$
March	6	1	6 2 $\frac{1}{2}$	September	6 3 $\frac{3}{4}$ „ 6 3 $\frac{3}{4}$
April	6	1	6 1 $\frac{1}{4}$	October	6 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ „ 6 2
May	6	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	6 2 $\frac{3}{4}$	November	6 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ „ 6 1 $\frac{3}{4}$
June	6	2	6 2 $\frac{1}{2}$	December	6 2 „ 6 1 $\frac{1}{2}$

The average rate of exchange for the year 1862 was therefore 6s. 2d. per tael of silver.

TABLE showing the English Equivalents of the Weights, Measures, and Moneys mentioned in this Report.

MEASURES OF WEIGHT.

1 tael .. equal to .. 1 $\frac{1}{3}$ oz. avoirdupois.	1 picul .. equal to .. 133 $\frac{1}{3}$ lbs. avoirdupois.
1 catty .. „ .. 1 $\frac{1}{3}$ lb. „	

MEASURES OF WEIGHT APPLIED TO MONEY.

1 tael equal to .. 1 $\frac{1}{3}$ oz. avoirdupois.	10 candareens.. equal to .. 1 mace.
10 mace „ .. 1 tael.	10 cash „ .. 1 candareen.

SUMMARY OF LOCAL EXCHANGE.

1 tael .. equal to .. 1 $\frac{1}{3}$ oz. avoirdupois of silver.	70 taels .. equal to 100 dollars (Mexican).
1,400 cash .. „ .. 1 tael.	950 cash .. „ .. 1 dollar (Mexican).

The exchange market changes every day, but the above may be considered about the average rate.

Section III.—Agriculture.

Nature and Yield of Crops.—The agricultural productions of this province are very inferior, both in quantity and quality, to the produce of the central and southern provinces of the Empire. The following sorts of grain are generally cultivated in the Tien-tsin district, viz., wheat, millet, barley, pease, Indian corn, and rice. The price of rice, most of which is imported from the south, regulates the grain market. Wheat, which regulates the market at home, is here of comparatively little importance.

The Table annexed will show the value of the various sorts of grain most common in this district:—

TABLE showing the Market Prices of the different Kinds of Grain Cultivated in the Tien-tsin District.

Description of Grain.	Price in Mexican dollars.	Description of Grain.	Price in Mexican dollars.
	\$ c.		\$ c.
Winter wheat	3 50 per 133 $\frac{1}{3}$ lbs.	White millet (large)	1 75 per 133 $\frac{1}{3}$ lbs.
Spring ditto	3 40 „	Yellow ditto (ditto)	1 75 „
Buck ditto	2 25 „	Green pease (large)	2 40 „
Bearded ditto	1 30 „	Black ditto (ditto)	1 80 „
Barley	1 12 „	Green ditto (small)	2 00 „
White millet	1 50 „	Hempseed	3 50 „
Yellow ditto	1 50 „	Indian corn	1 50 „
Red Barbadoes millet	2 00 „	Rice	5 50 „
White ditto ditto	2 00 „		

Wheat.—Wheat is not extensively grown in this district. The two varieties most common, however, are winter wheat (*T. Hybernum*) and bearded wheat (*T. Turgidum*); spring wheat (*T. Æstivum*) is scarce. The soil, in most places, is too light for wheat. An acre of land yields from twenty-five to fifty quarters of wheat, according to quality.

Millet.—Millet is very extensively cultivated in this district. There are numerous varieties; but the Kao-liang or Barbadoes millet is the most common. The light sandy soil seems to agree well with this grain. The yield on an acre of average land is about 1,200 lbs. The poor people live on millet to a very large extent. A highly intoxicating wine is extracted from fermented millet, and extremely used in this and other districts. The stalks of the Barbadoes millet contain a great deal of woody matter, and are much used for fuel. Fences are often constructed of them.

Barley.—Barley is not uncommon. The yield of barley on an acre of average land is about 1,400 lbs., or 50 quarters.

Peas.—Peas are cultivated largely in this district. An acre of land produces about 1,600 lbs. of peas. A small quantity of peas was exported in 1862, and there is a large local traffic in this produce.

Indian Corn.—Indian corn is extensively grown in this neighbourhood. The grain is generally ground into flour, and largely consumed by the poorer classes. An acre of indifferent land will yield about 800 lbs. of Indian corn; an acre of good land double that quantity.

Rice.—This district is not suitable for rice cultivation; nevertheless, in certain localities rice is grown. It is, however, very inferior both in size and colour to the rice imported from the south. An acre of ground yields about 1,200 lbs. of rice.

Vegetables.—Vegetables are largely cultivated. The "pai-tsai" (called by foreigners the Shan-tung cabbage) excels in flavour, though not in size, any English vegetable of the same class. Its price in the market is about $\frac{3}{4}d.$ per lb. Parsley and turnips are spoiled in the cultivation. The carrots and sweet potatoes are uniformly good. The arrow-root plant (*Maranta Arundinacea*) is cultivated in the south-west part of this province. The arrow-root made from its tubers is palatable, but coarse and dark-coloured. The potato of Europe is grown successfully in this district; it exhibits no symptoms of disease, and sells at the rate of 5s. per 133 $\frac{1}{3}$ lbs. Many other sorts of vegetables abound, but those enumerated are the most common; all, however, are equally cheap.

Mustard.—Mustard is cultivated largely. Native mustard is very strong and pungent, but very coarse and dark coloured.

Rhubarb.—Rhubarb is also grown; it is used medicinally. A small quantity was exported last season.

Castor-Oil Plant.—The castor-oil plant is also cultivated, but sparingly. The berries are used as medicine.

Fruit.—Fruit of all kinds to be met with in a temperate climate is plentiful and cheap, but it is sadly defective in flavour as compared with English fruit. The apples and pears are flavourless. The peaches are better, but the natives generally pull them before they ripe. Walnuts, chestnuts, and dates abound. The grapes are remarkably good. Three varieties are common in the market, viz., 1st, a very small round grape; 2nd, a very long grape, rather sweet to the taste; and 3rd, a full round grape which tastes a little tart. In autumn all the three sorts are very cheap.

Hay.—Hay can be bought in the market, but it is very inferior stuff. The food of horses consists generally of hard unnutritious chopped straw mixed with millet, Indian corn crushed, or barley.

Horses.—The native horses are small and ugly, but remarkable for their quality of endurance. Their height is about twelve hands, head disproportionately large, ears long, neck short and massive, chest broad and ample, body short, legs strong and sinewy. The native horse requires no attention, or rather receives none. He eats anything, and lives anywhere. A good native horse costs about 5*l*. at Tien-tsin, but in the so-called desert of Gobi, where he is reared, only about 1*l*. 10*s*.

Black Cattle.—The cattle, in common with the horses, come from Gobi. There are two breeds: the one large and somewhat coarse, the other small and fine. The large breed resemble much at a little distance the Highland bullock; the small breed are generally spotted red and white, and are not unlike the Ayrshire breed.

The beef exposed for sale in the market is good. Its quality might, however, be improved by better feeding and treatment, but the Chinese understand nothing about the rearing of stock. Beef costs in the market about 2*d*. per lb.

Sheep.—The sheep also come from the desert of Gobi. The breed sent down from

Mongolia is almost always the large long-eared broad-tailed sort. The Mongolians have another much finer breed, but they do not find their way down to Tien-tsin. The quality of the mutton is good, but equally with the beef might be improved. It costs in the market about 2½d. per lb.

Pigs.—The breed of pigs in this district is exceedingly inferior. Pork is abundant, but of bad quality. This is entirely owing to the fact that the pigs are not properly fed. There is no attention paid to them whatever. Their food consists of anything they can pick up.

Poultry.—The breed of poultry is good. The fowls are large, abundant, and cheap. Ducks and geese are reared in great numbers, and the market is well supplied with them at a cheap rate. In winter, hares, partridges, pheasants, land grouse, wild duck and teal abound in the market; and, in their season, quail, and a most diminutive though highly delicate little bird called by the natives the "iron bird," from the colour of its plumage.

Together, the agricultural productions of this district are numerous and important. The population is large, but the means of living are abundant and cheap, and there is much less destitution in this than in many other far richer districts of the Empire.

Section IV.—*Population and Industries.*

Gold Mines.—Gold mines are said to exist in this district, but they are no longer worked. Gold is found in small quantities in the north of the Province of Chi-li; also in Shansi; but the bulk of the gold brought into the market is the product of Kwan-tung (Manchuria), and of districts lying beyond the Great Wall.

Coal Mines.—Coal mines exist in the hill ranges to the westward of Peking. There are also numerous coal mines beyond the inner Great Wall in the neighbourhood of Hsüen-hua-fu. The coal turned out is generally of very fair quality, but the mining operations are conducted very sluggishly and unscientifically. I paid a visit to the coal mines of Hsüen-hua-fu in February in 1862. The coal I saw being turned out was not very good, but this was easily accounted for by the preference the miners showed for the surface seams. The miners in one or two places, indeed, were working coal of vile quality, apparently just because it was easily reached. Some of the mines (very likely the more valuable ones) had been recently abandoned on account of a little water which a small engine would have cleared out in two hours. Even on the flanks of the mountains, where the seam of coal might easily have been struck obliquely, and the water allowed to drain itself away without difficulty, the miners had sunk perpendicular shafts. I asked two miners what they would do in case they cut in upon a spring. They replied, "When the waters rush in, the miners rush out." The tools of the miners, and the general economy of the mines, were defective in the last degree.

There is, however, no doubt but that the excellent coal exists in several localities in the north of this Province, and that even the mining I saw in force at Hsüen-hua-fu, prosecuted with a little more energy, would turn out great quantities of coal suitable for the use of steamers. The ordinary coal consumed by people in their houses, a hard shaley variety, is altogether unfit for steam purposes; but good steam-coal has been found both in the hills west of Peking and in the neighbourhood of Hsüen-hua-fu. The coal mines further eastwards, in the direction of Jehol, are reported to be productive; the quality of the coal is said to be good; it burns freely, being very bituminous, but throws off a great quantity of smoke, and is therefore not very well adapted for the use of steamers. There is water carriage the whole way between the Jehol mines and Taku. The coal can be laid down at the latter place for 7 or 8 dollars a ton. In the absence of better, this coal would fetch at Taku 10 or 12 dollars a ton.

Specimens of the following kinds of coal have been sent me by a Tien-tsin coal merchant for examination, and all have been found on trial to be good, viz., 1st, an anthracitic coal of superior quality; 2nd, a caking coal, very bituminous, said to resemble the Jehol coal, and which burned remarkably well in the grate; 3rd, a kind of coal not unlike "splint," but more bituminous; and 4th, a kind of cannel coal, rather coarse and gritty.

Coal mines in North China, and especially in this particular district, are likely soon to become of great importance. The steamers which trade between this port and Shanghai often require a supply of coal, and the large prices the masters of these vessels are willing to give for good steam-coal has excited the cupidity of certain speculative natives. A company has been formed at Tien-tsin to open a trade in coal. The local Government have given these persons every encouragement to prosecute their enterprise, and it is

probable that in the course of a year or two a considerable trade in coal will be done here. The great drawback to the success of the undertaking consists in the want of proper transport between the western mines, where the best steam-coal is procured, and the city of Tung-chow, whence the coal can be conveyed cheaply and expeditiously to Tien-tsin by water. Camels are the only transport available between Tung-chow and the coal mines. How very unsatisfactory these animals are as a means of transporting baggage, even on a sandy plain, every one knows who has had any experience of them. The hard uneven roads between Tung-chow and the mines will cut their soft fleshy feet to pieces; casualties innumerable will take place among them; new relays will have to be provided at much expense; and the coal in consequence, instead of being laid down at Tien-tsin for sale, as it would be if there was a good tramway between Tung-chow and the mines, at 9 or 10 dollars a ton, will probably not cost less than 11 or 12 dollars a ton. Still, if the coal prove useful for steam purposes, a good trade may be done in the article even at those high rates.

Employment of the People.—The people of this district are mainly employed in agricultural pursuits. The district produces no manufactures. The merchants who purchase foreign stuffs at Tien-tsin are, generally speaking, natives of other provinces; a great many of them come from Shan-si.

The population of this district is, upon the whole, very poor. Much unmixed suffering prevails among the lower orders, especially during the winter. No efficient system of public relief is held out to the poor; private benevolence, however, which the Chinese practise to an extent (their means considered) quite as great as the English, does much to ameliorate the wretchedness that prevails; but notwithstanding private efforts, and notwithstanding the fact that the means of living are procurable at a very cheap rate, mendicants are numerous. Probably there is not a single wealthy family (in the English acceptance of the expression) in the whole of this neighbourhood. The wholesale division of property which ensues upon the father's death among the different members of his family partly accounts for the general poverty of the Chinese; but it is, no doubt, owing still more to the bad civil administration under which the people live. The natives generally content themselves with the acquisition merely of a moderate subsistence. If, with small exertion, they are able to secure sufficient for their daily wants, they gladly avoid those extraordinary efforts of perseverance which insure the accumulation of a fortune; not because they are an indolent people, nor because they do not appreciate the conveniences and luxuries which wealth commands, but because their wealth would be certain to lay them open to the extortions of the officials with all the troubles which these involve. The Imperial Government, it is true, taxes lightly, but the rapacity of the civil officers discourages the accumulation of wealth in private hands, by subjecting its possessors to unmitigated oppression and spoliation.

Section V.—*Public Works.*

Public Roads.—The roads of this district are probably among the best of the Empire, but they are nevertheless badly constructed. In fact the high road between Tien-tsin and Peking is, after all, only a wide track. The soil is soon cut up by the sharp-wheeled native carts, and after a few hours' rain the road becomes all but impassable. Very little rain fell in 1860, but on one or two occasions during the campaign of that year, the Peking road was absolutely impassable for infantry and artillery, and virtually so for cavalry. Deep ruts are formed in wet weather, which hardening in the sun produce inequalities very formidable to the legs and feet of draught animals. Altogether the road between Tien-tsin and Peking is many degrees worse than the worst public road I have ever seen in the north of England. Yet this is the best road in the Empire! The other so-called roads in this neighbourhood are simply narrow inconvenient tracks. Scientific road-making, like every other branch of civil engineering, is an art totally unknown in this district.

Canals.—The Grand Canal joins the Peiho at Tien-tsin, and is still navigable for many miles beyond the southern limits of this Province. As a work of practical utility the Grand Canal is entitled to high praise. Centuries have elapsed since this great work was completed, but with the exception of a short distance in the neighbourhood of the turbulent Yellow River, the canal throughout its whole extent is still in good working order. That such is the case, however, depends much more on the nature of the country through which the canal is conducted, than upon any efforts which have been made, recently at least, for its conservation. Wherever the wearing processes of nature have discovered a flaw in the construction of the work, the destructive influences in operation are permitted to carry all before them, unobstructed by any conservative agency.

Bridges, &c.—Bridges, some of them substantial granite structures reared not unscientifically, massive embankments which, once constructed, might easily have been preserved in excellent order, are everywhere hurrying on to destruction for want of proper superintendence. Excessive steepness characterizes most of the bridges I have seen on the Grand Canal. They are generally also very narrow. The best bridge I have seen in this district is some twenty miles to the north of Peking, at a town called Sha-ho, on the road to the Nan-kou, or Southern Pass. This bridge is of stately dimensions, constructed of granite beautifully hewn. Its arches, seventeen in number, are almost perfectly level, and the roadway is roomy and neatly paved. This work remains in good condition.

The Great Wall.—The Great Wall has been often described. People who have only seen this monstrous misapplication of human labour at the passes have little idea of the paltry character of its general construction. Away from the neighbourhood of the passes, the proper Great Wall is simply a huge rubble fence, about 16 feet high by 12 feet in width at the bottom, sloping up to 2 or 3 feet at the top. The wall would keep black cattle out of China indifferently well, but it never could keep, and never has kept, the Tartars out. It therefore deserves the censure which every work deserves which fails in securing the end for the attainment of which it was brought into existence. Nevertheless, the wall is venerable, even in its meanness; standing alone on its stern granite hills, grey with the hoar of twenty centuries. Its age touches our sympathies, and blinds our eyes to its essential paltriness and inutility.

Railways and Telegraphs.—No railways or telegraphs exist in this district. A scheme propounded by a gentleman residing at Tien-tsin for constructing a telegraph from Canton to Peking via Shanghae is on foot, but the unsettled condition of the country constitutes a serious obstacle to the achievement of the undertaking. The line of telegraph would cost been 80,000*l.* and 100,000*l.* Its importance when constructed can hardly be over-estimated.

No. 4.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received August 15.)

My Lord,

Peking, May 25, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to inclose the Trade Returns from Hankow for the year 1862, with Mr. Gingell's Report. Trade, population, and buildings are increasing with astonishing rapidity, and the relations with the authorities and people are on a satisfactory footing; the latter due in a great measure to the final arrangement of the land question, and to the opening of a Custom-house, by which the local officials obtain an increased revenue.

This prosperity, however, will come to a speedy end should the insurgents attack or menace seriously the town.

I have, &c.

(Signed) **FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.**

Inclosure 1 in No. 4.

Consul Gingell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Hankow, March 10, 1863.

THE inclosed Returns of foreign trade at this port during the year ended the 31st December, 1862, exhibit a total value of 6,189,951*l.* 18*s.* 6*d.*, and show an increase of 3,011,482*l.* 10*s.* over last year.

Freight opened at 4 taels, and at the close of the year rose to 10 taels, the average rate being about 7 taels per ton hence to Shanghae.

Imports.—Total treasure during year:—

British	..	..	..	..	..	..	885,094	Taels.
American	..	..	..	..	..	..	2,532,800	"
							3,417,894	

Opium.—

British	..	..	..	..	522 chests	..	317,915	lbs.
American	..	..	..	..	611½	"	371,486	"
							1,133½	
							689,401	"

Export.—Tea:—

British	..	..	..	..	124,226	piculs	}	28,846,533	lbs.
American	..	..	..	..	92,125	"			

Tonnage.—1,462 vessels of all nations arrived and departed, having an aggregate of 290,536 tons. Of this 128,478 are British, while 161,424 are American, giving an excess in favour of the latter nation of 32,946.

During the year 1861, 401 vessels entered and departed, of 93,433 tons. The year 1862, therefore, shows an increase of 1,061 vessels, and of 196,103 tons.

The large amount of treasure imported on American bottoms much augments the value of their inward trade when compared with the British. It must, however, be borne in mind that a large proportion of their cargoes, and likewise that some of the steamers under American colours, are British-owned. Many of the American steamers are better adapted for the river, and several make regularly two trips backward and forward during the month. British vessels, too, being compelled, under river regulations, to stop at Chin-kiang on their passage, while American vessels passed without doing so, operated disadvantageously against the former, so long as the Regulation existed.

Of the 293 British junks, nearly all were purchased or chartered at Hankow, and were dispatched from this port under Consular pass: the 14,650 tons under this class were therefore created at this port; and the same observation applies equally to the tonnage of American and French-owned junks.

Owing to the near approach of rebels to Hankow in October and November last, a depression of trade existed for about a month, and little or no business was done: as, however, the danger decreased, active business operations were resumed.

Hankow still continues steadily to increase in magnitude and busy life. Large numbers of Chinese of different grades are flocking to the place, either returning to their homes, from which they had been scared by the rebels, or in search of employment, which they readily find. Buildings of every size and description are being erected on all sides; and it is believed by all, both foreign and native residents, that Hankow will shortly regain its once far-spread celebrity and importance.

The lots within the British concession are nearly all walled in, and several renters have already begun to build. The operation of bunding the concession is favourably progressing, but only a portion of the line will be completed this season, the rising of the water effectually putting a stop to the commencement of work at lower water mark.

Foreign relations with the Chinese people and with the authorities continue on a favourable footing.

Respectfully, &c.
(Signed) W. RAYMOND GINGELL.

Inclosure 2 in No. 4.

RETURNS of the Foreign Trade at the Port of Hankow during the year ended the 31st of December, 1862.

RETURN of the Number and Tonnage of all Foreign Merchant-Vessels, Junks, and Rafts which Arrived and Departed from the Port of Hankow during the year ended 31st December, 1862, giving the Values of the Cargoes carried.

ARRIVED.					DEPARTED.				
Flag and Description.	No.	Tonnage.	Value of Cargoes.	Total Values.	Flag and Description.	No.	Tonnage.	Value of Cargoes.	Total Values.
British merchant-vessels ...	144	44,253	Taels.	£ s. d.	British merchant-vessels ...	150	47,063	Taels.	£ s. d.
Ditto ditto in ballast ...	14	2,178	4,169,185		Ditto ditto in ballast ...	10	1,481	4,409,035	
Ditto, junks owned and chartered.	99	4,850	125,117		Ditto junks owned and chartered	293	14,650	528,930	
Ditto ditto in ballast ...	31	1,550	—		Ditto ditto in ballast ...	49	2,450	—	
	...	52,831	4,314,302	1,402,148 3 0	Ditto rafts ...	15	—	95,146	
American merchant-vessels ...	128	72,404	5,621,245		American merchant-vessels ...	124	70,204	3,373,743	
Ditto ditto in ballast ...	10	5,550	—		Ditto ditto in ballast ...	12	5,550	—	
Ditto, junks owned and chartered.	11	650	26,100		Ditto junks owned and chartered	149	5,288	179,180	
Ditto ditto in ballast ...	33	1,278	—		Ditto ditto in ballast ...	8	400	—	
	...	79,882	5,647,345	1,835,387 2 0	Ditto rafts ...	16	—	112,605	
French merchant-vessels ...	17	770	59,518		French merchant-vessels ...	23	1,080	32,023	
Ditto ditto in ballast ...	1	40	—		Ditto junks owned and chartered	89	5,724	120,001	
Ditto, junks owned and chartered.	6	420	6,140		Ditto rafts ...	6	—	39,381	
Ditto ditto in ballast ...	13	810	—			...	6,754	191,405	63,206 13 6
	...	2,040	65,658	21,338 17 0	Russian merchant-vessels ...	2	920	25,443	8,268 19 6
Russian merchant-vessels .	2	920	103,217	83,545 10 6	Grand total ...	909	154,863	—	2,897,533 5 6
Grand Total ...	514	185,673	—	3,292,419 13 0					

SYNOPTICAL Table of the Trade in Hankow during the years 1861 (commencing 24th April) and 1862.

Port and Year.	Arrived.							Departed.								
	British.	American.	French.	Russian.	Portuguese.	Danish.	Dutch.	Total British and Foreign Imports.	British.	American.	French.	Russian.	Portuguese.	Danish.	Dutch.	Total British and Foreign Exports.
1861.																
Shanghai	Taels. 2,407,678	Taels. 3,041,316	Taels. 24,380	Taels. 92,250	Taels. 48,015	Taels. 14,401	Taels. 34,200	Taels. 5,662,240 £ 1,840,228 0 0	Taels. 2,547,871	Taels. 1,430,659	Taels. 41,669	Taels. 7,937	Taels. 27,101	Taels. ..	Taels. 32,432	Taels. 4,117,669 £ 1,338,242 8 6
Exchange 6s. 6d.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
1862.																
Shanghai	Taels. 4,314,302	Taels. 5,647,345	Taels. 65,658	Taels. 103,217	Taels. ..	Taels. ..	Taels. ..	Taels. 10,130,322 £ 3,292,419 13 0	Taels. 3,033,111	Taels. 3,665,528	Taels. 191,405	Taels. 25,443	Taels. ..	Taels. ..	Taels. ..	Taels. 8,915,487 £ 2,897,533 5 6
Exchange 6s. 6d.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Increase	Taels. 1,906,624	Taels. 2,606,029	Taels. 41,278	Taels. 10,967	Taels. ..	Taels. ..	Taels. ..	Taels. 4,468,282 £ 1,452,191 13 0	Taels. 2,485,240	Taels. 2,234,869	Taels. 149,736	Taels. ..	Taels. ..	Taels. ..	Taels. ..	Taels. 4,797,818 £ 1,559,290 17 0
Decrease	..	..	..	..	48,015	14,401	34,200	..	..	..	..	12,494	27,101	..	32,432	..

Total Trade of 1861 £ 3,173,470 8 6
 Total Trade of 1862 £ 6,189,952 18 6
 Increase of 1862 £ 3,011,482 10 0

STATEMENT of the Quantity and Value of Goods Imported into the Port of Hankow in
158 British Vessels of 46,431 tons (including 14 of 2,178 tons in ballast) during the
year ended 31st December, 1862.

Description.	Packages.	Pieces.	Piculs.	Value in Taels.
Alum	820	—	895	1,480
Aniseed	78	—	104	700
Bamboo-ware	—	—	—	1,420
Barley	24	—	24	85
Bells	—	600 dozen	—	1,850
Betel-nut	668	—	520	1,240
Beche-de-mer	92	—	115	3,308
Birds' nests	5	—	4	500
Broadcloth	11 bales	5,222 yards	—	6,785
Brocades, white	50 "	2,310 pieces	—	4,780
" dyed	25 "	1,250 "	—	3,100
Buttons	5 cases	—	—	500
Cambrics	1 "	100	—	1,500
Camlets	115 "	1,064	—	18,125
Camphor	70 tubs	209	—	5,500
Chintz	387	16,510	—	26,195
Coal	—	—	128 tons	2,048
Copper cash	42,009 bags	—	—	430,981
Cotton	5,731 bales	—	5,809	74,192
Cottons, plain	4,279 "	179,542	—	382,575
" dyed and figured	319 "	15,618	—	39,220
Cotton cloth (Chinese)	180 "	—	—	1,620
" twist	20 "	—	—	1,500
Cuttle-fish	2,314 cases	—	—	25,311
Damask, dyed	79 bales	2,808	—	13,686
Dates	5 cases	—	5	45
Domestics	2 "	50	—	250
Drills	442 "	7,032	—	24,086
Fish (dried)	3,695	—	5,078	24,700
" skins	19	—	32	309
" eggs	6	—	6	33
" maws	2	—	2	160
" salt	7,865	—	8,778	57,880
Flowers	10	—	10	150
Fruit (dried)	64	—	55	600
Gentian	8	—	5	1,760
Glass	687 boxes	—	—	2,900
Grass-cloth	1 case	75	—	30
Gypsum	4	—	—	200
Handkerchiefs	51	9,885 dozen	—	5,236
Horns (deer)	—	—	222	1,670
Iron bars	767	—	—	725
Isinglass	1,808	—	965	21,009
Jeans	25	500	—	1,500
Lastings	8	258	—	2,960
Lacquer	38	—	—	200
Lead	10,528	—	11,393	90,114
Long ells	538	10,652	—	74,020
Medicine	8,154	—	—	87,795
Mushrooms	1,820	—	866	20,735
Nutmegs	77	—	77	180
Nankeens	109	—	—	662
Opium	522	—	—	317,915
Orleans (figured)	4	136	—	650
Paper	50	—	15	150
Pepper	11,529	—	—	76,197
Prints	45	2,250	—	5,200
Putchuck	732	—	628	7,056
Quicksilver	976	—	434	22,190
Rattans	7,087 bundles	—	—	2,276
Rice	1,783 bags	—	1,700	3,000
Sandal-wood	—	—	3,934	67,335
Sapan-wood	—	—	6,109	18,446
Seaweed	45,634	—	42,992	151,198
Sharks' fins	80 bales	—	45	720
Shirtings, white	457 cases	23,000	—	45,070
" grey	6,012 "	293,953	—	647,330
" figured	76 "	4,000	—	9,400
" dyed	10 "	499	—	1,390
Silk	94	—	—	25,960
Silk piece-goods	18	—	—	1,800
Spanish stripes	169	3,816	—	58,475
Spots, white	65	3,250	—	6,537

Description.	Packages.	Pieces.	Piculs.	Value in Taels.
Spots, dyed	20	1,000	—	2,550
Sugar	45,895 bags	—	44,462	197,023
Sugar-candy	—	—	760	6,986
T-cloth	—	15,825	—	32,455
Tin	525	—	430	6,425
Treasure	313 boxes	—	—	885,094
Turmeric	20 cases	—	—	400
Velvets	162	3,319	—	19,700
Velveteens	254	2,500	—	15,250
Woollens	617	10,198	—	74,390
„ and cottons	7	350	—	1,400
Zinc	117 slabs	—	—	2,000
Miscellaneous:— Matting, feathers, peel, hair, camphor, cutch	—	—	—	9,107
Total	—	—	—	4,189,185

Equal to £1,366,485 2s. 6d.

STATEMENT of the Quantity and Value of Goods Exported from the Port of Hankow in 160 British Vessels of 48,547 tons (including 10 of 1,481 tons in ballast) during the year ended 31st December, 1862.

Description.	Packages.	Pieces.	Piculs.	Value in Taels.
Alum	20 cases	—	20	80
Camlets	8 „	79	—	1,200
Camphor	60 „	—	180	3,600
Charcoal	2,155 baskets	—	—	2,106
Chinaware	2,245 „	—	—	2,829
Coal	—	—	8,072	2,042
Coir	3,310 packages	—	—	4,139
Cochineal	36 cases	—	66	4,800
Copper	2,659	—	2,003	20,361
Cottons, plain	116 bales	5,702	—	11,910
Cotton	417 cases	—	—	1,190
Crackers	3,795	—	—	16,400
Dates, nuts, &c.	648	—	639	2,774
Dye	356	—	—	4,040
Felt	70 bales	—	—	1,000
Fungus	433	—	318	5,475
Gall-nuts	—	—	560	5,045
Gold	2 boxes	—	—	4,350
Grass-cloth	570 bales	—	—	7,510
Gypsum	—	—	8,081	3,452
Handkerchiefs	6 boxes	1,200 dozen	—	1,000
Hemp	21,957	—	16,836	95,542
Iron (nail, rod)	—	—	215	572
Lacquer	148	—	157	2,663
Lastings	6 bales	—	—	1,320
Lead	400 slabs	—	192	786
Lin-che	—	—	150	1,559
Lounges	12 bales	—	—	1,800
Medicine	14,977 cases	—	—	127,156
Mushrooms	2,414 „	—	—	27,886
Oil	90,350 tubs	—	—	288,581
Opium	22 chests	—	—	14,307
Paper	69,707 bales	—	—	101,746
Piles, poles, &c.	—	1,769	—	1,748
Planks	—	6,392	—	1,445
Rattans	3,065 bundles	—	—	1,060
Rice	60,957 bags	—	—	100,744
Rhubarb	1,565 cases	—	—	23,225
Safflower	433	—	—	30,995
Sandal-wood	280 bundles	—	270	1,600
Seaweed	10 bales	—	7	108
Silk	82 „	—	—	16,815
Spanish stripes	7 „	—	—	1,232
Shirtings	65 „	—	—	3,850
Skins	15 „	—	—	300
Steel	747 cases	—	—	5,040
Tallow	14,474 tubs	—	11,494	102,944
Tea	—	—	124,226	2,950,936
Timber	—	8,585	—	6,545
Tin	178	—	100	3,300

Description.	Packages.	Pieces.	Piculs.	Value in Taels.
Tobacco	21,894	—	21,712	186,316
Treasure	23 boxes	—	—	92,974
Varnish	1,177 tubs	—	1,003	8,630
Velvets	28 bales	—	—	4,230
Wax	—	—	2,991	78,863
Walnuts	88 boxes	—	—	373
Wheat	1,000	—	500	500
Wood (hard)	—	222	—	580
Woollens	20 bales	—	—	1,000
„ and cottons mixed	8 „	—	—	4,459
Miscellaneous—eggs, lamps, red lead, skins, paint	—	—	—	9,999
Total	—	—	—	4,409,035

Equal to 1,332,936*l.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

STATEMENT of the Quantity and Value of Goods Imported into the Port of Hankow in 99 junks of 4,850 tons (exclusive of 31 junks of 1,550 tons in ballast) during the year 1862.

Description.	Packages.	Piculs.	Value in Taels.
Coal	—	122 tons	1,880
Fish	720 cases	—	5,800
Lead	2,700 slabs	—	22,000
Sapan-wood	—	710 piculs	2,320
Seaweed	33,859 bags	—	72,968
Sugar	3,546 „	—	16,080
Miscellaneous—medicines, vegetables, clothes, &c.	—	—	4,069
Total	—	—	125,117

STATEMENT of the Quantity and Value of Goods Exported from the Port of Hankow in 293 junks of 14,650 tons (exclusive of 49 junks of 2,450 tons in ballast) during the year 1862.

Description.	Packages.	Piculs.	Value in Taels.
Charcoal	24,377 bags	—	14,938
Coal	—	77,062	17,892
Coir	2,980 bales	—	5,440
Crackers	1,845 boxes	—	8,775
Gypsum	—	12,621	4,536
Hemp	3,052 bales	—	15,732
Iron pans	56,492 pieces	—	4,252
Lime	—	—	929
Medicine	4,220 cases	—	26,174
Oil	70,030 tubs	—	219,035
Paper	31,360 bales	—	25,484
Rice	12,140 bags	—	21,108
Tallow	790 tubs	—	5,316
Tea	1,437 chests	—	15,483
Tobacco	4,452 boxes	—	34,623
Wood	—	—	13,294
Miscellaneous—fans, mats, feathers, skins, rosin, bamboo, wax, alum, nuts, chinam, chinaware, mushrooms, &c.	—	—	95,919
Total	—	—	528,930

British Consulate, Hankow, December 31, 1862.

(Signed)

W. RAYMOND GINGELL,

Her Britannic Majesty's Consul.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received August 20.)

My Lord,

Peking, June 2, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copies of Consular Returns of Trade from Foo-chow, Formosa, Kiu-kiang, and Che-foo, for the year 1862.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 5.

RETURNS of Foreign Trade at the Port of Foo-chow-foo during the year ended the 31st of December, 1862.

1.—RETURN of British Shipping Arrived at and Departed from the Port of Foo-chow-foo during the year ending 31st December, 1862.

ARRIVED.

Number of Vessels.	Tonnage.	Where from.	General Cargo. Inwards.	Value.
				£ s. d.
3 steamers ..	33,811	Coast of China and Hong Kong	Raw and manufactured cotton and silk, woollens, indigo, rice, sugar, lead, salt, saltpetre, tobacco, drugs, paper, peas, bean cake, sapan and sandal wood, rattans, teamats, opium, pepper, and miscellaneous Chinese goods	2,169,524 15 0
19 large vessels..	63,303	Formosa, the Coast of China, Hong Kong		
5 small vessels under 100 tons	471	Coast and Hong Kong		
207 ships ..	97,585	—	—	—

DEPARTED.

Number of Vessels.	Tonnage.	Where to.	General Cargo. Outwards.	Value.
				£ s. d.
82 steamers ..	33,399	Hong Kong and Coast	Tea, paper, chinaware, planks and spars, dried and fresh fruits, oil, and miscellaneous Chinese cargo	3,195,901 5 0
119 large vessels..	63,679	England, Colonies, America, Hong Kong, and Coast		
5 small vessels ..	471	Hong Kong and Coast		
206 vessels ..	97,549	—	—	—

DUTIES.

							Taels	M.	C.	C.
Import ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	269,818	8	1	5
Export ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1,101,507	0	1	7
Tonnage dues	..	..	..	..	..	..	10,945	2	0	0

2.—RETURN of the Quantity and Value of Merchandize Imported into Foo-chow-foo in 207 British vessels of the burden of 97,585 tons, from the undermentioned places, during the year ending 31st December, 1862.

Description of Articles.	Quantities.	Whence imported.	Estimated Value in Sterling at 5s. per £.		
Bêche de mer	920·50 piculs	Hong Kong and Coast of China.	£	s.	d.
Cotton, raw	6,159·74 "		6,443	10	0
Cotton piece goods—			30,798	15	0
White, grey, plain, and twilled ..	39,107 pieces		29,330	5	0
Drills	46 "		46	0	0
T-cloths	112,229 "		56,114	10	0
Dyed, figured, and plain	6,476 "		4,047	5	0
Brocades	981 "		1,962	0	0
Chintzes	4,717 "		4,500	0	0
Damasks	296 "		450	0	0
Velvets	654 "		3,270	0	0
Handkerchiefs	7,863 dozen		2,006	10	0
Coal	2,043 tons		5,107	10	0
Carpets	1,768 pieces		221	0	0
Ginseng	60 piculs		3,449	10	0
Indigo	462·67 "		1,040	0	0
Iron	1,290 "		1,290	0	0
Lead	32,976 "		65,952	0	0
Medicine	930·16 "		465	0	0
Nankeens	15,449·60 "		193,120	0	0
Rattans	3,797·41 "		9,492	10	0
Rice	55,040 "		41,280	0	0
Saltpetre	857·12 "		2,571	0	0
Silk, raw	163 "		24,450	0	0
Sugar and sugar-candy	12,808·50 "		32,021	5	0
Tin plates	17·83 "		62	0	0
Wood, Sapan	241 "		180	15	0
" Sandal	2,699 "		9,446	10	0
Silk piece-goods	237·97 "		63,391	0	0
Tea-mats	880,000 pieces		11,000	0	0
Tobacco	2,736 piculs		15,730	0	0
Peas	23,784 "		12,000	0	0
Bean-cake	4,996 "		2,498	0	0
Pepper	2,819 "		6,547	10	0
Paper	2,531 "		945	10	0
Woollens, Blankets	407 pairs		712	5	0
" Broad cloth	153 pieces		1,723	0	0
" Spanish stripe	3,297 "		16,485	0	0
" Camlets, long ells, lastings ..	4,801 "		12,000	0	0
Miscellaneous, viz., flour, collars, caps, buttons, betel nut and leaf, fish, seeds, bones, horns, paint, isinglass, and sundry Chinese goods			50,000	0	0
Opium			1,447,374	15	0
			2,169,524	15	0

3.—RETURN of the Quantities and Value of Merchandize Exported from Foo-chow-foo in 206 British vessels of 97,549 tons, to the undermentioned places, during the year ending 31st December, 1862.

Description of Article.	Quantities.	Whence imported.	Estimated Value in Sterling at 5s. per £.		
Bamboos	None.	Hong Kong and Coast of China.	£	s.	d.
Chinaware	123·50 piculs		375	0	0
Fruit and dried vegetables			30,500	0	0
Medicine	1,679 "		5,546	0	0
Miscellaneous	8·13 "		10,000	0	0
Oil	17,290·48 "		20	5	0
Paper	392 "		55,560	0	0
Rice (Red)	None.		800	0	0
Soap	528·70 "		1,000	0	0
Sugar	30·32 "		300	0	0
Tin foil	973·08 "		5,750	0	0
Tobacco	49,232,500 lbs.		3,000,000	0	0
Tea	1,200,000 "		75,000	0	0
Ditto			11,050	0	0
Wood		Great Britain, Colonies, &c. Hong Kong and Coast	3,195,901	5	0

4.—RETURN of the Number and Tonnage of British vessels Arrived at and Departed from the Port of Foo-chow-foo, during the year ending 31st December, 1862, distinguishing those employed Coastwise, and in the Colonial, Homeward, and Foreign service.

Nature of Voyage.	Arrived.		Departed.	
	Number of Vessels.	Tonnage.	Number of Vessels.	Tonnage.
Coastwise	199	94,948	133	53,289
Great Britain	..	..	56	38,180
Colonies	8	2,637	17	6,080
Formosa				
America				
Total	207	97,585	206	97,549

5.—RETURN of Tea exported in British and Foreign Shipping during the year ending 31st December, 1862.

Flag.	Number of Vessels.	Tonnage.	Lbs. of Tea.
British	68	41,039	49,233,500
American	16	14,169	11,171,200
Other foreign	31	10,897	12,171,300
Total	115	66,105	72,576,000

6.—GENERAL RETURNS of Foreign Import and Export Trade at the Port of Foo-chow-foo for the year ending the 31st December, 1862.

ARRIVED.

Flag.	Number.	Tonnage.	Nature of Cargo.	Whence Imported.	Approximate Value of Cargo.
American	54	32,355	Cotton, rice, sugar, lead, drugs, peas, &c., and Chinese sundry goods	Hong Kong and Coast	£ 10,000
Other foreign	91	24,013	Ditto	Ditto	50,000

DEPARTED.

Number.	Tonnage.	Nature of Cargo.	Whither Exported.	Approximate Value of Cargo.
45	27,091	Chinaware, oil, tea, fruits, paper, rice, &c.	America and Coast ..	£ 1,000,000
119	23,708	Ditto	Coast, Colonies, and Continent	1,000,000

DUTIES, &c.

	Taels	M.	C.	C.
American—Imports	8,090	7	5	3
Exports	183,933	7	5	7
Tonnage dues	4,169	5	0	0
Other Foreign—Imports	22,564	8	1	1
Exports	254,170	2	6	8
Tonnage dues	4,062	9	0	0

(Signed)

CHAS. SINCLAIR, *Consul.*

British Consulate, Foo-chow-foo, January 1, 1863.

N.B.—No records are kept at most of the foreign Consulates, and it is impossible to obtain reliable Returns.

Inclosure 2 in No. 5.

RETURNS of Foreign Trade at the Port of Tamsuy during the year ending the 31st of December, 1862.

RETURN of British Vessels Arrived at and Departed from the Port of Tamsuy during the year 1862, all sailing Coastwise.

Number arrived.	Tonnage.	Cargo.	Duties.	Number departed.	Tonnage.	Cargo.	Duties.	Tonnage Dues.
15	2,746	Opium, lead, sundries, and treasure.	T. M. C. C. 2,876 0 3 6	16	3,036	Camphor, rice, tea, indigo, sugar, wood, sundries.	T. M. C. C. 2,132 2 0 7½	T. M. C. C. 185 2 0 0

RETURN of Imports in British Vessels for the year 1862.

Denomination.	Quantity or Weight.	Value.
		Dollars.
Alum	1,000 piculs	1,500
Lead	100 "	1,000
Opium	222 chests	270,940
Mat-bags	6,500 pieces	328
Sundries	258 packages	Unknown.
		273,765

RETURN of Exports in British Vessels during the year 1862.

Denomination.	Quantity or Weight.	Value.
		Dollars.
Camphor	7,604 piculs	136,872
Cash	468 "	6,552
Indigo	85 tubs	900
Rice	5,807 bags	16,260
Sulphur	1,666 piculs	3,332
Tea	2,879 "	40,306
		204,222

RETURN of Vessels, not being British, Arrived at and Departed from the Port of Tamsuy between the 18th July and 31st December, 1862.

Number arrived.	Tonnage.	Cargo.	Number departed.	Tonnage.	Cargo.
27	6,176	Opium, lead, tiles, shirtings, native cloth, miscellaneous, and treasure	23	5,139	Rice, camphor, indigo, sugar, coal, tea, wood, and miscellaneous.

RETURN of Imports in Vessels not being British for the period between the 18th July and 31st December, 1862.

Denomination.	Quantity or Weight.	Value.
		Dollars.
Lead	97 piculs	776
Native cloth ..	41,880 catties ..	..
Opium	179 chests	143,200
Paper	119,765 catties ..	2,385
Shirtings, &c. ..	1,489 pieces	4,467
Tiles and bricks ..	445,000	534
Tobacco	83 boxes	830
Satin crape gauze ..	154 pieces	..
Wood	1,500 planks	..
"	350 timbers	..
Miscellaneous ..	389,140 catties ..	Unknown

RETURN of Exports in Vessels not being British for the period between the 18th July and 31st December, 1862.

Denomination.	Quantity or Weight.	Value.
Camphor	2,238 piculs	Dollars.
Coal	9,548 "	40,584
Indigo	2,495 tubs	1,472
Rice	55,457 bags of 130 lbs.	24,950
Sugar (various)	1,168 piculs	133,096
Tea	637 "	..
Wood	3,580 planks	8,918
Timbers	150 "	..
Miscellaneous	567,300 catties	..
		Unknown.

(Signed)

GEO. C. P. BRAUNE.

British Consulate, Tamsuy, February 1, 1863.

Inclosure 3 in No. 5.

Consul Hughes to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Kiu-kiang, February 20, 1863.

I HAVE not been able to obtain accurate statistics of the trade at Kiu-kiang for the last six months of 1862. The manifests do not appear to have been regularly filed at this office, and the merchants have not up to this date, in all cases, responded to my request to furnish me with particulars of the exports and imports in British vessels. These facts, coupled with that of my absence during the period, will explain the impossibility of forwarding Returns of Trade in regular form.

Such slender information as I possess I now forward:—

Shipping and Navigation.—The steamers and other vessels which arrive at Kiu-kiang from Shanghai, commonly, but by no means invariably, proceed to Hankow. American-built steamers are preferred; they carry cargo on deck, and therefore load and discharge with greater speed, facility, and safety. Paddle-wheel vessels are superior to screw-steamers for the navigation of the Yang-tze. The former make better way against the current; and, in the event of touching the ground, the reversing of the paddle-wheels is found to be more effective than that of the screw. About twenty steamers now ply regularly on the river, and the number this season will be probably much increased.

Trade and Commerce.—The great staple of the export trade of Kiu-kiang is tea,—the green tea coming from the Moyune (Woo-yuen) districts, distant, by water, about 280 miles; and the black tea from I-Ning-chow, distant, by water, about 250, by land 90 miles.

The following is an approximative estimate of the export for the past year:—

Description.	1st January to 30th June.	1st July to 31st December.	Total.
	Lbs.	Lbs.	Lbs.
Green	6,473,933	7,900,000	14,373,933
Black	3,157,560	4,600,000	7,757,560
Unprepared leaf	124,400	406,000	530,400
			22,661,893

Paper and china ware are the exports next in importance. These are frequently shipped by natives, and accurate Returns cannot at present be obtained.

Copper cash was largely imported during the past year to Kiu-kiang, owing to its high relative value here, as compared with that which it bore at Shanghai and other ports, the difference frequently being as much as 15 to 20 per cent. Of late, in consequence of the large importations, this traffic has become no longer profitable.

A considerable business appears to have been done in opium, grey shirtings, and long ells. The retail prices of the latter in the native shops are as follows:—

	Per piece.
	T. M. C.
Long ells—Best quality	7 2 0
„ 2nd quality	6 8 0
„ Inferior	6 4 5
Grey shirtings, from 2 taels 9 mace to	2 7 0

100 taels Kiu-kiang currency are equal to about 105 Shanghae taels.

General Remarks.—At the opening of the port in 1861 there were no tea-men at Kiu-kiang. In consequence, the tea purchased here had to be sent in an unprepared form to Shanghae, there to be packed and prepared for the foreign market. Sixteen or seventeen native merchants have now established houses here, in which tea is prepared for export. Other houses of the kind are expected to be opened this year.

Foreign trade has already done much for the improvement of this neighbourhood, and is likely to do more. Numbers of the poorer classes, who would have otherwise been starving, or who might have been forced by want to join the rebels, are now employed in making roads in the British Concession, building foreign and native hong, and in loading and discharging the numerous steamers which daily visit the port. Even within the walls of the city the rebuilding of temples and other public edifices evidences the increase of prosperity and the return of public confidence.

The revenue on trade in foreign vessels received at the new Custom-house amounted, for the month of January this year, to 77,505 taels 9 mace 6 candarins 3 cash, that is to say :—

	T.	M.	C.	C.
Full export	52,498	0	7	2
Coast trade	24,997	3	9	1
Tonnage	10	5	0	0
Total Hae-kwan taels.	77,505	9	6	3

The actual amount received, in Kiu-kiang taels, is higher; about 7 taels 9 mace per cent. having to be paid to the Custom-house to make up the silver here current to the Hae-kwan standard.

I have, &c.
(Signed) P. J. HUGHES.

Inclosure 4 in No. 5.

RETURNS of Foreign Trade at the Port of Che-foo during the year ended the 31st of December, 1862.

RETURN of the Quantities and Value of Merchandize Imported into the Port of Che-foo in 69 British vessels of 25,090 tons, during the year ended the 31st of December, 1862.

Denomination of Articles.	From what places imported.	Quantities.	Estimated Value in Mexican Dollars.
			Dollars c.
Grey shirtings	Tien-tsin,	532 bales	82,450 0
White do.		53 cases	9,770 0
Chintzes		9 "	1,150 0
Drills	Shanghae,	151 bales	5,730 0
T-cloths		56 "	6,424 0
Various cotton and mixed fabrics		319 "	39,845 0
Ditto ditto	Foo-chow,	144 cases	20,390 0
Woollens		2 "	900 0
Opium		625½ chests	575,250 0
Iron, iron wire.	Formosa,	840 piculs	3,750 0
Ditto ditto		2,176 bundles	3,892 0
Lead		271 packages	1,420 0
Glassware, crockery	Amoy,	1,597 "	2,620 0
Medicines		2,125 "	27,297 0
Isinglass		290 bales	3,653 0
Sugar, sugar candy	Swatow,	10,211 piculs	50,639 0
Ditto ditto		22,347 baskets or	112,676 0
Paper		bags	82,180 0
Pepper	Nagasaki,	44,938 packages	
Tea		105 bags	1,050 0
Timber		916 packages	4,325 0
Cotton (raw)	Hong Kong,	1,350 pieces	824 0
Sea-weed		1,000 bales	12,200 0
Saffron		5,128 "	6,855 0
Copper cash	Ningpo.	591 bags	4,250 0
Dried fish		1,961 packages	17,610 0
Rice		36 bundles	756 0
Miscellaneous		1,800 piculs	3,600 0
		3,365 packages	28,869 0
Total			1,110,375 0

In Sterling at 4s. 2d. per dollar = £231,328 2s. 6d.

RETURN of the Quantities and Value of Merchandize Exported from the Port of Che-foo, in 69 British vessels of 25,090 tons, which arrived at Che-foo during the year ended the 31st of December, 1862.

Denomination of Articles.	To what places Exported.	Quantities.	Estimated Value in Mexican dollars.	
			Dollars	c.
Peas and Beans	Shanghai,	115,157 piculs	183,804	0
Beancakes		157,390 pieces	84,900	0
Ditto		38,110 piculs	32,092	0
Millet, maize, &c.		928 bags	1,307	0
Ditto		1,063 piculs	940	0
Rice		836 "	1,800	0
Ditto		658 bags	1,840	0
Melon seeds		965 "	3,640	0
Flour		195 "	292	0
Ditto		264 piculs	750	0
Oil	Foo-chow,	309 "	1,500	0
Ditto	Amoy,	841 baskets	6,116	0
Dates, dried fruit		10,598 bags	61,878	0
Ditto	Swatow,	685 piculs	2,136	0
Vermicelli		2,215 bales	12,366	0
Ditto	Hong Kong,	809 piculs	4,773	0
Medicines		5,053 "	19,821	0
Ditto	Nagasaki.	781 packages	6,218	0
Raw silk		126 bales	17,340	0
Pongees		43 "	4,625	0
Chinese wine		815 jars	1,600	0
Tobacco		922 packages	31,073	0
Straw braid		431 bales	9,710	0
Dried fish		649 packages	3,585	0
Miscellaneous		347 piculs	3,515	0
Ditto		1,174 packages	7,130	0
Total			504,751	0

In Sterling at 4s. 2d. per dollar = £105,156 9s. 2d.

RETURN of British Shipping at the Port of Che-foo during the year ended the 31st of December, 1862.

ARRIVED.						DEPARTED.			
Name of Vessel.	Date of Entry.	Tonnage	Where from.	Nature of Cargo.	Value of Cargo.	Date of Clearance.	Where bound.	Nature of Cargo.	Value of Cargo.
					£ s. d.				£ s. d.
1. Earl of Chester	1862 Mar. 29	517	Shanghai	Opium, iron ...	5,156 5 0	1862 April 1	New-chwang	Re-exported ...	—
2. Neptune	April 1	533	"	Opium, iron, cotton goods	23,266 13 4	April 10	Swatow	Bean-cakes, vermicelli	2,062 10 0
3. Chicora	4	453	Tai-wan	Raw cotton, &c.	2,031 5 0	May 17	"	Bean-cakes, oil, &c.	1,927 10 0
4. Douglas	May 3	291	Ningpo	Sugar, sundries	3,078 2 6	May 31	Amoy	Peas, oil, sundries	1,592 1 8
5. Falcon	9	463	"	Sugar, opium, sundries	2,684 16 10	27	Hong Kong	Peas, sundries	4,108 6 8
6. Banshee	17	407	Shanghai	Sugar, opium, cotton goods	8,375 0 0	31	"	Ditto	1,657 10 0
7. Carthage	23	519	"	Opium, medicines, sundries	11,077 1 8	23	Tien-tsin	Re-exported	—
8. Ellen Masters	23	498	Amoy	Sugar, &c.	7,189 11 8	June 16	Amoy	Peas, vermicelli, &c.	2,520 16 8
9. Star Queen	24	769	Foo-chow	Paper	1,875 0 0	May 28	Tien-tsin	Re-exports	—
10. Carthage	June 4	519	Tien-tsin	General	Re-exported	June 5	Shanghai	Flour	156 5 0
11. Aallor	19	457	Shanghai	Opium, cotton goods	2,234 7 6	July 7	Swatow	Bean-cakes, peas, &c.	1,918 6 8
12. Star Queen	23	769	Tien-tsin	Woolens, ballast	187 10 0	3	Foo-chow	Peas, oil, tobacco	3,860 8 4
13. Amitié	24	427	Hong Kong	Sugar, paper, sundries, &c.	9,975 4 2	23	Swatow	Beans, Bean-cake, silk, &c.	3,148 10 10
14. Swatow	25	145	Tien-tsin	General	Re-exported	June 25	Shanghai	Re-exports	—
15. Crimea	July 7	478	Nagasaki	Sea-weed, isinglass, &c.	2,608 15 0	Sept. 4	Nagasaki	Medicines	317 1 8
16. Lightning	7	316	Shanghai	Opium	2,500 0 0	July 7	Tien-tsin	Re-exports	—
17. Wild Dayrell	15	158	"	Ballast	—	19	Shanghai	Rice, sundries	1,133 6 8
18. Lightning	13	316	"	Ditto	—	16	"	Dates, melon-seeds, flour	1,915 12 6
19. Omar Pacha	16	398	Swatow	Sugar, paper, crockery	3,103 15 0	Aug. 16	Hong Kong	Peas, vermicelli, &c.	3,125 0 0
20. Melrose	21	286	Shanghai	Ballast	—	2	Amoy	Bean-cakes, vermicelli	1,593 15 0
21. Carthage	22	519	"	Opium, cotton goods, &c.	14,806 5 0	July 23	Tien-tsin	Re-exports	—
22. Swatow	26	145	Tien-tsin	General	Re-exported	Aug. 28	Shanghai	Dates, sundries	1,453 2 6
23. Carthage	31	519	"	Ballast	—	2	"	Dates, tobacco, sundries	4,987 5 10
24. Oriental	Aug. 1	500	Shanghai	Shirtings, iron	1,757 14 2	16	Hong Kong	Peas, vermicelli	1,333 6 8
25. George Ruxton	2	352	Ballast	"	—	20	"	Ditto	2,166 13 4
26. Ellen Masters	16	498	Amoy	General	4,602 5 10	Sept. 22	Amoy	Peas, oil, sundries	2,416 13 4
27. Marmora	30	363	Shanghai	Shirtings	4,535 16 6	22	Swatow	Bean-cakes	2,187 10 0
28. Persia	30	661	"	Sugar	729 3 4	Oct. 3	Hong Kong	Peas, &c.	597 18 4
29. Swatow	Sept. 2	145	"	Opium	5,208 6 8	Sept. 2	Tien-tsin	Re-exports	—
30. Lady Elgin	4	750	Foo-chow	Sugar, sugar-candy, &c.	4,291 13 4	Oct. 29	Amoy	Bean-cakes, peas	6,136 9 2
31. Lightning	8	316	Shanghai	Opium, cotton goods, &c.	5,031 5 0	Sept. 8	Tien-tsin	Re-exports	—
32. Water Witch	11	279	"	General	Re-exported	12	Shanghai	Straw-braid	729 3 4
33. Amaranth	12	638	Amoy	Sugar, sundries	6,154 3 4	Nov. 3	Swatow	Peas, bean-cakes, vermicelli	5,775 0 0
34. Swatow	13	145	Tien-tsin	General	Re-exported	Sept. 15	Shanghai	Silk, straw-braid, medicines	1,375 0 0
35. Ballarat	15	497	Shanghai	Ballast	—	Oct. 13	Hong Kong	Peas	2,295 16 8
36. New York	16	536	Newchwang	Ditto	—	Sept. 23	"	Vermicelli, medicines	2,977 18 4
37. Carthage	20	519	Tien-tsin	General	Re-exported	Oct. 23	"	Dates, sundries	1,176 0 10
38. Kinguanhin	20	437	Shanghai	Ballast	—	Nov. 3	Swatow	Peas, vermicelli	1,147 18 4
39. Douglas	20	291	Amoy (via Formosa)	Sugar, sundries	2,818 15 0	Oct. 15	Amoy	Bean-cakes	1,190 12 6
40. Pet	22	223	Tien-tsin	Ballast	—	10	Hong Kong	Peas	1,250 0 0
41. Swiftsure	22	319	Shanghai	Ditto	—	11	"	Peas, vermicelli	916 13 4
42. Ann	23	194	Taku (via Wan-chow)	General	750 0 0	1863 Jan. 6	Amoy	Beans, bean-cakes, dates, &c.	640 4 2
43. Melrose	Oct. 1	286	Amoy	Ballast	—	Oct. 13	"	Bean-cakes	937 10 0
44. Swatow	2	145	Shanghai	Opium	1,875 0 0	2	Tien-tsin	Re-exports	—
45. Swatow	14	145	Tien-tsin	Ditto	376 0 0	14	Shanghai	Pongees, re-exports	614 11 8
46. Island Queen	15	120	Shanghai	Ditto	6,458 6 8	15	Tien-tsin	Re-exports	—
47. Island Queen	23	120	Tien-tsin	Sundries	129 3 4	24	Shanghai	Pongees, &c.	250 0 0
48. William Frederick	25	484	"	Ballast	—	Nov. 24	Swatow	Bean-cakes, peas, &c.	2,679 11 8
49. Shanghai	31	504	Shanghai	General	3,547 18 4	1	Tien-tsin	Ballast	—
50. Swatow	31	145	"	Opium	9,870 16 8	1	"	Re-exports	—
51. Statesman	31	449	"	Ballast	—	29	Swatow	Beans, bean-cakes, &c.	2,911 0 10
52. Crimea	Nov. 4	478	Nagasaki	Sundries	1,403 10 10	1863 Jan. 8	Nagasaki	Beans, medicines	6,333 6
53. Lightning	5	316	Shanghai	General	1,014 11 8	1862 Nov. 5	Tien-tsin	Re-exports	—
54. City of Nantes	6	204	"	Ditto	—	10	"	Ditto	—
55. Island Queen	11	120	Tien-tsin	Opium	10,291 13 4	11	"	Ditto	—
56. Swatow	11	145	Tien-tsin	Ballast	—	12	Shanghai	Straw-braid	231 5 0
57. Wagoola	25	549	Shanghai	Opium	5,487 10 0	Dec. 30	Swatow	Bean-cakes, vermicelli	991 5 0
58. Alfred Hawley	26	420	"	Opium, cotton, &c.	1,583 6 8	10	"	Bean-cakes, sundries	2,524 11 8
59. Argus	28	161	"	Shirtings, opium	7,625 0 0	2	Shanghai	Silk, dates	3,550 0 0
60. Istamboul	Dec. 3	269	Tien-tsin	Ballast	—	25	Hong Kong	Beans, &c.	1,125 0 0
61. Swatow	Nov. 29	145	Shanghai	Opium	4,895 16 8	Dec. 30	Tien-tsin	Re-exports	—
62. Ocean Bride	29	333	"	General	7,033 6 8	Nov. 20	Swatow	Bean-cakes	1,583 6 8
63. Mona	Dec. 5	303	Taku	Ballast	—	19	Shanghai	Dates, sundries	3,685 16 8
64. Isabella Hamilton	8	238	Shanghai	Opium	6,875 0 0	19	Hong Kong	Peas	1,458 6 8
65. Swatow	12	145	Tien-tsin	Ballast	—	13	Shanghai	Pongees	260 8 4
66. J. Gibson	15	313	Shanghai	General	5,800 0 0	1863 Jan. 8	Swatow	Bean-cakes	1,427 1 8
67. Island Queen	16	120	Tien-tsin	Ballast	—	1862 Dec. 20	Shanghai	Dates	1,770 16 8
68. Carthage	18	519	Shanghai	Opium, paper	17,635 8 4	20	"	Ballast	—
69. Alicia Annie	23	300	Foo-chow	Paper, sundries	3,547 18 4	1863 Jan. 17	"	General	3,602 1 8
Total		25,090			231,328 2 6				105,156 9 2

RETURN of the Number of Foreign Merchant-Vessels of all Nations entered at the Port of Che-foo during the year ended 31st December, 1862.

Flag.				Number of Vessels.	Flag.				Number of Vessels.
British	..	..	..	69	Prussian	..	..	..	4
Danish	..	..	..	24	Swedish	..	..	..	3
Siamese	..	..	..	20	French	..	..	..	2
Hamburgh	..	..	..	19	Russian	..	..	..	1
America	..	..	..	18	Chilian	..	..	..	1
Bremen	..	..	..	11					
Dutch	..	..	..	6	Total	..	..	..	178

No. 6.

Consul Caine to Mr. Hammond.—(Received August 20.)

Sir,

Swatow, June 20, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to forward a copy of my Report on the trade of this port during the year 1862; also copies of the Returns forming inclosures therein.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. W. CAINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 6.

Consul Caine to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Swatow, June 20, 1863.

I HAVE now the honour to report upon the trade of this port during the last year.

British Shipping.—During the year 1862 there has been an increase both in the number and tonnage of British shipping, as compared with 1861.

ENTRIES.

With Cargo.		In Ballast.		Tonnage.	
1861.	1862.	1861.	1862.	1861.	1862.
133	130	27	33	59,142	62,965

CLEARANCES.

With Cargo.		In Ballast.		Tonnage.	
1861.	1862.	1861.	1862.	1861.	1862.
84	101	62	58	57,634	60,815

By the above it will be seen there was a large increase over 1861 in the number of vessels leaving with cargo.

Foreign Shipping.—85 vessels other than British entered the port during the year; of these 20 were American, being an increase of 6 vessels over the previous year, 15 Hamburgh, 12 Dutch, 7 Danish, 6 Norwegian, and 4 French.

A large quantity of the coasting trade has gone into vessels under flags of Continental States, the cause being the cheaper rate at which these vessels can be chartered by Chinese, by reason of the crews being engaged in Europe for a certain number of years; thus avoiding the high wages paid to seamen shipped in China.

Imports.—The value of the Import Trade in British vessels amounted to 3,589,685 dollars, being an increase over 1861 of 38,039 dollars; by all other vessels it amounted to 1,829,362 dollars, an increase of 721,679 dollars over the year 1861: the total increase in the year being 759,718 dollars.

Exports.—The total value of the exports during 1862 amounted to 3,143,960 dollars, being an increase over the previous year of 929,305 dollars. The value by British vessels being 1,255,965 dollars; by all other vessels 1,887,995 dollars, or an increase in British ships of 274,865 dollars, and in others 654,440 dollars.

The articles principally causing this increase being sugar and paper ; for the former the demand was greater than the supply, and many vessels had to leave in ballast, or with only half cargoes.

A much larger quantity of ground was set apart at the end of the year for sugar plantations, which will in a year or two double the present export of sugar from hence. The total increase in the value of the trade in 1862 over 1861, was 1,689,023 dollars.

The steady advance in the trade of this port, both in imports and exports, augurs well for its durability.

English shipping labours under a great disadvantage in the trade with Singapore. The Chinese emigrate in large numbers annually to the Straits.

British ships can only carry these under the terms of the Chinese Passengers Act, whilst other vessels leave with their decks literally jammed up with human beings. I saw some instances of vessels of 300 to 400 tons, which by the Act could carry only some 240 men, leave the harbour with over 1,500. The Chinese Government should take steps to prevent more than a certain number, according to the tonnage, leaving in vessels. The present system is fraught with much risk, for it would be impossible to work vessels so crowded in bad weather.

Every year shows a large decrease in the junk trade at this port. The Chinese prefer chartering vessels which can make several voyages in the year, to the unwieldly junks which can travel only with a fair wind.

I believe the removal of this Consulate to the vicinity of Swatow will have a beneficial effect on trade ; many Chinese merchants, more particularly those engaged in trade with Singapore, being desirous of building godowns and hong's near foreigners. Double Island is too distant, and Swatow itself too swampy to permit of secure storage ; goods have therefore to be sent to Ahmpo, some twenty miles to the north-west of Swatow : whereas on the spot selected for buildings there is ample room for the erection of go-downs close to the bank of the river, and but half a mile or so removed from the foreign quarter.

The Returns forwarded with the Report are numbered from 1 to 4.

The departure of Mr. Assistant Cooper for England at the commencement of the year, and the non-completion until lately of its Returns by the Customs, have prevented this Report being transmitted at an earlier date.

Respectfully, &c.
(Signed) G. W. CAINE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 6.

RETURNS of Foreign Trade at the Port of Swatow during the Year ended the 31st of December, 1862.

No. 1.—RETURN of the Imports at the Port of Swatow, China, in the Year 1862.

Names of Articles.	In 180 British Vessels. Aggregate Tonnage, 62,106.			In 20 American Vessels. Aggregate Tonnage, 10,554.			In 4 French Vessels. Aggregate Tonnage, 1,136.			In 55 Sundry Vessels. Aggregate Tonnage, 17,765.			In Native Vessels.* Aggregate Tonnage.			Total.		
	Quantities.	Estimated Value.		Quantities.	Estimated Value.		Quantities.	Estimated Value.		Quantities.	Estimated Value.		Quantities.	Estimated Value.		Quantities.	Estimated Value.	
Almonds...	Pieces.	Piculs cat.	Dollars c.	Pieces.	Piculs cat.	Dollars c.	Pieces.	Piculs cat.	Dollars c.	Pieces.	Piculs cat.	Dollars c.	Pieces.	Piculs cat.	Dollars c.	Pieces.	Piculs cat.	Dollars c.
Bamboo ware	...	2 37	30 81	...	6 63	88 19	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Battery	...	25 37	289 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Bean cake	...	4 4	24 54	...	...	243 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Beef, dried	...	169 756 43	299 756 0	...	...	122 196 52	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Beef, fresh	...	39 396 86	78 843 76	...	...	33 354 48	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Betel nuts	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Birds' nests, 2nd quality	...	15 42	4 132 72	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Camlets, English	...	13 44	15 323 44	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Camlets, Dutch	...	...	576 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Canees	...	...	113 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Cardamoms	...	105 44	189 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
China-ware	...	2,809 41	38,050 56	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Colton, foreign	...	4,096 90	154,768 30	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
" yarn	...	11,703 67	210,697 90	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
" Shanghai	...	25 0	300 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
" rags	...	6,546	25 638 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Cottons, dyed	...	1,455	5 355 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
" printed	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Cupids fish	...	138 81	1,665 72	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Dates	...	7,830 0	7,830 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Dates, American	...	56 33	6,322 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Drills	...	1,573	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Felt caps	...	253 53	2,279 33	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Fish, dried	...	39 82	1,735 61	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
" maws	...	3 5	1,200 95	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
" rangers	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Ginseng, clarified	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
" crude	...	0 7	29 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Handkerchiefs	...	1,360	1,020 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Hair, goats	...	136 74	1,244 80	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Itemp	...	223 35	5,345 90	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Indigo, seed	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Liquors	...	1,133	19,601 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Liquors, 2nd quality	...	11 9	110 80	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Liquors, 3rd quality	...	...	26,776 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Long ella	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Linens, grey	...	155	775 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Mangrove bark	...	60 0	120 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Manti scales	...	5 84	175 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Maure cakes	...	357 20	580 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Medicines	...	376 67	3,766 70	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Metals—	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Copper, old	...	49 40	1,187 90	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Iron, nail, rod, and bar	...	1,233 32	4,791 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Lead	...	12 55	132 53	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Tin	...	506 51	4,558 53	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Tin	...	974 17	24,995 51	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...

The Customs have been unable to furnish the Number and Tonnage of Native vessels.

Return of Imports at the Port of Swatow, &c.—continued.

Names of Articles.	In 180 British Vessels. Aggregate Tonnage, 53,105.			In 50 American Vessels. Aggregate Tonnage, 10,554.			In 4 French Vessels. Aggregate Tonnage, 1,136.			In 55 Sundry Vessels. Aggregate Tonnage, 17,793.			In Native Vessels.* Aggregate Tonnage.			Total.		
	Quantities.	Estimated Value.		Quantities.	Estimated Value.		Quantities.	Estimated Value.		Quantities.	Estimated Value.		Quantities.	Estimated Value.		Quantities.	Estimated Value.	
	Pieces.	Piculs cat.	Piculs c.	Pieces.	Piculs cat.	Piculs c.	Pieces.	Piculs cat.	Piculs c.	Pieces.	Piculs cat.	Piculs c.	Pieces.	Piculs cat.	Piculs c.	Pieces.	Piculs cat.	Piculs c.
Melon seeds	...	13 74	...	...	1,108 87	604 25	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Mushrooms	...	...	124 0	...	...	43 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Musels, dried	...	...	7,836 06	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Mustard-seed	...	5,403 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Nankens	...	570 53	...	...	1,65 24	3,264 09	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Oil	...	...	1,383 57	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Opium, Malwa	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Opium, Patna	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Papaya, India	...	610 49	5,165 20	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Peanut, white	...	38 51	5,530 14	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Rattans	...	363 8	1,433 32	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Rice	...	190 0	475 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Sago	...	36 1	288 84	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Sunahoo	...	27 64	165 84	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Sesamum-seed	...	55 99	176 70	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Seaweed	...	43 2	32 10	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Shrimp, black	...	1,833	81 4	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Shrimp, white	...	2 50	95 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Shirtings, grey	...	34,043	101,509 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Silk, piece-goods	...	12,391	48,064 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Spanish stripes	...	71 79	38,840 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
T-cloths, 24 yards	...	1,130	21,871 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Tallow, vegetable	...	24,366	53,232 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Tanned, meats and spars	...	...	31 15	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Tinned	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Tiles	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Varnish	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Velvets	...	...	3,908 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Vermorelli	...	1,419 36	11,327 88	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Wax	...	2 44	68 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
White nuts	...	35 34	141 86	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Woods—	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Woods—	...	1,403 33	4,311 49	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Woods—	...	10 0	100 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Woods—	...	8 80	88 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Woods—	...	25 93	51 81	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Woods—	...	265 32	8,424 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Total	...	...	3,599,695 56	...	...	479,573 23	...	...	28,563 33	...	...	1,073,667 93	...	...	947,557 31	...	...	5,419,047

Estimated Value of the Import Trade in British Vessels
 American Vessels... 3,599,695 56 equal, at 1s. 8d. the Dollar, to 857,593 6 1
 French Vessels... 479,573 23
 Sundry Vessels... 38,563 33
 Native Vessels... 1,073,667 93
 Total... 5,191,500 03

NOTE.—The Picul is equal to 133½ lbs. avoirdupois; the Catty (½ of a picul) 14½ lbs. avoirdupois.

* The Customs have been unable to furnish the Number and Tonnage of Native vessels.

(No. 2.)—Return of the Exports at the Port of Swatow, China, in the Year 1862.

Names of Articles.	In 101 British Vessels. Aggregate Tonnage, 38,840.			In 19 American Vessels. Aggregate Tonnage, 9,600.			In 4 French Vessels. Aggregate Tonnage, 1,136.			In 52 Sundry Vessels. Aggregate Tonnage, 17,072.			Total : 176 Vessels ; 66,648 Tons.	Estimated Value.
	Quantities.		Estimated Value.	Quantities.		Estimated Value.	Quantities.		Estimated Value.	Quantities.		Estimated Value.		
	Pieces.	Piculs cat.		Pieces.	Piculs cat.		Pieces.	Piculs cat.		Pieces.	Piculs cat.			
Alum, green	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	Piculs cat. 16 68	Dollars c. 67 0
Arsenic	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	Pieces. 22 52	Dollars c. 631 0
Bamboo-ware	..	3 33	49 95	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	Pieces. 64 35	Dollars c. 965 5
Betel leaves	..	748 35	2,495 5	..	549 36	1,898 8	..	3 40	51 0	..	6 3	117 95	Pieces. 754 38	Dollars c. 2,613 0
" nuts	..	15 19	68 64	..	33 31	63 31	..	..	..	..	..	..	Pieces. 1,146 31	Dollars c. 4,012 0
" husk	..	15 2	30 2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	Pieces. 50 29	Dollars c. 99 0
Bêche de mer	..	146 57	3,664 25	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	Pieces. 147 93	Dollars c. 3,728 0
Brassware	..	14 54	727 0	..	8 69	434 50	..	..	..	..	..	..	Pieces. 37 24	Dollars c. 1,862 0
Camphor	..	84 78	1,696 0	..	460 69	4,606 90	..	..	..	..	..	..	Pieces. 84 78	Dollars c. 1,696 0
Capoor cutchery	..	303 15	3,031 50	..	3 4	42 24	..	..	..	..	..	..	Pieces. 11,689 0	Dollars c. 11,689 0
Cassia	..	6 43	103 8	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	Pieces. 10 5	Dollars c. 161 0
Chestnuts	..	139 13	755 65	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	Pieces. 437 50	Dollars c. 2,402 0
China-root	..	..	..	..	7 13	36 52	..	45 73	271 80	..	252 62	1,374 55	Pieces. 79 81	Dollars c. 3,758 0
China-ware, coarse	..	10,560 52	30,754 96	..	1,121 37	7,242 74	..	2 58	11 8	..	70 10	330 40	Pieces. 22,725 4	Dollars c. 64,884 0
Coir	..	5 25	21 0	..	18 33	75 38	..	1,625 6	3,250 12	..	9,318 9	23,636 18	Pieces. 42 72	Dollars c. 175 0
Copper, old	..	114 11	2,510 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	Pieces. 114 11	Dollars c. 2,510 0
Cotton	..	..	..	..	174 33	3,145 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	Pieces. 174 33	Dollars c. 3,145 0
Dates	..	49 25	344 31	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	Pieces. 73 92	Dollars c. 3,145 0
Earthenware	..	268 47	400 33	..	165 39	265 39	..	..	..	..	..	..	Pieces. 1,064 11	Dollars c. 1,596 0
Felt caps	..	..	186 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	Pieces. 1,240	Dollars c. 186 0
Fire-crackers	..	4 4	73 86	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	Pieces. 46 77	Dollars c. 863 0
Pine-wood	..	2,148 69	1,074 34	..	200 0	100 0	..	19 20	355 60	..	23 53	433 54	Pieces. 2,610 11	Dollars c. 1,305 0
Fish, dried and salted	..	1,161 56	9,392 48	..	14 66	117 28	..	5 70	45 60	..	261 45	130 66	Pieces. 1,538 47	Dollars c. 12,439 0
" skins	..	40 0	320 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	Pieces. 40 0	Dollars c. 320 0
Fruits	..	262 36	824 72	..	28 53	90 96	..	..	..	..	..	..	Pieces. 634 5	Dollars c. 1,902 0
" dried	..	20 52	41 4	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	Pieces. 126 0	Dollars c. 126 0
Galangal	..	..	..	..	18 82	66 42	..	18 86	37 72	..	23 46	47 24	Pieces. 80 68	Dollars c. 262 0
Ginger	..	14 57	93 71	..	298 62	1,217 78	..	..	..	..	61 86	195 58	Pieces. 746 72	Dollars c. 2,934 0
Grass-cloth, coarse	..	24 48	2,134 24	..	9 83	865 4	..	..	..	..	433 53	1,622 51	Pieces. 370 24	Dollars c. 33,863 0
" fine	..	..	..	..	43 33	26,771 41	..	2 93	257 84	..	4 27	2,624 59	Pieces. 407 48	Dollars c. 35,863 0
Hemp	..	..	..	..	168 26	841 50	..	..	..	..	86 70	433 59	Pieces. 47 60	Dollars c. 29,396 0
" thread	..	274 67	5,492 80	..	0 61	12 20	..	49 69	998 80	..	168 56	3,371 20	Pieces. 1,275 0	Dollars c. 9,870 0
Joss-sticks	..	486 44	871 10	..	6 60	13 20	..	1 28	2 56	..	369 7	838 14	Pieces. 863 39	Dollars c. 1,723 0
Kittysols	..	15 0	16 0	..	300	36 0	..	..	..	..	7,457	897 0	Pieces. 7,915	Dollars c. 949 0
Lead	..	157 48	1,260 0	..	237 85	3,152 5	..	34 10	443 30	..	114 38	1,526 94	Pieces. 157 48	Dollars c. 1,260 0
Leather	..	69 65	923 71	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	Pieces. 455 98	Dollars c. 6,046 0
Lily-flowers, dried	..	11 21	56 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	Pieces. 11 21	Dollars c. 56 0
Lung-gans	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	Pieces. 87 7	Dollars c. 609 0
Maccaroni	..	496 16	2,976 96	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	75 95	531 16	Pieces. 1,123 8	Dollars c. 6,738 0
Medicines	..	516 23	5,978 53	..	395 67	4,429 10	..	..	..	..	626 92	3,761 4	Pieces. 1,334 57	Dollars c. 15,337 0
Melon seeds	..	54 63	271 52	..	..	..	..	18 74	206 14	..	403 93	4,743 48	Pieces. 69 71	Dollars c. 346 0
Mussels, dried and salted	..	138 61	421 34	..	4 52	13 56	..	14 54	74 48	..	130 6	390 18	Pieces. 283 83	Dollars c. 857 0
Olives	..	244 83	735 30	..	7 22	27 66	..	10 64	31 92	..	685 68	2,239 4	Pieces. 937 73	Dollars c. 8,002 0
Opium, Malwa	..	..	31,402 75	..	..	795 25	..	..	..	..	..	..	Pieces. ..	Dollars c. 32,198 0
" Chests	..	..	..	..	..	7,480 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	Pieces. ..	Dollars c. 7,480 0
" Patna	..	..	..	..	1 8	219 75	..	..	..	..	..	..	Pieces. 8	Dollars c. 3,297 0
Oranges	..	350 61	550 61	..	119 75	492 33	..	492 33	745 38	..	1,381 26	1,781 26	Pieces. 2,343 95	Dollars c. 3,297 0

Return of Exports, &c.—continued.

Names of Articles.	In 101 British Vessels. Aggregate Tonnage, 38,840.			In 19 American Vessels. Aggregate Tonnage, 9,600.			In 4 French Vessels. Aggregate Tonnage, 1,136.			In 52 Sundry Vessels. Aggregate Tonnage, 17,072.			Total : 176 Vessels ; 66,648 Tons.	Estimated Value.
	Quantities.		Estimated Value.	Quantities.		Estimated Value.	Quantities.		Estimated Value.	Quantities.		Estimated Value.		
	Pieces.	Piculs cat.		Pieces.	Piculs cat.		Pieces.	Piculs cat.		Pieces.	Piculs cat.			
Paper	..	3,567 52	Dollars c. 31,049 16	..	12,168 35	Dollars c. 106,846 80	..	213 9	Dollars c. 2,315 68	..	28,030 92	Dollars c. 243,247 36	Piculs cat. 43,979 88	Dollars c. 383,459 0
Peas	..	1,797 66	3,594 72	..	..	..	..	164 16	328 32	..	108 48	216 96	..	4,140 0
Peel, orange	..	166 60	433 20	..	71 87	173 74	..	22 26	52 18	..	80 44	190 88	..	850 0
Pepper, black	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	103 8	904 0	..	904 0
Pepper, white	..	4 6	49 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4 6	49 0
Pickles	..	67 69	40 61	..	352 7	211 24	..	1 59	1 15	..	45 14	20 0	..	282 0
Potash	..	28 89	110 80	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	47 55	80 20	..	291 0
Potatoes, sweet	..	909 43	454 16	..	861 45	430 78	..	33 44	16 72	..	1,656 63	828 34	..	1,730 0
flour	..	7,897 15	31,500 45	..	3,164 43	12,600 29	..	59 38	230 39	..	9,306 29	34,357 87	..	78,689 0
Prawns	..	23 82	254 0	..	16 40	189 60	..	..	..	..	12 60	175 40	..	619 0
Preserves	..	92 53	960 50	..	116 79	1,247 90	..	6 22	62 20	..	125 4	1,330 40	..	3,601 0
Pumpkins	..	14 59	35 82	..	18 37	45 74	..	..	..	..	20 72	52 44	..	134 0
Rattan-ware	..	19 23	192 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	192 0
Resin	..	73 92	191 64	..	28 59	192 99	..	..	..	..	23 1	20 37	..	405 0
Rhubarb	..	8 87	177 40	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4,580 91	11,216 82	..	637 0
Rice	..	739 53	1,879 76	..	2,570 0	6,653 42	..	1 16	34 80	..	26 70	801 20	..	19,750 0
Sharks' fins	..	..	..	..	5 99	60 50	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	836 0
Shells, mother-o'-pearl	..	0 95	9 50	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	70 0
Shoes	19,384	..	9,692 0	13,997	..	6,998 50	2,170	..	1,085 0	14,568	..	7,293 50	50,139	25,069 0
Silk piece-goods	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	144 0
Soy	..	113,255 50	440,763 38	..	..	..	..	6 50	65 0	..	..	..	..	65 0
Sugar, brown	..	92,974 56	557,847 36	..	48,671 59	146,274 77	..	3,213 69	9,644 95	..	82,325 30	326,975 90	..	923,659 0
white	..	..	..	..	51,696 45	310,178 70	..	3,401 47	20,408 82	..	58,440 22	350,641 76	..	1,239,076 0
Tallow, animal	..	9 27	101 97	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	41 45	456 3	..	358 0
Tea, black	..	7 15	153 63	..	..	..	..	6 8	129 68	..	168 77	35 73	..	496 0
Tea, leaves	..	..	..	..	2 8	44 90	..	..	294 0	168,746	..	2,342 0	231,676	3,229 0
Timber	..	..	463 0	9,200	..	130 0	20,870	..	..	1,779	..	1,355 0	4,656	2,793 0
Tobacco	..	2,751 30	49,518 0	1,461	..	730 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	7,482 47
leaves	..	148 82	1,389 38	..	1,850 73	33,306 0	..	32 22	576 0	..	2,848 22	49,845 0	..	133,239 0
Turneric	..	64 13	271 52	..	87 72	813 88	..	..	..	..	136 86	1,381 74	..	3,585 0
Vanish	..	55 53	944 0	..	7 21	32 20	..	..	..	..	24 7	111 28	..	95 41
Vegetables	..	4,276 61	10,553 22	..	110 63	371 64	..	991 30	2,382 60	..	6,316 77	16,633 54	..	55 53
Vermicelli	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	944 0
Vinegar	..	376 41	772 82	..	..	12 16	..	64 80	135 10	..	20 3	200 0	..	200 0
Woods, fragrant	..	1 84	28 0	..	6 8	..	..	..	..	..	..	917 92	..	1,833 0
sandal	..	..	..	..	324 34	2,270 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	28 0
Total	..	..	1,255,965 59	..	..	693,909 77	..	..	44,848 13	..	..	1,149,236 38	..	3,143,950 0

Estimated Value of the Export Trade in British Vessels			Dollars c.			at 4s. 8d. the dollar, equal to		
..	..	..	1,255,965 59	..	..	293,058 12	5 1	5 1
..	..	..	693,909 77	..	..	161,912 5	2 1	2 1
..	..	..	..	..	..	10,464 11	4 1	4 1
..	..	..	..	..	..	268,155 2	1	1
Total	..	..	..	..	..	723,590 11	1 1	1 1

NOTE.—The picul is equal to 133½ lbs. avoirdupois; the catty (¼ of a picul) is 1½ lbs.

(No. 3.)—RETURN of British Shipping at the Port of Swatow in the year 1862.

Direct Trade in British Vessels from and to Great Britain and British Colonies.

ENTERED.

Total Number of Vessels.			Total Tonnage.			Total Numbers of Crews.
With Cargoes.	In Ballast.	Total.	With Cargoes.	In Ballast.	Total.	
63	11	74	25,329	4,007	29,336	4,056

CLEARED.

Total Number of Vessels.			Total Tonnage.			Total Numbers of Crews.
With Cargoes.	In Ballast.	Total.	With Cargoes.	In Ballast.	Total.	
26	37	63	10,459	13,391	23,850	2,989

Indirect or Carrying Trade in British Vessels from and to other Ports.

ENTERED.

Ports whence Arrived.	Number of Vessels.			Tonnage.			Total Number of Crews.
	With Cargoes.	In Ballast.	Total.	With Cargoes.	In Ballast.	Total.	
New-chwang ..	8	..	8	3,438	..	3,438	133
Chefoo ..	11	..	11	4,783	..	4,783	252
Shanghai ..	18	2	20	6,708	632	7,340	326
Amoy and Foo-chow ..	29	19	48	11,738	6,100	17,838	2,729
Formosa ..	1	1	2	110	120	230	31
Total ..	67	22	89	26,777	6,852	33,629	3,471

CLEARED.

Ports to which Departed.	Number of Vessels.			Tonnage.			Total Number of Crews.
	With Cargoes.	In Ballast.	Total.	With Cargoes.	In Ballast.	Total.	
New-chwang ..	1	..	1	255	..	255	12
Chefoo ..	3	..	3	1,478	..	1,478	85
Shanghai ..	31	9	40	14,667	3,009	17,676	895
Amoy and Foo-chow ..	43	11	54	13,846	5,242	19,088	3,255
Canton ..	1	..	1	145	..	145	16
	79	21	100	30,391	8,584	38,975	4,275

(No. 4.)—RETURN of British and Foreign Shipping at the Port of Swatow in the year 1862.

Nationality of Vessels.	ENTERED.						CLEARED.					
	With Cargoes.		In ballast.		Total.		With Cargoes.		In ballast.		Total.	
	Vessels.	Tons.	Vessels.	Tons.	Vessels.	Tons.	Vessels.	Tons.	Vessels.	Tons.	Vessels.	Tons.
British ..	130	52,106	33	10,859	163	62,965	101	38,840	58	21,975	159	60,815
American ..	20	10,554	..	..	20	10,554	19	9,600	3	1,725	22	11,325
French ..	4	1,136	..	..	4	1,136	4	1,136	..	..	4	1,136
Dutch ..	12	4,483	1	242	13	4,725	12	4,480	1	245	13	4,725
Hamburgh ..	15	4,162	1	492	16	4,654	14	3,909	2	745	16	4,654
Bremen ..	2	948	..	..	2	948	2	948	..	..	2	948
Chilian ..	1	615	..	..	1	615	1	615	..	..	1	615
Danish ..	7	2,109	1	203	8	2,312	7	2,109	1	203	8	2,312
Hanoverian ..	2	473	..	..	2	473	2	473	..	..	2	473
Norwegian ..	6	2,125	..	..	6	2,125	4	1,355	2	770	6	2,125
New Granadian ..	2	376	..	..	2	376	..	..	2	376	2	376
Oldenburg ..	3	887	..	..	3	887	3	887	..	..	3	887
Siamese ..	4	1,277	1	300	5	1,577	5	1,577	..	..	5	1,577
Swedish ..	1	281	..	..	1	281	1	281	..	..	1	281
Sundry ..	..	..	2	469	2	469	1	438	1	31	2	469
Total ..	209	81,532	39	12,565	248	94,097	176	66,648	70	26,070	246	92,718

(Signed)

G. W. CAINE, Her Majesty's Consul.

British Consulate, Swatow, December 31, 1862.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received October 28.)

My Lord,

Peking, July 27, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to forward, herewith, copy of an interesting report on foreign trade at Canton, for the year 1862, by Mr. Consul Robertson.

The delay in the publication of the Customs Returns has prevented its earlier completion.

The prospects of trade at Canton are satisfactory, in spite of the effect produced by the opening of the Yang-tze river.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure I in No. 7.

Report on the Foreign Trade at the Port of Canton for the Year 1862.

THE Returns annexed to this Report have been compiled from those furnished by the Imperial Custom-house, and will show the nature and value of the Foreign trade at the Port of Canton for the year ending the 31st of December, 1862; compared with those of 1861, the following results are obtained:—

IMPORTS.—The total value in sterling of the import trade for the year 1862 is estimated at 2,412,515*l.*, whilst that for 1861 stands at 2,919,908*l.*, showing a deficit on last year of 507,393*l.*

This deficiency, however, must not be taken as evidence of decline in trade, as a few brief remarks on the subject will probably show.

Canton has for years been a mart for Bombay and Madras raw cotton. In 1860 the import of this produce amounted to 526,798 piculs (627,140 cwt.), in 1861 to 272,107 piculs (323,936 cwt.), and in 1862 to only 35,928 piculs (42,771 cwt.), showing compared with the former year a deficiency in 1861 of 254,691 piculs (303,203 cwt.), and in 1862 compared with the previous year a deficiency of 236,179 piculs (281,165 cwt.), or in 1861 there was nearly 51½ per cent. less cotton imported in 1860, and in 1862 nearly 132¼ per cent. less than in 1861.

The cause of this is to be attributed to the cotton famine in England. When the prospects of a short supply of the American staple became confirmed in the early part of 1861, the shipments from Bombay and Madras to China fell off rapidly, and ultimately receded to a nominal amount. Indeed the tide set the other way, and old stocks were exported to meet the home demand, and the requirements of the Canton market being met by large importations of native-grown from the northern provinces.

Taking therefore the deficiency of Bombay and Madras cotton for the year 1862 to be 236,179 piculs (in value say 1,052,487*l.*) and the increase of importation of native-grown to supply the market at 39,096 piculs (value 179,190*l.*), the difference in this article alone (903,297*l.*) will cover by nearly double the total loss on the whole import trade (507,393*l.*), and go far towards showing that there has been a loss on this portion of the trade in as far as this particular article is concerned, but there has in truth been a gain to the amount of (395,904*l.*), as that would have been the increase, and probably somewhat more, had piece-goods not been similarly affected for the year 1862, and had the southern ports of America remained open.

The importation of manufactured goods was also much less in the last than the preceding year.

In shirtings the deficiency was:—

In grey	..	..	..	..	..	..	218,764 pieces.
In white	..	..	..	..	..	..	34,467 „
T-cloths	..	..	..	..	..	..	36,511 „
Yarns	..	..	..	..	..	..	10,481 piculs.

but perhaps the best test of trade is afforded by sales of goods, and the following comparative Table will show the transactions of the past two years in the above-named articles:—

				Pieces.	Difference.
				Pieces.	
Grey shirtings	..	1861	Pieces.	192,400	
" "	..	1862		66,300	
					126,100
White shirtings	..	1861		44,180	
" "	..	1862		19,800	
					24,380
7-cloths	..	1861		37,886	
" "	..	1862		14,540	
					23,346
				Piculs.	
Yarns	..	1861		8,546	
" "	..	1862		4,147	
					Piculs.
					4,399

or a loss of 46 per cent. on the year 1862.

That this is attributable to the same causes which influenced the falling off in the raw cotton supply, there can be no doubt, and indeed the rise in the market affords the best proof thereof. Take for instance the quotations for grey shirtings on the 31st of December for the last three years:—

				Catties.	Dols. c.	Dols. c.
1860	..	..	..	5½ to 7½	1 95	to 3 25
1861	..	..	..	"	2 5	to 3 25
1862	..	..	..	"	2 85	to 4 0

showing at a fair average an advance in price in 1862 of 75 per cent.

The above are market quotations to which are to be added the duty and customary 2½ per cent. discount, say altogether 20 per cent.

With a market like this, it is not surprising that the general results of the year's imports should show a deficiency, but it is obvious that the deficiency is caused by circumstances irrespective of the port itself, and had they not occurred there would have been a large increase in this branch of the trade instead of a reduction.

In opium there is an increase, as the following Table will show:—

				Piculs.	Piculs.	lbs.
1860	Malwa	..	..	1,359.47	2,342.26	312,302
	Patna	..	..	982.79		
1861	Malwa	..	..	849.02	1,363.14	181,752
	Patna	..	..	514.12		
1862	Malwa	..	..	1,668.77	3,913.83	521,844
	Patna	..	..	2,445.06		

It will be seen therefore that in a principal item of import not affected by foreign influences, the success in 1862 is large, and this applies to other miscellaneous articles generally.

But independent of failures in the cotton supplies there are local circumstances which tend to hamper the import trade.

The disorganised state of the Empire requires a large military force to be kept on foot, and to meet this extraordinary expenditure a war tax is levied on everything; which although not heavy, at least it would not be so considered in the more affluent countries of Europe, still in China is felt to be, and is, a burden on a people among whom wealth is an exception and poverty a rule, that is, the poverty of having or earning barely sufficient on which to live in respectability, or to supply the daily wants of life. By a population so situated, any tax, however light, is strongly felt, and by none more than the trading classes, who find their goods remain on hand and their counters deserted by customers.

Naturally this affects foreign trade, and is a great element in producing a dull market, and restricted transactions.

In another way the war tax and other impositions affect the trade of the port,—they encourage smuggling or conduce to it. The south-western coast of China, by its numerous bays, inlets, and rivers, affords every facility for illegal traffic, and as the British Colony of Hong Kong is a free port, within sight of the mainland, no difficulties exist in transporting opium or manufactures to any extent to places where Chinese officers are unable to resist or take the better course, for a consideration, of not using their eyes.

All this, of course, affects the legal trade at Canton, and renders the Trade Returns a mere record of the transactions at the port, and of little value as a means of judging of the capabilities of this part of China.

EXPORTS.—In this branch of the trade no great fluctuations appear. Taking the three past years 1860, 1861, 1862, the comparative quantities of teas stand thus:—

			lbs.	lbs.
1860	..	Black	33,093,400	35,101,812
		Green	2,008,412	
1861	..	Black	32,935,208	39,474,856
		Green	6,539,650	
1862	..	Black	25,589,332	31,894,031
		Green	6,304,702	

Showing a deficiency in the exports of 1862 of 7,580,826 lbs.

This, however, was not unexpected; the only matter for surprise being that so much was on the market; but it is evident that for a certain quality and class of teas, Canton will be the market notwithstanding the facilities afforded by the ports of Hankow and Foochow. There are local interests here which will always direct a portion of both blacks and greens to the place, and if the import trade improves, of which there can be no doubt in quieter times, a large increase may be anticipated. Independent of this the teamen are well aware that better prices are likely to be obtained by a division of markets than by confining produce to only one or two.

In silk there appears an increase as shown by the following Table:—

	Raw.	Thrown.	Coarse.	Refuse.	Cocoons.
	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.
1860 ..	731,872	10,956	864,380	22,520	3,150
1861 ..	441,268	14,400	615,820	61,876	9,620
1862 ..	798,664	16,952	694,212	105,908	2,274

The excess of raw silk in 1862 being 357,396 lbs., of thrown, 2,552 lbs., of coarse, 78,392 lbs., and of refuse, 44,032 lbs. This article, however, is intended chiefly for the India market, and the demand for it fluctuates accordingly.

Other articles of import or export might be named and brought forward as evidence that the trade of the port has not really declined, but sufficient has been said not only to prove that position, but to show that it requires only the pacification of the country to restore the trade to something like its former prosperous condition.

(Signed) D. B. ROBERTSON.

Inclosure 2 in No. 7.

Returns of Foreign Trade at the Port of Canton during the Year ended the 31st of December, 1862.

(No. 1.)—RETURN of British Shipping at the Port of Canton in the Year 1862.

ENTERED.

Direct Trade, in British Vessels, to and from Great Britain and British Colonies.

Countries Arrived from.	Total Number of Vessels, including River Steamers and Lorchas.			Total Tonnage.			No. of Men exclusive of River Steamers and Lorchas.
	With Cargo.	In Ballast.	Total.	With Cargo.	In Ballast.	Total.	
Great Britain* ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Colonies, chiefly Hong Kong	161	54	215	44,957	26,225	71,182	2,960

Indirect or Carrying Trade, in British Vessels, from and to other Countries.

Treaty Ports, China ..	5	..	5	2,111	..	2,111	54
Macao	..	2	2	..	1,617	1,617	75
South America	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Siam	4	..	4	1,634	..	1,634	76
Total	170	56	226	48,702	27,842	76,544	2,895

* Vessels from Great Britain discharge their cargoes at Hong Kong and proceed thence to Whampoa to load.

CLEARED.

Direct Trade, in British Vessels, to and from Great Britain and British Colonies.

Countries to which Departed.	Total Number of Vessels, including River Steamers and Lorchas.			Total Tonnage.			No. of Men exclusive of River Steamers and Lorchas.
	With Cargo.	In Ballast.	Total.	With Cargo.	In Ballast.	Total.	
Great Britain ..	41	..	41	24,877	..	24,877	718
Colonies, chiefly Hong Kong ..	133	34	167	33,328	11,026	44,354	1,561

Indirect or Carrying Trade, in British Vessels, from and to other Countries.

Treaty Ports, China ..	18	..	18	7,644	..	7,644	583
Macao ..	..	2	2	..	502	502	51
South America ..	1	..	1	436	..	436	13
Siam ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Total ..	193	36	229	66,285	11,528	77,813	2,926

(Signed) D. B. ROBERTSON, Consul.

British Consulate, Canton, May 20, 1863.

(No. 2.)—RETURN of British and Foreign Shipping at the Port of Canton, during the Year ended 31st December, 1862.

ENTERED.

Nationality of Vessels.	With Cargo.		In Ballast.		Total.	
	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.
British ..	64	32,260	44	26,130	108	58,390
River steamers and lorchas ..	106	16,442	12	1,712	118	18,154
American ..	15	12,661	33	27,121	48	39,782
River steamers ..	349	116,526	41	4,029	390	120,555
Sundry nations ..	35	9,114	24	7,151	59	16,265
Total ..	569	187,003	154	66,143	723	253,146

CLEARED.

Nationality of Vessels.	With Cargo.		In Ballast.		Total.	
	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.
British ..	88	49,602	23	9,953	111	59,555
River steamers and lorchas ..	105	16,683	13	1,575	118	18,258
American ..	24	21,503	25	20,519	49	42,022
River steamers ..	384	118,796	6	1,339	390	120,135
Sundry nations ..	35	9,167	21	6,345	56	15,512
Total ..	636	215,751	88	39,731	724	255,482

(Signed)

D. B. ROBERTSON, Consul.

British Consulate, Canton, May 20, 1863.

(No. 3.)—RETURN of Foreign Shipping at the Port of Canton during the Year ended the 31st December, 1862.

ENTERED.

	With Cargo.		In Ballast.		Total.	
	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.
American	15	12,661	33	27,121	48	39,782
River steamers	349	116,526	41	4,029	390	120,555
Sundry nations	35	9,114	24	7,151	59	16,265
Total	399	138,301	98	38,301	497	176,602

CLEARED.

	With Cargo.		In Ballast.		Total.	
	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.
American	24	21,503	24	20,519	49	42,022
River steamers	384	118,796	6	1,329	390	120,135
Sundry nations	35	9,167	21	6,345	56	15,512
Total	93	149,466	52	28,203	495	177,669

(Signed)

D. B. ROBERTSON, *Consul.*

British Consulate, Canton, May 20, 1863.

(No. 4.)—A SYNOPTICAL RETURN of the Foreign Trade at the Port of Canton during the Year ended the 31st December, 1862.

IMPORTS.

Denomination of Goods.	From Great Britain and British Possessions, except Hong Kong.		From Hong Kong, in River Steamers and Lorchas.		From America.		From Sundry Nations, viz., Hamburg, Prussia, Portugal, and Norway.		Total.	
	Quantities.		Quantities.		Quantities.		Quantities.		Quantities.	
	Pic. cat.	Dollars.	Pic. cat.	Dollars.	Piculs.	Dols.	Pic. cat.	Dollars.	Pic. cat.	Dollars.
Cotton piece-goods—										
Drills, American	7,000	25,200	30,985	0	162,566				30,985	0
Shirtings, grey			126,539	0	455,504				126,539	0
" white			49,788	0	154,343				49,788	0
" 36 yards	1,000	3,400	1,876	0	6,378				1,876	0
" 24 yards			20,631	0	47,383				20,631	0
Cottons—										
Dyed, figured, plain			21,627	0	73,532				21,627	0
Damasks			3,607	0	23,002				3,607	0
Printed			11,382	0	23,902				11,382	0
Muslins			610	0	610				610	0
Handkerchiefs			28,057	0	35,071				28,057	0
Velveteens			1,711	0	11,977				1,711	0
Cotton velvets			1,060	0	9,540				1,060	0
Yarn	800	0	19,644	26	989,213			90	0	4,600
Cotton, Bombay, raw	19,355	86	16,572	89	331,448				35,928	25
Woolen manufactures—										
Blankets			3,510	0	21,060				3,510	0
Broadcloths			167	0	8,792				167	0
Camlets, English			3,193	0	57,474				3,193	0
" Dutch			610	0	17,080				610	0
" Imitation			644	0	4,508				644	0
Flannels	104		371	0	4,336				371	0
Habit and medium cloths	100		566	0	24,621				566	0
Lastings			3,441	0	55,056				3,441	0
Long cloths			8,666	0	77,940			200	0	1,800
Spanish stripes	120		9,007	0	176,117				9,007	0
Woolen and cotton mixtures			8,769	0	54,806				8,769	0
Metals—										
Copper manufactures, &c.			50	80	1,778				50	80
Iron	26,211	4	14,897	84	45,194			2,645	99	7,988
Lead	10,898	41	11,632	86	97,632			3,285	0	27,597
Quicksilver	885	0	3,111	87	25,744				25,506	58
Spelter			1,827	15	12,790			388	70	2,721
Steel	418	54	281	76	2,173			524	16	4,561
Tin			2,183	30	60,575			85	30	2,388
Tin plates			244	62	1,835				244	62
Opium—										
Malwa			1,688	77	1,213,979				1,688	77
Patna			2,245	6	1,437,198				2,245	6
Total		638,951		5,714,026				51,295		6,404,372
Chinese cargoes and miscellaneous articles chiefly belonging to the coast and carrying trade in foreign bottoms										4,176,656
										10,580,928

General Imports for the half-year ended 30th June 5,491,687 Mexican dollars at 4s. 6d. 1,235,574
Ditto ditto 31st December 5,039,041 at 4s. 7½d. 1,176,840
Total value of Import trade in sterling 2,412,616
Ditto ditto in 1861 2,919,908

Decrease of Import trade in 1863 507,293

(Signed)

D. B. ROBERTSON, *Consul.*

British Consulate, Canton, May 20, 1863.

(No. 5).—A SYNOPTICAL RETURN of the Foreign Trade at the Port of Canton during the Year ending December 31, 1862.

EXPORTS.

Description of Goods.	To Great Britain and British Possessions except Hong Kong.		To Hong Kong in River Steamers and Lorchas.		To America.		To Sundry Nations, viz., Hamburg, Prussia, Portugal, and Norway.		Total.	
	Quantities.		Quantities.		Quantities.		Quantities.		Quantities.	
	Pic. cat.	Dollars.	Pic. cat.	Dollars.	Pic. cat.	Dollars.	Pic. cat.	Dollars.	Pic. cat.	Dollars.
Tea—										
Black ... lbs.	169,534 59	5,495,014	12,381 52	398,785	4,687 73	150,801	5,336 14	171,823	191,919 98	6,170,923
Green ... "	23,546 74	795,583	7,324 31	228,360	13,733 0	554,584	2,698 23	110,664	47,302 23	1,089,491
Silk—										
Raw ... piculs	490 80	203,682	5,134 10	2,180,651	466 83	193,734	...	...	6,091 73	2,528,067
Thrown ... "	2,637 0	250,515	2,267 59	21,771	321 0	29,640	...	...	5,215 59	201,920
Coarse ... "	785 98	35,369	7 95	358	0 87	17	...	...	794 30	85,744
Refuse ... "	15 55	1,749	1 50	169	...	...	...	...	17 5	1,918
Cotton—										
Raw, Bombay ... "	51,370 56	627,411	3,043 3	60,861	2,239 14	64,783	1,112 96	22,495	38,775 69	775,494
Total ... "	...	7,373,323	...	2,840,955	...	993,359	...	204,946	...	11,503,563
Chinese cargoes and miscellaneous articles chiefly belonging to the coast and carrying trade in foreign bottoms ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	6,339,028
Total ... "	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	17,743,591

General Exports for the half-year ended 30th June ... 6,756,330 Mexican dollars at 4s. 6d. ... 1,520,174
 Ditto ditto 31st December ... 10,988,260 " at 4s. 7d. ... 2,540,572

Total value of the Export trade in sterling ... 4,960,746
 Ditto ditto in 1860 ... 8,557,590

Increase of Export trade in 1862 ... 503,156

(Signed)

D. B. ROBERTSON, Consul.

British Consulate, Canton, May 20, 1863.

No. 8.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received October 28.)

My Lord,

Peking, July 30. 1863.

I HAVE the honour to forward, herewith, the Trade Report from Amoy for 1862.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 8.

Report on British Trade at Amoy during the Year 1862.

SHIPPING.—There has been a successive decrease in the number of British vessels that have arrived at Amoy during the years 1860 to 1862; but the aggregate tonnage has not fallen off in a like proportion owing to a progressive increase in the number of steamers, a class of vessels generally having a greater average tonnage than that of the sailing vessels resorting to Amoy. But these steamers are coasting vessels, serving many other ports than Amoy; and only a small portion of the tonnage they represent can be considered as having been engaged in the trade of this place; so that, strictly speaking, if allowance was made for this circumstance, the tonnage employed might be considered to have decreased to a much greater extent than the number of vessels.

The following Table exhibits the aggregate number and tonnage of British vessels that have entered during the last three years:—

Year.	Sailing Vessels.	Steamers.	Total Tonnage.
1860	186	92	84,136
1861	150	96	86,154
1862	97	126	83,819

The decrease in the number of British vessels is to be attributed partly to a reduction in the trade of the port, and partly to their being to a great extent supplanted in the coasting trade by continental vessels specially adapted for the employment; handy

vessels of from 150 to 250 tons; fast sailing, and yet of fair carrying capacity, with light draught of water.

The following Table shows the number and aggregate tonnage of foreign vessels, other than British, that have arrived at Amoy during the last three years:—

Years.	Number of Vessels.	Total Tonnage.
1860	250	77,765
1861	293	72,337
1862	261	70,598

TRADE.—The value of the trade carried on in British vessels has decreased in a far greater proportion than the number of vessels, as will be seen by the following statement of the value of imports and exports during the last three years:—

Year.	Estimated Value of Imports in Spanish Dollars.	Estimated Value of Exports in Spanish Dollars.
1860	5,324,791	3,673,646
1861	4,645,674	3,910,585
1862	3,591,921	2,092,043

The decrease in the trade is probably even greater than that shown in the Table, as there is reason to believe that the Returns for 1860 and 1861 were under the mark, especially with regard to the exports for the year 1860. The decrease is, no doubt, partly owing to the war in the United States; which, for instance, by the rise it has caused in the price of cotton, has led to a greatly reduced importation of Indian raw cotton and British cotton manufactures; but it may also be attributed in part (especially with regard to imports) to the heavy extra burdens indirectly laid by the local authorities on foreign trade. There are several officers in the town charged with the collection of local duties on articles of foreign trade, there being one office for opium, one for piece-goods, &c., &c. As soon as a Chinese dealer purchases anything from a foreign merchant, he has to proceed to the proper office and pay the duty on it. These are purely local taxes, distinct from the Custom-house and Transit duties, and are in most cases excessively heavy: opium, for instance, being charged at about three times the tariff rate. It is believed that the revenue of these offices is farmed for nominal amounts (which go to the public account) by people more or less connected with the mandarins, and that the farmers and the mandarins share the difference between the amount at which the revenue is let and that which is actually levied. Under these circumstances, as may be imagined, the farmers do not content themselves with levying the duties specified in the published tariffs of their respective offices, but by ways and means difficult to describe, oblige dealers to pay them far more than they are entitled to receive; the dealers feeling that it is of no use to apply to the authorities whom they believe to be personally interested in these illegal exactions for protection or redress. It is impossible to produce legal proofs of these proceedings, as the Chinese dealers would not dare to give the particulars of any case except in strict confidence. But I am positive that such things are done, and that it is in a great part owing to them that during the year 1862 not more than half the usual amount of imports was sold by foreign merchants here. It is more than likely, however, that a large smuggling trade is done outside the port, as there are frequent reports of Portuguese lorchas and other small craft, delivering goods in the neighbourhood; and the Commissioner of Customs has told me that he knows that, at least, one clipper schooner is solely engaged in smuggling along the coast.

If British merchants could send their goods into the interior for sale, under the transit certificates provided for in the XXVIIIth Article of the Treaty, things would possibly not have come to so bad a pass, but that provision of the Treaty is practically inoperative here.

Experience has shown that goods sent in that way direct to the markets in the interior would be followed, the Chinese purchaser would be noted, and, at the instigation of the authorities here, he would be so ill-used on some pretext or other that he would not venture to purchase goods in that way again.

(Signed)

W. H. PEDDER, *Consul.*

Amoy, May 30, 1863.

Inclosure 2 in No. 8.

Returns of Foreign Trade at the Port of Amoy during the Year ended the 31st of December, 1862.

(No. 1.)—DIRECT TRADE, in British Vessels, to and from British Ports during the Year ending December 31, 1862.

ARRIVED.

Countries whence Arrived,	Number of Vessels.			Tonnage.		
	Cargoes.	Ballast.	Total.	Cargoes.	Ballast.	Total.
Hong Kong	31	5	36	12,957	1,350	14,307
Straits	9	1	10	4,018	161	4,179
London	2	—	2	636	—	636
Freemantle	1	—	1	401	—	401
Indirect or Carrying Trade to and from other Countries.						
Foo-chow	42	12	54	17,450	3,460	20,910
Swatow	48	2	50	19,541	939	20,480
Shanghai	26	7	33	10,762	1,839	12,601
Formosa	22	—	22	4,911	—	4,911
Ningpo	3	—	3	1,233	—	1,233
East Coast	3	1	4	1,188	194	1,382
Saigon	3	—	3	1,450	—	1,450
Kampoot	2	—	2	427	—	427
Japan	1	—	1	324	—	324
Macao	1	—	1	295	—	295
Sourabaya	1	—	1	283	—	283
Totals	195	28	223	75,876	7,943	83,819

Direct Trade, in British Vessels, to and from British Ports, &c.

DEPARTED.

Countries whither Departed,	Number of Vessels.			Tonnage.		
	Cargoes.	Ballast.	Total.	Cargoes.	Ballast.	Total.
Hong Kong	23	4	27	8,994	969	9,963
Straits	15	—	15	6,917	—	6,917
London	1	—	1	270	—	270
West Indies	—	1	1	—	920	920
Indirect or Carrying Trade to and from other Countries.						
Foo-chow	64	7	71	26,097	4,107	30,204
Swatow	36	3	39	13,861	1,040	14,901
Shanghai	19	2	21	7,796	304	8,100
Formosa	15	17	32	3,901	3,369	7,270
Ningpo	3	—	3	972	—	972
East Coast	2	1	3	677	192	869
Japan	1	2	3	317	610	927
Saigon	1	—	1	417	—	417
Kampoot	1	—	1	157	—	157
Manilla	—	1	1	—	421	421
New York	1	—	1	471	—	471
Totals	182	38	220	70,847	11,932	82,779

(Signed)
British Consulate, Amoy, December 31, 1863.

W. H. PEDDER, Consul.

(No. 2.)—A RETURN of the Number and Tonnage of Merchant-Vessels which Arrived at and Departed from the Port of Amoy during the Year ending December 31, 1863, distinguishing the Countries to which they belong.

Under what Colours.	ARRIVED.		DEPARTED.	
	No. of Ships.	Tonnage.	No. of Ships.	Tonnage.
American	17	11,693	16	10,432
Bremen	9	2,390	8	2,084
British	223	83,819	222	83,229
Danish	34	6,121	32	5,736
Dutch	33	12,937	29	11,149
Hamburgh	46	14,277	40	13,088
Hanoverian	3	527	3	527
Norwegian	1	281	1	281
Oldenburg	6	1,513	5	1,212
Prussian	15	2,474	14	2,239
Siamese	19	8,268	15	6,592
Spanish	32	6,681	30	6,377
Swedish	3	743	3	743
Portuguese lorchas	43	2,693	44	2,768
Total	484	154,417	462	146,457

(Signed) W. H. PEDDER, Consul.

British Consulate, Amoy, December 31, 1863.

(No. 3.)—A STATEMENT exhibiting the Movements of British Shipping in the Trade with the Port of Amoy during the Year 1862, and showing the Number and Tonnage of British Vessels in Harbour on the 31st December, 1862.

Places and Ports.	ARRIVED.		DEPARTED.	
	Number.	Tonnage.	Number.	Tonnage.
East Coast	4	1,382	3	869
Foo-chow	54	20,910	71	30,204
Formosa	22	4,911	32	7,270
Hong Kong	36	14,307	27	9,963
Japan	1	324	3	927
Kampoot	2	427	1	157
London	2	636	1	270
Macao	1	295	—	—
Manilla	—	—	1	421
New York	—	—	1	471
Ningpo	3	1,233	3	972
Saigon	3	1,450	1	417
Shanghai (and Chefoo, &c.)	33	12,601	21	8,100
Sourabaya	1	283	—	—
Straits	10	4,179	15	6,917
Swatow	50	20,480	39	14,901
West Indies	—	—	1	920
Western Australia	1	401	—	—
Vessels sold	—	—	2	450
Total	223	83,819	222	83,229

SUMMARY.

Entered — — — — — 223 vessels — 83,819 tons
 Departed — — — — — 222 „ — 83,229 „

Of which number—

28 vessels 7,943 tons entered in ballast.
 38 „ 11,932 „ cleared in ballast.
 and 2 „ 450 „ were sold to other than British subjects.

In harbour on 31st December, 1862, 8 vessels, 2,770 tons.

(Signed) W. H. PEDDER, Consul.

British Consulate, Amoy, December 31, 1863.

(No. 4).—A RETURN of the Exports in British Vessels at the Port of Amoy in China in the year 1862.

Articles.	Quantities.	Whither Exported.	Value.	
			Dollars	c.
Almonds	853 lbs.	Straits	82	37
Alum	186,666 "	Hong Kong and Straits..	2,030	0
Arsenic	2,330 "	Ditto	149	0
Artificial flowers ..	85 "	Shanghai	16	88
Assafoetida	560 "	Ditto	80	0
Bamboo ware	9,306 "	Hong Kong and Straits..	458	0
Betel leaf	63,689 "	Shanghai	3,716	0
" nut	38,933 "	Ditto	1,022	0
Bêche-de-mer	1,141 packages	Formosa and Ports ..	16,766	0
Bird's-nests	3,450 lbs.	Ditto	12,140	0
Bricks and tiles ..	1,119,394	Ditto and Straits ..	7,693	90
Brooms	400	Ditto	7	30
Camphor	5,284 lbs.	Hong Kong	912	0
Cash	1,593 "	Ditto	15,800	0
Cassia	26 "	Straits and Hong Kong..	8	0
China root	4,450 "	Hong Kong	505	23
China and earthenware	1,915,380	Straits and Hong Kong..	24,429	10
Clogs (Chinese) ..	120 pairs	Ditto	24	0
Cuttle fish	7,364 lbs.	Ditto	1,235	92
Dates and dried fruit	1,128,490	Straits	79,605	19
Drums	5	Ditto	50	0
Dye red	784 "	Ditto	5	88
Fans	2,638	Ditto	264	0
Feathers	350 lbs.	Ditto	31	0
Fish (salt)	32,853 "	Shanghai and Ports ..	985	0
" (shell)	21,304 "	Ditto	1,038	56
" (dried)	16,292 "	Ditto	1,272	0
" (skins)	2,133 "	Ditto	134	0
Flints	9,866 "	Ditto	94	0
Flour (potatoe) ..	126,845 "	Straits and Ports ..	8,314	60
Flower buds and seeds	41,018 "	Ditto	1,555	92
Garlic	65,514 "	Ditto	1,474	8
Ginger	4,220 "	Ditto	31	65
Glue	9,306 "	Ditto	718	40
Groundnuts	41,905 "	Ditto	1,121	16
Fire crackers	17,621 "	Hong Kong and Straits..	3,304	0
Gold leaf (imitation)	320,000	Ditto	278	0
Gold thread	1,320 lbs.	Ditto	185	30
Grasscloth	490 "	Ditto	247	40
Hartall	250 "	Ditto	20	68
Hats (straw)	250	Ditto	25	0
H mp	19,122 lbs.	Formosa	1,207	36
" bags	511,254	Ditto	22,706	0
" thread	814 "	Ditto	73	32
Horn-ware	2,390	Straits	107	58
Horns (buffalo) ..	333	Ports	8	0
" (rhinoceros) ..	10 "	Ditto	64	0
Joss-sticks	39 packages	Straits	430	94
Indigo	111 tubs	Ports	2,600	0
" seed	173 lbs.	Ditto	260	0
Kittysols	42,630	Straits	12,157	50
Lanterns	3	Ditto	1	30
Liquorice	2,252 lbs.	Ditto	144	49
Medicine	224,768 "	Ditto	6,718	0
Maccaroni and vermicelli	290,421 "	Ditto	17,202	16
Mats	586	Ditto	285	0
Metals—				
Old copper	52,221 lbs.	Ports	7,316	59
Iron	9,133 "	Ditto	355	0
Tin	24,723 "	Ditto	6,492	0
Quicksilver	76 "	Ditto	36	0
Manufactured metals—				
Brass buttons ..	2 "	Straits and Ports ..	0	80
Brass-ware	178 "	Ditto	180	0
Iron-ware	144,898 "	Ditto	9,790	66
Tin-ware	109 "	Ditto	32	34
Mangrove bark	57,733 "	Shanghai	636	0
Miscellaneous merchandise..	—	Straits and Ports ..	24,239	0
Mushrooms	644 "	Ditto	135	24
Nutgalls	2,285 "	Straits	103	0
Oil	240 "	Ditto	16	0
Olives	8,810 "	Ditto	376	48

Articles.	Quantities.	Whither Exported.	Value.
Opium	260 chests	Foo-chow and Formosa..	Dollars c.
Paper	495,881 lbs.	Straits	208,600 0
Peas	82,650 "	Ditto	8,108 78
Pepper	71,260 "	Ditto	1,251 76
Peas (Chinese)	70	Ditto	2,851 03
Preserves	320,524 lbs.	Ditto	10 0
Rattans	218,968 "	Ditto	17,334 11
Red lead	6,968 "	Ningpo and Shanghai ..	6,693 80
Rice	775,133 "	Straits	82 76
Sago	1,486 "	Ningpo and Shanghai ..	10,729 0
Salt	7,333,333 "	Ports	67 0
Salt meat	67 packages	Wenchow	1,200 0
Sea-weed	7,186 lbs.	Straits	230 0
Shark fins	1,425 "	Ports	181 96
Shoes	728 pairs	Ditto	218 0
Silk	225 lbs.	Straits	1,556 0
Stones (granite)	1,365 pieces	Ports	2,097 0
Sugar	1,020,582 lbs.	Straits	3,862 0
Sugar-candy	3,657,781 "	Ports	33,454 30
Tallow	1,296 "	Ditto	229,116 24
Tea	2,570,383 "	Ditto	87 0
Tobacco	1,803,460 "	(Foo-chow, London and New York)	771,114 90
Toys	12,000 packages	Straits	11,582 0
Treasure		Ditto	80 0
Tubs	140	Hong Kong and Foo-chow	1,108,271 0
Turmeric	4,626 lbs.	Straits	147 0
Varnish	360 "	Ports	119 0
Vegetables (salted)	83,138 "	Ditto	27 0
Vermilion	1,696 "	Straits	1,284 49
Wood	200 pieces	Ports	381 60
" ware	653 lbs.	Ditto	120 0
" (fragrant)	2,284 "	Ditto	58 80
" (laka)	23,830 "	Ditto	411 0
" (sandal)	695,396 "	Ditto	893 65
" (sapan)	70,613 "	Ditto	33,900 0
Wine	26,120 "	Ditto	375 0
Yams	1,433 "	Ditto	1,919 10
Cottons, Woollens, &c.—		Ditto	12 57
Nankeens	6,920 "	Ports	2,076 0
Brocades	963 packages	Ditto	3,744 0
Grey shirtings	650 "	Ditto	2,015 0
T-cloths	100 "	Ditto	260 0
Turkey red	2,290 "	Ditto	6,604 70
Cotton goods	300 "	Ditto	1,500 0
Chintz	700 "	Ditto	1,540 0
Cotton	50 bales	Hong Kong	1,950 0
" (Bombay)	417,165 lbs.	Ditto	56,317 0
" (Shanghai)	74,500 "	Ditto	10,057 0
" thread	320 "	Ditto	140 40
Buntings	72 packages	Shanghai	864 0
Camlets	10 "	Ditto	200 0
Habit cloths	180 "	Ditto	3,420 0
Spanish stripes	660 "	Ditto	12,925 0
Canvass	15 bolts	Ditto	180 0
° Total			2,092,043 03

At 4s. 7d. per dollar, being the average rate of exchange for 1862 = £396,220 5s. 5d.

(Signed)

W. H. PEDDER, Consul.

British Consulate, Amoy, December 31, 1863.

(No. 5).—A RETURN of the Imports in British Vessels at the Port of Amoy in China, in the Year 1862.

Articles.	Quantities.	Whence Imported.	Value.	
			Dollars	c.
Shirtings	34,782 pieces	Hong Kong and London.	98,841	25
T-cloths	3,397 "	Ditto	7,860	60
American drills	58 "	Ditto	3,338	40
Calicoes, chintzes, &c.	1,013 "	Ditto	3,449	95
Handkerchiefs	148 dozens	Ditto	148	0
Turkey reds	8,663 pieces	Ditto	27,426	50
Velvets, &c.	562 "	Ditto	3,742	0
Muslin	10 "	Ditto	67	0
Linen	195 "	Ditto	2,322	0
Cotton (Bombay)	62,964 lbs.	Hong Kong	8,501	94
" (Shanghai)	2,128,190 "	Shanghai	257,651	0
Yarn	523,300 "	Shanghai and London }	243,278	0
"	496 bales	Ditto		
Canvass	177 bolts	Hong Kong and London	2,124	0
Woollens, &c.	592 pieces	Ditto	6,928	0
"	9 packages	Ditto		
Camlets (English)	855 pieces	Ditto	17,400	0
"	2 packages	Ditto		
" (Dutch)	61 "	Ditto	1,474	0
Lastings	345 pieces	Ditto	6,401	50
"	5 packages	Ditto		
Long ells	368 pieces	Ditto	3,580	0
Spanish stripes	630 "	Ditto	12,271	0
Buntings	274 "	Ditto	3,288	0
Broad cloth	14 "	Ditto	294	0
Copper sheathing	67,993 lbs.	Ditto	2,489	80
"	57 packages	Ditto		
" (old)	105,710 lbs.	Ports	3,112	0
Iron	2,092 "	—	143	0
" nail	33,452 "	—	789	0
" old	18,654 "	—	9,393	43
" wire	213 "	—	24	0
Lead	378,601 "	—	20,903	34
Quicksilver	1,512 "	—	48,221	0
Yellow metal	1,066 "	—	150	0
Brass	7,333 "	—	550	0
Tin	1,025,360 "	—	28,750	90
"	80 packages	—		
Gold leaf	1 "	—	200	0
Cash	129,600 lbs.	—	8,900	0
Treasure	—	—	415,514	0
Copper ware	1,600 lbs.	—	60	0
Brass ware	26,725 "	—	150	06
Iron ware	3,133 "	—	385	0
"	7 packages	—		
Clocks and watches	67	—	828	0
Umbrellas (cotton)	28	—	28	0
Alum	401,323 lbs.	—	6,032	0
Aniseed	7,169 "	—	1,044	0
Arsenic	6,800 "	—	433	0
Ashes	253 "	—	3	80
Beans	1,013 "	—	16	72
Bean-cake	8,535,040 "	—	98,019	20
Bêche-de-mer	64,977 "	—	5,851	15
"	2 packages	—		
Beef and pork	29,700 lbs.	—	1,754	0
"	27 barrels	—	985	59
Betel-nut and leaf	42,124 lbs.	—	15,566	0
Bird's-nests	4,468 "	—	528	0
Bones, &c.	53,589 "	—	28	80
Brass buttons	384 "	—		
Caps and hats	6,100 "	—	1,600	0
"	3 packages	—		
Chalk	340 lbs.	—	124	0
Charcoal	66,666 "	—	400	0
China root	13,634 "	—	920	34
China-ware (coarse)	212 "	—	14	31
Cinnabar	470 "	—	103	90
Coal	539 tons	—	7,590	0
Coblet shells	70,000	—	1,750	0
Coir	26,378 lbs.	—	791	0
Collars (velvet)	700	—	105	0

Articles.				Quantities.	Whence Imported.	Value.	
						Dollars	c.
Combs	..	..	..	10 packages	—	320	0
Cuttle fish	..	..	..	51,656 lbs.	—	1,300	0
Dates	..	..	..	533 "	—	24	0
Dye stuffs	..	..	..	3,425 "	—	308	28
Fans	..	..	..	6,855 "	—	1,072	0
Feathers (Kingfisher's)	..	..	..	352 pieces	—	45	76
Felt	..	..	..	400 "	—	200	0
Fish (dried)	..	..	..	532,666 lbs.	—	}	31,281 40
" "	..	..	..	22 packages	—		
" (salt)	..	..	..	499,240 lbs.	—		
" (shell)	..	..	..	41,733 "	—		
" skins	..	..	..	6,193 "	—		
Flint	..	..	..	227,150 "	—	2,044	0
Flour	..	..	..	336 "	—	21	16
Fungus	..	..	..	5,434 "	—	978	50
Fruit	..	..	..	59,333 "	—	}	2,464 0
"	..	..	..	285 packages	—		
Gambier	..	..	..	70,417 lbs.	—	2,376	58
Ginseng, American and Corean	..	..	..	2,726 "	—	10,962	90
Glass bangles	..	..	..	1,666 "	—	647	76
" ware	..	..	..	3,724 "	—	955	10
Grass cloth	..	..	..	2,260 "	—	1,185	95
Ground nuts	..	..	..	40,000 "	—	580	0
Gums	..	..	..	857 "	—	112	06
Hartall	..	..	..	489 "	—	15	0
Hemp	..	..	..	3,093 "	—	163	0
Hides	..	..	..	24,421 "	—	1,695	15
Horns	..	..	..	4,053 "	—	106	80
Ink (Chinese)	..	..	..	166 "	—	75	0
" stones	..	..	..	37 pieces	—	19	0
Lacquered ware	..	..	..	618 lbs.	—	23	17
Lead (white)	..	..	..	4,481 "	—	338	41
Leather	..	..	..	11,333 "	—	1,180	50
Lily flowers (dried)	..	..	..	19,118 "	—	1,720	68
Liquorice	..	..	..	13,532 "	—	710	43
Mangrove bark	..	..	..	1,156,628 "	—	13,071	69
Matches	..	..	..	2,496 boxes	—	49	92
Mats (tea)	..	..	..	268,000 "	—	11,225	0
" (sleeping)	..	..	..	2,056 "	—	616	80
Medicines	..	..	..	176,004 lbs.	—	10,856	06
Mirrors	..	..	..	645 "	—	12	90
Nankeens	..	..	..	292 lbs.	—	89	60
Nutmegs	..	..	..	436 "	—	65	40
Oil	..	..	..	36 tubs	—	300	0
Oil cake	..	..	..	3,039,074 lbs.	—	34,027	72
" (vegetable)	..	..	..	190,656 "	—	12,846	78
" (rose)	..	..	..	266 "	—	400	0
Opium	..	..	..	343,237 "	—	1,670,566	0
Ornaments	..	..	..	384 "	—	1,126	75
Paint	..	..	..	905 kegs	—	1,845	0
Paper	..	..	..	15,457 lbs.	—	}	2,034 68
"	..	..	..	40 packages	—		
Pearls (false)	..	..	..	4 lbs.	—	3	0
Pease	..	..	..	3,204,352 "	—	53,717	28
Pepper	..	..	..	28,408 "	—	1,720	68
Pipes (Chinese)	..	..	..	60 "	—	30	0
Potash	..	..	..	1,300 lbs.	—	97	0
Potatoes (sweet)	..	..	..	751,333 "	—	5,635	0
Pouches	..	..	..	409 "	—	65	0
Prawns (dried)	..	..	..	211,378 lbs.	—	14,171	15
Rattans	..	..	..	95,077 "	—	}	2,955 15
"	..	..	..	7 bundles	—		
Rhubarb	..	..	..	3,137 lbs.	—	460	0
Rice	..	..	..	8,306,288 "	—	142,724	70
Ropes	..	..	..	81 coils	—	1,015	0
Rose mallows	..	..	..	258 lbs.	—	77	60
Rouge	..	..	..	57 "	—	16	0
Rugs (Chinese)	..	..	..	9 "	—	14	0
Samshoo	..	..	..	6,237 lbs.	—	467	80
Saltpetre	..	..	..	43,177 "	—	406	30
Seeds	..	..	..	1,600 "	—	110	40
Shark's-fins	..	..	..	565 "	—	84	0
Shoes	..	..	..	2,457 pairs	—	868	75
Silk (raw)	..	..	..	762 lbs.	—	3,432	0
" piece goods	..	..	..	4,072 "	—	}	32,958 0
"	..	..	..	6 packages	—		
Sinews	..	..	..	5,156 lbs.	—	424	40
						M	

Articles.	Quantities.	Whence Imported.	Value.	
			Dollars	c.
Skins	83	—	164	0
Spectacles	36 pairs	—	26	0
Snuff	16 lbs.	—	4	0
Sticklac	2,812 "	—	127	0
Stock fish	4,533 "	—	408	0
Stones	1,000	—	80	0
Stores, furniture, &c.	..	—	7,700	0
Straw braid	1,934 "	—	160	0
Sulphur	112,744 "	—	2,537	0
Sweetmeats	466 "	—	42	0
Tamarinds	1,457 "	—	22	0
Tar	10 barrels	—	120	0
Tea	8,814 lbs.	—	753	0
Timber	6,153 pieces	—	1,638	20
Tobacco	48,261 lbs.	—	5,065	30
Tortoiseshell-ware	2 lbs.	—	24	0
Towels	185 "	—	65	60
"	3 packages	—	1,039	0
Twine	50 "	—	188	80
Varnish	3,146 lbs.	—	22,500	0
Vegetables (dried)	66,666 "	—	5,931	0
Vermicelli	98,484 "	—	431	40
Wax (white)	1,205 "	—	7,420	40
Wheat, oats, &c.	408,213 "	—	3,288	0
Wines	275 cases	—	5	80
Wood (fragrant)	26 lbs.	—	288	60
" (garoo)	641	—	822	50
" (laka)	11,933	—	41,517	75
" (sandal)	851,641	—	678	0
" (sapan)	452	—	207	85
" ware	1,812	—		
Total	..	..	3,591,921	70

At 4s. 7d. per dollar, being the average rate of exchange for 1862 = £660,290 6s. 11½d.

(Signed) W. H. PEDDER, Consul.

British Consulate, Amoy, December 31, 1862.

(No. 6.)—STATEMENT of the Aggregate Amount of Tonnage Dues and Import and Export Duties paid by British Vessels in the Port of Amoy, from the 1st January to the 31st December, 1862.

No.	Ship's Name.	Tonnage.	Amount of Duties collected.	No.	Ship's Name.	Tonnage.	Amount of Duties collected.
1861			T. M. C. C.	1861			T. M. C. C.
184	Waterwitch .. .	279	111 6 0 0	17	Aden .. .	507	—
226	Regina .. .	171	—	18	Douglas .. .	291	215 4 8 6
336	Ocean Gem .. .	324	1,240 6 0 0	19	Vindex .. .	179	—
239	Saint Jean .. .	354	129 1 1 9	20	Louisa .. .	272	91 8 1 0
240	John Brightman .. .	373	—	21	Aden .. .	507	—
242	Flag of Truce .. .	417	1,628 5 2 2	22	Ly-ee-moon .. .	369	—
243	Kim Rock-hein .. .	262	111 4 4 4	23	Carthage .. .	500	363 0 3 0
				24	Croukbane .. .	134	—
1	Swatow .. .	145	179 5 4 4	25	Aim .. .	194	77 6 0 0
2	Carthage .. .	500	396 7 7 8	26	Cadiz .. .	481	—
3	Chilo .. .	398	—	27	Swatow .. .	145	—
4	Collingwood .. .	270	—	28	Azof .. .	476	—
5	Croukbane .. .	134	—	29	Swatow .. .	445	—
6	Ellen Masters .. .	498	—	30	Azof .. .	476	—
7	Swatow .. .	145	—	31	Amelion .. .	192	108 2 0 0
8	Gem .. .	252	216 7 0 6	32	Croukbane .. .	134	39 8 0 0
9	Pearl .. .	97	—	33	Azof .. .	476	22 2 6 6
10	Ann .. .	436	494 8 9 0	34	Vindex .. .	179	—
11	Azof .. .	476	—	35	Swatow .. .	145	202 7 9 0
12	Mona .. .	314	329 0 0 0	36	Azof .. .	476	—
13	Malacca .. .	565	—	37	Swatow .. .	145	—
14	Swatow .. .	145	—	38	Azof .. .	476	—
15	Azof .. .	476	—	39	Douglas .. .	291	—
16	Swatow .. .	145	—	40	Croukbane .. .	134	45 6 0 0

No.	Ship's Name.	Tonnage.	Amount of Duties collected.	No.	Ship's Name.	Tonnage.	Amount of Duties collected.
1861			T. M. C. C.	1861			T. M. C. C.
41	Whampoa . . .	376	27 3 6 0	116	Formosa . . .	450	—
42	Swatow . . .	145	—	117	Undine . . .	386	837 6 1 8
43	Glendower . . .	317	159 2 3 0	118	Formosa . . .	450	535 6 4 1
44	Azof . . .	476	—	119	Undine . . .	386	399 0 9 3
45	Vindex . . .	179	—	120	Peking . . .	759	782 6 7 1
46	Swatow . . .	145	—	121	Fei-séen . . .	255	—
47	Cambalu . . .	499	—	122	Amaranth . . .	688	—
48	Ellen Masters . . .	498	518 6 5 7	123	Weymouth . . .	829	—
49	Aden . . .	507	2,040 3 0 1	124	Migrator . . .	354	—
50	Lady Eliza Bruce . . .	920	580 3 7 5	125	Eliza Mary . . .	126	132 6 0 0
51	Wild Wave . . .	159	289 1 0 0	126	Carthage . . .	500	1,627 2 2 5
52	Aden . . .	507	127 4 5 5	127	Formosa . . .	450	6,844 7 4 6
53	Swatow . . .	145	1,040 7 8 3	128	Peking . . .	759	377 4 4 6
54	Banshee . . .	407	3 6 0 0	129	Aden . . .	507	1,620 1 7 3
55	Croukbane . . .	134	62 6 1 7	130	Melrose . . .	286	207 9 6 9
56	Carthage . . .	500	3,857 5 9 0	131	Undine . . .	386	994 4 6 8
57	Azof . . .	476	1,978 7 2 6	132	Formosa . . .	450	180 0 0 0
58	Swatow . . .	145	180 9 6 8	133	Glen-clune . . .	471	10,822 3 3 8
59	Vindex . . .	179	840 0 0 0	134	Carthage . . .	500	991 6 1 8
60	Min . . .	628	175 2 0 0	135	Aden . . .	507	—
61	Flag of Truce . . .	417	235 3 3 0	136	Undine . . .	386	360 7 0 0
62	Fei-séen . . .	255	1,139 4 1 1	137	Amelion . . .	192	58 1 4 1
63	Swatow . . .	145	82 7 6 6	138	Formosa . . .	450	491 8 9 6
64	Formosa . . .	450	1,334 1 4 4	139	Aden . . .	507	532 8 0 0
65	Naomi . . .	709	157 8 5 0	140	Undine . . .	586	301 7 9 3
66	Formosa . . .	450	580 0 2 9	141	St. Jean . . .	354	883 3 1 1
67	Swatow . . .	145	82 7 6 6	142	Rona . . .	784	3,149 7 9 3
68	Azof . . .	476	1,378 5 8 8	143	Undine . . .	386	624 4 5 3
69	Croukbane . . .	134	76 2 2 0	144	Formosa . . .	450	112 3 3 0
70	Swatow . . .	145	1,207 5 2 7	145	Eagle . . .	110	—
71	Collingwood . . .	270	6,775 6 7 9	146	Vindex . . .	179	—
72	Azof . . .	476	31 7 4 0	147	Tien-tsin . . .	196	624 7 9 8
73	Rosetta . . .	283	331 0 6 5	148	Emperor . . .	106	46 6 0 0
74	Wild Wave . . .	159	3,632 0 0 0	149	Aden . . .	507	8 2 4 4
75	Formosa . . .	450	65 0 0 0	150	Undine . . .	386	1,950 4 5 1
76	Shah Jehan . . .	443	96 6 7 8	151	Formosa . . .	450	818 5 8 6
77	Ellen Rodger . . .	584	—	152	Aden . . .	507	300 7 4 7
78	Vindex . . .	179	1,023 0 0 0	153	Fei-loong . . .	260	659 7 7 4
79	Formosa . . .	450	5 2 2 0	154	Argus . . .	161	64 4 0 0
80	Azof . . .	476	2,327 5 3 4	155	Undine . . .	386	523 8 3 1
81	Croukbane . . .	134	17 4 5 0	156	Victoria . . .	94	—
82	Affiance . . .	401	2,487 8 2 0	157	Aden . . .	507	26 8 8 0
83	Amelion . . .	192	157 5 5 2	158	M. Howes . . .	446	54 3 4 6
84	Lady Elgin . . .	750	812 8 3 1	159	Ellen Masters . . .	498	1,074 3 8 0
85	Formosa . . .	450	3,865 2 2 7	160	Polka . . .	157	512 4 5 1
86	Welcome . . .	382	998 0 3 2	161	Royal Saxon . . .	510	—
87	Fiery Cross . . .	449	2,182 4 8 0	162	Rona . . .	784	22 6 1 4
88	Azof . . .	476	52 3 8 2	163	Shanghai . . .	412	16 1 2 8
89	Antelope . . .	200	—	164	Undine . . .	386	2,489 4 3 5
90	Undine . . .	386	3,484 9 0 5	165	Cobang . . .	358	671 7 5 6
91	Zoe . . .	295	472 7 5 4	166	Fei-loong . . .	260	222 3 2 4
92	Geelong . . .	392	300 1 5 3	167	Aden . . .	507	1,430 4 7 0
93	Kim Yuen-tsin . . .	437	649 4 0 2	168	Rona . . .	784	2,259 5 3 0
94	Azof . . .	476	685 0 0 3	169	Mexicana . . .	276	131 5 6 0
95	Solomon Family . . .	700	886 9 6 0	170	Eagle . . .	110	12 1 2 8
96	Arratoon Apar . . .	938	2,393 3 7 7	171	Undine . . .	386	1,056 9 3 0
97	Ocean Gem . . .	324	1,242 0 6 8	172	Melrose . . .	286	205 8 8 9
98	Blue Jay . . .	403	980 5 5 4	173	Welcome . . .	387	198 1 1 3
99	Tory . . .	451	579 1 6 1	174	Aden . . .	507	505 3 9 5
100	M. Howes . . .	446	868 5 7 5	175	Fei-loong . . .	260	36 7 5 3
101	Douglas . . .	291	332 7 4 5	176	Salamander . . .	106	—
102	Azof . . .	476	25 6 2 0	177	Douglas . . .	291	92 5 8 9
103	Prince Regent . . .	582	1,558 0 2 8	178	Undine . . .	386	13,349 8 5 7
104	Ann . . .	436	1,621 7 9 9	179	Union . . .	210	1,310 5 1 5
105	Undine . . .	386	2,871 8 3 2	180	Ann . . .	436	411 9 7 2
106	Bessie Searight . . .	130	—	181	Zoe . . .	295	340 9 2 3
107	Ellen Masters . . .	498	869 8 2 9	182	Aden . . .	507	377 9 1 5
108	Adventure . . .	290	932 6 7 6	183	Fei-loong . . .	260	777 7 2 1
109	Homer . . .	595	1,261 2 2 0	184	Undine . . .	386	6 4 3 0
110	Peking . . .	759	1,112 1 6 3	185	Tory . . .	451	562 4 9 3
111	Undine . . .	386	167 0 6 1	186	Union . . .	210	—
112	Peking . . .	759	16 2 1 0	187	Carthage . . .	500	2,411 5 5 8
113	Ly-ee-moon . . .	369	—	188	Aden . . .	507	30 6 7 5
114	Azof . . .	476	1,558 6 2 9	189	London . . .	405	1,028 3 0 6
115	Undine . . .	386	3,531 2 5 1	190	Croukbane . . .	134	—

No.	Ship's Name.	Tonnage.	Amount of Duties collected.	No.	Ship's Name.	Tonnage.	Amount of Duties collected.
1861			T. M. C. C.	1861			T. M. C. C.
191	Undine . . .	386	2,053 5 0 1	209	Fei-loong . . .	260	80 2 3 4
192	Aden . . .	507	2,601 6 1 4	210	Union . . .	210	681 0 5 1
193	Eagle . . .	110	—	211	Undine . . .	386	442 6 6 0
194	Undine . . .	386	116 6 5 0	212	Rosemeath . . .	256	689 4 0 8
195	Solomon Family . . .	760	559 5 2 0	213	Eagle . . .	110	11 0 0 0
196	Union . . .	210	2,309 5 6 3	214	Union . . .	210	1,379 6 6 5
197	Aden . . .	507	1 9 8 0	215	Undine . . .	386	442 6 6 0
198	Fei-loong . . .	260	—	216	Viola . . .	684	2,394 4 5 2
199	Malacca . . .	565	345 5 3 4	217	Adventure . . .	290	—
200	Undine . . .	386	3,755 6 5 4	218	Croukbane . . .	134	161 8 6 4
201	Carthage . . .	500	733 3 4 3	219	Shanghai . . .	412	417 2 3 6
202	Aden . . .	507	720 0 9 6	220	Burman . . .	319	547 7 7 8
203	John Brightman . . .	373	63 8 9 9	221	Volunteer . . .	143	—
204	Fei-loong . . .	260	748 4 9 2	222	Undine . . .	386	1,491 0 3 5
205	Union . . .	210	25 4 8 1	223	Welcome . . .	387	683 6 2 5
206	M. Howes . . .	446	500 4 0 1				
207	Undine . . .	386	504 5 6 0				
208	Aden . . .	507	—			Total	172,252 3 0 5

Amoy, December 31, 1862.

(Signed)

W. H. PEDDER, *Consul.*

No. 9.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received December 14.)

My Lord,

Peking, September 18, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a report of Mr. Acting Vice-Consul Braune on the trade of Formosa.

The Chinese authorities depend mainly on the funds that can be collected on camphor, to meet the expenses of the Government, and no orders for the abolition of the monopoly will be attended to unless it can be shown that duties on open trade will be as profitable as the sale of the monopoly. To effect this a proper Custom-house system must be established.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 9.

Acting Consul Braune to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Formosa, February 7, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to inclose in duplicate the Returns of Trade for the last year. The British Returns are made up from the Manifests in the office, commencing with the beginning of the year. The Foreign Returns are supplied to me by the Custom-house, and date from the 18th July, on which day it opened. The sulphur and cash returned amongst the British exports were exported before the opening of the Customs.

Your Excellency will see that a considerable trade might be done here, but unfortunately the greater part of it is in the hands of the Chinese, but two or three of the twenty-seven foreign ships having been consigned to a foreign firm, or loaded on other than Chinese account.

This state of affairs will, I doubt not, be remedied shortly. Messrs. Forster and Co. have established a business here. Messrs. Dent and Co. have sent up a gentleman to inquire into the prospects of the place, which will, I understand, lead to the appointment of an Englishman as agent: the steamer "Union," lately purchased by them, is to run regularly between this port and the Chinese coast and Hong Kong. Land is being sought after (though there appear to be prejudices against the sale of it, which, in an insubordinate place like this, will doubtless give trouble), and, generally speaking, the port seems likely to prosper. A large amount of ready money is, however, necessary to carry on business. The Chinese traders do not give credit; in fact, generally a large

advance on the transaction is required; and thus the agents of wealthy firms who have a large command of money will, for some time at least, have the advantage over other traders. This may be the reason why so few persons have as yet tried the port.

The camphor monopoly is a considerable bar to individual enterprise, and I really trust your Excellency will be able to do something to remove or modify it, as far as Tamsuy is concerned. I hear (though I know not how far truly) that ——— has bought the monopoly for one year from the Taoutae at Tai-wan-foo, and is shortly coming here, bringing with him a man deputed by the Taoutae to carry on the camphor business. Since the death of Kung, Taoutae, and in consequence of the disturbed state of the island, rendering communication between the north and south difficult, and frequently impossible, the system has not been enforced with any rigour. The business was carried on by the person to whom it had last been entrusted, and though the price at the Government depôt was higher than that of private camphor, no difficulty was experienced by any one who wished to buy. Should, however, the arrangement above be true as reported, and duly carried into force, it will prevent other persons from purchasing camphor at all, unless they purchase illicit camphor, which is liable to seizure by the Taoutae's deputy. I may not myself recognize a contract entered into at an unopened port, with the object of securing to one man a trade in which others have an equal right to share: but if ——— can induce the camphor man to carry out the system strictly, for his benefit, he will have absolute command of the camphor produced near this port, and other merchants will be compelled to procure it on the coast at the risk of seizure by the Taoutae as illicit, as well as by the Custom-house, as bought at unopened ports; or, to buy it in Tamsuy from wealthy settlers in the interior, of influence and power enough to be able to defy the authorities; thus leading to the most unsatisfactory quarrels and private wars.

To prove that this is not an exaggerated view, I must report to your Excellency that there is at this moment within a few miles of this place a private war being carried between the head of the camphor depôt and a large landowner from whom a foreign merchant had purchased some private camphor. This quarrel hinges on the manufacture and sale of this private camphor. There are about 2,000 men engaged on each side, and though the loss of life is small, the influence of such quarrels on the people is demoralizing, and leads to the anarchy and dislocation of the usual relations between the people and their rulers which at present prevail.

The export of rice is subject to temporary stoppages, which can only be relieved by opening fresh channels for trade. Rebellion, private wars, and dearth, all cause stoppages of the export, and latterly the large amount taken away by foreign ships, without considering the other two causes, would be sufficient to account for the present difficulty in buying rice. This power of stopping the export is not exercised by the Government officials, but by the heads of the several districts and villages, and they are most strict in enforcing their orders. Messrs. Dent and Co.'s agent lately witnessed an engagement between a large junk which had been loading rice and a fleet of sampans commanded by the heads of the district where the rice had been procured. It occurred at Banca, a large trading town some ten miles up the river, and ended in the defeat of the sampans with some loss, after an action in which fire-arms and stink-pots were freely used. Generally, however, the prohibited rice is seized while being carried in small boats to the place of shipment; but in no cases do the authorities interfere.

As regards foreigners, no greater inconvenience is experienced than a refusal to sell on the part of those who hold the rice; and even could a merchant find a seller in a district the export from which had been stopped, the price of the rice would be much increased, the English merchant paying for the rice when brought alongside his ship, and the seller having to stand the risk of seizure of his rice by the heads of the district during its transit to the vessel.

As these temporary pressures do not occur at all places at the same time, the obvious cure is to open as many outlets as possible, and I must again draw your Excellency's attention to the harbour of Kelung. Kelung is supplied with rice from the Ka-wa-lang country, on the east side of the island, and trade there may be flourishing and prices low, whilst ten or fifteen foreign ships have exhausted the supplies of Tamsuy, and caused a temporary stoppage. Again, both Kelung and Tamsuy might be closed as regards rice, while a large business could be done at Takow or Tai-wan-foo. Kelung might be opened as an anchorage dependent on this port, making the duties payable here, should the Chinese Government not wish to establish a separate Custom-house.

With regard to Takow, the case would be different, and it would require a staff for itself; but the opening of it would be a decided help to the development of the resources

of the island. Large quantities of sugar, rice, and indigo are procured there, and the port is too far distant from Tamsuy to allow of these products being brought up over-land should the Custom-house prevent vessels from trading there. No steps have yet been taken, I believe, to put down this trade; but it cannot be expected that the foreign Customs will overlook it when they shall have means at command to prevent it. I understand, privately, that the opening of Takow and Kelung, with one or two other ports on the China coast, is to be recommended to the Imperial Government; and with regard to Takow, I consider this plan a judicious one, for if it is not opened officially it must soon be closed by the effects of the present Customs system if strictly carried out; and I do not think it advisable that the only outlet for produce in the southern part of the island should be closed. Kelung, as I have already said, might be included in Tamsuy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GEORGE BRAUNE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 9.

RETURNS of Foreign Trade at the Port of Formosa during the year ended December 31,
1862.

[See Inclosure 2 in No. 5.]

Commercial Reports from Her Majesty's Consuls
in China, for the year 1862.

*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Com-
mand of Her Majesty. 1864.*

LONDON:

PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS

CHINA. No. 5. (1864.)

MEMORIALS, &c.,

ON THE SUBJECT OF

OPENING UP A DIRECT COMMERCE

WITH THE

WEST OF CHINA

FROM THE

PORT OF RANGOON.

Presented^d to the House of Lords by Command of Her Majesty.
1864.

LONDON:

PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.

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Memorials, &c., on the Subject of Opening up a Direct Commerce with the West of China from the Port of Rangoon.

No. 1.

The President of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce to Viscount Palmerston.

My Lord,

Manchester Chamber of Commerce, July 12, 1860.

THE Directors of the Chamber of Commerce of Manchester desire to represent to your Lordship that they have had under their consideration for some time past the question of our relations with the Chinese, with reference mainly to the arrangements which it will be eventually advisable to make for the security of commerce and the orderly and peaceable conduct of affairs, without which trade cannot be expected to flourish, but that the Chamber has abstained from expressing the views it entertains, until the expeditions of Lord Elgin and Baron Gros have been brought to a conclusion, when the proper course to be pursued by our Consuls and Representatives in China can be deliberated upon free from the difficulties by which the question is at present surrounded.

This Chamber trusts, however, that a settlement may shortly be arrived at by the Representatives of Great Britain and France, and that our intercourse with China may at length be placed on a satisfactory basis.

This Chamber has had pressed upon its notice that the negotiations of our Commissioners may be made available to provide for the opening up of the commerce of the western portion of the Chinese Empire by means of communication from the British possessions in Pegu. This Chamber has no occasion to occupy your Lordship's time in dwelling on the increasing trade between this country and the port of Rangoon, or on the friendly relations which are understood to exist with the King of Burmah, whose dominions intervene between Pegu and the south-western Chinese frontier. This Chamber understands that a considerable traffic already exists between the Chinese who make use of the city of Esmok as the emporium of the trade of this western district of China and the Burmese merchants, and that were facilities given for the construction of roads, or other communications from Pegu to Esmok, such a measure would confer the greatest benefits upon the interests of commerce. The Directors of the Chamber of Commerce have therefore to urge that a communication be made by Her Majesty's Government to Lord Elgin, calling his Lordship's immediate attention to the expediency of the western half of the Chinese Empire being opened to our commerce overland by arranging that the city of Esmok shall be made an open inland mart, under such regulations and provisions as may be in the circumstances advisable. They have also respectfully to suggest that an Envoy be instructed to proceed to His Majesty the King of Burmah to announce that Her Majesty the Queen has assumed the direct government of her territories in India, and to express Her Majesty's desire for the maintenance of friendship and amity with the King of Burmah, so that the subjects of each Power, living as they do in contiguity and free intercourse, being protected and encouraged in the pursuit of commerce, may develop the resources of the countries in which they dwell, as also of the new and important portion of the Chinese Empire, which it is hoped may thus be opened to our commerce.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDMUND POTTER.

• No. 2.

The Secretary to the Manchester Chamber of Commerce to Lord J. Russell.—(Received July 13.)

My Lord,

Manchester Chamber of Commerce, July 12, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to transmit for your Lordship's perusal copy of a letter this day addressed by the President of this Chamber to Lord Palmerston on the subject of our relations with China.*

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH FLEMING.

No. 3.

Mr. Baring to Mr. Fleming.

Sir,

India Office, August 3, 1860.

I AM directed by Sir Charles Wood to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 12th ultimo, inclosing copy of a communication addressed by the President of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce to Lord Palmerston,* on the subject of our commercial relations with China, and to thank you for the same.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T. G. BARING.

No. 4.

The President of the Huddersfield Chamber of Commerce to Viscount Palmerston.

My Lord,

Chamber of Commerce, Huddersfield, August 7, 1860.

I AM desired by the Council of this Chamber to request your Lordship's attention to the important advantages to be derived by increased facilities for commercial intercourse with the western portion of China, overland from Pegu, and I beg most respectfully to submit, for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, through your Lordship, the subjoined brief statement on the subject.

The Council wish me, in the first place, most respectfully to suggest to your Lordship that the present time is most opportune for the consideration by Her Majesty's Government of the means by which peace with China, when restored, may be most effectually preserved, and further complications from quarrels between the Chinese authorities or people and Her Majesty's subjects prevented, and that with this view it may be desirable to consider whether Her Majesty's Envoy may not advantageously forego any additional trading facilities on the sea-board which might be stipulated for in a fresh Treaty, upon having commercial privileges conceded in other parts of China which can be reached from Her Majesty's Indian Empire. The Council do not wish me to trouble your Lordship with any lengthened observations on this point, but they think it is very probable that the objections and jealousy entertained by the Chinese to intercourse with Europeans on the East Coast (which will probably be found to increase as the capital is approached) may not exist, or at all events not in the same degree, with reference to a proposal for the establishment of an inland free mart on the western frontier, and the Council therefore consider the accomplishment of such an object very probable and deserving of every attention.

The establishment of such a communication as I have mentioned would, it is submitted, be productive of the greatest advantage to the commercial and general interests of this country in a variety of ways, with a detail of which it is unnecessary for me to trouble your Lordship.

I wish, however, to mention to your Lordship that in addition to the direct advantages to be derived from such a Treaty with the Chinese, the Council are of opinion that a considerable impetus would be given to the trade between English merchants and Her Majesty's subjects in British Pegu if roads or railways were formed from the port of Rangoon, through Her Majesty's territory in the direction of the south-western portion of China, and I am directed to mention specially, in connection with the staple trade of this district, that such increased facilities of transit would probably lead to an important and valuable

addition to the supply of wool produced from the hilly districts in the north-eastern part of Pegu.

I beg, therefore, most respectfully to urge upon the attention of Her Majesty's Government, through your Lordship—

That it is desirable to provide, by any new Treaty with the Chinese Government, that the city of Esmok should become an open mart, that a British Consul should be stationed there, and that British merchants and merchandize should be allowed to enter China by that city;

That it is also desirable to enter into such arrangements with the King of Burmah, and to make such preparations by way of surveys and otherwise as will expedite and facilitate the making of a commercial road or railway from the port of Rangoon, through British Pegu and Burmah, to Esmok.

I trust that these objects may be found worthy of the attention of Her Majesty's Government and that they will determine to forward instructions with a view to the accomplishment of them to Lord Elgin and Her Majesty's Viceroy of India.

I have, &c.

(Signed) THOS. MALLINSON.

No. 5.

Memorial of the Leeds Chamber of Commerce.

To the Right Honourable the Lord Viscount Palmerston, M.P., G.C.B., First Lord of Her Majesty's Treasury,

The Memorial of the Leeds Chamber of Commerce, through their President,

Sheweth,

THAT the attention of your memorialists has been drawn to the practicability of securing an extensive mart for goods, the manufactures of the United Kingdom, in the direction of the western inland provinces of China.

That, being fully sensible of the desire of Her Majesty's Government to employ all possible and just means to promote the extension of British commerce, they have every confidence, in bringing the following suggestions under your Lordship's notice, that they will receive the consideration which your memorialists feel they deserve.

Your memorialists learn* that the extensive Yunnan and six other western inland provinces of China, covering a territorial space of 650,000 square miles, with a population of 126,000,000 souls, having districts where the finest of all Chinese teas are produced, as well as many commercial articles of the first importance to our manufacturers and merchants, present an interesting and extensive field for British commercial enterprise both as regards the products of those provinces and for trade in British manufactures.

Hoping for a favourable and speedy termination of the present rupture with China, they would respectfully urge that in the negotiations that would necessarily follow the British Government should stipulate that British merchants shall have properly defined and full privileges accorded by the Emperor of China, to be faithfully observed by all Chinese authorities, to trade in the interior of their country as well as at their outports, and more especially that a traffic may be allowed to be carried on by British merchants with the provinces referred to overland from Her Majesty's port of Rangoon, in the Bay of Bengal.

In order to reach the Chinese frontier from that direction, the route which your memorialists (from what they have been able to ascertain) regard as the most favourable would be along the plains of Eastern Pegu to our extreme north-eastern frontier on or near the banks of the Salween river, at which point they believe it would be highly advantageous to form a permanent trading settlement or commercial emporium, which would be about midway between the port of Rangoon and the city of Esmok, on the frontier of the Chinese Yunnan province, and accessible to numerous caravans and traders from various tribes, as well from the Burmese States as the provinces already referred to.

For this purpose, seeing that a portion of the Kingdom of Burmah would have to be traversed, your memorialists beg to submit to the consideration of Her Majesty's Government the expediency of sending a Civil Envoy to His Majesty the King of Burmah to announce to him the fact of Her Britannic Majesty having now assumed direct rule over the Asiatic portion of her empire, and to offer to His Majesty her royal friendship.

* Forbes' "China," 1858.

expressing the hope that the people of Burmah and those of the United Kingdom and British Possessions may enjoy permanent peace with each other, and be privileged to traffic to mutual advantage, as also with the Chinese under the protection of the two Crowns.

Your memorialists would further suggest that in any new Treaty with China and arrangement with the King of Burmah provision may be duly made for the extension of telegraphic communication over the route thus suggested to be continued forward from Esmok to Canton, and from the latter city onward to all the Consular open ports.

Your memorialists therefore pray your Lordship to submit the above allegations and suggestions to Her Majesty's Government, and trust that after due consideration the Government will be led to see the wisdom of using every effort to secure for British merchants and manufacturers what your memorialists believe to be a very important route and outlet for trade in the direction of Western China.

And your memorialists will ever pray.

Signed on behalf of the Council and Members of the Leeds
Chamber of Commerce,

(Signed) DARNTON LUPTON, *President*.

No. 6.

Memorial of the Bradford Chamber of Commerce.

To the Right Honourable Henry John Viscount Palmerston, K.G., &c.

The Memorial of the Bradford and Halifax Chamber of Commerce,
Sheweth,

THAT your Memorialists represent the Worsteds District containing an industrial population of about half a million.

That your Memorialists are therefore at all times most anxious to promote the extension of the trade and commerce of the country generally and of this district in particular.

That they believe a wide field for an extended commerce exists in the western provinces of China.

That if those provinces were opened a large extent of our manufactured goods would be exported to them, while we should receive from them an almost inexhaustible supply of raw materials with which those provinces abound, and which are suitable for our manufactures.

That your Memorialists have had an opportunity of reading Memorials on the subject forwarded to your Lordship by Chambers of Commerce of the North of England and they desire to express their hearty concurrence in the sentiments contained therein.

That your Memorialists believe that it is at the present time most desirable that negotiations should be entered into with the King of Burmah, for a route from British North-Eastern Pegu across the south-east angle of his kingdom to Esmok, on the south-west frontier of China, in continuation of a route from our port of Rangoon in the Bay of Bengal across Eastern Pegu.

That your Memorialists believe there will be no difficulty in negotiating for this with the King of Burmah, if an Ambassador be sent to him direct from Her Majesty the Queen.

Your Memorialists therefore pray that Her Majesty's Government will be pleased to adopt early and energetic measures so as to secure to this country a trade with the inland western half of the vast Empire of China.

(Signed) HENRY W. RIPLEY, *President*.

(Signed) JOHN DARLINGTON, *Secretary*.

No. 7.

The President of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce to Viscount Palmerston.

My Lord,

Chamber of Commerce, Liverpool, August 23, 1860.

I HAVE been requested by the Council of this Chamber to bring under your Lordship's notice the proposal for opening commercial intercourse with Western China, by way of Rangoon, through Pegu and Burmah.

As the question has already been laid before you in detail, and the advantages which would accrue to commerce and shipping pointed out, the Council purposely abstain from entering fully into the subject. They, however, wish me to assure you that they have investigated and given every consideration to it, and, as far as they are able to form an opinion, they conceive that such a proposal is deserving of the best attention of Her Majesty's Government, as well in a political as a commercial sense.

The Council do not presume to point out any means by which that proposal might be carried out; but they take the liberty of suggesting whether, since the Government of British India is now under the direct control of the Crown, it might not be desirable that Her Majesty should be represented by a suitable Envoy at the Court of Burmah, for the promotion of British interests in general in that country, as well as to secure the co-operation of the Burmese in the proposal here alluded to, and also that by the construction of good roads from Rangoon through Pegu and Burmah to the Chinese frontier, and the introduction (in any new Treaty with China) of stipulations for opening the frontier city of Esmok for commercial purposes, on similar terms to the open ports on the seaboard, this important object might be attained; and they trust that Her Majesty's Government will be pleased to take such steps in the matter as may be deemed most desirable.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WM. JNO. TOMLINSON.

No. 8.

*Mr. Hammond to Mr. Lupton.**

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 27, 1860.

I AM directed by Lord John Russell to inform you that Viscount Palmerston has referred to his Lordship the Memorial signed by you on behalf of the Leeds Chamber of Commerce, urging that in any negotiations which may follow a pacification of affairs with China, stipulations should be included for opening up the Western Provinces of that Empire to British trade, by an overland route from the port of Rangoon; and I am to state to you that the project advocated in your Memorial does not appear to Lord John Russell to be feasible, at least for the present.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 9.

Memorial of the Leeds Chamber of Commerce.

To the Right Honourable Lord John Russell, M.P., Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Foreign Department.

The Memorial of the Council of the Leeds Chamber of Commerce, through their President,

Sheweth,

THAT your memorialists beg respectfully to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's reply to their Memorial to Viscount Palmerston on the subject of opening up the Western Provinces of China to British trade by an overland route from the port of Rangoon, which project they learn is not feasible at present.

At the same time they desire to express to your Lordship the great importance they attach to any arrangement or stipulation that may be hereafter entered into or made by Her Majesty's Government whereby the populous commercial city of Esmok, on the

* Similar letters, *mutatis mutandis*, were addressed to Mr. Ripley and Mr. Tomlinson, Presidents of the Bradford and Liverpool Chambers of Commerce.

extreme western frontier of China, in the Province of Yunnan, adjoining the Kingdom of Burmah, may be included in the number of free towns and ports of the Chinese Empire, from which city of Esmok British trade has hitherto been debarred.

Your memorialists are credibly informed that the Province of Yunnan is fertile and thickly peopled, being covered with populous cities and towns, connected together in all directions by high roads, navigable rivers, lakes, and canals, besides being bounded on the north by another province, the largest and most populous in the Chinese Empire, the province of Sze-chuen, and that the Yunnan province yields in itself large quantities of various rich commercial products suited to the English market, including the finest description of teas produced in China.

They therefore further desire respectfully to impress upon your Lordship and the Government the prospect of great and manifold advantages which must eventually result to British industry and enterprise were a fair opportunity afforded in the direction pointed out, and your memorialists pray,—

That in any negotiations that may take place on the termination of the present rupture with China the said city of Esmok in Western China may be thenceforth constituted open and free to British trade.

And your memorialists will ever pray.

Signed on behalf of the Council of the Leeds Chamber of Commerce,
(Signed) DARNTON LUPTON, *President*.

No. 10.

Mr. Hammond to Mr. Lupton.

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 22, 1860.

I AM directed by Lord John Russell to acknowledge the receipt of the Memorial of the Leeds Chamber of Commerce, praying "that in any negotiations that may take place on the termination of the present rupture with China, the city of Esmok in Western China may be thenceforth constituted open and free to British trade;" and I am to request that you will acquaint the Chamber that Lord John Russell is fully alive to the importance of facilitating as far as possible the extension of British trade with the Chinese Empire. It appears however to his Lordship, that much inconvenience might arise from introducing into any fresh negotiation with China, at the present time, so novel a question, as far as this country is concerned, as that of access to a city on the Western frontier of the Chinese Empire; and that even in the improbable case of the Chinese Government acquiescing in a proposal to that effect, the opening of Esmok to British trade would be more likely to have a prejudicial effect than otherwise on the relations between the two countries. For it would be impossible to afford adequate protection to British trade at so inland a city, or to exercise due control over British subjects; while redress for any wrong done in that remote quarter could, in all probability, only be obtained by applying pressure at places more accessible, and so placing in jeopardy the more important interests of British trade on the sea-board of China.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 11.

Memorial from the Salt Proprietors of Cheshire and Worcestershire.

Memorial from the Salt Proprietors of Cheshire and Worcestershire united under the Salt Chamber of Commerce.

Respectfully sheweth,

THAT your Memorialists have long been endeavouring to obtain a Mart for their manufactured salt in the vast regions and densely populated country known as the Empire of China.

That they have from time to time memorialized Her Majesty's Government, and called attention to the opportunity which may be afforded in pending commercial arrangements with the Chinese authorities, to include therein British salt, which is now an entirely prohibited article of import, and they have been assured that the attention of Her Majesty's Plenipotentiaries and Ambassadors now in China has been called to this object.

That upon the return of Lord Elgin from his late Mission, an interview was sought with his Lordship, as also with the Honourable Mr. Bruce previous to his departure for China, in order to point out to them the great advantage that would accrue both to the salt manufacturers of this country, and to the shipping interest, if they were allowed to import salt into China upon a similar principle to that which has been so successfully established at Calcutta.

That your Memorialists have reason to believe that the introduction of English salt into China would be regarded as a boon by the teeming population of that country, they being at present confined to the use of very inferior salt made from sea-water, and sent up the rivers into the interior provinces.

That the attention of your Memorialists has been drawn to the feasibility of approaching the Western Provinces of China by means of a new route from Rangoon through a portion of Burmah and the Shan States to the frontier Chinese city of Esmok, far removed from that portion of China to which we have access by Treaty, and coming at once into the heart of China with considerable saving in the sea voyage.

That your Memorialists are informed such route would be comparatively easy of accomplishment, the distance from Rangoon to the proposed emporium on the borders of British Pegu and Burmah being only 250 miles, and from thence on to Esmok, a further 250 miles, in round numbers a distance of 500 miles, presenting, as your Memorialists believe, few impediments to the construction of a railway or tramroad.

That your Memorialists are aware of various representations emanating from the commercial bodies of this country having been addressed to Her Majesty's Government on the aforesaid subject, and they believe that the advantages likely to accrue to the manufacturing and industrial interests, should the practicability of such proposed route to China be established, have not been at all overstated. The British settlement of Rangoon affords an excellent pivot of operations, and your Memorialists are strongly impressed with the success that may attend peaceful negotiations for the extension of British commerce, such as they believe could be established with the King of Burmah and other neighbouring States to the mutual benefit of both countries.

Your Memorialists have further occasion to believe that in the event of such negotiations being successfully carried into effect with the Emperor of Burmah, it would be followed by an extensive import of salt into that Empire, and in districts far removed from the possibility of obtaining salt, except by very circuitous and costly routes.

Your Memorialists would therefore pray that whilst every exertion should be used to obtain from the Chinese Government permission to import salt into China as an article of merchandize, the opportunity likely to be afforded by the proposed communication with China, through Rangoon, should not be lost sight of, and that inquiries should be instituted by Her Majesty's Government, in order to test the feasibility of a scheme which appears to open up so many advantages to British commerce.

(Signed)

W. WORTHINGTON,

Chairman of the Salt Chamber of Commerce.

No. 12.

Mr. Hammond to Mr. Worthington.

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 8, 1860.

I AM directed by Lord John Russell to acknowledge the receipt of the Memorial of the Salt Proprietors of Cheshire and Worcestershire, which has been forwarded to his Lordship by Viscount Palmerston, and I am to state to you that instructions have already been addressed to the Earl of Elgin and to Her Majesty's Minister in China relative to the importance of obtaining a removal of the prohibition on the importation of salt into China, but that Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to take any steps at the present time for opening commerce with that country through the territory of Burmah.

I am, &c.

(Signed)

E. HAMMOND.

No. 13.

The President of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce to Mr. Milner Gibson.

Sir,

Chamber of Commerce, Liverpool, September 5, 1862.

I HAVE been requested by the Council of this Chamber to state that they have had under serious consideration the question of opening up a trade with the western portion of the Chinese Empire; and to bring the matter before you, in the hope that Her Majesty's Government will deem it worthy of attention.

It has been strongly represented to this Council that, if moderate transit duties were established by Treaty with the King of Burmah, there is reason to believe private enterprise would improve the means of communication with that country and develop a considerable trade with it.

The Council take the liberty of suggesting that it may be desirable to ascertain the opinions of the Representatives of Her Majesty in India and British Burmah upon this subject, with the view (should those opinions be in accordance with the representations now made) of negotiating a Treaty with the King of Burmah.

I have, &c.

(Signed) THOMAS CHILTON, *President.*

[A letter in exactly the same terms was addressed to Sir C. Wood.]

No. 14.

Mr. Booth to Mr. Chilton.

*Office of Committee of Privy Council for Trade,
Whitehall, September 10, 1862.*

Sir,

I AM directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 5th instant, suggesting the adoption of measures for establishing commercial intercourse with Western China, and I am to state to you, for the information of the Council of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, that my Lords have referred the letter for the consideration of the Secretary of State for India.

I am, &c.

(Signed) JAMES BOOTH.

No. 15.

Mr. Merivale to Mr. Chilton.

Sir,

India Office, September 13, 1862.

IN reply to your letter of the 5th instant,* inviting, on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce of Liverpool, the attention of the Secretary of State for India to the question of opening up a trade with the Western portion of China, through the Burmese country, and "suggesting that it may be desirable to ascertain the opinions of the Representatives of Her Majesty in India and British Burmah, I am directed by Sir Charles Wood to inform you that he directed the notice of the Government of India to the subject in June 1861, and that he has recently received a despatch from that authority, stating that the Chief Commissioner of British Burmah has been "desired to keep his attention directed to the prospects of trade with Western China, and to avail himself of every favourable opportunity to obtain a knowledge of the several routes which have been suggested for tapping the commerce of China in that quarter."

I have, &c.

(Signed) HERMAN MERIVALE.

* See No. 13.

No. 16.

The Chairman of the Liverpool East India and China Association to Sir C. Wood.

Sir,

Liverpool, September 23, 1862.

THIS Association having recently had under consideration the importance of opening a trade through Burmah with the Western Provinces of China, I have been directed by the Committee to bring to the notice of Her Majesty's Government the favourable opportunity afforded by the proposed Mission of Colonel Phayre to Mandalie for obtaining further information on the subject, and for negotiating a Commercial Treaty with the Court of Ava, with a view to facilitate the transit of goods through the Burmese territories.

I have, &c.
(Signed) KIRKMAN FINLAY.

No. 17.

Mr. Melvill to Mr. Finlay.

Sir,

India Office, September 25, 1862.

IN reply to your letter of the 23rd instant relative to the question of opening up a trade through Burmah with the Western Provinces of China, I am directed by Sir Charles Wood to state, for the information of the East India and China Association, that he directed the notice of the Government of India to the subject in June 1861, and that he has recently received a despatch from that authority, stating that the Chief Commissioner of British Burmah has been "desired to keep his attention directed to the prospects of trade with Western China, and to avail himself of every favourable opportunity to obtain a knowledge of the several routes which have been suggested for tapping the commerce of China in that quarter."

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. COSMO MELVILL.

No. 18.

Memorial from the Liverpool Shipowners Association.

To the Right Honourable Thomas Milner Gibson, M.P., President of the Board of Trade, Whitehall.

The Memorial of the Liverpool Shipowners Association,
Sheweth,

1. THAT your Memorialists have had under their attentive consideration the desirability of opening up a direct trade with the western portion of the Chinese Empire from the British port of Rangoon.

2. That upon a perusal of maps of the British Provinces of Pegu and Martaban, founded on surveys made by the Government of India, it appears to your Memorialists that the best route for such a trade would be from Rangoon to the extreme north-east limit of the two provinces before named on the River Salween.

3. That the present uncertainty as to the transit duties which might be levied by the King of Burmah on goods passing through his territory is calculated to discourage any efforts of private enterprise to establish the proposed route, but your Memorialists have been led to believe that if an Ambassador was sent from Her Majesty the Queen (as was done in the case of Siam) to the King of Burmah, it would be practicable at once to negotiate a Treaty with him, fixing a moderate scale of transit duties.

4. That your Memorialists being very largely interested in British shipping will view with great satisfaction, as conducive also to the best interests of British manufacturers and commerce generally in both exports and imports, the opening up by this route of what must prove an entirely new commerce, with upwards of 150,000,000 of Chinese and Tartar people occupying fully a million of square miles of the earth, which your Memorialists are informed yields many valuable articles of commerce, including the precious metals, silks, tea, &c.

Your Memorialists therefore respectfully submit the above to your favourable consideration with a view to the negotiation of a Treaty with the King of Burmah, fixing the

transit duties across his territory, and the survey of the line of country from Rangoon to Kiang-hung for a railway, tramway, or such other road as will suffice for the extension of commerce which may be confidently expected to pass over it.

All which your Memorialists respectfully submit.

(Signed)

FRANCIS A. CLINT, *Chairman.*

Liverpool, October 29, 1862.

No. 19.

Sir J. Emerson Tennent to Mr. Clint.

*Office of Committee of Privy Council for Trade,
Whitehall, November 6, 1862.*

Sir,

I AM directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade to acknowledge the receipt of the Memorial forwarded by you on the 29th ultimo on behalf of the Liverpool Shipowners Association, suggesting the adoption of measures for establishing commercial intercourse with Western China, and I am to state to you, for the information of the Liverpool Shipowners Association, that my Lords have referred the question for the consideration of the Secretary of State for India.

I am, &c.

(Signed)

J. E. TENNENT.

No. 20.

Mr. Merivale to Messrs. Carson, Ellis, and Field, Secretaries to the Liverpool Shipowners Association, November 22, 1862.

[This letter is the same in substance as the reply to the Chairman of the Liverpool East India and China Association, dated the 25th September, 1862: see No. 17.]

No. 21.

Memorial from the Manchester Cotton Supply Association to Viscount Palmerston.

Manchester, July 15, 1863.

The Memorial of the Cotton Supply Association,

Respectfully sheweth,

THAT your Memorialists have heard with much satisfaction that Treaty relations have again been entered into between Her Majesty and the King of Burmah.

That your Memorialists observe from a copy of the Treaty printed in India that one of its provisions is that "British merchants shall be allowed to settle and hold lands for the erection of houses of business in any part of the Burmese territory;" and that another Article is that "people from whatever country or nation who may wish to proceed to the British territory shall be allowed by the Burmese Ruler to pass without hindrance."

That your Memorialists have been informed that between British Pegu and the south-west of China are the three Burmese Shan Provinces of Moni, Kiang-tung, and Kiang-hung, which were severally visited by Dr. Richardson and Lieutenant-Colonel McLeod, now Major-General Commanding in Pegu, under the directions of the Supreme Governor of India,* with a view to ascertain their commercial capabilities, and to open if possible a trade with them from Moulmein; and that these officers found the country they traversed producing much cotton, all of which was collected by Chinese caravans and carried into China to be manufactured, some of the Chinese so seen by Dr. Richardson being within twenty miles of the frontier of what has since become British Pegu. Your Memorialists therefore consider that if a commercial way were opened from the port of Rangoon across Eastern Pegu, in a direct line to the above-named three Burman Shan Provinces, the cotton there grown, reported to be of a superior quality, would find its way to Rangoon for shipment to England.

That your Memorialists are advised that there are upwards of 40,000,000 acres of waste land in the Provinces of Pegu and Martabam, very much of which could be made

* In 1836 and 1837.

highly productive, and that the suggested road would induce Chinese to come down from the south-west of China to settle on these waste lands, which, under their cultivation, would furnish large supplies of cotton.

Your Memorialists therefore respectfully request your Lordship to take the subject into serious consideration, and to instruct the Viceroy of India to open up a commercial way between the port of Rangoon and the extreme north-east frontier of British Pegu, on or near the Salween River; and further to move the King of Burmah for a continuation of such commercial way from that British frontier through Kiang-tung to Kiang-hung on the Upper Cambodia River.

And your Memorialists will ever pray.

(Signed)

JOHN CHEETHAM, *President*.

No. 22.

Mr. Baring to Mr. Cheetham.

Sir,

India Office, July 28, 1863.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to acknowledge the receipt of the Memorial of the Cotton Supply Association addressed to Lord Palmerston, on the subject of the capabilities of the Burmese Shan Provinces of Moni, Kiang-tung, and Kiang-hung, for the cultivation and production of cotton, and requesting that steps may be taken to open up communication between Rangoon, the port of British Burmah, and the provinces in question.

In reply I am to state that the matter to which Lord Palmerston's attention is called has already been under the consideration of this Department, and that instructions have been issued to the Government of India to report on the best means to be adopted for developing the resources and improving the intercommunications of British Burmah.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. G. BARING.

No. 23.

The Secretary to the Liverpool East India and China Association to Mr. Milner Gibson.

Sir,

3, Brown's Buildings, Liverpool, August 28, 1863.

I AM instructed by the Committee of the East India and China Association of Liverpool to address you on the subject of overland communication with China, by way of British Pegu and Burmah.

The Committee are of opinion that the Treaty recently concluded with the Burmese Government affords a most favourable opportunity for extending British commerce to the south-west and western provinces of the Chinese Empire, and they believe that the establishment of a trade route between the port of Rangoon and the south-west border of the province of Yunnan would greatly facilitate this desirable object.

The Committee would therefore respectfully suggest that, as a preliminary measure, the Viceroy of India be instructed to order a survey of the country between Rangoon and the Cambogia river, or that if this be deemed undesirable, the opinion of the Chief Commissioner in British Burmah, Colonel Phayre, be obtained as to the feasibility of the project.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. B. COOPER.

No. 24.

Mr. Farrer to Mr. Cooper.

*Office of Committee of Privy Council for Trade,
Whitehall, September 4, 1863.*

Sir,

I AM directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th ultimo, offering on behalf of the Committee of the East India and China Association of Liverpool, certain suggestions with

reference to overland communication with China by way of British Pegu and Burmah, and to inform you that copies have been transmitted to the Foreign Office and the Secretary of State for India.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T. H. FARRER.

No. 25.

The President of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce to Viscount Palmerston.

My Lord,

Liverpool, October 6, 1863.

I HAVE been requested by this Council again to bring before the notice of your Lordship the question of opening up a trade with the western portion of China; and to call to your remembrance the fact that in August 1860, and September 1862, this Chamber addressed communications to Departments of Her Majesty's Government upon the subject.

Since then this Chamber has been happy to learn that a Treaty of Commerce has been arranged between Her Majesty's Government and the King of Burmah, which permits the settlement of British merchants in Burmah and of Burmese merchants in the British territory for the purpose of trade.

For the full development of the intentions of that Treaty, this Chamber is of opinion that, if a thorough practical survey, under the superintendence and direction of duly qualified persons, were made in order to ascertain the most direct and easy line for a tramway or road for the conveyance of goods and passengers between Rangoon and Kiang-hung, private enterprise would most likely be used to establish the means of communication between British territory and Western China.

The Council of this Chamber therefore humbly submit this subject to the favourable consideration of your Lordship, in the hope that the suggestion they have ventured to make may receive the careful attention of Her Majesty's Government and of your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. A. MACFIE.

No. 26.

Mr. Merivale to Mr. Macfie.

Sir,

India Office, October 16, 1863.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to acknowledge your letter of the 6th instant, addressed to Viscount Palmerston, praying that the Government of India may be instructed to depute a qualified engineer to survey the country between Rangoon and Kiang-hung, with a view to the eventual construction of a road, as may be found best, between those two points; and I am to inform you in reply, with reference to my letter to your address of the 18th September, 1862, that the Government of India have been instructed to report on the best means to be adopted for developing the resources and improving the intercommunication of British Burmah. Pending the receipt of their report, Sir C. Wood is not prepared to issue any further or more specific orders on the subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) HERMAN MERIVALE.

No. 27.

Memorial from the Liverpool Shipowners Association to Viscount Palmerston.

The Memorial of the Liverpool Shipowners Association,

Respectfully sheweth,

1. THAT having had much under their consideration the great importance to the manufacturing, mercantile, and shipping interests of the United Kingdom, of opening up a direct commerce with the West of China, overland from the port of Rangoon, your Lordship's Memorialists had the honour in the month of October last year, to address a

Memorial to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, praying his favourable consideration to the negotiation of a Treaty with the King of Burmah, fixing the transit duties across his territory, and to the survey of the line of country from Rangoon to Kiang-hung, for a railway, tramway, or such other road as would suffice for the extension of the commerce which might be confidently expected to pass over it.

2. That your Memorialists have therefore learnt with extreme satisfaction that since then such a Treaty has been entered into between the King of Burmah and Her Majesty's Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Her Majesty's behalf, the provisions of which Treaty, if rightly availed of, are very favourable to the establishment of such a commerce with Western China.

3. That to make the Treaty available, your Memorialists believe that it is necessary a road should be made by the most direct practicable route over the line of country from Rangoon to Kiang-hung.

Your Memorialists therefore very respectfully pray your Lordship, that you will be pleased to cause early instructions to be transmitted to Her Majesty's Viceroy and Governor-General of India, to have a survey made to ascertain the best route for merchandize between Rangoon and Kiang-hung, and that such survey may be carried out by some well-known and approved engineer, so as to insure as far as possible the selection of the best route.

And your Memorialists will ever pray.

(Signed)

THOMAS CHILTON, *Chairman.*

No. 28.

Mr. Merivale to Mr. Chilton, October 16, 1863.

[This letter is the same in substance as the reply to the President of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce of the same date: see No. 26.]

No. 29.

Memorial from the Leeds Chamber of Commerce to Viscount Palmerston.

Leeds, October 1, 1863.

The Memorial of the Leeds Chamber of Commerce, through its President,

Sheweth,

THAT in the year 1860 your Memorialists had the honour of addressing your Lordship in reference by the desirableness of some efforts being made to open more direct commercial relations between this country and the South-Western Provinces of China, through the port of Rangoon in British Pegu.

That since that date a Treaty of Commerce has been concluded with the King of Burmah, by which the transit of goods and passengers is permitted through Burmah, on reasonable terms, and your Memorialists believe that the conclusion of this Treaty affords a favourable opportunity for extending the trade of this country with such provinces.

That these provinces are inhabited by a large, industrious, and wealthy population, producing tea, cotton, and other articles of the best quality and suitable for European consumption, against which the products of this country may be exchanged.

That at present access to these provinces is difficult, expensive, and indirect, and, in the opinion of your Memorialists, commercial relations with them cannot be satisfactorily developed until a more suitable route can be established.

That the city of Esmok, a large commercial city on the south-western frontier of China, is a suitable centre for trading purposes, being connected by roads, canals, and navigable rivers, with a large number of populous trading towns spread over the neighbouring provinces.

That a road or tramway from Rangoon to Kiang-hung, on the Upper Cambogia River, would afford an efficient means of communication between Rangoon and the said provinces.

That before such road can be made, it is essential that a careful survey of the immediate country should be made (a distance of about 500 miles) with a view to discover the most advantageous route for commercial purposes.

Your Memorialists, therefore, most respectfully request that instructions should be sent to the Indian Government to cause such a survey to be immediately made through British Pegu, and to induce the King of Burmah to make, or permit to be made, a similar survey through his territory.

Your Memorialists would further request that such survey should be entrusted to a competent practised engineer, specially instructed to keep in view the advantages of such route for commercial purposes, and the establishment of telegraphic communications, and its capability of being kept open throughout the year.

And your Memorialists will ever pray.

(Signed)

DARNTON LUPTON, *President.*

No. 30.

Mr. Merivale to Mr. Lupton, October 16, 1863.

[This letter is the same in substance as the reply to the President of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce of the same date : see No. 26.]

No. 31.

Memorial from the Bristol Chamber of Commerce to Viscount Palmerston.

Bristol, October 16, 1863.

The Memorial of the Bristol Chamber of Commerce,

Most respectfully sheweth,

THAT your Memorialists being interested in the continued prosperity and increase of Bristol commerce and shipping, have viewed with much satisfaction the strong desire of late expressed by commercial bodies that a direct trade should be opened up with the extreme Western Provinces of China, overland from Her Majesty's port of Rangoon, in Pegu.

That your Memorialists have learnt that your Lordship has, in compliance with the solicitations of Chambers of Commerce, caused steps to be taken by the Government in India from which have resulted a Commercial Treaty with the King of Burmah, the provisions of which, if rightly availed of, are favourable to the establishment of the desired overland trade with the West of China, and your Memorialists desire to give their support to the efforts of those Commercial Associations of the kingdom who have striven to realize it by Memorials to your Lordship in the past two years.

That it appears the Western Provinces of China are in the same latitude as the provinces of the ocean side of that Empire, and are densely peopled, extensively and well-cultivated, and rich in their yield of many valuable commercial products, including the precious and other metals, and that their inhabitants on the frontier have long desired direct trade with the outer world, and are as qualified for it as their more eastern countrymen.

That your Memorialists consider it most desirable that steps should be without delay taken to form a commercial way, such as shall be practicable the year through, from the port of Rangoon to that point of the Upper Cambogia River, to admit of the establishment there of a regular trade with the Western Chinese.

That before the construction of any way can be decided upon an efficient survey is necessary of the line of country between Rangoon and Kiang-hung to ascertain the most direct and easy route for it to take.

Your Memorialists therefore very respectfully pray that your Lordship will be pleased still further to assist the commercial opening of the West of China by causing the Government of India to have such survey forthwith made of the British portion of the line by practical surveyors, under the direction of an engineer of repute, in the construction of modern commercial ways, and to effect arrangements with the King of Burmah for a similar survey of the portion of his territory lying between the British frontier and Kiang-hung.

(Signed)

WILLIAM HENRY WILLS, *Chairman.*

No. 32.

Mr. Baring to Mr. Wills, October 26, 1863.

[This letter is the same in substance as the reply to the President of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce of the same date: see No. 26.]

No. 33.

Memorial from the Halifax Chamber of Commerce to Viscount Palmerston.

The Memorial of the Halifax Chamber of Commerce through its President,

Sheweth,

THAT in the year 1860 a Memorial was sent to your Lordship from the Bradford and Halifax Chamber of Commerce, with which this Chamber was at that time incorporated, praying "that Her Majesty's Government would be pleased to adopt early and energetic measures so as to secure to this country a direct trade with the inland western half of the vast Empire of China."

That a Treaty of Commerce has since been entered into with the King of Burmah, whereby British merchants are allowed to settle and hold lands for the erection of houses of business in any part of the Burmese Empire, and also for the transmission of goods and passengers through Burmah on very easy terms, which your Memorialists believe will afford the commercial community of this country a favourable opportunity of extending its trade into the thickly populated Western Provinces of China.

That these Provinces produce tea, silk, cotton, wool, and other articles suited to English markets, for which the products of Europe may be exchanged with great advantage to British commerce.

That your Memorialists are of opinion that the trade of this district would be greatly improved by the opening of a passage into Inland China, which at present is circuitous, difficult, and expensive, and that it cannot satisfactorily be developed until a more direct and convenient route is established.

That your Memorialists are also of opinion that a careful survey of the country between the port of Rangoon and Kiang-hung, a distance of about 500 miles, should be made by some eminent engineer of repute in England, on whose survey and report the commercial interests of the kingdom would have confidence, for the purpose of ascertaining whether it is practicable to make a tramway, or other means of communication between Rangoon and the said Chinese Provinces, which will be available the year through.

Your Memorialists therefore humbly pray that your Lordship will be early pleased to give instructions to the Indian Government to cause a survey to be made by some eminent engineer of repute, in whose Report the mercantile community of the kingdom would have full confidence, and specially instruct him to direct his survey so as to discover the best practicable route for an active commerce to be carried to and fro between Rangoon and Kiang-hung on the Upper Kamboja river the year through, unimpeded by the monsoon rains.

(Signed) EDWARD AKROYD, *President.*

No. 34.

Mr. Baring to Mr. Akroyd, October 29, 1863.

[This letter is the same in substance as the reply to the President of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce of the same date: see No. 26.]

No. 35.

*Memorial from the Gloucester Chamber of Commerce.**Gloucester, October 16, 1863.*

The Memorial of the Gloucester Chamber of Commerce,

Sheweth,

THAT your Memorialists having taken into consideration the present difficulties of internal communication with the South-west Provinces of China, in consequence of their

great distance from Chinese ports to which we have commercial access, are exceedingly anxious that some steps should be taken for the purpose of throwing open this large territory, and placing the products of that country, rich in tea, silk, cotton, and other valuable articles of commerce, into more immediate communication, not only with England, but with the chief city of our Indian Empire.

Your Memorialists therefore view with satisfaction the result of the proceedings directed by your Lordship to be taken in India, giving a Commercial Treaty between the Empire of Burmah and this country, whereby a more practicable and easy communication might be effected, not only with the whole of the Burmese Empire, but also with the Western Provinces of China.

Your Memorialists respectfully submit that the commercial proceedings of the French in Cochin China, giving to them a large field for profitable trade, call upon this country to exert its powers by promoting the means of communication to so large a territory, especially when it can be effected by traversing a line of country not exceeding 500 miles, the half of which distance runs through the British territory of Pega, and the other half only through the Burmese Empire, now open to British merchants.

Your Memorialists therefore pray your Lordship to continue your exertions for throwing open Western China to British enterprise, and that your Lordship may be also pleased to suggest that the Government of India be instructed to direct a survey of the country between Rangoon and the Upper Kamboja River, in order the more fully (if such a line be practicable) to throw open by means of an overland route the whole country lying between Calcutta and the North-east Provinces of China to commercial purposes, and placing that great Empire within shorter distance of England.

(Signed) WILLIAM D. PRICE, *Chairman.*

No. 36.

Mr. Merivale to Mr. Price, November 17, 1863.

[This letter is the same in substance as the reply to the President of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce of the same date : see No. 26.]

No. 37.

The Chairman of the East India and China Association to Viscount Palmerston.

My Lord, 2, Cooper's Court, Cornhill, London, October 29, 1863.

THIS Association has learned with pleasure that a Treaty of Commerce has been concluded between Her Majesty's Government and the King of Burmah, which allows the settlement of British subjects in Burmah, and of Burmese subjects in Her Majesty's territory, for trading purposes.

This Association is of opinion that the conclusion of this Treaty, if the provisions are rightfully carried out, will be a favourable opportunity for the extension of the trade of this country and the Western Provinces of China, the inhabitants of which Provinces are well conducted, industrious, numerous, and wealthy, and produce silk, tea, and other articles of good quality, and well suited for British consumption, and for which the British products may be beneficially exchanged.

At present, however, these Provinces of China are inaccessible, except by a difficult, circuitous, and expensive route, which will prevent commercial relations from being fully and satisfactorily developed.

This Association, therefore, respectfully submit this subject to your Lordship's consideration, in the hope that Her Majesty's Government will cause instructions to be transmitted to the Indian Government for a thorough practical survey to be made under the superintendence and immediate direction of some duly qualified and well-known engineer, in order to ascertain the most easy and direct route for a road or tramway between Rangoon and Kiang-hung, as by so doing private enterprise would doubtless be used to establish a means of commercial communication between British territory and the Western Provinces of China.

I have, &c.
(Signed) S. GREGSON.

No. 38.

Mr. Merivale to Mr. Gregson, M.P., November 17, 1863.

[This letter is the same in substance as the reply to the President of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce of the same date : see No. 26.]

No. 39.

*The Secretary to the Liverpool East India and China Association to Earl Russell.—
(Received November 16.)*

My Lord, *Brown's Buildings, Liverpool, November 13, 1863.*

I AM directed by the East India and China Association to inquire whether your Lordship has received a copy of a Memorial addressed by this Association to the Board of Trade* relative to overland communication with China by way of British Pegu and Burmah, which copy was said to have been transmitted to your Lordship on the 4th September last, and I have further respectfully to inquire whether Her Majesty's Government have decided upon taking any action therein.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. B. COOPER.

No. 40.

Mr. Hammond to Mr. Cooper.

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 25, 1863.*

IN reply to your letter of the 13th instant, I am directed by Earl Russell to state to you that the letter addressed by the East India and China Association to the Board of Trade on the subject of a proposal for establishing a line of communication between India and China by way of Pegu and Burmah was communicated by that Department to his Lordship, but the matter to which it relates more immediately comes within the department of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, to whom the Association should address themselves.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 41.

*Memorial from the Chamber of Commerce and Manufactures of Glasgow to
Viscount Palmerston.*

Glasgow, November 18, 1863.

The Memorial of the Chamber of Commerce and Manufactures of Glasgow, incorporated by Royal Charter,

Respectfully Sheweth,

THAT your Memorialists have learned with much satisfaction that a Treaty has been recently entered into with the King of Burmah, the provisions of which, if wisely taken advantage of, the Memorialists are of opinion, will greatly tend to develop the commercial resources of Western Inland China, and favourably affect the trade of Great Britain and her dependencies.

That various suggestions have from time to time been laid before this Chamber for giving greater facilities of communication through British territory to Western China, and their attention has been more especially called to a scheme proposed by Captain Richard Sprye for opening up a route from Rangoon to Kiang-hung.

That your memorialists are not possessed of sufficient information to enable them to judge whether the route proposed by Captain Sprye may be preferable to others that have been indicated, but they would respectfully and earnestly call the attention of Her

Majesty's Government to the importance of opening up by every available means the provinces of Western China to the influences of British commercial enterprise.

May it therefore please your Lordship to order a survey to be made of such a route as may be considered most likely to meet the object in view.

And your memorialists will ever pray.

(Signed) ALEX. HASTIE, *Chairman.*

No. 42.

Mr. Merivale to Mr. Hastie, December 7, 1863.

[This letter is the same in substance as the reply to the President of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce of the same date : see No. 26.]

No. 43.

Memorial from the Chamber of Commerce of the United Salt Proprietors of Cheshire and Worcestershire to Viscount Palmerston.

Northwich, Cheshire, November 5, 1863.

The Memorial of the Chamber of Commerce of the United Salt Proprietors of Cheshire and Worcestershire,

Respectfully sheweth,

THAT your Lordship's memorialists, having given considerable consideration to the subject, had the honour on the 23rd November, 1860, to address a Memorial to you praying "that, whilst every exertion should be used to obtain from the Chinese Government permission to import salt as merchandise into the seaports of China, opportunity for disposal of the article by overland communication with the West of China from the port of Rangoon should not be lost sight of by Her Majesty's Government, &c."

2. That it gave great satisfaction to your Lordship's memorialists to learn, in the present year, that subsequent to the receipt of that Memorial an Envoy was sent to the King of Burmah; that on the 10th November, 1862, that Monarch entered into Treaty relations with Her Majesty the Queen; and that the provisions of the Treaty are such as greatly facilitate the establishment of a direct and regular trade between Rangoon and the West of China.

3. That the French missionary, M. Imbert, who previous to 1835 spent much time in the most western Chinese provinces, described the salt thereof to be of a very inferior quality, drawn with great labour and at a heavy cost from wells of only a few inches diameter, bored to various great depths—even to 3,000 feet, through rock, coal, and other difficult ground.

4. That the later traveller over that part of China, the Abbé Huc, who passed through the same western provinces in 1846, confirmed those representations of M. Imbert, and described some salt wells which he there saw as "the wonders of Sze-chuen," in consequence of the great depth to which they were bored, the difficulties encountered therein, the time and labour spent before saline water is obtained, and the very acrid quality of the salt prepared from it, the effect of it being painfully inflammatory to the throat.

5. That Captain Blackiston, in his recent expedition up the Chinese river Yang-tze, passed much of the country which M. Huc had traversed and described; and he having publicly vouched in England the general accuracy of M. Huc's descriptions, your Lordship's memorialists feel warranted in considering that in the inland west of China Proper salt is obtained with much difficulty, at heavy cost, and only of a quality that is greatly injurious to the health of those who have to use it.

6. That, further, salt is reported not to be produced in the Shan States bordering the south-west and west of China, between the Upper Salween and the Upper Cambogia rivers, the people of which country are supplied by Chinese caravan dealers with the inferior and pernicious article before described at a very high price.

7. That your Lordship's Memorialists feel still more strongly, therefore, that those Shan States and the extreme west of China Proper would become considerable and permanent markets of British salt, and to the benefit to that large portion of the people of Asia,

if a way was constructed for its conveyance to them in mercantile quantities from Rangoon.

8. That numerous as are those of Her Majesty's subjects who depend for employment upon the activity of the salt works of Cheshire and Worcestershire, large as is the portion of the nation's mercantile marine which looks more or less to salt freights for employment, and much as the well-being of your Lordship's Memorialists in particular rests upon the prosperity and extension of the export salt trade, they might hesitate to appeal thus a second time to your Lordship for the long-desired peaceful opening of commerce with the virgin west of China, did they not feel confident that many other branches of British industry and trade, import as well as export, would derive as great and greater benefits therefrom.

9. That your Memorialists believe it to be now generally admitted, my Lord, that those west provinces of China, being situated in the same latitudes as the eastern and central provinces, and densely peopled with a race as industrious, enterprising, and desirous of gain by trade as their countrymen along the sea coast, yield proportionately of many valuable articles of general commerce, including tea, silk, gums, dyes, tental fibres, &c., with the addition of gold, silver, and copper; the supply of any or all of which the Western Chinese would make equal to any demand created for them by the establishment of a regular and active British and Indian trade on their frontier.

10. That renewed consideration of the subject, with the latest information before them, makes it, therefore, the duty of your Lordship's Memorialists respectfully to express their firm belief that having the Treaty we now have with the King of Burmah, such a trade with the west of China and the adjacent Shan States has become most practicable if the best land route be selected for it from the port of Rangoon to the Burmese Shan town of Kiang-hung on the Upper Cambogia River, where it debouches from the Chinese province of Yanan, a large stream navigable the year through, north and south, for laden boats.

11. That your Lordship's Memorialists understand that the point indicated of that important Asiatic river is distant from the north-east frontier of British Pegu only about 250 miles.

12. That about 1200 miles south of the same point, Kiang-hung, the river flows into the sea of China, through the Cochin Chinese provinces, which, with the fortified port of Saigon, were last year formally ceded and annexed to the French Empire.

Your Memorialists earnestly pray of your Lordship, therefore, to give the subject early consideration, and that you will be pleased to issue the necessary instructions to the proper Department, for a thorough survey to be made of the route from Rangoon, *vid* Shwawgyeen and Kiang-tung, to Kiang-hung, under the direction and supervision of some eminent engineer in whose work and report the home commercial interests will have confidence.

And your Lordship's Memorialists will ever pray, &c.

(Signed) JAMES BLACKWELL, *Chairman.*

No. 44.

Mr. Merivale to Mr. Blackwell, December 7, 1863.

[This letter is the same in substance as the reply to the President of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce of the same date: see No. 26.]

No. 45.

The Secretary to the Liverpool East India and China Association to Sir C. Wood.

Sir,

3, *Brown's Buildings, Liverpool, November 27, 1863.*

HAVING applied to the Foreign Office to know whether Her Majesty's Government intend adopting any steps to promote the survey of the route from Rangoon with the view of establishing a line of overland communication between India and China by way of Pegu and Burmah, I am referred by Earl Russell to you for information upon the subject, and I shall esteem it a favour if you will oblige me with a reply embodying the information required by this Association.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. D. COOPER.

Mr. Merivale to Mr. Cooper, December 7, 1863.

[This letter is the same in substance as the reply to the President of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce of the same date: see No. 26.]

Memorial from the Huddersfield Chamber of Commerce to Viscount Palmerston.

The Memorial of the Huddersfield Chamber of Commerce,

Sheweth,

THAT in the year 1860 a Memorial was addressed to your Lordship by this Chamber praying that Her Majesty's Government would cause such surveys to be made as would expedite and facilitate the making of a commercial road or railway from the port of Rangoon across British Eastern Pegu, and the south-eastern territory of Burmah towards Esmok and the Western Chinese provinces.

That your Memorialists, after having obtained further information, are now still more forcibly impressed with the importance of opening up a direct route of commercial communication with the provinces of Western China, whose productions of silk, cotton, wool, and tea, well suited to English markets (and the cultivation of which might be indefinitely increased if a convenient outlet could be formed), might thereby be readily exchanged for British manufactures to the advantage and development of the commerce of the country.

That recent events (such as the American civil war) have shown that existing markets, furnishing important raw materials, and receiving British manufactured goods largely in exchange, are liable to be deranged so as to interfere seriously with the operations of important branches of industry in this country, which renders it of great importance that all proper effort should be made to facilitate the opening of new markets to the wants and enterprize of British manufacturing and trading interests.

That the recent Treaty of Commerce concluded with the King of Burmah, by which British merchants are allowed liberal trading facilities in that kingdom, is regarded by your Memorialists as a favourable step, if properly availed of, towards a commercial contact with Western China.

That the Emperor of the French, having gained a footing in Cochin China, is fully alive to the advantages of his newly-acquired position there, and contemplates using the route by the River Kamboja to open up French commerce with the Western Chinese provinces, in competition with the British trader. This circumstance makes it highly desirable that Her Majesty's Government should endeavour to render available the superior position and shorter route possessed by this country so as to secure a full share of advantage in commercial intercourse with the new markets now presenting themselves in Western China.

That your Memorialists learn through the public journals that the authorities of Calcutta have contributed a sum of money to the Rev. Mr. Bixby (an American missionary) to enable him to explore, during the approaching dry season, some of the Burman Shan States; also that Dr. Marfels (a German) is instructed to proceed by another route in the direction of the same States, and also that Captain Fitzroy, of the Royal Artillery service, is commissioned to explore from Pegu in still another direction.

That your Memorialists, however, beg most respectfully to submit to your Lordship that the proposed exploring journeys by these individuals are not what the manufacturing, shipping, and mercantile interests of this country have so earnestly and so generally appealed to your Lordship to have effected; nor can the reports of such individuals be satisfactory on so important a question as the practicability of opening the West of China commercially by the most direct route.

Your Memorialists, therefore, earnestly pray that your Lordship will be pleased to cause instructions to be forwarded to Her Majesty's Viceroy and Governor-General of India forthwith to cause a thorough survey of route from Rangoon through Pegu and the South-eastern corner of Burmah to Kiang-hung on the Upper Kamboja River, to be entered upon by a sufficient party of surveyors and engineers acting under the directions of a Chief Engineer of eminence, whose report might be calculated to give satisfaction to Her Majesty's Government, and to the manufacturing and trading classes of this country.

(Signed)

THOS. P. CROSLAND, *President.*

No. 48.

Mr. Baring to Mr. Crosland.

Sir,

India Office, January 28, 1864.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to acknowledge the receipt of the Memorial of the Huddersfield Chamber of Commerce addressed to Viscount Palmerston, praying that the Government of India may be instructed to depute a qualified engineer to survey the country between Rangoon and Kiang-hung with a view to the eventual construction of a road, as may be found best, between those two points ; and I am to inform you in reply that, in accordance with the opinion expressed by the late Viceroy, Sir Charles Wood is not prepared to sanction the measures suggested by you.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. G. BARING.

CHINA. No. 5. (1864.)

Memorials, &c., on the Subject of Opening up a Direct Commerce with the West of China from the Port of Rangoon.

*Presented to the House of Lords by Command
of Her Majesty. 1864.*

LONDON:
PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.

CHINA. No. 6. (1864.)

EXTRACT OF A DESPATCH

FROM

SIR F. BRUCE

RESPECTING

MAINTENANCE OF TREATY RIGHTS

IN

CHINA.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.
1864.

LONDON:

PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.

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Extract of a Despatch from Sir F. Bruce respecting Maintenance of Treaty Rights in China.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received August 10.)

(Extract.)

Peking, June 12, 1863.

I STATED to M. Berthemy that I had long since urged the union of foreign Powers in questions affecting their common Treaty rights, as the only effectual mode by which these rights could be asserted. That the Representatives of Russia and the United States held the same views, and that we were prepared to act upon them. That, in my opinion, no assistance or moral support should be given to this Government unless on condition of our Treaty privileges being respected, and of the Government showing itself willing to brave the unpopularity it would have to incur with the anti-foreign party in China, by pursuing a friendly course in its relations with foreign Powers.

I explained to M. Berthemy that the course I had pursued in General Burgevine's case was dictated partly by these general views and partly by the wish to prevent British officers from being employed beyond the limits of Shanghai at a time when the delays of this Government in affording redress for serious breaches of Treaty threw doubt on its willingness or ability to fulfil its obligations, and I offered to request an interview with the Prince of Kung for the purpose of explaining to him distinctly that we should make common cause whenever our general rights were infringed in the person of a foreigner, to whatever nationality he belonged; and that if justice were not done, I should be prepared to recommend the withdrawal of the aid we had hitherto afforded to this Government, whatever might be the consequences to it. I accordingly had an interview, in which I expressed these views in the most decided language. The principal topics I touched on are embodied in the accompanying Memorandum. The same course was pursued by the Ministers of Russia and the United States.

I need not point out to your Lordship the good effects which will result from the recognition of this principle of joint action in China.

Inclosure.

*Memorandum of the Substance of Observations addressed to the Prince of Kung by
Sir F. Bruce, on the 5th of June, 1863.*

SIR F. BRUCE wished the Prince of Kung to understand that he had reason to be greatly dissatisfied—

1st. With the general disregard of Treaty provisions manifested at the ports.

2nd. With the tone of the Government generally towards foreigners.

On the appointment of His Imperial Highness to the post of Prince Minister, Sir F. Bruce had strongly urged Her Majesty's Government to support the Chinese Government, firstly, by protecting the ports against the rebels; secondly, by aiding it in the organization of a regular Executive.

The feeling of the British nation is always opposed to interference in the internal dissensions of other States. Sir F. Bruce had notwithstanding, on his own responsibility, authorized Her Majesty's army and navy stationed in China to defend the ports against the rebels; and it is entirely due to the exertions of the allied forces that Shanghai and Ningpo are not now in rebel possession. Had Shanghai fallen, the

Imperial authority would have received a blow from which it would never have recovered. Thus not only our own people, whom by Treaty the Chinese Government should protect, have been protected by our own forces, at our own expense, but a vast Chinese population has been rescued by us from danger and maintained in security.

Sir F. Bruce did not look for any extraordinary demonstration of gratitude for these services, but he had hoped that the Central Government would, at least, have insisted on the faithful observance of the Treaty at the ports. He had hoped, also, that it would have addressed itself with some increase of vigour to the organization of a competent Executive.

These expectations have not been realized. At several of the ports the Treaty is daily broken, in matters great and small; and the Central Government, if not unwilling, shows itself unable to enforce a better order of things. The orders sent by the Foreign Board, when Sir F. Bruce complains, are not carried out, either because the local authorities do not stand in awe of the Foreign Board, or because they do not believe that the Foreign Board issues them in earnest. This has been notably the case as regards the treatment of Mr. Caine, Her Majesty's Consul at Swatow, and the surcharge of duties at Ningpo, Shanghai, and Hankow. At the latter port, especially, the authorities persist in an entire disregard of the transit-duty clauses.

Questions of this sort have been again and again brought forward by Sir F. Bruce. The Foreign Board has gone through the form of issuing instructions thereupon, but the causes of complaint remain as they were, either because the local authorities do not fear, or because the Foreign Board does not care. Seeing that none of the authorities whose conduct has been complained of have been punished or removed; that officials notoriously hostile to foreigners have been appointed to places in which they have increased opportunity of indulging their anti-foreign tendencies, while in two or three instances, as at Canton, New-chwang, and Foo-chow, officials of friendly dispositions have been withdrawn,—Sir F. Bruce is induced, however reluctantly, to infer that if the Imperial Government be not adverse to foreign intercourse, it is, at all events, indisposed to do what is necessary to teach the people and local authorities that China is sincerely desirous of friendly relations with foreign Powers.

Sir F. Bruce would remark that, as all the Treaty Powers enjoyed the same rights, the security and rights of all foreigners are alike attacked when the subjects of any one Power suffer injury and obtain no redress. The barbarous murder of a Frenchman at Kwei-chau, by a Government official, for which no satisfaction has been given, and the disgraceful treatment of the American, Burgevine, by the officials at Shanghai, and the unwillingness or inability of the Chinese Government to do justice in these cases, prove that, as yet, foreigners have no security for protection or just dealing.

In this state of affairs Sir F. Bruce must decline to allow officers of Her Majesty's army to take any part in military operations further than may be necessary for the protection of British interests; and his first step, consequently, will be to desire that Major Gordon, and others serving with him at Shanghai, shall not pass the boundary described as the thirty-mile radius. He will not object to their assisting in the disciplining of Chinese troops for the defence of Shanghai, provided a monthly allowance is set apart, free from the control of the local authorities, for the payment of the men so organized, and provided it is understood that their duty be to protect Shanghai and the country round within the radius.

Some such protection, the Prince may be satisfied, is indispensable, whatever may be the reports of the efficiency and success of Hu-nan or Chao-chow Contingents. Sir F. Bruce warns His Imperial Highness that these statements are untrue. The men brought by the Governor Li to Shanghai cannot face the rebels, and are invariably defeated unless supported by foreign troops, or by Chinese disciplined by foreign officers.

Sir F. Bruce was present when Shanghai was attacked by the rebels in 1860, and was a witness to the helpless cowardice of the authorities and the total inefficiency of their troops, the rebels having been driven off solely by the exertions of the allied force. He read in the Gazette the Memorial presented to the Throne on that occasion, and which purported to give an account of what had taken place. He perfectly understands, from its perusal, why it is that rebellion and anarchy rage throughout the land, and why the Imperial Government hesitates to adopt the improvements required for its salvation; for he sees that it is systematically and

habitually deceived as to the real condition of affairs by the officers charged with its Provincial Administration.

Sir F. Bruce warns His Highness that, until the Central Government takes into its own hands the administration of its finance and organization of its Executive, it has no protection against this system of deceit, and the disaster it entails.

It is for the Chinese Government to consider whether it will listen to these warnings, given in no unfriendly spirit, or not. In the meantime, while it is menaced from within by disorder, which increases daily, and which it makes no serious effort to repress, there is impending, from without, a very serious danger in the alienation of those Powers who, though perfectly willing to assist China in extricating herself from her difficulties were she faithful to her engagements, will afford her neither sympathy nor support in any contest she may provoke by her persistent indifference to Treaty obligations.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Extract of a Despatch from Sir F. Bruce
respecting Maintenance of Treaty
Rights in China.

*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Com-
mand of Her Majesty. 1864.*

LONDON:

PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.

CHINA. No. 7. (1864.)

CORRESPONDENCE

RELATIVE TO

LIEUT.-COLONEL GORDON'S POSITION

IN THE

CHINESE SERVICE.

Presented to the House of Lords by Command of Her Majesty.
1864.

LONDON
PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.

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Correspondence relative to Lieut.-Colonel Gordon's Position in the Chinese Service.

No. 1.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received February 29.)

(Extract.)

Peking, December 15, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to inclose translation of the Decree announcing the capture of Soochow.

Your Lordship will see that Major Gordon is designated "General of Division in the Imperial Service," and that his merits are alluded to in handsome terms. I may mention that this act of the Chinese Government is spontaneous and unsolicited. I was not consulted as to the reward bestowed, or as to the terms in which the Decree is couched. When on previous occasions the question of employing and rewarding foreign officers has come before me, my language to the Chinese Government has been that these officers should be Imperially appointed, and that, if rewards were bestowed, they should be notified through the "Gazette," with an allusion to the services for which they were given.

I trust that Her Majesty's Government will permit Major Gordon to wear this medal, which he has so honourably won. His tact in dealing with the difficulties arising from the jealousy and suspicion of the Chinese authorities, in rescuing Burgevine and the misguided foreigners who served in the Taiping ranks, and in thereby obviating the risk of this foreign adventurer element uniting with them has been not less conspicuous than his personal gallantry and military skill. There is no affectation in the cordial expressions of good will and admiration with which the Prince and his associates in the Foreign Board mention invariably his name.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Extract from the "Peking Gazette" of December 14, 1863.

(Translation.)

THE Grand Secretariat has received the following Decree :—

Li Hung Chang (Governor of Kiangsu) reports that the army under his command has captured the city Soochow and exterminated (the rebels within its walls). The rebels had been reduced to great extremity ; and those of them who were desirous of returning to their allegiance, together with the Imperial troops, entered the city, destroyed the rebel army, and so re-captured the Province of Kiangsu.

The reading of this report has afforded His Majesty sincere delight and gratification.

Soochow, the capital of the Province of Kiangsu, was four years ago captured by the rebels, and has remained in their hands ever since. The army, acting under orders from Li Hung Chang, captured in succession the lines of rebel works outside four gates of the city, and (so) struck terror into the enemy in the city that urgent offers of returning to allegiance were made.

On the 30th of November the Chung Wang, seeing that the attacks of the Imperial troops were daily becoming more vigorous, and that the rebels in the city were in a state of disorganization, fled under cover of night with more than 10,000 of his death-deserving adherents; handing over the city to the old rebel Mu Wang (Fan Shao Kuang), with orders to defend it to the death.

On the 3rd and 4th of December the naval and military forces under Ch'êng-Hsio-Ch'î, Li Ch'ou-pin and Huang Yi-shêng attacked the different gates of the city, keeping up day and night an incessant attack, which became more vigorous the longer it lasted. Gordon also, established himself close to the city walls and opened a cannonade against them.

On the 4th December the Mu Wang ascended the walls to direct the defence; when at the head of his men and in the act of issuing orders, a rebel leader named Kao Ying-Kuan, who with others had entered into a conspiracy with a rebel officer named Wang Yü-Wei against him, took him off his guard and stabbed him to death. After killing more than a thousand of Mu Wang's associates, they threw open the gates and came out to give in their allegiance. Ch'êng Hsio-Ch'î with the troops under his command entered the city, and having posted his soldiers, searched out and killed above a thousand of the surviving rebels. Li Ch'ou-pin attacked and killed great numbers who were escaping by the Pan Mên, and set at liberty several thousands of prisoners.

The recapture of the provincial capital was thus effected.

His Majesty directs Li Hung Chang to take advantage of this victory to march with his troops under Chang-chou, which city having been captured, he will join his forces with those before Nanking, sweep that place clear of rebels (*lit.*, sweep the dens and take possession of the pools), and free the river of their presence.

His Majesty commands the Board of War to confer suitable honours on Tsêng Kwo-fan, Minister of State and Governor-General of the two Kiang, who sent a contingent to assist in the re-capture of this noted city.

Li Hung Chang, since he entered office as Governor of Kiangsu, has displayed great prudence and calculation, and his skilful tactics have been completely successful; he has again and again captured cities and gained honours on the field of battle; and now the re-capture of Soochow by his troops renders him still more worthy of praise; as a mark of his sincere approbation, His Majesty is pleased to confer upon him the honorary title of "Guardian of the Heir-Apparent," and to present him with a yellow robe.

Huang I-Shêng and Li Ch'ou-pin, in addition to receiving the hereditary rank of Yün ch'î Yu (a title with 4th rank button attached), are recommended to the notice of the Board of War. Ch'êng Hsio-Ch'î receives the same rank as the above, and in addition is presented with a yellow robe.

Gordon, specially appointed a General in the army of Kiangsu, was in command of troops who assisted in these operations; His Majesty, in order to evince his approval of the profound skill and great zeal displayed by him, orders him to receive a military decoration of the first rank and a sum of 10,000 taels.

(Here follows a list of honours and rewards conferred upon officers engaged.)

No. 2.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received April 18.)

My Lord,

Peking, February 12, 1864.

THE "Manilla" was taken off the station at the beginning of December, and sent for repairs to Hong Kong, and there being no vessel to supply her place, it was not until the 20th of January that I received the despatches of Mr. Markham and Major-General Brown, containing an account of what occurred at the capture of Soo-chow. I was in complete ignorance of these events when I wrote my despatch of the 15th of December, 1863, on the subject.

I received at the same time a private letter from Major Gordon, objecting to the precipitate disbanding of the disciplined corps under his command on the following grounds, namely, the probability of a considerable part of the force going over to the insurgents, the renewal at Shanghai of the state of anxiety and danger in which it was placed two years ago, and the repetition in its neighbourhood of the scenes of pillage and massacre from which the unfortunate inhabitants suffered so severely at the same period. He advocates the continuance of the aid given to this Government on conditions that will prevent an officer from being placed in such a position as he has been by Governor Li, and in conclu-

sion remarks that corrupt as the Mandarins are, they pursue a regular system of government and administration, whereas the insurgents have no system of civil government whatever. The proposal that this force should be employed as a protection for Shanghai and the recovered districts is in accordance with the views I expressed to Major Gordon in a letter dated the 22nd of November, of which I inclose a copy, though but for the misconduct of the Governor I should have been glad had its co-operation been continued until the line of the great canal from Hang-chow to Chin-kiang was cleared of insurgents.

In order to meet the embarrassments due to the conduct of the Governor, I pointed out to this Government that the defective constitution of the corps, to which I have frequently alluded as a source of danger to the Chinese, rendered it indispensable that it should be kept together under Major Gordon, and as that officer declined having any further communication with the Governor, after the deception practised upon him, that it should be looked upon as the garrison of Shanghai and of the neighbouring districts freed from the insurgents, and not be called upon to take further the offensive against the insurgents, unless those districts were invaded. I enlarged on the dangers that would ensue, in the present temper of the corps, should there be any irregularity in paying it, and I proposed, as a provisional measure, that stringent orders should be given to the Taoutae of Shanghai to pay the corps, and to make the necessary arrangements for its movements, &c., with Major Gordon directly, so that he might not be brought in contact with the Governor. They assure me that strict orders have been given to the Taoutae to carry out these suggestions.

At the same time I embodied in a Memorandum the principal facts stated by Major Gordon and others, on which the charge of bad faith against the Governor is based, and I communicated it to the Government.

In the conversations which I myself and Mr. Brown, by my directions, held with his Excellency Wen-siang and other members of the Foreign Board on the subject, I dwelt on the importance attached in Europe to the observance of capitulations, and on the loss of character the Chinese Government will suffer if the facts are not thoroughly sifted, and the Governor Li properly dealt with, in the event of the charges being proved against him.

The Chinese Government, on receipt of the document, addressed me the inclosed despatch, which may be looked upon as Governor Li's defence. Though it states that an inquiry will be made and the result communicated to me, I thought it advisable to express my opinion that the defence was unsatisfactory, and that Governor Li had not succeeded in clearing himself sufficiently from the charges of bad faith towards the insurgent Chiefs, and of want of proper consideration towards Major Gordon, to enable an officer of his character to act with him. If an arrangement can be made by which Shanghai can be protected and our interests secured, I do not wish to demand the dismissal of Governor Li, because that is a question of internal administration, and I do not feel sure how far the Government is strong enough to dismiss him, or will be supported in doing so on the grounds alleged by Chinese opinions. But I claim the right to decide what principles are to be observed, and what terms are to be agreed on, if the Chinese Government is anxious to have the active co-operation of British officers.

I am inclined to think that Governor Li, in putting these Chiefs to death, may have acted in a spirit of revenge for the perfidious massacre of his men at Tai-tsan, which I reported to your Lordship in my despatch of July 14, 1863.* It will be recollected that the orders to continue the negotiations for the surrender of Tai-tsan, and thereby to inveigle Imperialist soldiers into the town, and put them to death, were sent by the Chiefs at Soo-chow, and were carried into execution. This may have palliated, in the eyes of Governor Li, his breach of faith towards these men. The *lex talionis* is quite in accordance with Chinese maxims.

I gather also from his Excellency Wen-siang's remarks, that the Governor entertains very different feelings towards the bulk of the insurgents and towards the men of Kwantung and Kwang-si, the originators of the insurrection. The latter are looked upon as dangerous characters, whose submission is merely nominal, and who will be ready, on any favourable opportunity, to recommence their malpractices. The Prince, in his despatches, alludes to this when he says that by the death of a few the death of many will be avoided. The former, who consist chiefly of natives of the Central Provinces, are looked upon as forced into the rebellion, and readily obtain pardon and relief on submission, as in the instances quoted in his despatch. I apprehend that public opinion in China approves of this distinction.

* See China Papers, No. 3 (1864).

The course pursued with reference to Governor Li will probably depend much upon the progress of affairs in his Province. If he is strong enough to take Chang-chow-foo with the assistance of foreigners like Mr. Macartney and Mr. Bonnefoy, who continue to serve with him, it is not likely that the Government will venture to remove him, as it is contrary to their system of administration to interfere with a provincial authority as long as things go well. But if he is unsuccessful, and they are driven to invoke the aid of a foreign officer, they will, I trust, find that no one will serve unless his position is properly defined, and unless proper guarantees are given that he will not be involved, directly or indirectly, in transactions so abhorrent to our principles.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 2.

Sir F. Bruce to Major Gordon, R.E.

My dear Major Gordon,

Peking, November 22, 1863.

THE letter I wrote to you was intended to support you if you wished to give up your present command, but not to urge you to give it up. For I agree with you that after having entered the service on the terms of the agreement it would not be fair to leave the Footae at a critical moment as long as he abides by his agreement, unless he so disregards your suggestions in the composition and management of the force as to render it an element of danger. This seemed to be your opinion as far as I could judge from the confidential report to the General.

The break-down of the flotilla and the menacing state of affairs in Japan are additional reasons for your not taking any step which would weaken the Imperialist cause near Shanghai. I fear there is no chance at present of carrying out a re-organization of the Chinese army. The provincial authorities will not keep up a drilled force which is expensive to them, and which they cannot manage. The same thing has happened to the flotilla. We must therefore do what we can to protect ourselves in a small way and rely on clearing the country near Shanghai with forces such as you have got together and steamers like the "Hyson." We will go on as at present until the Government at home has time to decide what it will do about the "Order in Council" after they hear Osborn's history.

Our interest is that Soo-chow be re-taken and the silk districts and line of the Imperial Canal cleared. Tseng Kwo-fan and his own people may take Nanking, if they can, single-handed.

I think your ability and tact beyond praise, and if it suited you to go on I would use all my influence to get you put in a proper position. But I have found out that a foreign officer must really depend on the relations he keeps up with the provincial authorities with whom he is acting. The Chinese system makes it difficult for the Peking Government to interfere in such questions with the discretion of the Governor.

If Soo-chow falls you will probably have enough to do in clearing and pacifying the neighbouring country to keep you employed until spring. You might then come up here and see whether any partial plan of military improvement sufficient to secure the ports could be carried out. I should very much like to see you, and I think your opinions might have some weight. Don't let the Governor fancy you are coming to complain of him, otherwise he will intrigue to defeat your object.

I shall suggest here that all these foreign-led corps should be put under you, though I fear that Li will oppose it from jealousy and suspicion. Finally, rest assured that you have no more sincere admirer of what you have done than myself, and indeed it is chiefly because I don't think you properly appreciated that I sometimes feel indignant at the position you are placed in.

Pray consider this letter official if it will be of service to you.

Yours, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 2.

Major-General Brown to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Head-Quarters, Shanghai, December 17, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to forward the inclosed Report from Major Gordon, Royal Engineers, commanding the Anglo-Chinese force in this Province, for the information of your Excellency.

The circumstances attending and preceding the occupation of Soo-chow by the Imperialists are so calculated to produce an impression on public opinion unfavourable to the line of conduct adopted by Her Majesty's Government in China, that I trust I need not apologise for entreating your most earnest consideration of the whole subject.

I received the first intimation of events passing in Soo-chow by a hurried note from Major Gordon, which reached me during the forenoon of the 8th instant. A second note which, although written previously, did not reach me until a later period, produced the impression that affairs were proceeding favourably; consequently I was so far from apprehending the gravity of the crisis that I decided to carry out my intention of proceeding to Hong Kong by the mail-steamer, and was on board when Prince Wittgenstein, despatched by Major Gordon in the steamer "Tsatilee," brought a more complete and detailed narration of events.

The additional information thus received determined me to accede to the urgent entreaties of Major Gordon, of which the Prince was the bearer, and to proceed to Quinsan, the head-quarters of Major Gordon's force at once.

I arrived at Quinsan about 3 o'clock P.M. the following day, and immediately received from Major Gordon a Report which differed but slightly from the more carefully compiled narrative inclosed. Major Gordon had been unable to express in writing the intense indignation and disgust with which the infamous and dastardly conduct of the Footae had inspired him.

You will perceive by Major Gordon's narrative that he was able to withdraw his force from before Soo-chow to Quinsan only under the formal promise from the Taoutae of one month's pay to the officers and soldiers; and that it required all his influence to prevail on them to accept these terms. The subsequent treachery of the Imperial authorities had, however, destroyed the confidence of all ranks; their cruelties had turned the sympathies of the Europeans in favour of the rebels, and I found it necessary, in order to restore discipline, and to avert a perhaps total defection of the force, to take Major Gordon and his force formally under my command.

This move on my part, I am happy to inform your Excellency, had the best effect. All ranks now expressed their perfect satisfaction and reliance, and every symptom of hesitation disappeared from the force under Major Gordon's command.

I considered it expedient to have an interview with the Footae, with a view of hearing any explanatory statement he might have to offer, and to communicate to him my views on recent events, and explain the future relations between himself and Major Gordon.

I therefore despatched the interpreter to the Consulate (Mr. Mayers) the following day, accompanied by two of my officers, to convey to him my desire for an interview.

Having thus prepared the way, I proceeded the following morning to Soo-chow, but was met at Ching's stockade by the Footae, who had come out of the city to meet me.

I speedily ascertained that though the Footae was prepared to take on himself the whole responsibility of the murder of the Wangs, and the sacking of the city, and fully to exonerate Major Gordon from all blame, he was either unwilling or unable to offer any exculpation or explanation of his conduct, and it only remained for me to express my opinion and future intentions.

This I did in as few words as possible. I expressed the indignation and grief with which the English people, together with all the civilized nations of the world, would regard his cruelty and perfidy. I exposed to him my views on the impolicy of a fruitless severity which paralyzed his friends, and drove the rebels to desperation, when we had good reason to believe that they were prepared to capitulate and return to their homes in peace.

I then informed him that I should insist on the promised reward of one month's pay, and that I deemed it my duty to refer the whole matter to our Minister at Peking, and that, pending such reference, Major Gordon had received instructions from me to suspend all active aid to the Imperialist cause, further than protecting Soo-chow, knowing its importance to the safety of Shanghai, and warning the rebels to abstain from attacking his position.

I concluded by expressing my unhesitating conviction that, after what had occurred, my Government would withdraw all assistance hitherto afforded to the Imperial cause,

recall Major Gordon and all English subjects serving under him, and disband the Anglo-Chinese force.

I left Quinsan the following morning, and arrived here on the 14th instant. I propose leaving this to-morrow for Hong Kong, where I shall await with anxiety the receipt of your Excellency's views on these embarrassing events, and I trust that in my communications with the Footae, while expressing the horror and indignation we must all feel at the treachery and cruelty practised, I have left the door open for the adoption of any course of action you may be prepared to recommend.

I learn to-day from apparently good authority that Woosie, a strong place on the Great Canal, north-north-west of Soochow, has been evacuated by the rebels, and occupied by the Imperialists, an event which will no doubt tend to strengthen the influence of the Futai at Peking.

Before closing this despatch I trust your Excellency will not deem it out of place if, in a few words, I venture to express my opinion regarding the solution of affairs; which is, that every demand on the part of Major Gordon shall be paid in full by the Footae; embracing in the above all outstanding claims, all moneys paid by Major Gordon in obtaining the release of prisoners, secret service money, &c.; and, further, that every officer be paid a gratuity according to his rank and length of service in the force; the wounded provided for and the force disbanded; and no foreigner of any nation be allowed to enter the Chinese army; thus leaving the Chinese to fight their own battles, still myself retaining the radius of Tai-tsan, although Quinsan is the real strategical position. To settle the question of claims, a Mixed Commission could easily be appointed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. G. BROWN.

Inclosure 3 in No. 2.

Sir F. Bruce to Major Gordon, R.E.

My dear Major Gordon,

Peking, January 25, 1864.

I INCLOSE you copy of the letter I have addressed to General Brown on the late proceedings at Soo-chow. So much time has elapsed since these occurrences took place, and communication is so slow and uncertain, that I think it better to confine myself to the great objects we have to keep in view, and not to hamper you on points of detail. I agree with you entirely in the opinion that these events make no change in our policy, which is to keep the city of Shanghai and as large a part of the neighbourhood as free from rebel incursions as possible. Our interests require that we should be left in peace, and the population of the country, the legitimate object of humanity, require it as well. But pending the result of an inquiry into the Footae's conduct, and his removal, if the charges are proved against him, it is clear that no officer of character can serve with him, and I have informed the Government here that you can hold no communication with him, or in any way be under his orders. The Taoutae is instructed to arrange for the payment of your corps, and for such movements as, in the interest of Shanghai and of the silk districts, you may think it advisable to make. I hope you will be able to avoid any collision with the Chinese authorities. I need not point out that anything of the kind would undo all that has been done. I rely with confidence on the calm judgment and good sense you have exhibited to do nothing precipitately, and to prevent complications. I think it would be well to weed the corps of such Europeans as are not trustworthy. They ought to be given a handsome gratuity on condition of their leaving China. All the foreign Ministers agree with me in the importance of your holding on provisionally, as the only means of preserving Shanghai without a foreign garrison, and of preventing the officers and men of your corps from going over to the rebels. They all, as well as myself, are aware that in so doing you make a sacrifice of your personal feelings to the general good.

As to Governor Li, much will depend on the turn things take. The Government condemns treachery as a crime, but if he is successful they will be afraid of finding him guilty. If he is defeated, he will probably be dealt with severely. But I speak with hesitation, as they are only now in possession of the evidence, and they cannot be expected to deal with so important a case without inquiry. I only received your letter and the General's five days ago. I will write when I know more. In the meantime keep the force from deserting, and preserve Shanghai. These are the two cardinal points of which every one will approve.

Act upon no instructions from home incompatible with these objects without consulting me.

Yours, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 2.

Sir F. Bruce to Major-General Brown.

Sir,

Peking, January 26, 1864.

I HAVE received your despatch of the 17th of December, informing me of the measures taken by you consequent upon the proceedings of Governor Li on the surrender of Soo-chow.

Whether this atrocious massacre was due to premeditated treachery on his part, or was due to pretensions put forward by the insurgent Chiefs, at variance with a complete surrender of the city, and of the forces that occupied it, to the authority of the Governor, it is clear that gross deception was practised upon Major Gordon, and it is equally clear that no officer of character can act on such terms under a Chinese authority. I am glad, therefore, that you have taken his force under your protection, and that it is not to be employed at present in further offensive operations against the insurgents. The evidence of the Governor's treachery has been laid before the Chinese Government, and it remains to be seen how far they are sincere in expressing their intention to have a full inquiry, and to punish any breach of faith towards the insurgents. I am fully aware of the difficulties they have to encounter in dealing with an offender so powerfully supported as the Governor Li.

In the meantime, it is necessary to proceed with great caution with respect to the disciplined force under Major Gordon. The object of Her Majesty's Government is to secure Shanghai and its neighbourhood from the ruin and desolation to which it would be exposed from a successful advance on the part of the insurgents, and I see nothing in late events to induce a change in that policy. The perfidy of the Governor to the rebel Wangs does not differ much from the perfidy they exhibit towards each other, of which the assassination of the Mow Wang, as a means of buying their own safety, is only one among many instances. Neither party will scruple to commit acts of treachery when their immediate interests seem to be thereby promoted; and though, as a general rule, the terms of capitulation granted by the Imperialists to those who surrender seem to have been kept, I do not delude myself with the belief that they are guided in observing them by any higher motive than that of expediency.

I am averse, therefore, to any step which would lead to the disciplined forces going over to the insurgents, and to a renewal of the state of anxiety and disquietude from which Shanghai suffered when the insurgents were in possession of the cities in its vicinity. I am also adverse to taking any step which might render necessary the presence of an increased number of foreign troops for the security of the place. I would prefer that the corps should be kept together under Major Gordon, and made use of for the protection of that part of the country which has been cleared of insurgents, and where the unfortunate inhabitants may be thus enabled to pursue their avocations in peace. But Her Majesty's Government must be put to no expense in connection with the corps.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 5 in No. 2.

Memorandum embodying the Substance of Major Gordon's Reports on Affairs at Soochow, between the 28th of November and 7th December, 1863 (translation of which was forwarded by Sir F. Bruce to the Foreign Board at Peking).

THE morning after the failure of the night attack by the Imperial troops on the Low-mên stockades, General Ching came to me and said that the Kung Wang had been to see him, and that he had proposed to come over with the Na Wang and three other chiefs, with thirty-five Tien Chuangs and three-fourths of the garrison of Soo-chow; that of the six gates of Soo-chow four were in their possession. General Ching asked me if I thought it a good thing. I told him that with the small force at our disposal it would be a far safer mode to induce them to surrender than if we had to storm the city, the success

of which might be doubtful. He said that the Kong Wang had stated that the Mu Wang was averse to a surrender, but that if we resumed our attack when the Mu Wang came out to oppose us they would close the gate of the city and prevent his re-entering. On the 29th the Imperialist troops renewed their attack, but the Wangs did not succeed in shutting the Mu Wang out of the city. After the attack General Ching came to me and told me that on the night of the 28th the Chung Wang had arrived in the city, and had prevented the others from executing their purpose. On the 1st of December General Ching came to me again and told me that the Chung Wang had left the city that morning at 3 o'clock, that the Na Wang would send out the Tien Chuangs to General Ching that evening to consult concerning the surrender. General Ching asked me to see them, which I did that evening in his boat, when some desultory conversation took place, after which I left and returned to my quarters.

On the morning of the 2nd General Ching came to me and said that the Tien Chuangs had told him that the Na Wang had had some difficulty with the Mu Wang, who was determined on not surrendering. The Na Wang proposed to remain neutral if we attacked the city, and would trust us not to touch their men or horses, the men wearing white turbans for the sake of distinction. He also said that the Na Wang was coming out that evening to see him, and asked if I would meet him. I said not unless there was any great necessity for my doing so. He said he thought it would be a good thing if I did, and finally I agreed to go.

Accordingly, that evening I met him in the evacuated stockades, off the north gate. His first expression after seeing me was that he wished me to help him. I answered that I would be most willing to do so if he would tell me in what way. I also said that the proposal he had made the day before, of which General Ching informed me, appeared to me to be impracticable, inasmuch as if the Imperialists assaulted and took the city it would be impossible to restrain the force which I command from indiscriminate looting and massacre; that if I agreed to the terms now I would be certain to fail in maintaining them afterwards; that therefore if they were desirous of coming over and could make their terms with the Imperialists they should give over one gate as a guarantee, but that if they could not do so it would be better for them still to fight. The Na Wang said that he would consult the other Wangs on the subject. I then said that there should be as little delay as possible. He wanted to the 6th of December. I said that if General Ching asked me to wait I would do so, but I expressed to him a hope that the negotiations would not be of much length, as I was apprehensive that the Mu Wang would hear of it. He said that his men were sufficient to protect him, and that he did not fear him. I then told him to arrange matters with General Ching, after which I returned to my quarters.

I may remark that the Imperialists in their negotiations hitherto with the rebels had always kept faith, and the mandarin camps were full of rebel chiefs who had given in their allegiance. I had therefore no suspicion that the Imperialists would not keep perfect faith in this instance.

On the morning of the 3rd General Ching came to me and said that my interview of the day before with the Na Wang had been very successful, and that he thought there would be no doubt of their really surrendering.

In the afternoon he came to me again, and I told him that it would be much better for them to surrender, as, if we were obliged to attack the city, it would not be by any means certain, after our heavy losses in officers and men on the two previous days' fighting, that we could take the city; that the Governor therefore must negotiate in such a way as to induce them to come over. I saw the Governor Li afterwards, and told him that he must really show mercy to these people, who were going to surrender, and not to be too severe with them. I did so because I knew that if the city were taken by assault a great disorder and massacre would be sure to ensue.

On the night of the 3rd the Na Wang told General Ching that after the defeat on the 29th the Chung Wang had assembled all the Chiefs at his place to a deliberation, and had proposed to them to vacate Soo-chow and Nanking and to return to the south. The Mu Wang would not accede to this, as his father and mother were both at Nanking and his property was at Soo-chow. The other Wangs would not agree, inasmuch as they had the intention of surrendering.

On the morning of the 4th General Ching came and said that the Na Wang had sent out to say that he had arranged with the other Wangs to get Mu Wang on the wall to see our preparations for the attack on the city, that they would then throw the Mu Wang down off the wall, and would escort him in a boat to our lines. I told General Ching that the Mu Wang must be my prisoner, to which Ching, who knew Mu Wang before, gladly assented.

I then went to the Footae to tell him of this matter, but he was out. I saw,

however, a Civil Mandarin named P'an, whom I requested to inform the Footae of the matter, and I said in addition that the Footae must really assent to what I asked. I had not returned to my quarters five minutes when General Ching sent me two Frenchmen, who had just come out of Soo-chow. This was 4 P.M. They said that that morning at 11 o'clock all the Wangs in the city had been assembled at Mu Wang's palace to discuss the rebel affairs; that the Mu Wang made a long discourse in which he praised the superiority of the Cantonese and Kuangsi rebels, saying that the others were not trustworthy. The other Wangs answered him, and the altercation grew hotter and hotter till the Kong Wang got up and took off his robe, and going forward stabbed the Mu Wang, who immediately fell, and one of the Tien Chuangs cut off his head. The head of the Mu Wang was afterwards sent out to General Ching. On this night the rebels all shaved their heads.

On the morning of the 5th, the Cantonese in the city began to give some trouble, and the Na Wang's men drove them out of the city, killing some fifty or sixty of them. Thereupon General Ching advanced some of his men, who took charge of the Low-mên, my men being advanced to the North gate; but, fearing that they might do mischief there, I immediately withdrew them. I then went to the Footae, and said that it would not do to let my men remain idle, and proposed to him to march on towards Woo-sieh and Chang-chow. I asked him to give the men two months' pay as a present, stating that since I had taken the command they had received no reward, though they had recaptured a great many places and had had very hard and continuous fighting. He still objected. I told him if he could only promise he would do so that it would be all right, but that I could not keep them in hand unless he assented, and gave him until 3 o'clock, as after that time I could not remain in command.

I then went myself into the city. The Imperialists had a few men straying about, but everything in the street seemed quiet and orderly. I went to see the Na Wang, at whose house I met the other Wangs. I asked them if everything had gone on properly and satisfactorily. They said, yes. I then went down to the Mu Wang's place, and saw the body there, where it had fallen, still unburied. I then went out of the city to my troops.

It was now 4 o'clock, and I met General Ching coming to arrange matters in reference to my force. I told General Ching that I could do nothing in the matter. General Ching then offered one month's pay. I said that, as for myself, I wanted nothing, and referred him to the officers commanding regiments to discuss the matter. Afterwards, as the men began to make a disturbance, and were threatening to make an attack on the Footae's place, with a view to prevent further trouble I determined to make the men accept the one month's pay, and succeeded in quelling the disturbance. I left a guard on the Footae's boat that night, being apprehensive of further trouble. General Ching told me that night that the Footae had already written to Peking, and said that he was going to extend mercy to the rebel Wangs, &c.

At 8 o'clock the next morning I ordered my troops to march back to Quinsan. From some information I had received from letters which were found in Mu Wang's house and from the foreigners who had escaped, I had reason to believe that the steamer "Firefly," which had been carried off some time ago, was somewhere on the Taihu Lake: I accordingly ordered the two small steamers to come round and meet me at Wu-lung-chiao, directing my boat to come up to the South gate and await me there. I then went into the city by the Low-mên, where I heard that the Na Wang and others were to go out of the city to see the Footae at 12 noon, when the city was to be given over.

At half-past 11 o'clock I went to the Na Wang's house, where I saw the Na Wang and the other Chiefs with their horses saddled to leave for the Footae. I took the Na Wang aside, and asked him if everything was all right. He said that everything was all right. I told him I was going to the Taihu Lake to search for the steamer. He said, "Why not wait a little? I am coming to see you." I said that unless there was an absolute necessity I could not wait. He said that there was no great necessity, so I left him, and soon after I saw the Wangs, with some twenty attendants, going towards the Low-mên, on their way to the Footae's camp.

I went down to the Mu Wang's palace, and saw General Ching's men come down to bury the Mu Wang's body, according to my request; and then fearing that my boats had not yet got round to the South gate, I went on to the East gate. Just as we arrived at the gate, I saw a large crowd near General Ching's and the Footae's stockade, which I thought was the ceremony of submission going on. A few minutes afterwards a large force of the Imperialists came rushing into the city, firing off their muskets in the air, and yelling as they usually do when they enter a vacated stockade. I remonstrated with the mandarins and soldiers, as their conduct was liable to frighten the rebels and cause them

to create a disturbance. After a few minutes General Ching came in, and looked rather pale. I asked him if the interview was over and had been satisfactory. He said the Wangs had never seen the Footae. I said I had seen them going, and asked how it was they had not seen him. He said he did not know, but they might have run away. I asked what could have induced them to do so. He said he had been told that they had sent out to the Footae to ask to keep 20,000 men, and to have half the city, building a wall inside: that the Na Wang had said before that he wanted to retain 2,500 men, and at another time he wanted no soldiers, but merely to return home; it was said that he also wanted to bring in some of the Chung Wang's men; that the Footae had objected to his demand, and had told him to take his men outside of the city gate and stockade them there; that the Na Wang had taken alarm and run away. What he said in regard to the Chung Wang I knew, at the time, to be false; as to the rest, I could not say whether it was so or not. I asked him if he thought that the Na Wang and the others had gone back to the rebels. He said, no; but they would go back to their own homes and live there. On hearing this, I did not feel well satisfied, and asked an Englishman, who was by, to go to the Na Wang's house and see him, and to reassure him if anything had alarmed him. General Ching did not wish him to go, saying that his men alone would be allowed in, and that there would be no looting whatever on the part of his soldiers. As I knew before that he had his men in good discipline, I had no fear, and went round the wall with him to the Pan-mên, and reached that place at 5 o'clock P.M. On the way, I had frequently returned to the question of the Na Wang, but found that both General Ching and the interpreters seemed to evade my questions. I heard volleys of musketry in the city to some extent. I asked General Ching what it was. He said there were some Kwang-si and Canton men who would not shave, and they were wanting to frighten them out of the city, and nothing more. General Ching then left, and as I did not like the look of affairs, I asked my interpreter what he thought of the state of matters. He said he thought that the Imperialists having got the city did not care to keep their promises. I therefore decided immediately on riding to the Na Wang's house and seeing him. I, with the interpreter, rode through the streets, which were full of rebels standing to their arms; and I also saw Imperialist soldiers looting. I went to the Na Wang's palace and found it ransacked, and there met the Na Wang's uncle, who begged me to come to his house and protect it. As I had no one to send to General Ching or to summon my troops, I accompanied the Wang's relative, who brought with him the female household to his residence, where there were some 1,000 rebels under arms in a barricaded street.

It was now dark, and I wished to send my interpreter to search for assistance, but they were unwilling that the interpreter should go, and I remained with him until 2 o'clock A.M., keeping away the Imperial looting parties. At 2 A.M. I sent my interpreter and an Imperial soldier who was with my horse, to bring round my steamers to the Footae's quarters, in order to ask the meaning of the proceedings. The interpreter was of opinion that the Wangs had not yet been beheaded, and that we might be in time to prevent it. I also gave the interpreter an order to bring up my body guard. The soldier who accompanied him came back at 3 o'clock, and said that the interpreter had been seized by the Imperial troops, and wounded. He also made me understand that the order I had sent had been torn up by the Imperialist troops.

It was now 4 A.M., and being apprehensive of a general massacre in the city, I started for the Pan-mên to look for the interpreter, and to send additional orders by my boat, which was waiting there. I found no traces of the interpreter, and on reaching the Pan-mên I was detained an hour by the Imperialists.

It was then 5 A.M. when I got out of the city. I determined to go to the Low-mên, hoping to be able to reach the Footae's place, and to get back into the city in time to save the house of the Na Wang's uncle. When I reached the Low-mên I sent my soldiers to the house, but it had already been ransacked. I then went to the Low-mên, and there met General Ching, to whom I gave my opinion of the affairs that had taken place. I then proceeded to the stockade, to await the steamers, as up to this time I was still ignorant that the Wangs had been beheaded.

While here I met General Bailey, commanding General Ching's Artillery, whom I asked if the Wangs had yet been beheaded. He said that they had already been beheaded. He also said that General Ching was very much put out in the affair, and had sent him (Major Bailey) to tell me that he was not responsible for the affair; that the Footae had ordered him to execute the Wangs, and had ordered the troops to plunder.

Major Bailey told me that he had the Na Wang's son at his quarters, and he afterwards brought him to me. The son came up, and pointing to the other side of the river, said his father and the other Wangs had been beheaded there. I went over to examine the place, and found there the bodies, and recognized the Na Wang's head. The bodies

had been gashed and cut down the middle. Just as I was taking up the Na Wang's head, the steamer came up, and as I heard that there were some rebel Chiefs still in custody who had not been executed, I determined on going to the Footae, so as to induce him not to put them to death. The Footae had, however, already gone into the city, and I left a note for him in his boat. I then went on board the steamer, and moved off to Quinsan.

The above is a brief summary of the late events, which are fraught with serious consequences to the Imperial Government. I imagine the matter was arranged between the Footae and General Ching. The other Mandarins entirely condemned the proceedings.

Inclosure 6 in No. 2.

Memorandum embodying the Substance of Mr. Interpreter Mayers' Report to Mr. Consul Markham, at Shanghai, on Proceedings at Soo-chow (translation of which was forwarded to the Foreign Board by Sir F. Bruce).

ON the 8th of December I reached Quinsan, and saw Major Gordon. On the following day a Civil Mandarin named P'an arrived as a Commissioner from the Footae, to endeavour to effect a reconciliation. This officer admitted the ignominy of the Footae's conduct; but, as I acted by Major Gordon's request as interpreter, he implored me to do all in my power to appease Major Gordon's mind, and bring about a reconciliation, deprecating especially the idea of his abandoning the command, and thus causing the disciplined force to fall into disorder, and desert most probably to the rebels, and expose the country to destruction.

Major Gordon impressed upon P'an his firm resolve to hold no further communication with the Footae.

I also pointed out to P'an that Major Gordon could do no more than conscientiously act for the maintenance of obedience in his force, and maintain from injury or loss the territory already reconquered, until a reference to higher authorities should lay down rules for his conduct.

From what I gathered on this and on other occasions, it appears that the Chiefs on reaching the camp on the 6th instant were received with friendly demonstrations by the Footae; that General Ching also received them; and that, while conversing with them, the executioners suddenly rushed forward, and decapitated the Wangs. No sooner was the deed committed than the orders were given for the troops to rush into the city by the East Gate so as to drive out the rebels by the Western Gate. The Footae's reason for doing so seemed to be that he was alarmed at the number of troops in the city (some 30,000 or more), whom it would be difficult to restrain. It was also alleged that General Ching was a consenting party to the arrangement, as he was afraid lest the Na Wang should eventually supplant him as a Commander.

Although wishing to return to Shanghai, I was induced to await the arrival of the General, who was expected at Quinsan.

I spent the intervening day, the 10th, at Soo-chow, where I found the city completely plundered, and many conflagrations not yet extinct. Loot was being publicly sold by the soldiers in and around General Ching's stockades. Order, however, prevailed, and the Mandarins within the city were busily engaged in distributing the inhabitants to their respective quarters, and making public donations of food.

On the 10th General Brown arrived, and on the 11th he instructed me to proceed to Soo-chow to see the Footae, and appoint a time for an interview. The Footae appeared ill at ease, but received me with a confident air, and inquired of me whether I could not communicate what the General had to say without troubling him to come personally, adding, "Everything is quite right, is it not?" But suddenly changing this tone, he said, "The fact is, the Wangs are already killed, and cannot be brought to life again!" and deprecated any cessation of friendly feeling between the two countries in consequence of an act which was justified by Chinese ethics, and in which foreign nations, however they might differ from this view, had no concern.

Having arranged General Brown's interview, I withdrew to the house occupied by P'an, where the latter renewed his supplications that the affair might be condoned. He said that, notwithstanding the confidence assumed by the Footae, he was repentant of his act, and would recommend to the Throne for employment the Na Wang's son.

I pointed out to the P'an that if the Footae really had the repentant feeling which was represented, he should acknowledge it in an official manner to General Brown. I

also took the opportunity of pointing out to P'an the effect which would be produced on public opinion abroad by a knowledge of the Footae's conduct.

P'an also remarked that but for the putting of the Wangs to death, the Chiefs commanding the cities of Hu-chow and Chia-hsing to the south of the Tai-hoo Lake, who were followers of the Na Wang, would undoubtedly have imitated his surrender, a result which could not now be anticipated. He attempted in a circuitous manner to relieve the Footae of the blame, and cast it on General Ching.

On the following day I accompanied General Brown from Quinsan to Soo-chow. The Footae, attended by General Ching and P'an, had come out of the city to the stockades to meet us.

General Brown commenced by expressing to the Footae the reasons for his visit. The Footae was visibly disturbed, but evaded any acknowledgment of his wrong. Should he be declared to have done wrong, he would submit to any punishment the Emperor might decree, but he was of opinion that, as the chief Chinese authority in the Province of Kiang-su, he was empowered to take what measures he thought fit with Chinese offenders. He did not, however, attempt to deny that he had implicated Major Gordon in the act committed by prevailing on him to share in the preceding consultations.

He next inquired what it was that General Brown wanted of him. He was informed that he must first declare the complete exoneration of Major Gordon from all share in the transaction. This he hastened to declare was obvious. Major Gordon had known nothing of what took place.

General Brown continued to say that there was danger to be apprehended from the dissatisfaction prevailing among both officers and men of the disciplined force, and, with a view to prevent disturbance, he had instructed Major Gordon to retain the command for the present until the Peking Government should pronounce on what had passed.

The Footae signified the relief he felt in hearing that Major Gordon would continue in command of the disciplined force, though he did not lead it against the rebels.

On General Brown's taking leave of him, the Footae suddenly grasped me by the arm, and said, "I look to you to arrange matters, and prevent a breach of friendship."

I shortly afterwards returned to Shanghae.

Inclosure 7 in No. 2.

*Memorandum embodying Extracts from Letter of Prince Wittgenstein to Sir F. Bruce
(translation of which was forwarded to the Foreign Board in Peking).*

I JOINED Major Gordon in the middle of November, and remained with him for a month, and was present at all the engagements which took place during that time, including the attacks on the 27th and 29th of November. I was also a personal witness of the affairs which took place on the 5th and 6th of December.

With respect to the interview with the Na Wang which took place on the 2nd, Major Gordon was present only at the request of General Ching; and although it was General Ching who made the arrangements with the Na Wang about the surrender of the city, it is clear that he was induced to pass over to the Imperialists with his men only in consequence of Major Gordon's attitude at the interview, when he was informed by Major Gordon that he could not guarantee their safety during an attack if his men were to be distinguished simply by wearing white turbans; and that, if they really wished to surrender, they must give up a gate as a guarantee. The Na Wang naturally presumed that Major Gordon could, if they would do so, guarantee their safety, and consequently immediately after the death of Mu Wang he opened the Eastern gate (Low-mên).

On the morning of the 5th of December I went into the city by the Low-mên, which was occupied by a mixed guard of Imperial soldiers and followers of the Na Wang. Everything appeared quite quiet, without any thought of treachery on either side. The Imperial soldiers were strictly forbidden entering the town, and all those who tried to pillage the city were immediately put to death without mercy. The day passed very tranquilly; the police of the Na Wang patrolled the streets, and proclamations had been issued to reassure the inhabitants. There was no idea of barricading the streets or offering any opposition. During the whole day of the 5th Major Gordon kept his men drawn up under arms, and would not allow them to enter the city, which had been voluntarily surrendered, fearing that if they were allowed in he could not prevent a general pillage. Going in person to the Footae he asked that a present of two months' pay might be given

to his soldiers, that he might continue his march towards Woo-sieh and Chang-chow. The Footae refused, however, stating that there was no hurry, and that he had much better rest with his forces at Quin-san for the present. The soldiers having heard that the Footae had refused to give the two months' pay which Major Gordon had asked, and that the latter had resigned his command, were about to seize their arms and march down to the Footae's place to commit some act of violence. Major Gordon was obliged to restrain them sternly. They eventually received a promise of one month's pay from the Footae. Major Gordon placed a guard over the Footae's boat that night; and as the soldiers were a short distance from the city, he was afraid of a commotion, and was obliged to order them back to Quin-san. It would appear that the Footae made use of Major Gordon in the consultations between General Ching and the Wangs, so as to induce the latter to come out and surrender. He would not allow Major Gordon to go on against the rebels nor to keep his soldiers at Soo-chow, because he was afraid lest, in the latter case, Major Gordon would oppose the execution of the Wangs, and therefore he induced him to remove his troops to Quin-san.

Inclosure 8 in No. 2.

The Prince of Kung to Sir F. Bruce.

(Translation.)

February 4, 1864.

THE Prince of Kung makes a necessary communication to Sir F. Bruce, &c. &c.

A few days ago the Prince had the honour to receive from the British Minister (translation of) a letter from General Gordon, relative to the execution of the Na Wang and his associates by Governor Li. The letter says that the Na Wang went to General Ching to tender his allegiance; that General Ching had previously consulted with General Gordon on the subject, who considered that it would be much better to allow (the city) to surrender, as a massacre would thereby be avoided; that Governor Li, however, afterwards decapitated the Na Wang and his associates, which the latter characterizes as a breach of faith.

The Foreign Board is also in receipt of a despatch from Governor Li on this subject to the following effect:—

"Kao Yun-kuan, *soi-disant* Na Wang, and his associates, in consequence of the late success of the Imperial arms, came of their own accord to beg permission to capitulate. After the permission had been given them, they still, with their rebel followers numbering several hundreds of thousands, held possession of and refused to surrender the Chang, Hsu, and P'an, three gates of the city; and when they came out to have an interview with the Governor they had not yet shaved their heads, they still wore their arms, and their general bearing was marked by extreme ferocity. They stated that the guardianship of Soo-chow must be placed in their hands, and that all the soldiers then under their command must be placed at their disposal, and that high rank must be conferred upon them; that if these conditions were not complied with, they would not return to their allegiance.

"Such a menacing and intimidating attitude, adopted with a view to enforce demands, has never been assumed by any rebels who have hitherto returned to their allegiance. The slightest hint of non-compliance at the time would have resulted in an immediate catastrophe. If the Wangs had not been promptly beheaded, not only would the Imperial soldiers in the city have been slaughtered to a man, but the enormous force under the command of these Chiefs would still have remained within the rebel ranks, and a subsequent and much greater slaughter would have been unavoidable, and violence would thus have been done to the beneficent principle of heaven and earth, which delights to create (and is opposed to destruction). There was nothing then for it but at once to execute the eight Wangs. The remaining rebels immediately shaved their heads and surrendered. Small sums of money were given to them, and they were dismissed to their respective homes. Not one man of them was killed. By the death of these few men the lives of hundreds of thousands have been saved."

The Prince has to remark that inasmuch as General Gordon was engaged in the discussion which took place in the camp of General Ching when the Na Wang came out to beg permission to surrender, if a sudden alteration in the position of affairs, requiring that action should be taken without a moment's delay, prevented any consultation on the subject, it was Governor Li's duty after the affair was over to have explained the circumstances to General Gordon, by doing which, mutual misunderstanding would have been avoided; and if Governor Li had nothing for it but to put the Wangs to death, the Prince, on his part does not uphold his conduct in not minutely explaining, after the affair was over, the circumstances which prevented him from doing other than he did.

With reference to what the rebel Wangs said to General Gordon on the subject of their surrender, his Highness observes that they did not give up the whole of the city; they only gave up one gate, and that moreover was held by a mixed guard of Imperialist and rebel troops. None of the rebels within the city, nor of those guarding the gates, had shaved their heads; they still wore their rebel uniforms and badges; these facts are borne witness to by the personal observations of Prince Wittgenstein of Prussia, who, himself went into the city, and from them it is evident that (the rebel Chiefs) had not at that time determined upon making a complete surrender.

The rule which obtains in China is that when men have given in their allegiance their lives are guaranteed to them, but if they again rebel they are liable to the punishment of death. Others thus take fear to themselves, and are deterred from the commission of such crimes. As an instance (of such clemency) may be cited the case of Hung Sung-hai (a relative of the Taeping Tien Wang, originator of the rebellion), who gave in his allegiance last year, and had a subordinate rank immediately conferred upon him, and afterwards, having distinguished himself, received further promotion. Great numbers of other rebel leaders have similarly returned to their allegiance, and China has hitherto never taken advantage of a voluntary surrender to put a single man wrongfully to death.

Moreover, in this case, if the Governor Li was not justified in putting the rebel Wangs to death, it is certain that no other rebels would have subsequently surrendered; but how is it that even after the capture of Soo-chow, the rebels holding the towns of Wu-hsi, Chin-kuei, Ping-hu, and Cha-pu, have one after another voluntarily surrendered, and that quite lately the rebels of Chia-shan-hsien have delivered up their town, and returned to their allegiance? In all these cases Governor Li has prayed His Majesty to confer official rank upon (the leaders), and it has not been alleged that a single man of them has been put to death.

From these instances it may be inferred that the real reason for the execution of the rebel Wangs was that they employed an armed menace to enforce their demands, and that the Governor could not do otherwise than put them to death.

By the laws of China any man who employs an armed force to intimidate a superior officer into complying with his demands, although he may have previously distinguished himself in the service of his country, is liable to the punishment of death; how much stronger does it hold in the case of persons who have just come out from the rebel ranks, and who have previously committed incalculable excesses in the destruction of life and property?

Saving the life of hundreds of thousands by the death of a few, accords with what is laid down in the historic classic: "By putting to death you prevent (the necessity of) putting to death."

The Prince has to add that, in reference to the respective statements of General Gordon and Governor Li, a decision can only be arrived at when the real facts of the case are ascertained, and his Highness will immediately institute a close investigation, the result of which he will bring to the notice of the British Minister.

As China and foreign countries are now acting together in a spirit of harmony, should foreign officers hereafter be engaged in assisting and acting in conjunction with Chinese authorities, there must in all matters be a conjoint deliberation, so as to ensure that (the action taken) will not be at variance with the principles held to be right either by China or foreign countries; differences of opinion, resulting in difficulties like the present, will thereby be avoided.

Inclosure 9 in No. 2.

Sir F. Bruce to the Prince of Kung.

Sir,

Peking, February 10, 1864.

I HAVE received your Imperial Highness' despatch of the 4th instant, containing the account forwarded to the Chinese Government by Governor Li of the events that led to the decapitation of the insurgent chiefs at Soo-chow. I regret that I find nothing in it which tends to alter the views of the case I arrived at on the perusal of the documents I submitted to your Imperial Highness. It is difficult to suppose that the rebel Chiefs put themselves in the power of the Governor without having received full assurances of their personal safety, and without the conditions of surrender having been definitively settled. Governor Li, by putting the rebel Chiefs precipitately to death, has deprived himself of the power of substantiating, by sufficient evidence, his account of what passed at his interview with them; and this act is the more to be regretted as the arrest and detention

of the Chiefs would have secured the capture of Soo-chow as effectually as their death. The conclusion to which any person reading these statements will come to is this, that the Governor Li made fair promises to these men to get them into his power, and that having gained his object, he availed himself of trivial pretexts to put them to death.

Under these circumstances I cannot expect any British officer of character to serve under the orders of or with Governor Li, and the simple course to take would be to withdraw Major Gordon altogether. But to do this precipitately would be to inflict great injury on the interests of the Chinese Government, and to expose the country and the population between Soo-chow and Shanghae to a repetition of the scenes of pillage and massacre that marked the advance of the insurgents two years since. To prevent this it would be necessary either to constitute Major Gordon and the corps he commands a British force, or to increase the foreign garrison and to disband the disciplined legion, of whom many officers and men would join the insurgents. These plans are open to serious objection.

I am willing, therefore, to advise Major Gordon to remain in command of the force, for the protection of Shanghae and the districts recaptured from the insurgents, until Her Majesty's Government decides whether it will withdraw its officers from the Chinese service or lays down the terms on which it will allow them to serve. In order, however, to prevent further embarrassment and difficulties, I must be able to reassure Major Gordon on the following points:—

1. Major Gordon is to be relieved from any communication with Governor Li.
2. Orders are to be given to the Taoutae of Shanghae to provide for the punctual payment of the officers and men constituting the force, in order that mutiny and desertion may be avoided; and for any failure he is to be held responsible.
3. Major Gordon is to provide for the defence of Shanghae, and of such a tract round it as the force under his command can protect.
4. Major Gordon is to have the power of reducing the force as far as he may think advisable, and of making pecuniary arrangements to induce such of the foreign officers as he may not wish to retain, to quit China.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

No. 3.

Acting Consul Markham to Earl Russell.—(Received April 18.)

My Lord,

Shanghae, February 23, 1864.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, copy of two despatches dated respectively the 20th and 23rd instant, addressed by me to Sir F. W. A. Bruce.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM.

Inclosure 1 in No. 3.

Acting Consul Markham to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Shanghae, February 20, 1864.

I HAVE to inform you that Major Gordon has considered it right to abandon the position of inactivity which he took up, under the direction of General Brown, in December last, in consequence of his rupture with the Footae.

Major Gordon's reasons for this step have not been clearly stated, but I believe that he has been actuated to some extent by an apprehension that discontent was likely to arise among the officers or men of the force should he continue longer at Quinsan. He appears to have visited the Footae at Soo-chow about the beginning of this month, and to have arranged with him the plan of a campaign which he has now left Quinsan for the purpose of executing.

Cognizant as I was of the circumstances which attended Major Gordon's withdrawal from the active command of the Quinsan force, and of the serious nature of the protests against the Footae's late conduct which he forwarded to you conjointly with General Brown, and mindful also of the communication of the latter officer with the Footae, I

deemed it my duty, on learning Major Gordon's intentions, to urge him to continue in the position he had deliberately adopted, and in which he had been strengthened by General Brown, with the unanimous assent of the Consular Body of Shanghai, until your views on the subject should become known, but I regret to say that I was not successful in inducing him to renounce his intention for the time.

A copy of a Proclamation, drawn up by the Footae with the assistance of Mr. Hart, which has been posted up at Quinsan, has just reached me. Its tenour is exculpatory of the Footae's conduct, but I shall not be in a position to inclose a translation until the next opportunity for the North.

Respectfully &c.
(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM.

Inclosure 2 in No. 3.

Acting Consul Markham to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Shanghai, February 23, 1864.

REFERRING to my despatch of the 25th instant, I inclose translation of a proclamation drawn up by the Footae with the assistance of Mr. Inspector-General Hart, in which a favourable construction is placed upon the act of perfidy which elicited Major Gordon's determined protest at the time of its occurrence.

Respectfully, &c.
(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM.

Inclosure 3 in No. 3.

Proclamation by Li, Footae of Kiang-soo, &c.

(Translation.)

THE ever-victorious force, since the command was taken by General Gordon, has assisted with uniform success in the operations against the rebels, and the Footae has on repeated occasions obtained decrees of approbation for its services in reply to his memorials to the Throne. At the time when the rebel Kao, falsely known as the Na Wang, and his associates were summarily put to death, the overthrow of settled arrangements was imminent from one moment to another, and General Gordon, not being on the spot, could not be cognizant of the circumstances involved. He was thus led to conceive that the course of action adopted was in opposition to the agreement previously entered into; and now, as both Chinese and foreigners appear to attach credence to mere rumours, and are ignorant that the Footae's intentions, although seemingly at variance with those of General Gordon, were in fact identical with them, it behoves him to remove all doubt upon this subject by the issue of one distinct Proclamation. The facts to be stated are these:—

At the moment when the operations against Soo-chow were on the point of being crowned with success, the rebel Kao and his associates, finding themselves in straits, besought permission to surrender. A great distinction existed between this act and the submission tendered before the arrival of a besieging force, by the rebel garrisons of Nawei, Chang-shu, and other places. When General Gordon obtained the Footae's consent to admit them to surrender, in order to avert the slaughter that must ensue upon the storming of the city, it was from a desire to spare the myriads of the population, and not simply with the wish at all hazards to secure the lives of the rebel Kao and his associates. Still less can it be said that when once the agreement was entered into, no alteration was possible, so that these men could have been empowered, in tendering their submission, to enforce claims on their own behalf, and in despite of all, be still held as pardoned, whilst their rebellious tendencies were arising afresh! This principle is perfectly clear, and both the law of China and foreign practice are identical upon this point, respecting which there can be no doubt.

At first, in the negotiations for the submission for the murder of the so styled Mu Wang, the surrender of the North-east gate, and the fixing of a time for their interview at the camp, every step was known to General Gordon: but on his arrival at the camp, the so-styled Na Wang had not shaved his head, and his rebellious designs were patent to view. He both refused to disband his men, and insisted on their being enrolled in the army, to the number of several tens of battalions, and further urged the demand that the ranks of Brigadier-General, &c., should be obtained from the Throne for his adherents, who

were to be left at the head of their men as garrison for Soo-chow. Not only was no sign of contrition evinced, but, on the contrary, there was a design of preparing the way for an eventual return to rebellion. Whilst his speech was evasive and ambiguous, his expression of countenance was ferocious and bold to an extreme; and all this took place after the surrender had been completed. The Footae could, therefore, for his own safety, do no otherwise than guard against a (dangerous) departure from the arranged conditions; and these were all particulars with which General Gordon was not acquainted. As regards the outset, when the Footae agreed with General Gordon to accept the submission of these men he had no conception that hesitation would take place at the last moment; and with respect to subsequent occurrences, the signs of danger were disclosed in a single instant, when, if no action could have been taken until after communicating with General Gordon, not only would it have become too late, but all the advantages secured would have been sacrificed. Supposing that the Footae had adhered rigidly (to his agreement), so that these few bandits had been enabled to ensure their own safety and resort to their rebellious practices, it was many tens of thousands who would have suffered by the consequent misfortune; and the result would have been far from what was contemplated when first these men were admitted to surrender. Fortunately, however, by a summary decision at the vital instant, by which these few bandits only were put to death, and the mass of their followers scattered to the winds, benefit was secured to the same vast number of the people, whom to protect was the main object held in view.

From first to last what was aimed at was the prevention of slaughter in the moment of victory at Soo-chow; and therefore has the Footae said that his intentions, though seemingly at variance, were in reality identical with those of Major Gordon. When, in fact, on the 6th of December, the so-styled Na Wang came with his associates to the camp, General Gordon, having previously looked upon the matter as securely settled, did not accompany them; and, after the occurrence, he returned to Quin-san. He was thus both not an eye-witness to what actually occurred on the spot, and he was misled by the rumours which were spread abroad after the affair had taken place. He was impressed with the conviction that, the terms of surrender having been agreed to, the subsequent execution of the individuals was a breach of the Convention entered into; but he was totally unaware of the pressing urgency and extreme danger of the consequences involved, which left not an instant for delay, and which led the Footae to inflict at once the penalty prescribed by military law.

The Footae has already written a minute account of these circumstances to the Board of Foreign Affairs for communication to the Foreign Ministers; and, in addition to this, he now publishes this Proclamation for the information of Chinese and foreigners alike.

He will take stringent measures to prohibit the circulation of false and inflammatory reports.

Tung-Chih, 3rd year, 1st moon, 7th day (February 14, 1864).

No. 4.

Mr. Layard to Sir E. Lugard.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 25, 1864.

I AM directed by Earl Russell to request that you will state to Earl de Grey and Ripon that as the Order in Council under which Major Gordon was permitted to take service under the Chinese Government has been revoked, and there is great doubt as to whether the treachery of the Wangs was any excuse for the breach of faith committed by the Footae, Lord Russell is of opinion that it will be advisable to withdraw explicitly from Major Gordon all leave and license to serve under the Emperor of China.

Lord Russell therefore requests that instructions to this effect may be addressed to General Brown, who may, however, be informed that he may employ Major Gordon to defend Shanghai and the thirty-mile circle round it, if he can make any agreement by which Major Gordon would receive his orders from General Brown. In that case he would not be in the service of the Chinese Government.

If this cannot be done, Major Gordon should return home.

I am, &c.

(Signed)

A. H. LAYARD.

No. 5.

Sir E. Lugard to Mr. Hammond.—(Received April 26.)

Sir,

War Office, April 26, 1864.

WITH reference to your letter of the 25th instant, relative to the position of Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon in the Chinese service, I am directed by the Secretary of State for War to transmit to you, for the information of Earl Russell, a copy of the instruction which Lord de Grey has addressed to Major-General Brown on the subject.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWARD LUGARD.

Inclosure in No. 5.

Earl de Grey and Ripon to Major-General Brown.

Sir,

War Office, April 26, 1864.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you that as the Order in Council of the 9th January, 1863, enabling military officers to take service under the Emperor of China, has been revoked, Her Majesty's Government have had under their consideration the position occupied by Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon as Commandant of the disciplined Chinese force, and have determined that it will be advisable to withdraw explicitly from this officer all leave and license to serve under the Emperor of China.

You will therefore inform Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon of this decision, and direct him to quit the Chinese service. But if you should deem it advisable to employ him in defending Shanghai and the thirty-mile circle round it, you are at liberty to do so, pending a reference to me, provided an arrangement can be made by which he would receive his orders direct from yourself, and would not be in the employment of the Chinese Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) DE GREY AND RIPON.

No. 6.

Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 26, 1864.

I INCLOSE for your information a copy of a letter which I have caused to be addressed to the War Office,* relative to Major Gordon's position in command of the Chinese troops.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

P.S.—I also inclose a copy of an instruction which has been addressed by the Secretary of State for War to General Brown, relative to Major Gordon.†

No. 7.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received May 13.)

My Lord,

Peking, February 23, 1864.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 12th instant, I have the honour to forward copy of a document, the original of which appeared in Chinese and English in a Chinese paper published at Shanghai, and purports to emanate from a benevolent society, styling itself "the Soo-chow Committee for the protection of the Defenceless." It contains what may be considered an accurate representation of Chinese opinion on the execution of the Wangs at Soo-chow.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 7.

Acting Consul Markham to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir,

Shanghai, January 18, 1864.

IN connection with my recent reports of the proceedings of the Footae at Soochow, I have to forward copy of a notice which has been published in English and Chinese in the newspapers here, excusing the massacre of the prisoners on the ground of expediency. The Committee in whose name the document appears is a Board established here for charitable purposes; but the arguments and wording are almost identical with those of a Proclamation which the Footae thought fit to send to me a few days since.

Respectfully, &c.
(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM.

Inclosure 2 in No. 7.

Notification.

ON account of the floating rumours regarding the late affairs in Soo-chow, the Undersigned have thought it best to publish this card, and make known the real facts of the case.

The public ought to bear in mind that it was when Le Footae had invested the city, and had captured in succession twenty-three stockades in front of Low-mên, that the hearts of the rebels first began to fail them, and that it was on the departure of Chung Wang on the 23rd of 10th moon (3rd December) for Woo-chow, Na Wang and others first gave intimation of surrender. Now if they sincerely wished to save their own lives, the question arises under what plea did they again collect an army and entrench themselves. Each of the five Wangs and four head men had under him 20,000 or 30,000 men, who continued to wear long hair, and were in possession of the three gates of the city.

On the 25th (December 5th) Na Wang sent out Mu Wang's head. On the 26th the Footae went to the stockade situated immediately without the wall, to receive the allegiance of the rebel Wangs. The Wangs and head men, in all nine men, came, but accompanied by a large body of men fully armed, and whose appearance wore an air of fierceness. They demanded of the Footae the exclusive right to garrison the Soo-chow city, and sole power over their own men. On the spot it would be dangerous for the Footae to refuse the demand, as well as impossible to grant it. Accordingly the Footae, having answered in a few words, left the stockade, and ordered the gates to be closed and the head men seized and beheaded.

The remaining 20,000 or 30,000 rebels in the city, seeing their leaders killed, at once shaved their heads and tendered allegiance, willing to return to peaceful avocations.

Now we find that Na Wang and the other Wangs and head men during the three years of their possession of Soo-chow had committed incalculable evil, and the people they killed exceeded myriads of souls. Their surrender was not made in good faith. If opportunity offer, they would again raise the Tae-ping standard.

If such men are not killed, though Soo-chow might be recaptured, the advantages resulting from the success would be less than what should be expected.

Rebels in other places have on surrender been spared, and even received into services of honour; why should these be singled out as objects of punishment? It was because the Footae found it impossible to tolerate their existence, and he deserves no censure for his course of action.

(Soo-chow Committee for the Protection of the Defenceless.)

Shanghai, December 24, 1863.

No. 8.

Sir E. Lugard to Mr. Hammond.—(Received May 14.)

Sir,

War Office, May 13, 1864.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for War to transmit to you, for the information of Earl Russell, the accompanying copies of a despatch and its inclosures from

Major-General Brown, commanding the troops in China, containing a narration of Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon's proceedings since the fall of Soochow.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD LUGARD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 8.

Major-General Brown to Earl de Grey and Ripon.

(Extract.)

Head-Quarters, Hong Kong, March 31, 1864.

IN connection with the late events in the north of China, of which you will have seen some account in the newspapers, I now forward a narrative of Major Gordon's proceedings since the fall of Soo-chow.

The reasons which induced Major Gordon to take the field were numerous and weighty.

By his remaining inactive the Footae had already incurred a loss of 50,000*l.*, and Major Gordon had sufficiently marked his sense of disgust at the treacherous execution of the Wangs.

The rebels, too, if left to themselves might again make head, and the rebellion be prolonged for years to come; while, if advantage were taken of their present panic, a few months would suffice to restore peace and order to what were formerly the richest and most prosperous districts in China, and from which a large trade might be expected.

Besides this, there was another danger of no small magnitude.

The rowdy population who fount at Shanghae, and in the Tae-ping rebellion, a wide field for employing their energies, had been restrained from joining the rebel party by a wholesome dread of Major Gordon's force.

Should that officer, however, remain inactive, or should he be supplanted by one of Ward's officers, these men would at once join the Tae-pings, and the seizure of the steamer "Tsatee," and of a silk-steamer lately at Shanghae itself, showed what might still be expected.

Another contingency, and one of an alarming nature, was also to be looked to.

What if Burgevine's plan of forming a third party, distinct from Tae-pings and Imperialists, should find its realization under an American successor to Major Gordon?

Such a cause would rally round its banners every vagabond European or American in China, recruited by a large immigration from the American possessions on the Pacific Coast.

It would be absolutely necessary then to put down such a set of banditti at any cost, but how much more advisable to prevent the opportunity from being offered them; and by Major Gordon's again taking the field, the ground was thus, as it were, "cut from under them."

The danger was imminent, and Major Gordon refused to indulge any private feelings of hostility to the Footae; and on public grounds, and in the cause of humanity, knowing the sufferings of the population, he overcame his repugnance to renewed co-operation with the Chinese authorities.

Further reference to our Minister at Peking would have involved the loss of precious time, and Major Gordon moved out from Quinsan, as detailed in the narrative.

It is with much satisfaction that I am able to inform your Lordship that since writing the above, the mail which arrived yesterday from Shanghae brought me the inclosed copy of a letter addressed by Sir F. Bruce to Major Gordon, fully approving of that officer's late proceedings, and I have every reason to believe the termination of the rebellion is not far distant.

Inclosure 2 in No. 8.

Narrative of Events from the Fall of Soo-chow to the middle of March, 1864.

MAJOR GORDON having withdrawn from co-operation with the Footae, employed the months of December and January in re-organizing his force whilst awaiting communications from Sir Frederick Bruce.

But this inaction, though necessary, was attended with serious disadvantage. The officers, though brave and zealous in the field, were of various nations and from a very low class of society.

Such men, when not actively employed, were only too apt to become troublesome and dissatisfied with a leader whose higher motives they could not understand, but whose course of action plainly kept them from opportunities of securing plunder, or those pecuniary rewards which the Footae had been accustomed to bestow in General Ward's time, whenever any important success had been gained.

It is more than probable that the Footae himself, who was fully aware of the peculiarities of the force, and who was extremely displeased at Major Gordon's continued inaction, took measures in some way to tamper with the officers, and make arrangements for placing one of them in command of the force, should Major Gordon continue unwilling to move out.

Whether this were so or not, Colonel Brennan, it appears from report, gave out that he was to succeed to the command, and made no secret of what his arrangements would be.

In the end, Major Gordon was compelled to dismiss from the force no less than sixteen officers (including Colonel Brennan), notwithstanding which wholesome severity he continued to feel that his position was becoming more and more precarious every day; and it was even hinted to him, not obscurely, that the Footae had decided on dismissing him should he still refuse to take the field.

And in defence of this the Footae might fairly allege that the force was a most expensive one; that he had complied with all Major Gordon's demands on account of wounded officers, &c.; and that were operations not pushed on actively, the rebels might recover from their panic and again make head.

These and other reasons of a political and of a military nature, which will be mentioned in a separate communication, induced Major Gordon to move out from Quinsan to Woosieh, after receiving on the 18th of February a letter from Sir Frederick Bruce, which requested him only to make use of his force to retain the conquered districts, but at the same time to keep on good terms with the mandarins.

It was evidently impossible to carry out both these objects, and pressing circumstances would not admit of further reference to Sir Frederick Bruce, communication with Peking being rendered more than usually tedious, owing to the Gulf of Pecheli being frozen.

At this time the Tae-pings were in possession of the towns of Hang-chow, Yuo-ying, Sha-mun, Hayning, Jaching, Kashing-foo, and Wuchu, in the south: Yesing, Liyang, Newshin, Kintang, Chan-chow-foo, Tayan, and Nanking in the north; the towns of Woosieh, Pingho, Chapoo, and Kashyen having come over during December and January: and it is but fair to the Footae to mention that he kept faith with all the towns which came over after the fall of Soo-chow, and that the slaughter of the Wangs on that occasion did not appear to influence the Tae-pings, and deter them from surrendering.

Major Gordon then, after giving his reasons to the Major-General commanding in China for adopting his present determination, and in the propriety of which the Major-General fully concurred, moved on the 29th of February from Woosieh, where the force had been detained for some days, to Yesing, a distance of forty miles, which by a forced march was accomplished in one day.

The stockades in front of the East Gate of Yesing were attacked and carried on the 1st of March, with the loss of only six or seven men killed and wounded.

During the night of the 1st of March the mass of the rebels quitted the city, which came over next day. Major Gordon was now within twenty-five miles of the Imperialists, who held the town of Ning-kow-foo, south-west of Yesing, and who were within three miles of Liyang, a small city which was now the only obstacle between Major Gordon's force and the troops of Tseng Kwo-fan.

The whole country was found to be ravaged and desolate, and the inhabitants reduced to feed on human flesh—a fact the horrible import of which it is impossible to over-estimate.

Shortly after the surrender of Yesing, the Tae-ping garrison at Japooku, a town on the Tahoo Lake, was desirous of coming over to the Imperialists, but the rebel leader and 1,000 men, out of 3,000 forming the garrison, were unwilling to abandon their cause.

Major Gordon proceeded therefore with a detachment to Japooku, overawed the malcontents, and brought the 2,000 men who had submitted to Yesing, the rebels evacuating Japooku.

On the 5th of March Major Gordon moved towards Liyang, and much inconvenience and anxiety was caused by the boats pushing on too hurriedly, and leaving far in their rear the force, which had to cross ten or twelve large creeks.

However, no ill consequences ensued, and the mere appearance of the steamer "Hyson," with the convoy of boats, was sufficient to induce the Tae-pings to evacuate two stockades fifteen miles from Liyang.

After much trouble Major Gordon concentrated his force at Sze-chiaou, one of the abandoned stockades.

From this place to Liyang the distance was fifteen miles, and twenty-three large creeks intervened, but by great exertion the whole force was pushed on to Liyang by the 8th of March.

The rebel Chiefs then lost heart, and returned untouched two officers' boats which had been captured by them during the rash advance of the convoy on the 5th, at the same time proposing to surrender.

Their proposals were acceded to, and the next day Major Gordon occupied Liyang; and shortly afterwards some mandarins arrived from Tseng Kwo-fan to communicate with Major Gordon.

It was afterwards ascertained that Shih Wang, second in command to Chung Wang, had sallied out with 500 men to attack the "Hyson," and that the garrison had shut the gates to prevent his return. Shih Wang's family were captured in Liyang, but have been dismissed and sent to him.

The rebel Chief who commanded at Japooku has since come in and submitted to the Imperial Government, and the number of Tae-ping prisoners in the hands of the Imperialists is no less than 20,000.

Although no particulars have as yet been received, it is known that the city of Kintang is also prepared to return to its allegiance.

The only towns of importance now under the Tae-ping rule are Nanking, Chan-chow-foo, Kashing-foo, and Hang-chow, all closely invested by the Imperial troops.

By the latest dates from Shanghai, marauding parties from Chan-chow-foo are moving about the country, evidently with the desire to get away, having no place to retire upon.

Inclosure 3 in No. 8.

Sir F. Bruce to Major Gordon, R.E.

Sir,

Peking, March 12, 1864.

I HAVE received your letter of the 6th of February, stating the reasons that have led to your continuing operations in concert with the Government of Kiangsoo. I informed the Chinese Government that I did not feel called upon to interfere with the course you have taken, but that my acquiescence was founded on the passage in their despatches to me which states that, in any future operations in which a foreign officer is concerned, the rules of warfare as practised among foreign nations are to be observed, and that I should inclose you the extract of that despatch for your guidance, and as containing the arrangement agreed upon for the future.

I have received the strongest assurances that it will be strictly adhered to, and that the Governor Li is to be instructed to that effect. I need not impress upon you how essential it is that there should be no repetitions of the occurrences at Soo-chow.

I fully appreciate the motives that led you, after the correspondence that has taken place, to resume operations at once and to expose yourself thereby to hostile criticism. You might have limited yourself to a statement of the reasons which rendered the step expedient, and have thrown upon others the onus of decision before committing yourself to any action. But you appear to have felt as Commander of a Chinese force, and as the only person thoroughly acquainted with its composition and with the dangers to which this force, if indiscreetly handled, might give rise, that the decision must be based upon your representations, and you therefore assumed its responsibility. This honourable and manly conduct on your part entitles you to a frank expression of my opinion on the subject.

I think it due to you to state that my concurrence in the step you have taken is founded in no small measure on my knowledge of the high motives that have guided you while in command of the Chinese force, of the disinterested conduct you have observed in pecuniary questions, and of the influence in favour of humanity you exercised in rescuing Burgevine and his misguided associates from Soo-chow. I am aware of the perseverance with which, in the face of serious obstacles and much discouragement, you have steadily pursued the pacification of the Province of Kiangsoo; in relieving it from being the battlefield of the insurrection and in restoring to its suffering inhabitants the enjoyment of their homes and the uninterrupted exercise of their industry; you may console yourself with the assurance that you are rendering a service to true humanity as well as to great material interests. It would be a serious calamity and addition to our embarrassments in China were you compelled to leave your work incomplete, and were a sudden dissolution

or dispersion of the Chinese force to lead to the recurrence of that state of danger and anxiety from which during the last two years Shanghae has suffered. Her Majesty's Government cannot be expected to garrison Shanghae indefinitely, and tranquillity cannot be relied on until a Civil Administration suited to Chinese ideas and habits is finally established in the province, and until the disorderly and brigand element which forms the force of the Tae-ping insurrection is either put down or so thoroughly repelled from its frontier as to leave that unfortunate Province in peace. To the force under your command we must look for that result, and to its efficiency and discipline your presence is indispensable. In a body so composed a state of inaction is full of danger, and I approve of your not awaiting the result of the inquiry into the Footae's proceedings at Soo-chow, provided you take care that your efforts in favour of humanity are not in future defeated by the Chinese authorities.

I am, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

No. 9.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received May 28.)

My Lord,

Peking, March 18, 1864.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a letter I received from Major Gordon, informing me of the reasons which had induced him to resume operations in the Province of Kiangsoo.

I have confidence both in the rectitude of his motives and in the soundness of his judgment, and as he is the only person thoroughly acquainted with the position of affairs near Soo-chow, and with the character of the corps he commands, I thought it due to him to give him all the support in my power.

I have also provided, as far as possible, against the recurrence of what took place at the capture of Soo-chow, and after what happened on that occasion Major Gordon will avoid the mistake he then made of taking part in the parleys with the insurgents, without being made acquainted with the terms of surrender, and without being present to see that the terms are respected.

It is indispensable that officers of character should remain at the head of these semi-disciplined Chinese corps until tranquillity is sufficiently restored, so as to allow of their being dissolved without danger. Otherwise, not only would the results already achieved be sacrificed, but the prospect of the restoration of tranquillity would be indefinitely postponed. The magistrates, elders, and population of the pacified districts have united in entreating Major Gordon to continue in the command; and every person of humanity must feel anxious that they should not be exposed to a repetition of the sufferings they have endured since the insurgents appeared in the Province.

I have the honour to inclose the Proclamation of the Governor Li, in which he clears Major Gordon of all participation in the death of the insurgent Wangs, and states the reasons which induced him to execute them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 9.

Major Gordon, R.E., to Sir F. Bruce.

My dear Sir Frederick Bruce,

Soo-chow, February 6, 1864.

IN consequence of the danger which will arise by my delaying inaction with the force any longer in a state of uncertainty, I have arranged with the Footae to issue a Proclamation (which he will send to you), clearing me of any participation in the late execution of the Wangs, and have determined to act immediately.

The reasons which actuate me are as follows:—I know of a certainty that Burgevine meditates a return to the rebels; that there are upwards of 300 Europeans ready to join them, of no character, and that the Footae will not accept another British officer if I leave the service, and therefore the Government may have some foreigner put in, or else the force put under men of Ward's and Burgevine's stamp, of whose action at times we should never feel certain.

I am aware that I am open to very grave censure for the course I am about to pursue

but in the absence of advice, and knowing as I do that the Peking authorities will support the Footae in what he has done, I have made up my mind to run the risk. If I followed my own desire, I should leave now, as I have escaped unscathed, and been wonderfully successful. But the rabble called the Quinsan force is a dangerous body, and it will be my duty to see that it is dissolved as quietly as possible, and that, while in course of dissolution, it should serve to benefit the Imperial Government.

I do not apprehend the rebellion will last six months longer if I take the field. It may take six years if I leave, and the Government does not support the Imperialists. I propose to cut through the heart of the rebellion, and to divide it into two parts by the capture of Yesing and Liyang.

If the course I am about to pursue meets your approbation, I shall be glad to hear, but if not shall expect to be well rebuked. However, I know that I am not actuated by personal considerations, but merely as I think will be most conducive to the interests of our Government.

The Footae does not want the force to move against Nanking, I imagine, as Tseng Kwo-fan has the wish to capture it himself.

The Footae, if he is to be believed, has some extenuating circumstances in his favour for his action, and although I feel deeply on the subject, I think that we can scarcely expect the same discernment that we should from an European Governor.

This letter will relieve you from any responsibility on this matter, and thanking you very much for your kind letter, which I will answer shortly, I am, &c.

(Signed) C. G. GORDON.

P.S.—If you would let the matter drop, and make me responsible for my action in the matter, I think it would be more conducive to our good relations with the Peking Government than pressing them to punish or degrade the Footae.

C. G. G.

Inclosure 2 in No. 9.

Sir F. Bruce to Major Gordon, R.E., March 12, 1864.

[See Inclosure 3 in No. 8.]

Inclosure 3 in No. 9.

Proclamation by Li, Governor of Kiang-soo, &c.

[See Inclosure 3 in No. 3.]

No. 10.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received May 28.)

My Lord,

Peking, March 21, 1864.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a letter from Mr. Hart, the Inspector-General of Customs, written at the request of Major Gordon, for the purpose of embodying Governor Li's explanations of the events at Soo-chow, and Major Gordon's reasons for again taking the field.

There is no statement of what passed between General Ching, who conducted the negotiations on the Governor's part, and the Tae-ping Wangs. But it appears to me, from the fact that the Ping Wang at Kia-shing-foo refused to treat with him for the surrender of that city, that the Tae-ping Chiefs attribute to him rather than to the Governor the deception, if any, practised upon them. It is perfectly clear that the Governor could not have acquiesced in the terms which the Wangs are represented as having demanded in their interview with him. His position would have been more dangerous with Soo-chow behind him in their power than it was before the capture of the place.

It is to be recollected that these Wangs were the men who were the authors of the treacherous massacre of the Imperialist soldiers at Taitsan. It was by their orders that part of the Tae-ping garrison shaved their heads, as a token of surrender, and let in the Imperialist troops through one of the gates of the city, when they were seized and put death.

One of the charges on which Shen-pao was put to death was that of having amnestied rebels in Ngan-hwey, who subsequently headed a fresh insurrection. Governor Li would certainly have been held personally responsible had any disaster taken place in consequence of his leaving Soo-chow virtually in the power of the insurgents; and after what had taken place at Taitan, he would naturally feel no confidence in their promises, unless they were deprived of the power of doing mischief.

It appears that there was no massacre or pillage of the town; the marauders were taken and shot.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure in No. 10.

Mr. R. Hart to Sir F. Bruce.

My dear Sir Frederick,

Shanghai, February 6, 1864.

ON the 23rd ultimo, when visiting Li, Footae at Soo-chow, I took advantage of the opportunity to make some inquiries relative to the beheading of the Na Wang and others; the explanations then made led me to conclude that, however seemingly wrong from some points of view the action taken may have been, the Footae could not with justice be charged with premeditated treachery.

On the taking of the Low-mên stockades, the Wangs agreed to surrender almost unconditionally; the Footae's promise to them being merely to the effect that the lives of themselves and their followers would be spared, and that "buttons" would be given to some of them. That promise having been made, the Wangs signified their acquiescence by causing their followers to shave their heads, and by opening the city gates; a portion of the Imperialist force then entered the city. That done, the surrender was completed; the Wangs and others having divested themselves of their character as rebels, and having been permitted to return to their allegiance, were from that moment the subjects of the Footae, and as such, were as much bound to obey his orders as any other Chinese in the Kiang-soo province. The only thing that remained to be attended to was to make provision for sending the quondam Tae-pings to their native districts, and for that purpose a Committee was at once formed, and funds were appropriated.

The Wangs thereon visited the Footae, but their demeanour was rather that of men who had terms to dictate than of people who had just been allowed to participate in an act of clemency. The tone they assumed, and the language they used, were alike unbecoming; but both tone and language might have passed without remark had it not been for the demands they then preferred. They not only refused to disband their followers, but they stated their intention of holding three of the city gates, strongly fortified positions, and demanded pay for their troops. The Na Wang told the Footae that his followers would obey the orders of nobody but himself; and when the Footae replied that that difficulty could easily be got over by his (the Na Wang's) ordering them to take the commands of himself (the Footae), the Na Wang refused to give any such order.

From the tone, demeanour, and language of the Wangs it was very evident to the Footae that he had still dangerous characters to deal with. The question then arose as to whether or not it would be safe to acquiesce in their demands.

To the Footae acquiescence seemed altogether inexpedient, and that for the following among other reasons. From the Na Wang's remark that his people would not obey the orders of any one but himself, it was only too certain that, to allow him to retain his men around him armed and not disbanded, would be simply to give a dangerous man the means wherewith to work mischief whenever inclined to do so; and the same objection pointed to the inexpediency of allowing the other Wangs to continue with their followers too, the more especially as the refusal to disband their people was coupled with a determination to hold three of the city gates. Even supposing that the Footae had seen no other necessity for calling on them to disband their men, the demand that they should be paid was in itself a sufficient reason for refusing to keep them together; for, in the first place, the Footae knew very well that the funds at his disposal were far from being adequate for the regular payment of the troops already employed in the province; and secondly, to take on 20,000 or 30,000 additional troops would have been certain to lead, the moment funds were not forthcoming, to mutiny, revolt, and further disasters. The Footae, too, had a very distinct recollection of Tae-ping treachery, and more particularly of what had been done at Taitan, where the Tae-pings shaved their heads, admitted the Imperialists, and then, closing

the gates, fell on them while unprepared, and murdered them most treacherously. For these and other reasons the Footae felt that it would be utterly unsafe and inexpedient to accede to the demands made by the Wangs.

The moment was a critical one, time pressed, and the Footae had to make up his mind very quickly as to the best course to be adopted. He felt that it would not do to refuse to comply with their demands, and at the same time allow them to rejoin their people in the city. Were he to do so, the probability was that the immediate result would be the massacre of the Imperialists (far outnumbered by the Tae-pings) who had entered the city, and an attack upon his troops outside the walls, who, scattered and unprepared, and unsupported by Gordon's force, which had previously returned to Quinsan, were sure to be cut up and dispersed; even were no such attack made, the rebel Chiefs could at least rejoin their men and march off with them and their arms to some other rebel position, and it seemed demanded by general interests that they should not be allowed to do even that.

Then there remained but two courses open to the Footae: the one was to arrest the Chiefs and keep them in confinement; the other, was to behead them at once; and in either case the action determined on was to be followed at once by the occupation of the city with as much display as possible by the whole Imperialist force. To behead them seemed the safest plan; the only harm that beheading them could possibly do would be to deter other Chiefs from coming over to the Imperialist side; whereas to arrest and keep them prisoners, while likely to have just the same effect in alarming other Chiefs, would be attended with the additional inconvenience of retaining in existence noted and able men whose continued existence would in itself be a rallying-point for discontent, and for whose liberation other Tae-pings, otherwise likely to desert the Tae-ping cause as now hopeless, might perhaps still be induced to band together, scheme and fight. The Footae therefore decided on their immediate execution.

But although the Footae appears to have had all the above pros and cons more or less distinctly before his mind, the point which seems to me to have had most weight in leading him to resolve upon the immediate execution of the Wangs, is that hinted at in my second paragraph. The terms of surrender had not only been arranged, but the surrender had been made; the Tae-pings had shaved their heads, and Imperialist troops had entered the city: the people who had returned to their allegiance were bound to obey the Footae. The Wangs, however, refused to obey him, and preferred demands which savoured of further opposition already determined on as coming from subjects and addressed to a Viceroy. The place, too, was in what would correspond to a state of martial law in the West; and the Footae seems to have felt that safety lay in prompt and vigorous action.

The above, with other explanations made by the Footae, added to the fact that the Footae has never harmed any of the other rebel leaders that have submitted to him, cause me to think that, in the present instance, there was no premeditated treachery, and that the Footae suddenly and unexpectedly found himself placed in a dilemma, from which he saw no other way of extricating himself with safety to general interests than by acting as he did. I am not by any means a mandarin worshipper, nor am I sufficiently intimate with the Footae to have any wish to engage in special pleading in his behalf; but I give my opinion looking at the matter calmly and dispassionately.

In addition to charging the Footae with treachery, it has been said that his action damaged the Imperial cause by making it certain that in future rebels would die fighting rather than surrender, and by rendering it impossible for Gordon to co-operate again with him.

I have no doubt whatever but that the beheading of the Wangs will have an effect upon other Wangs: I do not think, however, that it will much affect the Tae-pings generally. And, indeed, Chinese are such strange people, so different in their ways of acting and thinking from Europeans, that it is not all unlikely the Footae's conduct will be to make other Wangs more careful to attend to his wishes when they get into difficulty, than to deter them from coming to terms. Could he have spared his life, the Footae might have made good use of the Na Wang; the rebel leaders are chiefly Kwang-se and Hoopih men, and between the two sets arise frequent differences of opinion. The Na Wang was from Hoopih, and being popular and influential the Footae might have succeeded through him in effecting a decided split between the two parties, if not in bringing over all the Hoopih people to the Imperialist side. As events have shown, the execution has not prevented other Chiefs from surrendering; for since the taking of Soo-chow four important cities have surrendered, viz., Cha-poo, Kea-shen, Ping-hoo-heen, and Hae-yen-heen; and, further, the Ting Wang, at Kea-hing-foo, as also the rebel leader at Hang-chow itself, are both in communication with the Footae's agents, and their surrender may now be heard of any day.

With regard to the Footae's act having made it impossible for Major Gordon to co-operate with him for the future, it certainly up to the present has had that effect, as General Brown's despatches will have shown. The resolution came to to retain the force inactive at Quinsan until the Peking authorities had pronounced upon the Footae's conduct may have seemed the best thing to be done in the first instance. At the same time I am inclined to think that an easier and more practical way of getting out of the difficulty would have been to have sifted, and, if possible, arranged the affair on the spot, rather than to have tied one's own hands, and hurried off a report of a gross treachery to Peking. Had the occurrence been quietly and without excitement inquired into, it would been at least understood why the Footae felt called upon to act as he did; and, though I have not seen them, I very much doubt whether the General's despatches will be found to have made the occurrence altogether intelligible or to have placed it on its proper footing. It would, too, have been seen that whereas in former instances the capture of cities had been followed by wholesale massacres, the taking of the great city of Soo-chow had been followed by no more bloodshed and by no more questionable act than the beheading of about ten rebel leaders, and that the Footae had given special orders to restrain the troops from acts of violence simply because Major Gordon had induced him to do so. Gordon's aid ensured the fall of Soo-chow; and, too, it was Gordon's advice and connection with the troops that prevented the taking of the place from being followed by the massacre of thousands of people. Gordon says that Prince Wittgenstein must have made a mistake in his excitement, for, after the surrender of the city, although the Imperialists when entering it in force made a great noise, there was little or no bloodshed, save when Imperialist braves were beheaded by their own Commanders for looting.

Every one felt for Gordon after the execution, for it was generally supposed that it was their confidence in his honour and ability to protect them that induced the Wangs to surrender. This I am now inclined to doubt. It is a fact that the Wangs did see Gordon with General Ching, the Footae's agent, in settling for the surrender of the city; and it is very likely that the Imperialists hoped that (when they let the rebels see that our foreign leader who had beaten them in so many fights, was actually at Soochow, and prepared to attack if they did not surrender) Gordon's presence would lead the Wangs to conclude that further resistance was hopeless; it was this that induced the Imperialists to wish Gordon to meet the Chiefs, and it was this effect produced, rather than any feeling of confidence in Gordon alone, that induced the Wangs to surrender. My opinion is borne out by the following facts. A youth of about 18 years of age, bold, straightforward, and intelligent, the adopted son of the Na Wang, is now an officer in Gordon's body guard. I had several opportunities of conversing with him, and on one occasion I allowed him without interruption to recount the story of the surrender and execution; he, in so doing, made no mention whatever of Gordon as having been present when the terms of surrender were arranged between General Ching and the Wangs; and, on the other hand, he said that the Na Wang had no fears for his safety when deciding to surrender, because the man who guaranteed his safety, General Ching, was the sworn brother of the Na Wang, having exchanged cards with him after the Chinese fashion. I asked the youth subsequently whether Gordon had not been present at some of the interviews, and he said that he had, but in such a way as to convince me that it was not Gordon's but Ching's presence that had led the Na Wang to feel secure. Another fact is, that the Ting Wang at Kea-hing-foo refused to treat with General Ching since the execution, and the Footae had to send another agent, Hsieh, with whom the Ting Wang is now in communication; this second fact strengthens the presumption that it was Ching's presence that had induced the Na Wang to surrender without fear. At the time of the execution Gordon was supposed to have gone to Quinsan, and even had the Footae deemed it proper to have communicated with him before acting, neither the urgency of the occasion nor the pressure of time would have allowed him with safety to have done so.

I now come to what are to some extent the results of my visit of the 23rd to the Footae.

A week after the explanations had been made by the Footae to me, I met Gordon at Quinsan. It was the first time I had ever seen him. I found that during the week the Footae had settled all the claims preferred by Gordon for gratuities to men wounded before Soo-chow, and that he had acted so liberally that Gordon had resolved to pay him a visit. I accompanied Gordon to Soo-chow, and we saw the Footae together on the 1st instant; Gordon at first conversed with him through his linguist, but afterwards through myself. I need not trouble you with a detailed account of the conversation, but shall simply relate its result.

The execution of the Wangs was touched on as lightly as possible, and it was agreed that it should not again form a subject of conversation between Gordon and the Footae:

for the former has still his own opinions and feels sore about it ; while the latter takes the responsibility entirely on himself, and is content to abide by the judgment of his Government. The Footae consented to issue a proclamation in which are to be embodied his reasons for executing the Wangs (on which the public can form its own opinion), and in which he is also to state that although Gordon knew of the consultations that took place prior to the surrender, the execution of the Wangs took place unknown to and in the absence of Gordon ; a copy of the proclamation is to be forwarded through the yamun to the British Minister. On the other hand, Gordon consents to co-operate with the Taoutae's forces, and will move from Quinsan to Woo-sieh, some thirty miles north-west of Soo-chow, in about a fortnight ; arrived there he will then consider the next step. Should instructions in the meantime be received from you directing him, on the strength of the General's representations, to leave the force, he will at once withdraw, making beforehand however such arrangements as may seem most likely to make the disbanding of the force possible ; but should no such instructions be received from you, he will go on from Woo-sieh, and he will be prepared to go to work with still greater vigour and expedition should you be pleased to express approval of the local arrangement now reported of this disagreeable occurrence.

Were one even to leave aside the question as to the propriety of the step taken by the Footae, it seems to me that Gordon is right in deciding on again taking the field. The British policy in China has been to support the Imperialist cause, and general interests demand the speediest possible suppression of Taepingism. Foreign Powers do not want to divide China between them ; and apart from such a step as that, the only choice left is between the Government party and the Opposition party in the country itself. The Opposition party, the Tae-pings, is one from which there is nothing to be hoped ; even were it successful in coming into power, a score or so of years must pass before the country could be quieted. The present Government, corrupt as are its officials, and suspicious as we may be with regard to its hopes and actions in the future, is a Government, and one, too, suited to the nature of the people. Little as we may like it, it is better than the Tae-ping attempt at rule, and from supporting and strengthening it much more is to be hoped for than from anything else short of that difficult measure—direct foreign intervention and rule. Looking at the matter then from the broadest point of view, and with a desire for practical and beneficial results, Gordon ought to take the field without delay.

Disaffected people—rowdy foreigners and low-class Chinese—have been immensely delighted with the inaction of the last two months. Merchants fear to return to Soo-chow, not knowing but that Gordon in his wrath may with his men join the rebels, and their continuance at Shanghae is delightful to the owners of land and houses. The rebels themselves don't know what to make of the occurrence, and their expiring energies are again fanned into a flame. His appearance in the field will have immediate results ; rowdies will commence to see that their game is hopeless and that they had better leave China ; Chinese traders will again flock back to Soo-chow ; and the rebels will again lose heart. Chang-chow-foo will soon fall, and that will be followed very probably by the capitulation of Hang-chow, Woo-chow, and Kea-hing, and the other two or three small cities still held by the Taepings in this province and Che-keang. Whether a stand will be made or not at Nanking Gordon thinks very problematical, but he is rather of opinion that it will not fight. The destiny of China is at the present moment in the hands of Gordon more than of any other man, and if he be encouraged to act vigorously, the knotty question of "Taepingdom" versus "union in the cause of law and order" will be solved before the end of May, and quiet will at length be restored to this unfortunate and sorely-tried country.

We left the Footae with the understanding that the matter had been settled, the settlement being that Gordon would co-operate unless ordered by you to withdraw.

Personally, Gordon's own wish is to leave the force as soon as he can. Now that Soo-chow has fallen there is nothing more that he can do, whether to add to his own reputation or to retrieve that of British officers generally, tarnished by Holland's defeat at Tae-tsing. He has little or nothing personally to gain from future successes, and as he has himself to lead in all critical moments and is constantly exposed to danger he has before him the not very improbable contingency of being hit sooner or later. But he lays aside his personal feelings, and seeing well that if he were now to leave the force it would in all probability go over to the rebels or cause some other disaster he consents to remain with it for a time.

I trust that the local settlement of the matter will prove satisfactory, and should it be so, if you could give a word of encouragement to Gordon it would make his work while he continues with the force much easier, as I think that, with your approbation, he would go about it even more cheerfully than before. Since hearing Gordon's linguist interpret I

am quite satisfied that it is impossible for him not to have misunderstandings and pecuniary fights with the Footae. The linguist is a "talkee-talkie" "my-no-savez-he" sort of person, whose attempt at Mandarin is even viler than his English. He is quite unable to comprehend Gordon, and he is equally incompetent when he attempts to communicate the real purport of the Footae's remarks, and he besides abases himself in language to such an extent as to place Gordon in an utterly false position vis-à-vis the Footae, and to obstruct the enforcement of commonplace rights by characterizing them as the "undeserved favours of a gracious and benevolent condescension, &c." However, Gordon likes the man, and as he has been with the force since Ward started it he is no doubt useful.

Gordon wished me, if writing to you, to explain matters pretty fully—I mean as to what he is about to do. I thought it well at the same time to enter into particulars generally, in order to "ventilate" from different points of view a subject which is sure to be talked and written about much at home. Trusting that you will on this score pardon the length of this letter, I am, &c.

(Signed) ROBT. HART.

No. 11.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received May 28.)

My Lord,

Peking, March 29, 1864.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of an edict published in the "Peking Gazette," which is of interest as showing the principles which, according to Chinese ethics, ought to guide this Government in dealing with persons who take part in insurrectionary movements.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure in No. 11.

Edict published in the Peking "Gazette" of March 23, 1864.

(Translation.)

SENG-KO-LINSIN memorialized the Throne to the effect that he has investigated the charges brought against an associate of Miao P'ei-lin, and submits to the Emperor his decision on the guilt of the accused.

P'an-k'ai, an associate of Miao P'ei-lin, together with his son P'an Li-hsün, was originally pressed into the rebel ranks by the Nien-fei; afterwards, having returned to their allegiance and rendered good service against the Nien-fei, and having served at the head of the militia of Huo Ch'in (in Anhui), they were both promoted to posts in the public service. It would naturally be expected that they would have done their best to evince gratitude for the favour thus conferred; but when Miao P'ei-lin again rose in revolt, they were bold enough to furnish him with boats and send him supplies of money and provisions. Being entrusted with the levying of the war-tax at San-ho-chien, and relying upon their official position, they usurped the power (of levying extra taxes). While to all appearance following the Imperial army in the discharge of their duty, they were secretly keeping up a traitorous correspondence with the rebel Miao P'ei-lin.

His Majesty considers the guilt attaching to their conduct as in the highest degree unpardonable, but reflecting that on the occasion of Miao P'ei-lin's besieging and carrying by assault the town of Mêng-ch'êng, they neither acted as his associates nor rendered him assistance, it is in His Majesty's power to exercise some slight clemency towards them.

It is hereby decreed that P'an-k'ai, officer of the fifth rank, expectant District Magistrate, and wearing the blue feather, together with his son P'an Li-hsün, holding the brevet rank of Major-General and the real rank of Major, wearing the blue feather, be both of them immediately degraded and banished to the military station at Wuli-zasu (in Mongolia), and there be kept under strict surveillance by the Tartar General.

When the rebellion under Miao P'ei-lin first burst out so furiously, there were numbers of the actors in it who had been forced against their will into the rebel ranks; but P'an-k'ai and his son, originally common people employed in the militia, and afterwards, for service rendered against the rebels, raised step by step in the public service, have, ignorant of the great principles that ought to govern men's conduct, shown by their actions, both while among the rebels and in the Government service, that they were,

not like simple country people, forced without chance of escape into the rebellion; on this account His Majesty has punished them with severity.

Further, as many people of the lower classes, forced into the rebel service, have already repented them of their misdeeds and made a sincere return to their allegiance, the Emperor will not in any way visit them for what is past.

Let this be published as a general Proclamation.

Respect this!

No. 12.

Sir H. Parkes to Earl Russell.—(Received June 2.)

My Lord,

Shanghai, April 8, 1864.

SEVERAL important successes have recently been obtained by the Imperialists over the rebels in this Province of Kiang-soo and the adjoining one of Chih-keang. In the latter province the city of Kea-hing fell on the 25th ultimo to the Chinese General Ching, and on the 31st ultimo this event was followed by the capture of Hang-chow, which had long been invested by a large Chinese force combined with the Franco-Chinese contingent under M. d'Aiguebelle. The importance of the latter success will be seen when it is mentioned that Hang-chow is the capital city of Cheh-kiang, and the sister city of Soo-chow, the metropolis of this province, which, as your Lordship is aware, was recovered in December last.

The seat of the rebellion has for some months past been confined to a belt of country which has its southernmost extremity at Hang-chow and its northernmost limit on the banks of the Yang-tze River, in the vicinity of Nanking. By a bold and well-concerted movement, undertaken by Colonel Gordon last month, which resulted in the recovery of the cities of Pshing and Liyang, and a junction between the Chinese forces with which he is operating and those which are investing Nanking, this tract of country was divided into two parts, and the rebels in the Province of Cheh-kiang became separated from those in this Province of Keang-soo.

Unfortunately for the Imperialists, however, Colonel Gordon, who had attempted a flank movement upon Chang-chow (a place of considerable note between Soo-chow and Chin-kiang, and the only city that the rebels now retain along the whole line of the Grand Canal from Hang-chow to Chin-kiang), his object being to attack it on the west while the Chinese besieging force operated against it on the east,—met with a reverse on the 20th of March before the small city of Kin-han, which obliged him to fall back on Liyang. On that occasion he sustained a loss of one officer killed and twelve wounded, and himself received a flesh wound. From Liyang he was obliged to move across to the eastern side of the province to aid the Chinese forces in checking a considerable sortie of rebels from Chang-chow, made apparently with the view of taking Keang-yin, Fuh-shan, and Chang-shuh by a *coup de main*, and thus raising the siege of Chang-chow. Colonel Gordon succeeded in covering all these cities, and obliged the rebels to retreat hastily again upon Chang-chow; but in the course of these movements a detachment consisting of two regiments of his force have been much cut up by the rebels, and have lost 7 officers and about 150 men. Colonel Gordon's wound had disabled him so far that he could not personally direct the movements of this detachment, and their defeat may in some measure be accounted for by this circumstance.

The general result, however, of these operations tells greatly to the advantage of the Imperialists. The exigency of the circumstances in which they are now placed is doubtless one reason of the rebels having recently fought with some degree of desperation; and the extensive disunion which is known to prevail among themselves, and the straits to which they are driven by the want of arms and provisions, leave but slight ground to believe that they will retrieve their former position in these provinces.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HARRY S. PARKES.

No. 13.

Sir E. Lugard to Mr. Hammond.—(Received June 11.)

Sir,

War Office, June 10, 1864.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for War to transmit to you for the perusal of Earl Russell, the accompanying copy of a letter from the officer commanding the

troops in China, together with a narrative of Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon's proceedings from the 4th to the 24th of March.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD LUGARD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 13.

Major-General Brown to Major-General Forster.

Sir,

Head-Quarters, Hong-Kong,

I HAVE the honour to forward for the information of His Royal Highness the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-chief, a narrative of Major Gordon's late proceedings, and a plan of country, and to mention that his late reverses will not, I think, affect his future operations, and I have every reason to hope that a crisis is approaching to the rebellion in China.

I have nothing in particular to bring to the notice of His Royal Highness.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. G. BROWN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 13.

Narrative of Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon's Operations, from the taking of Li-yang, on the 9th March, to the 24th March, 1864.

ON taking possession of Liyang, the population was found to amount to 20,000, who were at once disarmed.

The 10th and 11th of March were passed in clearing the city ditch, which was crowded with numerous boats, among which were found twenty rebel gun-boats fit for service. Eighty more gun-boats had left a short time previously for Kashing-foo, to escort a convoy of rice.

It would appear that the rebels drew most of their supplies from Kashing-foo, the whole of the country passed over by Colonel Gordon being reduced to a mere desert, the villages totally uninhabited, and their vicinity strewn with the bleached skeletons of their former inhabitants. On the 11th of March, the last rebel stockade near Liyang surrendered, thus leaving the road open to Kintang.

Permission was now given to those of the rebels who preferred it, to leave the city with their effects, and all the rebels still remaining in the stockades who did choose to return to their houses were brought into the city.

On the 13th, Captain Davidson, in the "Hyson," was sent up the creeks to find, if possible, a navigable route to Kintang, but returned on the 14th, having been unsuccessful. The force was at this time increased by enlisting 1,000 of the rebels, who were formed into a separate regiment, and agreed to serve for 1 dollar per man a month, and their rations.

Colonel Gordon now proposed to move against Kintang, taking with him the 1st, 2nd, and 5th Regiments, the Light Artillery (with the exception of two 12-pounder guns), two 32-pounder guns, two 8-inch mortars, and three 24-pounder guns, mounted in gun-boats; 8,000 rounds of ammunition were also provided, and provisions for ten days. The force amounted to about 1,000 Infantry and 350 Artillery.

The 3rd and 4th Regiments, with the newly raised regiment, and two 12-pounder guns, were to be left for the protection of Liyang.

In spite of heavy rains Colonel Gordon moved out from Liyang on the afternoon of the 16th, and marched twelve miles towards Kintang. On the 17th, five miles more were effected, the men being transported in boats; the rain having made the road, such as it was, almost impassable. The force was now within fourteen miles of Kintang, and Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon made a reconnaissance to within a mile of Kintang, and sent in a letter offering the garrison their lives and property if they would surrender.

On the 19th, the force moved up in boats to within three miles of Kintang, and the rain at last abated, having been continuous from the 9th of March.

Early on the 20th, the 1st Regiment, followed by the Artillery, was pushed on to within 1,000 yards of Kintang, and Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon having closely reconnoitred the place, decided on attacking it at the south-east angle. The 2nd and 5th Regiments were obliged to await the return of the boats which had conveyed the 1st Regiment, but

came up in the morning of the 21st of March. The siege guns were now moved from the main creek, under cover of the three gun-boats, armed with 24-pounders, and placed in position opposite the south-east angle, and about 300 yards from it, and at 9 o'clock, the two 32-pounders and the three 24-pounders in the boats began to breach. The 1st Regiment was placed under cover behind a large mound to the right of the guns. The two 8-inch mortars and three 4½-inch mortars played on the towers on the south and east sides of the city, and the 24-pounder rocket tube was placed so as to enfilade south.

The 2nd and 5th Regiments were held in readiness to embark and cross the creek which separated them from the 1st Regiment. About 1 p.m. a practicable breach was effected, and three companies each of the 2nd and 5th Regiments were told off as storming parties, and embarked in gun-boats. Three companies of the 1st Regiment were to break their way through a brick breastwork in front of the south-east gate, and from thence had to make their way to the foot of the breach, a distance of about thirty yards, under the city wall.

Until this moment the rebels had been firing but feebly, and contrary to their usual custom, there was no display of flags on the wall, but the moment the storming parties appeared, the rebels manned the breach in the most determined manner, and opened a heavy fire, throwing also showers of stinkpots and bricks, which so intimidated the crews of the gun-boats, that they could not be got to advance.

The rebels defending the breach with even greater resolution than they displayed at Taitsan, drove back the storming party. A second assault was then made, led by Colonel Kirkham, but this officer was severely wounded, and the assailants again forced back.

Notwithstanding the losses the stormers had already sustained, Major Brown, Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon's aide-de-camp, re-formed them, and with Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon's own particular flag headed them for a third assault, but he too was wounded and struck down, and the attack failed.

At 5 p.m. the rebels still maintaining the breach, Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon, having been wounded and disabled, as well as a number of officers, and having no fresh regiments at hand with which to make a renewed effort, decided on withdrawing his force. This was effected without further loss, and a strong picquet being left in front of the breach, the troops resumed the positions they had occupied previously to the assault.

One officer was killed and 15 wounded, and about 100 men were killed and wounded, besides which the colour of the 1st Regiment was taken on the top of the breach in spite of the gallantry of the Chinaman who carried it, and who, though wounded, remained on the breach after the storming party had been repulsed in the vain hope of recovering his flag.

During the night the rebels attempted to turn the left of the position, but were warmly received, and retreated after suffering a heavy loss.

Early on the 21st the force commenced its retrograde movement to Liyang covered by the 24-pounder gun-boats. The enemy at first did not molest the retreat, but on the last boats entering the principal creek leading to Liyang, the rebels came to the bank and opened fire, but a few rounds of canister from the 24-pounders quickly drove them off. The heavy guns proceeded direct to Liyang, but the Infantry halted for the night on the ground occupied on the 19th.

On the 23rd the whole force was again concentrated at Liyang.

It should here be mentioned that just previous to the breach being commenced, Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon received information that the Imperialists had fallen back from before Chan-chow-foo to Woosieh; but all his preparations being complete, he deemed it better to risk an assault than to retire without striking a blow which would have greatly encouraged Tze Wang, who was stated to command 8,000 Cantonese who formed the garrison of Kintang. Arrived at Liyang Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon was apprized that a body of rebels under Chung Wang himself had marched from Chan-chow-foo and captured Fushan. Without losing a moment, Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon, taking with him two 24-pounders, some light artillery, and the 3rd and 4th Regiments, together about 1,500, moved out again from Liyang to re-capture Fushan, and reaching Woosieh on the 24th, pushed forward on the 25th to the mouth of the principal creek leading from Woosieh to to Chanzu.

Here he received the gratifying intelligence that the Imperialists were still holding stockades in front of Chan-chow-foo, and that a large body of them were at Chanzu, and that in addition the Chung Wang had but few men with him.

On the night of the 26th March, Colonel Gordon reached some villages, ten miles to the south-west of Kong-yin, driving out the rebels who occupied them and making some prisoners.

From information here received, a force of from 7,000 to 8,000 rebels, under the Chung Wang's son and two other Wang's, had left Chan-chow-foo two days previously with the intention of attacking Kong-yin, but failing in that, pushed on to Chanzu, where they suffered another repulse, and attempting to return by the road they came, found their retreat cut off, at the moment of Major Gordon's arrival.

Kong-yin, Chanzu, Fushan and Quinsan were perfectly secure.

On the 27th, Colonel Gordon followed up the rebels, inflicting much loss, and ascertained that they were chiefly composed of men from Kwang-tung and Kwang-si, and that they had many horses with them.

It further appeared that the rebels were from 10,000 to 15,000 strong, and hemmed in as they were between Kong-yin, the Yang-tze, and Chan-zu, their total destruction might be hoped for.

For two days, from 200 to 300 of Gordon's force drove the rebels before them with ease; but considering that by pressing them in the direction he was then taking, they might be driven to devastate fresh tracts of country, Colonel Gordon on the 29th of March concentrated 1,000 Infantry under two of his best officers, Howard and Rhode, and all his artillery, and determined to operate against the left of the rebel line, so as to drive them on Kong-yin.

Unfortunately, Colonel Gordon was from his wound still unable to leave his boat, but having confidence both in his men and their leaders, who had on the previous days driven with ease before them ten times their number of rebels, he directed the infantry to advance on the 30th to a village held by the rebels, while he himself moved on it with the artillery by a creek.

At 10 A.M. the whole force started, and Colonel Gordon got to within half a mile of the rebel position, whence after waiting some time, and seeing no signs of his infantry, he returned to camp.

On arriving in camp everything was found in confusion. It would appear that as the Infantry advanced the rebels retired before them, until they reached a breastwork, where the Infantry halted, without attempting to carry it, for an hour, and that then the rebels, a mere desperate mob, armed with spears and knives, came round the flanks, and attacking the Infantry, broke them, and pursued for some distance, capturing or killing no less than seven European officers, and from 150 to 200 men.

It would be vain to hope that the rebels would spare the lives of these unfortunate men, the cruelties perpetrated by them in the villages they had occupied showing but too plainly what might be expected from such atrocious miscreants.

As a specimen, one young girl lay dead with her hands tied behind her back, her breasts cut off, and her middle split up, while little children lay about in every direction with their throats cut.

Colonel Gordon upon this repulse withdrew his force to a place about twelve miles north of Woosieh, where he purposed remaining for a few days, until his wound would allow him to take the field in person.

Gordon's misfortune was, however, compensated by the capture of Hang-chow on the 31st of March, and that of Haining and Semun, of which no particulars have as yet been received.

The only towns remaining to the rebels are—in the Province of Kiangsu, Nanking, Chew-yang, Sayan, Chan-chow-foo, and Kin-tang; and in the Che-kiang Province, Chew-ching, Woo-choo, and Songku; while by the occupation of Yesing and Liyang, the rebellion is cut in half, and the rebels are every day more and more in want of ammunition.

No. 14.

The Marquis of Hartington to Mr. Hammond.—(Received June 18.)

Sir,

War Office, June 18, 1864.

WITH reference to the letter from this office dated the 10th instant, I am directed by the Secretary of State for War to transmit to you, for the information of Earl Russell, the inclosed further narrative of the proceedings of Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon, commanding the force of disciplined Chinese, up to the 11th April last.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HARTINGTON.

Inclosure in No. 14.

Narrative of Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon's Operations to the 11th of April, 1864.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GORDON remained at Se-ang-chuaou reorganizing his force, and endeavouring to restore confidence to his men, until the 7th of April, when he again moved out to a place called Poo-coo, to his right, and arranged with the Imperialists to attack some rebel stockades three miles distant, at Tantze.

On Colonel Gordon's approach the rebels evacuated the stockades, five in number, and both strong and difficult of access, leaving their rice, &c., and flags, behind them. The rebels appeared to be very careful to construct their stockades in places not approachable by boats, so as to prevent Colonel Gordon from bringing up his guns by water; while fear of the enemy's Cavalry rendered the dragging guns across country too hazardous an operation to be attempted, especially with so small a force as Colonel Gordon could dispose of, not exceeding 800 men, while the rebels mustered from 20,000 to 30,000 strong, in a comparatively small space.

Colonel Gordon then decided, in conjunction with the Imperialists, to endeavour to bring the rebels to action at Waissoo, the scene of the repulse on the 14th of April, and should he not succeed in this, he resolved to abandon the following up of the rebels to the Imperialist troops, and attack Chan-chow-foo.

About this period Tayan, a town on the Grand Canal, to the north of Chan-chow-foo, surrendered. This was a most important success, and left in possession of the rebels only one town on the Grand Canal, viz., Chan-chow-foo.

Prisoners stated that the garrison of Chan-chow-foo would not admit into the town the body of Taepings which, under five Wangs, including Chung Wang's adopted son, had made the incursion towards Fushan and Chanzu, and which was now hard pressed by Gordon and the Footae.

The rebels appeared to have continued their usual barbarities. In every village were seen the bodies of persons murdered by them, and at Tantze alone were found no less than fifty men, women, and children, either decapitated or with their throats cut.

On the 11th of April, at 11.30 A.M., Gordon's force, together with from 8,000 to 10,000 Imperialists, moved forward to attack the rebels, who, to the number of 15,000, were strongly posted at Waissoo, where they had constructed twelve stockades.

After an hour's shelling, Colonel Gordon succeeded in turning the left of the rebels' position, upon which they fled, hotly pursued by the whole force of the Imperialists, who, up to 3 P.M., were, by Colonel Gordon's last letter, continuing the pursuit, and destroying great numbers of the enemy.

Colonel Gordon states that the number of corpses in Waissoo was something horrible, every vacant space having from ten to twenty bodies with their throats cut.

This decisive defeat it was supposed would complete the ruin of the rebel expedition, and would leave Colonel Gordon at liberty to undertake the siege of Chan-chow-foo.

No. 15.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received July 1.)

My Lord,

Peking, April 4, 1864.

I HAVE the honour to inclose two reports on the progress made by Major Gordon in pacifying the province of Kiang-soo.

The large number of those who surrender, and their evident disinclination to offer resistance, would appear to show that the great bulk of the so-called insurgents are men who have been forced into the ranks by a small but bold band of adventurers. Indeed, the desolation of the country round Yeshing, and the state of destitution and misery in which the people, huddled together at the only village left standing, were found, sufficiently explain how the ranks of the insurgents are filled, and the little reliance that can be placed on their levies.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 15.

Memorandum of Operations of the Disciplined Chinese Force against the City of Yeshing.

THE force resuming its march from Wai-ye-san, near Woosieh, reached Hoo-chow, a village nine miles from the north gate of the city of Yeshing, and were halted for the night. On the following morning, the 20th of February, the force approached within three *li* of the city. Three regiments with some light cavalry made a detour to the east side of the city, and passing over the main creek from the Tahu Lake, drove the rebels out of a small village which the force occupied for the night, separated from two rebel stockades only by a creek, a portion of the 2nd Regiment having reached this place from the north gate the 1st of March early in the morning; the other three regiments marched along the base of the hills southward, and there in a valley encountered the rebels some 3,000 strong, composed of a portion of the city garrison, and reinforcements sent from a village called Changsu, twelve miles to the westward, and drove them in great precipitation and panic towards a city over a narrow fortified bridge where their loss from drowning and the troops pursuing them was very heavy. The troops pursued them right under the walls of the city, where, unfortunately, a heavy fire opened from the walls, killed four and wounded ten men of the force. While this was going on, four 12-pounders, brought into position, opened fire on the stockades in front of the village and opposite the east gate, and after a few rounds, the 2nd Regiment having been passed over the creek to the right, flanked and carried the position without any loss, the rebels running towards the city. The Imperialists remaining stockaded at the north gate with the 5th Regiment, the city was completely shut in except on the west gate, which was purposely left open to give the garrison a chance of evacuating the town. During the night some Chiefs came into our lines and said they garrisoned the south part of the city and would surrender it, but said the She Wang would surrender the north. This was found to be a lie, for by this time She Wang, with about two-thirds of the garrison, had evacuated the city and carried off all their property. The city was entered at daylight by the Imperialists, this force taking up quarters in a village one mile to the west of the city.

On the 3rd of March, two Chiefs came from Tapooku, informing Major Gordon that their two stockades had shaved their heads, but that two others, separated by a creek, would not surrender, and asked for assistance to reduce them. This was at once afforded, and the unshaven evacuated their position on the approach of assistance. The shaven rebels were taken on with the force towards Suyang, and cared for in every way, also the rebels taken by the Imperialists at Yeshing were well treated.

Yeshing is a district city, well built, and in a good state of preservation, situated on an isthmus, between the upper and lower Tahu Lake, about sixty miles to the north-west of Soo-chow. It is to be lamented that there is scarcely a house standing within a radius of thirty miles, except a small village to the east of Yeshing, where had congregated some thousands of inhabitants who cling to life, although mere skeletons from want, the rebels having taken everything from them.

By order,
(Signed) O. BROWN, *Aide-de-camp.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 15.

Memorandum regarding the Surrender of Liyang to Major Gordon, Commanding the Disciplined Chinese Force.

FOR the purpose of reducing the Rebel city Liyang the Infantry on the 5th instant marched to Sheen-Shantin as the first day's march. Sheen-Shantin is 40 *li* from Yeshing. The artillery and other boats belonging to the force had taken the road to Sheen-Shantin by a creek leading through two small lakes. Directed by a bad guide, the boats had taken the creek leading from the small lake direct on Liyang. For two days were the infantry without rations on this account. Major Gordon was himself obliged to fetch the boats, which had a narrow escape of being all seized by the rebels when on the point of staying for the night near a rebel stockade which they took to be Imperial.

A strong fortified village, 36 *li* east of Liyang, had been evacuated by the rebels after a few shots at the approach of the steamer and the artillery boats, the latter not being able to reach Sheen-Shantin on account of the creeks leading to that place not being practicable for boats with deep draught of water. The infantry marched on the 8th instant to Shusan. Many were the obstacles on the line of march in consequence of the

rebels having broken the numerous bridges. Towards the evening of the 8th instant two officers' boats arrived at Shushan from Liyang, to which place they had been brought by the rebels after they had been seized by the chang-mows, the same night that all the boats had nearly fallen into their hands. The two boats brought two rebels with a letter from the Governor of Liyang, offering to surrender to the officer commanding this force. To arrange matters Major Gordon, accompanied by the Generals Lee and Oosingling, 150 men of the infantry in gun-boats, and the steamer and some artillery, started for Liyang at 9 P.M.. Ten li before reaching Liyang they halted for the night. On the morning of the 9th of March all was arranged, and before evening of the same day the main body of our infantry and artillery had come up to Liyang. All the city gates were guarded by our soldiers, and the troops comfortably quartered near the four gates.

The steamer was not able to come up on account of a broken bridge 10 li below the city.

Thirty thousand rebels are inside the city and stockades outside. All have shaved their heads.

The enormous number of rebels can only be accounted for by the supposition that after the fall of the different rebel cities large bodies of refugees must have come to Liyang.

The garrison at Liyang consists at this time merely of our own troops, the Mandarin soldiers having been kept back on account of their total want of discipline.

Major Gordon intends to remain at Liyang with the force for some time, so as to disarm the rebels and send them to their respective homes.

Liyang is a very small compact city, with very good walls and very strong outworks, particularly as the latter are at such a distance from the city walls as to be commanded by the city itself.

City of Liyang, March 11, 1864.

By order,

(Signed) O. BROWN, *Aide-de-camp.*

Major-General Brown,

Commander-in-chief of Her Majesty's Forces in China.

CHINA. No. 7. (1864.)

CORRESPONDENCE relative to Lieutenant-Colonel
Gordon's Position in the Chinese Service.

*Presented to the House of Lords by Command of
Her Majesty. 1864.*

CHINA. No. 8. (1864.)

C O P Y

OF

PRINCE KUNG'S ANSWER

TO

SIR FREDERICK BRUCE'S MEMORANDUM

RELATIVE TO THE

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

Presented to the House of Lords by Command of Her Majesty.
1864.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.

[3406]

Copy of Prince Kung's Answer to Sir Frederick Bruce's
Memorandum relative to the Affairs of China.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received October 28.)

(Extract.)

Peking, July 29, 1863.

IN continuation of my despatch of the 12th ultimo,* I have the honour to inclose copies of my correspondence with the Chinese Government on the subjects discussed during my interview with the Prince Kung.

Though I have not succeeded to the extent I could have wished, still, I have reason to believe that my observations have produced a considerable effect, and that they will be followed by instructions to the local authorities to avoid proceedings which may lead to remonstrances for breach of Treaty.

Inclosure 1.

Sir F. Bruce to Prince Kung.

Sir,

Peking, June 16, 1863.

YOUR Imperial Highness will have received the note I had the honour to address you on the 9th instant, inclosing a memorandum of the substance of certain observations I had felt it my duty to make when I met your Imperial Highness on the 7th instant.

As regards the first of the two important subjects to which my observations related, the foreign policy of China, I shall add nothing to what I have already said, upon the danger which the Empire will incur, should its Government fail promptly and completely to satisfy the Representatives of other States who are awaiting its action. My present business is with the claims of my own Government.

I put first on the list the forcible exclusion of Her Majesty's Consul from Chao-chou, and the refusal of the authorities at Ningpo and Shanghae to refund transit duties surcharged to British subjects. I place these foremost because His Imperial Highness has fully admitted the justice of my representations regarding these, and has more than once promised that the wrong done should be set right.

But complaints are incessant from almost every port, of entire indifference on the part of the authorities to the provisions of the Treaties affecting transit duties, passports, the free employment of Chinese, the acquisition of building sites, and the recovery of debts.

I do not deem it worth while to go more into detail, because there is no case before me in the catalogue of those still unsettled, which could not have been disposed of without reference to the capital, and which could not now be disposed of in a few days, were the local authorities persuaded of the fact that the Treaties form part of the law of the land, and that neglect or violation of their provisions will be denounced and punished as breaches of the law.

It was to inculcate upon the Provincial Government this proposition, so important to the peace of the Empire in its external relations, that I urged your Imperial Highness many months ago to obtain a decree in the above terms, addressed to the local authorities throughout the Empire. Your Imperial Highness assured me that a circular of instructions which you communicated to me would obtain the desired end, and as I was indifferent to the form, I insisted no further. But it is not too much to affirm that up to the present time the circular has produced no effect whatever. The grievances then unredressed

* See China. No. 6. (1864.)

remain unredressed still, and fresh grievances are constantly occurring. Indeed, at Hankow, the authorities deliberately violate the Treaties in the matter of transit duties, and at Swatow they refuse to issue passports unless the words "for purposes of trade" be excluded, alleging that this departure from the letter of the Treaty is in obedience to the express commands of the Tsung-li ya-mên (Foreign Board).

Under these circumstances, I am driven to one of two conclusions. Either the Imperial Government is unwilling to use its influence to cause the Treaties to be fairly carried out, or it has not the power to cause its orders to be obeyed. It then becomes my duty to bring these facts under the consideration of Her Majesty's Government as soon as possible, in order that it may decide on the propriety of discontinuing the moral and material aid hitherto afforded to the Chinese Government, and confine its efforts to the protection of its own interests in China. It will become impossible for me to allow officers to remain in the service of the Chinese Government, and if the Government is unable to afford us protection against the insurgents at any of the open ports, and we are consequently obliged to keep troops there, the revenues of the port must be applied to meet the cost of defence, and the payment of the indemnities and the present co-operation with the Chinese Government must cease.

I informed your Imperial Highness long since that such would be the case if the Chinese Government persisted, on the one hand, in unfriendly action, and on the other in refusing to adopt the improvements which the state of the Empire render necessary; and I must state distinctly that I cannot authorize the employment of British officers, naval or military, except under the following conditions:—

1. That the Imperial Government take into its own hands the Customs' revenues as a means of ensuring the regular payment of the force, in order that discipline may be preserved.

2. That these forces be directly under the Imperial Government, from which alone they are to receive their orders, and to which only they are to be responsible. They will thus act with the provincial authorities, but will not be under their control. It is for your Imperial Highness to decide whether you will make use of British officers. It is for me to point out the conditions on which alone their services are to be had.

I must request your Imperial Highness to give me an explicit answer on the propositions contained in this despatch at an early date.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 2.

Prince Kung to Sir F. Bruce.

(Translation.)

Peking, June 19, 1863.

THE Prince of Kung makes a communication in reply.

The Prince is in receipt of the British Minister's despatch of the 17th instant. The memorandum transmitted him on the 9th June, relating to the two important questions, of the policy of China towards foreign nations, and her administration of her finances and her army, His Highness has perused, as also all other matters contained in the despatch under acknowledgment.

The Prince was considering a reply to the British Minister's note of the 9th, when his Excellency's despatch arrived. With reference to the proposition on which it insists, that the Treaty should rank with the law, the Prince has to observe that the principle that the Treaty is identical with the laws of the Imperial Government, and that breach of Treaty is the same thing as violation of the law, is the principle on which the Government of China proceeds, and that its only desire is that foreign nations should regard the Treaty in the same light, as there would then, to the end of time, be peace between the native and the foreigner.

As regards the cases still undetermined in the provinces, the Prince hopes that the British Minister will refer to the record and inform him, case by case, of the particulars of each, and the Ya-men will at once write to the Provincial Governments concerned to hurry them with the cases enumerated.

The Ya-men will, on its part, supply the British Minister with a list of the cases still undecided by British authorities, and will request his Excellency to send them orders to use equal expedition. Under these conditions neither side will have a pretext for complaint.

As regards improvements in military organization in the forces, British and French, now co-operating against the rebels at Shanghai and Ningpo, there are foreign officers and

troops not paid by China, and there are foreign officers engaged by China to command troops, and the arrangement under which there is such a variety of denominations as to render uniformity of system impossible, is without doubt a bad one. The despatch under acknowledgment observes that, while it rests entirely with the Prince to engage British officers or not to assist the Chinese Government, the authorization to accept such engagement lies solely with the British Minister (?).

This reasoning is perfectly fair, and the Prince, after giving the matter the fullest consideration, is of opinion that, in order to the prevention of confusion, it is his duty, before proceeding further, to lay down certain distinctions.

Where British troops are engaged in protecting the mercantile community at one of the ports, these being troops placed there by the British Government, which objects to their moving away from the port, the co-operation of such troops against any rebels that may approach the port, rests entirely with the foreign Government. These troops, not being in Chinese pay, nor subject to Chinese control, the Chinese Government has certainly no right to direct their movements, nor has it anything to say to their discipline.

This there can be no question about. But when the Chinese Government purchases vessels and guns, and appoints a high officer to take command of them, the foreign military officers, whom it may engage to assist in the instruction of its forces, inasmuch as these are in the pay of the Government, cannot limit their services to action against the enemy only at the ports of trade. Their movements and the distribution of them must be entirely under the direction of the Chinese Government.

The decision of the question whether these officers shall be authorized to serve China or not must undoubtedly lie with the British Minister, and if his Excellency will not authorize their doing so, there is an end of the matter; but if they be authorized to lend their aid, it will be for the Prince alone to decide under whose command they are to be, and from what source they are to be paid.

After this plain declaration of the merits of the question, there cannot be on either side any usurpation of the authority proper to the other, and this understanding arrived at, all the remaining points involved in that case can be settled by discussion.

It is the Prince's duty to reply, and he trusts that his Excellency, when he shall have duly considered the matter, will reply.

A necessary communication, &c.

Inclosure 3.

Sir F. Bruce to Prince Kung.

Sir,

Peking, July 2, 1863.

I HAVE received the reply of your Imperial Highness to my despatch of the 16th of June.

Your Imperial Highness states in explicit terms that the Government of China recognizes the Treaties as the law of the Empire in its relations with foreigners, and that breaches of Treaty are considered as violations of those laws. But the despatch of your Imperial Highness contains nothing to show that this principle will be carried out in practice. I stated instances at Hankow and Swatow in which the authorities, in spite of the remonstrances of Her Majesty's Consuls, have deliberately set aside the letter of the Treaty for no other object than to curtail the privileges of Her Majesty's subjects. Your Imperial Highness in your reply does not allude to these cases, nor do you inform me that any steps have been taken to remedy these grievances, or to prevent a repetition of such conduct. I am simply requested to send in a list of the grievances complained of, and I am informed that the local authorities will be urged to settle them with speed. Such a proposal is entirely unsatisfactory, for what reason have I to suppose that the instructions now to be sent by your Imperial Highness will be attended to when I see that the orders which I am assured were given by your Imperial Highness for the redress of outrages, such as that committed on Her Majesty's Consul at Chao-chow-foo, and for the repayment of surcharges at Shanghai and Hankow have been disobeyed?

Moreover, I do not complain of particular acts only; I complain of the disregard generally shown to Treaty obligations by the local authorities, and to the constant complaints I receive from the ports of the levy of excessive duties, and of the refusal to repay surcharges improperly levied, &c.

Some time ago I suggested to your Imperial Highness that in the latter class of cases, where the foreign Commissioner of Custom differs in opinion from the Chinese authority, and considers that the lower rate of duty is the one justly due, or that a surcharge should

be repaid, the opinion of the foreigner Commissioner should prevail until the question be decided at Peking. In such matters of detail it is evident that the foreign Commissioner, whose sole duty it is to transact business of this kind, is far more likely to be right than the Chinese authority, who has many other duties to perform. Had your Imperial Highness adopted this suggestion, many of the lesser complaints would have been avoided.

With respect to the deliberate breach of Treaty stipulations, of which I gave instances both at Hankow and Swatow, I have simply to observe that as long as the Imperial Government refuses to proceed in the usual Chinese form against local officers for these breaches of law, the Government becomes itself responsible for these acts by the impunity it accords to its subordinate agents. I feel convinced that if your Imperial Highness had obtained a decree in the terms I suggested eighteen months ago, and the provincial authorities had seen that it would be really enforced, the subsequent acts complained of would not have been committed.

My object since I have been at Peking has been to seek for redress through the Imperial Government, and to do away with the necessity of seeking redress by forcible demonstrations at the ports for violations of Treaty. But it is evident that the reluctance of your Imperial Highness to enter frankly into this policy renders my efforts ineffectual, and will force ultimately Her Majesty's Government to adopt the former proceeding, which is inconsistent with friendly relations, and which has proved the source of disaster to China.

In the meantime, I shall address a circular to the Consuls at the different ports to bring all matters in dispute again before the notice of the local authorities with a view to their speedy settlement. I shall be able to judge from the result how far the instructions given to them by your Imperial Highness are sufficient to induce them to act in accordance with the Treaty.

As to the employment of foreign officers, I repeat that it is necessary for the security of China that the Imperial Government should undertake the question of military organization, and not leave it to the provincial officers. For no officer of character will serve unless the terms, on which he lends his services and his position, are recognized by the Imperial Government. The system hitherto pursued at Chinkiang and Kiang-soo is full of danger to all who are interested in the tranquillity of China.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

CHINA. No. 8. (1864.)

Copy of Prince Kung's Answer to Sir Frederick
Bruce's Memorandum relative to the Affairs of
China.

*Presented to the House of Lords by Command
of Her Majesty. 1864.*

LONDON:

PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.

71

PAPERS

RELATING TO THE

SEIZURE OF THE CHINCHA ISLANDS

BY A

SPANISH SQUADRON.

*Presented to the House of Commons by Command of Her Majesty, in pursuance of their
Address dated June 9, 1864.*

LONDON:

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“Copy or Extracts from any Despatches received from Her Majesty’s Minister at Lima relating to the Seizure of the Chincha Islands, belonging to Peru, by a Spanish Squadron: and of any Communications on the same subject which may have been received from Her Majesty’s Minister at Madrid.”

No. 1.

Mr. Jerningham to Earl Russell.—(Received May 14.)

My Lord,

Lima, April 11, 1864.

WITH respect to the Commission with which General Mazarredo is said to have been intrusted on the part of the Spanish Government, one of the leading papers here gave out that he had been denied the title of Spanish Commissary by the Peruvian Government; but I see by the extract taken from “*El Peruano*,” herein inclosed, that the official journal says that, as nothing official concerning Señor Mazarredo’s mission has as yet been revealed, it is ignorant on what such an assertion can be founded, and that, on the contrary, there are motives to suppose that the Peruvian Government, far from having acted in this way, have manifested to Señor Mazarredo that they are disposed to facilitate to him the means that may be indispensable for the accomplishment of his mission.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WM. STAFFORD JERNINGHAM.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Extract from the “Comercio” of April , 1864.

“EL MERCURIO” de anoche dice, en su parte editorial, que nuestro Gobierno se ha negado á reconocer al Señor Mazarredo en su carácter de “Comisario” Español, y hace con este motivo serias inculpaciones al Gabinete.

Como nada de lo que se relaciona con la mision del Señor Mazarredo se ha revelado oficialmente, ignoramos en que haya podido fundarse “El Mercurio” para asentar ese hecho; pero ya que asi ha procedido, nos vemos obligados á decir que tenemos motivos para creer, por lo que hemos podido traslucir, que el Gobierno, lejos de haber obrado como lo indica “El Mercurio,” ha manifestado al Señor Mazarredo que está dispuesto á facilitarle los medios que sean indispensables para el cumplimiento de su mision. Por lo demas, si algun inconveniente se ha presentado, creemos que solo versa sobre el verdadero sentido que, para evitar ulteriores tropiezos, debe darse á la palabra “Comisario,” que determina el carácter con que ha sido enviado el Señor Mazarredo.—*Del “Peruano.”*

(Translation.)

THE “Mercurio” of last evening says in its editorial part, that our Government has refused to recognize Señor Mazarredo in his character of Spanish Commissary, and makes serious accusations against the Cabinet.

As nothing relating to the mission of Señor Mazarredo has been revealed officially we are ignorant upon what grounds “El Mercurio” could assert that act; but as it has done so we find ourselves bound to say that we have reasons to believe from what we have been able to learn, that the Government, far from having acted as “El Mercurio” indicates, has manifested to Señor Mazarredo that it is disposed to facilitate the means that may be indispensable for the carrying out of his mission. However, if any obstacle has been presented we believe that it only relates to the true sense, which, to prevent ulterior difficulties, should be given to the word “Commissary,” which shall determine the character with which Señor Mazarredo has been sent.—*From the “Peruano.”*

No. 2.

Mr. Jerningham to Earl Russell.—(Received May 14.)

My Lord,

Lima, April 13, 1864.

YESTERDAY afternoon M. Lesseps came to me and put some documents into my hands, at the desire of Señor Salazar y Mazarredo, who has come out here as Spanish Commissary.

Since this gentleman's arrival at Lima little has transpired respecting the relations which he has been endeavouring to establish with the Peruvian Government.

It appears now by the letter, copy of which is herein inclosed, that he is accredited by his Government as Spanish Commissary, in order to enter into relations with the Government of Peru.

Having presented this letter from the Spanish Government to the Peruvian Minister for Foreign Affairs, the latter returned for answer, according to the document copy of which I beg to annex, that the Peruvian Government would be happy to receive him, and give him those facilities and means which the law allows for the accomplishment of his mission, and that as the letter of the 18th of January accredited Señor Salazar y Mazarredo in purely a confidential character, they accept him as invested with such; but that, at the same time, they cannot agree to the denomination of Commissary, as this would be at variance with the diplomatic rules and usages, and give rise to embarrassments in the course of negotiations, concluding that if Señor Salazar agreed to this understanding, the Peruvian Minister informs him that he might commence his mission when he thought proper.

After the receipt of this note, Señor Mazarredo wrote another to the Peruvian Minister, copy of which I inclose, together with a Memorandum addressed to the Representatives of the allied nations.*

The Spanish Agent in his last note refers his Excellency the Peruvian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the above Memorandum for the explanation which he renders to Her Catholic Majesty's Government regarding the proceeding of the Peruvian Government, in not, I suppose, recognizing him as Spanish Commissary. He also hints that it is supposed Peru is getting up a loan in order to resist the just exigencies of Spain; that the Peruvian Government may do as they like, but that the moderation of its Government and authorities will be a guide for the future respecting the line of conduct which the Spanish Government may deem it fit to observe; however, that if any excesses unhappily are committed, speedy, energetic, and decisive reprisals will be decided upon, as modern Spain is firmly determined not to consent to her sons being outraged and her banner stained.

All these papers have been communicated to me so late that I have not been able to send translations of them.

Señor Mazarredo has, I am told by M. Lesseps, left Lima, but where he is gone to I am not aware.

Admiral Pinzon sailed from Callao some little time ago, and there is not, to my knowledge, any Spanish vessel of war in that port at present.

This is the unforeseen termination of Señor Mazarredo's mission; and I think it is the more to be regretted, as, up to the time of the Talambo difficulty, there has not been in this Republic any general or real animosity against Spaniards or Spain, in proof of which there are many rich and influential Spaniards resident in Peru who have made fortunes here, and who have not met, apparently, I should imagine, with impediments and vexations either in their commercial or social careers on account of their nationality.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WM. STAFFORD JERNINGHAM.

Inclosure 1 in No. 2.

Señor Arrazola to Señor Ribeyro.

Excelentísimo Señor,

Madrid, 18 de Enero de 1864.

CONSIDERANDO útil para los intereses de España en sus relaciones con el Peru, enviar á esa República un Comisario especial que por sus conocimientos y cualidades personales puede contribuir á estrechar los lazos que deben unir los dos Estados, y concurrendo las circunstancias que al efecto se requieren en Don Eusebio de Salazar y

* For the Memorandum, see Inclosure 13 in No. 3.

Mazarredo, Diputado á Cortes y Sub-Director de Política que ha sido en el Ministerio de Estado, ruego á vuestra Excelencia se sirva reconocerle como tal Comisario especial y atenderle en cuanto concierna á su encargo.

Al propio tiempo ruego á vuestra Excelencia se sirva acoger favorablemente al Caballero de Salazar y Mazarredo, aprovechando entre tanto esta ocasion, &c.

(Firmado) LORENZO ARRAZOLA.

(Translation.)

Sir,

Madrid, January 18, 1864.

THINKING it conducive to the interests of Spain in her relations with Peru, to send to that Republic a special Commissary, who by his experience and personal qualities should be able to draw closer the ties which ought to unite the two States, and the requisite conditions being found united in Don Eusebio de Salazar y Mazarredo, Deputy to the Cortes and late Political Sub-Director in the Ministry of State, I request that your Excellency will be pleased to acknowledge him as such special Commissary, and to pay attention to him in regard to the business with which he is charged.

At the same time I beg that your Excellency will be pleased to receive the Caballero de Salazar y Mazarredo favourably, and in the meanwhile I avail, &c.

(Signed) LORENZO ARRAZOLA.

Inclosure 2 in No. 2.

Señor Ribeyro to Señor Mazarredo.

Lima, 1 de Abril de 1864.

EL Gobierno del Peru, interprete fiel del sentimiento publico, procura siempre distinguirse en sus relaciones internacionales por actos de benevolencia y de lealdad. Guiado por los principios de esta franca politica recibirá al Señor de Salazar y Mazarredo, comisionado por el Excelentísimo Señor Presidente del Consejo y Primer Secretario de Estado de Su Magestad Católica cerca de este Ministerio, con la mas viva cordialidad, dandole aquellas facilidades y concediendole todas aquellas preeminencias que el derecho reconoce y son necesarias para el desempeño exacto de su encargo.

Como la comunicacion de 18 de Enero del presente año acredita al Señor de Salazar en un carácter puramente confidencial, á juzgar por su texto, como tal Agente del Gabinete de Madrid lo acepta, desde luego, el Infrascrito, Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de la República, porque la denominacion de Comisario sobre no estar conforme con las reglas y usos diplomaticos, traiera tal vez embarazos en el curso de las negociaciones, que, en bien de uno y otro Gobierno, deben alejarse á todo costa. Si el Señor de Salazar admite, como es de esperarse, esta previa y precisa explicacion, puede, cuando lo estime conveniente, dar principio á su mision, seguro de encontrar de parte del Peru y su Administracion las mas felices disposiciones para entenderse con el Representante de la ilustrada nacion Española.

Con sentimientos, &c.

(Firmado) JUAN ANTO. RIBEYRO.

(Translation.)

Lima, April 1, 1864.

THE Government of Peru, faithful interpreter of the public feeling, is always ready to distinguish itself in its international relations by acts of loyalty and goodwill. Guided by the principles of this frank policy it will receive Señor de Salazar y Mazarredo, deputed to this Ministry by his Excellency the President of the Council and Chief Secretary of State to Her Catholic Majesty, with the most lively cordiality, giving him those facilities, and conceding to him all those privileges which the law recognizes, and which are necessary for the faithful discharge of his commission.

As the communication of the 18th of January of the present year accredits Señor de Salazar in a purely confidential character, to judge from its context, the Cabinet of the Undersigned, Minister of Foreign Affairs, accepts him at once as such Agent of the Cabinet of Madrid, because the denomination of Commissary, on account of its not being in conformity with diplomatic rules and usages, might lead perhaps to embarrassments in the course of the negotiations, which, for the good of both Governments, ought to be prevented at any cost. If Señor de Salazar admit, as it is to be hoped he will, this preliminary and necessary explanation, he may enter upon his mission whenever he may think fit, secure of meeting, on the part of Peru and its Administration, with the most happy dispositions

to come to a good understanding with the Representative of the enlightened Spanish nation.

With sentiments, &c.

(Signed)

JUAN ANTO. RIBEYRO.

Inclosure 3 in No. 2.

Señor Mazarredo to Señor Ribeyro.

Lima, 12 de Abril de 1864.

EL Infrascrito, Comisario Especial Extraordinario de Su Magestad Católica, ha tenido la honra de recibir la nota que su Excelencia el Señor Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores del Perú se ha servido dirigirle con fecha 1 del corriente. En ella rechaza el Gobierno Peruano el título de Comisario Especial, por no estar conforme con las reglas y usos diplomaticos.

El Memorandum que el Infrascrito ha dirigido á los Representantes de las naciones aliadas, y de que es adjunta una copia, explicará al Excelentísimo Señor Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores la significacion que dará el Gobierno de Su Magestad al proceder del de la República en estas criticas circunstancias.

En una de las ultimas sesiones de la Comision permanente del Congreso, se ha dado á conocer que la Administracion actual abriga el pensamiento de contratar un empréstito de setente millones de pesos, que, por ser excesivamente superior á las atenciones del tesoro, tiene por objeto, segun la opinion de hombres politicos influyentes, adquirir medios para oponerse á las justas exigencias de la España.

El Gobierno Peruano hara lo que estime mas conveniente ; pero el Infrascrito espera que durante su ausencia de Lima serán respetados los súbditos de la Reina en el territorio de la República, sean cuales fueren las eventualidades del porvenir. La moderacion de su Gobierno, de las autoridades y del pais en general, darán al de Su Magestad la medida de la conducta que ha de observar en lo sucesivo ; y si desgraciadamente se cometieran excesos, las represalias serán prontas, energicas y decisivas, pues la España moderna esta firmemente resuelta á no consentir que se atropelle á sus hijos, ni se mancille su bandera.

II Infrascrito, &c.

(Firmado)

EUSEBIO DE SALAZAR Y MAZARREDO.

(Translation.)

Lima, April 12, 1864.

THE Undersigned, Special Commissary Extraordinary of Her Catholic Majesty, has had the honour to receive the note which his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Peru has been pleased to address to him, with the date of the 1st instant. In it the Government impugns the title of Special Commissary on account of its not being in conformity with diplomatic rules and usages. The Memorandum which the Undersigned has addressed to the Representatives of the allied nations, and of which a copy is annexed, will explain to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs the significance that will be attached by Her Majesty's Government to the proceeding of that of the Republic under these critical circumstances.

At one of the late sittings of the permanent Commission of the Congress, it was stated that the present Administration entertained the idea of contracting a loan of 70,000,000 dollars, which, from being so vastly beyond the requirements of the treasury, is, according to the opinions of influential politicians, for the purpose of obtaining means to oppose the just demands of Spain.

The Peruvian Government will do what it thinks best, but the Undersigned hopes that during his absence from Lima the Queen's subjects will be treated with respect in the territory of the Republic, whatever may be the eventualities of the future. The moderation of the Government, of the authorities, and of the country in general, will give to that of Her Majesty the measure of the conduct which is to be followed hereafter ; and if, unfortunately, excesses shall be committed, the reprisals will be prompt, energetic and decisive, for modern Spain is firmly resolved not to acquiesce in the ill-treatment of her sons, or in insult to her flag.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed)

EUSEBIO DE SALAZAR Y MAZARREDO.

Mr. Jerningham to Earl Russell.—(Received May 28.)

My Lord,

Lima, April 28, 1864.

SINCE forwarding my despatch of the 13th instant by last mail, in which I transmitted to your Lordship copies of a correspondence which had taken place between the Peruvian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Señor Salazar y Mazarredo, who came here claiming to be received special and extraordinary Commissary from the Spanish Government to that of Peru, as well as of a memorandum addressed by Señor Mazarredo to the allied Powers, I have received from the Peruvian Government through the official gazette, "El Peruano," copy of a note, herein inclosed, addressed by Señor Ribeyro to the Minister of State of Her Catholic Majesty, with reference to the proceedings of Señor Mazarredo and Admiral Pinzon since their advent to Peru.

But I now regret to have to report that an event has occurred which has taken every one by surprise, viz., the forcible occupation of the Chincha Islands by the Spanish squadron under Admiral Pinzon, in conjunction with M. Mazarredo, by which Peru is suddenly deprived of the chief source of her revenue.

This occurrence has caused in Lima the greatest possible irritation and dismay, as well as much trouble and astonishment amongst the foreign commercial body, especially the British members of it, who have much capital engaged in Peruvian trade, and who anticipate that much inconvenience and loss must ensue from this strange proceeding of the Spanish squadron.

To give your Lordship exact information how this occupation was carried into effect, I beg to have the honour to forward copy of a letter received from Mr. John Dartnell, British Vice-Consul at Pisco, who happened to be at the time at the Chincha Islands.

The day I received the copy of the memorandum (which I transmitted to your Lordship), M. Mazarredo left Lima, and I was told it was not known whither he had proceeded; but it now appears that he then repaired to Callao, went on board the Spanish war sloop "Covadonga," and feigning to sail for the north, proceeded afterwards in search of Admiral Pinzon's squadron, when he and the Admiral having met, they went to seize the Chincha Huano Islands (Chinchas). The Governor was then summoned to surrender and menaced even with force, if he refused. He had not sufficient force to resist, and therefore was made prisoner; the Spanish flag was immediately substituted for the Peruvian ensign and hoisted in the islands, whilst the 150 Peruvians, who had been left there to guard the wealth of the Republic, where, after a parley, allowed to depart to the mainland. The convicts were also dispatched to the coast, and the Peruvian sloop "Iquique," captured there by the Spaniards, was alone left with a complement of ten men to guard the spoils which had been so secretly and unceremoniously taken possession of by Admiral Pinzon and Commissary Salazar y Mazarredo.

After the consummation of this act, the legality of which, no doubt, Her Majesty's Government and other civilized nations will discuss and decide upon, the Spanish squadron made their appearance off Callao in the morning of Saturday the 16th instant, when a note, without date, was dispatched by Admiral Pinzon, accompanied by a declaration signed by him and M. Mazarredo of the 14th April, 1864, to Señor Ribeyro, the Peruvian Minister, copies of which are hereto annexed.

On the same day Señor Ribeyro replied to the Admiral, copy herein inclosed, and his Excellency likewise addressed a circular to the Diplomatic Body, copy of which I also forward to your Lordship, together with my answer.

I beg also to draw your Lordship's attention to the inclosure giving the official correspondence between Admiral Pinzon and the Governor of the Chincha Islands, Señor Valle-Riestra.

On the advent of the Spanish Admiral to Callao on the 16th instant, copies of this declaration were dispatched to the several members of the foreign Diplomatic Body residing in Lima.

I was, however, first made acquainted with it that day by Captain Douglas, of Her Majesty's ship "Shearwater," stationed at Callao, to whom M. Mazarredo had given a copy, which I have since learnt was intended for me.

A few days ago the members of the Diplomatic Body assembled at the house of the Dean, the United States' Minister, Mr. Robinson, to take cognizance of the documents which had been forwarded to them individually, and after some consideration it was decided to issue a collective manifesto, copy of which I beg to inclose (and also of Señor Ribeyro's rejoinder), and as the members of the Body signed it, I likewise came to the determination to append my name. This is, as stated in the paper, only *ad interim*, awaiting the instructions which our respective Governments may resolve upon.

The French Chargé d'Affaires for certain reasons did not sign the declaration of the Diplomatic Body, probably because M. Lesseps holds a double character here, being Chargé d'Affaires of France and being likewise charged with the protection of the Spanish subjects in Peru, and also because he may have imagined that in case he has hereafter to mediate, signing this paper might render his position less acceptable to the Spaniards.

I also entertained the same idea; but as the United States' Minister signed it, I did likewise. If I had refused, the British public in Peru, as well as the natives, would certainly have viewed my silence in a very objectionable light.

The situation of Peru, owing to the event I have just mentioned, is of the gravest nature. At first there existed a strong feeling against the Government, and even a large assemblage of citizens thronged one evening the chief square of Lima, and crowded round the Palace, when the President, Pezet, was induced to appear at the window and address them.

At Callao crowds appeared in the streets, and "Vivas" for "Castilla!" (meaning the former President of that name) were heard, and even an attempt at upsetting the Government was anticipated by people who argued that by mismanagement they had brought affairs to the present crisis.

However, the Government have not been idle in endeavouring to instil confidence, and the Peruvians, friends or oppositionists of the Government, feel the necessity in the present state of affairs of uniting together to resist what they consider a most serious aggression; for taking the Chinha Islands is, in fact, tantamount to seizing the chief wealth of Peru, for most of the treasures this land contains are still hidden in the mountains, or are to be sought for in the distant and thinly populated trans-Andine districts.

If the islands are to remain in the hands of the Spaniards, the detriment to trade and British capital circulating in Peru, at a rough estimate at nearly 100,000,000 dollars, will be most seriously affected.

The annual exportations of guano by the Peruvians is about from 16,000,000 to 18,000,000 dollars, and their expenditure about 23,000,000 dollars; consequently, unless they impose taxes and make loans, they remain with only 5,000,000 dollars to carry them through the financial year.

The Spanish Declaration gives out that money contracts made hitherto with Peru by foreign companies will be respected; but what security have the British bondholders in this assertion, when Spain has not yet met her engagements with regard to part of her debt, and her paper, I am told, is not even admitted in the London Exchange.

If the Islands are to be kept by Spain, this is a very serious affair for the Peruvians, but it is also a blow to British interests involved in Peruvian trade.

What has likewise stung the Peruvian mind especially in the seizure of the Chinchas is the assertion contained in the Declaration, that the Spanish Admiral and Commissary have resolved to "revindicar" (retake or reconquer) the Islands, as if they still belonged to Spain, and were not, after the lapse of nearly forty years, an integral part of an independent State, which had been recognized as such by most of the civilized world.

But what has been the reason assigned for the occupation of the Chinchas? Is it the attitude assumed by Peru with regard to Spain and her Agent?

The Peruvian Government have apparently only declined to receive M. Mazarredo as Commissary, respecting which term they required explanations; but according to M. Ribeyro's note (inclosed in my last despatch of the 13th instant), this Government consented willingly to receive him as a confidential Agent.

Respecting the term "Commissary" I will not undertake to offer any remark; but, supposing the Peruvian Government has not found it advisable to receive M. Mazarredo in that character, surely some other might have been devised which could not have been objected to, and which might have prevented such an abrupt and regrettable termination of a mission which reasonable persons might have supposed could have solved all difficulties and led to permanent friendship.

The Memorandum sent home contains a list of various grievances, &c., such as the ill-treatment of Spanish subjects; but even if all these turn out to be correct, surely the occupation of the Chinchas, which may be considered as impounding the Treasury of Peru, can hardly be considered in the light of a just material guarantee for enforcing redress.

Unwilling to believe that the Spanish Government can entertain a permanent retention of the guano islands, I am led to look for a reason for this sudden and secret occupation in the idea that the Spanish authorities may have effected it as a means of pressure for causing Peru to give satisfaction for certain grievances.

By this *coup de main* Peru has been reduced for the moment to a helpless condition.

Her squadron consists of one frigate and several steamers, but these, especially the frigate, are not in a state to resist or cope with the Spaniards, and although enthusiasm has been kindled to the highest pitch, they are unable to attack the Spanish squadron with any prospect of success. They have fortified Callao, in a sort of a way, and the war vessels they possess are placed under the protection of the castle guns; besides, I am told they are going to plate some of their war-steamers with iron rails fashioned for the above purpose; but all this will take some time before it can be accomplished.

The President has applied to the Congress for resources, and has been authorized to contract a loan of 50,000,000 dollars, and to raise the army to 30,000 men. A private loan has also been set on foot.

The great Chilean capitalist Candamo has lent the Government 1,000,000 dollars, and the native commercial body is contributing towards it. General Castilla, who is in the south of Peru, has been sent for, probably to take the command of the army, and give his experienced counsel to Government.

It is thought by some, although I have no reason to participate in the belief, that this affair has been concocted previously in the Spanish Peninsula; and if so, the tenacity of the Spaniards will probably cause them to keep their hold on the Chinchas until obliged to relinquish them by the friendly mediation of the great Powers, or till they are driven away by a sufficient force, which the Peruvians may eventually be able to collect in the course of time.

The Spanish Admiral has retained as hostages the Governor and several officers of the Chinchas; but there appears no desire to injure or persecute the Spanish residents in Lima. They have even addressed a letter to that effect, and stating that retaining the above-mentioned officers as hostages is unnecessary.

Since writing the above I hear that Admiral Pinzon has set at liberty all the Peruvians he took, and Señor Valle-Riestra, &c., are now in Lima.

There has been a great show of patriotism, as far as offers of services go, both moral and physical: the Archbishop and Canons of the Cathedral and some of the clergy, the legal and other bodies, and numerous private citizens, have placed their services at the disposition of their country, so to make use of them for the just rights of the Republic as may be deemed most fit.

The Memorandum to which I have constantly alluded has now been printed in the "El Peruano," and likewise Señor Ribeyro's answer to it, both of which I have the honour officially to forward to your Lordship.

I have received from the French Chargé d'Affaires, M. de Lesseps, a copy, which I suppose is authentic (although not signed by any one to that effect), of Admiral Pinzon's answer to Señor Ribeyro's note of the 16th instant, which I now inclose to your Lordship.

I have the honour also to inclose copy of a circular addressed to the Foreign Governments by Señor Ribeyro, dated the 26th instant, and published in the official Gazette "El Peruano" of this day, regarding the unfortunate incidents that have just taken place between the Peruvian Government and the Spanish authorities on this coast.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WM. STAFFORD JERNINGHAM.

Inclosure 1 in No. 3.

Extract from the "Peruano" of April 17, 1864.

Lima, 13 de Abril de 1864.

DESEO muy pronunciado y vivo ha tenido el Perú, desde hace tiempo, de restablecer sus relaciones con la España, nacion á la cual lo unen sentimientos y afinidades comunes: pero este deseo, mas de una vez manifestado, se ha ido frustrando por desgracia, por dificultades que no han podido ser facilmente superadas. Ha llegado la ocasion de que el Gobierno, traduciendo con lealtad los votos del pueblo cuyos destinos dirige, se entienda directamente con el Gabinete de Madrid para remover todos aquellos embarazos que hasta ahora han impedido alcanzar el bien inapreciable de la reconciliacion y de la paz entre dos Estados, llamados por su origen y por sus intereses recíprocos á vivir en perfecta union y cordial amistad.

Apenas concluyó la guerra en América se formaron en ella nacionalidades independientes que buscaron, en el ejercicio de sus derechos, los medios de prosperar y de iniciarse en todos los progresos de la industria y del comercio. No fué excepcional el Perú en

esta política civilizadora. Sus puertos, sus campos y sus ciudades, sin limitacion alguna, fueron abiertos á todos los extranjeros laboriosos; y los Españoles, aun sin pactos preexistentes y como miembros de nuestra misma asociacion, gozaron y gozan de libertades, de consideraciones y de prerogativas á la par de los nacionales. De estos hechos, que estan al alcance de todas las personas competentes e imparciales que han visitado nuestro territorio, pudiera hacerse, si la ocasion lo permitiera, una enumeracion que los confirmase de una manera tan cumplida, como victoriosa; pero el Gobierno de Su Magestad Católica, que harto conoce la índole proverbialmente mansa de los Peruanos, la bondad de sus leyes y su organizacion administrativa, excusa, por cierto, un trabajo que no aumentaria los conocimientos útiles que tiene sobre todas las regiones del continente.

La benevolencia de la nacion Peruana y de su Gobierno ha sido falsamente interpretadas, unas veces por funcionarios apasionados, y otras por particulares á quienes esperanzas burladas convirtieran en gratuitos enemigos del pais que les daba hospitalidad; mas nunca se hizo creíble que testimonios de este género pudieran aflojar los lazos que dos pueblos instintivamente conservaban para elaborar su mútuo bienestar. A fin de obviar y prevenir nuevos tropiezos que quizás perturben las relaciones existentes y malogren los votos por la paz definitiva, el Infrascrito, Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores del Perú, tiene el honor de dirijirse al Excelentísimo Señor Ministro de Estado de España, haciendole algunas explicaciones que, por su sinceridad y su franqueza, no pueden menos que acercar á los dos Gobiernos para entenderse y tratar bonancible, equitativa y convenientemente.

Se nota, no sin profundo sentimiento, que la prensa de España, de algunos años á esta parte, registra en periódicos acreditados, publicaciones contra el Perú que una sola persona de allá en correspondencia con otra residente en esta capital tienen el cuidado oficioso de redactar. No hay impostura que no aseveren, ni acontecimiento que no tergiversen, pintando á la nacion sin leyes, sin costumbres y sin moralidad, entregados todos los habitantes á las demasias de una repugnante licenciosidad y al Gobierno como instrumento de todos estos excesos y de todos estos atentados. Menos que un pais bárbaro, el Perú es considerado como una reunion de malvados, donde no se respeta ningun derecho y donde la existencia está de continuo expuesta y amagada. Estas calumnias sistematicamente difundidas han podido producir en ciertos ánimos ingratas impresiones; y de aquí es, sin duda, de donde han partido tantas prevenciones contra las autoridades de la República que no han podido ser dominadas, poniendo así obstáculos al pronto arreglo de entre ambas naciones.

Y dicho sea de paso en este momento de revelaciones importantes:—el móvil de esta conducta reprobada no es otro que una pasion innoble mucho mas vituperable desde que no hay ni fundamento especioso que la justifique.

Cuando la escuadra Española destinada al Pacifico llegó al puerto del Callao, el Gobierno le dispensó aquella hospitalidad generosa que se tributa constantemente á los amigos; y á pesar de las alarmas que trataron de esparcirse con motivo de esta expedicion naval, la circunspeccion y el buen sentido tuvieron su lugar de preferencia á vagas y maliciosas informaciones. Ni las reglas de la mas rigurosa etiqueta, ni comedimientos de todo género para con los marinos de la Península, ni actos de una marcada deferencia se omitieron á la llegada de huéspedes con quienes los hijos del Perú se avienen tan bien por vínculos que han sido formados desde los tiempos mas lejanos. Mas á tan esquisita como cabal hidalguia no se ha correspondido debidamente, ni se ha manifestado con la mas insignificante demostracion la reciprocidad que tenia nuestra sociedad derecho de esperar. El Señor Almirante, gefe de la escuadra, caballero á quien desde el Gobierno hasta el ciudadano en su condicion privada otorgaron con profusion cortesias de toto linaje, desplegó desde el principio un tono desdeñoso, tanto con las autoridades como con los particulares; y en vez de estudiar á nuestro pueblo y á nuestros hombres públicos, para consultar así mejor las intenciones de su Gobierno, se alejó de todos ellos, les increbó, sin merecerlo, su conducta; y rodeando e de descontentos y de injustos pretendientes formó un círculo especial que cada dia hacia menos llevadera su permanencia entre nosotros. Estos son hechos de un carácter que en cualquiera otra parte habrian producido fatales desacuerdos. No faltó, por fortuna, en ninguna de estas malhadadas circunstancias toda aquella cordura necesaria para disipar perturbaciones que habrian retardado la buena inteligencia entre el Perú y la España.

Un acontecimiento inesperado pero muy comun en todos los lugares de la tierra, sea cual fuere el grado de su cultura, vino á dar mayor anza á las pretenciones ya muy avanzadas del Almirante y de los que buscaban pretestos para un conflicto. En una hacienda de la costa del norte, llamada Talambo, se trabó en mal hora un choque entre algunos Colonos Españoles y ciertos naturales dependientes del fundo, á consecuencia de lo qual resultaron un Español y un Peruano muertos y otros accidentes de menos

gravidad. Desde que la Administracion suprema supo tal ocurrencia, sin dejar de atender á sus importantes y peculiares ocupaciones, exitó á los mandatarios locales, y á los funcionarios judiciales para que cada uno, dentro de la esfera de sus propias atribuciones, llenase sus deberes, ora aprehendiendo á los culpables, ora instaurando el proceso con la celeridad correspondiente, hasta obtener el castigo de los que resultasen delincuentes. Y este encargo se formuló, no por ceremonia, ni cediendo á estímulos ó insinuaciones extraños, sino por el deseo de dejar completamente vindicada la justicia.

El juicio se ha formalizado; y aunque no se ha concluido definitivamente, siguen tomándose todas aquellas providencias y haciéndose aquellos esclarecimientos que son conducentes al conocimiento del hecho en toda su plenitud y de sus verdaderos autores. No ha habido ni hay hasta ahora denegacion de justicia, ni retardacion culpable de ella, únicos casos en que el derecho internacional prescribe y autoriza la reclamacion diplomática. Se ha pintado y se pinta, sin embargo, de tal modo la catástrofe de Talambo que, á juzgarse por las exajeradas narraciones que de ella se hacen, el Perú seria la última nacion en la escala de las sociedades humanas. Pero afortunadamente, mas de un testimonio irrecusable y mas de un documento auténtico acreditan de consuno que nuestra estadística criminal no guarda proporcion con nuestra poblacion, y que en este pueblo, tan siniestramente tratado, se perpetran menos delitos que en otros que se hallan mas avanzados en la carrera de los adelantos sociales.

Los enemigos del pais, porque así merecen ser llamados los que de él dán tan absurdas noticias, han explotado el suceso de Talambo, y el Señor Pinzon, dando oído á informes apasionados, ha ocurrido, segun se afirma, al Gobierno de Su Magestad haciendo entrever la deformidad del hecho, la desentendencia de las autoridades, y los riesgos que aquí corren siempre los súbditos Españoles. No es extraño qui así hayan juzgado algunos á quienes debe sponérseles ó ignorantes de nuestras instituciones ó poco afectos al Gobierno; pero si lo es y no poco, que un jefe caracterizado, encargado de una mision civilizadora y amigable, malogre ó contribuya al menos á malograr pensamientos felices concebidos por una y otra parte.

La causa de Talambo ha sido un motivo de permanente censura, y lo ha sido igualmente la conducta circumspecta de los Tribunales, sin excluir á la Corte Suprema de Justicia, digna de veneracion por su saber, por su prestigio y por su tradicional pureza. El Consul de España, á quien este Ministerio instruyó del estado del juicio, sin tener carácter diplomático y solamente por deferencia y por conservar buena armonía con la nacion cuyos intereses gestionaba, se permitió en nota de 25 de Febrero último hacer alusiones ofensivas á un cuerpo que es la salva-guardia de los derechos el depósito de la ciencia jurídica y la confianza del Gobierno y de los particulares, y formular una protesta por autos judiciales que, siendo de pura forma, en nada afectaban lo esencial de la causa, ni nada decidían definitivamente sobre los puntos sometidos al juzgamiento. Y sucedía esto precisamente en los momentos que sentencias del primer Tribunal de la República recibían aplausos públicos por el sello de imparcialidad y de justificacion con que se expedían, notándose entre ellas alguna que mas significacion envolvia tanto en el orden económico-político, como en el porvenir del pais. Es preciso detenerse sobre todos estos puntos, menos por provocar contestaciones y suscitar nuevas diferencias que este Gabinete desea de muy buena fé concluir irrevocablemente, que por llamar la atencion sobre ciertos incidentes que prestan sobrada luz para testificar el criterio y la lealtad con que el Perú procede siempre en sus relaciones con los otros pueblos de la tierra.

Ni presumible es que en este pais en el que viven tantos Españoles y extranjeros de todas clases y condiciones trabajando tranquila y cómodamente, sin trabas ni gabelas de ninguna especie, muchos de ellos con bienes de fortuna, estén expuestos á peligros frecuentes como se ha querido hacer entender y corriendo aventuras de mala índole. Si así fuera, ni habria esa inmigracion espontánea que afluye á nuestro territorio, ni se elaborarían esos capitales fuertes que se encuentran en manos de personas no Peruanas, ni se harían esas francas manifestaciones de contentamiento que mas de una vez han verificado los extranjeros en obsequio de la justicia, manifestaciones que han vindicado ámpliamente el honor de la República, vulnerado con harta ligereza. Sea de esto una prueba el discurso que un Español notable pronunció á bordo de la fragata "Resolucion," cuando, á nombre y en compañía de un gran número de sus compatriotas, felicitaba al Señor General Pinzon por su feliz arribo á estas playas.

Muy distante estaba el Gobierno del Perú y no lo estaba menos toda la sociedad de que un hecho de naturaleza comun habria de servir de pretexto para inventar ridiculos romances contra una tierra que, entre otras cosas, se distingue por su hospitalario carácter. Con todos sus huéspedes se explica el pueblo Peruano con señales de cordial

candor y á todos ofrece sus riquezas sin reserva; pero naturalmente se manifiesta mas expansivo con los Españoles, á quienes mira como miembros de una misma familia y á quienes distingue por señales visibles de predileccion, tanto en el trato doméstico y social, como en las mismas leyes que les dispensan concepciones de una palmaria liberalidad. Léjos, muy léjos pues, de haber hostilidad contra España y contra sus hijos, hay aquí, Excelentísimo Señor, mas que comunicaciones frías é indiferentes, mucha tolerancia, mucha afecto y mucha generosidad.

Cuando el Señor Salazar y Mazarredo arribó á esta capital, varias y antojadizas traducciones se hicieron de su mision; pero el Gabinete esperó su presentacion oficial para juzgar con acierto y para proceder con la circunspeccion que acostumbra, principalmente con los Representantes de las naciones amigas, pues tal considera á España, á pesar de no haberse definido aun explícitamente las condiciones en que fueron colocados los dos pueblos por sucesos que no deben conmemorarse en estas circunstancias.

Como nada ha deseado ni desea el Perú mas ardientemente que su buena inteligencia con la nacion que antes fué su madre patria, esperó, no sin sobrados fundamentos, que la mision del Señor Mazarredo, no obstante su especialidad, franquease el camino para un avenimiento formal, definitivo y explícito. Lejos de procurar el Gobierno motivo que retardase la conclusion de este importante resultado, estaba dispuesto á facilitar todos los medios de esplicarse con el Enviado, y al presentarse para entregar al Infrascrito sus credenciales, aseguróle que sus intenciones eran desinteresadas y nobles, no siendo él sino el órgano fiel de los sentimientos del pais y de su administracion. Este acto de marcada cortesía y algunos otros aun mas significativos, no fueron en verdad retribuidos de la misma manera, porque el Señor Mazarredo se detuvo en algunas apreciaciones sobre ciertas cuestiones y ciertos personajes del pais, que á continuar en ellas habrian podido tal vez conducirnos á un fatal resultado. Aceptó el Infrascrito la explicacion que hizo este caballero sobre la materia, cuando le llamó la atencion y le suplicó que se evitasen discusiones que podrian muy bien tener su oportunidad. Así acabó la única entrevista con el Señor Mazarredo.

Su credencial, contenida en el respetable oficio del Excelentísimo Señor Presidente del Consejo y Primer Secretario de Estado de Su Magestad Católica, fué leída y examinada sin pasion y sin ninguna mira ulterior; pero el Gabinete, sin dejar de aceptar al Señor Mazarredo en su carácter, le hizo una observacion que, definida como se esperaba, hubiese dejado á las partes cumplidamente satisfechas. Se le dijo con suma moderacion que siendo su mision puramente confidencial como tal Agente de España se le admitia, porque el título de Comisario podria en el curso de las negociaciones ofrecer embarazos que en el interés comun estaba alejar á toda costa. No se lo propuso que cambiase el título que tenia por que esto no competia á él sino á su mismo Gobierno, sino que recibiera la explicacion que se le hacia de considerarlo, aun sin atender al nombre atribuido á su encargo, solo como un agente confidencial; y fué preciso este paso porque antes el Señor Tavira vino acreditato con este carácter, por satisfacer un voto generalmente expresado, y porque en verdad el título de Comisario no era el mas adecuado para entrar en ciertas negociaciones superiores á este caracter. Si la contestacion hubiese sido que la cuestion era de poca significacion desde que con un nombre ú otro el fin del Gabinete Español era entenderse por medio de un agente confidencial todo se habria allanado y las cosas habrian tomado por fortuna otro semblante. Para que vuestra Excelencia se penetre de la sinceridad del Gobierno Peruano se remite en cópia la nota que con tal motivo se dirigió al Señor Mazarredo, donde no hay ni una sola frase que no sea decorosa y digna, y donde no se revela sino la mas pura cordialidad.

Sin embargo el Señor Salazar y Mazarredo ha dirigido al Infrascrito, con fecha de ayer, una nota con la cual acompaña un Memorandum que asegura haber circulado á las naciones aliadas en el que recapitula multitud de hechos y de apreciaciones tanto políticas como históricas, para probar la constante hostilidad que los Gobiernos del Perú, en los cuarenta años de independencia, han empleado contra la España. Como uno y otro documento fueron enviados á este despacho al concluir el dia y en circunstancias de haber salido de esta capital el Señor Mazarredo y embarcándose en el Callao á bordo de la "Covadonga," no podran ser contestados debidamente, con especialidad el segundo, porque la premura del tiempo, debiendo salir hoy la mala para Europa, no ha permitido entrar en un razonamiento que no puede dejar de ser concluyente para el Perú, que se halla á todas luces asistido de la justicia. No prescindirá el Infrascrito, á pesar de esto de formular ligeramente algunas reflexiones para patentizar que el Señor Mazarredo, aceptando como verdades simples conjeturas y dichos aislados desnudos de toda verosimilitud, prodiga increpaciones á la nacion y á sus autoridades que de cierto no merecen, manifestando así el ánimo prevenido de un diplomático á quien desde hace tiempo se atribuye la redaccion

en los diarios de Madrid de artículos altamente ofensivos á la dignidad de un pays cuya cultura no ha sido por fortuna desmentida. El Gobierno del Perú, ni para resistir á las exigencias del Gabinete de la Península, ni para ningun otro objeto, ha pensado levantar, dentro ó fuera de la República, un empréstito de setenta millones de pesos. El mismo Señor Diputado que presentó sobre el particular una mocion á la Comision Legislativa la retiró en seguida, convencido de la inexactitud y falsedad del rumor que maliciosamente se difundia. La operacion de un empréstito en una cantidad tan considerable como la referida es de tal naturaleza que no puedè realizarse sigilosa y clandestinamente: sean cuales fueren las precauciones que se adopten para mantenerla en secreto, ella necesariamente tiene que revelarse y pertenecer al dominio público. No habrá en apoyo de la asercion del Señor Mazarredo ni un solo dato, ni un leve indicio siquiera que acredite que el Gobierno ha abrigado semejante pensamiento. El tiempo vendrá á desvanecer una proposicion que el Señor Mazarredo ha debido examinar previamente para no incidir en una equivocacion, que tanto compromete su circunspeccion, y ultraja á un Gabinete que hasta ahora no ha dado mérito á que se ponga en duda su lealtad.

Han tenido tal confianza el Perú y su Gobierno actual en la moderacion de los personajes que dirijen la politica Española que no creyó, ni por un momento, que las cosas llegasen al estado lamentable en que por desgracia se encuentran. No obstante el jiro que ellas van tomando, se complacen uno y otro en persuadirse de que las occurrencias malhadadas que se han desenvuelto desde la llegada del Señor Mazarredo, serán estudiadas detenidamente por el Gabinete Español, quien á no dudarlo, verá en todos los pasos y en todas las medidas sagaces de que ha usado el Infrascrito, ménos que actos de animadversion para los Españoles, señales de benevolencia en armonia con la dignidad nacional.

El Señor Mazarredo, al ausentarse de Lima, ha dejado en su nota un motivo de profundo sentimiento para el Gobierno del Perú, atribuyendole malas disposiciones para entrar en un arreglo con el Gobierno de vuestra Excelencia, y este sentimiento recrece infinito, desde que hace ciertas alusiones relativamente á la inseguridad de los súbditos Españoles residentes en la República. Ellos seguirán siendo, como hasta aquí, atendidos y protegidos por las leyes; ellos seran constantemente el objeto de una hospitalidad cordial y sincera; ellos no serán perjudiciados ni en su persona ni en sus bienes, dejándolos en el ejercicio de su industria y gozando de los ámplios beneficios de un suelo feliz por su clima y feliz por las condiciones de su ilustrada politica. Y estas garantías dispensadas sin restriccion de ningun género no son el resultado de los temores que ha tratado de inspira el Señor Mazarredo, haciendo traslucir la accion de las represalias, que no tendrán nunca efecto desde que el Perú obra en el sentido de la justicia y desde que la España no puede dejar de tributar, como siempre lo ha hecho, un homenaje á la verdad, á la razon y al derecho.

Si desafortunadamente, lo que no se avanza á creer, no fuese atendida esta franca esposicion, el Perú confia en la bondad de su causa, en el testimonio irrefragable de los hechos, en sus propios y generosos sentimientos y en los votos de los pueblos cultos y civilizados.

Reservandose el Infrascrito razones y fundamentos de mas consideracion para cuando responda al Memorandum, lo que hará, tan luego como las atenciones del momento lo permitan, concluye la presente comunicacion, esperando que el contenido de ella sea una prueba mas de su recto y noble proceder.

Con sentimientos, &c.

(Signed) JUAN ANTONIO RIBEYRO.

Al Excelentísimo Señor Ministro de Estado de
Su Magestad Católica.

(Translation.)

Excellent Sir,

Lima, April 13, 1864.

PERU has long entertained a strong desire to re-establish her relations with Spain, a nation to which she is united by the bonds of affinity; but this often-expressed desire has been foiled by difficulties not easily to be set aside. The time has now come for the Government, as faithful interpreter of the wishes of the people whose destinies they govern, to address themselves directly to the Madrid Cabinet in order to remove all the difficulties which have hitherto prevented the reconciliation of the two States so called upon by their origin and interests to live in perfect peace and harmony.

The war was scarcely over in America, when independent nations were formed, which, in the exercise of their right, endeavoured by every means to attain to prosperity, and initiate themselves into the paths of industry and commerce. Peru made no exception to this enlightened policy. Her ports, fields, and cities, without any exception, were thrown open to all laborious foreigners; and Spaniards, although without any previous

agreement, and as members of our Association, enjoyed and still enjoy the same freedom, respect, and prerogatives as our own people. An enumeration of these facts, which are evident to all competent and impartial persons who have visited our country, might be made so as to prove them in a most victorious manner; but Her Catholic Majesty's Government, who so well know the proverbial mildness of the Peruvian character, the excellence of our laws and of our administrative organization, will no doubt not require such a work to be made, as it would not increase the useful knowledge possessed by them of all the regions of the Continent.

The benevolence of the Peruvian nation has been falsely interpreted by passionate functionaries and private persons, who, having found themselves deceived in their expectations, became gratuitous enemies of the country which had given them hospitality; but it was never believed that such statements would loosen the bonds which unite nations for their mutual good. In order to obviate and prevent fresh difficulties, which would perhaps relax existing ties and endanger peace, the Undersigned, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Peru, has the honour to address the Spanish Minister of State, in order to give him some explanations which, by their sincerity and frankness, cannot fail to induce the two Governments to come to an understanding, and to treat in a proper, frank, and harmonious manner.

It has been observed, not without great sorrow, that for the last few years the Press of Spain publishes articles against Peru, which one person in the former country, in correspondence with another resident in this capital, is careful officiously to prepare. There is no imposture they do not assert, nor event which they do not transfigure, stating that the nation is without laws, customs, and morality, and that all the inhabitants are abandoned to the frenzy of a repugnant licentiousness, and that the Government is responsible for all these excesses. Lower in the scale than a barbarous nation, Peru is considered to be a den of bandits, where no right is respected and where life is continually exposed. These calumnies, systematically spread abroad, may have produced a bad feeling in some persons, and have no doubt given rise to that dislike of the Peruvian authorities which has created difficulties to the prompt settlement of questions between the two countries.

Let it be said, in passing, the motives for this conduct are to be found in ignoble passion, which is the more inveterate as it has no grounds whatsoever to justify it.

When the Spanish squadron destined for the Pacific arrived at Callao, the Government extended that generous hospitality to it with which they receive their friends, and notwithstanding the alarm created by the motives attributed to that naval expedition, circumspection and common sense gained the victory over vague and malicious reports. Neither the most rigorous rules of etiquette, nor civilities of all sorts, nor a marked deference, were omitted on the arrival of the sailors of the Peninsula, with whom the sons of Peru felt they had ties of blood which were formed in the most remote times. But this most refined politeness has not been properly met, nor the most insignificant demonstration made such as our society had a right to expect. The Admiral, Chief of the squadron, to whom all, from the Government down to the private citizen, showed every sort of attention, used, from the first, a disdainful tone both with the authorities and private persons, and instead of studying our people and public men in order better to carry out the intentions of his Government, he avoided them, and accused them unjustly, surrounding himself by a special circle, which made his stay amongst us every day more intolerable. Anywhere else such acts would have led to fatal disagreements. Fortunately, notwithstanding this, the Peruvian Government were not wanting in the politeness necessary to dissipate fears and disturbances which would have retarded the good understanding between Peru and Spain.

An unforeseen event, but a very ordinary one in every part of the world, however civilized, gave greater extension to the Admiral's already very extensive demands, and to those of the persons who were desirous of a conflict. A conflict unfortunately broke out at a farm called Talambo, situated in the north, between some Spanish colonists and the natives, in which a Spaniard and a Peruvian were killed, and some others wounded.

As soon as the Supreme Administration heard of the event, they cast aside their important occupations, and ordered their Delegates to do their duty by apprehending the culprits, and investigating the matter in order to punish the guilty. They were not compelled to do this, but were stimulated by a desire to see justice properly executed.

The matter has been set on foot, and although not quite terminated, measures are being taken to clear up the facts, and demonstrate clearly who are the real authors of the crime.

So far there has been no denial of justice nor culpable delay, which are the only cases which, according to international right, authorize diplomatic reclamations. The affair of Talambo has, however, been painted in such colours that, to judge by these narrations, Peru would be the last of nations. But, fortunately, unquestionable testimony and documents prove sufficiently that our criminal statistics bear no proportion to our population, and that fewer crimes are committed in the nation thus harshly treated than in others more advanced in civilization.

The enemies of the country—for those who give absurd information must be considered as such—availed themselves of the Talambo affair; and M. Pinzon, lending an ear to passionate assertions, has, it is affirmed, stated to Her Catholic Majesty's Government that it is a most hideous event, that the authorities have not moved in the matter, and pointed out the risks which are always run by Spanish subjects. It is not strange that persons ignorant of our institutions, or badly affected towards the Government, should judge in this manner; but it is strange, and in no slight degree, that an authorized Chief, charged with a civilizing and friendly mission, should disappoint or tend to disappoint good feelings engendered on both sides.

The Talambo affair has been the cause of continual censure, as has also the circumspect conduct of the Tribunals, not excepting the Supreme Court of Justice, so worthy of veneration for its wisdom, prestige, and traditional purity. The Spanish Consul, to whom this Department communicated the state of the case, although he has no diplomatic character, and it was only done out of deference and to preserve good harmony between the two nations, allowed himself, in a note dated the 25th of February last, to make offensive allusions to a Body which is the safeguard of all right, the deposit of all judicial science, and which enjoys the confidence of both the Government and the people. He also made a protest which being only a matter of pure form, did not affect the case. This happened just as the sentences of the first tribunal of the Republic were being hailed with public applause, owing to their impartiality and justice.

It is necessary to delay a little over these points, not with a view of provoking replies and engendering fresh differences, which this Cabinet wishes to terminate irrevocably, but in order to call attention to certain incidents which throw more than sufficient light to bear witness to the uprightness and loyalty with which Peru always deals with the other nations of the earth.

Nor is it to be expected that in this country, where so many Spaniards and foreigners of all classes and conditions live quietly and easily at work without let or hindrance, many possessed of the blessings of fortune, that these should be exposed to frequent danger, as some have wished to make out, nor should continually run risks from ill-nature. If it were so there would be neither that spontaneous emigration which flows to our country, nor would those large capitals be amassed which we find in the hands of those who are not Peruvians, nor those frank acknowledgments of content be made, by which more than once strangers have testified to the honour of justice,—acknowledgments which have fully vindicated the honour of the Republic, which is wounded with so little consideration. We have a proof of this in the speech made by a distinguished Spaniard on board the frigate "*Resolucion*," when, in the name and presence of a great number of his fellow-countrymen, he congratulated Admiral Pinzon on his fortunate arrival in these waters.

The Government of Peru, as well as all the society, was very far from admitting that a common act of naturalization should serve as a pretext for inventing absurd stories against a country which prides itself, amongst other things, on its character for hospitality. The Peruvian people greet all their guests with marks of candour, and offer to all their riches, without reserve; but they naturally show themselves more demonstrative with Spaniards, whom they look on as members of their own family, and whom they distinguish by especial marks of preference, as well in their domestic and social dealings as in the laws themselves, which give them concessions with open-handed liberality. Far, very far, from enmity with Spain and her sons, there are here to be found, Sir, more than cool intercourse, but great tolerance, much affection, and vast generosity.

When Señor Salazar appeared in this capital, various and contradictory accounts were given of his mission, but the Cabinet waited for his official presentation to judge with certainty, and proceeded with the circumspection which they are accustomed to use towards the Representatives of friendly nations, since such they consider Spain, in spite of its not having been defined at all explicitly in what position the two nations are placed on account of events which we will not now speak of.

As Peru never has wished for, nor wishes for, anything more sincerely than a good understanding with that nation which formerly was her mother-country, she hoped, not without sufficient reason, that the mission of Señor Mazarredo, in spite of its especial

character, might clear a path for a formal, definitive and explicit reconciliation. The Government, far from placing obstacles that might retard the conclusion of this important result, was disposed to offer every facility for coming to an understanding with the Envoy; and when the latter presented himself in order to deliver his credentials to the Undersigned, he assured him that their intentions were disinterested and noble, and that he was nothing more than the faithful organ of the views of the country and the Administration. This act of marked courtesy, as well as others even more significant, was, indeed, not returned in the same manner, because Señor Mazarredo turned his attention to the consideration of certain questions and certain persons in the country, which, had they continued, might perhaps have led us to a fatal result. The Undersigned accepted the explanation which this gentleman made upon the matter, when he called his attention to it, and begged him to avoid discussions which might be left for another opportunity. Thus ended the only interview with Señor Mazarredo.

His credentials, contained in the despatch of his Excellency the President of the Council and Principal Secretary of State of Her Catholic Majesty, were read without passion and without any ulterior view; but the Cabinet, without ceasing to accept Señor Mazarredo in that character, made an observation which, rightly interpreted, would have left the parties completely satisfied. It told him, with the greatest moderation, that his mission being purely confidential, they would receive him as a confidential agent of Spain, because, in the course of negotiations, the title of Commissioner might offer embarrassments which, in the common interest, it was necessary to avoid at any cost. It was not proposed that he should change the title, because this was not in his power but in that of his Government, but that he should receive the explanation that was made to him to be considered, even without attention to the name given to his mission, only as a confidential agent: this step was necessary, because before this Señor Távira had come accredited in this character, in order to satisfy a vote generally expressed, and because, in reality, the title of Commissioner was not the most fit to enter upon certain superior negotiations of this nature. If the answer had been that the question was of little moment, since, under one name or another, the aim of the Spanish Government was to come to an understanding by the means of a confidential agent, everything would have become smooth, and affairs would fortunately have taken a different appearance. That your Excellency may perceive the sincerity of the Peruvian Government, a copy of the note addressed to Señor Mazarredo is inclosed, in which there is not a single phrase which is not decorous and worthy, and in which the purest cordiality is revealed.

Nevertheless, Señor Salazar y Mazarredo addressed to the Undersigned a note dated yesterday, accompanied by a memorandum which he affirms he has sent to the allied nations, in which he recapitulates a number of events and considerations, political as well as historical, to prove the constant enmity which the Governments of Peru during the forty years of its independence has manifested against Spain. As both of these documents were sent to this office late in the day, and under the circumstance of Señor Mazarredo having left this capital and embarked at Callao on board the "Covadonga," it was not possible to answer them properly, especially the second, because the shortness of the time, as the mail starts for Europe to-day, does not allow of a discussion, which could not but be conclusive for Peru, which has from every point of view justice on her side. The Undersigned will not omit, however, to make some reflections to show that Señor Mazarredo, taking for truth simple conjectures and isolated sayings utterly destitute of anything like truth, should lavish abuse upon the nation and its authorities which they certainly do not deserve, thus showing the prepared mind of a diplomatist to whom has been attributed for some time the publication of certain articles in the Madrid newspapers, highly offensive to the dignity of a country whose culture has fortunately not been surpassed. The Government of Peru, neither to resist the demands of the Government of the Peninsula nor for any other purpose, has had the idea of raising a loan of 70,000,000 dollars. The same Deputy who presented a motion on this account to the Legislative Commission withdrew it immediately, convinced of the inexactness and falseness of the rumour which had been maliciously spread. The negotiation of a loan of such a large amount as that referred to is of such a nature that it cannot be effected silently or clandestinely. Whatever might have been the precautions adopted to keep it secret, it necessarily has to reveal itself, and belong to the public dominion.

Señor Mazarredo's assertion has not the support of a single fact, nor even of the slightest indication to show that the Government had entertained such an idea. Time will show the falseness of a proposition which Señor Mazarredo should have examined previously in order not to fall into a mistake which compromises his prudence, outrages his Government, which up to this time has not given reason to doubt its loyalty.

Peru and its present Government had so much confidence in the moderation of those persons who direct Spanish policy, that it did not think even for a moment that affairs would have arrived at the lamentable state in which they now are. In spite of the course which they have taken, there are some people who comfort themselves in thinking that the unfortunate occurrences which have lately taken place since the arrival of Señor Mazarredo will be carefully studied by the Spanish Government, who, no doubt, will see in all the steps and wise measures of which the Undersigned has made use, the signs of good feeling in accordance with the national dignity, rather than acts of enmity against the Spaniards.

Señor Mazarredo, in leaving Lima, has left in his note a cause of deep grief for the Government of Peru, attributing to it evil dispositions in entering into an arrangement with the Government of your Excellency; and this resentment increases infinitely since there are certain allusions relative to the insecurity of the Spanish subjects resident in the Republic. They shall continue, as up to the present, protected by the laws; they shall always be the object of a cordial and sincere hospitality; they shall not be injured either in person or property; and they shall be left in the exercise of their industry, and in the enjoyment of the many benefits of a country happy in its climate, and happy in the conditions of its enlightened policy.

And these guarantees, granted without restriction of any sort, are not the result of the terror which Señor Mazarredo attempted to inspire, by making reprisals which shall never take effect, since Peru will act in a sense of justice, and since Spain is not able to cease paying, as she always has done, a homage to virtue, to reason, and to right.

The Undersigned reserves to himself the reasons and arguments of greater consideration until he shall reply to the memorandum, which he will do so soon as the affairs of the moment allow him; and he concludes the present communication in the hope that its contents may be a further proof of his just and noble conduct. If, unfortunately (which he cannot bring himself to believe), this frank exposition is not attended to, Peru puts her faith in the justice of her cause, in the incontestable testimony of real facts themselves, and the generous sentiments and opinions of civilized and impartial people.

With the sentiments, &c.

(Signed)

JUAN ANTONIO RIBEYRO.

Inclosure 2 in No. 3.

Vice-Consul Dartnell to Mr. Jerningham.

Sir,

Chincha Islands, April 15, 1864.

YESTERDAY, about 10 or 11 o'clock A.M., a Spanish steamer of war hove in sight from the north, and presently she was seen to be signaling with two vessels from the south, that eventually proved to be Spanish steam-frigates of war. Shortly afterwards an officer from the Admiral's ship came on shore with despatches for the Governor of these islands, and in a few minutes he retired, when it became known that the possession of the islands was demanded within the space of a few hours.

The Governor, in answer to the demands of the Spanish authorities, refused to deliver up the islands or haul down the Peruvian flag without orders from his Government; but not having a sufficient force to defend the place, and attend to the security of the large number of convicts here at work in the guano, and also being desirous of avoiding useless bloodshed, he had to allow the Spanish force to come unmolested on shore, and proceed as their judgment advised. He, the Governor, being powerless, had only to protest in the most formal manner.

Somewhere about half-past 3 P.M. an armed force in several boats was seen to proceed from the Spanish fleet on board the Peruvian vessel of war "Iquique," when presently her flag was hauled down and the Spanish ensign hoisted at the peak.

Immediately afterwards the same body of men (about 400, more or less) proceeded on shore, and straightway took possession of the Government House, and hoisted the Spanish flag, when a salute of twenty-one guns was fired by the before-mentioned vessels of war.

Soon after this I was honoured with a visit from Señor Salazar y Mazarredo, the Spanish Commissary or Minister, who assured me that both he and Admiral Pinzon would guarantee the security of all property, both foreign and Peruvian, on the islands, and that in no way should the loading of the vessels be interfered with, and that after loading they could proceed to Callao as usual.

On the retiring from the islands of the Admiral, Señor Mazarredo, and the Spanish troops, the Governor, Señor Capitan Don Ramon Valle-Riestra, the Captain of the Port, Señor Capitan Don Diego de la Haza, and the Commander of the "Iquique," Señor Capitan Don Augustin Ariolo, were taken on board the flag-ship in character of prisoners; and up to the present none of these gentlemen have returned on shore, so I suppose they must have proceeded on to Callao in the fleet.

The officers and crew of the "Iquique" have also been taken away, and only some ten or twelve men from the Spanish men-of-war left on board, with, it is said, orders not to communicate with the islands.

On shore we are completely abandoned, for not a single Peruvian soldier was left here, the "guarnicion," together with the convicts, having been taken off the islands, and sent, I believe, to Pisco in a Peruvian vessel of commerce which sailed last night.

Owing to the state of *abandon* in which this place has been left, the greatest alarm was felt last night, and still continues to be felt; but owing to the exertions of some persons here, headed and encouraged by the Cargador, Señor Calderon, a guard has been formed, and the streets during the night are to be patrolled. Nevertheless, as this population is formed of some of the worst kind of characters, and as the British Vice-Consulate is actually the deposit of considerable money and property belonging to several persons here, I do not feel altogether at ease, and should really, as well as others here, wish to see the flag of even the smallest British vessel of war in our harbour.

When, Sir, you consider that at this moment there is not one single employé of the Peruvian Government, much less of the Spanish, on these islands, I hope that you will take into consideration my position, and, if possible, send a vessel of war here, so that the minds of the British subjects here be set at rest, and that in case of a riot we may know where and how to apply for protection.

Thinking it my duty to apprise you as quickly as possible of what has taken place here, I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN DARTNELL.

Inclosure 3 in No. 3.

Admiral Pinzon to Señor Ribeyro.

Excelentísimo Señor,

TENGO la honra de poner en conocimiento de vuestra Excelencia que la conducta del Gobierno Peruano respecto de España me ha obligado á tomar posesion de las Islas de Chincha hasta que el de Su Magestad determine, bajo las condiciones espuestas en la declaracion diplomatica que adjunta acompaño.

Conservo en rchenes varios jefes y oficiales de la marina Peruana que respondéran de cualquier atropello que se quiera cometer con los súbditos Españoles.

En las Islas de Chincha espero su respuesta y aprovecho esta oportunidad para ofrecer á vuestra Excelencia, &c.

(Firmado) LUIS H. PINZON.

Declaracion.

Los Infrascritos, Comisario especial extraordinario de Su Magestad Católica en el Perú, y Comandante-General de su escuadra en el Pacífico;

En atencion á que las razones espuestas en el memorandum dirigido el 12 de este mes á los Representantes de las naciones aliadas en Lima demuestran de un modo evidente que el Gobierno de la República Peruana se ha colocado respecto del de Su Magestad en una actitud que hace indispensable el empleo de la fuerza;

Considerando que la política de conciliacion fraternal seguida hasta el dia solo ha servido para que el Gobierno de un pais que tiene con la España obligaciones sagradas las olvide, creyendo que la moderacion significa impotencia;

Considerando que el Gobierno de Su Magestad Católica no ha reconocido la independencia del Perú por culpa del de la República, y que segun la espresion de uno de sus publicistas "la tregua continúa solo de hecho;

Considerando que el bombardeo de uno ó mas puertos serviria tan solo para derramar sangre inutilmente y para destruir la propiedad de súbditos de las naciones aliadas, y tal vez la de Peruanos que censuran la conducta de su Gobierno;

Considerando que el de Su Magestad no pretende nunca mezclarse en la política interior de las Repúblicas Hispano-Americanas, y que para demostrar la sinceridad de

sus deseos, ha evitado en cuanto le ha sido posible hacer ningun desembarco en la tierra firme;

Considerando que el Gobierno del Peru ha declarado además en un documento diplomatico dirigido al de la Gran Bretaña "que las islas del guano no son sino una factoría, un establecimiento rentístico del Gobierno," y que por esa razon no podrá admitir en ellas Cónsules ni Agentes Consulares;

Considerando que la propiedad de las mencionadas islas puede reivindicarse por el Gobierno de Su Magestad con un derecho semejante al que la Gran Bretaña sancionó, devolviendo las islas de Fernando Pò, Annobon y Corisco, despues de una ocupacion formal y no interrumpida, durante un número considerable de años;

Considerando que segun una manifestacion que acaba de hacerse en la Comision permanente del Congreso Peruano, el Gobierno ha enviado al extranjero comisionados que deben contratar un empréstito de setenta millones de pesos, cantidad excesivamente superior á las atenciones del tesoro;

Considerando que segun la opinion pública, parte de ese capital se destinará á adquirir los medios de oponerse á las justas exigencias de la España, y que los obstáculos puestos al recibimiento del infrascrito Comisario especial tienen por objeto ganar el tiempo suficiente para terminar aquella operacion rentística;

Los Infrascritos, Comandante-General de la escuadra de Su Magestad Católica en el Pacífico y su Comisario especial extraordinario en el Perú, declaran que han resuelto lo siguiente :—

Art. 1. La escuadra de Su Magestad se apoderará de todas las islas pertenecientes al Perú y de los buques de guerra que sirvan de obstáculo á este proyecto.

Art. 2. El guano que contienen las Islas de Chincha servira de hipoteca para todas las cantidades adelantadas al Perú por súbditos extranjeros con la garantia de aquel abono, siempre que los respectivos contratos hayan sido aprobados por el Congreso Peruano, y publicados de un modo oficial antes del dia de la fecha.

Art. 3. Las compañías extranjeras que embarcan guano en la actualidad seguirán esportandolo, y rendirán cuenta al Gobierno de Su Magestad de las toneladas que estraigan desde el dia de hoy, en que se ha enarbolado el pabellon Español en las Islas de Chincha.

Y para que conste y llegue á noticia de quien corresponda, firmamos esta declaracion en el fondeadero de las Islas de Chincha á 14 de Abril de 1864.

(Firmado)

L. H. PINZON.

EUSEBIO DE SALAZAR Y MAZARREDO.

(Translation.)

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to bring to the knowledge of your Excellency that the conduct of the Peruvian Government towards Spain has obliged me to take possession of the Chincha Islands until Her Majesty's Government shall determine, under the conditions referred to in the diplomatic declaration which I herewith adjoin.

I retain as hostages several officers of the Peruvian navy, who shall be answerable for any insult offered to Spanish subjects.

I expect your reply at the Chincha Islands, and avail, &c.

(Signed)

LUIS H. PINZON.

Declaration.

The Undersigned, Special Commissioner Extraordinary of Her Catholic Majesty in Peru, and Commander-General of her squadron in the Pacific:

Whereas the reasons laid down in the Memorandum directed on the 12th instant to the Representatives of the allied nations in Lima are an evident proof that the Peruvian Government has placed itself with respect to Her Majesty's Government in an attitude which renders the employment of force indispensable;

Considering that the policy of conciliation followed up to the present day has had the only result that the Government of a country which owes Spain sacred obligations should forget them, believing moderation to signify impotence;

Considering that it is the fault of the Government of the Republic that the Government of Her Catholic Majesty has not recognized the independence of Peru, and that, according to the expression of one of her public writers, "truce only continues *de facto*;"

Considering that the blockade of one or more ports would only cause useless blood-

shed and destruction of property of subjects of the allied nations, and perhaps that of Peruvians who censure the conduct of their Government ;

Considering that Her Majesty's Government has never pretended to meddle with the politics of the Hispano-American Republics, and has, in order to show the sincerity of its desires, avoided as much as possible to effect a landing on the continent ;

Considering that the Government of Peru has moreover declared in a diplomatic document addressed to the Government of Great Britain, "that the guano islands were only a factory, a financial establishment of the Government," and that therefore they could not admit on them any Consuls or Consular Agents ;

Considering that the property of said islands can be revindicated by Her Majesty's Government with a right similar to that which Great Britain sanctioned when she restored the Islands of Fernando Po, Annobon, and Corisco, after a formal and uninterrupted possession during a considerable number of years ;

Considering that, according to a manifestation lately made in the Permanent Commission of the Peruvian Congress, Government has sent abroad Commissioners to contract a loan of 70,000,000 dollars, a sum greatly in excess of the requirements of the Treasury ;

Considering that according to public opinion a part of that sum would be employed in acquiring the means of opposing the just exigencies of Spain, and that the object of the obstacles put to the reception of the undersigned Special Commissioner is to gain sufficient time for terminating that financial operation ;—

The undersigned Commander-General of Her Catholic Majesty's squadron in the Pacific, and her Special Commissioner Extraordinary in Peru, declare to have resolved the following :—

Article 1. Her Majesty's squadron will take possession of all the islands belonging to Peru, and of all men-of-war that might form an obstacle to that project.

Art. 2. The guano existing on the Chincha Islands shall serve as mortgage for all sums advanced to Peru by foreign subjects under the guarantee of said manure, in all cases where the respective contracts have been approved of by the Peruvian Congress, and officially published before the present date.

Art. 3. The foreign Companies at present shipping guano will continue exporting it, and will render an account to Her Majesty's Government of the tons they extract from the present day on which the Spanish flag has been hoisted on the Chincha Islands.

And in order that notice be given to whom it may concern, we sign this declaration at the roadstead of the Chincha Islands on the 14th day of April of 1864.

(Signed) LUIS H. PINZON.
EUSEBIO DE SALAZAR Y MAZARREDO.

Inclosure 4 in No. 3.

Señor Ribeyro to Admiral Pinzon.

Señor Almirante,

Lima, 16 de Abril de 1864.

EL Gobierno del Perú se ha instruido, con la mayor sorpresa, e indignacion á la vez, de que las fuerzas navales que están á las órdenes de US., con violacion desusada de todas las exijencias del derecho, sin el menor pretexto que lo justifique y empleando para ello el uso de la fuerza, ha apresado un buque de la marina Peruana, y enarbolando la bandera de España, tomado posesion de las Islas de Chincha, que son y forman parte del territorio de la República.

Semejante proceder, para el que el Gobierno del Perú se resiste á admitir que pueda US. estar autorizado por el Gabinete de Madrid, conducta semejante llevada á efecto en el estado de paz, sin prévia declaracion de guerra, y cuando, sino mediaban precisamente las mejores relaciones entre el Perú y la España, tampoco puede decirse que ha existido entre ambas naciones hostilidad manifiesta ; es un atentado inaudito, y significa el mayor insulto, la injuria mas atroz que ha podido inferirse á la independencia, á la dignidad nacional y al buen nombre de la República Peruana.

Su Excelencia el Presidente, lleno de la justa indignacion que corresponde á tamaña afrenta, me ha ordenado dirija á US. esta comunicacion, y que pida que exija en ella de US. las mas perentorias, inmediatas y satisfactorias esplicaciones del atentado cometido el 14 en las Islas de Chincha. Esas esplicaciones las espera el Gobierno con ansiedad, por que admite todavia como posible que haya error en los informes que se le han trasmitido, y por que aun suponiendolos ciertos, abriga la esperanza de que la autoridad Española sobre quien pesa inmediatamente la responsabilidad de esos actos ha podido,

en un momento de extravío, decidirse á llevarlos á cabo, sin órdenes de su Gobierno, y venga al fin en conocimiento de que lo compromete muy seriamente con ellos.

US. está al corriente de la llegada á esta capital del Señor Don Eusebio de Salazar y Mazarredo; US. conoce el objeto de su mision, y probablemente esta tambien impuesto, asi de la manera atenta y comedida con que el Gobierno del Perú hizo sus observaciones al carácter de Comisario que investia, como de la descortes é insultante con que respondió á ellas. El folleto injurioso, manifiesto, ó Memorandum que acompañó á su contestacion, si bien habria justificado la resolucion adoptada por el Gobierno de romper para en adelante todo género de comunicaciones personales con el Señor de Salazar y Mazarredo, de ningun modo podia traducirse como la interrupcion de relaciones entre el Perú y la España, y menos era, por cierto, un manifiesto de guerra, ni una declaracion formal de hostilidades, ni siquiera un ultimatum. Por consiguiente, y desgraciadamente para la honra del Gobierno Español, el atentado de que me ocupo agrega á la injuria las condiciones de la alevosía.

El Gobierno del Perú, que jamás ha abrigado indignos sentimientos de preparacion contra la España ó sus súbditos, y que lejos de eso ha prestado á las personas autorizadas que han representado sus intereses en la República consideraciones extremas, que no siempre han tenido esas personas la hidalgia de reconocer; el Gobierno del Perú, á cuyo nombre hablo, aceptará con sincera satisfaccion las esplicaciones que espera de US. en contestacion á esta nota; pero si ellas no vinieren, ó si dadas por US., no fueran tan esplicitas y completas como corresponde á la enormidad de la ofensa, debe entender desde luego US. que el Gobierno Peruano, y el Perú entero con él, cumplirán su deber.

Para ese caso tengo el encargo, y lo lleno con la intensidad personal de sentimientos propios del que habla á nombre del pais cuyos derechos se ultrajan, de decir á US. que el Gobierno del Perú, fuerte con la justicia que le asiste, y decidido, firmemente decidido, á conseguirla á toda costa, rechaza la injuria hecha al pabellon de la República col el apresamiento de uno de sus buques de guerra, y la violacion armada de una parte de su territorio. Protesta solemnemente de esos actos atentatorios, y deja la responsabilidad de las consecuencias que ellos traigan, bien sea á US., si ha procedido *motu proprio*, bien sea al Gobierno mismo de España, en el caso increíble supuesto de que llegare á asumirla.

Hace cuarenta años, cuando el Perú pobre de recursos no tenia los medios de accion con que hoy podria contar; cuando la España disponia de ejércitos y elementos numerosos de poder dentro de su propio suelo, y de la influencia moral consiguiente á la dominacion de tres siglos, tuvo lugar la lucha heroica que no ha debido olvidarse todavia y que terminó por la conquista de su independencia. Hoy que posee la República un puesto honroso en la comunidad de las naciones, y está en el goce pleno de los derechos de su personalidad independiente, no vacilará un instante en repetir, si necesario fuere, ni los sacrificios, ni los actos de heroismo que han consagrado en la historia el nombre de Ayacucho.

Escrita la parte que precede de esta comunicacion ha llegado á mis manos una nota de US. cuyo objeto es imponerme de que "ha tomado posesion de las Islas de Chincha hasta que el Gobierno de Su Magestad determine, bajo las condiciones expuestas en la declaracion diplomatica que se ha servido US. acompañar," y que, "conserva en rehenes varios jefes y oficiales de la marina Peruana que responderán de cualquier atropello que se quiera cometer con los súbditos Españoles." Evidente es pues ya el hecho atentatorio y alevoso sobre el que acabo de consignar la protesta del Gobierno del Perú, y vistos los términos de la nota de US., no debo esperar ya esplicaciones de ningun género. Me cabe por lo tanto y simplemente reiterar y dar nueva fuerza, si es necesario, á la protesta hecha.

Respecto de la "declaracion" que US. se ha servido remitirme, solo diré á US. que ella quedará archivada en este Ministerio, como una prueba de la ofensa inferida á la República, y como un documento destinado á estimular en el Gobierno y en cada uno de los Peruanos que lo lean los sentimientos del orgullo nacional imprudentemente herido por US. No seria digno del Gobierno del Perú entrar en discusion sobre el mérito de las afirmaciones hechas en ese documento, mientras que el que lo suscribe se mantenga en la posesion de una parte del territorio nacional adquirida con el empleo de la fuerza; y aun cuando tal documento no estuviese firmado por US. que se ha decidido á llevar sobre sus hombros la responsabilidad de la injuria, ni por el Señor de Salazar y Mazarredo, con quien no reconoce el Gobierno la obligacion de entenderse oficialmente y está resuelto á comunicarse en lo futuro, sería casi ofender al buen sentido, descender ahora á demostrar que, cuando es notorio que no han llegado á establecerse negociaciones diplomáticas entre el Perú y la España, pueda decirse con verdad que se emplea la fuerza como

último recurso; que, ante la evidencia de los hechos, ante el proceder del Señor de Salazar y Mazarredo y el de US. mismo, ahora como antes, pueda decirse que la política de España ha sido fraternal respecto del Perú; que, después de dos misiones diplomáticas encargadas de cultivar la buena inteligencia entre las dos naciones, y el reconocimiento de la independencia del Perú, no sea casi salvar los límites de la decencia, asegurar que ese reconocimiento no ha sido obtenido por culpa de la República; y que pueda alegarse respecto de las Islas de Chincha un pretendido derecho de revindicación, como si entre esas islas, que son parte integral del territorio de la República, y el Perú entero, existiese, respecto de los derechos consiguientes al dominio y la soberanía, la mas pequeña diferencia.

Cualquiera que sea, ó pueda ser en adelante, la conducta de US., debe US. descansar con fiadamente en que los súbditos Españoles que hoy residen en el Perú continuarán disfrutando de la mas completa seguridad en sus personas, sin correr el peligro de atropellos, mientras sigan pacífica y honradamente consagrados á sus propios negocios. Algo ha ganado el Perú en civilización con la independencia de la que fué su metrópoli, para que sea necesario tomar respecto de él la seguridad de rehenes; tocaba á US. revivir una costumbre bélica que terminó con los tiempos de barbarie y que está lejos de hacer honor al jefe de marina de una nacion que pretende ser culta.

Tengo, &c.

(Firmado) JUAN ANTONIO RIBEYRO.

(Translation.)

Sir,

Lima, April 16, 1864.

THE Government of Peru has learnt with the greatest surprise as well as indignation that the naval force under your orders has, with violation of all law, without the least pretext that might justify it, and with the employment of force, seized a vessel of the Peruvian navy, and hoisting the flag of Spain taken possession of the Chincha Islands, which are and form part of the territory of the Republic.

This proceeding, for which the Peruvian Government can hardly believe you can be authorized by the Cabinet of Madrid, this conduct observed in time of peace, without previous declaration of war, and when, if not exactly the best relations reigned between Peru and Spain, still it cannot be said that there existed any manifest hostility between both nations; it is an unheard of outrage, and signifies the greatest insult, the most atrocious injury that could have been inflicted against the independence, national dignity, and good name of the Peruvian Republic.

His Excellency the President, full of the just indignation which corresponds to such an affront, has ordered me to send you this communication, and to ask to exact in it from you the most peremptory, speedy, and satisfactory explanations of the outrage committed on the 14th instant at the Chincha Islands: These explanations are anxiously expected by Government, because it admits yet the possibility of errors in the informations received, and because even supposing them correct it will not abandon the hope that the Spanish authorities upon whom the responsibility of said proceedings weighs might have determined in a moment of aberration to carry them out without orders of their Government, and might comprehend at last that they compromise the same most seriously.

You are well aware of the arrival at this city of Señor Don Eusebio Salazar y Mazarredo; you know the object of his mission, and probably also the polite and courteous manner in which the Peruvian Government made its observations on the character of "Commissioner" with which he was invested, as also the uncivil and insulting way in which he responded to them. The injurious pamphlet, manifest, or memorandum which accompanied his answer, although it would have justified a resolution of this Government to break off henceforth every kind of personal communication with Señor de Salazar y Mazarredo, could in no way be interpreted as an interruption of relations between Peru and Spain, and it was still less a manifest of war, or a formal declaration of hostilities, or even an ultimatum. Consequently and unhappily for the honour of the Spanish Government the attentat in question adds to insult the conditions of treachery.

The Government of Peru, which never has harboured unworthy prejudices against Spain or her subjects, and which, far from it, has rendered to the authorized persons who have represented her interests in the Republic the greatest considerations, to acknowledge which these persons have not always shown sufficient nobleness of character, the Government of Peru, in whose name I speak, will accept with sincere satisfaction the explications it expects from you in reply to this despatch, but if they should not come, or if they were not as explicit and complete as corresponds to the enormity of the offence, you must know at once the Peruvian Government and all Peru will do their duty.

For said event I am charged to tell you, and I fulfil this duty with the intensity of personal feelings proper to him who speaks in the name of a country whose rights have been outraged—that the Government of Peru, strong in the justice assisting it, and determined, firmly determined, to obtain it at every cost, rejects the insult offered to the flag of the Republic by the seizure of one of her war vessels, and by the armed violation of a part of her territory—solemnly protects against those attentatory acts, and leaves the responsibility of their consequences to you, if you have proceeded *motu proprio*, or to the Government of Spain in the incredible supposition that it should assume said responsibility.

Forty years ago, when Peru, poor in resources, had not the means of action on which she now counts, when Spain had at her disposal armies and numerous elements of power within her own country, and the moral influence consequent on a domination of three centuries, the heroic struggle took place which cannot yet be forgotten, and which ended with the conquest of her independence. Now, when the Republic owns a honourable place in the community of nations, and is in the full enjoyment of the rights of her independent personality, she will not vacillate an instant to repeat, if necessary, the sacrifices and heroic deeds which have consecrated the name of Ayacucho in history.

After the preceding part of this communication was written, a despatch of yours has come to my hands, the object of which is to tell that—"You have taken possession of the Chincha Islands until Her Majesty's Government determine, under the conditions referred to in the diplomatic declaration which you have pleased to adjoin," and that "you retain as hostages several officers of the Peruvian navy who shall answer for any insult committed against Spanish subjects." The attentatory and treacherous deed is thus evident on which I have consigned the protest of the Peruvian Government, and in view of the terms of your despatches I cannot expect from you explanations of any kind. I have merely to repeat, therefore, and give new force, if necessary, to the protest made.

As to the "declaration" which you have been pleased to send me, I shall tell you only that it shall remain deposited in the archives of this Ministry as a proof of the offence inflicted on the Republic, and as a document destined to stimulate the Government and every Peruvian to read in it how the sentiments of national pride have been imprudently wounded by you. It would not be worthy of the Government of Peru to enter into discussions upon the merit of the assertions made in said document, while he who signed it remains in possession of a part of the national territory forcibly acquired; and even if such a document were not signed by you who have determined to take upon yourself the responsibility of the insult, nor by Señor Salazar y Mazarredo, with whom Government does not recognize the obligation to act officially, and is resolved not to act in future, it would be almost an offence to common sense, if we condescended now to prove that, when it is notorious that diplomatic negotiations have not been established between Peru and Spain, it can be truly said force has been employed as the last resource; that, before the evidence of facts, before the proceedings of Señor Salazar y Mazarredo and those of yourself, it can be said now, the same as before, that the policy of Spain has been fraternal towards Peru; that after two diplomatic missions charged to cultivate good understanding between the two nations, and to have the independence of Peru recognized, it would not almost pass the limits of decency if we were to assure that such a recognition has not been obtained by the fault of the Republic; and that with respect to the Chincha Islands a pretended right of revindication may be alleged, as if between these Islands being an integral part of the Peruvian territory and the whole of Peru there existed the slightest difference in the rights of dominion and sovereignty.

Whatever be henceforward your conduct, you may safely trust that the Spanish subjects actually residing in Peru will continue enjoying the completest security in their persons without any danger of being insulted whilst they follow peaceably and honestly their own business. Sufficient advance in civilization has been made by Peru through the liberation from what once was her metropolis, to render unnecessary the taking of hostages as a security against her; it was reserved for you to revive a warlike custom which terminated with the times of barbarism, and which is far from honouring the Chief of the squadron of a nation pretending to be civilized.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JUAN ANTONIO RIBEYRO.

Inclosure 5 in No. 3.

*Señor Ribeyro to Mr. Jerningham.**Lima, 16 de Abril de 1864.*

LA presencia de la escuadra Española en las costas del Peru, asi como el arribo á esta capital del Señor Don Eusebio de Salazar y Mazarredo, lejos de causar alarma alguna en el pueblo Peruano y en el Gobierno que rije sus destinos, alentaba en uno y en otro, la halagüeña esperanza de definir pacífica y amigablemente las relaciones que instintivamente han conservado el Peru y la España, y que debian conservar un beneficio reciproco de ambos Estados. Pero desgraciadamente se han frustrado aquellas esperanzas, por la incalificable conducta que ha observado el Señor Mazarredo, desde que entró en comunicacion con el Infrascrito, y por los hechos atentatorios y depresivos de la honra y de la propiedad nacional que sigue realizando en union del jefe de la flotilla de su nacion.

Para que el Honorable Señor Encargado de Negocios y Consul-General de Su Magestad Británica aprecie como conviene las aserciones del Infrascrito, basta que fije su ilustrada atencion en los hechos que han mediado y que pasa desde luego el Infrascrito á referir.

El 20 de Marzo proximo pasado recibió el Infrascrito una nota del mencionado Señor Mazarredo en la que solicitaba se le señalara dia y hora para entregar una comunicacion de su Gobierno. Dos dias despues, accediendo á su solicitud, se le designó el 30 de ese mismo mes para el indicado fin, porque los dias que mediaron entre estas dos fechas fueron los de la Semana Santa y de la Pascua, en los que no era posible consagrarse á asuntos oficiales. Tuvo lugar la conferencia; y en ella el Agente Español entregó al Infrascrito el oficio referido, en el que su Gobierno lo investia con el caracter de Comisario especial cerca del Gobierno del Perú. Como este titulo podia en el curso de las negociaciones ofrecer dificultades que el Gobierno deseaba prevenir, fuele preciso al Infrascrito manifestar al Señor Mazarredo que si su caracter era confidencial, como tal Agente del Gabinete de Madrid, lo aceptaba desde luego el del Perú y que en esta inteligencia podia dar principio á su mision. Desde la fecha ultimamente citada, hasta el 12 del actual á las cuatro y media de la tarde, permaneció en silencio, y á esa hora mandó una nota y una esposicion que, segun afirma, ha circulado á los Representantes de las naciones aliadas; documentos que no puede el Infrascrito apellidar diplomáticos, porque ni su estilo, ni la adulteracion de los hechos que contienen, ni las frases amenazantes en que abundan, pueden colocarlos en esta gerarquia. Desea el Infrascrito que el Honorable Señor Jerningham se fije en el hecho muy significativo de la demora y en la circunstancia mucho mas remarcable de que, en ese mismo dia y muy de mañana, el Señor Mazarredo se embarcó en uno de los buques de guerra de su nacion, surto en la bahia del Callao, el que, haciendo un falso rumbo al norte, se dirijió á las aguas del sur con el objeto de consumir, en union del resto de la escuadra, la detentacion de las Islas de Chíncha y el apresamiento de sus principales autoridades y de uno de los buques de nuestra armada, todo lo cual ha verificado el 14 del presente. Este hecho acaba de comunicarse al Infrascrito por el Almirante Pinzon, por medio de una nota, á la cual acompaña una esposicion firmada por él y por el Señor Mazarredo, en la que despues de algunos considerandos que no es del caso referir, manifiesta que ha tomado posesion de las Islas, hasta que el Gobierno de Su Magestad determine lo conveniente; y que conservan en rehenes varios jefes y oficiales de la marina Peruana, que responderan de cualquier atropello que se quiera cometer con los súbditos Españoles.

El Infrascrito se halla, como debe suponerlo el Honorable Señor Encargado de Negocios de Su Magestad Británica á quien tiene la honra de dirijirse, bajo la influencia de la exitacion que ha producido en él, en su Gobierno, y en la poblacion entera, un hecho que, sin ejemplo en los anales del mundo civilizado, acaba de realizarse con tanta violencia como insidia. Se abstiene por lo tanto de calificarlo; pero no puede prescindir, en cumplimiento del mas imperioso de sus deberes y en uso de uno de sus mas sagrados derechos, de protestar, á nombre de su Gobierno y á nombre del Perú, como en efecto protesta, ante las naciones cultas de ambos continentes, de la ocupacion que acaba de realizarse de los depósitos de huano, que constituyen la principal riqueza de la República, sobre los que esta nacion conserva un perfecto dominio, sean cuales fueren los actos que posteriormente practiquen los detentadores. Se ha inferido, pues, un ultraje á la nacion, que no consentiran los hijos de los que supieron conquistar su independecia á costa de tantos y tan heroicos sacrificios. La depredacion de las Islas no arguye nada en contra de la personalidad política del Perú, ni de sus derechos como nacion libre y soberana; y si en ese acto tuviese participacion el Gobierno de España, lo que no es de creerse, sabria

recordar las glorias de los que, sacandolo de la humilde condicion de colonia, gravaron su nombre en el rol de las naciones.

Concluye el Infrascrito la presente comunicacion, asegurando al Honorable Señor Encargado de Negocios de Su Magestad Británica que oportunamente tendrá el honor de remitirle en copia autentica los documentos relativos á este asunto; y aprovecha de esta oportunidad, &c.

(Firmado) JUAN ANTONIO RIBEYRO.

(Translation.)

Lima, April 16, 1864.

THE presence of the Spanish squadron on the coast of Peru, as well as the arrival in this capital of M. Eusebio de Salazar y Mazarredo, far from causing any alarm among the Peruvian people and to the Government who direct their destiny, both one and the other were animated with the flattering hope of pacifically and amicably defining the relations which Peru and Spain have instinctively preserved, and which they should preserve to the reciprocal benefit of both countries; but, unfortunately, those hopes have been frustrated by the unqualifiable conduct observed by M. Mazarredo since he entered into communication with the Undersigned, and by the unlawful acts, depressive of the honour and property of the nation, which he continues realizing in union with the Chief of the flotilla of his nation.

In order that the Honourable Chargé d'Affaires and Consul-General of Her Britannic Majesty may appreciate, as is due, the assertions of the Undersigned, it is sufficient to fix his enlightened attention upon the facts that have taken place, and to which the Undersigned now proceeds to refer.

On the 20th of March last the Undersigned received a note from the said M. Mazarredo, in which he solicited that a day and hour should be appointed for the delivery of a communication from his Government. Two days afterwards, acceding to his desire, the 30th of the same month was assigned to him for the object indicated, because the intermediate days were those of the Holy Week and Easter, during which it was not possible to enter into official matters. The conference took place, and during it the Spanish Agent delivered to the Undersigned the despatch referred to, in which his Government invested him with the character of Special Commissary to the Government of Peru. As this title might, in the course of the negotiations, offer difficulties which the Government desired to prevent, it was necessary for the Undersigned to express to Señor Mazarredo that, if his character was confidential, as such Agent of the Cabinet of Madrid, that of Peru at once accepted him, and that with this understanding he could commence his mission. From the last date mentioned down to the 12th instant, at half-past 4 in the afternoon, he remained silent, and at that hour he sent in a note and an exposition, which, according to his statement, he has sent to the Representatives of the allied nations. documents which the Undersigned cannot call diplomatic, because neither their style, the adulteration of the facts they contain, nor the threatening phrases with which they abound, can place them in this hierarchy. The Undersigned desires that the Hon. Mr. Jerningham should note the very significant fact of the delay and the circumstance (much more remarkable) that on that very day, and very early in the morning, M. Mazarredo embarked on board of one of the vessels of war of his nation, in the Bay of Callao, which, taking a false route to the north, proceeded to the waters of the south, with the object of consummating, in union with the rest of the squadron, the embezzlement of the Chincha Islands, and the capture (or seizure) of their principal authorities, and of one of the vessels of our fleet, all which he has effected on the 14th instant. This fact has just been communicated to the Undersigned by Admiral Pinzon by means of a note, in which he incloses a declaration signed by himself and Señor Mazarredo, in which, after some matters requiring consideration to which it is not necessary to refer, is manifested that they have taken possession of the islands until the Government of Her Majesty shall determine, and that they keep as hostages various Chiefs and officers of the Peruvian navy, who will answer for any aggression that may be committed against Spanish subjects.

The Undersigned is, as the Honourable Chargé d'Affaires of Her Britannic Majesty may well suppose, under the influence of the excitement caused to him, his Government, and the whole population, by an act which, without example in the annals of the civilized world, had just been realized with so much violence as well as contrivance. The Undersigned, therefore, abstains from giving it a name; but he cannot but, in the fulfilment of the most imperious of his duties, and in the use of one of his most sacred rights, protest in the name of his Government and in the name of Peru, as, in effect, he protests before the enlightened nations of both Continents, against the occupation which has just been effected of the deposits of guano, which constitute the principal riches of the

Republic, over which this nation holds a perfect dominion, whatever may be the acts which the detainers may hereafter commit. An outrage has been perpetrated upon the nation, which will not be consented to by the sons of those who obtained their independence at the cost of so many and such heroic sacrifices. The depredation of the islands does not argue anything against the political personality of Peru, nor its rights as a free and sovereign nation; and if in that act the Government of Spain has had any participation, which is not to be believed, it will remember the glory of those who, in bringing it out of the humble condition of a colony, engraved its name on the roll of nations.

The Undersigned concludes the present communication, assuring the Honourable Chargé d'Affaires of Her Britannic Majesty that he will opportunely have the honour to transmit to him authentic copies of the documents relative to this matter, and avails, &c.

(Signed)

JUAN ANTONIO RIBEYRO.

Inclosure 6 in No. 3.

Mr. Jerningham to Señor Ribeyro.

Lima, April 20, 1864.

THE Undersigned, &c., has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note which his Excellency the Peruvian Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed to him on the 16th instant, detailing the proceedings of Señor Salazar y Mazarredo and Admiral Pinzon, and the taking possession of the Islands of Chincha by the Spanish squadron.

The Undersigned will not fail to send a copy of his Excellency's note to Her Britannic Majesty's Government, who will instruct the Undersigned what line of conduct he will have to observe in an affair which has caused him great surprise and astonishment.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed)

WM. STAFFORD JERNINGHAM.

Inclosure 7 in No. 3.

Admiral Pinzon to the Governor of the Chincha Islands.

Fondeadero de las Chinchas, á 14 de Abril de 1864.

ESTANDO resuelto á posesionarme de las Islas Chinchas con las fuerzas de mi mando, lo participo á U., debiendo ponerlas á mi disposicion; pues de lo contrario las tomaré á viva fuerza.

Dios guarde, &c.

(Firmado)

LUIS H. PINZON.

(Translation.)

Anchorage of the Chinchas, April 14, 1864.

BEING determined to take possession of the Chincha Islands by means of the force under my command, I communicate this to you, that you may deliver them up to me; if you do not I shall take them by main force.

God preserve, &c.

(Signed)

LUIZ H. PINZON.

Inclosure 8 in No. 3.

The Governor of the Chincha Islands to the Vice-Admiral of the Spanish Squadron.

*Gobernacion de las Islas de Chincha,
á 14 de Abril de 1864.*

Señor Contra-Almirante,

HE recibido la nota que el Señor Almirante ha tenido á bien dirigirme con fecha de hoy, en la cual me intima que ponga á su disposicion estas islas, y que en el caso de no hacerlo así, tomará posesion de ellas por medio de la fuerza. En contestacion debo decir al Señor Almirante que no tengo instrucciones de mi Gobierno sobre el particular, y que no pudiendo por lo tanto proceder en asunto de tanta gravedad, pediré les necesarias, esperando que el Señor Almirante tenga á bien darme el tiempo necesario para recibirlas.

Tengo, &c.

(Firmado)

RAMON VALLE-RIESTRA.

(Translation.)

Administration of the Chincha Island, April 14, 1864.

I HAVE received the note of this day's date which the Admiral has been pleased to address to me, in which he calls upon me to place these Islands at his disposal, and says that in case of my not doing so he will take possession of them by force. I now have to inform the Admiral in reply that I have no instructions from my Government on this matter, and, therefore, not being able to act in an affair of such importance, I will ask for the necessary instructions, hoping that the Admiral will be pleased to allow me the time necessary to receive them.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RAMON VALLE-RIESTRA.

Inclosure 9 in No. 3.

*Admiral Pinzon to the Governor of the Chincha Islands.**Fondeadero de las Chinchas, á 14 de Abril de 1864.*

EN contestacion á la atenta nota de US. que acabo de recibir, pongo en su conocimiento que el Alférez de navio, dador de esta comunicacion, lleva una bandera Española, que deberá sustituir á la de la República del Perú en el plazo improrrogable de quince minutos. Si así no fuese se romperá el fuego inmediatamente sin contemplacion de ningun género, y US. será responsable de la sangre que se derrame y de la propiedad que se destruya.

Dios guarde, &c.

(Firmado)

LUIS H. PINZON.

(Translation.)

Anchorage of the Chinchas, April 14, 1864.

IN reply to your polite note which I have just received, I inform you that the naval Ensign who brings this communication carries a Spanish flag, which he will substitute for that of the Republic of Peru within fifteen minutes without delay. If this be not done, he will immediately open fire without any further consideration, and you will be responsible for the blood which may be shed and the property destroyed.

God preserve, &c.

(Signed)

LUIS H. PINZON.

Inclosure 10 in No. 3.

*The Governor of the Chincha Islands to the Vice-Admiral of the Spanish Squadron.**Gobernacion de las Islas de Chincha,
á 14 de Abril de 1864.*

Señor,

ES en mis manos la segunda nota del Señor Almirante fecha de hoy, en la cual se niega á darme el tiempo necesario para recibir instrucciones de mi Gobierno, sobre la intimacion que me hace de entregarle la posesion de estas Islas, y reitera esa intimacion. Contesto dicha nota diciendo al Señor Almirante, que careciendo de las instrucciones que he dicho, no está en mi facultad el hacer la entrega; pero que si el Señor Almirante, haciendo uso de las crecidas fuerzas que tiene á sus ordenes, realiza el hecho que se propone, protestaré, como protesto desde ahora á nombre del Gobierno Supremo de la República, de la violencia que sobre el Perú ejercen las armas Españolas surtas hoy en este puerto: y que el Señor Almirante será responsable de las consecuencias que pueda traer sobre la poblacion su procedimiento, así como de los perjuicios que puedan originarse á los buques extranjeros que actualmente se hallan á la carga.

Soy, &c.

(Firmado)

RAMON VALLE-RIESTRA.

(Translation.)

Sir,

Administration of the Chincha Islands, April 14, 1864.

I HAVE in my hands the Admiral's second note of this day's date, in which he refuses to give me the time necessary for receiving instructions from my Government

upon the notice which he has sent to me to deliver up these islands to him, and he repeats that notice. I reply to that note by saying to the Admiral that being without instructions, as I have stated, it is not in my power to surrender them; but if the Admiral, making use of the large force under his command, shall carry into effect the act which he proposes, I shall protest, as I do now protest, in the name of the Supreme Government of the Republic, against the violence which the Spanish vessels, now at anchor in the port, exercise against Peru, and that the Admiral will be responsible for the consequences which his act may draw upon the people, as also for the damage that may be caused to foreign vessels which are now loading.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RAMON VALLE-RIESTRA.

Inclosure 11 in No. 3.

Declaration of the Diplomatic Body at Lima.

LES Soussignés, Ministres Etrangers, composant le Corps Diplomatique à Lima, réunis sous la présidence de leur doyen, l'Honorable M. Robinson, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire des Etats-Unis d'Amérique;

Prenant en sérieuse considération la Déclaration envoyée le 14 courant du mouillage des Iles de Chinchas par MM. le Commissaire de Sa Majesté Catholique au Pérou et le Commandant-en-chef de son escadre dans le Pacifique, et vû :

Que les résolutions contenues dans le dit document ont été adoptées sans déclaration de guerre préalable, ultimatum, ou autres formalités établies par le droit des nations pour les cas semblables;

Que l'un des motifs sur lesquels est basée cette occupation est le droit que MM. le Commissaire et le Commandant-Général attribuent à leur nation de revendiquer les Iles appartenant au Pérou;

Les Soussignés, dans l'impossibilité de recevoir promptement des instructions de leurs Gouvernements respectifs,

Déclarent:—

1. Qu'ils déplorent sincèrement que MM. le Commissaire et le Commandant-en-chef n'aient pas procédé dans cette circonstance suivant les règles établies par le droit des gens pour de tels cas.

2. Qu'ils n'admettent pas le droit de revendication invoqué comme l'un des fondements de l'occupation, mais considèrent au contraire les Iles de Chinchas comme appartenant à la République du Pérou, jusqu'à ce qu'ils reçoivent des instructions convenables de leurs Gouvernements respectifs.

Signé à Lima, ce 20 d'Avril de 1864.

(Signé) CHRISTOPHER ROBINSON, *Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States to Peru.*

J. DE LA CRUZ BENEVENTE, *Ministro Plenipotenciario de Bolivia en el Perú, nombrado en el mismo carácter para el Congreso Americano.*

THOS. R. ELDREDGE, *Encargado de Negocios y Consul-General de Su Magestad el Rey de Hawaii en el Perú.*

WM. STAFFORD JERNINGHAM, *Her Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires and Consul-General to Perú.*

J. NICOLAS HURTADO, *Encargado de Negocios de Chile en el Perú.*

(Translation.)

THE Undersigned, Foreign Ministers who compose the Diplomatic Body in Lima, being met together under the presidency of their eldest member the Honourable Mr. Robinson, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary for the United States;

Having taken into their serious consideration the declaration issued on the 14th instant, in the anchorage of the Chincha Islands by the Commissioners of Her

Catholic Majesty, and the Commander-in-chief of the squadron in the Pacific; and bearing in mind,—

That the Resolutions contained in that document were come to without previous declaration of war, ultimatum, or other formalities which are dictated by the public right of nations;

That one of the reasons adduced for the occupation is the right which the Commissioners and General in command attribute to their nation, to recover the Islands belonging to Peru;

The Undersigned, in the impossibility of receiving instructions from their respective Governments in so short a time,

Declare—

1st. That they deplore sincerely that the Commissioner and Commander-in-chief should not have regulated their proceedings by the rules prescribed by international law in such cases.

2nd. That they do not admit the right of recovery which has been invoked as one of the reasons for the occupation, but will continue to consider the Chincha Islands as belonging to the Peruvian Government until their respective Governments shall decide what they consider right.

Signed at Lima, on the 20th April, 1864.

(Signed)

CHRISTOPHER ROBINSON, *Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States to Peru.*

J. DE LA CRUZ BENEVENTE, *Minister Plenipotentiary of Bolivia to Peru, and named in the same character for the American Congress.*

THOS. R. ELDREDGE, *Chargé d'Affaires and Consul-General of His Majesty the King of Hawaii to Peru.*

WM. STAFFORD JERNINGHAM, *Her Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires and Consul-General to Peru.*

J. NICOLAS HURTADO, *Chargé d'Affaires of Chili to Peru.*

Inclosure 12 in No. 3.

Señor Ribeyro to the Doyen of the Diplomatic Body at Lima.

Lima, 21 de Abril de 1864.

El Infrascrito, Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores del Perú, tuvo ayer la honra de recibir de manos de los Honorables Señores Encargado de Negocios de Su Magestad el Rey de Hawaii y Encargado de Negocios de Chile, la "Declaracion" que se sirvieron presentarle á nombre de los Excelentísimos y Honorables Ministros que forman el Cuerpo Diplomático extranjero residente en Lima; en la que, despues de haber tomado en seria consideracion la expedida, el 14 del actual, en el fondeadero de las Islas de Chincha por el Comisario de Su Magestad Católica, y el Comandante en jefe de la escuadra Española en el Pacifico, los expresados Excelentísimos y Honorables Ministros han tenido á bien manifestar de un modo solemne:

1. Que deploran sinceramente que los Señores Comisario y Comandante en jefe no hayan ajustado sus procedimientos á lo que el derecho internacional prescribe para tales casos; y

2. Que no aceptan el derecho de revindicacion que se ha invocado como uno de los fundamentos de la ocupacion, si no que seguirán considerando las Islas de Chincha como pertenecientes á la República Peruana, interin sus respectivos Gobiernos resuelvan lo que tuviesen por conveniente.

Al protestar el Gobierno del Perú de los actos de violencia consumados en la República por fuerzas navales extranjeras, tenia la conciencia de que procedia con los justos titulos que nacen de derechos imprescriptibles y sagrados. Doler suyo era sostener esos derechos; y si se considera que ellos son ó están envueltos en los de independencia y soberania del Perú, comprenderá fácilmente el Excelentísimo Señor, á quien el Infrascrito

tiene el honor de dirigirse, hasta qué punto ha sido satisfactorio para su Gobierno, verlos reconocidos y solemnemente apoyados por el ilustrado y muy competente voto del cuerpo diplomático residente en Lima.

El Gobierno Peruano, con tan favorable precedente, no puede menos que aumentar su fé y su confianza en el éxito de la gran cuestion que ha motivado la declaracion citada, y sentirse robustecido al encontrar á ese respetable cuerpo de su lado en defensa de las formalidades salvadoras que han sido holladas por el Comandante y Comisario Españoles y que el derecho de gentes prescribe como última garantia del trato internacional.

Cumple el Infrascrito con la mayor complacencia el grato deber de manifestar estos sentimientos de su Gobierno; y de orden de su Excelencia el Presidente de la República, que estima en alto grado cuanto tiene de favorable á los intereses del Perú la declaracion de ayer, los consigna en esta nota, á fin de que sean públicas y espresas las gracias de que le ha encargado ser intérprete ante el Cuerpo Diplomático, por la manera noble y espontánea con que esa declaracion ha sido hecha.

El Infrascrito suplica al Excelentísimo Señor Enviado Extraordinario y Ministro Plenipotenciario de los Estados Unidos, Decano del Cuerpo Diplomático, que acepte para sí esta manifestacion del reconocimiento del Gobierno Peruano, y quiera dignarse comunicar á los Representantes de las naciones amigas que firmaron con él la declaracion citada.

Con sentimientos, &c.

(Firmado) JUAN ANTONIO RIBEYRO.

(Translation.)

Lima, April 21, 1864.

THE Undersigned, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Peru, had the honour to receive from the hands of the Chargés d'Affaires of His Majesty the King of Hawaii and of Chili, the declaration which they were pleased to present to him in the names of their Excellencies the foreign Diplomatic Body residing in Lima, in which, after taking into serious consideration the declaration which was sent on the 14th instant from the anchorage of the Chincha Islands by the Commissioner of Her Catholic Majesty and the Commander-in-chief of the Spanish squadron in the Pacific, the said excellent and honourable Ministers have thought proper to declare in a solemn manner—

1. That they lament sincerely that the Commissioner and the Commander-in-chief have not proceeded in accordance with what is prescribed by international law for such cases; and,

That they do not accept the right of revindication which has been appealed to as one of the foundations of the occupation; but that they shall continue to look upon the Chincha Islands as belonging to the Peruvian Republic, until their respective Governments shall determine what they shall consider expedient.

The Government of Peru, in protesting against the acts of violence committed in the Republic by foreign naval forces, was convinced that its procedure was founded on those just claims which depend on imprescriptible and sacred rights. It was its duty to maintain those rights, and if it be considered that they are bound up with those of the independence and sovereignty of Peru, the most excellent gentlemen to whom the Undersigned has the honour to address himself will readily feel how satisfactory it has been to his Government to see those rights recognized and solemnly supported by the enlightened and most competent opinion of the Diplomatic Body resident in Lima.

The Peruvian Government, with such a favourable precedent, cannot but feel its faith and confidence increased in the issue of the great question which has brought out the above-mentioned declaration, and also feels itself strengthened on finding this honourable body on its side, in the maintenance of those saving forms which have been trampled upon by the Spanish Commander and Commissioner, and are prescribed by the law of nations as the ultimate guarantee of international intercourse.

The Undersigned has very great pleasure in fulfilling the grateful duty of making known those feelings which his Government cherishes; and by order of his Excellency the President of the Republic, who highly estimates all that is favourable to the interests of the Republic in yesterday's declaration, he inserts them in this note, in order that those thanks may be public and manifest, which he has directed him to communicate to the Diplomatic Body, for the noble and spontaneous manner in which this declaration was made.

The Undersigned requests his Excellency the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister

Plenipotentiary of the United States, the doyen of the Diplomatic Body, to accept for himself this manifestation of the gratitude of the Peruvian Government, and to communicate the same to the Representatives of the friendly nations who signed the Declaration with him.

(Signed)

JUAN ANTONIO RIBEYRO.

Inclosure 13 in No. 3.

Memorandum by Señor Mazarredo.

(Translation.)

FROM the time when, in 1836, Her Majesty's Government solemnly recognized the independence of Mexico, it has been its constant endeavour to establish relations of peace and friendship with the new States of America. In order to arrive at this, it has not evaded any sort of sacrifice, sometimes taking the initiative in sending Diplomatic and Consular Agents, making important concessions in Treaties, and looking with indifference at acts of frailty and aggression which rendered the negotiations difficult.

An exceptional circumstance favoured the conduct of Spain in this case. The ancient provinces of the Crown of Castille in America were united to the mother country by all the ties which constitute brotherhood between nations, and that which would have been a humiliating proceeding with foreign nations, in this case was an additional proof of benevolence and consideration.

The Peruvian Republic was one of the last which responded to the appeal of the Government of the Queen Isabella II, and it did not open its ports to the Spanish mercantile flag until it concluded the Treaty of the Recognition of the Independence of Mexico.

The General President Echenique accredited Señor Don Joachim de Osma in Madrid, some time after that the war corvette "Ferrolana" had saluted the Peruvian flag in Callao. That diplomat, with the First Secretary of State, Señor Calderon de la Barca, signed in 1853 the Treaty of Recognition of the Independence of this country. The Government of Her Majesty did not receive even a reply of courtesy to the important act which it had executed. At the expiry of two years, when the due time for the resulting exchange had elapsed, a non-official journal of Lima published some diplomatic documents, which were thrown into the streets in 1855 by the rioters who on the 5th of January forced their way into the Foreign Office. In these documents Señor Paz Soldan, the Minister of State, declares that Peru rejects not only certain terms, but even the bases of the stipulation agreed to. In this singular way the conduct observed on this occasion by the Government of Peru came to the knowledge of the Queen's Government.

Serious events took place between 1853 and 1859, which made it expedient to send to Lima Señor Tavira, Her Majesty's Minister in Chili, but Spain could not congratulate herself upon the result of his mission.

In 1860 Señor Galvez, the new Plenipotentiary of Peru, presented himself at Madrid. The Chief Secretary of State of the Queen received him in his official character, and entered into diplomatic relations with him, notwithstanding that the Peruvian Minister had disregarded ("hacia caso amiso") the Treaty of 1853.

Everything therefore pointed to a happy result, when Don D. Pedro Galvez declared with a certain arrogance that it was a condition *sine quâ non* of continuing the conference, that he should previously be received by Her Majesty in a solemn audience, as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Peru. The Cabinet, under the presidency of General O'Donnell, replied that nothing similar had been demanded by Señor Osma, and that if this demand were acceded to the Treaty was useless, because the reception asked for, especially after the facts mentioned, was by itself alone tantamount to a definitive recognition of the Republic. The conference terminated, and Mr. Galvez went away from Madrid without Her Majesty's Government being able to account for so many and such gratuitous discourtesies.

The series of outrages to which Her Majesty's subjects have been victims in Peru since 1853, when the two Governments placed themselves in official communication, has been perhaps greater than in the period when the instability of the new political order excused to a certain extent the violences committed. The property of Spanish subjects, moreover, has been forcibly taken from its lawful owners, generally by arbitrary acts, such as that of which the Count of San Isidro was and still is the object, and sometimes by not announcing the decease of opulent Spaniards who have died intestate, and whose

heirs reside in the Peninsula. The charitable corporations or citizens of the Republic have likewise taken possession of several important foundations instituted for the exclusive benefit of Spaniards. Señor Tavira drew up in 1860 well-founded remonstrances relative to these facts, and of murders whose authors remained unpunished, although they were well known, and upon the case of a respectable Spanish subject plundered by agents of the police, and publicly struck ("abofeteado") by General Vidal, the Governor of Callao, for asking him to administer justice; but the result of his ostensible mission gave to Her Majesty's Government the measure of justice to be expected from the Republic.

Being directed to demand indemnification for the undue capture of the Spanish vessel "Maria y Julia," declared by the competent Court to be bad prize, Señor Tavira received from Dr. Carpio, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, a diplomatic reply, which commenced, without any other preamble, by the following words. "The reasons newly brought forward by the Honourable Señor Tavira have not been sufficiently convincing to induce the Government," &c.

The Sublime Porte does not treat the Envoys of Tripoli or Tunis with more sovereign disdain than that of which the Representative of the nation of Charles V was the object in the city of Pizarro. The conduct of General Vidal, and the note of Señor Carpio are various phases of the same order of ideas, which are founded on the sincere belief that Spain has not power enough to make herself respected.

The outrages continued until 1863, when the events of Talambo occurred, almost in sight of the Spanish squadron. This event is too well known to require the Undersigned to record it at any length. Seventy families of Guipuzcoa were hired in Spain by an agent of the wealthy and influential political man, Don Manuel Salcedo, and conveyed to his estate of Talambo, in 1860, with the object of being employed in cultivating cotton. Immediately on their arrival, far from fulfilling the agreement, a new contract was drawn up, which all of them did not accept; that also was not fulfilled. Señor Salcedo, not satisfied with the ill-treatment which those peaceful labourers suffered, at last proceeded to deprive them of part of the lands which belonged to them. Of those colonists who, compelled by their circumstances, submitted to the new demands of the contractor, 20 per cent. died, although they were all men of robust constitution.

Those Basques, on the 4th of August, eighteen in number being at the house of the proprietor, who had called them in to settle their differences, on a sudden some seventy armed men entered into the court, and rushed upon the undefended Spaniards. One of them, Ormazobal, fell dead, and four others, Miner, Sorazu, Fane, and Arteaga, were wounded, the two former so seriously that they received extreme unction. The house of the dead man was pillaged, and one woman, wife of Eguren and her son, died in a few days. After this butchery was completed, they placed the villains as sentinels to keep close watch over the colonists, continuing to ill-treat them inhumanly.

It is a public and notorious fact that Don Manuel Salcedo observed the murderers from the balcony of his house; that his steward, Carmen Valdez, was the man who headed the band, that he distributed to them the rewards of this treachery by order of his master, and that for many days they were lodged and maintained at the cost of Salcedo.

It is also the fact the Basques, wounded and others, remained for seventeen days, from the 4th to the 21st of August, guarded by these same murderers.

It is the fact, that a quarter of an hour before the catastrophe the Governor of Chepén, the chief place of the district, breakfasted with Don Manuel Salcedo, and that, on leaving the estate, he met the murderers without putting any obstacle in the way of their plans.

It is a fact, that Manuel Suarez, the Juez de Aguas of the estate, and two servants of the Governor of Chepén, were among the murderers.

It is a fact, that when the Justice of the Peace of Chepén went to the estate to investigate ("actuar"), he remained four days without taking any proceedings, and that afterwards he received the declarations of the wounded colonists and their companions, they being in the custody of the armed murderers.

It is a fact that when the Sub-Prefect of the Province, the Governor of the District, and the Judge of First Instance presented themselves on the same estate on the 21st of August, they still found there the armed murderers.

The turn given to the affair of Talambo in the Supreme Court of Justice has a tendency to put off indefinitely the punishment of the criminals, and has given rise to an energetic protest of the Spanish Consul in Lima.

Soon after these crimes were committed several Spaniards were oppressed and molested in different parts of the Republic: Ramon Prieto, in Linga, Department of

Junin; Don Juan José Vieda and his family, in Polloc, near Cajamarca; Don Ramon Coutador, in Chiclango; José Manuel Barros, in Moyobamba; Don Lorenzo Apaulaza, in Abancay. In a word, there is scarcely one Department where it has not been seen that Her Majesty's subjects are persecuted, with the connivance of the administrative and judicial authorities themselves.

The Undersigned will not give a name to what the Courts of Peru are; he will confine himself simply to mentioning that Mr. Layard, the present Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, said recently in the House of Commons, in discussing the claim of Captain White, that this British subject, "having, like many others, been treated in a cruel manner, had had the misfortune to fall into the clutches of what may be called, only by courtesy, 'a Court of Justice.'"

Those repeated outrages have naturally excited the attention of the Spanish Government, which has given no cause of complaint to that of the Republic; and as to the Queen's subjects, pacific in excess, it must be owned that they have committed great fault—they have forgotten that the true Peru is now the country they are leaving.

The contrast between the conduct of the two Governments cannot be more eloquent. That of Peru offends the Spaniards in complete peace; and that of Spain, in exchange, leaves in the tranquil possession of their property the subjects of this Republic, who are proprietors or residents in the Peninsula, without their having to suffer the smallest molestation during the struggle or after it.

The Viceroy and Generals of Spain did not confiscate or sequester in Peru during the war the real or personal property of the Peruvians; and this assertion of the Undersigned is confirmed by the intelligent writers of the "*Comercio*" of Lima—an impartial periodical in everything when it praises Spain.

When the Treaty of Recognition was signed, the ship "*Maria y Julia*" was captured, grave outrages were left unpunished; and Spain, to the injury of her own navy, helped in obtaining crews for the Peruvian war-ships built in England, and saluted the flag of the Republic in Callao.

The Queen's Government admitted the Consuls of Peru without any difficulty; but the Consul of Spain in Lima did not receive the considerations that were due to him.

The Spanish Consuls in Islay and Lima, Señores Olivares and Jane, neither of whom were Consuls by profession, absented themselves from Peru, as is public and notorious, in consequence of some private affairs. The Government of the Republic nevertheless abruptly withdrew their Consuls from Spain, alleging as the pretext of this gratuitous rupture the casual departure of those men of business.

The Minister, Señor Paz Soldan, refused *exequatur* in 1863 to a subject of Her Majesty, nominated Vice-Consul in place of the former Consul; and the Government of Madrid, far from insisting on his admission, acknowledged the right of Peru, and replaced him by another Agent of higher class, a native of Biscay, but a citizen of the Republic, because it was the fact that he was a person agreeable to the present Administration. Its complaisance on this occasion brought upon it a sensible misunderstanding with the Cabinet of the Tuileries, which protected the interests of Spain in this country, in consequence of the share which the person chosen had taken in several questions in which France was interested.

The Spanish Government did not consider it expedient to intervene in the serious disputes between Peru and Ecuador in 1859, and it took the opportunity of this to point out the groundlessness of certain accusations. The Peruvian Government distinguished itself among all those of America, being the only one which protested violently against the re-incorporation of St. Domingo. Also it would not admit the uprightness of the intentions of Spain in Mexico. It permitted her Queen to be calumniated, and allowed aid to be sent to the troops of Juárez.

The President of Peru then went so far as to plan a coalition directed against Spain, of which all the Spanish American Governments were to form a part; it refused to hear the energetic remonstrances of Her Majesty's Government, and it desisted later from its project, only because the other Republics look more to the rights of justice than to the fears of imaginary intrigues. What were the reasons of the Peruvian Government to excite against that of the Undersigned the hatreds of all America on the realization of the expedition to Mexico, which was justified on so many grounds, and on carrying out the re-incorporation of St. Domingo? Absolutely none, if they had followed on this occasion the footsteps of that of the prudent and enlightened Chili.

It was many years ago that the two contending bands of St. Domingo solicited from several nations of America and Europe that they would take charge of the government of their territory, because sensible people were convinced that, if left to itself, the Republic did not possess the conditions of existence.

No Government, including that of Spain, would accept that unhappy legacy ; but Spain, after twelve years of repeated and even troublesome supplications, compassionating such a deplorable situation, and taking into account the proximity of Cuba and Puerto Rico, assented at length to the prayers of the Dominican people. It endeavoured to reorganise them, availing itself for that purpose of the party of Santana and of that of his adversary Baez ; it expended enormous sums, and when it was reposing on the loyalty of its new subjects, to whom it entrusted the guard of all the fortresses, the Captain-General, who had but 1,200 soldiers, was surprised by an insurrection which was got up in a foreign country.

The Peruvian Government may live tranquil. Spain has no pretension to renew those 300 years of her rule which the orators and writers of Peru are pleased to call "three centuries of shameful slavery maintained by tigers thirsting for blood." She has no such pretension, because America was the principal cause of her decline, and she has become great again only since that, reconcentrating within herself all the strength she possesses, she devotes herself with success to developing the great elements of prosperity which are contained in her privileged land.

America deprived Spain of liberty, population, industry, and agriculture. The glorious discovery of Columbus robbed her of a generation of giants, cotemporaries of the men of 1521, who would have consolidated the oldest constitutional system of all Europe. Without America the Iberian Peninsula would now contain 40,000,000 of inhabitants, a treasure a hundred times more valuable than all the mines of Mexico and Peru, and the brilliant youth of Spanish America would now be aiding Spain in the regeneration of one common country.

Rome at its greatest height could not have carried out, in such a brief space, an enterprise like that which was dared by those heroes, who would have come down to posterity like legendary beings, in those times when the scalpel of criticism did not bring to view the tribute which is paid by mortals to the weakness of humanity.

Here only, in sight of this exuberant nature, in the presence of an immense territory, under the influence of its climate, and contemplating the memories of Spain, is it possible to feel what Castillian efforts can perform, how many annoying obstacles were vanquished by its determination ; and instead of inveighing against her ascendancy, the writers of Peru might remember with legitimate pride that the deeds of their illustrious progenitors obtained for Spanish America an era of peace and prosperity of which there is no example in the annals of Europe.

Spain will recognize the independence of Peru and of all the nations of this Continent, because she does not burn with a thirst for vengeance, nor does she aspire, as she has proved in Mexico, to establish European Dynasties in America. If a nation so noble could cherish such a paltry sentiment, the comparison of the spectacle offered by some Republics with the state of the happy Western Island, miserable yesterday, and this day a jewel of greater price than the old Viceroyalties, would be an ample compensation for her. But he is contemptible who takes pleasure to himself from the misfortune of another, and modern Spain will greet with joy the dawn of that day when she can exclaim, in imitation of the maxims of the Gospel, "These fruits also are the testimony of my life."

The responsibility of the Peruvian Government in all the outrages of which Her Majesty's subjects have been the victims during half a century cannot be more evident, and diplomatic compacts present few such examples. Administrative centralization confers great powers upon it, which the country, on its part, does not scan too closely, and the citizens cordially assist the public functionaries in the acts of service.

Can those outrages be the consequence of an innate hatred in the Peruvians, which renders all the vigilance of the Government abortive. The Undersigned will examine this hypothesis, only because he is unwilling to leave any argument standing, however weak may be the foundation on which it rests, and because it is now the time that truth must be placed before calumny aided by ignorance.

The Spanish Government, from the middle of the sixteenth century, sent to Peru enlightened Governors and prelates, such as Mogrovejo, Guerra, and others, whose sublime acts constitute one of the glories of Catholicism, and in the Indian laws entered clauses so favourable to the natives that they are, by their exceeding solicitude, the admiration, in this impartial age, of distinguished writers, North Americans, English, Chilians, and Columbians.

Spain is likewise the nation, *par excellence*, which, far from exterminating the primitive inhabitants, or considering them as Pariahs, have amalgamated with them, completely assimilating them to themselves in America and in the Philippine Islands, and practically giving them larger guarantees than they enjoy, in fact, at present.

Nuñez de Vela, the first Viceroy of Peru, when he held the Government (1544), had to suppress an insurrection of the colonists, which was caused from the new regulations being "as favourable to the Indians as they were prejudicial to the Spaniards."

The cities of Peru, in their buildings, bear witness to the solicitude of the Spanish Government; and the names of the families show that the society of the metropolis vied with each other in peopling the districts with their most illustrious branches. When two centuries of colonization had elapsed, the other provinces of America always reproached the Court of Madrid for the partiality with which it looked upon this chosen daughter of Spain.

If some excesses were committed in the first years, the Spanish Government endeavoured to repress them speedily and constantly, even at the risk of seeming ungrateful; and those excesses, enhanced by religious fanaticism and by powerful national rivalries, were, on the other hand, inherent in the times, in the greatness of the events, in the distance, and in the perturbation caused by the splendour of a new world.

The descendants of those Spaniards are the Americans of to-day; and though they inveigh against them, and deny their origin, yet Spanish blood flows in their veins.

Tranquil days passed away, and when the struggle for independence began Her Majesty's Government so far persisted in its conciliatory conduct that one of the first statesmen of Peru, and also a Peruvian diplomatist, have done justice in recent writings to the chivalry of the Spanish Generals in all the events of the war, as also to the prudence, benevolence, and equity of the Viceroy's Abscal, Pezuela, and Laserna. The moderation of the Spanish officials is the more worthy of eulogium, inasmuch as they had to make great efforts to repress the just indignation of their troops, in view of the acts of cruelty to which General San Martin abandoned himself.

History, too, will not forget that even in the encounter of Ayacucho (December 1824) called with reason a battle, from the results which it produced, almost the whole army which supported the rights of Spain against the Columbian troops, chiefly commanded by the Venezuelan General Scure, were nevertheless composed of Peruvians, notwithstanding that several provinces of America had proclaimed their independence from 1810. It is also seen in the capitulation of Callao, which took place on January 1826, that a small number of peninsulars only fought under the command of Brigadier Rodil at that memorable siege.

The people of the Republic also profess for the faith of the Spaniards the same love as their ancestors; and the monument raised to Columbus by independent Peru, instead of representing him discovering a new world, represent him as the piety of Isabella the Catholic understood the great navigator, exhibiting to a new race the Labarum of the Cross. The citizens of this Republic cannot therefore be the enemies of the Peninsula, nor systematically hostile to its authorities; but the Executive Power, induced by political passion, or believing, doubtless, thus more securely to establish the independence of the country, has endeavoured to pervert the spirit of two successive generations by instilling into the young a profound disaffection towards Spain. In order to obtain any advancement in the public service it has been, under one of the last administrations, an effectual recommendation to have made an ostentatious parade of hostility towards the recollections of the mother country, and general opinion points out in various branches repeated instances in confirmation of this assertion.

A very recent fact proves that the zeal displayed in this ungrateful task has been so much the greater in proportion to the lesser preparation of the soil in which the intentions of the Government were to take root. Her Majesty had prepared to dispatch to the Pacific a naval division under the command of Rear-Admiral Pinzon, and the Peruvian Ministry under the presidency of Signor Paz Soldan, now Fiscal of the Supreme Court of Justice, hastened to demand, on the impulse of a guilty conscience, extraordinary powers from the Chambers, as if that intention had involved an attack on the autonomy of Peru. The co-Legislative Bodies unanimously rejected the authorization asked for, and the Spanish ships, in accordance with what was done in 1851, saluted the flag of the fort in Callao, thus showing the falsehood of the unjust want of confidence shown.

Spain and the Republic of Peru are not bound by diplomatic stipulations; the Treaty of 1853 was broken by Peru notwithstanding the great concessions then made to her. The law of nations ought therefore to protect more strongly the Queen's subjects; the Government, however, has not complied with the provisions of that law, and for the purpose of eluding them it relies upon the circumstance that her independence has not been acknowledged, as though positive law, created by Treaties, were anterior to the duties, which, without any need of particular agreements, are incumbent, for the honour of humanity, on all Governments which aspire to take shelter under the cloak of modern civilization.

It is not a matter of surprise that the authorities should be remiss in the fulfilment of their duties, and that they do not administer justice to unprotected Spaniards if it be considered that the Supreme Government, from its conduct, its groundless suspicions, and its promptitude in alarming public opinion against Spain, must be looked upon as indirectly the cause of very serious disasters.

In the sphere of ideas as of physical order a fatal concatenation exists which, analogous causes being given, produces similar effects; and a Government which, so far as Spain is concerned, has been for half a century the unwearied promoter of conflicts, cannot readily find support in punishing those crimes either in the people or among their own functionaries.

The present administration, composed of public men who have their own policy, may have advantageously modified that of their predecessors, but they persisted in sanctioning it to a certain point, rejecting the good offices of France in the note which his Excellency the Foreign Minister sent to M. Lesseps on the 11th of last December, definitively confirming that which his predecessor, Señor Paz Soldan, had sent to him on the 13th November, 1862.

Hitherto the Queen's subjects have found protection in the French flag; henceforth it will not be so. It has also been a lamentable coincidence that since the arrival of Her Majesty's squadron in the Pacific, outrages have been more frequent and not less violent.

In the notes above-mentioned, the officious intervention of France was rejected because the Peruvian Government was desirous of treating directly with Spain.

As soon as it arrived to the knowledge of the Queen's Government that for the second time the generous mediation of France had been rejected, it entrusted to the Undersigned an urgent and extraordinary diplomatic mission, with the title of Special Commissioner. On the 20th March he asked for an audience of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, with the object of delivering the credential letter of Her Majesty's First Secretary of State. It was granted to him on the 30th, two days after the departure of the fortnightly packet. On the 1st of April the Peruvian Government rejected the denomination of Special Commissioner, because "in addition to its not being in conformity with diplomatic rules and usages, it might perhaps cause embarrassments in the course of the negotiations," and it required of the Undersigned that he should accept, as a previous and necessary condition, that of Confidential Agent. The Representative of a nation cannot be received with a character different from that with which his Government sent him, and the reply of Señor Ribeyro is a fresh injury to the Spanish nation.

The title of Commissioner is received by many authors of international law, known to every one, and practically by various nations of Europe. The most important Treaty recently concluded between Spain and France is signed by two high French functionaries, and by General Monteverde and Marin, Senator of the Kingdom, with the title of Commissioners.

The recollections left by the mission of Señor Tavira, who came to Lima in 1860 as Confidential Agent, did not allow the Government of Her Majesty to give its Representative in the present time the same denomination, and therefore the President of the Council of Ministers insists on the words "I ask your Excellency to recognize him as Special Commissioner." On the other hand, the circumstance that it has not yet definitively recognized the Peruvian Republic prevents it from accrediting the Undersigned with the character of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.

The conduct of the Administration of General Pezet is perfectly in accordance with that of the preceding Governments. The Government of Spain in Madrid signs a Treaty with the Representative of Peru, and it is disapproved in Lima. Events occur in the Republic which seriously demand the attention of the Spanish Government, and the Peruvian Government, fearful of the consequences, and wishing to avoid them, accredits in Madrid a new Minister, with instructions which render a good result of the negotiation impossible. Spain then appeals to the good offices of France, her ally, and Peru replies that she wishes to come to an understanding with the Spanish Government. The Undersigned arrives at Lima, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs demonstrates the good dispositions of his Government towards the ancient mother country, by presenting difficulties intended to gain time required for carrying out financial ("rentísticas") operations, the object of which, hostile to Spain, he has not been able to conceal, and by endeavouring to give Her Majesty's Government a lesson upon diplomatic forms, wrapped up in phrases whose sincerity is belied by the inflexible logic of facts.

The Government consequently accepts the opinion of some of the most important men of Peru, among others of Señor Mariátegui, now President of the Supreme Court of Justice, who have recently censured the opening of their ports to the Spanish flag, and

who assert in writing that a Treaty with Spain is the last thing that the Government of the Republic should occupy itself with.

In the meantime the unfortunate Spaniards who, trusting in promises always illusory, come to these coasts, find no protection; the authorities who have violated the laws continue in active service, assassins, instead of being punished, dare to accuse their victims, and many of those sons of a great nation are begging for public charity in Peru.

The reasons above detailed contain in themselves a lesson, the importance of which cannot be concealed from the penetration of statesmen of all countries.

Lima, April 12, 1864.

(Signed)

EUSEBIO DE SALAZAR Y MAZARREDO.

Inclosure 14 in No. 3.

Reply of Señor Ribeyro to the Memorandum of Señor Mazarredo.

(Translation.)

THE arrival of Señor Eusebio de Salazar y Mazarredo in Peru is an event of so much importance to the Republic, from the evil results which it is unfortunately producing, that it must necessarily be well examined and brought under the consideration of Statesmen of all nations in order that they may judge with impartiality of the conduct of the present Government and of that of its predecessors in all that appertains to the Spanish Peninsula. America, of which this nation is part, has experienced for some time very frequent opposition in its relations with Spain; and whether it be that its weakness provokes excesses and injustice very remarkable and reiterated, or whether the conviction that it is unable to make use of ample and ready means of defence contributes thereto, it is certain that on this occasion it has seen itself compromised and outraged in its own territory.

Since the emancipation, which was the exercise of an unalienable right; since the foundation of the South American Nationalities, Peru, although not exempt from the passions of the moment, never dissociated herself from the duties and rules of enlightened policy, nor belied that character of meekness which has acquired for her an imperishable name that is justly celebrated in the world. When the war was at an end, although the ravages which it had caused in families, in civil society, and in fortunes both private and public, were still fresh and visible, she forgot past dissensions, mingled the interests of her fathers with her own, and helped to strengthen ties which the revolution had not broken but only weakened. Political toleration as well as religious toleration, when they do not involve principles of anarchy or social dissolution, and when they do not conduce to scepticism or to unbelief, fulfil lofty and transcendental ends for the advantage of humanity. This toleration was practically and profitably established in Peru; for the Spaniards, not excepting even those who ceased to be enemies on the plains of Ayacucho, obtained State appointments, offices of every kind, some lucrative, others confidential and honorary, every course was open to them, and cheered them with hopes of a prosperous future. There was no distinction and there is now no distinction between Peruvians and Spaniards in any of the advantages which the hospitable soil of the Republic dispenses to all who devote themselves to labour, or to the exercise of some useful profession; and this generosity, perhaps unexampled, is the more worthy of praise if the situation of the two countries be taken into consideration.

Señor Mazarredo, appointed by the Government of Spain to come to an understanding with ours, ought, in raising himself to the height of the part he had to play, to have helped to bring to perfection a work, which, by its salutary consequences, was destined to be a monument of glory for his country, and for himself a mark of honour in his nice career. He has not willed it so; but exchanging so brilliant a position for that of accuser of our country and its authorities, he writes an exposition which he sends round, as he says, to the representatives of the allied nations; it was addressed to the Undersigned with a note derogatory to the national dignity; he states facts, the inaccuracy of which reveals a hostile and prejudiced mind; and he tries to bring into discord two nations who ought, for their mutual advantage, to live in peace and good understanding.

In order to reply to this truly extraordinary document it is necessary to take things from their beginning, to run summarily over the principal events of the American revolution, to discourse upon the spirit of our legislation, to rebut the forced arguments with which Señor Mazarredo's Memorandum abounds, to sketch the conduct of Peru from the time when her political individuality began to show forth her generous feelings, and to prove that

never have the Government refused to enter into Treaties with the ancient metropolis when they have not been opposed to the public interests or to the national dignity. This will be a moderate labour which the Cabinet would rather have avoided if it had not been forced to it against its will, but the truth will be faithfully brought out, for the public men of Peru do not forget that they are the representatives of a nation eminently circumspect, civilized, and peaceable.

Every one knows what was the state of the Peninsula at the beginning of the present century; engaged in a foreign war, without any more government or resources than those created by patriotism, certainly worthy of praise, and at the very time when a crisis was in operation, a social transition, which kept in combustion passions and political elements of every sort. The American Colonies, far away from the centre of Government, without special means of administrative action, neglected in regard to their affairs, and with the most urgent wants and exigencies, sought in real life the conditions of stability which were not afforded by the artificial life imposed upon them, and which promised, without doubt, the situation of a new order of things. Here is in brief, without reckoning other causes, the origin of the just insurrection of the Continent.

In order to establish and to gain definitive possession of independence, sacrifices and efforts were necessary, as well as mighty struggles; for in no other way could a colossal work arrive at a complete and perfect end, having to encounter everywhere the secular resistances of the dominant system, forces superior in discipline and experience, and riches scattered with profusion to restrain the revolutionary spirit. War presented itself with a disadvantageous aspect to the independents; deprived of means, wanting in the knowledge of military science, and struggling against the obstacles offered by Nature itself, they had to perform prodigies to obtain the happy result which has crowned their magnificent enterprises.

The revolution was distinguished, notwithstanding the opposition and the obstacles which it met with in its development, by a spirit of toleration, of prudence, and of fraternity, which does no little honour to the history of those heroic times for the whole of America. The vigorous acts employed to stop it in its career, the reiterated violence employed to repress the efforts for emancipation, were always met by acts of benevolence which are not ignored by those who have studied the gentle disposition of these countries.

It was necessary for the independents that they should take away from those called, for that time only, their enemies, the abundant resources which they have had at their disposal, and to adopt other saving measures; for it cannot be conceived that the war, an abnormal and extraordinary state of the nations, could be carried on without misfortunes, without reprisals, and without blood. But Peru, as well as the other Republics, although under the necessity of launching out boldly for the acquisition of a sacred right, did not stain herself with crimes which modern civilisation condemns. The hostilities were always of a benign character, if that expression be allowable; and the American annals, to our glory, register no records of fires, poisonings, or wholesale massacre. It is grievous certainly to enter into these details so alien to a State document; but it is necessary to descend to them to vindicate the most unoffending country of the earth from those supposititious cruelties attributed to it by the Spanish diplomatist.

The sequestrations which were decreed during the open hostilities between the Americans and Spaniards were a measure which, under the circumstances, necessity and the right of nations authorized. The right of embargo is recognized by all civilized nations, and there has never been up to this time either tradition or authority to condemn it; and if the independents seized the property of the enemy, it was because they preferred this class of measures, because neither law nor justice blamed it, and because by the side of the sad scenes enacted against them, some reprisals, though slight, might have the result of restraining adversaries so resolute and so strong.

These Spanish properties have been, for the most part, restored, and those which were adjudicated indemnified with profusion; enormous and fabulous sums, which attracted universal attention, having been applied in these operations. There was no obligation upon the Government in this matter; what it undertook was the result of its profound convictions in regard to the credit of the country, the effect of a generosity perhaps raised to extravagance, and the most evident proof that it did not harbour animosity, nor keep up a rivalry, ill-sounding and worse received at a time when nations and Representatives ought to labour for the fusion of all interests, in the path of civilization, of commerce, and of industry.

These deeds, with which both natives and foreigners were perfectly well acquainted, cannot be disfigured or obscured by the simple and capricious exposition of a negotiator, who, in a fit of ill humour, has falsified the veracious historical narrative, compromised his reputation, and scattered the dismal seed of malevolence, which, in good turn, it is

necessary to keep from fructifying. Notwithstanding the preliminaries already stated, sufficing, in the judgment of impartial men, for the true appreciation of things in the intended negotiations between Peru and Spain, it is fit, according to the plan laid down, to analyse other circumstances which will make the truth more apparent, and win for this nation ample votes of approval and sympathy.

The American revolution, properly styled by many writers "the gigantic event of the nineteenth century," presents two very remarkable aspects. They deserve to be studied by the philosopher and the statist, at a better opportunity than the present; but, by the way, we shall have to make merit of both, in order to judge with exactness on the question in debate, and because it contributes a great deal to the advantage of the praiseworthy object of satisfying the exigency of the nation, in defending its prerogatives, its rights, and its name.

The revolution was at the same time a war and a social movement; and in both ways it did important service, not only to these regions, but to all humanity. When the insurrection of all the Spanish-American people began, the colonial system had become insupportable, for the sons of this soil were in the enjoyment of no class of benefits, whether political, administrative, or domestic. We will not go back to the primitive times of the conquest, where cruelties are recorded which the Catholic Kings rigorously repressed, where we find the valiant deeds of those grand Spanish figures who discovered and presented to the Throne of Castile vast provinces and extensive kingdoms as trophies of their efforts against a nature that repelled them. Ideas had penetrated the New World; and they, in spite of the prohibitive system of the Peninsula, opened the eyes of the colonists, and threw them into an unequal conflict whose pole-star was the thought of emancipation, and whose primordial end was the realization of a theory. The Americans were not ungrateful in separating from Spain, any more than sons who emancipate themselves upon reaching their majority, set up for themselves, and labour for the consistency and well-being of society, seeking in other families restoring elements of it, and conditions of perpetuity in new and vigorous generations. Nor were they false to their blood, who, while exercising a right, extended their arms to their fathers as soon as the fire of the combat had burnt out: they who boast of their pateruity and speak with enthusiasm the language of Cervantes. Everything is ignored in the critical times gone through by this country, worthy, undoubtedly, of better treatment; and the abuse which is lavished upon it, and the recriminations which are made to devolve upon it, rather than arguments of a strict logic, are an antagonism fomented by those who know how to bring the Governments into conflict.

The American sections raised in the times of European regeneration have not refused relations with any civilized people, much less with Spain. As Colonies they were sequestered from intellectual, political, and economical commerce with all other nations; and though internally they had their protective legislations, which do credit to the judgment and rectitude of their authors, they were never observed; for capitation, pecuniary and personal burdens, and ignorance, were always the sad patrimony of the native. If the present state be compared with that of this epoch, any one will perceive a remarkable and significant difference. Even if the Americans had been treated with cordiality and generosity, independence was inevitable and necessary; for nations, like individuals when they reach the plenitude of life, want no foreign support to sustain and develop themselves and to enable them to prosper.

So it was understood by an eminent Minister of King Charles III, who proposed to his Sovereign the complete emancipation of the Colonies as the only means of deriving advantage from them. Then, indeed, thanks to the foresight of one of her most distinguished Statesmen, Spain might have acquired a laurel and a place of preference in the communications with the new States of America; but things took another turn, and emancipation was consummated without being indebted to anything except those splendid triumphs which sealed it with blood in scenes for ever memorable.

The nations which form the Republics of the New World, full of vigour and with abundant riches, which were formerly unknown or were curtailed in commerce, have all the requisites for a political existence of long duration. In them have been realized what were until now sneeringly called utopias; for democratic institutions fulfil a providential end, improving the citizen, and improving society still more. Slavery, the cancer of modern peoples, is abolished without hope of re-establishment; the tribute has disappeared for ever; industry enjoys full liberty; the exchanges operate without restriction, or the monopolies of bad law; and genius takes a flight which it could not attempt in the time of the past domination.

And these evident advances are not and cannot be paralleled by the temporary and factitious progress of societies, which, though treated better than they were in former

times, neither enjoy the advantages of liberty nor experience in their present situation the plenitude of the representative system. With a poor and defective education the American nations have by themselves advanced that which has cost others long years of instruction, sacrifices, and even social martyrdoms; and if, in truth, some faults were perceived in their administrative organization, in their customs, and in their legislation, as may be easily supposed, such blemishes could only be imputed to those who, in exchange for keeping the Colonies in subjection, care little or nothing for their moral development.

The War of Independence consists of a series of deeds which well deserve to be appreciated, if not under a historical aspect, in their relations with the present well-being of the South American Republics. In the tumult of combats, when the passions almost always grow wild again, here was spread abroad, without limitation and without reserve, that indulgence which gives to the inhabitants of these climes a special character of kindness and exquisite philanthropy. Those useless attempts, those deaths, of no avail to procure peace, which is the object of war, were proscribed during the strife to which these people saw themselves compelled, when seeking a nationality which was openly and decidedly denied to them. In this manner the revolution shows itself always mild; whence it is clear that, in later periods, Peru, when experiencing those concussions which all new peoples must inevitably pass through, did not commit those alleged acts of barbarism which are attributed to her with hypocritical and fallacious temerity by covert as well as open slanderers.

Our war, though scanty of means for its support, was always carried on with the high feeling peculiar to gentlemen, regular in its action, and economic in the effects of its reaction; under its influence manners became so refined as has never, or but very seldom, been the case in civil conflicts; salutary examples of moderation occurred; and a career of noble aspirations and glorious actions for youth. This was the real character of the American contest; these its important results; and this the inestimable possession procured for us by an event which will make, whatever may be said by passionate writers, a memorable epoch in the annals of civilization and liberty.

The Republic became established in all the divisions of the Continent which had been Spanish Colonies; but a democratic Republic without extravagance or license to make its political and social results unfruitful. The laws which have been issued, both in the Civil Department and in administrative matters, bear an impress of liberality which puts them on a level with those of the most fortunate nations of the contemporary period; nor is there in any of them the least sign of prejudice against foreigners, to whom were immediately apportioned ample securities and comforts, not merely moderate, but extensive and permanent. Peru did not remain behind in this praiseworthy conduct; and as soon as she had constituted herself a nation, and had dictated a legislation appropriate to her requirements, she did not hesitate a single moment in treating strangers with the same attention and with same marks of generosity as those which she displayed to the natives. Honour beyond measure such disinterested conduct; but in spite of such signal proofs of culture and generosity, she has not been able to escape the unjust accusations which are heaped upon her, attributing to her acts of atrocity and barbarism.

Our legislation is distinguished by the unity of its dispositions; and in the Codes, as well as in the Fundamental Law, there is a certain connection, a harmony so apparent that it cannot fail to present a fine assemblage and a body of precepts and provisions calculated to protect persons and property from unjust or violent assaults.

Foreigners live peaceably under the shade of these laws, they acquire landed property without any restriction and without any obstacle, and they carry on commerce and trade on an equality with Peruvians. No extraordinary charges are ever imposed on them, nor is anything seized from their property to assist the nation in its conflicts in times of pressing need and emergency.

Spaniards are no strangers to these advantages; they share them all without exception; and being looked upon as members of one and the same family, they enter with us into a certain community of enjoyment, which it is necessary to mention in these serious times, when even virtues are accounted crimes.

There has been no necessity for Treaties with the Catholic Queen, in order that her subjects should be respected and surrounded with privileges and securities. Perhaps the opulent fortunes which many Spaniards enjoy, apart from their personal labour, are owing to the concessions and not scant liberality awarded to them by our legislation. We might well pause in this exposition for the estimation of other matters of a higher character were not the reasons adduced sufficient for the complete and victorious vindication of the national honour from accusations as calumnious as they are undeserved.

A serious and delicate point is now to be entered upon, in the elucidation of which

it is necessary to repress the promptings of patriotism in order not to lessen the gravity which ought to be reflected in this important document. The simple, though very expressive refutation of the miscalled Memorandum, is, for the rest, an easy task, which will inform the world of the justice of our cause, and of the inaccuracy of the facts reported in it.

The events of Talambo, which happened at a fatal moment, are up to the present time a rich mine which some miserable men have known how to work with profit, and whom unjust resentment on the one hand, and greed of gain on the other, have impelled to a career of defamation and fraud most unbearable and shameful. It is no wonder that such individuals forge daily and indefatigably accusations against the country and its authorities in favour of their designs; but what is surprising, and at the same time scandalous, is that those accusations should be entertained by a high and eminently qualified functionary, in order to derive from them specious arguments against our credit, fortunately based upon more solid foundations than a certain few European writers suppose.

A Colony of Biscayans engaged by an opulent proprietor, of the province of Chiclayo, were enjoying the beneficent gifts of some rich and productive lands, when certain differences of opinion and misunderstandings as to the conditions of the business led, when least expected, to conflicts, never to be sufficiently deplored, between the proprietor and his colleagues in the labours of Talambo. From words and arguments they came, as is stated by almost all parties, to the fatal and censurable logic of deeds; and the contending parties being armed there ensued a blind and obstinate struggle which ended with the death of two of these unfortunate men, and the wounding of some others. Proceedings were begun immediately upon the fact coming to the knowledge of the authorities; the respective examinations were taken and the judicial power exercised its high and delicate functions.

The trial is not yet concluded, not because there has been any culpable negligence on the part of those charged with the prosecution, and with the due punishment of the delinquents, but because things, from their very nature, meet with not a few complications, which it is necessary to get over quietly and cautiously. It cannot be averred who were the instigators of the catastrophe at Talambo, who were the first to use their arms, and who they were who, guided by their passions alone, preferred the way of force to the beneficent influence of the laws for the settlement of their disagreements, because all this depends upon the definitive result of the case. If one were to receive the statements made on each side with the object, as may be conceived, of extenuating the faults committed, and to get advantage of another kind, one would certainly run into no slight mistakes, opinions would be ventured, anticipating the judicial decisions, and questions would be entered upon of a different tendency and not regarding the actuality or the peculiar circumstances of the affair; reasons which induce one to keep up a prudent reserve until sentence has been passed in the cause.

Señor Mazarredo refers, in his above-mentioned Manifesto, to the affair of Talambo, according to the inspiration which he has received from false organs, in a manner intended to affect the sensibility of his countrymen and of foreigners who are not and cannot be acquainted with the details. Other narratives might be given on the part of Peru, as has been done by private persons, with more appearance of probability; but the Government, circumspect to excess, awaits, as it is bound to do, the proper time, because its judgment, in the matters submitted to the cognisance of the tribunals, is subordinate to the decisions pronounced by them. This is the system established in the Republic, where the independence of the political powers is a palpable reality.

When the cause has passed through all the courts, if the laws have not been observed, which is not to be expected, or if the criminals have been left unpunished, which is still less credible, diplomatic intervention will come, according to the precepts of international law. But it cannot be allowed that this should be done in an extemporaneous manner, because such a proceeding would defame the credit of Peru, attack the inherent rights of the national Sovereignty, and leave foreigners in a condition truly exceptional, and superior in everything to the very natives and citizens of the Republic.

Señor Mazarredo speaks of some other facts in his miscalled Memorandum—facts which have not been described with the desired clearness by the diplomatist who, seeking for charges against Peru, has brought in, no doubt, even those passing differences or ordinary accidents which cannot be foreseen, and which never remain without correction or punishment with us. We therefore omit to answer, even briefly, these supposititious accusations concerning violence at Moyobamba and other places, because either they are insignificant, or if serious, they are all being discussed in judicial course.

There was an assassination at Pisco, with aggravating and hideous circumstances, which, in juridical sense, characterized the crime, according to all the appearances, as

they were soon brought to the consideration of the inhabitants of that town. In this matter, as in the fatal affair of Talambo, administrative vigilance was not inattentive. Proceedings were taken which, in submitting the crime to the cognizance of the Judges, were necessarily calculated to produce their results. Nor was there any room here for the intervention of any Diplomatic Agent.

If Governments were responsible for all the criminal acts perpetrated in the nations they represent, very great would be the responsibilities that would devolve upon them; and their revenues would, to a great extent, be applied to numerous and repeated indemnifications. Spain, whose demands and elucidations must not be measured by the document signed by her Agent accredited to the Cabinet of Lima, and whose temperance and moderation we have acknowledged on other occasions, would be exposed to claims of the same kind; for to judge by the homicides committed last Easter—unless the victims were all Spaniards—we venture to say, applying the principle enunciated by Señor Mazarredo, that the Queen's Government would find itself in this respect worse off than ours.

The ancient patriot General Vidal is accused of having given offence to a certain Spaniard, an inhabitant of Callao; and since no efforts whatever were necessary to give the truth in all its nakedness, the faithful relation of what then happened relieves Peru and the Government, and would relieve the General himself, if he were alive, from all claim, whether of a judicial or diplomatic nature. The authority of a high functionary, of the Superior Chief of a province, was treated with disrespect, and wounded in the most sensible part; and withal, offence was given to the functionary and the citizen in such a way that there was a scene which, without expressing any approval of it, all excuse who have made themselves acquainted with it.

We should like to know what would have been done in the Peninsula with the insolent and haughty Peruvian who had failed in respect to one of its Captains-General of a province. At Lima and at other places in Peru they still remember the arbitrary and coercive means employed by Generals Ramirez and Rodil against inoffensive and peaceful citizens.

Indignation inspired by the most noble patriotism repels the insult offered to the Courts of Justice of the Republic; for nothing can be more frivolous, nor show less knowledge of our administrative organization, than to look upon them after the manner of Señor Mazarredo, appealing to the testimony of a foreign functionary, who knows as little about Peru as he does himself.

Explicit laws rising to the height of the principles of the present epoch are applied by Judges of wisdom, of probity, and of experience. The publicity of the trials and the responsibility of the Judges are guarantees that were not known or granted before: circumstances which give to the judicial power of the Republic conditions of impartiality and firmness in its sentences, since many, if not all of them, might be submitted without scruple as finished works in doctrine, in reasoning, and even in purity of style.

The "Maria and Julia" was seized in the waters of Guayaquil by the Admiral of the national squadron, Don Ignatius Mariategui, and the motives for this measure, justified as well by necessity as by law, have been already discussed before now; all the sanction of justice being on the side of Peru. A diplomatic correspondence between Señor Tavira, "Confidential Agent of Spain," and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of that time, proves that the naval forces of Peru fulfilled a duty in taking the Spanish vessel so obstinately claimed, and that the competent tribunal in this matter, in conformity with the principles of the law of nations, satisfied public confidence, fulfilled its duties faithfully, and bore witness as splendidly as eloquently of what the laws of the Republic are worth. Upon this subject Señor Mazzaredo makes an allusion to Señor Carpio, and takes leave to censure a certain expression in one of his diplomatic notes, the fact being that they all exhibit much moderation, much learning, and a very correct style. This fault-finding is another proof of the prejudice of the diplomatist, and of his eagerness to find pretexts in order to incriminate us.

A Spanish Vice-Consul was nominated by the Government of Madrid for this capital. The favoured individual was, and is at the present time, one of the most bitter and gratuitous enemies of our country; one who has given her the greatest offence, and who has most wilfully, and with the greatest perseverance, gone about prejudicing the minds of his countrymen against our institutions, our most distinguished personages, and against the customs of a country which received him in days fortunate for him. The exequatur of his appointment was refused, as the granting it would have been dishonourable and humiliating, Governments not being bound inviolably to accept Consular Agents when they do not consider it expedient to do so, and as we have no Treaty in this respect with the Government of Spain.

Our Consuls were withdrawn from the Kingdom of Spain and its colonies not as a hostile measure, but in consequence of the dissociation caused by the Government of Madrid in regard to the only functionaries of this class which it had in the Republic. Attempts have since been made to justify the conduct of Spain, and even now a character is given to it which it is very far from possessing.

The charges made against the Government of Peru for having altered the character, as it is said, of pious institutions, and raised "La Beneficencia" and other corporations of Peru by means of Spanish property, are not more true. But granting it were so, without admitting the previous proposition, the state of the relations between Peru and Spain would justify the measure; and no one is unaware that the supreme authority invested with a high national patronage, may apply funds, destined to certain objects of charity, to other purposes, so long as the ideas and intentions of the founders are fulfilled. This is a matter which would deserve to be treated more at length if the bare statement were not sufficient to refute the charge made against us on that particular score, with the same bad temper as the rest.

Neither the tribunals nor the Government have closed their ears to the titular Count de San Isidro, who, had he proceeded in form, would have been able to obtain full justice had it been on his side.

Señor Mazarredo makes other asseverations to obtain the sympathy of the readers of his manifesto; they are all, however, now beyond the cognizance of the Government, which cannot and ought not to notice isolated and unfounded statements wanting in the slightest appearance of legality.

The explanation hitherto made in answer to the charges of the Agent—charges examined, not without difficulty, on account of the manner in which they have been put forth—is sufficient to fulfil a requirement so much needed by the dignity of the nation and its Government.

Peru has, moreover, been generous during her independence to all Spaniards, nor does the Commissary deny this; this generosity, however, does not presuppose an indifference to her rights, nor include the idea of sacrificing her decorum to gratify the caprices of certain subjects of the Peninsula, who wish to speculate in the national funds and riches by means of undue compensations. The public men of the Republic are not the only ones who resist pretensions of a bad character. All Peru repels them; jealous of her laws, she will not consent to be oppressed nor humiliated. In proof of this assertion, Señor Mazarredo may see the enthusiasm with which the entire population rises against the insults of his squadron. He may see that the exalted love of the citizens for the children of Castile is being converted into hatred against those who seek to renew the sad episodes of the conquest. He may see by the shame and detestation of the atrocious attempt of the 14th instant, that neither natives nor foreigners grudge sacrifices to recover the riches usurped and to defend themselves from attacks against their independence, if it should be, as one can scarcely believe, threatened when least expected.

Señor Mazarredo has deserved the reply to his Manifesto from an enlightened people who appreciate their dignity at its true value. Señor Mazarredo, however, as writer of the "Epoca," and as Commissary, has been not at all fortunate in his double capacity. He is quick, very quick, in gathering together bitter and sad deceptions; and the men with whom he has been in communication, both before and since his appointment, are certainly not the most capable of giving exact information respecting the country. He may rejoice at the possession of the guano islands, seized with violence, whilst confidence was placed in that Spanish loyalty which has sometimes been so severely and strictly observed. Be it known, however, that between Peru and his Government there is a feeling in common; that the one as well as the other arms to defend itself to recover captured national property, and to raise its patriotic desires and efforts as high as they were raised by our fathers, when their adversaries fled to hide themselves far from this land after the conquest.

Señor Mazarredo, who was appointed to represent his Government in Peru, was a person the least fitted of any to fulfil so important a commission, and one involving such complex interests. Badly informed, or rather strongly prejudiced against the country—a most virulent writer against the rights of America, he was wanting also in that reflective calmness with which every negotiator, whether of great or small interests, should be endowed. With dangerous friends—for it is known that he has been in close communication with Spaniards badly received in society—he received their inspirations with entire confidence, whilst he rejected the suggestions of many of his countrymen, eye-witnesses and recipients of the good-will which we extend to them all.

The Manifesto overflows with the author's complaints against the Peruvians. He relates facts and quotes documents, not with the coolness and prudence befitting his high

character, but with the most notable effrontery and with an animosity unworthy of one who makes a show of suffering from an infringement of his rights.

His mission comprehended a most important object which will not fail should Spain, as wise now as formerly, disapprove and severely condemn the attempt of her Envoy. The Peruvian Government was prompt in recognizing him in a confidential character, and gave him, by the organ of its Minister for Foreign Affairs, an explanation which might lead to an understanding, and a smoothing of certain difficulties affecting the national point of honour which it was necessary and indispensable to consult. He who accepted the delicate duties of Minister for Foreign Affairs well knew that Señor Mazarredo could not alter the title which had been conferred upon him by his Government. He well knew that if the intentions of the Commissary were not sincere and cordial, the courteous note forwarded to him on the 1st instant would reveal all that the Cabinet could expect from him and his sagacity.

There was one means of commencing negotiations by which neither Peru nor Spain should suffer detriment to their honour, and that means was suggested by the Ministry. A quiet discussion either in writing or by word of mouth would have procured us without fail such a desirable result. Unfortunately for him, for his country, and for ours, he would not consent to this. The day will come, however, and that before long, when his conduct will be examined by the light of impartial criticism.

Commissaries are recognized by the law of nations, and have been for a long time; such functionaries, however, according to the unanimous opinion of publicists and the rules of customary law, can never be engaged in missions like that borne by Señor Mazarredo towards this Government. Between two nations whose friendly relations are undisputed, Treaties are made, if necessary, by means of Commissaries; but this is never the case when those relations are not clearly defined. Commissaries are employed to regulate boundaries, to liquidate accounts, and in other matters of a like nature or equal import; this is usual, and recognized between Governments, and can present no difficulties of any kind. For the formal assertion of claims from one Government to another, or for fixing the bases or concerting the points of a Treaty of what character soever, a personage distinct from the Commissary is indispensably required; otherwise the reciprocal national susceptibilities are wounded and the negotiations frustrated. The Spanish Government itself was so convinced of these principles that in order to settle matters, certainly of less importance than those now confided to Señor Mazarredo, it nominated, as confidential agent, Señor Tavira.

Whether under an historical, or under its purely diplomatic aspect, the Peruvian view of the question is supported by competent and respectable authorities, who, were it not foreign to the purpose, might be quoted to show that this Government has not acted either capriciously or disloyally; and in proceeding thus it was stimulated principally by the conviction that the plain recognition of the title of "Commissary" given to Señor Mazarredo, and adopted formerly for what were the colonies of Spain, would have involved somewhat of shame, and somewhat of unjustifiable timidity. And so certain is this, that in the declaration made by Señor Mazarredo, in concert with General Pinzon, concerning the possession of the guano islands, he styles himself the Commissary of Spain in Peru, and not to the Government of Peru. The Ministry has endeavoured to conciliate perfectly all rights and all interests; but the natural disposition of the Envoy was not the most fit for grave discussion and reasoning. The same conflict would have taken place had he been received without any opposition whatever. From the exposition of his commission and from his very demands, none of which were free from exaggeration, would have arisen the differences which are now deplored, and our property, and our trampled rights would still have passed into the hands of a stranger in the treacherous manner now witnessed. Then indeed would have been added to the loss of the national riches the humiliation of the country whose dignity now appears as resplendent as her enemies, and the robbers of her possessions appear dishonest and cowardly.

The Treaty entered into in Spain by Señor Don Joaquin de Osman was disapproved by the Government of Peru not without good reasons. Treaties require to be ratified by Governments, and in Peru, a country bound by constitutional forms, it is necessary, moreover that they should receive the approbation of Congress. There is nothing extraordinary or unusual in the conduct of the Cabinet of that time which, as it did not approve some of the conditions of that Treaty, remarked upon them and gave directions to its Minister accordingly by notes of the 25th of November, and the 12th of December, 1853. It is not expedient again to examine, as was done at the time with the best results, some of the essential clauses of the Treaty of that date, because it would be, from the extemporaneous character of the subject, stirring up questions foreign to the notorious matter now under consideration.

Señor Paz Soldan, a most competent person in matters of public law, acted in no way erroneously or offensively towards the Cabinet of Madrid. The note which he wrote to our Minister Plenipotentiary is a luminous document, in which facts and principles are set forth with so much precision that its mere perusal is sufficient to make manifest the justice of the Government of whose high interest it treats. If it was without effect, the fault was not ours, because that communication was a fresh instruction, or might be considered as such, for the renewal of diplomatic conferences.

The fact referred to by Señor Mazarredo of the publication of the Ministerial note in question cannot be confirmed. But if such were the case, the Government would not assume any responsibility from that circumstance. The necessary instructions were given to the Peruvian Minister, and, by this means, diplomatic requirements were fulfilled, and a duty was performed, and there was no necessity for any other kind of notification or declaration, as the Treaty was imperfect, and as it could neither be nor be considered otherwise than as a simple project for a Treaty.

Peru, nevertheless, when the conditions of her interior administration permitted, following the liberal and eminently benevolent policy which she has always observed in her international relations, imagined a means of solving the difficulties which kept her in a certain unfortunate state of interdiction with Spain. For this purpose she nominated Señor Galvez Minister Plenipotentiary to the Spanish Government; and this fresh appointment implied the recall of his predecessor. It is said that forms were infringed in this proceeding, which has much frankness in it, and strongly reveals our desire to set ourselves right with Spain. Nor were these wishes and these steps, so disinterested and so noble, prompted by any national interest that might bear the character of egotism.

The independence of Peru is a fact of forty years' standing; and all nations, from the most powerful to the most insignificant, have recognized her in a manner as solemn as explicit. Spain, although she has not expressed herself categorically, has maintained relations with the National Government, has given the same treatment to its Minister as he is entitled to according to universal usage, and the political personality of Peru has been by this proceeding evidently recognized. It was endeavoured to render perfect this state of things by a Treaty: the good faith of our Government was about to strengthen those bonds between fathers and sons which fortuitous circumstances had not allowed to be renewed in form and by express Conventions.

Treaties are only binding when the spontaneity and free decision of the two Contracting Parties are consulted. Were it not so they would fail to fulfil the conditions assigned to them by public law, and many bad effects would be produced by such Treaties, obtained by force or by the moral pressure which one of the Governments would attempt to exercise, or really would exercise upon the other with whom it might be stipulating about the bases of a Convention.

Peru, thanks to the honesty of her proceedings, has no cause for repentance in this delicate matter, which is so honourable to us. Even now, doing justice to the present Government of the Peninsula, the Government of Peru believes that the conduct of its agent will be disapproved, and that this nation, so scandalously and treacherously injured, will have reparations made to its honour, in order that the path of reconciliation may not long be closed.

Señor Mazarredo has wounded the heart of every Peruvian by his celebrated "Exposicion," which would be a barrier between the two countries were not a well-founded confidence entertained that this gentleman, styled by himself the representative of "Modern Spain," will find among his own countrymen, who have not forgotten the traditional good-breeding of the ancient and real Spain, the most bitter censure of his conduct. He has managed to inflame wounds which time had already healed. He has not only insulted the Government but the whole nation, in such a manner as will form an era in the annals of human aberration. Our actions have been very temperate, and our officers very prudent in bearing the insolence of those who formed the party of Señor Mazarredo, and from whom he required false information and fictions which he received as real and effective events.

They do not regret this prudence, as by it they have gained universal good will and the admiration of sensible people, who see throughout Señor Mazarredo's exposition a clear representation of his passionate character.

The other points of the Manifesto do not deserve examination, as beyond the statement of motives in justification of his conduct, they are personal allusions which must be met in an extra-official manner, with the moderation which distinguishes all the proceedings of Peru. Some voluntary misrepresentations, however, which affect the honour of the country, cannot be left entirely unnoticed. Among others, that the victory of Ayacucho was only called so on account of its results, whilst contemporaries, and the

history which begins by the events of the period of independence, have estimated that battle by its military effects and its political results.

The Peruvian army is admired for its discipline, for its *morale*, for its patience under the privations of military life, and for the execution of the most difficult and hazardous operations; and it is not strange that, by its supreme effort in the most memorable battle of modern times, it should have been enabled to attain a triumph which completed the liberty not only of one but of all the Republics of the Continent. Although Columbian troops assisted ours in the contest, the glory of our army is not impaired by this circumstance, any more than it is diminished by the fact that the enlightened General Sucre, whose fortune it was to direct that brilliant feat of arms, was a Venezuelan. Side by side with this Great American figure, there are others of the same stature belonging to Peru. Lamar and Gamarra are heroes whose actions will endure as long as the imperishable memorials of the revolution shall be preserved. If the forces of Spain succumbed it was not account of their quality or their descent, but because they were compelled to give way to the impulse of an irrevocable law, of a necessity which could not be satisfied except by the conquest of a right. The want of intelligence and the discord which prevailed among the troops which supported the fatal empire of the colonies contributed also to this result, which was unexpected by themselves.

In the desire to heap up charges against Peru, the circular which the Peruvian Government forwarded to the other Governments of the Continent on the subject of the annexation of the Dominican Republic to the Crown of Castile is mentioned. This is qualified as an act of open hostility, and other allusions are made for the purpose of holding us up before the world as gratuitous enemies of Spain. There is not even a latent reason for finding fault with us for this conduct, as it was less for the purpose of interfering in matters entirely foreign to us than to protect ourselves from ulterior emergencies that we took the initiative in establishing a purely precautionary alliance. One cannot enter into considerations of another kind with regard to this notorious event, because it would raise discussions foreign to the circumstances, and might become a motive, although an unfounded one, for causing the belief that we had an interest in provoking distrust of the Peninsula.

Defence itself and measures of precaution taken by nations of small consideration, when they see themselves threatened, and assemble for the purpose of becoming more united, and in order to contribute to the common good their resources, their efforts, and their sacrifices, are never regarded as manifest and gratuitous acts of hostility. Laying aside the reasons of Spain for taking possession of the said island, we cannot abstain from insisting that in making its protest the Peruvian Government was exercising a right. It was, then, neither provocation, nor assistance, nor intervention in the question of St. Domingo which actuated the Government when it circulated its note of the 24th of August, 1861, but an act of prevision by which it was induced to promote the union of the Continent, not for the purpose of giving offence or seeking adventures in distant countries, but in order to guard against events which might compromise its autonomy.

When the honourable Chargé d'Affaires of France, M. Edmund de Lesseps, intimated that he was entrusted with the claims of certain subjects of Her Catholic Majesty, the Government, taking into account the many grave inconveniences which a double diplomatic commission almost always entails, showed that functionary that the negotiations established on Spanish matters would be incomplete, and according to its judgment useless or even prejudicial, as, while pending, the relations between Peru and the Imperial Government might suffer some detriment by the unlooked for, although possible, case of the Spanish questions being not regarded by both negotiators from the same point of view. There was nothing unusual in this, and nothing hostile, if one takes into account, besides what has been shown, the very exceptional circumstances and the badly defined nature of the relations existing between Peru and Spain.

This Manifesto might now be concluded, as the arguments employed Señor Mazarredo, in his Manifesto, have been refuted, not only in their moral, but in their historical and political sense; there would, however, remain pending certain sufficiently serious reflections which spring from the nature of the late events.

In the hope of receiving an answer to a courteous note which this Government indited, and caused to be placed in the hands of the Commissary, when more confidence was placed in Spanish loyalty, now more bepraised than ever, there came from that functionary, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, a communication, together with the "Memorandum" now in course of being answered, both pieces overflowing with insult, errors, and calumny; and, to give still greater prominence to this fact, which will never be forgotten by Peru, it was expected that the official despatch for that day might be closed, and then hours before the departure of the steamer, and when Señor Mazarredo was

absent, both documents were delivered to the Minister—a circumstance which made no slight impression on the Government, and which led the entire Cabinet to assume a different attitude from that which it had assumed up to that unfortunate period.

But this want of courtesy, combined with the disrespect shown to the national authorities, was only the preliminary to another attempt, which is probably without a parallel in the records of the abuse of power.

The Spanish squadron in the Pacific under the command of Admiral Pinzon has taken possession of Peruvian property, thereby violating the rights of war, and attacking universal law which guarantees foreign property, and establishing principles which, later, will recoil upon the nation whose indiscreet agents have followed them, to the prejudice of civilization and justice. A plan, then, has been put into execution, which, for its treachery, deserves the reprobation of all civilized nations, a plan without the slightest trace of legality to alter its deformity, a plan conceived by the valiant mariner and the cunning diplomatist who accompanied him in his naval excursions, to constrain us to ratify a Treaty which would produce the same result of depriving us of the Guano Islands by means of negotiations. There is a mistake here between the two personages. The islands shall neither be usurped for ever, nor shall any Treaty be ratified which is not in accordance with the national dignity and the rules of public law, and in which reciprocity is not consulted, without which there can be no firm and lasting Convention.

Spain has assumed a most significant moral responsibility before the world, and equally so before posterity, which will examine her acts and those of her Representatives with the philosophy of justice, which is a philosophy without appeal, and of terrible import. Messrs. Mazarredo and Pinzon have revindicated in the name of their country some valuable islands which belong to an independent nation, having a place in the community of the rest, and which has been generally recognized in the plenitude of her political personality, even by the Government of Madrid, which has, more than once, held communication with her as between State and State. This revindication has been discussed in the Spanish journals before now; it has been studiously cherished and is now realised without regard or respect of any kind. If they had not for a long time entertained this sinister intention, and if we had given cause for commencing hostilities, we ought to have received a previous notice. If our relations with Spain could only be looked upon as a truce, long truces are similar to a peace, according to the unanimous opinion of writers on public law, and hostilities are not renewed until the belligerents have informed each other of the necessity of continuing the war. Even in armistices a notice is given before returning to the previous situation; nor can such cease to be the case, as honest war between gentlemen is always accompanied by acts of generosity and nobleness. Although we are not on a level with Spain in intellectual and moral progress, we know what should be done in these cases; and our knowledge is not purely theoretical, and fit to be consigned to periodicals, pamphlets, and books, but such as can be put into practice whenever a profitable use may be made of it.

In the midst of the profound disgust and the deep grief caused by the unexpected and extraordinary affair of the Chíncha Island, and the circumstances which preceded and accompanied it, there remains to us one satisfaction not less intense, that the whole nation repels with holy indignation this treacherous act, performed in the midst of peace, and that, instead of the Spaniards finding in this country crafty abettors of their plans of conquest and of their criminal tendencies, as Señor Mazarredo would lead us to suppose in his exposition, they will find in the Peruvians enemies who will defend the rights and the nationality of their country with courage, without having recourse, in the discharge of so serious and bounden a duty, to dissimulation, to treachery, or treason. From great misfortunes, useful and profitable instruction may always be derived; and from the present crisis, which Peru opposed with honour, she will, without doubt, arise in safety, leaving the American name in a good position, with her democratic institutions assured and her riches recovered. In a little while longer this political prediction will be satisfactorily and completely realized.

(Signed) JUAN ANTONIO RIBEYRO.

Lima, April 20, 1864.

Inclosure 15 in No. 3.

Admiral Pinzon to Señor Ribeyro.

Señor Ministro,

Fondeadero de las Islas de Chíncha, 21 de Abril de 1864.

HE recibido la comunicacion que VS. se ha servido dirigirme con fecha 16 del corriente. Manifestaré ante todo con franqueza militar que contestarla en terminos

semejantes á los que emplea VS. seria impropio del decoro de España, y del de sus agentes oficiales.

Asumo, juntamente con el Señor Comisario especial, toda la responsabilidad de los actos ejecutados. La conciencia publica juzgará de parte de quien está la razon, si de la de los Representantes de Su Magestad, ó de la del Gobierno Peruano, que me ha obligado á tomar medidas que correspondiesen á la magnitud de las ofenzas hechas, y de los proyectos que se preparaban.

VS. sabe que al ausentarme de Lima á principios del mes de Marzo, se me presentaron varios personajes en nombre del Presidente de la República á pedirme que indicara cuales eran las reclamaciones de España, pues serian atendidas prontamente.

Yo no estaba facultado por el Gobierno de la Reina para entrar en ninguna negociacion, pero como el Ministro de Francia era entonces el unico Agente Diplomático de Su Magestad en Lima, respondí que aquella no era la forma mas adecuada para resolver asuntos de esa importancia, y que el Gobierno podia entenderse con M. de Lesseps.

Zarpé para Valparaiso y si bien conocia del proceder tradicional del Perú para con España, jamas imaginé que aquellas promesas serian tan solo una nueva decepcion. Llegué á Chile donde supe el 29 de Marzo el arribo á Lima de un Comisario especial, y las respuestas dadas por el General Pérez á las personas referidas. El Presidente contestó que la escuadra tenia orden de volver á Europa, y que era por consiguiente innecesario el entrar en arreglos con el Gobierno de Madrid.

Si hallandose en el Callao las fuerzas de mi mando deseaba el Gobierno del Perú entenderse con el de la Reina, claro es que su dignidad y consecuencia le obligaban á cumplir los compromisos que contrajo, puesto que el alejamiento de la escuadra manifestaba el deseo de no ejercer presion en las negociaciones.

A principios de Marzo llegó á mi noticia en Lima que despues del relevo del Cónsul Señor Ugarte, ningun Representante Español seria recibido con caracter oficial, cualquiera que fuese su categoria. Asi me lo aseguró una de las personas mencionadas y no lo ocultaban en público ni VS. mismo, ni los hombres mas importantes de la Administracion.

Convencido ya de que lo que el Gobierno Peruano anhelaba con su politica habitual era ganar tiempo y terminar la contratacion del empréstito, encomendada á agentes de todos conocidos, el cual tenia por objeto dificultar el arreglo con España, escribí al Señor Salazar y Mazarredo para que saliese a conferenciar conmigo el día 14, y mi carta se cruzó con otra suya que no pude recibir, pero que en el fondo abundaba en el mismo pensamiento.

Inmediatamente que ley en la mar, sobre las Islas de Chíncha, la contestacion del Gobierno Peruano á la credencial del Comisario Español, tomamos ambos la determinacion de obrar con energia.

El Señor de Salazar y yo estamos dispuestos á responder de nuestra conducta ante el Gobierno de Su Magestad. Mis instrucciones me facultaban para hostilizar los puertos del Perú en el caso de que la mision del Comisario especial no tuviera un éxito satisfactorio, dando un plazo razonable para empezar las operaciones, porque podrian causar daños de consideracion á la propiedad particular. Ha parecido preferible, en cambio, tomar posesion de las espresadas islas, para que el Gobierno fuese el único perjudicado; y mal pudo el Señor Salazar dirigir á VS. un ultimatum explicito antes de ser recibido y de celebrar ninguna entrevista conmigo, siendo yo, como gefe de las fuerzas, la persona autorizada para hacer intimaciones.

Podria citar muchos autores de derecho internacional cuya doctrina guarda consonancia con el acto ejecutado; pero me limitaré á copiar las siguientes palabras de Vattel, por ser uno de los que gozan de mas credito. Dice así este escritor: "Las represalias se usan entre las naciones para hacerse justicia ellas mismas cuando no la pueden obtener de otro modo. Si una nacion se apodera de lo que pertenece á otra; si se resiste á pagar una deuda, reparar una injuria, ó dar una justa satisfaccion, puede apoderarse de alguna cosa que pertenezca á la primera y aprovecharse de ella hasta la concurrencia de lo que se la debe, ó retenerla en clase de prueba, hasta que se le haya dado una plena satisfaccion."

Las razones aducidas en la declaracion diplomatica del 14 de este mes daban mayor fuerza á las prescripciones del derecho de gentes; y he tomado rehenes, porque los sucesos de Talambo y las consecuencias que hasta ahora han tenido, á pesar de su enormidad, no son la mejor garantia de los progresos realizados por la administracion publica en cultura y civilizacion, desde que el Perú sacudió el, llamado hasta la saciedad, "ominoso yugo de la atrasada España."

Llevado siempre del deseo de que no se derramase sangre, tomé rehenes, no para renovar los usos bárbaros que desaparecieron en América con la civilizacion Española,

sino para dar fuerza al mismo Gobierno de Lima y ayudarle á contener á la multitud en los primeros momentos de efervescencia.

Arrojar al rostro de los Representantes Españoles el dictado de elevosos es tan contrario á la verdad de los hechos espuestos, como lo es la afirmacion incalificable de VS. de que el Gobierno de la República no tiene la culpa de haberse retardado el reconocimiento de su independencia.

No se me oculta la gravedad del acto llevado á cabo; pero mi confianza es tanto mayor, cuanto que dos de las primeras naciones de Europa acaban de tomar en Alemania una actitud mucho mas trascendental, sancionada de antemano por el Gobierno del Perú, que ha reconocido de un modo solemne hechos de una trascendencia mas grande todavia, ejecutados recientemente en los Estados del Sumo Pontifice.

Esperaré las resoluciones del Gobierno de Su Magestad y debo concluir felicitandome altamente de que no se haya derramado ni una sola gota de sangre y de que la conducta que observo con los súbditos y con el comercio del Perú sea correspondida por el pueblo de la República. Habiendo cesado por lo tanto mis temores de que fuesen atropellados los Españoles, han sido puestos en libertad todos los rehenes que conservaba en mi poder.

Con sentimientos, &c.

(Firmado) LUIS H. PINZON.

(Translation.)

Señor Minister,

Anchorage of the Chincha Islands, April 21, 1864.

I HAVE received the communication which you sent to me on the 16th instant. I will first of all declare with military frankness, that a reply to it in the terms which you employ would be unsuitable to the dignity of Spain and of her official agents.

I accept, jointly with the special Commissioner, all the responsibility of the acts done. The public conscience will judge which party is in the right, that of Her Majesty's Representative or that of the Peruvian Government, which has compelled me to take measures in keeping with the offences given, and with the designs which were preparing.

You are aware that on quitting Lima at the beginning of the month of March, several persons presented themselves to me in the name of the President of the Republic, asking me to point out what the claims of Spain were, and saying that they should be promptly attended to.

I was not empowered by the Queen's Government to enter into any negotiation, but as the Minister of France was then the only Diplomatic Agent of Her Majesty in Lima, I replied that that was not the most suitable form to resolve matters of such importance, and that the Government might come to an understanding with M. de Lesseps.

I weighed anchor for Valparaiso, and although I was cognizant of the traditional conduct of Peru towards Spain, I never imagined that those promises would be merely a new deception. I arrived in Chili, where I heard on the 29th of March, of the arrival of a Special Commissioner at Lima, and was informed of the replies given by General Pezet to this person above-mentioned. The President's reply was, that the squadron had orders to return to Europe, and consequently that it was not necessary to enter into arrangements with the Government of Madrid.

If when the forces under my command were in Callao, the Government of Peru had wished to come to an understanding with that of the Queen, it is clear that its dignity and consistency called upon it to fulfil the promises it had made, because the departure of the squadron showed no wish to exercise any pressure on the negotiations.

At the beginning of March it came to my knowledge in Lima, that after the withdrawal of Consul Ugarte, no Spanish Representative would be received with an official character, of whatever class it might be. I was assured of this by one of the persons mentioned, and it was publicly admitted by yourself and by the most important men of the Administration.

Being convinced that the Peruvian Government, with its habitual policy, was anxious to gain time, and to terminate the contract for the loan entrusted to agents known to everybody, the object of which was to embarrass the arrangements with Spain, I wrote to Señor Salazar y Mazarredo to come and confer with me on the 14th, and my letter crossed with another of his, which I could not receive, but which was entirely in the same sense.

As soon as I read at sea, in the Chincha Islands, the reply of the Peruvian Government to the credentials of the Spanish Commissioner, we both came to a determination to proceed with energy.

Señor Salazar and myself are ready to answer for our conduct before Her Majesty's

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Government. My instructions authorize me to make war on the Peruvian ports in case the mission of the special Commissioner do not come to a satisfactory result, giving a reasonable time before commencing operations, because considerable damage might be caused to private property. It appears preferable, instead, to take possession of these islands, so that the Government alone should be injured; and Señor Salazar could not address to you an explicit ultimatum before being received, and without having an interview with me, who am, as chief of the forces, the person authorized to make communications.

I might quote many writers on international law whose teaching is consistent with the act now done; but I will confine myself to copying the following words of Vattel, as he is one of those who are in most credit. This writer says, "Reprisals are made by nations for the purpose of doing justice to themselves, when they cannot obtain it by any other means. If one nation take possession of anything belonging to another, if there be resistance to the payment of a debt, or the reparation for an injury, or the giving of a just satisfaction, it may take possession of anything belonging to the other, and make a profit of it until the debt be paid, or detain it as evidence until full satisfaction be given."

The reasons adduced in the diplomatic declaration of the 14th instant add increased force to the prescriptions of international law; and I have taken hostages because the events of Talambo, and the consequences that have hitherto resulted from them, do not constitute the best guarantee of the progress made by the public administration in culture and civilization since the epoch when Peru shook off what one is surfeited in hearing called "the fatal yoke of retrograde Spain."

Always actuated by the wish to avoid bloodshed, I have taken hostages, not in order to renew the barbarous usages which disappeared in America with Spanish civilization, but to give strength to the very Government of Lima, and to help it in repressing the multitudes in the first moment of effervescence.

To throw into the face of the Representatives of Spain the title of "elevosos," is as contrary to the truth of the acts narrated, as is your uncharacterizable assertion that the Government of this Republic is not to blame for the delay in the recognition of its independence.

I do not conceal from myself the serious character of the act which has been done; but my confidence is the greater inasmuch as two of the first nations of Europe have just taken a much more critical and important attitude in Germany, which the Government of Peru has sanctioned by anticipation, since it has solemnly recognized acts of still greater extravagance recently done in the States of the Supreme Pontiff.

I shall await the resolutions of Her Majesty's Government, and I conclude by an expression of high gratification that not a single drop of blood has been shed, and that the conduct which I have maintained relative to the subjects and the commerce of Peru, has been responded to by the people of the Republic. Therefore, as I cease to feel any apprehensions of ill-treatment of Spaniards, I have set at liberty all the hostages which I had retained in my custody.

With feelings, &c.

(Signed) LUIS H. PINZON.

Inclosure 16 in No. 3.

Extract from the "Peruano" of April 23, 1864.

Circular á los Gobiernos Extranjeros.

Lima, 26 de Abril de 1864.

DESDE que el Perú adquirió su independencia, una de sus mas importantes atenciones fué establecer sobre bases de justa reciprocidad y de acuerdo con las exigencias de la civilizacion, sus relaciones con los demas Estados del mundo. Su política ha sido lealmente observada sin que pasajeros accidentes hayan podido en manera alguna interrumpirla; y desde entonces hasta los dias que contamos, la generosidad para con los extranjeros que se han avecinado en esta tierra hospitalaria ha sido tan amplia como permanente. Mas de un testimonio y mas de un hecho pudieran presentarse á la consideracion de los Gobiernos ilustrados á quienes el Infrascrito tiene el honor de dirigirse, con el fin de revelarles el suceso mas escandaloso de estos tiempos, si esta fuera la oportunidad de entrar en el exámen y apreciacion de nuestra historia. Mas, para que el Excelentísimo Señor Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de , juzgue con imparcial criterio de la cuestion que trae preocupados á los hombres públicos que se han instruido de su verdadero carácter y de las consecuencias funestas que envuelve, referirá el Infrascrito,

contando con el beneplácito de su Excelencia, cuanto ha ocurrido en la República en demanda y satisfaccion de exageradas pretensiones.

Los Españoles, por negocios antiguos unas veces, y otras por intereses recientes, se colocaron contra el Perú en cierta actitud, que, sin ser completamente hostil, ha contribuido á deshonrar un país por muchos títulos digno de estimacion y de respecto. La prensa periódica de Madrid ha sido convertida, con desnaturalizacion de sus principios esenciales, en órgano de difamacion y de calumnias; y nuestras instituciones, nuestras costumbres, y nuestras mas distinguidos personajes han sido el blanco de tiros emponzoñados y alevosos. Esta conducta, seguida con sistemático empeño, junto con informes apasionados de algunos súbditos de la Península, cuyas esperanzas frustradas los han llevado á extremidades vergonzosas, han dispuesto de tal manera las cosas en la Corte de Madrid que vino en acreditar un Enviado especial para formular cargos contra esta nacion.

El Gobierno, que nada quiere tanto como ostentar su buena fé, miró con regocijo la venida del Agente, porque creyó, como era probable, que, á la par de explicaciones francas, cordiales, y amistosas, se acordarian las principales bases de un Tratado, que fijase definitiva é irrevocablemente la suerte y la comunicacion de dos naciones ligadas por vínculos creados por la naturaleza y robustecidos por el sentimiento mútuo.

El Señor de Salazar y Mazarredo se presentó en esta capital con el título de Comisario especial de Su Magestad Católica; y al exhibir las credenciales de su encargo, se permitió, contra las reglas de la etiqueta y de cierto muy extemporaneamente, algunas alusiones depresivas del decoro nacional, que hubieran podido engendrar, sin la circunspeccion del Infrascrito, un lance desagradable que malograrse los planes y las intenciones de un acomodamiento equitativo. Sin faltar el Infrascrito á la energía mesurada que en tales casos es preciso emplear, defendió la dignidad del puesto elevado que desempeña y esperó, con vista de las credenciales del Gobierno de España, adoptar una línea de conducta que conciliase las exigencias de éste con el decoro y derechos nacionales.

El título de Comisario, de que venia investido el Señor de Salazar, fué un motivo de discusion para el Gobierno, porque queriendo negociar para satisfacer las esperanzas y los deseos del Gabinete de Madrid, no apetecia tampoco que la dignidad de la República fuese atropellada, ni menoscabados en lo menor los miramientos que, por mas de un título, le son debidos. Se contestó con una templanza y una moderacion que en nada podian ofender la susceptibilidad, tanto del Agente como del Gobierno que representaba; pero esa conducta tan medida y esa contemplacion llevada hasta el exceso no fueron bastantes para captarse la benevolencia del Señor de Salazar. Sin negarse á su admision, se le hizo una explicacion que, conciliando les derechos y el decoro de una y otra parte, dejaba expeditas las vias de las negociaciones.

Despues de muchos dias de un silencio estudiado y sospechoso, una tarde, cuando los negocios del servicio diario habian concluido, recibió el Infrascrito, ya fuera del local de su despacho, una manifestacion y un oficio, cuyo contexto no pudo dejar de producir una sensacion profunda de desagrado á todos los Miembros que componen la Administracion Suprema del Estado. Cuando debia esperarse, contando aun con las reglas usuales de la cortesia, una respuesta, si no satisfactoria, que abriese al menos la discusion, para arribar á resultados proficuos y convenientes para las dos partes, se formuló contra la República, contra sus autoridades y contra sus ciudadanos particulares, tal cúmulo de cargos, la mayor parte falsos ó exagerados, que se hacía inverosímil que un diplomático pudiese comenzar de este modo la mision delicada que su Gobierno le confié. A los cargos casi desfigurados ó fingidos, añadió el Señor Salazar tantas injurias, tantas calumnias, y tal virulencia y apasionamiento en sus escritos, que ya desde entonces el Gobierno empezó á temer otras demasias y mayores desafueros.

No fué equivocado este concepto, porque el 14 del mes que corre, á mansalva y aprovechándose de la buena fé del Gabinete Peruano, en plena paz, y cuando, libres de peligros y de asechanzas, las autoridades descansaban tranquilas en la lealtad Española, tan decantada antes como ahora, fueron arrebatadas por la fuerza nuestras Islas Guaneras, capturado un buque de nuestra escuadra, y enarbolado el pabellon de Castilla, tanto en éste como en aquellas. Tal suceso, por las circunstancias que le precedieron y por los accidentes que concurrieron á su consumacion, parece increíble; pero el Gobierno ha tenido el profundo pesar de verlo realizado, y califica esta desgracia como la mayor de todas, entre las que ha recibido durante el curso bonancible de su existencia política.

Muchas consideraciones se desprenden de este malaventurado hecho que, por las condiciones de alevosia que lo acompañan, es sin duda el mayor y mas escandaloso abuso de la fuerza, en los tiempos actuales de civilizacion y de cultura. El Perú, débil por sus medios de accion, pero fuerte, y mucho ciertamente, por sus convic-

ciones y por la justicia que le asiste, no consentirá que se le atropelle impunemente, y apelará á cuantos medios apruebe la moral y aconseje la defensa propia, para recobrar su propiedad arrebatada y para dejar á salvo sus derechos soberanos, tan innecesaria como violentamente vulnerados. Pero si bien el Gobierno Peruano quiere, con esta simple y verídica exposicion, captarse la benevolencia del Gabinete de , tan ilustrado y tan sensato, se propone al mismo tiempo someter á su acreditada é imparcial consideracion algunas otras reflexiones que son de todas las naciones, de todas las épocas y de todos los hombres de estado.

El ataque, los insultos y la presion que se ejerce contra el Perú por los agentes de España en estos criticos momentos, son demasiado vituperables ciertamente para que dejen de ser apreciados en su justo valor por todos los Gobiernos que se interesan vivamente en la santidad de los principios internacionales y en la inviolabilidad de la soberania de los pueblos. Si hemos sufrido los Peruanos la mas escandalosa ofensa, los extranjerios no padecen menos con el atentado cometido; porque paralizadas todas las transacciones, obstruidos los canales del comercio, sin arbitrios la industria para continuar los progresos que felizmente llevaba y sin elementos de vida un pais cuya riqueza principal consiste en sus copiosos depósitos de guano, todo tiene que ser por necesidad trascendental á las demás naciones que conservan en nuestro suelo sus hijos, sus capitales y sus elementos de trabajo. Ellos pierden, sin duda á la par de los Peruanos, y los detrimentos que experimentan, y los quebrantos que les sobrevengan no serán, por cierto, por culpa nuestra, que, moderados hasta donde lo exige la prudencia, y sufridos como pocos para evitar conflictos, hemos sido victima escogida para hacernos sentir las amarguras de un estado de hostilidad, que ni hemos buscado, ni hemos provocado directa ni simuladamente.

Mientras mas tiempo dure esta violenta situacion, serán mayores y mas costosos nuestros sacrificios, y no menos embarazosa la posicion de nuestros huéspedes. El Gobierno se defenderá con energía y excogitará expedientes para sustraerse de esta crisis; pero cuanto haga y cuanto emprenda será, como siempre, respetando los intereses y los derechos ajenos, sin que asuma esas responsabilidades morales que son, sin duda, de los que han colocado al Perú y á muchas naciones, cuyos intereses comerciales comprometen con su inusitada conducta, en tan tristes y en tan inesperadas circunstancias.

La España y su Gobierno reprobarán, así lo cree el Infrascrito, este atentado de sus agentes en el Pacífico; pero, si á pesar de todas estas probabilidades y todas estas lisonjeras esperanzas, nuestras creencias fuesen burladas por hechos désconsoladores y aprobatorios de las faltas perpetradas, el Perú seguirá llenando su deber hasta donde le alcancen sus fuerzas y hasta donde lo permita el derecho, con la misma circunspeccion y con la misma dignidad que hasta aqui ha desplegado.

Con sentimientos de particular aprecio, tiene el Infrascrito el honor de suscribirse del Excelentísimo Señor Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de . . .

Su mas, &c.

(Firmado)

JUAN ANTONIO RIBEYRO.

Al Excelentísimo Señor Ministro de

Relaciones Exteriores de . . .

Admiral Pinzon to Señor Ribeyro, April 21, 1864.

[See Inclosure 15 in No. 3.]

LA nota que precede es un documento que por sí mismo manifiesta que la causa del Perú triunfa definitivamente en la cuestion que se le ha promovido contra su voluntad. Y este triunfo, por lo mismo que es moral, se considera doblemente satisfactorio, puesto que se otorga á un pueblo débil y sin otro apoyo que la evidencia de su justicia.

Cuando el Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores dirigió al Contra Almirante el oficio de 16 del presente, acababa de recibir el pais una de aquellas hondas é inolvidables impresiones, que afectaban tanto su honra como sus intereses. Las Islas de Chíncha habian sido ocupadas y el pabellon nacional cambiado por la bandera de Castilla; y para justificar tal atentado, nuevo en los anales del mundo, se formula una declaracion, que es para el pais un nuevo y mas grave insulto. Era preciso no contestar á ese documento, que para sus autores se ha convertido en un motivo de descrédito; pero si, expresar con sentimiento y con señales de ese dolor que produce la reputacion ultrajada, que jamás se consentiría en el despojo violento de nuestra propiedad, ni se

silenciaria la injuria mas digna de vituperio. Protestó el Ministro y tradujo, con toda la moderacion que cumple observar á un alto funcionario, el estado de indignacion en que se encontraba un pueblo tan ilustrado como patriota, por el inaudito atentado cometido; protesta que encontrará eco en todas las naciones civilizadas, como va ya sucediendo á medida que circula la noticia. La venida al Perú del Señor Salazar y Mazarredo fué un acontecimiento grave por ciertas circunstancias que lo acompañaron. Este caballero, que andaba por algunas de las otras Repúblicas de América, se unió al Señor Contra Almirante en las costas de Méjico, y juntos regresaron al Callao para preparar el hecho que ahora hemos visto consumado. Fué el diplomático á España mas que precipitadamente, y su viaje no tuvo otro objeto que predisponer los ánimos en contra nuestra, haciendo del suceso de Talambo un motivo completo de desacuerdo entre ese Gabinete y el nuestro. A la distancia y con informes apasionados é inexactos, suministrados desde aquí por personas que andaban á caza de medras personales, fué fácil exitar el amor nacional de la Península, y revocar la orden de partir que tenia el Señor General Pinzon. El nombramiento del Señor Mazarredo, que era el acusador gratuito del Perú, fué una señal precursora de los infortunios que nos han sobrevenido; por lo tanto, no es absolutamente extraño que el Agente Español, desconociendo la gravedad e importancia de su elevada posicion, haya conservado todos los accidentes y todas las propensiones anexas á los que toman de buen grado el oficio de inculpar sin razon las acciones ajenas: entre las dos ocupaciones hay una notable diferencia, como que para cada una de ellas se necesitan caracteres especiales.

Sábase ya como se presentó el Comisario al Gabinete, el tono desdeñoso que empleó para ser recibido y el lenguaje que, tanto oficial como privadamente, adoptó para desacreditarnos y buscar un conflicto que el Gobierno quiso alejar á toda costa. Este ha llegado por desgracia con mengua de sus provocadores: y para cohonestar tan ruidoso acontecimiento, se apela á otros medios tan reprobados como los anteriores. El Señor Mazarredo mereció del Ministerio todas aquellas atenciones que le eran debidas, tanto por su posicion, cuanto por que las reglas de la civilidad mas trivial así lo demandaban y exigian. Desde el primer dia que se vieron en conferencia ambos funcionarios, pudo estallar una diferencia lamentable: evitóse este escandalo con mucha prudencia; y esto es una prueba evidente de que el ciudadano que lleva la cartera de Relaciones Exteriores procuraba allanar las dificultades que pudieran impedir la recepcion del Comisario. Su nota del 1 del actual así lo patentiza; y mal puede creerse que hubiese propalado, en círculos particulares, una opinion contraria, quien, en el curso de su larga carrera pública, ha dado mas de una prueba de circunspeccion y de lealtad.

Puede ser que muchas personas, tanto nacionales como extranjeras, se hubiesen acercado al Señor Contra-Almirante, con el objeto de evitar desavenencias ulteriores; pero tales pasos serian espontáneos, sin que en ninguno de ellos hubiese tenido participacion la mas pequeña ni su Excelencia el Presidente de la República, ni el Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores. No se presentará ningun dato, el mas liviano, que desmienta ó contradiga esta aseveracion. Buena, muy buena ha sido la disposicion del Gabinete para entenderse con el Representante Español; y en este sentido se ha hablado generalmente por todos los miembros que lo componen, sin que por esto se quiera maliciosamente dar á entender que estaban preparados á aceptar ciegamente todo lo que se les propusiera sobre Talambo y otros asuntos, sino en cuanto fuera compatible con la justicia y en armonía con la dignidad nacional.

La muy atenta, medida y conciliadora nota que el Ministro infrascrito dirigió al Señor Comisario, haciéndole una explicacion sobre el modo como podía y debia considerarse su caracter, no es ni diplomática, ni política, ni ordinariamente hablando una denegacion ó repulsa. Cualquiera persona imparcial que la lea se convencerá de que, al lado de una finísima atencion, de cierta deferencia al Gabinete de Madrid, llevada hasta el escrúpulo, campea el deseo muy claro de conciliar los intereses y los derechos de una y otra nacion. Ni pretexto se ha dejado al Señor Mazarredo para que adopte el uso de las represalias como una medida de coercion y apremio, para hacer entrar á los directores de la política Peruana en otra senda distinta de la que iban recorriendo.

Ese expediente no se adopta sino en casos muy diversos del presente, cuando no se admiten ó se frustran voluntariamente las negociaciones entabladas, cuando se desoye la justicia y cuando se conoce que la mala fé interviene en la eleccion de medios dilatorios para ganar tiempo y burlarse de las pretensiones de la nacion que las formula. Todos los autores de Derecho Público llevan la misma doctrina; y la autoridad de Wattel, muy respetable por cierto, no está en oposicion con los demas que han escrito con posterioridad. Los principios del publicista invocado por el Señor Pinzon, lejos de favorecer, condenan su conducta inusitada y violenta. Mas, suponiendo por un instante que hubiese existido denegacion de justicia de nuestra parte, agravios visibles y falsias en nuestra política, lo

que no ha sucedido por fortuna y honra del país tan malamente tratado, la ocupación momentánea y transitoria sería únicamente la medida autorizada; pero jamás la "revindicación," como impropriamente la apellidan los agentes Españoles, porque ésta, tanto como la idea de la reconquista, envuelve un principio destructor de las nacionalidades Americanas, una detentación arbitraria y un alzamiento perpétuo de los bienes ajenos. De cualquier modo que la cuestión se examine, por mucho favor que se otorgue á los Señores que han firmado la Declaración de 14 del actual, siempre resulta su lijereza, su animosidad y su malquerencia para el Perú.

Las relaciones entre esta República y la España eran, desde hace tiempo, parecidas á las que tiene con las demás naciones, con la diferencia de que no había ningún pacto expreso entre ambas. En este estado de cosas no cabía de ninguna manera la adopción de medidas coercitivas, sin notificación previa; porque los caballeros no proceden en sentido contrario, ni aun en el fragor mismo de las hostilidades. Las represalias, en el sentido y en el modo como las ha empleado el Contra-Almirante de la escuadra Española, cambian el estado de paz en el de guerra abierta; inducen á una ruptura que, según el derecho positivo, las costumbres inveteradas de los pueblos cultos y las ideas reinantes no pueden improvisarse, sin herir grandes intereses de amigos y neutrales. Aparte de que la coerción puesta en movimiento no daña al Gobierno del Perú sino á la nación entera, Señora y Soberana de su territorio, pues se le priva de uno de sus derechos sagrados y de su principal elemento de riqueza. A ella exclusivamente daña el procedimiento del Almirante, lo que se concilia muy mal con ese interés que propala tener por todos los Peruanos.

Que la ocupación de las islas es un plan preconcebido y concertado con madurez, lo revelan palmariamente todos los pasos que sucesivamente han ido dando, tanto el Comisario como el jefe de las fuerzas navales Españolas. Ellos prepararon todos los argumentos y todos los pretextos contra este país inofensivo: ellos obraron de consuno, para hacer brotar del seno mismo de la paz, causas de rencillas reciprocas; ellos estuvieron de acuerdo hasta en los detalles de la ejecución del atentado. Y sea de esto una prueba irrecusable que el Señor Pinzon salió de Valparaíso cuando no sabía, ni podía saber, el resultado de las negociaciones en Lima; cuando era natural y moralmente imposible que se le hubiese comunicado lo que hacía su compatriota en el desempeño de su misión. Perfectamente calculadas estuvieron la salida del uno y la salida del otro, para encontrarse en un punto determinado. El Almirante vino de los costas de Chile, con viveres para tres meses, con armamento nuevo para su tripulación y con otros recursos de que se proveyó, llevando su previsión hasta donde puede conducirla el jefe más experimentado. El Comisario formuló su Memorandum; se embarcó en la "Covadonga," y dejó un reto al Gobierno, que hará época en la historia del Continente. Rara casualidad, por cierto; que no es ni puede ser aceptada por ningún hombre que tenga buen sentido.

Créase que la conseja del empréstito de los setenta millones de pesos se había olvidado á los Españoles enviados al Perú en busca de simpatías; pero el Señor Pinzon, lo mismo que el Señor Salazar, insisten en esta infeliz originalidad. No hay sobre este hecho ninguna prueba, ni la habrá en adelante, como que no ha existido sino en la febril imaginación de los que lo inventaron con el objeto de dañarnos. Todos los argumentos empleados son de esta misma naturaleza y de esta misma fuerza.

La cuestión de Dinamarca no guarda la más pequeña analogía con la defraudación estrepitosa de las Islas, como no la guarda tampoco ésta con la conducta y política del Gabinete Peruano en los asuntos de la Italia. Peligroso y mucho es juzgar de la manera que lo verifica el Señor Contra-Almirante, porque en la historia, sea cual fuere el período en que se la considere, no hay acontecimientos exactamente iguales. Muchos tienen en verdad sus puntos de semejanza; pero, examinados á la luz de la filosofía, se encuentran diferencias esenciales; y no puede ser de otra manera, porque la humanidad recorre facies diferentes para seguir la regla providencial de su progreso indefinido. Cada nacionalidad, cada época y cada suceso, tienen en sí algo de original que les imprime un sello especial y los distingue de los demás. No son, pues, aceptables las aplicaciones que, con falta de oportunidad, se han hecho en la nota precitada.

No parece decoroso seguir sosteniendo comunicaciones oficiales con funcionarios que tanto han humillado el honor nacional; pero es preciso, en el sistema de publicidad que el Gobierno ha adoptado en la presente cuestión, rebatir los hechos y los principios que contiene la nota de que se ha hecho mención. Los oficiales Peruanos presos a bordo de la escuadra han sido devueltos; los Españoles, aunque tarde, han llenado un deber, merced á estímulos nuestros; mientras que el Perú sin necesidad de ninguno y cediendo únicamente á los impulsos de sus generosos sentimientos, ha respetado y continúa no solamente respetando, sino tratando como compatriotas á los peninsulares laboriosos y pacíficos que

residen entre nosotros. El mundo comparará la conducta de ambos y hará justicia desde luego: nos sometemos á su fallo inapelable.

Lima, 28 de Abril de 1864.

(Firmado)

JUAN ANTONIO RIBEYRO.

(Translation.)

Circular to Foreign Governments.

Lima, April 26, 1864.

FROM the time when Peru acquired her independence, it was one of her most important objects to establish her relations with the other Powers of the world, upon the foundations of just reciprocity and of harmony with the demands of civilization. Her policy has been loyally maintained, and temporary accidents have not in any wise been able to interrupt it; from that epoch to the present, her generosity to the foreigners who have resided in this hospitable land has been large and lasting. More than one testimony and more than one fact might be offered to the consideration of the enlightened Governments to which the Undersigned has the honour to address himself with the object of making known to them the most scandalous event of these times, if this were the occasion of entering into an investigation and estimate of our history. But in order that his Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Her Britannic Majesty may consider with impartial judgment the question which occupies those public men who have been made acquainted with its real character, and the fatal consequences which it involves, the Undersigned will narrate, depending on the kindness of his Excellency, what has taken place in the Republic, in the way of claims, and satisfaction of inordinate pretensions.

The Spaniards, mostly on account of matters of former times, and in some cases from recent interests, have adopted towards Peru a certain attitude which, without being wholly hostile, has contributed to dishonour a country worthy for many reasons of estimation and respect. The periodical press of Madrid has been changed, by a departure from its essential principles, into an organ of defamation and calumny, and our institutions, our customs, and our most distinguished men, have been the targets of their poisoned and treacherous shots. This conduct, sustained with systematic constancy, joined to the excited reports of some subjects of the Peninsula, whose disappointed expectations have carried them to shameful extremes, have so disposed matters at the Court of Madrid, that an especial Envoy was accredited to draw up charges against this nation.

The Government, which is not desirous of anything so much as to prove its good faith, expected with satisfaction the arrival of the agent, because it thought, as it was likely, that jointly with frank, cordial, and friendly explanations the chief bases of a Treaty would be agreed to, which should determine definitively and irrevocably the fate and the communication of two nations allied by ties formed by nature, and strengthened by mutual feelings.

Señor Salazar y Mazarredo presented himself at this city with the title of Special Commissioner of Her Catholic Majesty; and in exhibiting the credentials of his mission, he allowed himself, in opposition to the rules of etiquette, and certainly very unseasonably, to make certain allusions depreciatory of the national honour, which might have produced, had it not been for the circumspection of the Undersigned, an unpleasant difference which might have disconcerted the plans and intentions of an equitable arrangement. The Undersigned, without departing from the tranquil energy which it is necessary to use in such cases, defended the dignity of the elevated post which he holds, and he hoped, in view of the credentials of the Spanish Government, to adopt a line of conduct which would conciliate the requisitions of the latter with the decorum and the rights of the nation.

The title of Commissioner with which Señor de Salazar was invested, was a motive of discussion for the Government, because, wishing to negotiate so as to satisfy the hopes and desires of the Cabinet of Madrid, it did not wish, at the same time, that the dignity of the Republic should be trodden upon or impaired, in the smallest of those considerations which are due to it, for many reasons. He replied with a mildness and moderation which could not in any degree offend the susceptibility either of the Agent or of the Government which he represented; but that moderate conduct and that complaisance carried even to excess, were not sufficient to gain the goodwill of Señor de Salazar. Without refusing his admission, an explanation was given to him which, in conciliating the rights and the decorum of the two parties, should facilitate the course of the negotiations.

After many days of a studied and suspicious silence, one evening when the business of the day was over, the Undersigned, already out of his office, received a statement ("manifestacion") and a letter, the tenor of which could not fail to produce a deep feeling of displeasure in all the members who compose the Administration. When they were entitled to expect by all the usual rules of courtesy a reply, which, if not satisfactory, would at least open the discussion in order to arrive at results profitable and expedient for both parties, there was drawn out against the Republic, against its authorities, and against its private citizens, such a mass of charges, the greater part false and exaggerated, such that it was improbable that a diplomatist could commence in this manner the delicate mission entrusted to him by his Government. To these charges, more or less disfigured or pretended, Señor Salazar added so many insults, so many calumnies, and such virulence and passion in statement, that the Government began already to fear further rudeness and greater excesses.

This opinion was not wrong, for on the 14th of the present month, without risk, and taking advantage of the good faith of the Peruvian Cabinet, in full peace, and when the authorities, free from hazards and intrigues, were resting confident in Spanish loyalty, so much vaunted before as it is now, our Guano islands were attacked by force, a ship of our squadron was captured, and the flag of Castile was hoisted both in the ship and on the islands. Such an act, by the circumstances which preceded it, and by the accidents which concurred in its execution, appears incredible; but the Government has had the profound sorrow of seeing it realized, and it considers this misfortune to be the greatest of all that it has suffered during the tranquil course of its political existence. Many considerations arise from this calamitous act, which by the circumstances of treachery which accompanied it is without doubt the most scandalous abuse of force in the present times of civilization and culture. Peru, weak in means of action, but strong and most certainly so, by her convictions and the justice of her cause, will not consent to be trodden down with impunity, but will appeal to all the means which morality approves, and which self-defence urges for the recovery of her property plundered, and for saving her sovereign rights, as undeservedly as violently wounded. But while the Peruvian Government is desirous by this simple and truthful narration to obtain the good will of the Cabinet of _____, so enlightened and so prudent, it proceeds at the same time to submit to its impartial and distinguished consideration some further reflections which appertain to all nations, to all times, and to all statesmen.

The attacks, the insults, and the pressure exercised against Peru by the agents of Spain in these critical moments, are certainly too condemnable not to be appreciated in their just value by all Governments which are strongly interested in the sanctity of international principles, and in the inviolability of the sovereignty of nations. If we, the Peruvians, have received the most scandalous offence, foreigners do not less feel the injury of the outrage committed, because all affairs being paralysed, all the channels of commerce being obstructed, industry being without means to continue the progress it was so successfully making, and without the aliments of life; a country whose chief wealth consists in its copious deposits of guano has everything which can be of necessity important to other nations who obtain in our land the support of their people, their capital, and their elements of labour.

They lose, without doubt, equally with the Peruvians; and the losses they suffer, and the misfortunes they undergo, will not certainly be by our fault: for being moderate as prudence requires, and patient because few, so as to avoid conflicts, we have been chosen victims to feel the bitterness of a state of hostility that we have not sought or provoked either directly or disguisedly.

The longer this forced state of things continues, the greater and more costly our sacrifices will be, and no less embarrassing will be the position of our guests. The Government will defend itself with energy, and will find expedients to deliver itself from this crisis; but whatever it may do, and whatever it may undertake will be done now, as it always has been done, with due respect to foreign interests and rights, and it will not assume those moral responsibilities which are such as have without doubt placed Peru and many nations whose commercial interests clashed with their unusual conduct in such sad and unexpected circumstances.

The Undersigned is of opinion that Spain and her Government will disallow this outrage of their agents in the Pacific; but if, notwithstanding all these probabilities and all these flattering hopes, our expectations should be disappointed by unhappy facts and by approval of the offences perpetrated, Peru will continue to do her duty to the utmost of her power, and so far as justice allows, with the same circumspection and the same dignity which she has displayed hitherto.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed)

JUAN ANTO. RIBEYRO.

Admiral Pinzon to Señor Ribeyro, April 21, 1864.

[See Inclosure 15 in No. 3.]

THE preceding note is a document which of itself shows that the cause of Peru is definitively triumphant in the question which, against her will, has been put before her; and this triumph, because it is a moral triumph, may be looked upon as doubly satisfactory, inasmuch as it is given to a nation which is feeble, and has no other support than the evidence of its justice.

When the Minister for Foreign Affairs sent to the Admiral the note of the 16th instant, the country had just received one of those deep and indelible impressions which affected its honour as well as its interests. The Chíncha Islands had been seized, and the national banner changed for the flag of Castile; and for the purpose of justifying such outrage, new in the annals of the world, a declaration was drawn up, which is a new and more serious insult for our country. It was necessary to leave without reply that document, which became a source of discredit to its authors; but that instead of so doing we should declare with grief, and with the marks of that sorrow which is caused by outraged honour, that we would never consent to the forcible robbery of our property, nor pass over with silence an injury which is not worthy of condemnation. The Minister protested, and manifested with all the moderation which it is proper to observe towards an official of rank, the indignant feeling of an enlightened and patriotic people produced by such an unheard-of outrage; a protest which will find its echo in all civilized nations, as it is already doing wherever the announcement of it is circulated. The arrival of Señor Salazar y Mazarredo was a serious event, because of certain circumstances by which it was accompanied. That gentleman, who passed through some of the other American Republics, joined the Admiral on the coasts of Mexico, and they returned to Callao together in order to prepare the act which we have now seen consummated. The diplomatist proceeded to Spain with great precipitation, and his voyage had no other object than to predispose minds there against us, making of the affair of Talambo a complete motive of discord between that Cabinet and ours. Being at a distance, and having excited and incorrect reports furnished from hence by persons who were looking after their own gains, it was easy to excite the national self-love of the Peninsula, and to recall the order of departure which had been sent by General Pinzon. The nomination of Señor Mazarredo, who was the gratuitous accuser of Peru, was a precursory signal of the misfortunes which have fallen upon us; it is not, therefore, absolutely unparalleled that the Spanish Agent, forgetting the serious and important character of his elevated position, should have kept all the temperament and all the prejudices which appertain to those who assume spontaneously the duty of unreasonably blaming the actions of others; there is a notable difference between the two occupations, because each of them requires especial qualifications.

It is already known how the Commissioner presented himself at the Cabinet, what a scornful tone he employed in order to have his reception, and what statements he made, as well officially as privately, to damage us, and to seek a conflict which the Government was desirous of avoiding at any price. The conflict has, unfortunately, taken place to the disgrace of those who provoked it; and in order to give a decent colour to such a dashing event, recourse was had to other measures as culpable as those that had been taken previously. Señor Mazarredo received from the Administration all those attentions which were due to him, as well on account of his position as because the rules of the most ordinary civility require and demand them. From the first day that the two functionaries were in conference, a lamentable difference might have broken out; this scandal was avoided by great prudence, and this is an evident proof that the citizen who held the Portfolio of Foreign Affairs endeavoured to allay the difficulties which might prevent the reception of the Commissioner. The note of the 1st instant shows this, and it cannot be thought that he, who in the course of his long public career has given more than one proof of circumspection and loyalty, would have disseminated in private circles a different opinion.

It is possible that many persons, as well natives as foreigners, may have visited the Admiral, with the object of avoiding ulterior misunderstandings; but such acts were spontaneous, done without the smallest participation either of his Excellency the President of the Republic, or of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Not the slightest fact can be brought forward to refute or contradict this assertion. The disposition of the Cabinet to come to an understanding with the Representative of Spain was good, very good; and all the members who compose it have spoken generally in this sense,

without wishing maliciously to have it understood that they were prepared blindly to accept everything that should be proposed to them relative to Talambo and other matters, except so far as it was compatible with truth, and in consonance with the dignity of the nation.

The very polite, moderate, and conciliatory note which the Undersigned addressed to the Commissioner, explaining to him the manner in which his character could and ought to be considered, is not to be looked upon as a refusal or repulse, speaking either diplomatically or politically, or in the ordinary acceptation. Any impartial person who reads it will be convinced that there was in it, together with a very delicate attention, and a certain deference to the Cabinet of Madrid amounting to scrupulosity, a very obvious wish to conciliate the interests and rights of both nations. No pretext was left to Señor Mazarredo for adopting the employment of reprisals as a measure of coercion and pressure, to compel the directors of Peruvian policy to enter into a path other than that which they were following.

Such an expedient is adopted only in cases very different from the present, when negotiations prepared are not begun or are voluntarily broken off, and when it is known that bad faith is at work in the choice of dilatory means to gain time, and to mock the pretensions of the nation which brings them forward. All the writers on public law allege the same doctrine, and the authority of Vattel, certainly worthy of all respect, is not in opposition to the others who have written previously. The principles of the jurists appealed to by Señor Pinzon, far from favouring, condemns his unprecedented and violent conduct. But supposing for an instant that a denial of justice had existed on our part, visible grievances and errors in our policy, which fortunately and honourably for our ill-treated country has not been the case, nothing more than a momentary and pressing occupation could be adopted; but never the "revindication," as the Spanish Agents improperly call it, because that, as well as the idea of reconquest, involves a presumption which is destructive to American nationalities, an arbitrary seizure and perpetual detention of the property of others. In whatever way the question may be examined, whatever favour be granted to the gentlemen who signed the declaration of the 14th instant, their levity, their animosity, and their ill-will to Peru are apparent throughout.

The relations between this Republic and Spain have for some time been similar to those subsisting with other nations, with this difference, that there has been no express compact between them. In this state of things there was no case whatever for the adoption of coercive measures without previous notification. Gentlemen do not act in such a way even in the very tumult of hostilities. Reprisals, in the meaning and in the way that they were employed by the Admiral and the Spanish squadron, change the state of peace to that of open war; they bring on a rupture which, according to positive law, and the long subsisting customs and the prevailing ideas of civilized nations, cannot be produced without prejudicing the great interests of friends and neutrals; in addition to which the coercion exercised does not damage the Government of Peru alone, but the whole nation, which is lord and sovereign of its territory, since it is thereby deprived of one of its sacred rights and of its chief element of wealth. The act of the Admiral injures it alone, which is not very easily conciliated with that interest which it professes to feel for all Peruvians.

That the seizure of the islands is a preconceived plan, and maturely devised, is evidently shown by all the steps which have been successively taken both by the Commissioner and by the Chief of the Spanish naval forces. They were ready with all arguments and all pretexts against this inoffensive land; they acted in concert in order to get to causes of mutual rancour in the very bosom of peace; they were agreed even in the details of the execution of the outrage, and this is shown without a doubt by the fact that Señor Pinzon left Valparaiso when he did not, and could not, know the result of the negotiations in Lima; when it was naturally and morally impossible that he should have received information of what his countryman was doing in the fulfilment of his mission. The departures of the two were perfectly well calculated for their meeting at a place fixed upon. The Admiral arrived at the coast of Chili with provisions for three months, with a new armament for his crew, and with other means provided; his foresight extending as far as could be done by the most experienced Chief. The Commissioner drew up his Memorandum; they embarked on board the "Covadonga," and left a challenge with the Government which will form an epoch in the history of the continent. A rare instance of chance most certainly, such as is not, and cannot be, believed by any man of common sense.

It might be supposed that the design of the loan of 70,000,009 dollars would be forgotten by Spaniards sent to Peru in quest of sympathies, but Señor Pinzon, as well as Señor Salazar, dwell upon this unlucky original idea. There is no evidence of this

fact, nor will there be any, because it has not existed except in the feverish imagination of those who invented it with a view to injure us. All the arguments used are of this same nature and force.

The question of Denmark has not the smallest analogy with the dashing robbery of the islands, nor is there in the affairs of Italy any analogy with the conduct and policy of the Peruvian Government. It is very perilous to form a judgment in the way adopted by the Admiral, because there are no events exactly alike, whatever the epoch under consideration may be. Many of these in fact have their points of resemblance, but when examined by the light of philosophy, essential differences are found; and it cannot be otherwise, for humanity takes various phases in following out the providential law of indefinite progress. Every nationality, every epoch, and every event, has within itself something original which impresses upon it a special stamp, and distinguishes it from the rest. Those applications then cannot be accepted which are unseasonably made in the note alluded to.

It is not fitting to continue keeping up official communications with functionaries who have so greatly borne down the national honour; but in the system of publicity which the Government has adopted on the present question, it is requisite that we should demolish the facts and principles contained in the note mentioned. The Peruvian officers taken on board the squadron have been sent back; the Spaniards have fulfilled a duty, though tardily, thanks to our urgency; whilst Peru, without any kind of obligation, and yielding solely to the impulse of her sentiments, has respected, and continues not only to respect, but to treat as countrymen the industrious and peaceful natives of the Peninsula who reside among us. The world will compare the conduct of the two parties, and will at once do justice: we shall submit to its verdict, from which there is no appeal.

Lima, April 28, 1864.

(Signed) JUAN ANTONIO RIBEYRO.

No. 4.

Mr. Jerningham to Earl Russell.—(Received May 28.)

My Lord,

Lima, April 28, 1864.

THE Diplomatic Body in Lima were talking of offering their friendly offices to the Peruvian Government in the present crisis with the Spaniards, in case such an offer might be acceptable; but Mr. Robinson, the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Peru, who is Dean of the Body, told me the day before yesterday that he did not see any practical utility that might ensue; and I thought I could collect from his observations that he had sounded the ground, but had not received any indication that could warrant, for the present, any offer to the Peruvian Executive of a mediatory nature.

I also have not received as yet any hint from any official quarter that anything I could do in that way would be accepted, and therefore, willing as I should be to do my best to patch up differences, I have not been induced to take steps in that direction, being assured that Her Majesty's Government will best know, on serious consideration, what to devise in the affair of the seizure of the Chincha Islands.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WM. STAFFORD JERNINGHAM.

No. 5.

Earl Russell to Mr. Jerningham.

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, June 1, 1864.

HER Majesty's Government deeply regret to learn that questions have arisen between the Government of Peru and the Spanish Government which have led to so serious a step as the seizure by the Spanish Agents of the Chincha Islands.

The immediate departure of the West India mail, however, does not admit of Her Majesty's Government pronouncing any opinion on the merits of the case. They must also wait the explanations which the Spanish Government will doubtless be ready to afford in a matter where they must be aware that large British interests are concerned. In the meanwhile they can only trust that the questions immediately at issue between the

Peruvian Government and the Government of Spain may be satisfactorily settled, either by the mediation and good offices of the Representatives of friendly Powers, or by direct communications between the two Parties.

No. 6.

Sir J. Crampton to Earl Russell.—(Received June 4.)

My Lord,

Madrid, May 31, 1864.

THE intelligence received by way of Southampton of the occurrences at Peru in consequence of the complications which have arisen between the Government of that Republic and the Spanish Commissioner Señor Salazar y Mazarredo, has not failed to cause considerable sensation at Madrid.

A Cabinet Council, presided over by Her Catholic Majesty, was yesterday held at Aranjuez, as I am informed, for the consideration of this matter; but I have not yet had an opportunity of inquiring of Señor Pacheco how it is viewed by the Spanish Government. It appears, however, that official reports from the Pacific not having yet been received, no resolution in regard to it has been come to. They are expected to arrive within a few days.

In the meantime the "Epoca," an organ of the Administration, has published a certain number of documents relative to the previous history of this affair, and which throw some light on the causes of the present state of things.

I have the honour to inclose a copy and translation of these.

Among them will be found a copy of Señor Mazarredo's credentials, and of the first notes exchanged between him and the Peruvian Minister for Foreign Affairs; and also a despatch, dated the 13th ultimo, addressed by the latter to the Representatives of Peru in Europe for the purpose of being communicated to the Spanish Government. In this the conduct of the Peruvian Government up to that date is explained and justified.

I understand that a question will be put to the Administration on this subject in the Cortes either to-day or to-morrow.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN F. CRAMPTON.

Inclosure in No. 6.

Extract from the "Epoca" of May 31, 1864.

CUESTION ENTRE ESPAÑA Y EL PERU.—En los momentos presentes creemos que nada se puede dar mas importante á los lectores de "La Epoca" que los documentos oficiales que han mediado antes del rompimiento con el Perú. De esta manera podrán apreciar con exactitud las causas de este conflicto é ilustrarse la opinion en nuestra patria.

Nuestros lectores saben que nombrado el Señor Salazar, Ministro Residente de España en Bolivia y Comisario del Gobierno Español cerca del Perú, salió de Madrid en el mes de Febrero último. Llegado á Lima, por donde habia pasado meses antes y tenido conferencias con el Almirante de las fuerzas navales Españolas, General Pinzon, dirigió al Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno Peruano la siguiente comunicacion.—

"Muy Señor mio,

"Hotel Maury, Lima, 20 de Marzo de 1864.

El Infrascrito tiene la honra de poner en conocimiento del Excelentísimo Señor Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores del Perú, que el Gobierno de Su Magestad Católica se ha dignado conferirle una mision especial cerca del de esta República, y desea por lo tanto entregarle la comunicacion del Excelentísimo Señor Primer Secretario de Estado y Presidente del Consejo de Ministros de Su Magestad relativa á su encargo.

El Infrascrito ruega á su Excelencia el Señor Ribeyro se sirva designarle dia y hora para hacer la mencionada entrega, y aprovecha, &c.

(Firmado)

"EUSEBIO DE SALAZAR Y MAZARREDO.

"Excelentísimo Señor Ministro de Relaciones

"Exteriores de la República Peruana."

A esta comunicacion se contestó por el Gobierno Peruano con la siguiente : —

“Lima, 23 de Marzo de 1864.

“EL Infrascrito, Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores del Perú, ha recibido la nota confidencial que, con fecha 20 del presente, le ha dirigido el Señor Don Eusebio de Salazar y Mazarredo, comunicándole que el Gobierno de Su Magestad Católica se ha dignado conferirle una mision especial cerca del de esta República y solicitando se le designe dia y hora para entregar al Infrascrito una comunicacion del Excelentísimo Señor Primer Secretario de Estado y Presidente del Consejo de Ministros de Su Magestad relativa á su encargo.

“El Infrascrito, cediendo á los deseos del Señor Mazarredo, le participa que el Miércoles 30 del actual á la una de la tarde lo recibirá en el salon de su despacho.

“Con este motivo, el Infrascrito, &c.

(Firmado)

“JUAN A. RIBEYRO.

“Al Señor D. Eusebio de Salazar y Mazarredo.”

Las credenciales de que era portador el Señor Salazar decian lo siguiente :—

[Señor Arrazola to Señor Ribeyro, January 18, 1864, see Inclosure 1 in No. 2.]

Presentadas estas credenciales en la entrevista tenida por nuestro Ministro con e de Relaciones Exteriores de la República Peruana, surgieron las dificultades de que ha hablado la prensa, y deseando el Señor Salazar tener por escrito las observaciones que se le habian hecho por aquel Gobierno, se le dirigió esta comunicacion :—

[Señor Ribeyro to Señor Mazarredo, April 1, 1864, see Inclosure 2 in No. 2.]

A esta comunicacion contestó, despues de varios dias de conferencias sin duda amistosas, el Representante de España con esta importante comunicacion :—

[Señor Mazarredo to Señor Ribeyro, April 12, 1864, see Inclosure 3 in No. 2.]

A esta comunicacion acompañaba el Memorandum á que en ella se hace referencia y que no ha llegado todavia á nuestro poder. Procuraremos obtenerle cuanto antes á fin de publicar tan notablemente documento en las columnas de “La Epoca.” Es, segun el análisis que de él se nos hace, una recapitulacion de todos los agravios que el Perú ha inferido á España, teniendo el Señor Salazar la conviccion profunda de que el Gobierno Peruano nada ha hecho por castigar los sucesos de Talambo, mientras ha sido el incitador de las complicaciones que han surgido en América para con España; habiendo llevado su mala voluntad hasta el punto de apoyar la insurreccion de Santo Domingo y querer formar una liga de las Repúblicas Hispano-Americanas contra su antigua madre patria.

Comprendiendo el Gobierno Peruano toda la sensacion que debia producir en España la noticia de lo sucedido en Lima y el Memorandum del Señor Salazar, se apresuró á enviar á sus Representantes en Europa, para que la hiciesen llegar inmediatamente á manos del Gobierno Español, la siguiente nota en que pretenden justificar su conducta. A pesar de su estension, creemos que debemos insertarla por la importancia del asunto á que se refiere y por las noticias que contiene :—

[Señor Ribeyro to Peruvian Agents abroad, April 13, 1864, see Inclosure 1 in No. 3.]

Tal ha sido la comunicacion del Gobierno Peruano al Español. Inútil nos parece decir que la opinion debe suspender su juicio hasta conocer por completo las razones alegadas por el General que manda las fuerzas Españolas en el Pacífico y por nuestro Representante y Comisario Régio en el Perú, Señor Salazar. Es de creer que las hayan tenido muy poderosas para obrar de la manera que anuncian los últimos despachos telegráficos llegados por la via Inglesa.

(Translation.)

DISPUTE BETWEEN SPAIN AND PERU.—At the present moment we believe that nothing more important could be put before the readers of the “Epoca” than the

official papers which passed before our rupture with Peru. They will thus be able to take the causes of this quarrel at their real value, and to give a clear view of it to their countrymen.

Our readers know that when Señor Salazar was named Resident Minister of Spain in Bolivia, and Commissary of the Spanish Government in Peru, he left Madrid in February last. When he came to Lima, by which place he passed some months before, and conferred with the Admiral of the Spanish naval forces, Admiral Pinzon, he addressed the following communication to the Peruvian Minister for Foreign Affairs :—

“Sir,

“*Hotel Maury, Lima, March 20, 1864.*

“The Undersigned has the honour to inform the Peruvian Minister for Foreign Affairs, that Her Catholic Majesty’s Government has deigned to entrust him with a special mission to this Republic, and he wishes, therefore, to deliver to him the letter of his Excellency the First Secretary of State and President of the Council of Ministers of Her Majesty relating to his charge.

“The Undersigned begs his Excellency Señor Ribeyro to be so good as to name a day and hour for him to make this delivery, and takes this occasion, &c.

(Signed)

“EUSEBIO DE SALAZAR Y MAZARREDO.

“His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs.”

The Peruvian Government answered this letter as follows :—

“*Lima, March 23, 1864.*

“The Undersigned, Peruvian Minister for Foreign Affairs, has received the confidential note dated the 20th instant, which Señor Don Eusebio de Salazar y Mazarredo has sent him, informing him that Her Catholic Majesty’s Government has deigned to entrust him with a special mission to this Republic, and begging him to name a day and hour for him to deliver to the Undersigned a letter from his Excellency the First Secretary of State and President of the Ministerial Council of Her Majesty relating to his charge.

“The Undersigned yields to the wishes of Señor Mazarredo, and informs him that he will receive him in the drawing room of his office on Wednesday the 30th instant, at 1 o’clock in the afternoon.

“To this end, the Undersigned, &c.

(Signed)

“JUAN A. RIBEYRO.

“Señor D. Eusebio de Salazar y Mazarredo.”

The credentials which Señor Salazar brought with him said as follows :—

[See Inclosure 1 in No. 2.]

When these credentials had been delivered during the interview held by our Minister with the Minister for Foreign Affairs for the Republic, difficulties arose which the press has spoken of; and as Señor Salazar wished to have in writing the observations which that Government had made him, the following communication was sent him :—

[See Inclosure 2 in No. 2.]

The Representative of Spain replied after a delay of some days, occupied, no doubt, in friendly conferences, in the following important manner :—

[See Inclosure 3 in No. 2.]

The Memorandum mentioned in the above communication was inclosed, but it is not yet in our power. We will endeavour to obtain it as soon as possible, in order to publish it in the “*Epoca*.” According to what we have heard, it is a recapitulation of all the injuries inflicted on Spain by Peru. Señor Salazar is convinced that the Peruvian Government took no steps to punish the authors of the events of Talambo, while, on the other hand, she instigated the complications which have arisen for Spain in America, and that she carried her ill-will to the extreme of favouring the insurrection of Santo Domingo, and endeavouring to form an alliance of the Spanish-American Republics against her old mother-country.

The Peruvian Government, understanding the sensation which the events of Lima and the Memorandum of Señor Salazar would produce in Spain, hastened to address to their Representatives in Europe, in order that they might at once deliver it into the hands of the Spanish Government the following note, in which they attempt to justify their conduct, and which we insert *in extenso*, notwithstanding its length, owing to the importance of the question, and the information which it contains:—

[See Inclosure 1 in No. 3.]

Such has been the communication from the Peruvian to the Spanish Government. It appears useless to us to say that opinion must keep its judgment to itself until the reasons put forward by the General commanding the Spanish forces in the Pacific, and by our Representative and Royal Commissioner Señor Salazar, shall have been made known. It is to be believed that they must have been very powerful to have caused them to act in the way announced by the last telegraphic despatches received through England.

No. 7.

Sir J. Crampton to Earl Russell.—(Received June 7.)

My Lord,

Madrid, June 3, 1864.

I STATED in my despatch of yesterday's date that a question would shortly be put in the Cortes to the Spanish Government relative to the late occurrences in Peru.

This was done yesterday by Señor Lasala, and I have now the honour to inclose a report and translation of what took place in the Congress of Deputies on the subject.

Señor Pacheco, in reply to Señor Lasala, said that although the Government was aware of what was stated in the public journals, they had not yet received the official despatches of their Commissioner in Peru, nor of the Spanish Admiral in the Pacific.

Señor Pacheco then read an instruction which he had addressed to the Representatives of Spain at Paris, London, and Washington, on the 24th ultimo, when he had received the first notice that the affair had taken a disagreeable turn.

He could only now reiterate to the Cortes what he said in that instruction, viz., that Spain was not in any way disposed to question the independence of the nations of America, or to make conquests or to acquire territories in those countries, although she would of course sustain her rights and dignity there as well as elsewhere.

His Excellency added that the Government must wait for the receipt of Señor Salazar's despatches before pronouncing any opinion on the recent facts of the case.

The "Época" has to-day published a number of documents regarding this affair, which, although not officially in possession of the Government, are no doubt authentic. Among them is the Memorandum of Señor Salazar, in which are recapitulated in detail the complaints of the Spanish Government against Peru, and the "declaration" of the Spanish Commissioner and the Admiral on taking possession of the Chincha Islands.

The terms of some of the "considerations" stated as justifying this proceeding will no doubt attract your Lordship's attention.

I have now the honour to transmit these documents in Spanish. A translation will be forwarded as soon as it can be prepared.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN F. CRAMPTON.

Inclosure in No. 7.

Extract from the Madrid "Gazette" of June 3, 1864.

SUCESOS DEL PERU.—*El Señor Lasala.*—Hace pocos dias dirigí una pregunta al Gobierno sobre los sucesos del Perú. Despues han llegado otras noticias, y aun documentos que publican los periódicos. Muy graves son esos documentos, y es conveniente que el Gobierno diga si son auténticos; si hay otros, y si puede presentarlos sobre la mesa. Si esto no conviene, ruego al Gobierno que á lo ménos declare lo que oficialmente pueda sobre los hechos á que se refieren.

El Señor Ministro de Estado.—Señores, hace algunos días que el Señor Lasala me preguntó, como me pregunta hoy, lo que habia en aquella fecha sobre los desagradables sucesos del Perú. El Congreso recordará que yo manifesté que el Señor Salazar y Mazarredo habia ido con una mision dada por un Ministerio anterior á nosotros, con instrucciones de aquel Ministerio, y que á la fecha en que yo hablaba no habia recibido aun ninguna comunicacion del Señor Salazar. Dos días despues recibimos los despachos del Señor Salazar, los primeros que se han recibido en Madrid. Estos despachos indicaban acontecimientos graves; pero no eran bastante claros, no eran bastante completos para que el Gobierno pudiera tomar ninguna resolucion.

En atencion, pues, á lo incompleto de los despachos y á la falta de noticias en que se estaba de lo que iba á suceder en el Perú, y en la imposibilidad de evitar nada á la distancia en que nos encontramos, en pocos momentos el Gobierno resolvió esperar otros despachos del Señor Salazar. Sin embargo, como todo lo que toca á nuestras relaciones con las provincias ultramarinas, que fueron ántes parte de España, es una cosa delicada; como el Gobierno quiere que se comprenda bien cuál es su política; como no tiene ninguna idea que no pueda declarar ante el mundo, el Ministro que tiene la honra de dirigirse ahora al Congreso se apresuró al instante, en cuanto se recibieron aquellos despachos, á dirigir á nuestros Representantes en París, Lóndres, y Washington una declaracion que creia debia hacer para que nunca se dudase de los propósitos de España.

Tengo en la mano la minuta de esa declaracion, y voy á leerla al Congreso. Es un despacho dirigido á nuestro Embajador en París y á nuestros Ministros en Lóndres y en Washington. Dice así:—

“Primera Secretaria de Estado, Aranjuez, 24 de Mayo de 1864.

“Al encargarse del Ministerio los que tenemos hoy la honra de aconsejar á Su Magestad, sabe vuestra Excelencia que habia partido para el Perú con el encargo de formalizar reclamaciones sobre los tristes sucesos de Talambo el Ministro Residente Don Eusebio Salazar y Mazarredo. Uno de mis primeros cuidados fué el de tomar conocimiento de este asunto, y su consecuencia el escribir confidencialmente al mencionado Salazar recomendándole la mayor prudencia en el desempeño de su cometido. No entraba en el ánimo del Gobierno de Su Magestad el provocar ni el aceptar cuestiones en aquellos países, como en ningunos otros, que no estuviesen muy justificadas, ni el rechazar las satisfacciones racionales que pudieran dársele en los casos en que fuese forzoso el seguirlas por la honra y los intereses de la nacion.

“El correo ultimo de América ha traído despachos del Señor Salazar, los cuales indican el desagradable giro que ha tomado este asunto; pero no expresan claramente qué era lo que el mismo Señor Salazar se proponia hacer. Obligados á esperar otros que nos descubran más los sucesos, he creído, sin embargo, debia poner á vuestra Excelencia el despacho presente, repitiéndole la seguridad, para que sirva siempre de regla á su conducta y conversaciones con ese Gobierno, de que el Español ni desconoce la independencia de ningún Estado Americano, ni tiene pretensiones territoriales en aquella parte del mundo. Las diferencias que tuviese ó pudiese tener con las Repúblicas del nuevo continente no le harán abandonar la prudente línea de moderacion en que ha venido y viene marchando; ántes, por el contrario, las mirará siempre como una desgracia, y procurará terminirlas lo más pronto posible, sin exigir más que lo que notoriamente reclamen su decoro y sus bien entendidos intereses.

“Dios guarda, &c.”

El Congreso ve qué franco y explicito es el Gobierno; el Gobierno ha declarado, y repete hoy, que ni desconoce la independencia de ninguna nacion Americana, aun de aquellas con las cuales no hemos hecho Tratados de reconocimientos, ni tiene aspiracion ninguna sobre territorios de América. El Gobierno ha declarado, y repete hoy, que en las diferencias que pueden mediar entre él y las Potencias Americanas, como desgraciadamente median diferencias entre todas las Potencias del mundo, se conducirá de la manera que acostumbran á conducirse los pueblos civilizados, y no exigirá sino lo que el decoro y el interés notoriamente le aconsejan.

Hecha esta declaracion, que no es de hoy, sino que tiene la fecha de 24 de Mayo, el Gobierno añadirá que despues de esto no ha recibido despacho alguno del Señor Salazar; que sabe, como pueden saber los Señores Diputados, lo que dicen los periódicos; que tiene en su poder periódicos del Perú; que deplora estos tristes sucesos; que espera los despachos del Señor Salazar, que nadie puede pedirle; que no hay razon para exigirle que sin que él oiga al Representante de España forme ningún juicio; y ahora concluirá diciendo al Señor Lasala que en este estado de la cuestion no es posible presentar aquí documento alguno.

El Señor Lasala lo comprende bien: cuando llegue el caso de que sea posible

presentarlos, el Gobierno los presentará; y entre tanto no puede hacer otra cosa repetir lo que ya tiene dicho: que no trata de atentar de ningún modo á la independencia de las naciones Americanas; que no desea hacer conquistas ni aumentar su territorio en aquellos países; pero que sostendrá energicamente lo que exijan el decoro y los intereses de España, así en esta como en otras cuestiones; y por último, que espera despachos del Señor Salazar para poder formar juicio.

El Señor Lasala.—Me felicito de haber provocado esta explicacion. Yo someto la presentacion de esos documentos al juicio del Señor Ministro de Estado, de cualquier Ministro de Estado, porque en estas cuestiones al juicio de cualquier Ministro de Estado debemos deferir.

Aplaudo la declaracion del Señor Ministro. España respeta la independencia de todas las naciones Americanas y hará á su vez respetar su propia dignidad.

Entre tanto conviene que todos suspendamos nuestro juicio sobre los sucesos para que no formemos opiniones aventuradas, y no seria de Españoles formarlas ahora poco favorables á los que han sido y son todavía á estas horas Representantes de España en aquellos países.

(Translation.)

EVENTS IN PERU.—*Señor Lasala.*—I asked the Government a question a few days ago relative to events in Peru. Since then fresh news and even documents published in the papers have arrived. These documents are very serious, and it is necessary for the Government to say whether they are authentic, whether there are more, and whether they can be laid on the Table. If not I hope the Government will state what they officially can regarding these events.

The Minister of State.—Gentlemen, a few days ago, M. Lasala asked me, as he now does, what was then our information relative to the disagreeable events of Peru. The Congress will remember that I then said that Señor Salazar y Mazarredo had gone out on a mission given by a previous Cabinet; that he had instructions from that Cabinet, and that when I spoke I had not received any communication from Señor Salazar. Two days afterwards we received despatches from him; the first received in Madrid. These despatches spoke of serious events, but they were neither clear enough nor complete enough for the Government to take any decisive measures.

Taking into consideration therefore the incomplete state of the despatches and the want of information relative to what was about to take place in Peru, and also the impossibility at this distance of preventing any event taking place, the Government soon came to the resolution of waiting for fresh despatches from Señor Salazar. However, as everything which concerns the provinces beyond Sea, which formerly made part of Spain, is a delicate matter; as the Government are anxious that their policy should be well understood; as they entertain no views which cannot be declared before the whole world, the Minister who has the honour to address the Congress hastened at once, on the receipt of those despatches, to address our Representatives in Paris, London, and Washington, in order that no doubts might be entertained relative to the intentions of Spain.

I hold in my hand the Minute of this despatch, and I will read it to the Congress. It is a despatch addressed to our Ambassador in Paris, and to our Ministers in London and Washington:—

“*First Department of State, Aranjuez, May 24, 1864.*

“When we, who have to-day the honour of advising Her Majesty, took charge of the Cabinet, your Excellency is aware that Don Eusebio Salazar y Mazarredo had already gone to Peru to address reclamations relative to the unfortunate events of Talambo. One of my first acts was to become acquainted with this matter, and the consequence was that I wrote confidentially to M. Salazar, recommending him to act with the greatest prudence. It did not enter into the views of Her Majesty’s Government to raise up or accept questions in those countries or in any other, nor to refuse to accept any national satisfaction which might be offered in cases where it was necessary to exact it for the honour and interests of the nation.

“The last mail from America has brought despatches from Señor Salazar which show the disagreeable turn the affair has taken; but they do not say clearly what Señor Salazar intends to do. In the obligation to wait for others which may clear up matters, I have nevertheless thought it better to write you this despatch, impressing upon you, in order that it may serve as a rule for your conduct and in your conversations with the Government to which you are accredited, that the Spanish Government does not refuse to acknowledge the independence of any State in America, nor has any territorial pretensions in that part of the world. The differences which they may have with the Republics of

the New Continent will not cause them to abandon the prudent and moderate line of conduct which they have followed and are still following; on the contrary, they will also consider those differences as a misfortune and will endeavour to terminate them as soon as possible, without exacting more than their honour and well-considered interests manifestly require."

Congress see that the Government is frank and explicit. Government has declared, and now repeats, that it neither denies the independence of any American nation, even of those with whom we have made no Treaty of Recognition, nor has it views on any territory in America. Government has declared, and now repeats, that the differences which may arise between it and the American Powers, as unfortunately differences do arise between every Power in the world, shall be settled as such differences are settled by civilized nations, and that it will not require anything more than what decency and its interests clearly suggest.

Having made this declaration, which is not a declaration of yesterday, but bears as date the 24th May, Government will add that since that they have received no despatch from Señor Salazar; that they know, as the Honourable Members know, what the papers are saying; that they hold in their hands Peruvian newspapers; that they deplore these unfortunate events; that they are waiting for despatches from Señor Salazar; that no one can ask them for them; that it is unreasonable to require them to form a judgment without hearing the Spanish Representative; and now he would end by telling Señor Lasala that, in the present state of the question it was impossible to produce in that place any documents. Señor Lasala well understands this: when the time comes that it shall be possible to produce them, the Government will produce them; and, in the meantime, they can do no more than repeat what has been already said—that there is no question of attacking in any way the independence of the American nations; that the Government do not desire to make conquests or increase their territory in those countries; but that they will energetically maintain the honour and interests of Spain in this as in all other questions; and, lastly, that they are waiting for despatches from Señor Salazar, in order to form an opinion.

Señor Lasala.—I congratulate myself on having brought about this explanation. I submit the presentation of these documents to the opinion of the Minister of State—to that of any Minister of State, because in these questions we must defer to the opinion of any Minister of State.

In the meantime it is necessary that we should all suspend our judgment on these events, and that we should not form hazardous opinions, and it would not be Spanish in us now to form an unfavourable opinion of those who have been, and are still, the representatives of Spain in these countries.

I applaud the declaration of the Minister. Spain respects the independence of all the nations of America, and will, in her turn, cause her dignity to be respected.

No. 8.

Mr. Jerningham to Earl Russell.—(Received June 13.)

My Lord,

Lima, May 13, 1864.

DURING the very strange crisis in which Peru has been placed by the occupation of the Chincha Islands by the Spanish squadron, and in face of the great and increasing excitement and warlike preparations of the Peruvians to resent the insult which they conceive has been inflicted on their sovereignty by the act abovementioned, the Diplomatic Body, with their head, the American Minister, Mr. Robinson, have held several meetings to discuss this event, which must be replete with grave consequences, if war ensues, to the various interests of foreigners in Peru, and those trading with this Republic.

In one of these réunions it was suggested that, if at a later period the mediation of the Diplomatic Body was ever sought for by, or was offered to, the Peruvian Government, it would be highly desirable to sound beforehand the ground on which a basis for negotiation could be placed with some chance of leading to success, and therefore it was determined by the members present that the Dean, Mr. Robinson, might be requested to select two members for holding a confidential and private interview with the Peruvian Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Ribeyro, in order to learn the disposition of his Excellency with reference to the possibility of an arrangement in the case that the good offices or mediation of the Diplomatic Corps were officially offered.

M. Hurtado, the Chilean Chargé d'Affaires, and myself were selected by Mr. Robinson to undertake this private and confidential mission, and we were subsequently received by his Excellency, M. Ribeyro, in his own house at half-past 8 in the evening.

M. Ribeyro was then informed of the object of our coming to see him thus confidentially, and, after a graceful reception, conversed freely with us on the event which has caused such excitement in Peru.

It transpired from this conversation that the Peruvian Minister considered that giving up the Chinchas, restoring the Peruvian colours and saluting them by the Spanish squadron, and returning the small vessel of war the "Iquique," were absolutely necessary before any negotiation could be inaugurated for coming to an arrangement. That, in case this was done, a Peruvian Envoy might be sent to Madrid, and also another from Spain hither, to commence negotiations, but I think he objected to M. Mazarredo.

During this conversation it was suggested that a Treaty might be entered into; the recognition of the independence of Peru and the debt forming the first Articles.

With regard to the debt, disputes about this as well as other claims might be submitted to a Mixed Commission of Spaniards and Peruvians, and an Arbitrator for final decision be named; but, in the interchange of observations, M. Ribeyro remarked that with the Talambo case, as it was still in the hands of the judicial authorities, the Government could not interfere until a final sentence had been awarded, and if that was manifestly unjust, then there would be no objection to submit it to the arbitration of a friendly Power.

The Chilean Chargé d'Affaires and myself, the next day, attended a meeting of the Diplomatic Corps, at which the result of our private and confidential interview was made known.

Once in possession of the ideas of the Peruvian Minister on the subject of the basis that might lead to reconciliation, it was then determined to sound Admiral Pinzon; and the Chief of the Diplomatic Corps designated the Chilean Chargé d'Affaires, the French Chargé d'Affaires, and myself, to repair to the Spanish squadron at the Chincha Islands for that purpose.

So, last Thursday, I went down to Callao and endeavoured, first of all, to obtain a steamer from the Pacific Company to take us to the Islands, but unfortunately the Director had none ready. I then had recourse to Commodore Harvey, and explained to him the nature of our mission and the good that might possibly result from it, when he kindly consented to send us down to the Chinchas that night in Her Britannic Majesty's corvette "Shearwater."

As this was a private and confidential visit on the part of the Diplomatic Body for sounding Admiral Pinzon, as we had privately done M. Ribeyro, we did not inform the Peruvian Government of our departure or the public, and we were out at sea before the public learnt our movements.

At half-past 7 P.M. of the 6th instant, we reached the Chinchas, and anchored near the Spanish frigates. An officer of Admiral Pinzon came immediately on board to know the purport of the arrival, which Captain Douglas forthwith explained, and presently another officer came off on the part of the Admiral, sending his compliments and informing us that he was ready, that evening, to receive us, but that if we preferred visiting him at half-past 9 the next morning, he should be very happy to see us.

The next morning we went on board the "Resolution," and Admiral Pinzon received us with the greatest possible affability, attention, and distinction.

He was at first greatly under the impression that we had come to him on the part of the Peruvian Government, but when he was positively convinced that such was not the case, he was frank and open.

During the subsequent interview, he was spoken to and sounded as to the possibility of entering upon the way of reconciliation, which several private conversations and the endeavours, on the part of M. Mazarredo, tending to dispose the Admiral to listen calmly to suggestions, contributed to effect, and it ended by Admiral Pinzon calling a Council of his chief officers in which the position of affairs was warmly debated.

Admiral Pinzon, who is perhaps liable, like all Southern races, to fits of excitement, appears a very warm and generous hearted person, and after this Council, he came to inform us that it had been resolved to return the Peruvian war sloop "Iquique," with guns, colours, and appurtenances, and she was, therefore, made over to the Diplomatic Body for presentation to the Peruvian Government.

Saluting the Peruvian flag was not approved of in the Council, and therefore the vessel was returned without that ceremony.

Admiral Pinzon disclaimed any idea of interfering with the internal government of

this country, and any question of money he seemed to scout with the greatest contempt.

He considered that he had not been treated with proper respect by the Peruvian Government, and that he had been kept waiting a long time without Spanish difficulties having been solved, and that when an Agent from Spain had been sent that he had not been received. He said then it was necessary for him to use coercion; that if he had bombarded any of the ports, &c., he would have destroyed much native and foreign property, and, therefore, to avoid this, and the effusion of blood, he had taken the Chincha Islands, at first conceiving that they might have been fortified; that he did not interfere with the work going on there, or the loading of guano by ships duly chartered and authorized for fulfilling contracts.

This he had declared in his manifestation, meaning contracts previous to the 14th of April, made between foreigners and the Peruvian Government, and authorized by Congress.

I observed to him that occupying the Chinchas by his squadron had had great effect upon British trade and capital. To which he replied, "Let ships come for the guano—English, French, American, Peruvian," meaning those legitimately chartered.

But I then remarked that it was British commerce in Peru that the fact of his occupation of the Chinchas affected. To this he made a sign, as if he could not help it.

I likewise told him that there appeared to be a great scarcity of fresh provisions on the Islands, and requested to know whether, in case captains of British guano vessels sent their boats to the Peruvian mainland to get what they wanted with the permission of the Peruvians to bring provisions away, he would interfere with these boats, when he assured me that he would not.

From conversation with him, I collected that he intended remaining in his present position until he received instructions from his Government, and that he did not doubt that then he should give the Islands up, or back, I think he said, or something to that effect.

This was a fact which I was glad to learn, as the word "revindication" in his primary declaration had been construed by the Peruvians into "conquest," "retaking possession" of something that belonged to Spain.

The Admiral generally gave out that he occupied the Islands in the shape of reprisals or "prendas," and more than once assured the Chilean Chargé d'Affaires to that effect.

I remarked during the time that we were with him that he did not evince enmity to Peru, but spoke of the Government as being a bad one, and praised Chile immensely, as well as the President of the Argentine Republic.

When we took our leave he was very civil, and no doubt appreciated our private mission as a benevolent act in the interests of peace.

He had intended to give us a salute, but as we disembarked after dark this could not be done.

As Admiral Pinzon had made over the Peruvian sloop-of-war to the Diplomatic Body, of course to be presented to the Peruvian Government, a question arose how to take her up to Callao, or what to do with her. I therefore requested Captain Douglas to allow some of his men to navigate her up, which they did; and being out of order, and having lost her bowsprit at the Islands, the "Shearwater" the next day took her in tow, and she is now in Callao Bay.

Of course she came in without any flag, as her own could not be hoisted as long as British sailors of a war vessel were on board of her.

When we returned to Lima we gave our account of the result of our private interview with Admiral Pinzon, and the Diplomatic Body are now cognizant of what are his views as well those of M. Ribeyro, which will enable them, in case they have hereafter to mediate, to know on what grounds they can proceed with some chance of coming to a peaceful issue.

We entertained some hope that we could have induced Admiral Pinzon to have moved from the Islands, or to have given them up; but when he gave up the "Iquique," and said that he awaited instructions from home respecting the position he had assumed, and this after the Council had given their opinion, it was thought better not to touch upon this topic, especially as our visit was not an official one, but a private mission for sounding our ground.

The public in Lima pretend to look upon this as a mysterious business; but surely the Diplomatic Agents of foreign Powers, whose efforts ought always to be to endeavour

to reconcile differences, and prevent wars, if possible, have a right to ascertain the real state of affairs, and sound the grounds on which peace and harmony may be possibly re-established, without consulting anybody excepting their own respective Governments.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WM. STAFFORD JERNINGHAM.

No. 9.

Mr. Jerningham to Earl Russell.—(Received June 13.)

My Lord,

Lima, May 13, 1864.

M. MAZARREDO has resigned his office, and intends proceeding to Europe by this mail.

In the "Comercio" of the 11th instant there has appeared a new declaration, copy of which I beg to inclose, signed by Admiral Pinzon, in which he states that he has occupied the Chincha Islands as a reprisal; that he does not intend to meddle with the forms of government in Peru; and that he intends to keep on the defensive, unless obliged by an attack to do otherwise.

There is also a letter addressed by M. Mazarredo, stating that he has sacrificed himself in order not to be an obstacle in the way of arriving at an impartial solution of all the difficulties that may present themselves between the Governments of Peru and Spain.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WM. STAFFORD JERNINGHAM.

Inclosure in No. 9.

Extract from the "Comercio" of May 11, 1864.

LOS acontecimientos ocurridos en las Ilas de Chincha el 14 de Abril han si esplicados convenientemente en los documentos que el público conoce.

Los Representantes de la Reina han confiado siempre en que la moderacion de pueblo Peruano, reconocida en el Memorandum del 12 de aquel mes, y la calma natural de los espíritus, colocará por último la cuestion en su verdadero terreno.

Hoy que el cuerpo diplomático residente en Lima se ha dignado enviar á las Ilas de Chincha una comision de su seno, compuesta de los Señores Ministros de la Gran Bretaña, Francia y Chile, para conferenciar á cerca de la situacion actual, los Infrascritos declaran de nuevo espontáneamente, que la España no pretende mezclarse en la forma de Gobierno de la República Peruana, y que la ocupacion de las Islas en calidad de represalias hasta que el Gobierno de Su Magestad determine, fué preferible por circunstancias especiales á otros actos de hostilidad que causando efusion de sangre, dificultarán el arreglo de los asuntos pendientes.

Los Representantes de la Reina no han puesto el menor impedimento á que los comerciantes de la República y los dependientes Peruanos atiendan á sus transacciones y desempeñen sus deberes, como si se tratase de intereses pertenecientes á las naciones amigas; y han prohibido terminantemente desde el prima dia, que carguen huano los buques que no traigan el visto bueno de las autoridades del Callao, las cuales legalizen tambien un arreglo á las instrucciones vigentes todos los documentos de los capitanes antes de salir para el punto de su destino.

Queriendo dar una prueba de sus buenos deseos, los Infrascritos ruegan á los Señores Ministros de Inglaterra, Francia y Chile, se sirvan hacer llegar ademas á conocimiento de sus colegas, que era restituida la barca "Iquique;"

Que la escuadra Española se mantendrá á la defensiva mientras no se le obligue á lo contrario; y que se le concederá 48 horas de término á las autoridades respectivas, si se viese en la necesidad de hostilizar algun puerto de la República;

Que el Gobierno de Su Magestad, segun lo manifestado verbalmente el 16 de Abril á los jefes de las estaciones navales extranjeras, no reclamará el pago de ningun crédito de particulares que no reuna las tres condiciones siguientes: origen Español, continuidad y actualidad del derecho en súbditos Españoles;

Que los créditos ó reclamaciones de particulares, que por cualquier concepto ofrezcan dudas, serán sometidas á una Comision Mixta;

Y por último, que los rumores de que la España desea establecer en el Perú ó en alguna otra de las Repúblicas de América no reconocida, dinastías Europeas, carecen de todo género de fundamento.

Fondeadero de las Islas de Chíncha, á bordo de la fragata

"*Resolucion*," de 7 de Mayo de 1864.

(Firmado)

LUIS H. PINZON.

EUSEBIO DE SALAZAR Y MAZARREDO.

El Señor Salazar y Mazarredo, Comisario de Su Magestad Católica en el Perú y su Ministro en Bolivia, desea llegue á conocimiento del público, que ha hecho el sacrificio de su amor propio ante la importancia de las cuestiones que se debaten entre España y el Perú, dimitiendo por el último correo los destinos que debió á la confianza de la Reyna, porque es de parecer que cuando ocurren conflictos graves, los hombres que se respetan deben en el siglo decimonono colocar á sus Gobiernos en posicion de vencer desembarazadamente con un alto espíritu de imparcialidad, todas las dificultades que se presenten, olvidando siempre á las personas y fijándose solo en los principios.

(Translation.)

THE events which took place in the Chíncha Islands on the 14th April have been properly explained in the documents which are before the Republic.

The Representatives of the Queen have always trusted that the moderation of the Peruvian people, acknowledged in the Memorandum of the 12th of that month, together with the natural calmness of their minds, will ultimately put the question on its true footing.

To-day that the Diplomatic Corps residing in Lima have been pleased to depute to the Chíncha Islands a Committee of its body, composed of the Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Chili, to confer upon the present situation, the Undersigned declare again of their own accord, that Spain has no pretensions to interfere with the form of the Peruvian Government, and that the occupation of the Islands by way of reprisals, until Her Majesty's Government should decide, was, for especial reasons, preferable to other acts of hostility, which, by causing bloodshed, would render the settlement of the pending questions difficult.

The Representatives of the Queen have not in the smallest degree prevented the traders of the Republic and of the Peruvian Dependencies from attending to their transactions, and discharging their duties, as if the question were one of interest appertaining to friendly nations; and from the first day they have decidedly forbidden the loading of any guano on boats which have not the *visa* of the Callao authorities, who also, in accordance with the existing instructions, legalize all the documents of the captains previously to their departure for the places they are bound to.

Being desirous to furnish a proof of their good wishes, the Undersigned request the Ministers of England, France, and Chili, to be pleased likewise to make known to their colleagues—

That the "Iquique" has been restored;

That the Spanish squadron will keep on the defensive if it be not compelled to do otherwise, and that a term of forty-eight hours will be given to the respective authorities, if there shall be any necessity to bring hostilities against any part of the Republic;

That Her Majesty's Government, as it was verbally stated on the 16th of April to the Chiefs of the foreign naval stations, will not claim the payment of any debt of private persons which does not possess the following conditions, namely, Spanish origin and continuity and present existence of rights in Spanish subjects;

That the debts or claims of private persons which in any way admit of doubts shall be laid before a Mixed Commission;

And, lastly, that the reports which represent Spain to be desirous of establishing European dynasties in Peru, or in any other of the non-recognized Republics in America, are destitute of any sort of foundation.

Anchorage of the Chíncha Islands, on board the frigate "Resolucion,"

May 7, 1864.

(Signed)

LUIS H. PINZON.

EUSEBIO DE SALAZAR Y MAZARREDO.

Señor Salazar y Mazarredo, Commissioner of Her Catholic Majesty in Peru and her Minister in Bolivia, wishes it to be publicly known that he has made the sacrifice of his *amour propre* to the importance of the questions in debate between Spain and Peru, having resigned by the last post the appointments which he owed to the confidence of the

Queen, because he is of opinion that when serious conflicts take place men who respect themselves ought, in the nineteenth century, to place their Governments in a position to conquer without embarrassment, and with a lofty spirit of impartiality, all the difficulties which may offer themselves, always unmindful of persons and dwelling only on principles.

No. 10.

Mr. Jerningham to Earl Russell.—(Received June 13.)

My Lord,

Lima, May 13, 1864.

UPON our return to Lima from the Chincha Islands, the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Mr. Robinson, with two of its members, waited on his Excellency Señor Ribeyro, at his private residence, to inform him that the Peruvian war-sloop "Iquique" had been made over by Admiral Pinzon to the Diplomatic Body, and had been brought to Callao, and that they consequently presented to the Peruvian Government the vessel that had been restored.

In this interview Admiral Ribeyro seems to have been rather short, and refused on the spot to receive the "Iquique."

She is at present in Callao, but I believe that it is determined by the Diplomatic Body to return her now to Admiral Pinzon, which step will require a great deal of tact, as he may conceive the non-acceptance as an offence offered to himself, and perhaps to the Diplomatic Body, and might, therefore, consider himself released from his declaration of remaining at present on the defensive.

It is a great pity that when Admiral Pinzon has, by the act of restoring the "Iquique," although without saluting the Peruvian flag, made a sort of step towards an arrangement, that this Government has not received the vessel under protest, and thus not permitted a fresh difficulty to be added to the many others in the road to reconciliation.

The pressure from without has been the reason, and they fear a Revolution if they do anything which they apprehend may possibly be disapproved of by the public mind, which at present is in a most excited state.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WM. STAFFORD JERNINGHAM.

No. 11.

Sir J. Crampton to Earl Russell.—(Received June 13.)

My Lord,

Madrid, June 9, 1864.

A REPORT being in circulation that the Spanish Government had come to the decision of recalling Señor Salazar and Admiral Pinzon, and of restoring the Chincha Islands to the Peruvian Government, I inquired to-day of Señor Bañuelos, who, during Señor Pacheco's absence at Aranjuez, transacts business at the Foreign Department, whether such was the case.

Señor Bañuelos replied that the report was without foundation; that the Spanish Government had not yet received official Reports from the Pacific, and had come to no decision in regard to the matter, except in so far as the principles laid down in the despatch of the 24th ultimo,* addressed to the Spanish Representatives in London, Paris, and Washington, with which your Lordship is already acquainted, and to which the Spanish Government adhere, may be taken to constitute a decision.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN F. CRAMPTON.

No. 12.

Sir J. Crampton to Earl Russell.—(Received June 13.)

My Lord,

Madrid, June 9, 1864.

PUBLIC opinion here is very much divided in regard to the conduct of the Spanish Commissioner and Admiral in Peru, and the decision of the Government is looked for with anxiety.

* Señor Comyn read a despatch to Lord Russell saying the Spanish Government had no intention of restoring their dominion, or attempting any conquests in their former American possessions.

A petition was yesterday presented to Her Catholic Majesty at Aranjuez, on the part of a number of Spanish subjects resident in Peru.

I have the honour to inclose a précis, in English, of this document, from which your Lordship will perceive that, in the opinion of those who signed it, the general treatment of Spaniards by the Peruvian Government was by no means such as justified the statements made by Señor Salazar in his Memorandum, or the forcible seizure of the Chincha Islands, and other acts of violence by which he has placed Spain in a state of war with Peru.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JOHN F. CRAMPTON.

Inclosure in No. 12.

Précis of the Petition of the Spaniards of Peru.

THE petitioners suppose that the events which have lately occurred in Peru have been made known to Her Catholic Majesty's Government, and state, in order that Her Catholic Majesty may know the truth as regards the American nations and especially Peru, that the peaceable Spaniards who lived there by commerce and industry had nothing to complain of either from the Government or inhabitants, and that their properties were respected; that they themselves had lived there for many years, and acquired riches without suffering from the restrictions imposed on Spaniards by other foreigners; that if others had been less fortunate it was not on account of the restrictions of the Government or the inequality of the laws; that the character of the people is noble and generous, and only differs from that of the Spaniards by the social conditions owing to the infancy of the nation; that the conduct of the authorities and people during the late events is a proof of this, as in spite of the patriotic excitement the lives and properties of the Spaniards had been held sacred; that they have stated these facts truly; that they are sincerely patriotic, although they seek for a pacific solution of the difficulties; that their country, by prudence, generosity, and wise measures has obtained an advanced position in Peru; that a wise and magnanimous policy would put an end to the conflict; that they are impelled by no base motive, neither fear nor flattery; that hospitality has its rights, as also justice and the true enjoyment of rights; that their only wish is to fulfil these three sacred laws; that they request Her Catholic Majesty to accept their homage and sincere wishes for the happiness of Her Majesty and the Royal Family, and for the prosperity of the country.

Lima, April 20, 1864.

(Here follow 59 signatures.)

No. 13.

Sir J. Crampton to Earl Russell,--(Received June 21.)

My Lord,

Madrid, June 17, 1864.

I HAVE the honour to inclose an extract from the "Epoca," a Ministerial newspaper, containing notices from Peru, with commentaries thereupon by the Editor.

Among the documents published is one from which your Lordship will perceive that the Spanish Commissioner, Señor Salazar y Mazarredo, announced before leaving Peru that he had tendered his resignation to the Queen his Mistress.

The public impression here, in which the Government probably participates, is one of disapproval, felt if not expressed, of the rash and ill-judged proceedings of Señor Salazar, and at the same time of mortification at the indignities heaped upon Her Catholic Majesty's Representatives in other parts of Spanish America as well as in Peru.

This is a circumstance which somewhat disconcerts the theory of certain parties here who contend that it would be easy for Spain to acquire a natural preponderance in that part of the world, in opposition to that of the United States. The pretty general animadversion by the Representatives of European Powers in Peru of the acts of the Spanish agents has tended to increase the irritation.

The idea that the Spanish name has been held cheap in America is likely, I fear, to produce a pressure on the Government, under the mistaken notion that it is more consistent with national dignity to persist in violent measures than to retrace a false step.

A précis in English of the article which I have inclosed, shall be forwarded to your Lordship as soon as prepared.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JOHN F. CRAMPTON.

Inclosure in No. 13.

Extract from the "Epoca" of June 16, 1864.

[For Précis, see Inclosure in No. 16.]

No. 14.

Sir J. Crampton to Earl Russell.—(Received June 23.)

My Lord,

Madrid, June 19, 1864.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy of an additional document regarding the difficulty between the Spanish and Peruvian Governments, which has been published in the Ministerial newspaper, the "Epoca," being the rejoinder of Admiral Pinzon to the protest of the Peruvian Government against the seizure of the Chincha Islands.

Your Lordship will observe that Admiral Pinzon admits that neither he nor Señor Salazar were instructed to take that measure under any contingency, the direction of the Spanish Government being of a general nature, viz., that the Spanish Admiral might put himself in a hostile position ("hostilizar") to the ports of Peru in case the Commissioner should fail to obtain redress from the Peruvian Government.

The forcible resumption of the Chincha Islands as a former possession of Spain was consequently a measure originated by Señors Salazar and Pinzon on their own responsibility.

Your Lordship will perceive that the recent example of the two great German Powers as regards material guarantees has not been lost upon the Spanish Admiral, and that he also thinks that the occupation of Rome by the French forces is a case in point, justifying him, according to the doctrine of Vattel, in the course which he adopted."

A translation of the inclosed document will be transmitted to your Lordship as soon as it can be prepared.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JOHN F. CRAMPTON.

Inclosure in No. 14.

Extract from the "Epoca" of June 17, 1864.

[For Translation, see Inclosure in No. 17.]

No. 15.

Sir J. Crampton to Earl Russell.—(Received June 27.)

My Lord,

Madrid, June 22, 1864.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a report of what yesterday took place in the Senate respecting the difficulty between Spain and Peru.

Señor Pacheco, in reply to a question on this subject by the Marquis of Molins, explained briefly the circumstances which led to the late occurrences in Peru, and the principles to which the Spanish Government intended to adhere in bringing the questions which have arisen to a satisfactory termination.

Your Lordship will observe that Señor Pacheco altogether repudiates the notion of the revival by Spain of a claim to any part of the dominions of Peru, and states that the Spanish Government has neither the pretension nor the wish to recover a single inch of her former territory in America.

The acts of the Spanish Commissioner and of the Admiral are, his Excellency states, in this respect "entirely disapproved" by Her Catholic Majesty's Government.

Señor Pacheco, however, adds that the Chincha Islands will be occupied, not as a possession of Spain, but as a measure of coercion upon Peru, until full satisfaction shall be obtained, not only for the grievances, the redress of which was the object of Señor Salazar's mission, but for the insults and outrages to which that Commissioner was subjected on leaving Peru for Spain.

These, his Excellency is of opinion, constitute an additional and a very grave complication to the questions before pending between the Spanish and Peruvian Governments.

The Spanish squadron in the Pacific will be reinforced for this purpose.

Additional documents will shortly be laid before the Cortes in regard to this matter.

I have preferred forwarding the Report, herewith inclosed, at once to your Lordship in original; a translation will be sent so soon as it can be prepared.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN F. CRAMPTON.

No. 16.

Sir J. Crampton to Earl Russell.—(Received June 27.)

My Lord,

Madrid, June 22, 1864.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a précis in English of an article from the "Epoca" of the 16th instant, containing notices from Peru, which I had the honour of transmitting to your Lordship in my despatch of the 17th instant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN F. CRAMPTON.

Inclosure in No. 16.

Précis of an Article in the "Epoca" of June 16, 1864.

FROM the accounts just received from Peru we find our fears justified. The Ultra party in Peru, which hates Spain, has taken the occasion of the ill-timed seizure of the Chincha Islands to oblige the Government to refuse an honourable settlement with Spain.

But we must not sacrifice truth to sentiment, however honourable.

The case would have been very similar if France, on the refusal of Spain to accept the Count Salvandi as Ambassador, had taken the Balearic Islands. National feelings would have overpowered the prudence of Government. The facts are these:—

The Chincha Islands were taken on the 14th April, and on the 5th May the English, French, and Chilian Ministers went to the Guano Islands to try and settle the matter. There Admiral Pinzon and Señor Salazar made them this declaration:—

"That Spain does not wish to mix in Peruvian politics, and that her Representatives took possession of these Islands as reprisals, preferring that form to other and bloodier ones;

"The Representatives of the Queen wished in no way to interfere with the commercial arrangements connected with the islands, and from the first had refused to allow vessels to load without the visa of the authorities at Callao;

"They also wished to state that the barque 'Iquique' should be restored;

"That the Spanish fleet would continue on the defensive unless forced into action, and that in such case forty-eight hours' notice would be given to such ports as they might propose to attack.

"That Her Majesty's Government would not insist on any payment to persons who were not at once Spaniards by birth, continuity, and actual right.

"That doubtful cases should be settled by a Mixed Commission;

And lastly, "That the reports that Spain wished to establish European Dynasties in America were quite unfounded.

"May 7, 1864.

(Signed)

"E. DE SALAZAR Y MAZARREDO.
"LUIS H. PINZON."

This declaration, no doubt prompted by the instructions from the new Minister of State, altered the face of the question. There was now no longer question of re-asserting Spanish sovereignty in Chincha; the Peruvian barque was to be restored, and the claims of the Spanish Crown in America repudiated. Besides this a rather curious declaration was made by Señor Salazar, as follows:—

“Señor Salazar, Commissioner of Her Catholic Majesty, &c., informs the public that he has sacrificed his private feelings to the important questions which have arisen between Spain and Peru, and has resigned the charge given him by the Queen: for when serious difficulties arise, men of the nineteenth century, who respect themselves, should leave their Governments to act with free hands, and consider impartially every difficulty which presents itself, overlooking persons and sticking to principles.”

Though we admit the patriotic motives of this declaration, we doubt their being more meditated than the “revindicacion” of the Chinchas.

The Representatives returned to Lima with the “Iquique,” and offered their mediation. Ribeyro, doubtless intimidated by the adherents of General Castilla who wished to place the latter at the head of the Department of War and Marine, answered that he could not treat till the Spanish fleet had left Chincha.

We may mention as a proof that Señor Ribeyro was unwilling to break with Spain that the Spanish subjects in Lima were left unharmed, and that Señor Ribeyro issued a proclamation at Callao, directing the authorities of that port to make no distinction in their treatment of Spanish vessels and those of other nations, especially alluding to the “Rosa y Carmen,” a Spanish vessel then in the port of Callao.

On the 11th, two days after he had notified the resignation of his Commission, Señor Salazar arrived off Callao, and without landing went on board, first the French frigate “Leander,” then the English steamer “Talma” commanded by an English officer. Neither letter nor newspaper speaks of the dangers run by Señor Salazar, either on board this ship or afterwards on the Isthmus of Panama.

According to our correspondents, Admiral Pinzon, hearing that the Peruvian Government were in Treaty for the purchase of two “monitors,” sent to Montevideo for reinforcements, which will give the Spanish fleet in the Pacific great superiority over that of Peru.

The next thing worthy of notice is Señor Sarmiento, the Argentine Minister’s protest dated the 1st of May, 1864. In this he asserts a community of origin in the States of South America, declares that the Spanish attack on Chincha menaces all these States alike, and concludes with a solemn protest against the encroachments of Spain, which he unites with the protests of the other foreign Representatives at Lima.

According to the Peruvian and Chilian newspapers, the excitement in those countries is very great, and much is talked about increasing the army and forming an offensive and defensive alliance between Peru and Chili, but fortunately the latter Government knows the true motives of Spain, and in order to prevent the ultra party from rash action, the President has closed the Chambers which had been called together in Extraordinary Session.

Such are the facts brought by the American mail. We spoke yesterday our patriotic feelings in answer to certain foolish attacks made on us. We shall be always found defending Spain and Spanish honour. But when people say, as some do, that the peoples of America, our blood relations, are unworthy to be treated as civilized States according to the rules of international law, but as assassins who should be conquered by Spain, we proudly answer that such at least are not our principles, and that none more fatal to the interests of Spain can be held.

No. 17.

Sir J. Crampton to Earl Russell.—(Received June 27.)

My Lord,

Madrid, June 22, 1864.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a translation of an article from the “Epoca” of the 17th instant, containing the answer of Admiral Pinzon to the Peruvian protest which I had the honour of transmitting to your Lordship in my despatch of the 19th instant.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

JOHN F. CRAMPTON.

Inclosure in No. 17.

Extract from the "Epoca" of June 17, 1864.

(Translation.)

TO-DAY we are going to complete the review of the deeds and documents received by the last mail, in order that our readers may form a judgment, that the exactness of some reports upon the importance of the questions may not be contradicted.

General Pinzon, in the following communication, replies to the protest of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, which we already know :—

[See Inclosure 15 in No. 3.]

Papers relating to the Seizure of the
Chincha Islands by a Spanish
Squadron.

*Presented to the House of Commons, by Command
of Her Majesty, in pursuance of their Address
of June 9, 1864.*

FURTHER PAPERS

RESPECTING THE

SEIZURE OF THE CHINCHA ISLANDS

BY A

SPANISH SQUADRON.

Presented to the House of Lords by Command of Her Majesty.
1864.

LONDON:
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Further Papers respecting the Seizure of the Chincha Islands by a Spanish Squadron.

No. 1.

Mr. Jerningham to Earl Russell.—(Received June 13.)

My Lord,

Lima, May 13, 1864.

WHEN I was at the Chinchas, I went on the island where they were loading guano, where I met Mr. Dartnell, who happened to be there looking after his affairs.

He told me he had written me a letter, which I received on my return to Lima.

In conversation with Mr. Dartnell, and as your Lordship will perceive by the extract inclosed, I was informed that there was a great scarcity of fresh provisions on the islands, and it was suggested that the captains of guano vessels should be allowed by the Peruvians to take from the mainland the provisions which they needed.

As Admiral Pinzon assured us that he would not interfere with them, I have addressed a note to the Peruvian Government, copy of which is annexed, suggesting this remedy, and requesting that orders may be issued to allow captains of English vessels (the French and North American Agents intend making a similar request), to procure from the mainland those fresh provisions that they require for their sailors and workmen on the score of humanity, and even in the interests of the Peruvians themselves, for the loading of guano is not to be interfered with by the Spaniards, undertaken by any vessels which are legitimately chartered to that effect.

I have just received an acknowledgement of my note from M. Ribeyro, copy of which I beg to transmit to your Lordship.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WM. STAFFORD JERNINGHAM.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Vice-Consul Dartnell to Mr. Jerningham.

(Extract.)

Chincha Islands, May 5, 1864.

IT is now some time since any provisions have come over here from the mainland, and we are, or will be in a few days, absolutely without the prime necessities of life, for even salt food will be used up in a short time and none can be got from the shipping, as they are but scantily supplied, not having more than enough for their own use.

The captains of ships in general, and among them many of the English, are completely out of provisions and water, and their crews, having to work excessively hard, because now there are no workmen from on shore to assist them, complain of the want of fresh provisions, and it is no easy matter to keep them content.

A great many captains want to send to Pisco and bring their own stock, but they fear being stopped there and not allowed to return to their vessels. Could they by any means procure permission to go over, they would guarantee not to bring more than supplies for their own ships, and thereby perhaps save to the Peruvian Government any claims or disputes, because as soon as provisions fail entirely they must leave, although not fully laden.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

*Mr. Jerningham to Señor Ribeyro.**Lima, May 10, 1864.*

THE Undersigned, &c., has the honour to inclose an extract of a letter received from Her Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul, Mr. John Dartnell, who happens to be in the Chincha Islands at present, by which his Excellency the Peruvian Minister for Foreign Affairs will perceive that in a few days there will be a great dearth of provisions.

The prohibition to import fresh provisions from Pisco has already been felt most severely, not only by the workmen on the Islands, but by the captains and crews of British and other vessels which are loading guano on account of the various contracts with the Peruvian Government, and it appears very hard, notwithstanding the position of the Spanish squadron off those Islands, that these British subjects and others, who are carrying out their legitimate obligations with the Peruvian Government, should be sufferers from want and perhaps starvation, and that when provisions could so easily be procured for their necessities without any fear of their being taken by the Spanish ships, which it would appear have no need of intercepting food destined for the crews of guano vessels and workmen.

The Undersigned, deeply impressed with the duty of bringing this matter before the Peruvian Government, both on the score of humanity and for preserving the lives and health of British seamen and workmen and residents on and in vessels of those Islands, solemnly begs to draw the attention of his Excellency to this matter, being at the same time deeply convinced that it is for the interest of the Peruvian nation itself that the loading of guano should continue without abatement, which it cannot if the workmen and crews of British and other vessels have not sufficient nourishment.

Without fresh provisions such as meat and vegetables, sailors and others get the scurvy, which is a most debilitating complaint, and prevents these men from performing with vigour their hard tasks of manual labour.

He therefore proposes that the Peruvian Government should issue orders at Pisco, that when the captains of British vessels loading guano at the Chinchas send their boats to Pisco for water, fresh meat, and provisions, that they be allowed to embark them, as he is thoroughly convinced that the Spanish squadron will not take these provisions from these boats under the British flag to appropriate them for their own use.

An assurance has even been given to this effect; besides, it would appear the Spanish ships are not in want of provisions, and therefore it would be excessively hard that neutral persons whose business necessitates their presence at the Guano Islands for carrying on the loading of vessels should be exposed to hunger and starvation, when such a thing can be so easily prevented by a reasonable permission to import what they require for their subsistence from the mainland without the risk of its being captured by the Spaniards.

Convinced that his Excellency will speedily give his attention to this very pressing requirement, the Undersigned begs his Excellency to have the kindness and humanity to cause the necessary orders to be given at Pisco for the permission which he has so earnestly requested for the British captains and crews and workmen at the Chincha Islands.

The Undersigned, &c. (Signed) WM. STAFFORD JERNINGHAM.

Inclosure 3 in No. 1.

*Señor Ribeyro to Mr. Jerningham.**Lima, Mayo 12 de 1864.*

LE ha sido honroso al Infrascrito, Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores del Perú, recibir la nota que con fecha 10 del actual se ha servido dirigirle el Honorable Señor Encargado de Negocios y Consul-General de Su Magestad Británica, adjuntando el extracto de una carta que ha recibido del Vice-Consul Británico, Mr. John Dartnell, que se halla casualmente en las Islas de Chincha.

Participa el Infrascrito á su Señoría Honorable que, por pertenecer al despacho de Gobierno la resolucion del asunto á que se refieren el extracto y la nota que tiene la honra de contestar, las ha pasado á su conocimiento, recomendando la pronta y preferente atencion de dicho Ministerio sobre el indicado asunto.

Tan luego que se comuniquen al Infrascrito las medidas adoptadas, le será grato trasmitirlas al Honorable Señor Encargado de Negocios de Su Magestad Británica, de quien tiene, &c.

(Signed) JUAN ANTO. RIBEYRO.

(Translation.)

Lima, May 12, 1864.

THE Undersigned, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Peru, has had the honour to receive the note of the 10th instant, which the Honourable Chargé d'Affaires and Consul-General of Her Britannic Majesty addressed to him, together with the extract from a letter received from Mr. John Dartnel, [the British Vice-Consul, who is incidentally at the Chincha Islands.

The Undersigned has the honour to reply, that as the arrangement of the matter referred to in the extract and in the note to which he has the honour of replying appertains to the Home Department, he has forwarded the same to that Department, recommending its prompt and especial attention to the affair in question.

So soon as the measures adopted shall be communicated to the Undersigned he will have great pleasure in communicating them to the Honourable Chargé d'Affaires of Her Britannic Majesty; and has, &c.

(Signed) JUAN ANTO. RIBEYRO.

No. 2.

Mr. Jerningham to Earl Russell.—(Received June 13.)

My Lord,

Lima, May 13, 1864.

I HAVE just received a note from the Peruvian Minister for Foreign Affairs informing me that the Peruvian Government have granted permission for the captains of vessels loading guano to take provisions for themselves and crews from the mainland.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WM. STAFFORD JERNINGHAM.

No. 3.

Mr. Jerningham to Earl Russell.—(Received June 28.)

My Lord,

Lima, May 25, 1864.

AS the Peruvian Government did not consent to receive back the Peruvian vessel "Iquique," which Admiral Pinzon had given up, and which was presented to M. Ribeyro by a Commission of the Diplomatic Body, the latter decided upon sending her back to the Spanish Admiral.

I therefore, upon this being intimated, wrote to Commodore Harvey to allow some of his crew who had charge of the "Iquique," to return her to Admiral Pinzon, at the same time requesting him to permit the officer who might execute this commission, to deliver a verbal message from the Diplomatic Body to the Spanish Admiral on arriving at the Chincha Islands.

I now beg to have the honour to inclose copy of my letter to Commodore Harvey, as also that of the message which was to be delivered in the way above mentioned; likewise Commodore Harvey's reply, stating that the "Iquique" left Callao for the Chinchas at 11 o'clock on the 18th instant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WM. STAFFORD JERNINGHAM.

Inclosure 1 in No. 3.

Mr. Jerningham to Commodore Harvey.

Sir,

Lima, May 17, 1864.

THE Diplomatic Body have determined upon sending back the "Iquique" to Admiral Pinzon, as the Peruvian Government wish not to receive her back, and have refused;

therefore, if she could be returned to the Spanish Admiral as soon as possible, even this night, they would feel themselves under a great obligation to you for it.

In case you agree to this, would you allow the officer who takes charge of the "Iquique" to deliver her over with the following message, which he might recite by heart. The Diplomatic corps do not wish a copy of it to be given to the Spanish Admiral to avoid any official publication.

The corps and I believe the Peruvian Government now are anxious that the "Iquique" should leave the waters of Callao as soon as possible.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WM. STAFFORD JERNINGHAM.

Inclosure 2 in No. 3.

Message to be delivered to Admiral Pinzon.

THE Diplomatic corps resident in Lima have requested me to present their compliments to you, and inform you that they advised the Government, confidentially and privately, that the ship "Iquique" was in Callao at their disposal, and awaited her acceptance to proceed to send in an official advice; but as she was not accepted, from considerations of dignity, they abstained from taking any further action in the matter, and have now the honour to return her in a manner similar to that by which she was taken to Callao.

The Commission of the Diplomatic corps that had the honour to visit you at these Islands have requested me to present to you their very profound thanks for the delicate and cordial courtesies you were pleased to bestow upon them, and to express their warmest hopes that the conclusion of this transaction will not in the least influence your future proceedings.

Inclosure 3 in No. 3.

Commodore Harvey to Mr. Jerningham.

Sir,

"Leander," at Callao, May 18, 1864.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch marked Confidential, dated Lima, May 17, 1864, with the inclosures, and to inform you that the "Iquique" left for the Chinchas at 11 o'clock this day, immediately after the sea-breeze set in.

I have, &c.

(Signed) THOS. HARVEY.

No. 4.

Señor Pacheco to Señor Comyn.—(Communicated to Earl Russell by Señor Comyn, July 4.)

(Translation.)

Excellency,

Madrid, June 24, 1864.

IN the Royal Order which I had the honour of addressing to your Excellency on the 24th of May, I transmitted to you some ideas which Her Majesty's Government thought it very necessary to set forth with reference to the events which have occurred in Peru. I have now again to speak to you upon this point, and to enter into more detailed explanations, in order that you may more fully understand the situation in which we are, and the resolution which is demanded both by our rights and by our honour.

The sad events of Talambo are without doubt known to your Excellency. A sort of Basque Colony, conveyed to that place on account of Don N. Salcedo, was on a certain day attacked by a multitude of armed men, led by the manager of the latter, by which one person was killed and several wounded of those that composed that Colony. There were circumstances which aggravated the act, giving to it the highest degree of barbarity. Suffice it to say that Salcedo, who was in the place where the crime was committed, either inflamed the ferocity of the assailants, or, at least, did nothing to allay it and to save the unhappy men who met with persecution and death as a reward for their good conduct, their confidence, and their labour.

This does not imply any direct accusation against the Government of Peru further than that it is a poor recommendation for any Government that such outrages should be committed in the countries where it rules. After the act, that Government might have made an investigation into the reality of the crime, and punished its authors, making reparation in this way for what it had not been able, or had not succeeded in preventing and remedying in time. But unfortunately it did not adopt this course with the requisite energy, and public opinion in Peru, as well as in Spain, was persuaded that there existed a painful lenity, and that all hope of justice was vain on the part of the Tribunals, left as they were to themselves.

The Ministers, our predecessors, under the presidency of Don Lorenzo Arrazola, as Secretary of State, actuated by these ideas, thought it expedient to send a Representative of Spain to Peru, with the special mission of making a representation upon this matter. They wished to engage the Government of that Republic to adopt all the means which its laws allowed for doing justice and punishing the persons guilty of such an odious murder. They did not think that the non-existence of any Treaty between the ancient mother country and the Peruvian Power would be, or could be, any obstacle to this, because the rules of reason and of public law which govern all nations cannot but attach to those who from any cause may be in an irregular state, whenever, *de facto*, and without contradiction, they are free, independent, and sovereign. And precisely for those very circumstances an especial Commissioner was indispensable. If Spain had been in regard to Peru in the same condition as she stood in regard to Chili, to Bolivia, to Ecuador, and to Venezuela, she would have had her ordinary Representative to bring forward her representations; by not having one, she was compelled to take that course, when it was right and necessary to bring them forward.

Don Eusebio de Salazar y Mazarredo, Her Majesty's Minister in Bolivia, was nominated to present himself to the Government of Peru, and as there was no wish to raise difficulties, the title of Extraordinary and Special Commissioner was conferred upon him. The desire was to make it understood thereby that a particular mission was entrusted to him; that his powers and his functions were confined to that affair, and that the object was not to extend it beyond that negotiation. An official Representative he was, and could not be otherwise; but as the ordinary relations did not exist, as stated above, and that by the fault of the Peruvian Government which did not ratify the Treaty made years ago by one of its Agents, and withdrew another because he did not obtain something which was notoriously impossible, the Spanish Minister was of opinion that the title which he used was the most suitable, and that the Peruvian Government might look upon it as the best for so transitory a negotiation. Señor Salazar y Mazarredo having reached Lima, and having obtained an audience, after ten days, of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, he delivered to him the credentials of his nomination, and expected to be called to a Conference. But the Peruvian Government did not consider it expedient to receive him. It discussed his denomination, and refused to accept him under the character which Spain had conferred upon him. It offered to treat with him as confidential Agent; but as such Commissioner, as he really was, with the official seal, which he really held, it refused, I repeat, to receive him.

In view of a difficulty truly unexpected, of a refusal not expressly contemplated in his instructions, Señor Salazar published the Memorandum which your Excellency cannot but have seen, addressed it also to the Government of Peru, and withdrew to the squadron in the neighbourhood under the command of Admiral Pinzon. In union with this Chief, and after having conferred with him, they resolved to take possession of the Chincha Islands, not far from those coasts. Your Excellency is aware that they did this with no difficulty, and that they took possession in the name of the Queen our Sovereign, declaring that Spain could lawfully revindicate them. It is hardly necessary for me to tell your Excellency that Señores Salazar and Pinzon, authorized in certain cases to adopt forcible measures, had no instructions to employ the force which they did employ, much less to make such a declaration. The Government had not ordered them to occupy the islands in question, and admitting that they considered they might do it by the necessary amplitude of their instructions, nothing had been said to them which could imply such project of revindication. The Government has never hesitated to recognize Peru as a free and independent people, and has never considered that it preserved any right either over the whole of that State or over the parts of which it is constituted. If by any of those differences which unfortunately take place between nations, Spain should find herself in the necessity of undertaking and maintaining a war with Peru, the constant doctrine of this Ministry, and of any other which may rule over the destinies of our country, has not been and cannot be other than to consider such adversary to be in the same free position as appertains to any other people, American or European. It is possible that the Peruvians

may be our enemies ; we have not considered them for a long time, nor shall we consider them in future, as rebels.

The undersigned Minister had already made this declaration in the communication of the 24th of May, which I mentioned to your Excellency at the beginning of this note. He made a similar declaration in the session of Congress of the 2nd instant ; he repeated it a few days ago before the Senate, and he has no hesitation to say it again at this moment. The revindication of a part of the Peruvian territory has never entered into the ideas of Her Majesty's Government : such a word, spoken by its diplomatic and military Representatives, is decidedly disapproved by the Government.

I need not speak to your Excellency either of the agitation which has been excited by the above-mentioned incidents, both in Peru and in other parts of America, nor of the unsuccessful steps taken by several of the Diplomatic Agents resident in Lima, intended to bring that Government to an agreement with Señores Pinzon and Salazar. With regard to those steps, Her Majesty's Government is grateful for them, although they have not produced any effect ; with regard to the agitation, as it was chiefly caused by the idea that the question was to revindicate ancient rights, it was natural, and it is natural, that it should have been calmed, or that it will be calmed, so soon as it shall be known in America that Spain and her Government did not admit, but rather had disapproved, such revindication.

But I have now to inform you of a matter still more unexpected by us than the rejection of our Agent, and which I do not intend to designate. I mean the voyage to Spain undertaken by Señor Salazar, and I refer to the deplorable circumstances which attended it, from the waters of Peru to the passage across the Isthmus of Panamá and the arrival at Colon.

What occurred in the voyage to which I allude, your Excellency will find related *in extenso* in the despatch of Señor Salazar himself, copy of which I inclose. It would be useless to repeat it, and I therefore confine myself to a recapitulation thereof in a few words.

In the port of Callao, an armed force, with orders from the Peruvian authorities, endeavoured to take possession of the Secretary of Señor Salazar, who was on board of an English vessel.

From the very port of Callao to Paita (Peru) first, afterwards to Panamá, and lastly to Colon or Aspinwall, Señor Salazar was accompanied and followed by certain Peruvians, who, now by means of poison and now by other modes, endeavoured to put an end to his life.

Of the first of those two acts—the attempted capture—the Peruvian Government, without any doubt, has the responsibility. Of the second—the attacks on the person of Señor Salazar—I dare not, I will not, I cannot accuse that Government, because it appears to me impossible that any Government in the world would do it ; but its being done by Peruvians, and appearing to be a continuation of the other act which attaches to the said Government of Peru, there is no doubt that there is reason to call upon it to refute it on its part, and to declare its innocence by giving satisfactory explanations thereupon.

Thus it will be said by public opinion on hearing the details of Señor Salazar ; thus it is said by the Spanish Government on hearing the statement of its Representative which it cannot but look upon as true.

It is not possible to hide the importance of these events from your Excellency's penetration and patriotism. They surpass those which preceded them, and they supersede them, because questions of honour take the first place amongst those nations who have a sense of honour in their hearts.

In such a state of things your Excellency will understand what the conduct of Spain ought to be and must be who recognizes the Republic of Peru as an independent, free, and sovereign nation, but who cannot abandon without defence her citizens who reside in that country, nor permit an outrage against her Representative.

The Spanish Government has not revindicated the Chincha Islands, nor does it think of holding them as a property belonging to it. It declares that it retains them as belonging to Peru, and that it will restore them to Peru. But it holds them now by an act of force calculated to compel that nation to administer justice to Spaniards ; and as the outrages against Señor Salazar have taken place subsequently, it will not restore them until it has received satisfaction for them, and until it is persuaded that such justice will be administered. This appears to us now to be a clear and indisputable right.

We do not wish to humiliate Peru nor to take away from her anything which is hers ; but, as I have said to your Excellency, we have to place our honour in safety, and we cannot abandon either the rights or the interests of the nation. We have asked for

nothing, we shall ask for nothing, which should humble or degrade that State. In disapproving the conduct of its agents who endeavoured to capture the Secretary of the Spanish Representative,—in declaring that it had nothing to do with the criminal attempts made against the latter, and that it is ready to exact punishment for them,—in receiving a Commissioner charged to act (“gestionar”) for administering justice on the crimes of Talambo,—in nothing of this can there be any disgrace or ignominy, in nothing of this can there be any more than a fulfilment of the obligations incumbent on all of us by reason and justice. That is what we shall demand. We, on our part, as soon as those satisfactions are given to us which are required by our right and our dignity, in that same instant we shall deliver up the Chincha Islands to the Commissioner who shall be nominated by the Government of Peru to receive them.

We hope that this will put an end to a difference unpleasant to us, which we have not sought, which we do not exaggerate, but in which we cannot yield what our honour will not allow us to yield. We had a right to send a Representative to Lima, and the Government there had no right to refuse to receive him. We have a right to demand satisfaction for the attempts to which our Representative was near falling a victim. In the error which that Representative and Admiral Pinzon committed, expressing ideas which were not those of Her Majesty’s Government, I have made no hesitation to disapprove of them: before I knew they had taken possession of the Chincha Islands I protested against the idea of revindicating or of wishing to acquire territory; after becoming acquainted with their acts I made the same protest with equal frankness, with equal precision.

Let not our ideas, then, be misrepresented; let not our words be forgotten; let not the basis of our conduct be misunderstood. What we demand is that which we ought to demand, that which, with God’s help, we are determined to maintain, that which we cannot persuade ourselves that a civilized nation like Peru will refuse to us.

May this explanation serve your Excellency to enlighten your judgment, as also to be a rule and a guide in your relations to the Government of Her Britannic Majesty to which you are accredited, to which you may give a copy of this despatch.

God preserve, &c.

J. F. PACHECO.

Inclosure in No. 4.

Señor Mazarredo to Señor Pacheco.

(Translation.)

Excellency,

Madrid, June 21, 1864.

YOU are already acquainted, from oral explanation, with the plots which were formed against me from the time of my leaving Peru, on the 13th of May last. I will now detail them in writing with all possible brevity.

On the 8th of the month I arrived at Callao with the Naval Lieutenant, Señor Lora (who was carrying despatches for Cuba), in Her Britannic Majesty’s war-corvette “Shearwater,” Commander Captain Gordon Douglas, in company with the Ministers of France, Great Britain, and Chili, who had gone to the Chincha Islands to confer with Admiral Pinzon and myself. On the 9th I passed to the “Leander,” a man-of-war of the same nation, whose Captain, Commodore Harvey, as well as Mr. Douglas, paid me every sort of attention. I remained there until the 13th, the day of the departure of the “Panama” steamer, on which I intended to embark for my return to Spain. On the 12th, I received private advice to take precautions, because something was plotting against me; and M. Vion, the Chancellor of the French Legation, corroborated this information, warning me amongst other things not to go on board the packet in the spot near the mole, where she was anchored, and recommending me to request the Captain to take me on board on passing alongside of the “Leander.” On the morning of the 15th, the English merchant-ship “Dauntless” anchored in the bay, and in her came Señor Cerruti, professor of languages of the Marines, of the frigate “Resolucion,” who by appointment of Admiral Pinzon, was to go with me to Europe as my private Secretary. The authorities of Callao, as soon as they were informed of his arrival, endeavoured to capture him, but the Commodore, who had received notice of the outrage about to be committed against the English flag, sent his Orderly officer so seasonably to prevent it that he almost dragged him away from the hands of the Peruvian soldiers.

A few hours before the departure of the “Talca,” the Commodore noticed suspicious movements on a Peruvian war-ship, and fearing lest some injury should be done me, offered me ten marines to protect me to Panama; an offer which I did not accept for considerations which your Excellency will easily appreciate. He then went on to the house of Rear-Admiral Valle-Riestra, in company with the English Consul, and the latter

declared in Spanish to the Chief of the Naval forces of Peru, on the part of the Chief of those of Her Britannic Majesty, that if any outrage were committed against me on the "Talca" he would then seize all the war-ships of the Republic, to which Senor Valle-Riestra replied, by all sorts of assurances, that nothing should be done against me. At 7 o'clock exactly the steamer went off, and in passing starboard of the "Leander," I went on board of her, as did also Messrs. Lora and Cerruti. On the 14th some credible persons advised me to act very cautiously, and as the same warnings were repeated to me on the 15th I remained shut up in the cabin. One of the passengers, Señor R——, the brother-in-law of a Naval officer resident in Callao, endeavoured to gain my confidence, and I endeavoured to obtain from his conduct any hints that I could, relative to the intentions of the Peruvian Government regarding our squadron. On the morning of the 16th, the English steward, Frank, who served me, confirmed the suspicions which had been given me by other passengers, Spaniards who were unknown to him, saying to me, "Sir, you must absolutely take nothing unless I bring it to you myself, because a passenger"—and he pointed out to me a person who, according to the observations of Messrs. Lora and Cerruti, constantly followed my footsteps—"the merchant Señor L—— has just offered me 1,000 dollars if I will put some white powder into the cup of tea which you take in the morning, 500 down, and the rest afterwards; he added that it is only to make you sleep, in order to take from you some important papers which you have in your trunk. I told him that I was a very honest English Christian, who would never lend myself to such an infamous act." It is clear that the powders were to serve for something more than to make me sleep because, as my two travelling companions never left me, it was impossible to find me alone. At night, in accordance with our warnings, we fortified ourselves in the cabin, placing the trunks against the door, and at midnight when all was dark, some person came near, trying to raise the latch. Señor Lora immediately got up, and he only heard the steps of some person who was gliding along the passage.

On the 16th we arrived at Paíta; several Peruvian peasants and officers who were in that port came on board the steamer; two of them, one of whom belonged to the Navy formed a plan of shooting me with his revolvers from a boat if I appeared on deck. But they spoke of their plan with so little prudence that, by means of a passenger who occupied the adjoining cabin, it arrived to the knowledge of the Spanish actress, Donna Matilde Duclos, who was going with her family to the Havana; and being warned by her I did not go up on deck until after leaving Paíta. The officer said to the peasant, as it appears, "If we get rid of Mazarredo they will give you a great deal of money and promote me to be Captain of a ship."

I believed that my adventures were ended, and I did not hesitate to act as passengers usually do, but they had only begun. Señor R—— pretended in Paíta, no doubt for the purpose of gaining my confidence, that the port Captain wished to seize him; but after a scene of noise and abuse he sat quietly down drinking champagne with the authorities of the place, a proceeding which was not the best suited to make me fall into his snares.

I understood indirectly through this gentleman the contents of a letter which I had written the preceding day to Don Mariano Prado, our Chargé d'Affaires in Quito; it was intrusted to the purser of the steamer, and notwithstanding that it had a double envelope for the English Consul at Guayaquil, they opened it at the Paíta post-office; fortunately I said nothing of importance in it.

A Frenchman came on board the "Talca," and he wishing to spare money on his passage, had offered himself, as is frequently the case, to wait on the passengers at table. On the eve of our arrival at Panama he came and told me that the above-mentioned M. R—— had requested him to bring a little bottle of beer to his cabin, and there he said to him, "I have observed that Señor Salazar takes such a one at his dinner, and if you will serve him with this, after putting into it some white powder," showing him a paper, "I will give you 300 dollars down." The Frenchman, instead of accepting the offer, mentioned what had taken place to several of the passengers. The moment I knew this I could not contain myself; I called M. R——; I shut him up in his own cabin, and I was confirmed in my suspicions by the manner in which he replied to the very severe words that I addressed to him. He excused himself awkwardly, and, changing colour, he drank the bottle in my presence in order to prove his innocence. I complained to the Captain of the steamer, who corroborated the reports which had come to my ears about the intentions entertained by certain Peruvians; and we were both of opinion that a formal complaint ought to be made to the French Consul in Panama, because M. R—— had had time to throw away the proof of his crime. I will observe that both Frank the steward and the aforesaid Frenchman were men of the best character.

We arrived at that port on the evening of the 20th, and I walked about the town accompanied by M. Zeltner, the French Consul, without being molested by anybody.

We met the Frenchman who had been offered a bribe to poison me, and he declared the whole in presence of the Consul. Shortly after we were informed that a Peruvian belonging to the tailors' establishment at Callao, whom I saw at the Navy of the State, a travelling companion of M. R——, had boxed his ears in presence of one of the hotel people for having informed against his friend. The Frenchman came to complain of it, and M. Zeltner summoned him for the following day.

The capture of the islands, which was known twenty days before, had caused no great impression there; on the other hand, General Herran, who had emigrated to Peru, arrived there by the preceding packet, charged with a commission from the Government of Lima to purchase articles ("pertrechos") in the United States, and the authorities as soon as they knew of his arrival commanded the troops to take arms and opposed his crossing the Isthmus.

General Iriarte, who had been General-Commandant at Panama, whom I had known some months before on board the "Resolution," came at night to tell me that he knew positively that something disagreeable was plotting against me, and that he was of opinion I ought to go on to Colon. The said M. Zeltner and Mr. Henderson, the English Consul, went immediately to see the Governor of the State, but his servant told them that he was not at home. Mr. Commodore Harvey and Mr. Jerningham, the English Minister in Lima, had obtained for me letters of recommendation from Mr. Petrie, the general agent of the Pacific Steam-Paket Company, for his private agent in Panama. This gentleman transferred the recommendation to Mr. Nelson, the Superintendent of the Isthmus Railroad, who when he understood what had taken place, carried his kindness so far as to lodge me in his own house, because, said he to me, nobody will think that the Minister of Spain has taken refuge with the Representative of the North American Company, having at his disposal the houses of the European Consuls.

In fact, thirty or forty negroes, followed by as many children, came at half-past 10 o'clock at night before the French Consul's house, bursting out into all kinds of cries, and making a frightful noise with various utensils. The cries ceased; and at midnight the negroes came back alone, cried out "death" to Spain, to the Queen, to France, to the Emperor, to General Pinzon, and to me, broke the windows of the Consulate, damaged the Imperial coat-of-arms, and would have torn down the flag which M. Zeltner had hoisted when the tumult began, if a person with them had not cried out, "Don't do that, don't touch the flag!" and they retired satisfied with having dirtied it. I heard all this perfectly from Mr. Nelson's house.

After this the Consuls of France and England came in, and we resolved that M. Zeltner, Señor Lora, and I, should depart at 4 o'clock in the morning for Paraiso. This is the name of a railway station eight miles from Panama.

Mr. Nelson gave me the two accompanying letters, Nos. 1 and 2, for Señor Diaz, the station-master of Panama, and for Mr. Hughes, the station-master of Paraiso, but on second thought he preferred to accompany us himself until leaving us in the carriage in which we were to go. This was an uncovered hand-car, which, moved by two men turning a handle, can go on the rails seven or eight miles an hour.

When we arrived at the station Mr. Nelson said to me, "I will give you two trustworthy negroes, who will conduct you to Paraiso; you will wait there for the Californian treasure train (the specie train), and in this way all danger will be avoided. I manage the telegraph, and I will give orders that no suspicious party shall be allowed to travel."

Señor Diaz added that a party of negroes had gone by the rail during the night, and he advised us to go with great care.

We prepared our pistols, and after a little more than an hour, we reached the appointed place in the midst of a storm which wetted us completely through, but which perhaps saved us from another and greater evil.

In Paraiso I had the lucky idea of going on instead of stopping. We changed negroes, and relieving them every four miles, we arrived at Colon (Aspinwall) at a quarter before 1. When I alighted the station-master gave me the telegram No. 3, which I forward herewith to your Excellency, telling me that Mr. Nelson had refused passage to several very suspicious parties.

Mr. Nelson supposed that we should come on from Paraiso in the specie-train. In the train, in fact, the person belonging to the tailor's establishment in Callao had crossed the Isthmus; and as Mr. Maclellan, the station-master of one of the intermediate stations, told me afterwards on the steamer, he had raised his hands to Heaven when he understood that I must be already on board the "Solent."

On this occasion I will say that the rapidity with which we effected the passage save

us from another danger, because as Mr. Nelson did not know that we went on by the hand-car, he gave no information to the conductor of the train, and we might very easily have been victims by means of the man who conducted the treasure.

In the next train came Señor R——, with a body of very ill-clad negroes, armed with revolvers and cutlasses. On arriving at Paraiso, where they expected to find me, they sought for me everywhere, held councils, and decided to go on. In the train they were seen in the carriage (an American one, which held forty persons) by Sir Greville Bart., Captain Paul, M. Daignoux, one of the owners of the Aspinwall Hotel in Panama, M. Leon Plaus de Couterets, M. Peyroux du Pontacq, Messrs. Kontanills, Riembase, and other foreigners and Spaniards. Of the latter I will speak by-and-bye. As to the foreigners, they said to me that if the negroes should get to me there would be a terrible struggle, because they were all resolved to come to my defence.

The negroes and the two emissaries arrived at the mole by which the steamer was lying. The Captain of the "Solent" (for whom the English Consul at Panama had given me a letter) and his officers kept them off, but the emissaries found means to get on board. M. R—— came to speak to me, asking me to intercede with the French Consul not to carry the proceedings any further; that the Frenchman had retracted, and other similar talk.

I answered him in the presence of M. Zeltner, "The Consul of France will do as he thinks proper."

Mr. Mac Rice, the North American Consul, likewise came to me on the steamer, offering me his services in those critical circumstances.

Soon after, the tailor of Callao approached the Spanish bull-fighter Marin, who had come with us on his way to San Thomas in the Havana. Marion knew him in Peru. He abused him in very harsh terms, and would have knocked him down in the steamer if I had not prevented him. He, as well as R——, owned to Marin that the scene at Paita was only a sham, and that they had obtained in Peru some 2,000 dollars, with the promise of 200,000 more if they succeeded in getting my papers. The meaning of this is that the same story was going on as on the steamer "Talca."

Were so many armed negroes necessary for this? Should I have allowed my papers to be taken from me? What would have been the result of the struggle which would have taken place?

Notwithstanding all this, the tailor did not think that his mission was ended, and we found that he intended to take a ticket for Southampton. Immediately M. Zeltner said, "That man ill-used a French subject last night, and I decidedly object to his going on board." This threat coming to his ears sufficed to make him go quietly back to join the negroes, who were staying at pistol-shot from the steamer, but not till he had first said that if I were on shore he would blow my brains out ("levantar la tapa de los sesos").

I received a letter on the steamer from a Spanish merchant established in Panama, in which he informed me of the journey of the negroes and of their intentions. I do not find it among my papers, but Señor Garcia is well known there.

The authorities of the Isthmus did nothing to prevent these excesses; and upon this subject I have written to the Captain-General of Cuba also. The head of the police at Panama, when he was charged with his indifference, replied that if he meddled with those few negroes it was to be feared that all the others would make common cause with them, and that the disturbance would become as great as that which a few years ago had cost the lives of so many North Americans.

These are the facts simply told. From San Thomas I wrote to the Captain-General of Cuba that he might institute an official inquiry in relation thereto. Several Spaniards were going to the Havana together with Señor Lora: the actors Ortiz and Duclos, Marin the bull-fighter, a banderillero whose name I do not remember, and others to the number of ten, who will have made due declarations.

In view of what is said above, it is clear that my life has been miraculously saved; and I think Her Majesty's Government will do an act of justice in giving thanks for the assistance given to its Representative to Commodore Harvey of the English Navy, to Mr. Nelson, the Superintendent of the Isthmus Railway, and to the Consuls Zeltner, Henderson, and Mac Rice,—particularly to the French Consul, who deserves especial mention, because he incurred a serious risk in executing the act of disinterestedness which I have mentioned.

I will close this despatch with a simple reflection. I have not left any personal enemies in Lima. The expenses incurred in the gross attempts made have not been inconsiderable, for the passage of the Isthmus alone costs 500 reals for each traveller, and as it is not to be supposed that patriotic enthusiasm against my humble person would

extend so far, the question may be asked,—Who had an interest in the commission of those outrages; and, having it, who could supply the disbursements made?

God preserve, &c.

(Signed)

EUSEBIO DE SALAZAR Y MAZARREDO.

No. 5.

Earl Russell to Señor Comyn.

M. le Ministre,

Foreign Office, July 14, 1864.

I BEG leave to thank you for communicating to Her Majesty's Government the copy of a despatch from your Government dated the 24th of June, together with its inclosures upon the subject of the differences which have unfortunately arisen between Spain and Peru in connection with the mission of Señor de Salazar y Mazarredo to that Republic.

I have the honour to acquaint you, in reply, that as British subjects are deeply interested in these affairs, Her Majesty's Government earnestly hope that by the exercise of moderation on both sides, good relations will soon be restored between the two countries.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 6.

Acting Consul-General Rouse to Earl Russell.—(Received July 14.)

My Lord,

Valparaiso, May 17, 1864.

I HAVE the honour to lay before your Lordship the accompanying translation of a circular which has been addressed to the several Governments of America by the Chilean Minister for Foreign Affairs, upon receiving intelligence of the occupation of the Chincha Islands by the Spanish naval forces in the Pacific.

The Minister observes that the Spanish Commissioner and Admiral attempt to justify this occupation upon three grounds—

1. As an act of reprisal to obtain reparation for injury.

2. As a resumption of hostilities after a truce or armistice.

3. As a reassertion of sovereignty over a territory, the independence of which has never solemnly been acknowledged.

To the first of these, the Minister objects that Peru being disposed to give satisfaction for any wrong which shall be proved to have been committed, it cannot be urged that all pacific means for procuring redress have been exhausted.

To the second, that the universal custom of giving due notice of the intention to renew hostilities has not been followed.

To the third, that for nearly half a century the fact of the peaceable existence of Peru as an independent Republic has been accepted by all nations; recognized by some in public Treaties, and by Spain herself in numerous public and official acts, such as her credentials furnished to the Commissary now a party to the occupation, her reception and appointment of Consuls, her continued consent to trade, and her consideration of Peruvians in Spain and of Spaniards in Peru as foreigners.

The Minister expresses his hope that the Spanish Government will disavow the principles and conduct of its officers; accompanied, however, by the declaration that otherwise the American Republics, painfully affected and alarmed as they are, may feel it to be their duty to unite their forces for the preservation of territory belonging to a sister Republic, whose cause is one common to them all, and a resumption of hostilities by Spain against which, on the plea of a reassertion of sovereignty, might raise the question how they themselves were thereby placed, who during those hostilities were the allies of Peru, and, like her, belligerents.

In conclusion, the Minister protests, as well against the occupation as against the arguments which have been produced in support of it; and flattering himself that his circular will be found to be a faithful manifestation of the sentiments which animate the whole of America, he believes that it will be received as evidence of the disposition of

Chile to combine her efforts with those of all the other Republics to prevent any interruption to friendly relations with Spain.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. W. ROUSE.

Inclosure in No. 6.

(Circular addressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile to the American Governments.)

(Translation.)

Sir,

Santiago, May 4, 1864.

THE occupation of the Chincha Islands by the naval forces of Spain in the Pacific, has caused in the mind of the Chilian Government the most profound and painful impression, and awakened in all the Republic a lively alarm, which will be equally felt from one extremity to the other of the American continent.

Her Catholic Majesty's Commissary and the Commander-in-chief of the squadron in the Pacific, under whose personal responsibility this act appears to have been perpetrated, are not unaware of its gravity, and they have endeavoured to justify it, setting forth, in the declaration issued from the anchorage at the Chincha Islands, the motives which had decided them to take that resolution.

If this measure be considered as reprisals, calculated to obtain reparation for some injury or offence proffered to Spain by Peru, it is necessary to inquire if the moment had arrived to appeal to an almost extreme resource, when the pacific measures employed by nations to avoid the calamities of war were not exhausted.

The right which sovereign States ascribe to themselves to obtain justice, is marked by certain proceedings, which the constant practice of nations have constituted as tutelary principles of the peace and harmony upon which the common welfare of societies is based. To deviate from them without a just motive is an offence, which not only affects the interests of the State to which it is proffered, but also involves a general deviation from those general and obligatory rules, in the faithful observance of which all the members of the great family of sovereign and independent nations should interest themselves.

The declaration set forth by the Commissary of Her Catholic Majesty, and by the Commander-in-chief of her squadron in the Pacific, besides being liable to a just censure, viewed in the light which has been indicated, is neither more nor less than the sanction of principles which place in doubt the independence of Peru, and provokes a conflict throughout all America.

Thus, the Government of Chile cannot do otherwise than to reprobate, as it does most explicitly, such doctrines, and to protest against them, although confident that they will not be sanctioned by the Government of Her Catholic Majesty.

The independence of Peru and its existence as a free and sovereign State, is a fact not to be disputed, and even to doubt this, it would be necessary to obliterate the history of half a century, converting into a simple truce what in reality has been a durable and indefinite peace, universally accepted, and acknowledged by Spain herself in a long series of public and official acts. The Government of Her Catholic Majesty for many years has invariably styled "Republic" that which formerly was her Colony, this is repeated in the credentials of the Commissary which she has just sent to Lima; she has received the Consuls of the Republic, and allowed its ships to frequent the ports of the Peninsula, and between the two countries a reciprocal commerce has been maintained without interruption; lastly, she has considered the Peruvians as foreigners in the Peninsula, in the same manner as the Spaniards are looked upon as foreigners in Peru. As a sovereign State, Peru has negotiated Treaties of Peace, Friendship, and Commerce with nations of both continents; and with these facts before us, known to the Government of Her Catholic Majesty, can any force be attached, in the face of truth and the law of nations, to the want of a formal recognition, so as to found upon this a state of truce?

A truce supposes in communication, and it may even be said that this is its characteristic, nor is a long and indefinite armistice ended without a previous declaration of the intention to renew hostilities, an essential formality set forth by the practice of ancient and modern nations.

According to the judgment of the Commissary of Her Catholic Majesty and the Commander-in-chief in the Pacific, the Crown of Castille is in a position to recover the dominion of the Chincha Islands, and appears to derive this right as a logical consequence of the supposed truce. A nation constituted for forty years, exercising independently acts of sovereignty throughout all the extension of its territory, is not, nor can be, subject to a

demand of recovery. The taking possession of the Chincha Islands by the Spanish squadron becomes, in such a case, to be an act brought about by force, and is destitute of all the requisites which constitute a legitimate act; the right of recovery would become a right of re-conquest.

The armies of Chile fought side by side with those of Peru in the war of independence; the two Republics were one and the same in a common cause, as were also the other sections of America. Hostilities being renewed, there having been only a truce, what is the situation in which the old belligerents of all the continent and their allies are forcibly placed?

In view of so grave an event, it is the rigorous duty of the Government of Chile to reject, in the most public and solemn manner, the principles which from the bases of the declaration, and protest against the occupation of the Chincha Islands by the naval forces of Her Catholic Majesty, and does not acknowledge, nor will acknowledge, as legitimate owner of those Islands, any other Power than the Republic of Peru.

It entertains, however, the conviction that the Government of Her Catholic Majesty will not accept nor approve of the principles proclaimed in that declaration, because, if the principle of recovery were sanctioned, that of re-conquest would also implicitly be sanctioned, and the Republics of America would find themselves called upon by duty to reunite their forces to maintain the integrity of an independent sister Republic.

It would be painful that the rapid and inevitable development of the events should bring about complications, either by retarding the conclusion of an international question, to which the Government of Peru is disposed to lend due attention in order to arrange in a firm and permanent manner their differences with Spain, or by preparing new difficulties which considerations of a superior order would render necessary to be opportunely avoided by the Government of America.

The manifestation which I have now set forth, in compliance with the orders which I have received from the President of the Republic, will be considered, I hope, by the Government of your Excellency, as the faithful expression of the general sentiments of all America.

The Government of abounding in the same sentiments will, I doubt not, be pleased to learn the views of Chile, and the disposition in which she finds herself to act in conjunction to avoid a conflict which may disturb the peace of this continent by interrupting the friendly relations which happily she has cultivated, and desires to cultivate with the Spanish nation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) MANUEL ANTO. TOCORNAL.

No. 7.

Acting Consul-General Rouse to Earl Russell.—(Received July 14.)

My Lord,

Valparaiso, May 17, 1864.

IN order that your Lordship may form some idea of the sensation created here immediately upon news arriving that the Spanish Admiral had taken possession of the Chincha Islands, I take the liberty of submitting the undermentioned copies and translations of five papers on the subject.

The first two are communications to the Peruvian Minister for Foreign Affairs made by two Spanish South American Diplomatic Agents accredited to that Republic, but when writing at Valparaiso.

The one by Don Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, who, transmitting a copy of his credentials as Minister Plenipotentiary of the Argentine Republic, declares his reasons for adhering, pending instructions solicited from his Government, to a Protest which he states to have been drawn up by the foreign Diplomatic Body at Lima on the 20th April last against the occupation of the Islands in question by Spain; and the other by Don Justo Arosemena, setting forth his reasons likewise, although prevented for the moment from resuming his functions of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of Colombia, for adhering to the same diplomatic Protest, observing that Colombia being one of the Republics unrecognized by Spain, the pretended "right of sovereignty over territory" would apply equally to her as to Peru, and concluding by his own opinion that Colombia would with Peru make common cause.

The third is an invitation to the inhabitants of Valparaiso to meet at once, in the Theatre, in which invitation the conduct of Spain is commented upon in angry terms.

The fourth contains the declarations agreed upon at the meeting held in consequence

of the preceding invitation. Allusions are therein made to the part which Spain took in the French invasion of Mexico, to her seizure of Santo Domingo, and to her recent occupation of the Chincha Islands, as all affording cause for the suspicion that she entertains designs hostile to the independence of every one of her former Colonies in South America, and for justifying the expectation that the Government of Chile, strong in the support of its citizens, who will raise subscriptions towards the purchase of a vessel of war in augmentation of the Chilian navy, will act as it would act if its own territory were occupied; and

The fifth and last is a Report published by certain Commissioners, who had been deputed at a public meeting of the inhabitants of the capital to present a protest to the President of the Republic, of what had occurred at the audience granted to them. The President is therein made to say that the sentiments embodied in the Protest (to much the same effect as those in the Valparaiso Protest) are more or less those of Government, whose serious consideration had been drawn to the case, as one of menace, not merely to Peru but likewise to Chile and to the whole of America. In continuation of this paper will be found mentioned that immediately after the audience a Cabinet Council was held, upon the breaking up of which a special courier was despatched to Buenos Ayres, inviting that Government to come to an understanding with Chile upon the question.

This occupation of the Chincha Islands seems not only to have revived all those bitter feelings towards Spain which were supposed to have been extinguished with, or to have lain dormant since, the termination of the War of Independence, but to be made a pretext by the various political parties here for hostility towards the Executive. On all sides it uttered the cry of an offensive and defensive alliance with Peru, for an immediate war with Spain, and the Government is blamed for not taking up the popular cry, without the least regard to the consideration that unprepared as the country is such conduct must lead to serious embarrassment.

Advantage also is taken of the same occupation, although, indeed, recommending foreigners individually to hospitable treatment, to excite unfriendly feelings in the minds of the Chilians towards the Monarchical Governments of Europe, who are represented, and especially France and Spain, with holding the fixed purpose of overthrowing Republican and establishing Kingly Governments in Spanish America.

Assertions are most invidiously put forth, charging, not alone travellers and the press, but persons of exalted station and acknowledged capacity in Europe, with publicly maintaining that the "people of South America, like the blacks, are to be governed only by the lash; that anarchy and disorder are their chronic diseases—their second nature; and that to curb such semi-barbarians, what are required are strong Governments." In the same invidious spirit article are quoted from French newspapers, such as that "France need not send out fresh expeditions, not even ships of war, since to be obeyed it will be sufficient that she speak out."

So, also, Spanish newspapers are appealed to for the idea that "Spain, to obtain satisfaction from Peru, need not have recourse to her soldiers, but simply to her sailors."

In this manner, in inflammatory paragraphs, is the popular mind excited to form wrong conclusions as to the disposition of foreign Governments. Instead of teaching that there is nothing to be feared by those who act right; that justice is the best protection for the weak; all parties call loudly for warlike preparation, which must consume the national resources, for an augmentation of the Chilian navy, for the avowed purpose of resisting the anticipated future claims of European Powers. It is advised to oppose a threat of stopping trade, to every threat of blockade and reprisal, and even to treat the realization of such threats as a declaration of war, to be accepted in the confidence that Europe cannot long exist without the productions of America, and that her Governments are too well convinced of the cost of distant military expeditions, to be induced to sacrifice millions in such expeditions, when insisting on claims for thousands.

In short, much stress is laid upon the supposed weakness of Spain to enforce her claims at so a great a distance, and it is thought she would never have occupied the Chincha Islands with only two ships of war, could she have anticipated that this would have brought her into warlike contact with an entire continent.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. W. ROUSE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 7.

*Don D. F. Sarmiento to Señor Ribeyro.**Argentine Legation in Chile,
Valparaiso, May 1, 1864.*

(Translation.)

THE Undersigned, Minister Plenipotentiary of the Argentine Republic, accredited to the Republic of Peru, according to the authentic copy of the credentials which he has the honour to inclose, hastens to make his appointment known to his Excellency, induced by the serious nature of the circumstances, in order to make his adhesion to the protest which the foreign Diplomatic body drew up on the 20th April last in consequence of the violent occupation of the Chincha Islands by Spanish forces, and the unusual principles upon which it is pretended to give fair appearance to an act, the object and form of which are not in accordance with the practice of civilized nations.

The Republics of South America belong to the community of Christian nations which governs itself by international law; they exist by their own right, which they themselves have conquered, as proved by history, and secured by universal concurrence; whilst the people from whom they have severed themselves can in no manner deny their existence, by urging the absence of Treaties or of explicit acknowledgement, after forty years renunciation of all pretension of dominion, and a virtual approval of the Treaties of Ayacucho, which put an end to the war between the metropolis and its former colonies.

The act consummated by Spanish forces at the Chincha Islands, without any of the formalities which precede a declaration of hostilities between nations, endangers the peace of the greater part of the South American States, by delivering them up to the unforeseen hazards which would arise from any toleration of that ignorance of the principles of the law of nations, which the servants of the Crown of Spain proclaim with reference to a portion of the Peruvian territory.

The Undersigned, therefore, awaiting instructions for his future conduct, for which he has applied to his Government, fulfils a duty belonging to his Commission, and does himself honour by inscribing the name of the Argentine Republic amongst those of the States which, through their Ministers Plenipotentiary have protested against the unusual doctrines and unlawful acts which make the armed occupation of the Chincha Islands by Spanish forces, a scandalous exception to those practices and laws which govern the civilized world. At the same time, in his own name, and in that of the Argentine people, the Undersigned accompanies the Government of Peru in the just indignation produced by such unqualifiable proceedings.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed) D. F. SARMIENTO.

Inclosure 2 in No. 7.

Señor Arosemena to Señor Rebeyro.

(Translation.)

*Legation of the United States of Colombia,
Valparaiso, May 3, 1864.*

Sir,

The Undersigned was yesterday preparing to embark for Lima, which city he had for a time quitted, when, by reason of grave unforeseen events, he finds himself detained for fifteen days more, and for a like period delayed the day for re-assuming the exercise of his functions as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of Colombia to the Government of your Excellency.

Above all, the undersigned was proposing immediately to adhere to the Declaration made on the 20th of April last by the Diplomatic Body, to which he has the honour to belong, in consequence of the unheard-of outrage committed by the Spanish squadron, denominated "scientific commission," which is under the orders of Admiral Pinzon and the Envoy Mazarredo, by occupying the Chincha Islands, belonging to the Republic of Peru, without previous declaration of war, and not even as a security or pledge for the payment of preferred claims.

If we may judge by the Declaration of MM. Pinzon and Mazarredo, in which they set forth the grounds for that act of depredation, they proceed in virtue of the right of "revindication" of a property belonging to the Crown of Spain, inasmuch as the war between Spain and Peru was interrupted only by a *de facto* truce of forty years counting from the memorable 9th of December 1824. It is scarcely credible that the insane occupation of Peruvian territory, and the still more insane ground upon which it is

sustained, can have been dictated by the Government of a nation which calls itself civilized, and which not long ago claimed to figure amongst nations of the first rank. But, on the other hand, it is not less difficult to suppose, that agents selected by the Spanish Government for a special and important Commission, whatever it be, would dare in so decided a manner to exceed their instructions.

Until in possession of other data, we must reason upon the last supposition.

Spain invades Peru without previous declaration of war, as a simple continuation of that which the world had looked upon as concluded, and as recovery of property which all nations recognize as belonging to the Peruvian Republic; to a Republic as independent as any one of themselves.

In such a manifestation one is at a loss which most to admire, its audacity, or its imprudence. Any one might say that Spain, coolly and deliberately confident in her power, and in a right derived we know not whence, comes and knocks at the door of each of its former Colonies, now nations of long existence, to give them notice, foolishly and stupidly, that she undertakes the re-conquest of possessions which were, but which have for ever ceased to be hers.

Colombia, Most Excellent Sir, like Peru, is one of these Republics, which by their own fault have not been recognized by Spain, and to which with equal force may be applied the declaration and argument of the Spanish agents.

Nor has Colombia been willing to purchase an independence which the arms and blood of its best sons have gained in innumerable combats, and which the names of Torres and of Caldas, of Jirardot, and of Ricaurte, of thousands and thousands more, defend by their own virtue.

Consequently, the Undersigned has conceived it to be his duty, not merely to adhere to the declaration made by its honourable colleagues. He firmly believes that his Government, and the noble people over which that Government presides, will consider the cause of Peru to be its own in the present emergency, and in every other one of the kind. He thinks, and in so thinking he fears not to differ from that Government and from that people, that the alarm of Spain at the Chinchas will not sound in vain for Colombia: that, heard throughout her mountains and valleys, it will raise, armed for combat, the old and young, the rich and the poor, all classes and parties.

For, if Spain, as it would seem, has learnt nothing during her truce of forty years, America, her former slave, has raised herself to the rank of Sovereign: has cultivated relations with really civilized nations; has tasted, even midst disturbances, the sweets of liberty; has drawn morality from sources purer than those known to Cortes and to Pizarro, to Pinzon and to Mezarredo; has shaken off the absurd fanaticism of Philip II and of Torquemada; has acquired a true notion of political and social economy; has broken the chains of the slave; and, finally, has learnt to exist without her former master, whose obstinate and proud moroseness has been a constant matter of amazement for her better instructed descendants.

Although the Government of your Excellency cannot doubt the sentiments and purposes of the Colombian union in the crisis which Peru is going through for her own glory, the Undersigned has been unable to resist the desire here to interpret them, in like manner as he desires, very earnestly, that your Excellency will accept, &c.

(Signed) JUSTO AROSEMENA.

Inclosure 3 in No. 7.

Notice.

(Translation.)

To the Inhabitants of Valparaiso.

BY means of an iniquitous surprise, Spain has invaded and made herself master of a valuable portion of the Peruvian territory.

When acting thus, Spain declares it to be a continuation of our glorious struggle for independence, in which she was vanquished and driven away.

Danger is at our door: invasion pretends to enchain our brothers.

For this we must reunite: we must present ourselves in force, and let the invaders see that in 1864 they will find that heroic and energetic resistance which conquered them in 1818.

Valparaiso, the land of freemen, desires to be the first in Chile to raise the voice of protest against an aggression which is as unjust as it is rash and traitorously calculated. For this reason every man of courage is invited to present himself to-day in the Victoria Theatre at 2 in the afternoon, in order to draw up such protest.

It is the duty of every American to attend to this summons, and we likewise hope to see there the free son of Albion, the enthusiastic German, the Italian who lives by his love of independence, the Frenchman the devotee of liberty.

The protest of to-day should be not only one of the Americans, but the echo of all men whose hearts beat with a love of justice.

(Here follow the signatures.)

Inclosure 4 in No. 7.

Extract from "La Patria" of May 2, 1864.

Declarations agreed upon at a Meeting of the Inhabitants of Valparaiso, held May 1, 1864 in the Victoria Theatre.

(Translation.)

THE Undersigned, voluntarily and publicly assembled in the Victoria Theatre of Valparaiso, acting under the feelings excited by the news brought yesterday from Peru by the steamer, declare—

1. That the occupation of the Chincha Islands by the Spanish squadron, with the pretension of re-asserting a claim thereto on the part of the Crown of Spain, such as was made to Fernando Po, is an offence, not only against Peru, but likewise against the general law of nations, and the most vital rights of America.

2. That Spain, by promoting the war against Mexico, by seizing upon San Domingo, and by traitorously invading Peru, has furnished just motive for believing that she entertains insidious projects against all those States which formerly were her Colonies.

3. That they ardently desire the Government of Chile at so critical a moment to act as if a portion of Chilean territory had been invaded by a foreign force.

4. That so long as this danger threatens the Peruvian Republic, Chile should think of nothing but of energetically aiding its Government in worthily defending the interests of America.

5. That a public subscription be set on foot, and actively promoted, the amount of which shall be applied to the purchase of a ship of war for the purpose of increasing the national navy.

Inclosure 5 in No. 7.

Extract from "El Mercurio" of May 3, 1864.

(Translation.)

THE Commission appointed yesterday by a popular meeting held in the Theatre, and composed of Messrs. Antonio Varas, Matta, and Necocha, proceeded, at 1 o'clock this day, to the official residence of his Excellency the President. General Necocha placed in the hands of his Excellency the Act of what the people of Santiago had agreed upon yesterday when assembled in the Theatre, and which is as follows, signed by the Commissioners above named:—

Resolutions come to by the citizens collected in the Theatre on the 1st of May, by reason of the serious occurrences in Peru—

1. The assembled citizens protest against the occupation of a part of the Peruvian territory by the Spanish Agents, and they consider it to be an offence, not only against the sovereign rights of Peru, but of Chile and of all America.

2. Considering that by the piratical act of Admiral Pinzon, and by his own words, the hostilities of the war of emancipation are declared to be renewed, interrupted only by a truce of forty years, the citizens of Santiago also hope that the old times of heroism will be renewed, and that all will be disposed to repeat the sacrifices and the acts immortalized in Tucuman, at Carabobo, Bozacá, Maíeso, Junin, and Ayacucho.

3. Believing that the danger and the cause of Peru are the danger and the cause of Chile, they solemnly oblige themselves to contribute towards the protection and defence of the honour and independence of the Peruvian nation.

4. Assured that the sentiments which animate them, both of condemnation of the conduct of the Spanish Agents, and of fraternity with the Peruvian nation, will be those which animate the inhabitants of all other towns in Chile, the citizens of Santiago invite those inhabitants to make similar demonstrations.

The text of the preceding Resolutions having been placed by General Necocha in the hands of his Excellency the President of the Republic, his Excellency, after making

himself acquainted with them, said that the sentiments therein expressed were, more or less, those which Government itself entertained, and that since Saturday Government had been wholly occupied with a consideration of the very grave and highly censurable events which had given occasion for the assembling of the citizens of Santiago.

His Excellency added, that acts such as those which had given rise to the meeting, their circumstances and antecedents taken into account, might be looked upon, not only as an attack upon the dignity and liberty of the Peruvian Republic, but likewise as a menace to Chile and to America, and that he believed that both people and Governments were unanimous on these points.

The Commissioners having heard the expression of these sentiments, took their leave, and conceive it to be their duty to report, through the press, the manner in which they have exercised their Commission.

Santiago, May 2, 1864.

(Signed)

EUJENIO NECOCHEA.
ANTONIO VARAS.
M. A. MATTA.

His Excellency the President afterwards summoned before him (all his Ministers being there present), the Counsellors Don Alejo Valenzuela and Francisco de Borja Solar, and the citizens Don José Victorino Lastarria, Don Alvaro Covarrúbias, and Don Antonio Varas.

His Excellency signified to them his desire to hear what was their opinion in regard to the events in Peru.

The discussion lasted three hours.

The first point of discussion was, how to denominate the act of taking possession of the Chíncha Islands; what was the signification and consequences of this act as regarded Peru and Chile? The unanimous opinion was, that the act was one of unjustifiable invasion.

The second point was, what measures ought Government to take, under such circumstances; and after various opinions had been given, and measures, more or less energetic, and openly hostile, had been proposed—amongst other measures, one person, it is said, suggested that his passports should be given to the accredited Diplomatic Agent of Spain in Chile—the meeting broke up at a quarter past 3 in the afternoon.

Thereupon his Excellency, in company with his Ministers, proceeded to deliberate upon which of the opinions offered, or what other, it was most proper to adopt.

Invitation.—Government yesterday dispatched a special courier, with letters for the National Argentine Government, reporting the act of aggression committed by the Spanish squadron at the Chíncha Islands, and exhorting the President of the Argentine Republic to come to an agreement with Chile in respect of the attitude to be assumed by the American Republics against that unjustifiable act of invasion.

No. 8.

Acting Consul-General Rouse to Earl Russell.—(Received July 14.)

(Extract.)

Valparaiso, May 23, 1864.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that on the 21st instant Colonel Domingo Faustino Sarmiento was received in public audience by his Excellency the President of Chile, and placed in the hands of his Excellency his credentials to this Republic as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Argentine Republic.

The usual speeches were made on this occasion.

Colonel Sarmiento adverted to the occupation of the Chíncha Islands by Spain "as a provocation which might move the Argentine Republic, again by the side of Chili, to uphold the rights of Peru."

His Excellency the President in his reply, referring to the occupation, observed that, "although painfully affected by the conflict to which the Argentine Minister alluded, he was nevertheless confident that the enlightened Government of Her Catholic Majesty would know how to bring that conflict to a convenient termination; but should this confidence prove to have been misplaced; should the independence of Peru be endangered, that Chile would be found faithful to the policy which, in this respect, she had manifested; and that he himself doubted not that she would then be aided by the noble and valiant country which Colonel Sarmiento represented."

Acting Consul-General Rouse to Earl Russell.—(Received July 14.)

(Extract.)

Valparaiso, June 2, 1864.

I AVAIL myself of a short interval before the departure of the mail-contract steamer to inclose, for your Lordship's information, a supplement to the "Mercurio" newspaper, published late last night, which contains, as then received by telegram, an extract from the Message of his Excellency the President of Chile, upon the opening of Congress yesterday.

With respect to the Spanish occupation of the Chincha Islands, his Excellency declares it to be a lamentable unexpected event, which has created an extraordinary excitement throughout the Republic, and given occasion to patriotic and generous offers from the citizens.

He states that a Commission of naval officers will shortly depart for the purpose of acquiring in the United States or in Europe vessels of war, and that should the independence of Peru be put in danger, which his Excellency thinks improbable, Chile will be faithful to her historical reputation.

Inclosure in No. 9.

Extract from the Supplement to the "Mercurio" of June 1, 1864.

(Translation.)

THE lamentable and unexpected event of the Chinchas has created an extraordinary excitement in the Republic, and I have received with great satisfaction the patriotic and generous offers which have been made to me on this occasion. You know what are the sentiments of Government with respect to this serious business, although according to my judgment it is not probable that the independence and the sovereignty of Peru will ever be in danger. Should this prove to be the case, Chile will be faithful to her historical antecedents.

No. 10.

Mr. Jerningham to Earl Russell.—(Received July 14.)

(Extract.)

Lima, June 13, 1864.

On the 3rd instant the Spanish steamer "Covadonga," one of Admiral Pinzon's squadron, appeared off the port of Callao with a flag of truce, and upon a Peruvian official putting off from the frigate "Amazonas" to learn the reason of her arrival, it appeared that Admiral Pinzon had sent his Major-General of the squadron with three open letters for the French and Chilian Chargés d'Affaires and myself, which the Peruvian officer declined to receive for delivery.

Permission was requested to anchor in the bay, but this was not conceded, and the "Covadonga" was obliged to cruize in the offing under steam during the night.

The next day, as the Spaniards had been given to understand that communication was not to be allowed with the above Diplomatic Agents, they were ready to enter into a direct parley with the Government of Peru, the President of the Republic and his Ministers went down to Callao, and despatched a Dr. Barriga Alvarez, in the steamer "Tumbez," to hear what the Spanish officer had to communicate.

I find from what has transpired with respect to this interview, that the Spanish Major-General informed Señor Barriga Alvarez that the letters for the French and Chilian Chargés d'Affaires and myself, were simply sent for facilitating the means by which the Spanish "Parlamentarios" might be put in direct communication with the Peruvian authorities; however, they could now address themselves to the Commissioner himself, and they consequently informed him of the wish of Admiral Pinzon for a suspension of hostilities, alleging as a reason that the means which were being carried out against the Spanish squadron for cutting off supplies, although they would not immediately affect the squadron, as at present it possessed a sufficiency, might later on oblige his ships to take certain measures for procuring necessities, if perchance they should find themselves in want of them.

The request that the "Covadonga" might anchor was likewise urged. Upon the Peruvian Government being informed of the requisitions of the Spanish Admiral, they

resolved that an answer should be given to the "Parlamentarios," to the effect that the Spanish squadron being in the hostile situation in which it had placed itself on the 14th of April last, the Government could not permit the invaders to communicate with any one, and therefore they could not allow them to anchor, or forward communications of any kind; and, moreover, with respect to the suspension of hostilities, Peru could not consent to this, the more so, as the Spaniards had been the first to commence them; that Peru would continue to employ the means necessary for her defence, and that they, on their side, might adopt such measures as they might think most conformable for their object.

It was then intimated to the Commissary of Admiral Pinzon that the "Covadonga" should leave the bay immediately, as, on the contrary, they would proceed to hostileize her.

Señor Barriga returned in the "Tumbez" at noon. The "Covadonga" immediately left, and steered for the south.

The result of this interview has had some effect upon the public mind, and last Monday there was considerable agitation in Callao, and anxiety in Lima, for these excitable people imagined that Admiral Pinzon, upon learning the ill success of the mission, might endeavour to attack Callao.

In this there does not appear the least probability, as he would evidently prefer, if he is in want of provisions, &c., making an effort to procure them at some less formidable port on the coast.

However, to show your Lordship that the Government appear to entertain some fear on this point, I beg to inclose translation of a circular which has been issued by the Prefect, ordering the vessels of foreign nations to change their moorings out of the line of fire.

Inclosure in No. 10.

Señor Medina to Consul Barton.

(Translation)

Callao, June 6, 1864.

THERE are fears of an immediate attack on this port, on the part of the Spanish squadron, for which reason the Captain of the Port has been ordered to clear the bay in order to avoid accidents and injuries to the foreign vessels in case those fears should be realized.

I have the satisfaction to communicate this to you for your information, and for what it may import to your countrymen or to their vessels.

God preserve, &c.

(Signed)

J. MIGUEL MEDINA.

No. 11.

Acting Consul-General Mocatta to Earl Russell.—(Received July 14.)

My Lord,

Guayaquil, June 14, 1864.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, translations of the communications, contained in No. 155 of the official Gazette of this Republic, addressed by the Representatives of Spain and Peru to the Government of Ecuador, and the replies thereto; by which your Lordship will perceive the attitude taken by this Government with regard to the questions now pending between Spain and Peru, in consequence of the conduct of the Admiral of the Spanish naval forces in the Pacific.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

FRANCIS MOCATTA.

Inclosure 1 in No. 11.

Señor Barrenchea to Señor Herrero.

M. Minister,

Quito, May 16, 1863.

THE Undersigned, Peruvian Chargé d'Affaires, has received instructions from his Government to deliver the accompanying official note, and to address the present communication to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Ecuador.

On the 14th ultimo, Rear-Admiral Luis H. Pinzon, Commander of Her Catholic Majesty's naval forces in the Pacific, and Señor Eusebio de Salazar y Mazarredo, styled Special Extraordinary Commissary from Spain to Peru, took possession of the Chinch

Islands, and declared that the Spanish squadron will take possession of all the islands belonging to Peru, and of the vessels of war which may oppose this design, and that the foreign companies who export guano from the said Islands will have to account for the same to the Government of Her Catholic Majesty.

In consequence the Peruvian flag has been lowered on the Islands and on board the war-transport "Iquique," and the Spanish ensign hoisted in its place. The Peruvian authorities and officers have been made prisoners and kept as hostages.

The following reasons are assigned by the Admiral and the Spanish Commissioner for committing that act:—that the independence of Peru is not recognized by Her Catholic Majesty's Government, with whom, it is declared, only a truce exists; that Her Catholic Majesty's Government has the right of revindication of said Islands; and that the Peruvian Government was endeavouring to raise a loan of 70,000,000 dollars for the purpose of obtaining means to oppose the demands of Spain, and putting obstacles in the way of receiving the said Commissioner, in order to gain time and to carry that operation into effect.

The act of which the Undersigned has the honour to inform his Excellency is so clearly at variance with all law and all right, the documents which the Undersigned incloses with this note demonstrate so clearly and conclusively the justice and moderation of Peru, the note of Señor Ribeyro, which the Undersigned has the honour to deliver to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Ecuador, is so clear and so convincing, that the Undersigned might dispense with the easy task of demonstrating the illegality and violence with which the Agents of the Spanish Government have proceeded; but it seems that an epoch has arrived so deplorable that it is necessary to urge the demonstration that America is independent, and that the principles of right and of international morality established amongst all enlightened nations should prevail in it.

The independence and the constituent rights of States do not take their origin from Treaties, but from the very existence of nations, and they are guaranteed by the principles of the law of nations; and although Peru, having on two distinct occasions sent Legations to the Government of Her Catholic Majesty, may not have concluded any Treaty with the same, she has not on that account been considered otherwise than a sovereign State by the Spanish Government, and by their Agents, including Admiral Pinzon, and his naval forces, whom Peru has received, not as members of an army with whom they were at truce, but as friends whose differences have been buried in oblivion.

In taking possession of the Chincha Islands, the Admiral and Spanish Commissioner have committed an act of violence without a precedent in history.

Without previous declaration of war, without an explanation of motives, without even an ultimatum, without having, to say nothing of exhausted, even initiated the means of agreement, taking advantage of a generous hospitality, and placing themselves disloyally in a state of truce or war, they have committed an act of spoliation which is destined to be a scandal to the civilized world.

But more than that, Admiral Pinzon, by taking the Chincha Islands, according to his own declaration without being authorized to do so by his Government, has committed an unwarrantable act, which in rigour places him outside the bounds of the law of nations.

The Undersigned would fear to offend the enlightenment of his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ecuador, if he should dwell upon the examination of the principles and the enumeration of the writers on International Law, who unanimously agree that reprisals, embargoes, and in fact, all other acts of violence against a nation can only be decreed by the Sovereign, and not by a subaltern agent. His Excellency knows full well that in order to justify the use of force it is necessary not only that there must have been real violation of natural or acquired right, but also that it is necessary, and that no easier and less violent means of reparation exist; that the damage which has been suffered has been pointed out in vain, and that representations and threats have remained without effect.

The object which it is proposed to attain by violence marks its limits.

Thus the Spanish Admiral and Commissioner, in taking possession without the authorization of their Government of almost all the rich treasure of Peru, pretending to revindicate it, and in declaring that they will take possession of all the islands and fleet of Peru, have committed an act of violence which would not be justified even if the false facts on which they lean were true, and even were it evident that Peru had refused to enter into negotiations with the Spanish Government.

The state in which the question is at present, and the many documents which the Undersigned transmits with this note, render, to a certain extent, useless the examination of the questions pending with Spain previous to the mission of Señor Salazar y Mazarredo.

Moreover, the generosity with which Peru has paid all the creditors who have made claims against her with any degree of justice, is proverbial.

The payment of the so-called Spanish debt, decreed by the Peruvian Law of 1832, which was spontaneous in its origin, and whose consolidation is only delayed until the explicit and solemn recognition of the independence of Peru by the Spanish Government; the claims of private origin which have not hitherto met with any refusal of justice; the exaggerated question of Talambo, of a private character, in which the Peruvian Government bears no responsibility whatever, and in which the death of one Spanish subject has alone to be deplored; these and all other questions would have been arranged by Señor Salazar y Mazarredo if he had brought to Peru the intention of negotiating.

His Excellency the Minister knows very well that negotiations between Governments are made directly, or through the medium of Diplomatic Agents; but Señor Salazar y Mazarredo wished to bring to Lima, instead of any of the diplomatic titles which the Congresses of Vienna and Aix-la-Chapelle and general usage have accepted throughout the world, that of Royal Commissioner; as though the battle of Ayacucho had not taken place, and half a century of independence for Peru had not elapsed.

The non-acceptance of an Agent who has no title recognized by the law of nations is an unquestionable right, and our Chancellor has precedents which have made that right practical. His Excellency will permit me to call his attention to the following incident: On the 20th of December, 1826, M. Chaumette des Fossés presented himself in Lima with credentials from the Government of His Most Christian Majesty the King of France, which accredited him as Inspector-General of French Commerce in Lima and its dependencies. Señor José Maria de Pando, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Peru, refused to receive the French Agent, whose title was not found to be in conformity with international regulations.

After an intelligent discussion inserted in "El Peruano" of the 30th December, 1826, to which the Undersigned calls the attention of his Excellency, M. Chaumette des Fossés returned to France, and the Government of His Most Christian Majesty, far from being offended at the non-reception of his Agent, sent the same person again in the character of Consul-General. In the year 1860 the Spanish Government itself, desirous of arranging with that of Peru the question of the Spanish barque "Maria y Julia," sent M. Tavira, their Chargé d'Affaires in Chile, as confidential Agent to the Peruvian Government, in which character he was admitted as negotiator.

Señor Salazar y Mazarredo did not wish to go in the same character, and the Peruvian Government, not using, for the sake of moderation, the right which they had of not receiving him, answered him, three days after the announcement of his arrival, that they would receive him in their office, and addressed him afterwards the communication of the 1st of April, in which they accept his mission, giving to the name of Commissioner the interpretation of Confidential Agent.

Thus Señor Salazar y Mazarredo, although he would not conform, either in his title or even in the style of his communications, with diplomatic usage, was admitted in the character which it pleased his Government to give him, with the natural reserve of considering him as Confidential Commissioner, inasmuch as he himself did not pretend to be admitted with a really public title. The Peruvian Government did not refuse his title, but merely gave it an interpretation in conformity with the rights of nations, and suitable for initiating and concluding the pending negotiations; but Señor Salazar y Mazarredo did not go to Peru to negotiate, but he quitted Lima, leaving a written Memorandum, whose contents and style confirm the idea that the Spanish Commissioner did not wish to exercise diplomatic functions in Peru.

All was concerted: and Admiral Pinzon, without awaiting any answer from Señor Salazar y Mazarredo, weighing anchor from Chile, provided with provisions and coal, proceeded to the Chincha Islands, of which, in union with the Royal Commissioner, he took possession in the name of Her Catholic Majesty.

The honourable Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ecuador is already aware of the important sensation produced by that very serious, scandalous act. The constituted bodies of the State, the entire population of Lima, natives and foreigners, every one who has with Peru any intimate tie, have offered themselves to the Peruvian Government to aid her in the sacred task of national defence.

The Diplomatic Corps resident in Lima, to whose notes the Undersigned calls the attention of his Excellency, have hastened to manifest to the Peruvian Government their regret and astonishment at that great outrage; and have not limited themselves to this, but united in a body under the presidency of their senior, they declared, on the 20th ultimo, that they sincerely deplore that Messieurs the Commissioner and Commander-in-chief of the

Spanish squadron in the Pacific had not regulated their proceedings with the prescriptions of international law ; that they do not accept the revindication invoked by the Spanish Agents ; and that they will continue to consider the Chincha Islands as belonging to the Peruvian Republic until their respective Governments resolve on what is expedient.

Even the French Representative, although he is the protector of Spanish subjects, has not placed himself in opposition either to the dignity of his powerful Government or to the known loyalty of his personal character, or to the good will which he has towards Peru, and has expressed the sincerity of his sorrow, and the assurance that the Government of the Emperor with its sentiments of accommodation will hear of this occurrence with strong emotion.

The Spanish Residents in Lima have declared that there was no necessity for reprisals in order to consult their safety, and that they gave a vote of thanks to the Government and people of Peru for the guarantees and good-will that were shown towards them.

Germans, English, Italians, French, all foreigners generally, resident in Lima, have assembled and drawn up petitions to their Governments in order to obtain the freedom of our Islands. Almost all have offered their lives and property ; and it could not be otherwise. Even neutrality has its limits, and a great national outrage, such as has been perpetrated in Peru by the Spanish naval forces, affects the rights and interests of all the civilized world. The principles of international law form one of the most precious conquests of modern civilization ; and all Governments and all peoples have the right and the duty, for the interests of humanity and for their own benefit, to maintain them intact ; on this account, whenever the slightest infraction of these principles takes place in Europe, the great European Powers, although proclaiming principles of neutrality and non-intervention, hasten to mark their disapprobation of the overthrow of the guardian principles of Governments and nations.

History in these latter times is so abundant in examples of this nature that the Undersigned does not deem it necessary to mention them, they being, moreover, well known to his Excellency the Minister. Therefore the Diplomatic Agents, not only American, but European, resident in Lima have made public their sentiments of intense disapproval of the outrage by which the Spanish naval forces pretend to revive the ancient right of usurpation and conquest.

The Government of Ecuador, American and friend of Peru, will certainly not be less grieved at the unmerited calamity which has befallen Peru and all America, than the other Governments American and European of whom their Representatives in Lima have been interpreters.

What is taking place in the Chincha Islands clearly shows that the Agents of the Spanish Government, placing America beyond the bounds of the law of nations, try to establish in their relations with her a monstrous public right, destined to undermine the foundations of the political existence of the whole of our continent. The increase and impunity of such abuses would conduce fatally to one result—the destruction of American independence.

The undersigned believes that he would only anticipate the desires of the Equatorian Government and the expression of their rectitude and of their American feelings by inviting them to disapprove, as contrary to international law, the conduct which the Commander-in-chief of the Spanish forces and the Royal Commissioner have observed in taking possession of the Chincha Islands, and to declare that they do not admit the right of revindication appealed to by the aforesaid Agents, and that they recognize the Peruvian Government as sole proprietor of the said Islands, and to prevent the authorities and citizens of Ecuador from affording help of any kind to the Spanish naval forces ; but the Undersigned confidently hopes that the Equatorian Government will not limit themselves to these manifestations, but that in guarding the rights of Peru, their own, and those of the whole of America, they will not remain indifferent, but will lend Peru their moral and material support in the unjust struggle to which she has been provoked, and in which the Peruvian nation will not succumb until after having shed the very last drop of blood.

With sentiments, &c.

(Signed) J. A. BARRENECHEA.

Inclosure 2 in No. 11.

Señor Herrera to Señor Barrenechea.

(Translation.)

THE Undersigned, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Equator, has had the honour to receive the esteemed communication of the Honourable the Chargé

Quito, May 18, 1864.

d'Affaires of Peru, in which, after relating circumstantially the unfortunate occurrence which has taken place in that Republic, on account of the Admiral of Her Catholic Majesty's squadron and the Commissioner Extraordinary of Spain having occupied the Chinch Islands, invites the Equatorian Government to disapprove of this conduct as contrary to international law; to declare that they do not admit the right of revindication invoked by the aforesaid Agents; and to recognize the Peruvian Government as the sole owner of the said Islands. The Honourable Chargé d'Affaires adds, in conclusion, that he confidently hopes that the Equatorian Government will not limit themselves to these manifestations, but that in guarding the rights of Peru, their own, and those of the whole of America, they will not remain indifferent, but will lend Peru their moral and material support in the struggle to which she has been provoked.

Before receiving the esteemed communication of the Honourable M. Barrenechea, the Government of the Undersigned had learned from various newspapers the deplorable event, and hastened to address the Peruvian Government, manifesting their profound sorrow, and offering the mediation of Equator in order to arrange the questions pending between the two countries. They likewise addressed his Excellency the Minister of Chile, inviting him to act with them, and to contribute by means of peaceable reconciliation towards the termination of the differences which unfortunately exist between the two nations.

In making this invitation to the enlightened Government of Chile, that of the Equator has fully shown the American sentiments by which she is animated, and the lively desire of contributing, on her part, towards the maintenance of peace; and has no doubt but that the Cabinets of Lima and Madrid, guided on this occasion by the principles which regulate the conduct of the civilized Governments of America and Europe, and interested in removing to a distance the calamities and serious evils of war, will conclude their pending questions in a peaceful and friendly manner.

The Undersigned, therefore, has the pleasure to repeat that the Government of Equator cherishes the hope and full confidence, that Peru and Spain will accept the mediation offered, and that an honourable reconciliation will put an end to the differences which at present exist between the two nations.

With sentiments, &c.

(Signed)

PABLO HERRERA.

Inclosure 3 in No. 11.

Señor del Prado to Señor Herrera.

(Translation.)

Quito, May 15, 1864.

THE Undersigned, Her Catholic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, deeply lamenting the misapprehension which exists in the public opinion of this country with regard to the question pending between the Government of Spain and that of the Republic of Peru, regarding the assassinations of Talambo, and desirous that the Equatorian Government and people should comprehend the just reasons which have given rise to the conduct of Señor Salazar y Mazarredo, Her Majesty's Special Commissioner, has the honour to place herewith in the hands of the Honourable the Minister for Foreign Affairs, a copy of the Memorandum which the said Señor Salazar addressed to Señor Ribeyro and the Diplomatic Corps resident in Lima, in order that they might have an exact knowledge of the question.

The Undersigned hopes that the Government of Ecuador will adopt measures to prevent a reproduction of manifestations analogous to that published by the Municipality of Guayaquil, and has no doubt but that the reading of the accompanying document will leave impressed on the minds of the Equatorian Government and people the spirit which has guided the conduct of Spain on this occasion, and that they will be convinced that the Spanish Government does not aspire to conquests in America; that their policy with respect to the Spanish American Republics is one of peace and conciliation, and that if, unfortunately, the dignity of Spain and the necessity of protecting Her Majesty's subjects have compelled them to take an energetic resolution, the object will never be to make territorial acquisitions, totally at variance with the real interests of Spain.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed)

MARIANO DEL PRADO.

Inclosure 4 in No. 11.

Señor Herrera to Señor del Prado.

(Translation.)

Quito, May 18, 1864.

The Undersigned Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ecuador, has this day had the honour to receive the esteemed note of the honourable the Chargé d'Affaires of Her Catholic

Majesty dated the 15th instant, intended to dissipate the error that public opinion might suffer in Ecuador by reason of the resolution which Señor Salazar y Mazarredo, Her Catholic Majesty's Special Commissioner has taken in the question pending between Spain and Peru; soliciting the Government of the Undersigned to adopt measures to prevent a reproduction of manifestations analogous to that published by the municipality of Guayaquil, to show that the Spanish Government does not aspire to conquests in America, that their policy with respect to the Spanish American States is that of peace and conciliation, and that the object of the resolution taken by the aforesaid Royal Commissioner will never be to make territorial acquisitions totally at variance with the interests of Spain.

His Excellency, the President of the Republic, informed of this interesting communication, has instructed the Undersigned to declare to the honourable the Chargé d'Affaires of Her Catholic Majesty, that the Government of Ecuador, penetrated by the friendly feelings of the Cabinet of Madrid in favour of the Spanish American Republics, have always been of opinion, that instead of pretending to conquests or territorial acquisitions in America, it will continue to observe a frank and conciliatory policy, such as appertains to people of the same origin, and bound by close ties and dear affections.

In virtue of this intimate conviction, and of the good relations which happily exist between Ecuador and Spain, the Government of the Undersigned have hastened to offer their good offices in order that the questions pending between Her Catholic Majesty's Government and that of Peru may be arranged in a friendly manner.

The Undersigned has no doubt that Her Catholic Majesty's Government, as well as that of Peru, will accept the mediation of Ecuador, and guided as usual, by principles of justice, will put an honourable end to the reclamations and differences pending between two nations.

The Government of Ecuador has deplored that the illustrious civic body of Guayaquil should have published a manifestation foreign to their duty and legal attributions; but they have adopted proper measures to prevent a repetition of acts of this kind.

With sentiments, &c.

(Signed) PABLO HERRERA.

No. 12.

Acting Consul-General Mocatta to Earl Russell.—(Received July 14.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith translations of a further note contained in No. 156 of the official Gazette of Ecuador, from the Spanish Legation, with the reply of this Government, and circular of the same to the Governors of the maritime provinces.

Guayaquil, June 14, 1864.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FRANCIS MOCATTA.

Inclosure 1 in No. 12.

Señor del Prado to Señor Herrera.

(Translation.)

Quito, May 14, 1864.

THE Undersigned, Her Catholic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, requests that the Honourable the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Ecuador will be pleased to give the necessary instructions to the authorities of the maritime provinces, in order that they may supply Her Majesty's vessels of war which may call in at these ports, with such provisions or fuel as they may require.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed)

MARIANO DEL PRADO.

Inclosure 2 in No. 12.

Señor Herrera to Señor del Prado.

(Translation.)

Quito, May 14, 1864.

IN observance of the principles of maritime law adopted generally by civilized nations, his Excellency the President of the Republic has been pleased to direct the

authorities of the maritime provinces to supply Her Catholic Majesty's vessels of war which may touch at these ports, with the provisions or fuel they may require, it being understood that the Peruvian vessels of war shall enjoy an equal privilege, in case they may likewise be in need of provisions or fuel.

In these terms I have the honour to reply to your Honour's esteemed communication of this day's date.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) PABLO HERRERA.

Inclosure 3 in No. 12.

Circular addressed to the Governors of the Provinces of Guayaquil, Manabi, and Esmeraldas.

(Translation.)

IN observance of the principles of maritime law adopted generally by civilized nations, his Excellency the President of the Republic has been pleased to order that you supply Her Catholic Majesty's vessels of war which may reach the port of that province with the provisions and fuel they may require, doing as much with respect to the Peruvian vessels of war, in case they should also require the same provisions and fuel.

Which I communicate to you for your information and faithful execution.

God preserve, &c.

(Signed) PABLO HERRERA.

No. 13.

Mr. Mathison to Earl Russell.—(Received July 14.)

(Extract.)

Caracas, June 20, 1864.

AN official note from the Venezuelan Foreign Office, addressed to the Peruvian Secretary of that Department, has appeared in most of the newspapers of this capital (a translation of which I have the honour to send herewith to your Lordship), which circumstance has afforded the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires an opportunity to demand an explanation. This incident, added to the many other motives of complaint, such as the disregard paid to his communications, the evasive language, and latterly the tone of the replies he has received, lead me to infer that Mr. Ceballos may be instructed to suspend his Diplomatic Relations with the Republic.

The death of the Minister of the Interior and Justice, on the 16th instant, is generally considered as a severe loss to Venezuela. M. Planas who repeatedly expressed his conviction that his country could not be expected to progress or hold the position it ought, unless the just claims of all foreigners be attended to, and to whose influence M. Mellinet, the French Chargé d'Affaires is indebted for a recognition by the Venezuelan Government of a sum of 2,000,000 dollars, as the maximum amount due to French subjects, and payable by a gradual amortization after their examination by a mixed Commission would, had he lived, have done justice to M. Ceballos's pretensions to an equality of proceeding in favour of his countrymen, as well as to those of the Representatives of other countries.

Inclosure in No. 13.

Señor Ochoa to Señor Ribeyro.

(Translation.)

Caracas, May 28, 1864.

Excellency,

THE Government of the United States of Venezuela has attentively read your Excellency's despatch of the 26th of April, conveying the information of the unlooked-for despoliation of the Chincha Islands suffered by Peru, at the hands of the Spanish squadron in the Pacific, without any previous declaration of war. Your Excellency's note, that of the Venezuelan Plenipotentiary resident in Lima, and the documents sent by that Diplomatist, have placed my Government in possession of all the necessary antecedents to form a clear opinion of the events, and to enable it to express its intentions relative to their future development.

First of all, the Venezuelan Government sympathizes with that of Peru in the

defence of her property seized so greatly in opposition to the civilization of the age; for whatever be the motives of complaint which Spain entertains against your Excellency's Government, the Representatives of Her Catholic Majesty could not consider themselves exempted from the forms which the law of nations has consecrated in favour of the world's peace, and of the confraternity of its inhabitants, as a guarantee to the weak, and a barrier to the powerful.

No doubt it was to remove the universal condemnation of the non-compliance with international usage, that the right of dominion was appealed to by Spain on the Islands they have seized under the pretence that no explicit recognition of the independence of Peru existed on the part of the mother-country. But it cannot be admitted that the right of dominion can be imprescriptible for ever; this is the opinion of my Government; to admit such a right would be equivalent to a deprivation of the right appertaining to all the peoples of the world to assume their sovereignty, and to inscribe their names amongst nations.

In the case of Peru, forty years of independence undisputed by Spain, her recognition by the Governments of Europe and America, and the Diplomatic and other intercourse carried on by Spain itself with her former Colony as between State and State, for a long interval of time, are sufficient to uphold that the independence of the Peruvian nation is a positive fact, and consequently to impugn the pretension put forward that the occupation of the Chincha Islands, an integrant part of the territory of that Republic, is considered as a continuation of the war of independence in America. In the opinion of the Venezuelan Government, that war terminated *de facto*, at the surrender of Callao in 1826, and it also ended by right, since Spain admitted Peru in its relations as a sovereign nation, recognizing in this implicit manner that she was irrevocably separated from the Peninsular dominion.

From all these precedents, the necessary consequence to be deduced is, that Señor Salazar y Mazzaredo, and Admiral Pinzon, have violated, without any justifiable reasons, the sovereignty of Peru, and wounded the honour of America, the people and Government of which are by the nature of their institutions, history, and civilization, united in the preservation of their prerogatives.

My Government, nevertheless, entertains the hope expressed by your Excellency, that the Government of Madrid will disapprove the conduct of their Commissioner and of the Commander of the Spanish squadron, and will renew its Diplomatic intercourse with Peru, so as to arrive at a pacific understanding honourable to both Powers. But, if contrary to all expectation and considerations of justice, our hopes should prove fallacious, and the Government of Her Catholic Majesty should accept the responsibility of the acts of their Representatives, Venezuela will consider itself authorized to suspect, in view of such serious facts, that the designs of dominion over America attributed to certain European Powers, are not an unfounded supposition, and to believe that it is time to look out for its own independence, declaring from the present moment, as my Government does declare, that it will not sever the unity which binds it as an American and Republican Government with the other Republics of this continent for the defence which they may be called upon to make of their autonomy and institutions.

The President of the United States of Venezuela, in giving me instructions to reply to your Excellency in the manner I have done, has directed me also to state, that a copy of this note will be transmitted to the Diplomatic Agents of Venezuela accredited to sundry Governments; and directly to those of America where there are no agents, so that the attitude assumed by the Venezuelan nation in consequence of the violent despoliation suffered by Peru, may be generally and officially known, and that it may serve them as a guide in every instance when the nature of events does not permit them to obtain special instructions.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed)

J. G. OCHOA.

Further Papers respecting the Seizure of
the Chincha Islands by a Spanish
Squadron.

*Presented to the House of Lords by Command of
Her Majesty. 1864.*

579

PAPERS

RESPECTING THE

SETTLEMENT OF CIRCASSIAN EMIGRANTS

IN

TURKEY.

*Presented to the House of Commons by Command of Her Majesty, in pursuance of their
Address dated June 6, 1864.*

LONDON:
PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.

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for—

“Papers or Correspondence, or Extracts, relating to the Immigration of the Circassian Tribes into Turkey, with any account of the circumstances under which they have been driven out by the Russians, and of any preparations which have been made to receive them in Turkey.”

No. 1.

Consul Stevens to Earl Russell.—(Received March 12.)

(Extract.)

Trebizond, February 17, 1864.

THE agglomeration of Circassian emigrants in this town has become a serious matter, and ought to occupy the immediate attention of the Porte. During the last three days fresh arrivals have taken place, and circa 3,000 have been landed; some 40,000 more were preparing to quit their country. Amongst those who have reached, hundreds are labouring under disease, superinduced by famine and misery which they suffered previous to embarkation. Emin Pasha, Governor-General of the Province of Trebizond, has done all he could to alleviate the condition of these unfortunate people, but the means at his disposal are very limited. Meanwhile disease is spreading fearfully amongst the Circassians and natives; the mortality from typhus is on the increase; the panic is great and general, and every one is making arrangements to quit the town. Of three European doctors in whom confidence was placed, one, a French subject, died to-day of typhus; another, a British subject, attached to the Quarantine Department cannot attend the sick, the functions of his office absorbing all his time. A number of the Pasha's employés, whose duties brought them in contact with the Circassians, became infected, and several have died.

The Porte recently sent to this place a quantity of old military clothing, and some drugs for the use of the emigrants; the former has been distributed, the latter proved useless.

The quarters in the vicinity of the cemeteries are rendered uninhabitable owing to the careless manner in which the dead are buried, and the offensive consequences thereof; and whole families are abandoning their dwellings. The chief aqueduct which feeds the fountains of the town is tainted, a Circassian corpse having been found floating therein a few days ago. The streets and squares are in a wretched filthy condition; provisions are getting scarce and dear, and fuel is completely wanting, all which augments the misery and tends to the spread of disease. If some measure is not immediately taken to remove the various inconveniences alluded to, it is to be feared that directly the spring sets in, the public health will suffer considerably.

From the best information obtainable, the mortality must have exceeded 3,500 between December and this date, of which, emigrants 3,000, Turks 470, Greeks 36, Armenians 17, Catholics 9, and Europeans 6.

No. 2.

Consul Dickson to Earl Russell.—(Received April 5.)

(Extract.)

Soukoum-Kalé, February 22, 1864.

STEPS are being taken here for prosecuting the war on the Circassian coast with renewed energy.

A Staff Officer recently arrived here from Tiflis, has been reconnoitring Sochy, from the sea, which it is intended to occupy in spring. As far as I am able to learn, an expeditionary force of some 9,000 men, to consist partly of contingents from the army in the Transcaucasian provinces, and partly of the garrison troops of Soukoum-Kalé, will, in all probability, endeavour to proceed overland from Gagri. Meanwhile, the troops are being daily practised with the improved rifles that have been lately supplied them,

and all the bakeries are actively employed in the preparation of a large quantity of biscuit.

It would be equally difficult for me to state precisely what course the Circassians intend to pursue in the present emergency. All appear to centre their hopes in a forthcoming European war with Russia, and should that not take place, it is not unlikely that, rather than continue to offer open and armed resistance, which experience has taught would only entail upon them increased severities without the chance of final success, the mountaineers may come to terms with their Russian conquerors. Such, at least, I believe to be the opinion urged by many. The emigration of the Abadzekh, and subsequently of the Shapsough, famine, the cattle murrain, have considerably weakened the power even of the Oubikh, who are still in their integrity. To these misfortunes must be added the absence of all political cohesion between the northern tribes, or such remnants thereof, and those inhabiting other parts of the Caucasus, and, indeed, the almost utter impossibility of bringing about such a consummation. Each and all cannot be made to forget their blood feuds, still less to unite in a common cause; and the very war they are all so longing for perhaps only give fresh impetus to the former, and widen the breach in the latter.

The probable immediate result of the present cruel war cannot be better illustrated than by a local saying, that "even a woman might now-a-days travel from Soudjouk-Kalé to Anapa without fear of meeting a single human being."

No. 3.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received April 23.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 12, 1864.

THE continued advances of the Russians in Circassia, and the ill-treatment experienced by the natives from the Russian troops, have led to an almost complete emigration from the country: 25,000 have already reached Trebizond, and others are endeavouring to escape in small boats at every risk. The conglomeration of vast quantities of these people, who have no industrial habits, threatens the health and peace of any one locality, and the loss of life which is occasioned by their hazardous attempts to escape from their conquerors is shocking to humanity. The Turkish Government is therefore about sending vessels to Trebizond to remove the emigrants thence, and place them in different parts of the Empire; and it is also in negotiation with the Russian Chargé d'Affaires here, in order to be able to adopt some measures by which those unfortunate people, who, after the most heroic attempts in defending the country where they were born, are at last obliged to abandon it, may be able to seek an asylum with safety in the Ottoman dominions.

I understand that the Russian Chargé d'Affaires has shown no difficulty, as far as he is concerned, in entering into arrangements with the Porte, and has applied to his Government for further instructions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

P.S.—I may take this opportunity of transmitting to your Lordship a Petition which has been addressed to Her Majesty the Queen by the Circassians, together with a translation of the same.

H. L. B.

Incosure in No. 3.

Petition.

(Translation.)

OUR most humble Petition to Her Magnificent Majesty the Queen and Emperor of England is to the effect that—

It is now more than eighty years since the Russian Government is unlawfully striving to subdue and annex to its dominions Circassia, which since the creation of the world has been our home and our country. It slaughters like sheep the children, helpless women, and old men that fall into its hands. It rolls about their heads with the bayonet like melons, and there is no act of oppression or cruelty which is beyond the pale of civilisation and humanity, and which defies description, that it has not committed. We

have not, from father to son, at the cost of our lives and properties, refrained from opposing the tyrannical acts of that Government in defence of our country, which is dearer to us than our lives. But during the last year or two it has taken advantage of a famine caused by a drought with which the Almighty visited us, as well as by its own ravages, and it has occasioned us great distress by its severe attacks by sea and land. Many are the lives which have been lost in battle, from hunger in the mountains, from destitution on the sea-coast, and from want of skill at sea.

We therefore invoke the mediation and precious assistance of the British Government and people—the guardian of humanity and centre of justice—in order to repel the brutal attacks of the Russian Government on our country, and save our country and our nation together.

But if it is not possible to afford this help for the preservation of our country and race, then we pray to be afforded facilities for removing to a place of safety our helpless and miserable children and women that are perishing by the brutal attacks of the enemy as well as by the effects of famine; and if neither of these two requests are taken into consideration, and if in our helpless condition we are utterly annihilated notwithstanding our appeals to the mercy and grace of the Governments, then we shall not cease to invoke our right in the presence of the Lord of the Universe, of Him who has confided to your Majesty sovereignty, strength, and power for the purpose of protecting the weak.

We beg your Excellency to be the medium of making known to the great British Government and to the glorious British nation our condition of helplessness and misery, and we have therefore ventured to present to your Excellency our most humble petition. A copy of it has been submitted to the Sultan's Government and to the Embassies of other Powers.

29 Sheval, 1280 (April 9, 1864).

(Signed by the people of Circassia.)

No. 4.

Consul Dickson to Earl Russell.—(Received May 17.)

(Extract.)

Soukoum-Kalé, March 17, 1864.

I FEEL it a painful duty to report a deed that has come to my knowledge, which has so exasperated the Circassians as to excite them to further resistance, however desperate their case may be.

A Russian detachment having captured the village of Toobeh on the Soobashi River, inhabited by about 100 Abadzekh, and after these had surrendered themselves prisoners, they were all massacred by the Russian troops. Among the victims were two women in an advanced state of pregnancy, and five children. The detachment in question belongs to Count Evdokimoff's army, and is said to have advanced from the Pshish valley.

As the Russian troops gain ground on the coast, the natives are not allowed to remain there on any terms, but are compelled either to transfer themselves to the plains of the Kouban or emigrate to Turkey.

No. 5.

Consul Dickson to Earl Russell.—(Received May 17.)

(Extract.)

Soukoum-Kalé, April 13, 1864.

THE Ubikh and Fighett tribes are fast embarking for Trebizond. In fact, after their land having been laid waste by fire and sword, emigration to Turkey is the only alternative allowed to those mountaineers who refuse to transfer themselves to the Kouban steppes and contribute periodically to the militia.

The condition of these poor people is described by eye-witnesses as most distressing. In the hurry of departure the overcrowding of boats is so little heeded as to lead to frequent disasters, while such of their horses and cattle as war and famine have spared are being sold for a few paper roubles.

In some instances the emigrants, sooner than see their weapons (may be heir-looms in the family for centuries) exchange hands with the enemy, have flung them into the sea.

With a view of introducing Russian colonization in the conquered districts the Government offer grants of land and other privileges to the Azoff Cossacks who may desire to settle there. Government employ  s indiscriminately, who may have served ten years in the Caucasus, will be entitled to claim an allotment of the land.

No. 6.

Consul-General Murray to Earl Russell.—(Received May 17.)

My Lord,

Odessa, April 29, 1864.

I HAVE the honour to report that information has reached me that Vardan and Sochy   have recently been occupied by the troops under command of Major-General Heyman, who encountered no resistance. The mountaineers are in a most distressing condition, and are emigrating to Turkey as fast as boats can be found to take them away.

Grants of land in the conquered districts will now be offered to such of the Azoff Cossacks as desire to settle in the South of the Caucasus, and every encouragement will be given them to do so.

His Imperial Highness the Grand Duke Michael has recently made a tour of inspection in the South.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. C. GRENVILLE MURRAY.

No. 7.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received May 20.)

(Extract.)

Constantinople, May 3, 1864.

YOU are aware of the large and sudden immigration of Circassians into the Ottoman dominions.

The Russian Government has now acquired the territory of that brave and devoted race, who have only prized one thing more than country—liberty, or at least the life which is free from the domination of a foreign foe. They are flying the shores immortalized by their defence and seeking an asylum in a neighbouring Empire. In short, Circassia is gone; what yet remains to save is the Circassians.

The Ottoman Government is willing to afford the refuge they desire. But its means for doing this are, as your Lordship knows, scanty; what it has already done—and this, comparatively speaking, is little—has been at a cost of 200,000*l*.

One mode of granting hospitality to these unhappy exiles is by dividing them amongst different Turkish villages in different districts, and allotting to four Turkish families one Circassian family in these districts.

This is undoubtedly the cheapest mode, but the worst: it adds to the miseries of the already miserable condition of the Turkish peasant; it affords but a wretched chance of existence to the poor Circassians; whilst the strength of these almost invincible warriors is divided, dissipated, and lost.

It would be a matter of policy, favourable both to Turkey and Europe, to colonize that part of the Ottoman dominions which extends from the Black Sea towards Erzeroom with these gallant fugitives. This country is opposite to that they have quitted, and in some degree resembles it; and here they might repose from their misfortunes.

Nor is this all; if converted into a sort of military colony, they might furnish a new resource to the Turkish armies which are already too great a drain upon the agricultural part of the Turkish population.

There is, moreover, at this moment and precisely at this spot a great object to achieve, for which the Circassian population might be made most useful.

Your Lordship well knows how much a road from Trebizond to Erzeroom is required. The events of the last few weeks render this now more and more urgent for Turkish trade.

To the construction of the road a certain portion of the Circassian immigration might be applied, and this would of course be far easier if their ultimate home was in its vicinity.

Thus combined together are—a great immediate resource to the Ottoman armies; a great and immediate relief to the Ottoman agricultural population; and the completion

of a work not only highly essential to Ottoman interests, but to the general interests of the world. For carrying out a plan of this kind, however, in a suitable manner the Turkish revenue affords no adequate means; that revenue is already appropriated; nor would it do, just as Turkish credit is beginning to move a little freely, to overburthen it by taking from the ordinary income of this country a sum which that income cannot without great embarrassment supply.

At the same time the sum in question would not be so great if reduced to annual income. The calculation I make is about 1,500,000*l.* sterling; the employment of a part of the Circassian population on the Erzerroom road and in the Turkish army might make it something less. Take the interest at less than 100,000*l.* per annum.

Still, it would hardly be fitting for Turkey to seem to beg for this sum, however great the necessity for it, and however noble and useful the purpose on which it is to be employed. There should be something like a movement in Europe to aid her.

Surely policy, humanity, public admiration for unexampled valour, public pity for almost unexampled distress, would come in to assist a cause to which no heart that has ever felt for deeds of patriotic heroism could be insensible.

Were a Committee formed in London and Paris for raising a loan for the object I have described, Turkey might guarantee the interest; and the customs of Trebizond, which by the plan in contemplation would be immensely increased, would be a fitting guarantee.

A Commission in this case should be formed here, consisting of Ottoman subjects of known character, to which might be annexed some European delegate.

I saw so many advantages combined, without any great apparent difficulty, in my project, and it grew upon me so much by reflection, that I spoke of it two days ago to Aali and Fuad Pashas, who, after some consideration, showed a hearty willingness to enter into it.

I then communicated it to M. de Moustier, who said he himself had thought of something of the kind, and we agreed together, after a conversation on the subject, to address our Governments respecting it.

I think I know your Lordship's sentiments sufficiently to flatter myself that they will not be very different from my own; and if they should eventually be embodied in any scheme somewhat like that I have hastily sketched out, it will be a source of the highest gratification to me to have contributed in the slightest degree to have called forth a tribute of generous feeling towards a nation which, from a variety of untoward circumstances, has been crushed amidst the universal regret of sympathizing Europe.

No. 8.

Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received May 20.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 11, 1864.

IN relation to my despatch of the 3rd instant, I should observe that I do not expect any sympathetic movement in favour of Circassia would get the Turks money without security; but if the object for which such money was required was explained, and a sort of feeling manifested in favour of the project, Turkey would stand in a more favourable position than if she came forward without any such assistance to demand money.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 9.

Earl Cowley to Earl Russell.—(Received May 20.)

My Lord,

Paris, May 19, 1864.

WITH reference to Sir Henry Bulwer's despatch of the 3rd instant, transmitted to your Lordship by the present messenger, in which his Excellency lays before Her Majesty's Government a plan for the colonization of a part of Turkey by the immigrants from Circassia, a plan which he states to have received the approval of his French colleague, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that M. Drouyn de Lhuys approves equally Sir Henry Bulwer's views.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

COWLEY.

No. 10.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received May 23.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, May 17, 1864.

I TOOK the liberty yesterday of calling the attention of Prince Gortchakoff to the painful statements in the English newspapers concerning the hardships to which the emigrants from Circassia were exposed in their passage to Turkey, and to the burden imposed on the Turkish finances by the reception and sustenance of a population estimated to amount to 300,000 souls.

The Vice-Chancellor replied that the tribes had insisted on leaving the country; that the Imperial Government regretted it; that it was absolutely necessary to remove these people from their mountain fastnesses, where their predatory and martial habits would be incurable; but that a fair offer had been made to all to settle on lands in the plain, which they had rejected.

His Excellency added that the estimate of their numbers to which I alluded was probably greatly exaggerated; and that if the Turkish Government incurred a considerable expense on one hand, on the other they gained an addition to the Mahomedan population of the Empire which would be of considerable value to the Turkish army.

I said to Prince Gortchakoff that, two years ago, one of the most distinguished officers of the army of the Caucasus had told me that the tribes still in arms at that time on the shore of the Black Sea numbered about 30,000 fighting men, which would give a population of about 250,000. The estimate might, however, be exaggerated, and all might eventually not emigrate.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 11.

Earl Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 25, 1864.

HER Majesty's Government have had under their consideration your Excellency's despatch of the 3rd instant, on the subject of the immigration of Circassians into the Ottoman dominions; and I have to acquaint you that they concur in your suggestions as to the best means of providing a permanent Settlement for these unhappy people, and approve the course pursued by you in the matter.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 12.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received May 30.)

(Extract.)

St. Petersburg, May 19, 1864.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith, in reference to my despatch of the 9th instant, an extract of the official journal of this date, containing further particulars of the operations which have resulted in the emigration of the independent tribes in the Western division of the Caucasus, partly to the basin of the Kouban, but chiefly to Turkey.

The territory occupied by the several tribes alluded to embraces the mountain chains, from which the larger rivers run northward towards the Kouban and the smaller streams southward towards the Black Sea. The region lies between latitude $43^{\circ} 30'$ and $44^{\circ} 30'$ and between longitude 38° and 40° Greenwich.

It is designated on the accompanying map,* and the points on the coast at which the emigrants are assembled are written in red ink. No estimate has appeared as yet of the whole number of persons thus destined to expatriation. The Minister of War, I am told, speaks of 100,000. The calculation of the foreign newspapers is 300,000. In the report now submitted to your Lordship we hear of 80,000. In the month of March, 30,000 are affirmed to have gone from the mouth of the River Touapsé alone, and 50,000 are said

* Will be published hereafter.

to be waiting at various points on the shore. We know that many had emigrated previously, and we are not assured that the movement has come to an end. Some are mentioned of the tribe of the Abadzekhs, who have accepted the alternative of a settlement in the plain of the Kouban, but the number is not given. It certainly seems not improbable that the emigration may mount up eventually to more than 150,000. If 150,000 indigent persons of all ages and sexes be thrown upon Turkey, such a burden must be severely felt both by the Government and the population. It is difficult to conceive that such a multitude could be moved, clad, lodged, and nourished for one year for less than 500,000*l.* sterling, and certainly they will earn little or nothing for themselves in that period.

The Russians say that a fair offer was made to all the mountaineers to move into the plain, and to enjoy there, with an ample donation of land, some of the privileges of local self-administration. If the tribes had accepted the offer, the settlement of the people would have cost a vast sum to the Russian Government. The charge has been generously but rashly accepted by Turkey.

Inclosure in No. 12.

Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of May 19, 1864.

Bulletin du Caucase.

DANS ses Nos. 78 et 90 "L'Invalide Russe" a parlé de la défaite que le détachement du Général-Major de Heymann avait fait subir aux Oubykhs le 19 Mars, et qui avait contraint cette tribu à renoncer à continuer la lutte. Les détails de cette affaire que l'on vient de recevoir, ne seront pas, nous l'espérons, sans intérêt pour nos lecteurs.

Voici quelle était, au moment où le printemps de cette année allait commencer, la situation des affaires dans la partie occidentale du Caucase; tous les versants septentrionaux de la chaîne, depuis la Laba jusqu'à la mer, et les versants méridionaux, depuis l'embouchure du Kouban jusqu'à l'ancien fort Véliaminow, étaient nettoyés des populations hostiles.

Resserrés par la population Cosaque, qui occupait tout le territoire, de l'est au Pschisch, et depuis la mer jusqu'à l'Oubine, et isolés des montagnes par nos détachements, les Abadzèkhes avaient été mis dans l'impossibilité de se refuser à l'exécution des conditions de soumission acceptées par eux; dans le courant de Février, ils avaient quitté leurs aouls, et s'étaient transportés jusqu'au dernier, avec leurs familles et leurs biens, soit sur les points qui avaient été assignés pour leur établissement dans la plaine du Kouban, soit pour émigrer en Turquie.

A la fin de Février, lorsque ce résultat eut été définitivement obtenu l'Aide-de-camp Général Comte Yevdokimow résolut d'entreprendre des opérations persévérantes sur le versant méridional, afin de contraindre les tribus pillardes qui l'habitaient, soit à s'établir sur les points qui leur seraient indiqués le long du Kouban, après avoir renoncé à leur ancien genre de vie, soit à émigrer en Turquie.

Dans ce but, le détachement du Dakho, du Général-Major de Heymann devait franchir la chaîne principale aux sources du Pschisch et occuper la vallée du Touapsé.

Le Général-Major Comte Soumarokow devait, avec une partie du détachement de la Djouba, passer dans le bassin du Schapsoukho, et de là se porter, par la route de la côte, sur l'embouchure du Touapsé, afin d'opérer sa jonction avec le détachement du Dakho; l'autre partie du détachement de la Djouba devait coopérer aux opérations du détachement de la Pschéka du côté du Psékoups.

Le 21 Février, le détachement du Dakho, sous le commandement de l'Aide-de-camp Général Comte Yevdokimow en personne, opéra le passage de la chaîne principale, et, le 23, atteignit l'embouchure du Touapsé, où il occupa l'ancien fort Véliaminow, n'ayant eu, dans les escarmouches de ces trois journées, que deux hommes tués et trois blessés. Ce mouvement eut pour résultat la soumission à discrétion de toutes les tribus montagnardes établies entre le Touapsé et le Psésouapé. Simultanément une partie du détachement de la Djouba, qui avait attendu, près du poste de Tkhamakha, la baisse des eaux du Schebsch, avait également franchi la chaîne principale et atteint avant le 4 Mars l'embouchure de Schapsoukho.

De son côté, le détachement de la Pschékha, du Général-Major de Grabbe, de la suite de Sa Majesté l'Empereur, avait passé, le 1 Mars, des sources du Psékoups dans la vallée du Touapsé, et après avoir nettoyé de sa population le cours supérieur de

cette rivière, était rentré pour le 17 Mars dans le fort Khodyji, situé sur le versant du nord.

L'évacuation de tout le versant du nord par les populations aborigènes permit, au commencement de Mars, de supprimer, dans la province du Kouban, la majeure partie des lignes de cordons,* en n'y laissant que de très-faibles détachements.

Après avoir terminé la construction des postes entreprise le long du Touapsé, le Général-Major de Heymann marcha, le 4 Mars, avec le détachement du Dakho, le long du Psésouapé, et le 5 occupa sans coup férir l'ancien fort Lazarew.

Du 6 au 16, le détachement manœuvra pour nettoyer le versant méridional entre le Touapsé et le Psésouapé; ces mouvements eurent pour résultat l'émigration générale des Schapsougs, qui se concentrèrent par masses à l'embouchure du Touapsé, dans le but de passer en Turquie.

Entre-temps, on reçut la nouvelle que la jeunesse Oubykhe, ayant appelé à son secours les Akhtchipskhoves, avait résolu de s'opposer à notre marche ultérieure sur le Schakhé, et dans ce but s'était massée, près de la côte, dans une position avantageuse sur la rivière Godlik. Afin d'empêcher cette bande de recevoir des renforts, le Général-Major de Heymann, commandant le détachement du Dakho, jugea nécessaire de procéder immédiatement à l'attaque du Schakhé, et le 18 Mars il se mit en marche, de l'embouchure du Psésouapé, en trois colonnes : celle du centre, sous son commandement en personne (5 bataillons avec 2 pièces d'artillerie et la Cavalerie), longea la côte en suivant le versant de la chaîne qui la borde; celle de droite, guidée par le Lieutenant-Colonel Soltan (3 bataillons), suivit le bord même de la mer, et la colonne de gauche, du Lieutenant-Colonel Kluki de Klugenau (4 bataillons avec 2 pièces de montagne), s'avança par les montagnes. Les montagnards ouvrirent le feu à l'approche de nos colonnes de leur position. Après avoir reconnu la disposition de l'ennemi, le Général-Major de Heymann ordonna aux tirailleurs de Sévastopol et de Bakou de se débarrasser de leurs havre-sacs et de commencer une attaque de front, tandis que le Lieutenant-Colonel de Klugenau attaquerait, avec une partie de ses troupes, le flanc de l'ennemi, qu'il ferait tourner par une autre partie de sa colonne. Les montagnards soutinrent d'abord notre premier choc dans l'aouï qui se trouvait en avant de sa position, puis ils se replièrent derrière des abatis d'arbres; attaqués aussi derrière ce retranchement, ils prirent la fuite après une résistance peu prolongée mais assez vive. A la suite de ce combat, la majeure partie d'entre eux se dirigea vers la côte, dans le but d'émigrer, tandis que la plus faible portion se retira dans les montagnes.

Notre perte, dans cette affaire, a été d'un officier subalterne (le Lieutenant Gavronsky, du régiment d'Infanterie de Sévastopol) et de 7 hommes tués et d'un officier subalterne (le Sous-Lieutenant Ivanovsky, du même régiment) et de 14 hommes blessés.

Le 19 Mars, le détachement continua, dans le même ordre, son mouvement vers le Schakhé; pendant sa marche, quelques dizaines d'Oubykhs et de Schapsougs rallièrent, à cheval, le Général de Heymann, et la masse de cavaliers indigènes qui l'escortait s'accrut de plus en plus à mesure qu'il approcha du Schakhé. A deux heures après midi du 19 Mars, le Général, escorté d'une sotnia de Cosaques et d'environ 300 cavaliers Oubykhs et Schapsougs, occupa le fort Golovine, vers lequel convergea ensuite le détachement.

Les avis des espions affirmaient que la terreur inspirée par la défaite du rassemblement Oubykh dans la journée du 18 se propagait de plus en plus au fond des montagnes. Les Oubykhs et autres tribus hostiles restées sur le versant méridional avaient perdu tout espoir de maintenir leur indépendance. La plupart d'entre eux commençaient à penser à émigrer en Turquie, et déjà un grand nombre se rassemblaient par campements sur le bord de la mer; quelques centaines de familles habitant près de la côte avaient immédiatement frété les kotchermas récemment arrivées et étaient déjà parties. Profitant de cette situation des affaires, le Général-Major de Heymann résolut de se porter rapidement en avant, afin d'occuper le point central du territoire Oubykh avant de laisser aux montagnards le temps de se reconnaître.

En conséquence, le Général fit passer les troupes sur la rive gauche du Schakhé, l'infanterie au moyen d'une passerelle et la cavalerie ainsi que les chevaux de bât, à gué, où l'on perdit 12 chevaux entraînés par la rapidité du courant; le 22, il continua sa marche vers le sud, en trois colonnes comme précédemment, et le 25 Mars il occupa l'ancien fort Navaghinsky, à l'embouchure de la Sotcha. Pendant ces quatre journées de marche, les Oubykhs ne tirèrent pas un coup de fusil contre nos troupes.

Sur les bords de la Rivière Dagomys, le Général Major de Heymann avait reçu la soumission du principal ancien des Oubykhs, le Hadji Dogamoukow, ci-devant chef des

* Les lignes de cordons du Bas-Kouban, Abadzèkhe, de la Basse-Laba et les sections de cordons de Batalpacha de Stavropol, de Protchnookop et d'Oust-Laba.

bandes d'Oubykhs, de Schapsougs et d'Abadzèkhes qu'il rassemblait pour attaquer nos lignes et nos détachements.

Ensuite, les anciens des Oubykhs, des Schapsougs, des Djighètes, et des Akhtchipskhoves se rassemblèrent, vers le 30 Mars, auprès du détachement, pour être présentés à Son Altesse Impériale le Commandant-en-chef de l'armée du Caucase et lui faire leur soumission.

Le 2 Avril, Son Altesse Impériale reçut la soumission de ces anciens, et après avoir écouté leurs demandes, elle leur donna ordre de se transporter à la côte: cet ordre s'exécute. Des masses énormes d'Oubykhs et de Schapsougs sont établis par campements sur divers points au bord de la mer, et partent pour la Turquie au fur et à mesure de l'arrivée des navires qui viennent les chercher.

Dans le courant du mois de Mars, 30,000 individus sont partis du Touapsé; environ 50,000 autres attendent leur tour d'embarquement à Anapa, Novorossiïsk, sur la Djouba et le Touapsé, et il en partira au moins encore autant des côtes des territoires Oubykh et Djighète.

C'est ainsi que la résistance des dernières et des plus opiniâtres tribus hostiles a été vaincue, grâce à la persévérance et aux fatigues inouïes des troupes du Caucase. Quoique l'on ne puisse pas affirmer que la guerre du Caucase soit complètement terminée avant que nos soldats aient parcouru tous les défilés des montagnes et en aient expulsé les derniers habitants, il est à espérer du moins que nous ne rencontrerons plus de résistance opiniâtre nulle part, et qu'en raison même de leur faiblesse numérique, les tribus restées dans les gorges des montagnes ne peuvent plus être considérées comme offrant le moindre danger pour nous.

No. 13.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received May 30.)

(Extract.)

St. Petersburg, May 23, 1864.

IT is apparent that the Russian Government have long taken an absolute resolution at any risk to remove the whole of the mountaineers still in arms from their native places. The system pursued has been for two years past to move the troops and the Cossack forts and settlements slowly but surely up the valleys which pour their waters northwards to the basin of the Kouban, dispossessing the indigenous inhabitants at every step until at last the highest fastnesses have been reached, and the people inhabiting the watershed have been pushed over into the valleys sloping southward to the Black Sea, and have carried the savage and sequestered people of those regions in masses to the coast.

The policy of Russia, though unrelenting, has not been deliberately sanguinary. There was no desire to exterminate the people; the object was to remove them. Repeated attempts have been made to negotiate a general surrender and emigration, nor have the overtures of the Russian administration been altogether unsuccessful. In three settlements extending along the southern bank of the Kouban for about 150 miles from west to east, a portion of the Schapsougs, the Bjedouchofs, and the Abadzèkhes have been colonized with some success. The Abadzèkhes alone are more than 30,000. It is an error, therefore, to suppose that all these people, or even the great majority before the last general movement, have preferred the alternative of emigrating to Turkey. To the proposals of the Russians the Oubykhs have, however, remained altogether inaccessible. When the Emperor was in the Caucasus last year he visited the frontier of that tribe, and received a deputation from them. They demanded to be left in the possession of their territory, and promised to live on terms of peace and good neighbourhood with the Russians. The Emperor, as I am told, considering their inveterate predatory habits, and the difficulty of holding them to any engagement, declined their request and gave them the choice of war, emigration to the Kouban, or emigration to Turkey. They accepted the alternative of war, and the fortune of arms having gone against them, they now throw themselves on the generosity of a Mahomedan Power rather than on that of the Russian Government. To this result the Turks have greatly contributed by the incessant encouragements which they offered at an earlier period to the emigration. They have since discovered the inconvenience attached to this course, and have, when it was too late, requested the Russian Government to delay and regulate the movement which their incitements had aided to create.

However this may be, the unanimity and precipitation with which the tribes have crowded to the shore probably took both Russians and Turks by surprise. As soon as

the Emperor was informed of the reports circulated abroad concerning the hardships and sufferings to which the emigrants were exposed, His Majesty telegraphed to the Grand Duke Michael, desiring him to send agents to the spot to inquire into the state of affairs, and to provide the means of relief. Instead of sending an agent, the Grand Duke went in person, and during the last fortnight His Imperial Highness has been on the coast. The last reports have been received from Sviatii Doush (Holy Spirit), near Gagri, and it would appear by these accounts that the distress of the Circassians on the Russian territory has been exaggerated. The Grand Duke affirms that they are in possession of live stock, that distributions of bread have been made to them, and that their sanitary condition is by no means so bad as has been represented. No epidemic disorder prevailed among them. The sufferings of the emigrants had rather been on the voyage to Turkey, and after their arrival at Trebizond, where there was a deplorable accumulation, mismanagement, and misapplication of the assistance sent by the Sultan.

The Grand Duke had asked and had received authority to call to his assistance all the Russian vessels of war in the Black Sea, and as many merchant-vessels as could be disposed of for this duty, so as to provide better means of transport for those who were still bent on leaving the country. A certain reaction, however, seemed to have commenced, and some manifested a disposition to remain and accept an establishment on Russian soil.

From the last accounts of the Russian Consul at Trebizond, it would appear that the average number of deaths at that place among the emigrants was forty per diem.

According to the information derived from the Minister of War, the whole amount of emigrants cannot exceed 100,000.

No. 14.

Lord Napier to Earl Russell.—(Received May 30.)

(Extract.)

St. Petersburg, May 24, 1864.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith, an extract of the official journal of this date,

Inclosure in No. 14.

Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of May 24, 1864.

LE "Messager d'Odessa" publie la rectification communiquée suivante :—

"Il résulte d'informations particulières reçues de la Nouvelle-Russie qu'il s'y était répandu, et principalement à Odessa, des bruits touchant de prétendus abus dont les montagnards seraient l'objet lors de leur transport en Turquie et qui seraient tolérés par les autorités du Caucase. De pareilles informations, de quelque source qu'elles proviennent, ont en tout cas leur bon côté, et les dites autorités ne manqueront assurément pas d'y porter leur attention; toutefois le mot 'tolérés' ne saurait d'aucune façon y être appliqué, d'autant plus que le public est dans l'ignorance la plus absolue des conditions dans lesquelles cette transmigration s'opère.

"Voici ces conditions : L'autorité supérieure du Caucase propose spontanément aux montagnards qui se soumettent, de deux choses l'une; ou de s'établir sur les points qui leur sont assignés sur les bords du Kouban, ou bien émigrer en Turquie, alternative dans laquelle elle leur laisse une entière liberté de choix. Jusqu'à ce jour les montagnards se transportaient en Turquie sans le moindre contrôle de la part des autorités Caucasiennes; les propriétaires des embarcations Turques entraient en pourparlers directs avec les montagnards émigrants, et les prenaient à bord sur une rive qui non seulement était soustraite à notre surveillance, mais qui n'était pas même en notre pouvoir. Conséquemment les conditions déterminant le nombre de personnes à transporter à bord d'un navire d'un tonnage donné, de même que celles relatives à l'entretien de ces personnes pendant la traversée, dépendaient uniquement des arrangements personnels faits entre les montagnards et les propriétaires des navires frétés.

"Pour démontrer jusqu'à l'évidence que les autorités Caucasiennes ne sauraient être accusées des vexations endurées par les montagnards dans leurs traversées, nous croyons devoir rapporter le fait suivant, qui dénote suffisamment la manière de voir de ces autorités dans cette affaire. Pour venir en aide aux montagnards tant pacifiques qu'hostiles, transmigant en Turquie de points déjà occupés par nous, elles leur ont

accordé le droit de recevoir certains secours pécuniaires des Commissions nommées *ad hoc*."

No. 15.

Consul Stevens to Earl Russell.—(Received June 3.)

My Lord,

Trebizond, May 19, 1864.

FRESH arrivals of Circassian emigrants continue occurring daily, and the number encamped at Akchekaleh and Saradereh yesterday was 25,000. The mortality amongst them averages from 120 to 150 per diem: 35,000 to 40,000 have been landed at Samsoon, and have infected that place to an alarming extent; as many as 500 deaths have recently occurred there in forty-eight hours. The bakers, from fear, closed their ovens, and quitted the town; for several days bread was wanting, which nearly led to an *émeute*. Dr. Barozzi has proceeded to Samsoon to the assistance of the emigrants.

A Turkish steam-frigate, with a sailing frigate in tow, and divers smaller steamers recently arrived here from Constantinople, and were ordered to the coast of Circassia to embark emigrants for Varna direct. As many as 200,000 more are reported ready to quit their country, and Russia insists upon their leaving by the end of May, old style.

The emigrants present at Trebizond are of the Oubikh tribe. They are, generally speaking, poor, and of an indolent character; they have no regard for cleanliness, which prevents the allay of disease in their ranks, and which is making such frightful havoc amongst them. They live huddled together, infecting one another; they sell the rations and clothing distributed to them by the local authorities; they sell their children for a few piastres; they disinter their dead at night to steal the calico wrappers which envelope the bodies, and then abandon the corpses in the open fields. Lately they concealed several deaths from the local authorities with a view to continue in the receipt of the rations of the deceased individuals; and one corpse was discovered hid for eleven days in one of the tents, other emigrants occupying the same covering without the slightest repugnance.

Such a miserable state of things must lead to serious disorder before long, and will undoubtedly create a furnace of infection directly the warm weather sets in. The attention of the Porte should again be revived, or Trebizond and Samsoon, two important commercial cities, will suffer considerably.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FRAS. J. STEVENS.

Papers respecting the Settlement of Circassian Emigrants in Turkey.

Presented to the House of Commons, by Command of Her Majesty, in pursuance of their Address of June 6, 1864.


MAP
REFERRED TO AT PAGE 6
OF
“PAPERS
RESPECTING THE
SETTLEMENT OF CIRCASSIAN EMIGRANTS
IN
TURKEY,”

Presented to Parliament June 7, 1864.

Presented to the House of Lords by Command of Her Majesty.
1864.

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Map
referred to in
LORD NAPIER'S
Despatch of
MAY, 10, 1864.

Map referred to at Page 6 of "Papers
respecting the Settlement of Circassian
Emigrants in Turkey," presented to
Parliament June 7, 1864.

*Presented to the House of Lords by Command of
Her Majesty. 1864.*

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